Moon Shines on Apartheid

On May 17, a new, conservative newspaper hit the streets of Washington, D.C. The first daily to take the place of the Washington Star which folded last summer, the Washington Times bills itself as the "alternative" to the well-established, "liberal" Washington Post. There is just one catch: the paper is owned, financed, and partly staffed by the Unification Church of Rev. Sun Myung Moon, and is associated with pro-apartheid interests.

Moon and his church have been the subject of great controversy over the past decade, including charges of brainwashing, illegal business practices, illegal projects to buy political influence (the most well-known being the "Koreagate" scandal of the late 1970s), and accepting money from assorted right-wing governments and industrialists. Moon is presently appealing a recent conviction for tax evasion and faces possible deportation. Moreover, Moon has chosen to ally himself with any government or group that promotes anti-communism, one of the centerpiece of his doctrine.

Consequently, it is not surprising that many members of the Times' top management have strong connections to the South African government. Leading the list is John McGoff, a 58-year-old Michigan publisher and primary American recipient of South African Department of Information "Muldergate" funds in the 1970s. The return of John McGoff and his associates to Washington in producing the Times gives Pretoria a strong, new voice in the nation's capital.

Did Rhoodie and McGoff Achieve their Goal?

In February 1974, Secretary of the South African Department of Information (DOI), Eschel Rhoodie, met with Prime Minister John Vorster, Minister of Information Connie Mulder, and General Hendrick Van den Bergh, head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), to discuss South Africa's propaganda efforts around the world. According to Rhoodie, he told Vorster and his aides, "I want you to approve, not an information asset, but a propaganda war in which no rules or regulations would count." The officials approved a plan that would spend a minimum of $73 million on more than 160 secret projects to buy politicians and media enterprises and support pro-apartheid groups around the world. When the details of this plan were eventually divulged in 1976, the ensuing scandal (dubbed "Muldergate") forced all of these South African officials to resign.

Less than one month after that planning meeting, Michigan publisher John P. McGoff met with Rhoodie and other DOI officials in South Africa. According to the official South African Erasmus Commission findings, released in December 1978 after an intensive investigation, at least $11.75 million was given to McGoff by the DOI through the South African Department of Defense to buy the Washington Star and a share in UPI Television News (UPITN), the second largest newsfilm producer in the world. McGoff offered $10 million of the money as part of his unsuccessful $25 million bid for the Star. In December 1975, after the Star deal had collapsed, he bought the Sacramento Union instead for about $6 million. He also used $1.7 million of the secret money to buy 50% interest in UPITN. Although he calls these charges "utter nonsense," McGoff remains the subject of an on-going investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, for possible violation of US securities law, and the Department of Justice, for failing to register as a foreign agent.

The surreptitious purchase of the Star would have been a propaganda coup for Pretoria. The apartheid regime viewed the influential Washington Post as "anti-South Africa," and wanted a media outlet to counterbalance it. As the Erasmus report states: "For understandable reasons such a newspaper

"Whelan and McGoff are now able to do what McGoff could not do eight years ago: counter the Washington Post."
in the heart of Washington could... do a great deal for South Africa if it had a positive attitude towards the Republic.”

When the Washington Times’ first prototype copy was published on March 1, 1982, McGoff had recently sold his share of the Sacramento Union to conservative millionaire Richard Mellon Scaife. The editor of the Union, James R. Whelan, resigned to become editor of the Washington Times, inviting John McGoff to serve on his editorial advisory board.

McGoff and Whelan are now able to do what McGoff could not do eight years ago: counter the Washington Post. As Whelan stated in March: “I really believe that our nation is at peril because we don’t have an alternative voice in the nation’s capital. I can’t remember a time when the right was adequately represented in daily print journalism here.”

“Many conservatives feel that the news coverage of the Post is actually detrimental to the nation, particularly in the effect it has on foreign policy,” add Washington Tribune reporters Mark Jenkins and Charles Paul Freund in their in-depth expose of the Washington Times and the Unification Church. “Among the Post’s worst sins, conservatives maintain, is the coverage it has featured from Africa and Central America.”

