Reflections on Zimbabwe, March 1980

—an observer’s report by Ted Lockwood

It is now time to beat our swords into plowshares... Forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity and together as Zimbabweans trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society.

Robert Mugabe, March 4th address to the nation

Contradictory images float to mind as I remember the day the election results became public. The grim faces of whites eating dinner in our hotel, grins on the faces of the waiters. In Charter Road, crowds running with forbidden ZANU posters proudly carried aloft, now liberated. Fists punched to the sky from bus windows. Outside the wall of Mugabe’s house, jubilant singing in a passing truck, drowning out Mugabe’s careful, conciliatory press conference. And then on television, the prim Rhodesian announcer introducing the new prime minister designate as “Comrade President Robert Mugabe.” And then Mugabe’s address and fireside chat—personable, brilliant, articulate, reassuring and conservative.

For the audience, 90% white, biblical phrases must have seemed strange in the mouth of a man heretofore portrayed on the same TV as a Marxist dedicated to smashing the church.

Yet Mugabe’s words reflected his audience and himself. Africans and Europeans in Zimbabwe are religious. And while not a churchgoer, Mugabe describes himself as a “practical Christian” devoted to principles which the church in which he was reared and other traditions share: love and compassion that overcomes barriers, co-operation and sharing of resources instead of selfishness. While Mugabe’s eclectic mingling of Marxist and Christian principles may seem incorrect both to some Marxists and Christians, his fusion of them is rooted in Zimbabwean realities and his own history.

The election results gave us a sense of almost miraculous deliverance from a truly perilous situation. The British governor, Lord Soames, seemed bent on disenfranchising those areas were ZANU-PF had established control in the war. He argued that ZANU-PF and, to a lesser degree, the Patriotic Front, were guilty of intimidation because some 6,000 of their troops had not gone with their 22,000 comrades to the assembly points. Yet the reasons why they had not done so were understandable. Some 40,000 Rhodesian troops and 28,000 of Muzorewa’s auxiliaries were fully deployed throughout the country and, in all probability, had never been confined to base as they were required to do by the Lancaster agreement. ZANU-PF had no intention of surrendering territory over which they had established effective control to their political enemies.

As we went around the countryside, we heard many detailed accounts of harassment, intimidation, obstacles, detentions, shootings and dirty tricks by Rhodesian “Combined Operations,” aimed primarily at ZANU-PF. Soames’ charges of intimidation never included these actions but rather seemed to reflect Rhodesian biases, information and actions.

At the eleventh hour, Soames was pulled back from the brink. Machel and Nyerere and the African states warned that they would not recognize the results of an election from which Mugabe was excluded. Over 200 observers and 600 press were on hand, some of them growing critical of British bias. No one wanted to see the war resume.

One other aspect of the election seemed like a deliverance to us: it established ZANU-PF’s leading role.

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"Everybody talks about Robert Mugabe, because Robert Mugabe fought and won the war. So everybody is for Robert Mugabe. . . . Muzorewa was a puppet government." —a voter in Highfield, February 27th

Eddison Zvobgo, ZANU-PF national chairman for the campaign, had predicted they would win 56 seats. But we were skeptical and feared that Mugabe would get the most votes but not enough seats to command an absolute parliamentary majority. If he had won; say, 40 seats, Lord Soames was apparently prepared to pass over Mugabe and ask Nkomo to form a government of national unity, even though Nkomo was not predicted to win more seats than Mugabe’s party. We felt this would be a continuation of minority rule.

The overwhelming vote for ZANU-PF and the Patriotic Front meant a total repudiation of Muzorewa’s puppet government and a vote for the revolutionary struggle. The Quebec Human Rights delegation put it this way:

The population of Zimbabwe understood far more clearly than most observers realized the fundamental issue at stake. The people were conscious of the fact that they were choosing their future: an end to the war, rebuilding the country, unity and reconciliation. But above all, they demonstrated their wish for profound changes in their country.

