NEW AFRICAN REALITIES DEMAND RHODESIAN SANCTIONS
NEW REALITIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
DEMAND RENEWED SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

1975 marks perhaps the last moment in which the United States can demonstrate that it supports majority rule in Rhodesia by action rather than by mere lip service. The sanctions-breaking Byrd Amendment has been on the books now for three-and-a-half years. Its effect in damaging the reputation of the United States would be hard to exaggerate.

As majority rule comes closer to reality, as it now becomes more clearly evident that the Rhodesian regime is doomed as well as morally bankrupt, the opportunity for the United States to re-establish its credibility will exist for only a little time longer.

We therefore urge the Congress to act quickly to pass HR 1287, to renew United States compliance with United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia.

1. During the last year, a dramatic shift in the power relations in southern Africa has demonstrated that majority rule will soon come to Rhodesia. After twelve years of protracted fighting, Portugal opened negotiations with the liberation movements in 1974 and provisional governments were established in Mozambique and Angola. Mozambique, with which Rhodesia shares its 700-mile eastern border, became independent on June 25; Angola, to the west of Rhodesia, will follow on November 11.

When Portuguese colonialism collapsed, black Rhodesians began to demand with new intensity: "If Africans in Mozambique and Angola have succeeded in gaining independence, why shouldn't we?"

Independent Mozambique represents concrete as well as psychological support for the struggle in Rhodesia. With help from British Commonwealth countries, newly independent Mozambique is prepared to cut off Rhodesia's sanctions-breaking traffic through Biera and Lourenco Marques.

Furthermore, Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa has recognized that the new situation demands that Rhodesia grant majority rule soon in order to achieve "detente" in the area. To consolidate its own position, South Africa seems to be prepared to withdraw its para-military forces from Rhodesia and to lessen its economic support if the Rhodesian Front regime remains recalcitrant.

Meanwhile, the competing African nationalist groups of Zimbabwe (the African name for Rhodesia) have been working to achieve a united front. On December 17, the four major movements (ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and ANC) signed a declaration of unity that they would struggle together for the liberation of Zimbabwe. This united front approach has the full backing of the Organization of African Unity. The OAU Council of Ministers declared on April 10: "While the OAU accepts the task of helping in genuine negotiations in order to facilitate the transfer of power to the African majority, it must remain absolutely vigilant and undertake the necessary preparations for the intensification of the armed struggle should a peaceful solution in the Zimbabwe conflict be blocked."
2. The purpose of sanctions against Rhodesia is to avoid the human suffering and bloodshed of war by imposing economic isolation on a regime which has systematically violated the fundamental human rights of 95% of its population. Such gross violations are based on theories of racial superiority and a right to dominate, which is alien to accepted international standards of law and right conduct. Massive injustice on this scale is a threat to the peace. We cite only a few of many instances:

Last year the Rhodesian regime forcibly moved over 60,000 Africans into resettlement camps. Dr. Rosalie Johnson, an American Methodist missionary who was recently expelled from Rhodesia, described how these so-called "protected villages" are constructed: "They just put barbed wire around an area and shove people inside. There's no latrine, no water,... and no health facilities." The "protected villages" scheme in Rhodesia is proving to be as ruthless and futile as the "strategic hamlets" in Vietnam.

Africans whose villages have been left intact are faced with utter inequality in land and resources. The Rhodesian Constitution adopted in 1970 established that the 96% African population could live on only 50% of the land, while an "equal" portion - including the most fertile land and mineral resources - was reserved for the 4% white population.

A distinguished group of Christian leaders recently prepared a report on the brutality of the minority regime which stated: "Our investigation points to ... the deliberate use of illegal and inhumane acts of force when questioning civilians, even those against whom there is no prior evidence of complicity with the enemy." More than 200 political prisoners are still in jail, despite an agreement from the Smith regime in December that they would be released.

Ninety percent of urban African workers earn less than the Poverty Datum Line, the theoretical minimum necessary to keep body and soul together. In the mining industry (from which chrome and nickel now exported to the United States are extracted), average earnings for black workers in 1972 were $48 per month compared with $655 for whites, a disparity of one to thirteen.