Whelan insists that the Washington Times will never be an organ of the Unification Church. “I don’t speak for the Church. The paper doesn’t speak for the Church,” claims Whelan. Whether or not this is true remains to be seen, although, significantly, over one-third of the paper’s staff are “Moonies.”

As Whelan’s official biography explains that he worked as a reporter all over Latin America for a variety of newspapers and news agencies for twenty years before coming to Panax. In April 1961, he was assigned to “a special, secret UPI team in Miami organized to cover the Bay of Pigs invasion.”

His career also included a two-year stint in the late 1960s with the Western Hemisphere division of International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), a corporation known for its connections with the CIA in Latin America. When the Washington Tribune asked executive editor Smith Hempstone about suggestions that Whelan has the taint of the CIA, Hempstone replied, “So what? I thought they were on our side.”

Smith Hempstone, executive editor. Hempstone is known as the long-time associate editor of the Washington Star. He is also a long-time apologist for South African apartheid and Ian Smith’s former regime in Rhodesia.

Hempstone recently wrote a laudatory article on Jonas Savimbi in the February 1981 issue of Reader’s Digest after traveling with South Africa-backed UNITA for ten days in southern Angola. Entitled, “Angola: Where the West Can Still Win,” the article states: “If ever there is a place and a time in which the lengthening string of communist victories and Western defeats is to be ended, that place could be Angola and the time 1981.”

Hempstone began promoting South Africa and US intervention in Africa in early issues of the Washington Times. In an April 7 column, he wrote that what the Reagan Administration “ought to do is to retaliate against the Kremlin by making matters extremely unpleasant for the Russians and the Cubans by vigorously supporting viable nationalist guerrilla movements in places such as Angola and Ethiopia, Cambodia and Afghanistan.” In his May 20 column entitled, “South Africa: Slow to Change, but Modest Reform Happening,” Hempstone wrote: “Blacks now dine in swank Johannesburg restaurants once as pristinely white as Washington’s were 30 years ago. Blacks receive equal pay for equal work, and can aspire to any job in industry.”

Hempstone failed to mention the upsurge in arrests of trade unionists and church activists, the mass removals of the squatters near Cape Town, the continued military occupation of Namibia, and the invasion of Angola in his complimentary article.

Carlyle Reed, associate publisher and general manager. Reed published the conservative Sacramento Union from 1966 to 1974, before McGoff bought it with Muldergate money.
Reed was one of fifteen Americans who participated in a delegation led by South African agent, Andrew Hatcher, to Transkei's "independence" ceremonies in 1976, despite the objections of then-President Gerald Ford.


- **Edward King**, international and Capitol Hill reporter, **Cleto Di Giovanni**, editorial writer, and **Jeremiah O'Leary**, White House correspondent. Each has strong ties to the intelligence community. King and Di Giovanni were both CIA officers in Latin America. O'Leary left the National Security Council as "special assistant" to William Clark to work at the *Times*. Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act indicate that former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover frequently used O'Leary to promote the Bureau's perspective at the *Washington Star*.

- **William Rusher**, member of the editorial advisory board. Publisher of the very conservative *National Review* since 1955, Rusher also has had a long association with white minority regimes in Africa. In the mid-sixties, Rusher co-chaired the rightist American African Affairs Association (AAAA) with Max Yergan. It was revealed in 1966 that AAAA and the Office of Rhodesian Affairs in Washington collaborated very closely, to the point that they used the same postage meter. More recently, AAAA was revealed to be a recipient of Muldergate money—$13,000 in 1978-79 alone. According to the *Washington Post*, Rusher's first trip to South Africa in 1962 was at the expense of the South African government's Information Service, and a later, week-long trip in October, 1976 was totally subsidized by the pro-apartheid South Africa Foundation. Rusher wrote a June 1 column for the *Washington Times* entitled, "South Africa Unable to Please its Critics," claiming "it is obvious that in the long run the coloureds and Asians have as much to lose as the whites from a system of one-man-one-vote in a unitary state."