The response of the electorate demonstrated the popularity of the ZANU-ZAPU alliance. More than 90% of the electorate voted—2,649,529 compared to 1,802,758 in 1979, when the alliance was still banned. In provinces where ZANLA and ZIPRA organized a boycott in 1979, the increased turnout was especially noteworthy: up 234% in Matabeleland South and up 143% in Victoria, for example. But even in Mashonaland, where the turnout was roughly the same, ZANU-PF won 26 of 30 seats. With 87% of the popular vote and 77 out of a possible 80 seats, the government led by Mugabe won an overwhelming mandate that made the issue of intimidation academic.

This Manchester Guardian cartoon shows Mugabe offering Soames, Nkomo and Muzorewa a humble pie of rooster (the election symbol of ZANU-PF).

Which Way Now?

With Mugabe alternately praised as "pragmatic" and feared as "Marxist," readers of the Western press are pardonably confused. In trying to sort out this confusion, we think it’s worth bearing in mind both the principles to which ZANU-PF is committed and the realities it must deal with. Here are some concrete instances:

Land. Land hunger was a root cause of the war. Although more than eighty percent of Zimbabwe’s population lives in rural areas, the most fertile and productive lands, thirty-nine percent of the country, is owned by some 5,500 European commercial farmers. In 1978 they produced $840 million worth of maize, cotton, wheat, beef, sugar, etc., while the 165 African Tribal Trust Lands, roughly equal in size, produced only $107 million, most of it for personal consumption. Yet while African rural areas carry 80% of the rural population, European areas carry only 20%. In 1977, the African lands were carrying three times as many farmers as they could properly support. The vast majority of the African peasantry is intensely poor and twenty percent suffer from malnutrition.

ZANU-PF’s principles on the land question begin with the fundamental tenet that the land belongs to the people as a whole. While its election manifesto promises that land in the future will be owned by the people, the new government’s first steps will be to acquire that land which is unused, abandoned, underutilized or owned by absentee owners for the resettlement of peasants. Peasant agriculture, which is now individualistic, will be re-oriented toward collective methods, drawing on lessons learned by other countries committed to socialism. In Tanzania it was discovered that forced collectivization does not work. Mozambique applied that lesson and its experience in organizing will help Zimbabwe. The experience of collective farming in Mozambique will be an asset that returning Zimbabweans will bring back with them.

How much land would be needed? The British Economist estimates that 11-12.5 million acres could be distributed without dispossessing any white farmers at all and that a takeover of some white farms could actually improve productivity. 43% of white farms only produce 10% of farm products in spite of heavy subsidies. But since the European commercial farms as a whole produce almost all of the city’s food and 70 percent of the food for tribal trust lands, hasty governmental actions could lead to chaotic conditions of production and to starvation, furnishing the grounds for a coup. While most agricultural production facilities involve the use of low-level technology, the sugar estates such as Triangle and Hippo Valley require technical expertise which the new government does not now command. It is understandable, therefore, that Mugabe has appointed the head of the Commercial Farmers’ Union, Dennis Norman, to be minister of agriculture, an appointment that may be a transitional arrangement only.

Any longterm land reform will require money for land acquisition, roads, irrigation, agricultural equipment and other facilities. The Times of London estimates that over $350 million will be required to buy land, resettle people and make repairs to rural war damage. Over the longer term, the Anglo-American plan called for $1,5 to $2 million in five years while some estimates now run to $6 million.

When the Patriotic Front refused in principle to pay for land the Europeans had taken at the point of the gun, the United States and Britain dangled vague offers of aid and got round the sticking place. But now US officials say no specific sums were promised, certainly not to compensate whites and that in any case, Britain must lead. But it seems Britain will only put up $165 million over a 3 year period. And Mugabe has called US projected aid of some $45 million in the next 17 months “disappointing.” Dame Judith Hart, former head of foreign aid in Britain’s Labour government, calls this response “meager”:

The war is estimated to have cost £182 million a year. Now we offer £25 million for peace.