The majority African population in Rhodesia faces severe repression, exploitation and deprivation, yet there is no legal way they can effect change. Only 7,400 Africans, out of a total African population of 5,590,000 - 13/100 of one percent - are permitted to vote.

James Blake, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said on February 26, "For the United States to fail to pass the repeal bill at this time would be to reinforce the Smith regime in its recalcitrance. Retention of the amendment would encourage the minority Rhodesian regime to try to hold on to an unjust, unrealistic and increasingly dangerous way of life."

3. If there is to be a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, sanctions can supply the continued pressure on the Rhodesian Front regime that will be needed. The opponents of sanctions would have us believe that reimposition of sanctions would upset the delicate negotiations of "detente." On the contrary, President Kaunda of Zambia, a leading proponent of "detente", in a speech at the White House on April 19, expressed his dismay that the United States is not supporting majority rule and genuine peace in southern Africa. He pointedly warned that if the U.S. does not change its policies in southern Africa "it will find itself with the minorities against the majorities as it has in Vietnam and Cambodia."
It is naive to suppose that Rhodesian "Prime Minister" Ian Smith will on his own initiative grant majority rule in Rhodesia. He has repeatedly shown by both his words and his actions that he will not come to an acceptable settlement without outside pressure. In a May 12 interview on BBC, Smith stated that he could not see African majority rule in his lifetime. Since he started negotiations with African nationalists in late 1974, he has detained their leaders and restricted their political activities. On March 4, the regime detained the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, President of the former Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and in May, they arrested the Rev. Canaan Banana, the African National Council representative to the United States and the United Nations.

The few concessions Smith has made have all been in response to outside pressure. It was South Africa which forced Smith to open negotiations with African nationalist leaders in December. Shortly thereafter, South Africa announced that it would withdraw 2,500 para-military South African troops from Rhodesia. Once more, in March it was South African pressure which forced Smith to release Rev. Sithole only a few days after his detention.

4. Sanctions can now be an especially effective non-violent tool in achieving a settlement in Rhodesia, which is facing a seriously deteriorating economy and increasingly hostile borders. The April 25 Johannesburg Star reported that "evidence is mounting that Rhodesia is facing its worst economic crisis since UDI /the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965/... The most crucial factor appears to be the critical shortage of foreign exchange... If the full extent of the crisis were reported, the Rhodesian government's political bargaining position on the current debate exercise could be seriously weakened."

In 1974, exports of chrome, ferrochrome and nickel to the United States brought $18.9 million in foreign exchange to Rhodesia. Total earnings resulting from the sanctions-breaking Byrd Amendment since 1972 have been over $57 million. The repeal bill will end this source of support to the illegal Smith regime. Furthermore, an amendment added to the bill by the Subcommittee on International Organizations, providing that the Treasury Department must receive certification for any steel mill product imported into the U.S. to indicate that it contains no material of Rhodesian origin, could make international sanctions more effective by encouraging stricter compliance by other countries.

Land-locked Rhodesia will soon lose its outlet to the sea by way of Mozambique, through which approximately 80% of Rhodesia's trade now passes. This will leave Rhodesia with no outlet except South Africa, and South Africa is unable, and increasingly unwilling, to be Rhodesia's sole sanctions-buster. It would be absurd for the United States, with its history of opposition to racism and colonialism, to lag behind openly racist South Africa in putting pressure on the Smith regime to reach a settlement.

5. Rhodesian imports have not been crucial to our defense or our economy, and they can be replaced by supplies which are now in our national stockpile or can be obtained from other foreign suppliers. During calendar year 1974 the United States imported the following percentages of its national consumption of chromium products from Rhodesia: 10.2% of high-carbon ferrochrome; 2.9% of low-carbon ferrochrome; and 7.4% of metallurgical grade chrome ore.
The U.S. national stockpile contains enough metallurgical grade chrome ore to supply all domestic needs for 45 months if not a single tone of chrome were to be imported. Using only the stockpile grade material available, the U.S. could compensate for loss of Rhodesian material over the following periods:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chromite (46% +)</td>
<td>1,953,000 short tons, gross</td>
<td>51.9 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-carbon ferrochrome</td>
<td>402,000</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-carbon ferrochrome</td>
<td>299,000</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Releases from these reserves would not endanger national security. On July 20, 1973 Deputy Secretary of Defense W. P. Clements, Jr. wrote to Congressman Donald Fraser: "... the metallurgical grade chromite needed by industry to support the Defense Department's steel requirements during the first year of a war amounts to 128,300 short tons, or 2.3% of the quantity held in the stockpile inventory as of 31 December, 1972."