- **Alan C. Brownfeld**, although not on the staff, Brownfeld is a frequent column contributor. Brownfeld also writes for *Moonie* publications. According to Alan Crawford's authoritative book, *Thunder on the Right*, Brownfeld once serviced "a number of South African newspapers as a Washington correspondent," including the Department of Information-financed *To The Point*. He also attended the Transkei's "independence" ceremonies in 1976, writing for the *Phoenix Gazette*, "[T]he fact must not be forgotten that both Rhodesia and South Africa are more free than any of the black states surrounding them—for both blacks and whites. In addition, they are an intrinsic part of the Western world and are strategically located both geographically and with regard to resources. It is a policy of suicide to encourage their destruction and barbarization." In a May 17 column in the *Washington Times*, Brownfeld attacked UN support for the liberation movements.

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**Is There a Link?**

There is no conclusive evidence that the South African government has actually put money into the Washington "Moonie" paper. However, four facts are worth noting:


- *Trib* publisher Leonard Saffir states that Richard M. Scaife and Zoffer separately suggested he speak to McGoff as a possible financial contributor. "Saffir says Zoffer told him that the South African government wanted a stake in the paper (South African sources confirm this), and that it was prepared to disguise its involvement," writes Rothmyer. "He quotes Zoffer as saying, 'We have a way—John McGoff. He will make the actual investment.' (Zoffer in rebuttal, calls Saffir's statement 'total nonsense.') . . . McGoff did not pursue the matter, however, and *The Trib*, which began publishing in January 1978, folded three months later.

- At the height of the Muldergate scandal in December 1978, Prime Minister PW Botha said that the South African government would continue to fund secret projects despite the furor over Muldergate. "We are sick and tired of being represented as thugs," he said. A special government committee recommended that 56 of the 138 secret projects continue.

- According to the Erasmus report, McGoff and Rhoodie determined that McGoff would pay back a portion of the original $11.75 million since he had not used it all for agreed upon projects. Although some of the money was returned, the report states that, "$5,380,000 of the debt was written off." But SEC investigators have indicated that, in fact, about $2 million went to buy more than 400,000 shares of Panax in 1977 so that (continued on page 8)
Reagan’s Nuclear Carrot

“We can ascribe our degree of advancement today in large measure to the training and assistance so willingly provided by the United States.”

—A.I. Roux, President of the South African Atomic Energy Board

On September 22, 1979, a US Vela satellite detected an intense double flash of light in the South Atlantic off the coast of South Africa. Subsequent investigations have indicated that the double flash was an atomic explosion. Many charge South Africa with detonating the device, citing the vast degree of nuclear sophistication that Pretoria has achieved during more than two decades of collaboration with the United States.

Ironically, the history of US-South Africa nuclear cooperation dates back to the “Atoms for Peace” program of the 1950s under which the United States supplied Pretoria with its first reactor, Safari I, and the highly enriched uranium to fuel it. Since that time, the United States has offered South Africa key nuclear materials, technology, and expertise.

In 1975, US public outcry forced Washington to curtail its assistance to the South African regime. Now, however, the Reagan Administration appears ready to renew US assistance to Pretoria’s nuclear program in exchange for a South African settlement on Namibia. Already the administration has allowed an increase in sales of nuclear materials to South Africa. At the top of Pretoria’s wish list, however, is the resumption of enriched uranium exports for Koeberg, South Africa’s first commercial reactor.

The issue of enriched uranium supply arose early in Reagan’s administration when South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha came to Washington for talks in mid-May 1981. Of immediate concern to Pretoria was a May 31, 1981 deadline by which South Africa would have to supply uranium ore to the United States for enrichment under the terms of a 1974 contract. South Africa had been withholding the uranium because it was unsure if the US would fulfill its obligation to enrich the yellowcake and ship it to France for fuel rod production. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), passed by Congress in 1978, prohibits the export of nuclear fuel and sensitive nuclear materials to nations which, like South Africa, have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or agreed to full scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, on their nuclear facilities to prevent military use. The South Africans argue that they want to protect the “secret” nozzle technique used in their enrichment plant, yet with a history of apparent nuclear testing and a reactor which will produce 200 kg of plutonium annually, Pretoria may be protecting much more.