Guardian Weekly, April 27

If money is not forthcoming, Mugabe will either have to ignore the constitutional requirement for compensation and risk isolation from western credit or ignore the demands of
the landless poor. One ZANU official commented, "If land reform is 'way down the road,' as the Americans say, then ZANU-PF is way down the road."

**Resettlement.** One of the most pathetic sights I saw while in Salisbury was the squatters’ settlement in Harare. Here and in Sebe people displaced from the tribal trust lands by the war are living in plastic huts, in mess halls, in shacks and in two-room concrete prefabs. Lacking employment, food and educational opportunities, the squatters, who number some 750,000 nationwide, could become a permanent burden, depressing wage levels and exhausting relief funds. Some 250,000 who now live in protected villages are anxious to be resettled. Unfortunately, Zimbabwe is trying to arrange for some of the 175,000 refugees in Mozambique and Zambia to stay on for another year or so in order to lighten the resettlement task.

**Skills.** Over sixty-three percent of all skilled jobs are now held by Europeans. Almost all managerial, professional and many artisan roles are filled by Europeans. While there seem to be plenty of Africans with at least two years of secondary education to replace departing Europeans, Africans with three to four years of high school are fewer. While Zimbabwe is blessed with more than 6,500 African university graduates, there could be real shortages in engineering, administration, scientific work, statistics and accounting. In addition, 68,000 Europeans have had some kind of technical schooling beyond the secondary level. If they all decided to "gap it," Zimbabwe would have problems replacing them, although 20,000 Africans have had some kind of on-the-job training.

Under these circumstances, not to mention others such as the integration of the army and the civil service, Mugabe quite understandably, is moving with caution, conserving as much as he can during the difficult transition. Does this mean abandonment of principles? Martin Meredith of the London Sunday Times recently got this reply from the new prime minister:

No I haven’t changed my mind … . I never said I was going to impose socialist principles upon society. Although we stated that our principles derived from scientific socialism or from Marxism-Leninism, they also took into account our own traditions, our own environment. If you start by getting control of these capitalist enterprises, where do you go? You are only disrupting the infrastructure that has been built over the years. You can’t maintain it. You haven’t got the skills. You haven’t got the know-how. You haven’t got the capital. … Worker participation is the most we can do for now.

Mugabe argues that more land, free schooling, free health services and better wages are the most that can be accomplished now. He has the advantage of a much higher literacy rate than in Mozambique or Angola, a small but diversified industrial capacity and a developed mining base. He also has an even more important asset—a very strong mandate. He doesn’t want to squander that inheritance while his party is consolidating its political base. Its hold on the state apparatus and gaining for the people the technical skills to manage the economy.

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**For further study:** *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe,* published as a series by the Catholic Institute for International Relations, especially *Education for Employment and The Land Problem in Rhodesia* by Roger Riddell. (Available from the Africa Fund, 196 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10038.)
South Africa: The Lessons of Zimbabwe

I don't have to remind you that in Zimbabwe it took seven years of hardship, heartbreak, death and suffering. We are hoping it won't take seven years here. We hope [those in power] here will learn the lessons of Zimbabwe.

Ntshato Motlana
Soweto Committee of Ten

The impact of the overwhelming victory of Robert Mugabe in the Zimbabwe elections reached into every corner of South African society. The immediate reactions ranged from jubilation on the part of blacks to shock and anger on the part of whites. The Zimbabwe election results will have a direct and lasting effect on such issues as the Namibia negotiations, Prime Minister Botha's reform strategy and the militant action of blacks in South Africa.

Jubilation in Soweto

The black population of South Africa favored a Patriotic Front victory in Zimbabwe and were overjoyed by the results of the election. The Johannesburg Star reported that Soweto residents celebrated the victory with shouts of "amandla ngawethu" (the power is ours) and "viva Mugabe." Blacks in South Africa recognized Mugabe as the true leader of Zimbabwe because ZANU had put the most lighters in the field to liberate the country. A Soweto youth told the Washington Post: "Mugabe is a token of the genuine liberation in Africa [that] is achieved through armed struggle."