Even if the U.S. did not replace the 7.4% of its metallurgical grade ore which it now gets from Rhodesia by releases from the stockpile but instead turned to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union's market share would still be well within the boundaries of the period 1970-74.

In addition, technological advances of recent years have drastically decreased the importance of supplies of metallurgical grade ore from Rhodesia as well as from the Soviet Union. As the Council on International Economic Policy pointed out in late 1974:

"Recent technological advances have reduced U.S. dependence on the USSR and Rhodesia for metallurgical grade chromium. Processes have been developed which permit the use of South African chemical grade ores in metallurgical applications opening up vast reserves."

Alternative foreign suppliers are also now in a much better position to supply U.S. needs for ferrochrome because of the worldwide decline in demand from stainless steel manufacturers. 1974 figures for imports of processed chrome ores show that imports of ferrochrome from Yugoslavia increased fivefold to a level of 20,786 tons while Brazilian ferrochrome imports rose by 45%.

6. Reimposition of sanctions will not have a substantial effect on the price of stainless steel or threaten jobs in the American steel industry. The price of materials is a matter of concern in any period of inflation. Like all other commodities, chrome products are subject to the laws of supply and demand. It is highly unlikely that chrome prices can be artificially fixed by means of monopolization or cartelization, even if Rhodesia is excluded from the market due to the reimposition of sanctions.

In fact, chrome ore cost is a relatively small part of the cost of stainless steel. The effect of even a major shift in the price of chrome and ferrochrome (which we do not anticipate as a result of the reimposition of sanctions) would not be substantial. According to the testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs of February 26, 1974:

"It has been estimated that a doubling of the price of chromite and ferrochrome would raise the price of stainless steel by six percent
and ten percent respectively. It is doubtful, however, that a cut-back in chromite and ferrochrome deliveries from Rhodesia, amounting to about 12 percent of our imported chromium content, will translate into a doubling of chrome prices, especially in the present softening economic situation."

Claims by representatives of the steel industry that reimposition of sanctions will result in tremendous job losses in the U.S. steel industry are completely unfounded. The United Steelworkers of America has consistently supported renewal of sanctions, and has not feared that it would mean job losses for its members. The Steelworkers union also believes that the amendment currently attached to the sanctions bill requiring certification that any steel mill product imported into this country does not contain any material of Rhodesian origin will further protect its members from any possible theoretical competitive disadvantage from foreign producers.

7. Our economic relations with the states of Africa outside the white regimes require us to support majority rule in Rhodesia as a measure of prudent self-interest. African states have taken many opportunities to warn the United States, European states and Japan that they are prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to see to it that the African majorities of the south rule their own countries. If the United States is not responsive, U.S. businesses will find themselves increasingly subject to political pressure or even denial of important resources and markets in black Africa. Nigeria now supplies more crude petroleum to the United States than any other single country. Gabonese, Zairean and Ghanaian manganese are important to our steel industry. Guinea has one third of the world's bauxite reserves.

If majority rule in Rhodesia is only a matter of time, as we firmly believe it to be, then it is penny-wise and pound-foolish to break sanctions by importing chrome, nickel and other materials for the sake of a possible small saving in cost. The result may well be that U.S. firms will be excluded from access to Rhodesian materials when the shift to majority rule comes. As Bishop Abel Muzorewa, President of the African National Council, said at a June press conference:

"In a few months or even a few years the government of Rhodesia will be black... We will not forget those who ignored our suffering, scorned our rights and in complicity with the fascist regime of Mr. Smith took our minerals bestowing wealth to the white minority and sentencing the black majority to poverty and physical depravity. We will recall that when we demanded freedom you took our chrome, when we asked for understanding, you demanded that we understand your need for chrome... When we tried to employ non-violence, you usurped our minerals to make the tools of war for your battles in Asia."