At the urging of the State Department, the Department of Energy (DOE) suspended the penalty provisions for late delivery of the raw uranium for 90 days “in order to foster better relations with South Africa.” South Africa, thinking, perhaps, that the Reagan Administration would consent to resume enriched fuel shipments, met the new deadline on August 30.

During his visit, Botha also left a secret memorandum with former Secretary of State Alexander Haig. The document stressed the importance of resuming enriched uranium exports for the Koeberg reactor, noting that South Africa stood to lose $1.3 million for each day the March 1982 start-up date was delayed. (Koeberg’s start-up date has apparently been rescheduled for late 1982 or early 1983.) In addition, the memorandum stated that if the Reagan Administration could not circumvent the NNPA to provide Koeberg’s fuel, it should notify the French government that it would not object to France supplying the fuel. This latter stipulation may well have proven essential to Pretoria’s eventual procurement of the fuel.

US Firms Circumvent Law

In late October, Pretoria obtained the necessary amount of enriched uranium in time for Koeberg’s loading. The Swiss Kaiseraugst reactor had an excess of enriched uranium because of political and ecological battles in Switzerland. Two US firms, Edlow International and SWUCO, both based in the Washington, D.C. area, served as brokers by buying the excess uranium and turning it over to two European enrichers, one of them being Eurodif, a joint venture between France, Italy, Iran, Spain, and Belgium. The French then converted the enriched uranium into fuel rods and sent them to South Africa.

Edlow and SWUCO were not acting illegally as the NNPA does not restrict brokering activities of US companies. However, some members of Congress, angry that a US corporation undercut stated US non-proliferation policy, have introduced legislation to restrict brokering activities of companies like Edlow International. HR 531B, S 2505, introduced by Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), and Rep. Richard Ottinger (D-NY), and HR 3513, introduced by Reps. Jonathan Bingham (D-NY) and Morris Udall (D-AZ), are both designed to close certain loopholes in existing non-proliferation law.

The Reagan Administration was reportedly angry that South Africa had obtained the Koeberg fuel because the US was ostensively using the possible resumption of the fuel supply as a lever to get Pretoria to accept full scope safeguards. Nucleonics Week, however, reported on November 26 that “The US is not overly disturbed by the Escom [Electricity Supply Commission] enriched uranium purchase . . . .” State Department officials may well have urged the French government to proceed with the transaction as the South Africans suggested in the May 1981 memorandum, just as Under Secretary of State James Malone had earlier encouraged France to supply fuel for the Indian Tarapur reactor, despite the fact that India has exploded a nuclear device. Rather than make a controversial push for Congressional resumption of the enriched uranium supply, the Reagan Administration could simply have used its influence to get South Africa the
fuel from Europe.
Pretoria's procurement of the fuel does not resolve the issue, though. Most reports indicate the secret shipment consisted of approximately 75 tons of fuel, enough for the loading of Koeberg I, yet Pretoria still needs more. Transnuclear, Inc., a company based in Falls Church, Virginia, recently applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for export of enriched uranium to South Africa for the reloading of Koeberg I. South African officials have indicated they will need additional enriched uranium for Koeberg I and II. Thus the Reagan Administration still has the opportunity to renew the fuel shipments, and the South Africans will no doubt continue to press the issue during the Namibia negotiations.

Koeberg under construction
Photo: South Africa Digest

Officials Seek More Lenient Policy

The autumn of 1981 brought another significant development in the US-South Africa nuclear relationship. On October 11, the Washington Post reported on another leaked State Department document, this one authored by Under Secretary James Malone, the man charged with handling the State Department's nuclear policy. Malone proposed four changes in the Reagan Administration's nuclear policy:

- The transfer of all export licensing functions from the NRC to the State Department. The NRC is known to be the most stringent of all US government agencies on proliferation matters. By transferring authority to the State Department, Malone wanted political considerations to have priority over proliferation concerns.
- The repeal of current provisions of US law that cut off nuclear exports to countries developing atomic weapons for the first time.
- The weakening of current laws that require inspection of all nuclear facilities in order for a country to receive US nuclear materials.
- The exclusion from the NNPA of nuclear contracts made with countries prior to the law's passage in 1978.