In a poll of its readers conducted prior to the elections, the Rand Daily Mail found that over 80 percent of its African respondents favored the Patriotic Front leaders (50 percent for Mugabe and 31 percent from Nkomo). Among the reasons cited for favoring Mugabe were that "he is a firm opponent of the capitalist holy cow which impoverishes blacks" and "because of what he stands for, which is of course the liberation of blacks."

The reaction of South African blacks to the election was similar in many respects to the way in which they greeted the victories of FRELIMO in Mozambique and MPLA in Angola. In 1975 South African students sponsored nationwide "Viva FrelIMO" rallies which were disrupted by the police and in the following year they celebrated the forced withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. But, for a variety of reasons, the ZANU-PF victory was even sweeter than these previous ones. First, there are close cultural, historical and personal ties between the peoples of Zimbabwe and South Africa. Many Zimbabweans including Mugabe and other leaders of both ZANU and ZAPU either worked or went to school in South Africa. Second, the government of South Africa was by far the strongest supporter of the Smith regime and then the internal settlement government of Abel Muzorewa. The South African government and business interests contributed large sums of money to the Muzorewa election campaign and confidently predicted either an outright Muzorewa victory or a coalition which would keep Mugabe from power. Black South Africans delighted in their government's folly and their total misreading of the attitudes of black people.

Finally, the Mugabe victory brings the liberation struggle to South Africa's doorstep. One black South African favored Mugabe because "South Africa will be the only racist regime surrounded by black states." Although South Africa invested heavily in thwarting the advance of majority rule, it has suffered two humiliating defeats, first in Angola and now in Zimbabwe. The significance of these changes is not lost on black South Africans, few of whom would have dared to predict the rapid demise of Portuguese colonialism or white rule in Zimbabwe a decade ago. Putting these changes into historical perspective, they are inspired to pursue their own struggle with a sense of confidence in its inevitable victory.

Blacks Spurred to Action

Mugabe's victory not only gave the black population of South Africa the opportunity to thumb their noses at their white oppressors but it also spurred them to sharpen their demands. Among the most immediate manifestations of this is the nationwide campaign to win the release of Nelson Mandela, the leader of the banned African National Congress (ANC). Mandela, who is 61 years old, has been imprisoned for the past 16 years on Robben Island serving a life sentence with no chance of parole. In the month following Mugabe's election victory more than 42,000 persons signed petitions calling for his release.

The "Free Mandela" campaign was initiated by Johannesburg Post editor Percy Qoboza. Qoboza is very explicit about the link between this campaign and the Zimbabwe elections: "If they have learned a lesson from Zimbabwe, they will let Mandela out and talk to him." The campaign is supported by all the major black leaders in South Africa including moderates such as Bishop Desmond Tutu, Gatsha Buthelezi and Sam Moisueyane, a black business leader. Bishop Tutu, the general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, whose passport was seized the day the Zimbabwe election results were announced, noted ironically that God had provided the Zimbabwe experience for South Africa as "an object lesson on how not to solve a political crisis." He called on the government to state "clearly and unequivocally" that it is committed to "an undivided nonracial South Africa."

In the wake of Mugabe's victory, the armed wing of the ANC, Umkomlo we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) has stepped up its attacks on police stations, the most visible signs of state repression. The most recent attack in April was carried out against a police station in a white suburb of Johannesburg. The attackers escaped after scattering leaflets demanding the release of ANC leaders Mandela and Walter Sisulu.

The residents of Soweto openly demonstrated their support for the ANC at the funeral of Lillian Ngoyi, the first woman elected to the ANC National Executive Committee and a leader of the Anti-Pass Campaign and the mass women's march on Pretoria in the 1950's. People marched in their ANC colors and sang freedom songs; then they carried her coffin to the gravesite after the carriage bearing her coffin had broken down midway along the five-mile journey to the cemetery from Soweto.

Students have also stepped up their protests against the racially segregated educational system and the lack of funds provided for education. More than 100,000 students throughout the country are taking part in these protests and clashes between students and police in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg have been reported.