Although Malone's recommendations apply to other countries as well, they seem to especially fit the case of South Africa, a country developing nuclear weapons for the first time with a contract for fuel supply signed four years before the NNPA's passage.

Moreover, Malone recommended weakening nuclear facility inspection procedures just days before a Reagan Administration-appointed team of nuclear scientists began negotiating with South African officials to find a less rigorous program for monitoring South Africa's nuclear facilities.

Paul Van Slambrouck of the Christian Science Monitor reported that the talks examined ways to put the enrichment facility under "some form of inspection that would satisfy the US and also give Pretoria assurances its enrichment technique would be protected," without requiring Pretoria to sign the NPT. Pretoria stated clearly in the May 1981 memorandum that "South Africa cannot in the interest of its own security sign the NPT and thus set the minds of its would-be attackers at rest." South African officials have never admitted or denied possessing nuclear weapons and seem content to keep the world guessing as to the regime's exact nuclear weapons capacity. Although Malone's recommendations have not yet become official US policy, neither has the Reagan Administration rejected them.

Reagan Increases Nuclear Assistance

The United States presently provides other forms of nuclear assistance to South Africa, not restricted by the NNPA:

- The Reagan Administration has permitted an increase in nuclear sales to South Africa. In a letter to Senator Charles Percy (R-IL), Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige wrote, "[T]his Administration has adopted a more flexible policy with respect to approvals of exports of dual-use commodities and other material and equipment which have nuclear-related uses in areas such as health and safety activities." Baldrige noted that since May 1980, five export licenses for purchases for South Africa's nuclear program had been approved.

One such sale was a Control Data Cyber 170/750 computer to the state-controlled Council on Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), approved by the Commerce Department on March 26. The application to export this highly sophisticated computer had been held up for over fourteen months by the interagency Subgroup on Nuclear Export Control (SNEC) on the grounds that the computer would greatly aid Pretoria's nuclear weapons program and cryptography capabilities.

Another sale pending Commerce Department approval is the export of 95 grams of helium-three to South Africa. Helium-three, when converted into tritium, becomes an

(continued on page 8)

Investment Bills Advance


The first bill, HR 3597, introduced by Rep. William Gray (D-PA) would prohibit any new corporate investment in South Africa with penalties of up to $1 million in fines and ten years in jail for violations.

The second bill, HR 3006, introduced by Rep. Steve Solarz (D-NY), is more complicated and controversial. It would ban the import of South African Krugerrands, prohibit any new bank loans to South Africa, and require adherence to specific fair employment principles for corporations investing in South Africa. Some critics of the Solarz bill compare its fair labor code to the Sullivan Principles (although, unlike the Sullivan code, the bill includes sanctions against corporations which fail to comply), arguing that such codes only legitimize US corporate investment in South Africa.

The Gray and Solarz bills may not be considered by the full House Foreign Affairs Committee, however. Some supporters do not want the bills brought before the committee unless they have enough support to pass. Others predict that the committee will pass the legislation only in a considerably weakened form. Nevertheless, the subcommittees' action provides substantial encouragement to the campaign to halt US investment in South Africa.
Namibian Talks: Diplomacy or Deception?

State Department officials are again openly optimistic that a plan for Namibian independence consistent with UN Resolution 435 may be developed and implemented as early as next spring. A frenzy of diplomatic discussions throughout the past two months have supposedly diminished South African intransigence on several key issues. Pretoria now appears willing to set aside its long-standing disputes concerning UN impartiality, the size and composition of the UN election and transition monitoring forces, and establishment of a demilitarized zone along the Angolan-Namibian border. In addition, South Africa has indicated that it may accept substantial modifications in the confusing "two-track" election system proposed by the Western Contact Group earlier this year, but flatly rejected by SWAPO and the Frontline states.

Despite the State Department’s elation, the Contact Group remains unable to conclude Phase I of the negotiations. Skeptics point out that South Africa has really only agreed to abide by conditions which they originally accepted in 1978—and later refused. SWAPO officials note that the supposed “concessions” portend nothing more than the potential dissipation of various obstacles thrown up by South Africa and the Contact Group earlier in the process; they in no way reflect interest in genuine Namibian independence. Why does Pretoria suddenly appear so cooperative?

State Department officials maintain that South Africa is ready to move for financial and political reasons. Military occupation of Namibia is purportedly too expensive to continue. Furthermore, Prime Minister P.W. Botha, under attack from hard-liners, wishes to coalesce a “liberal” base of support around this issue, moving it permanently off the agenda. This official explanation lacks credibility. The war in Namibia has always placed enormous demands upon Pretoria’s coffers, but expenditures have been more than offset by the bounty of minerals which South Africa has reaped from the territory. South Africa is not likely to surrender these resources unless it is confident that it can maintain its economic hegemony without the expense of a military occupation.

Furthermore, South Africa’s internal political situation does not seem conducive to a settlement. Given the size and growing strength of the South African right-wing, it seems improbable that Botha would risk deepening the rift within the party and fueling the opposition’s claims that he is “soft on terrorism.”

Most important, however, relinquishment of Namibia would eliminate the last of the protective cordon that South Africa has long maintained around itself, leaving it to stand alone as the last bastion of white colonialism on the continent. Such a position is untenable in the regime’s eyes; in order for Pretoria to move suddenly in this direction, it must see substantial advantage in doing so.

Such advantages may indeed be surfacing in several areas. The Reagan Administration, openly sympathetic to South African demands for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, appears to be pressuring Luanda to acquiesce. Citing its so-called “concessions,” Pretoria has now labelled Cuban troops as the major obstacle to a settlement.

In June, special envoy Vernon Walters and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Wisner, Jr. toured Southern African capitals, holding a series of talks with government officials. According to State Department sources, the subject of Cuban withdrawal was “definitely on the agenda.” Although Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge has insisted that the matter of the troops not be tied to Namibian negotiations, the US government continues to dangle the carrots of recognition and aid in front of Angola, while South Africa offers glimpses of a new stick by threatening to establish a secessionist state in southern Angola under UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi if the Cubans stay.

South Africa may also be hoping to capitalize upon the US government’s eager (but largely unsuccessful) efforts to bolster Pretoria’s international image by putting SWAPO on the defensive. Hearings sponsored by Jeremiah Denton this spring sought to portray SWAPO as a “terrorist” organization. More recently, the State Department refused for several days to grant a re-entry visa to SWAPO’s UN observer, Theo Ben Gurirab, because his name appeared on a list of persons that the Reagan Administration wished to bar from the country during the UN Special Session on Disarmament. US press reports too have increasingly criticized SWAPO for obstructing the negotiations. Just as the Western Contact Group’s election plan was designed to force SWAPO objections (and, hence, create the illusion that SWAPO was delaying negotiations), so, too, the present pronouncements may be contrived to saddle SWAPO with the responsibility for the future of the negotiations. SWAPO will now feel pressure to respond to South Africa’s hollow “concessions” by yielding on more substantial points. Moreover, Walters and Wisner’s tour seemed designed to coax even the Frontline states into being a part of that pressure, thus driving a wedge between SWAPO and its traditional supporters.

In addition, South Africa may be receiving other concealed incentives from the Reagan Administration. Both Congress and the executive branch are currently considering a number of policy issues concerning South Africa: nuclear collaboration, military cooperation, export controls, etc. US-South African talks offer the opportunity for the administration to commit itself to greater strategic cooperation in exchange for a Namibian settlement.

Thus, if the multi-lateral Namibian talks presently underway in New York produce any noteworthy agreements, it will not be because South Africa has sacrificed any of its own interests, but rather because the US has found less obvious methods of satisfying those interests.
NEWSBRIEFS

New Consulates Proliferate

In its continuing efforts to polish its image, bolster relations with the US, and gain international recognition of apartheid, the South African government, with the approval of the State Department, will be opening three more honorary consulates in the US, to be located in Cleveland, Denver, and Seattle. These three bring the number of South African honorary consulates in the US up to ten, in addition to the five official consulates. The South Africans may also seek approval for an honorary consulate in Miami or Atlanta.

Honorary consulates operate on a part-time basis, often with American directors. Like South Africa's official consulates, the honoraries function primarily to promote and protect business relations between the US and South Africa. Moreover, the South Africans use these footholds to disseminate pro-apartheid propaganda, exert political influence, and counter anti-apartheid activities.

South Africa's ongoing effort to establish an honorary consulate in Pittsburgh in the spring of 1982 has met with stiff opposition. "Pittsburghers Against Apartheid," a coalition of labor, church, and civil rights groups, has organized continuing demonstrations since the consulate's installation on March 9 and has thus far forced its relocation from the center to the outskirts of Pittsburgh's downtown area.

Expanding South African representation in the US reflects the intensification of US-South African rapprochement under the Reagan Administration. As has been shown in Pittsburgh and other cities, however, the proliferation of honorary consulates also provides an important area of focus for local anti-apartheid organizations.

New Boys at State

The State Department recently hired two new architects of Southern African policy: Frank Wisner, Jr. and Robert Cabelli. Wisner, the son of CIA dirty-tricks mastermind, Frank Wisner, Sr., was appointed deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, replacing Lannon Walker.

Wisner joined the State Department in 1961. After a brief stint in Algiers, he served in several capacities in Vietnam, including a year as senior advisor to the province of Tuyen Duc during 1968. In 1975, Wisner was appointed special assistant to Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco and had an active hand in forming Southern African policy in the Kissinger State Department. The following year, he was named director of the Office of Southern African Affairs.

As the US ambassador to Zambia from August 1979 to April 1982, Wisner remained a key figure in US diplomacy in Southern Africa during negotiations for Zimbabwean independence. Recently, he represented the US at Maputo's Frontline state summit meeting, where he lobbied for the Contact Group's Namibian election scheme.

Robert Cabelli, the new special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, also has a long history of ties with Southern Africa. A former employee of Goldfields, a South African mining firm, Cabelli has many high-ranking South African friends, including Leo Conradie, the second-in-command of South Africa's UN mission.

Cabelli became involved with the State Department several years ago when the agency contracted with him for an analysis of the effectiveness of the anti-apartheid divestment movement. He is expected to promote US trade and investment in Southern Africa, particularly in Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

ANC Sentences Commuted

On June 3, 1982, after a month of intense international pressure, the South African government granted clemency to three ANC members who had been convicted and sentenced to death in 1980 for high treason under South Africa's vicious Terrorism Act. Ncimbithi Lubisi, Petrus Mashigo and Naphtali Manana were sentenced by the Pretoria Supreme Court for their part in the January 1980 attack on a police station in Lebowa. This is the first time the apartheid regime has imposed the death sentence for a strictly political "crime" involving no loss of life. On April 7, the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein rejected appeals against the death sentences, leaving a clemency petition to the State President as the sole avenue of redress.

International pressure generated by the ANC in support of their three members was overwhelming, and a prime factor in Pretoria's decision for clemency. The UN Security Council, for example, despite vigorous debate by the US, unanimously passed Resolution 503 on April 9, urging South Africa to commute the death sentences. The debate concerned the US on changes in the resolution, including the removal of a reference to the three as patriots and the demand that they be freed. Despite acquiescence to US demands, the resolution was nevertheless impressive as it was the first time the Security Council had adopted a resolution calling for clemency for those convicted under South Africa's dreaded security laws, and the first time the Reagan Administration voted against South Africa at the UN.

Although the death sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment, the international community has struck yet another blow at the South African government and quelled the setting of a dangerous precedent by the regime to legally murder those on trial for political crimes.

SUMMER 1982

7
Moon Shines on Apartheid

(continued from page 3)

McGoff would gain controlling interest (approximately 40%). Panax dissolved in 1981, supplying McGoff with large amounts of cash; McGoff’s use of the other $3 million remains a mystery. Since it is doubtful that the South African government can write off over $5 million, it is possible an agreement was reached that this money be used for future news outlets when the opportunity arose.

• Although the Unification Church is a multi-million dollar business empire, the Washington Times, like most of Moon’s business enterprises, is a money-losing operation. The costs of running the paper, which accepts no advertising as of yet, are estimated at up to $12 million to date. Moon’s New York paper, News World, loses a reported $3 million yearly, according to Linda Pine, former controller for two News World subsidiaries.

Moon is not above accepting help from friendly governments to run his enterprises. Bo Hi Pak, president of News World Communications, Inc., the parent company to the Washington Times, admitted in testimony before Donald Fraser’s International Organizations Subcommittee in 1978 that he received cash payments from the Korean CIA, although he said he was only a conduit for funds to reimburse others for anti-communist activities. In addition, the Latin America Weekly Report disclosed on May 18, 1980 that the editor of Moon’s Spanish-language newspaper in New York, Noticias del Mundo, is Antonio Rodriguez Carmona, an Argentine, who is working unpaid for Noticias while on the payroll of Telam, the official Argentine news agency. Two of his colleagues at Noticias, also unpaid, are the press consultant of the Uruguayan public relations directorate, Dinarp, and the editor of the Buenos Aires newspaper, Cronica. At the April 22, 1980 reception celebrating Noticias’ establishment, the military governments of Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay were “heavily represented.”

The Washington Times is one of Moon’s many projects to gain legitimacy. It is also a project the South African government may be trying to exploit. A conservative, daily newspaper in the nation’s capital has wide potential influence in the Congress and the executive branch, particularly in the Reagan Administration. “Moonies” and South Africa supporters with press credentials will now be able to infiltrate many more institutions to gain information. The US CIA is well-known for its use of journalists in covert operations. In addition, as Moon and his cult move more into the Third World, as they have in recent years, it is important to note governments with which they choose to ally themselves. Many Africans have already discovered that this friend of South Africa’s is no friend of theirs. ■

Reagan’s Nuclear Carrot (continued from page 5)

important component in thermonuclear weapons. In a hearing before his Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes, Senator Percy protested the sale, saying, “I can see no justification for providing any thermonuclear weapon material to a nation like South Africa,” a “nuclear renegade that could make weapons, if it so chooses.”

• The US periodically trains South African nuclear technicians at US government facilities, including at least 25 last year. US Atomic Energy Commission files show that from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, about 88 South Africans were trained in the US in various aspects of nuclear technology.

• Despite numerous resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly against doing so, the United States continues to import South African and Namibian raw uranium. In 1980, the US imported 546,873 kg of raw uranium directly from South Africa for domestic use and for export to other countries, plus massive quantities more through third party countries. That amount more than doubled in 1981. The NRC makes no distinction between uranium coming from Namibia and uranium coming from South Africa, thus, in a sense, legitimizing South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia, in direct violation of UN Decree Number One.

Americans are mobilizing against this increased nuclear assistance to South Africa. Teach-ins and film showings have been held in numerous cities across the nation in conjunction with the two weeks of national anti-apartheid action in late March and the UN Special Session on Disarmament in June. Activists in Baltimore have organized to try to stop South African uranium imports into their port. On Capitol Hill, members of Congress are considering a bill to prohibit further nuclear exports to Pretoria or training of South Africans in nuclear technology in the US. Nine national organizations and eleven members of Congress have filed a joint intervention at the NRC to oppose Transnuclear Inc.’s requested export of enriched uranium to South Africa. With such heightened anti-nuclear feeling prevalent throughout the country, the Reagan Administration will have to think twice before it exports enriched uranium or other sensitive nuclear materials to the apartheid regime. ■

NEW RESOURCES

Free Namibian available from Washington Office on Africa. Special resource on Namibia, newly updated. $6.50 each for 1-10; $1.50 each for 11-50; 15¢ each for over 50 copies; plus postage.

Automating Apartheid, available from American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. 60 pp., $3.50. US high technology exports to South Africa are detailed.


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