White Consternation

The demands of blacks and the concessions which whites might be prepared to make are still miles apart. Their differing reactions to the Zimbabwe election results under-
scored not only the deep divisions within South Africa but also the extent to which whites are out-of-touch with the feelings of blacks. A government spokesman showed how stunned white South Africans were at the election results: "I can't understand how we were so misinformed. I just can't understand."

The post-election views of the reformist, "enlightened" (verkrampte) wing of the ruling National Party led by Prime Minister P.W. Botha were reflected in an editorial in Die Burger, the National Party newspaper in Cape Province. The editorial stated that the lesson of Mugabe's victory was that "he who wishes to hold on to everything runs the risk of losing everything" and called for blacks to be given "an effective political voice." Since assuming the post of Prime Minister in 1978, Botha has called for a series of reforms designed to encourage investment from the business community and at the same time placate opposition from the black, "coloured" and Indian populations. These reforms are an integral part of what is termed the "total strategy" promoted by Army chief General Magnus Malan. General Malan sees the struggle in South Africa being fought on various "terrains of action" including social, economic and political as well as military with a massive effort aimed at obtaining allegiance to the state either through persuasion or coercion. Thus this year's South African national budget, swelled by windfall gold profits, shows significant increases in expenditure for black education, housing and other amenities as well as 46 percent increase in defense spending.

The objective of this strategy is to build an alliance between government and business which will create an urban black middle class with a stake in the system. This strategy is intended to appeal to those urban blacks who wish to distance themselves from the rural poverty and ethnic ties of the homeland. One black lamented about the potential effect: "We are split nationally and culturally and now they want to do it economically." Botha's major reforms, including changes in the pass laws and the registration of black labor unions combined with the granting of independence to several homelands, have served to exacerbate these divisions. The pass laws are now more efficiently and rigidly enforced, putting more pressure on the unemployed and the dispossessed in the rural areas.

Much attention has been focused on Botha's statements that "hurtful and unnecessary discrimination" must be eliminated and that whites must "adapt or die." But even this aspect of Botha's strategy is filled with contradictions. In one breath he deprecates segregation and calls for an end to the ban on mixed marriages and in the next breath he defends apartheid signs in the streets and the Group Areas Act, which legislates against blacks and whites living together in the same neighborhood. The contradictions are even starker in Botha's approach to black leadership. Although National party newspapers called on the government to talk to the "real" black leaders in the wake of the Zimbabwe elections and Botha himself called for a multiracial "state conference," the government continues to ban these very same leaders.

Challenge from the Right

In the wake of the Zimbabwe elections, Botha announced his intention to set up a multiracial "State Council" on which urban blacks would be represented for the first time. This proposal has been rejected by the conservative, "hard-line" (verkrampte) wing of the National Party which opposes the inclusion of blacks in any constitutional body which could influence the destiny of whites. Botha's entire reform strategy has been challenged by this wing which is led by Transvaal MP and Minister of Public Works, Andries Treurnicht. As Minister of so-called Bantu Education in 1976, it was Treurnicht who insisted that the Afrikaans language be used in black schools. This was one of the major causes of the massive student protest that year.

The verkrampte interpretation of the Zimbabwe election result is that white concessions to black political aspirations eventually lead to greater popular support for more radical leaders. For them, the lessons of Zimbabwe are that no political concessions should be made to blacks and the policy of strict racial separation should be vigorously pursued.

Treurnicht, nicknamed "Dr. No" on account of his opposition to any changes in the apartheid system, has confronted Botha on his proposals to relax the laws mandating racial segregation of all facilities, known as "petty apartheid." He believes that any relaxation will lead inexorably to the downfall of "grand apartheid," the plan to maintain white control by confining black political rights to the tribal homelands. In March Treurnicht went on record as opposing the participation of a coloured rugby team in a previously all-white schoolboy competition on the grounds that "if the white man shared the rugby field he would ultimately have to share the country." Botha publicly rebuked Treurnicht for his statement adding that "the time has come for this country to realize that attitudes creating the impression that coloured people are lepers must come to an end." In spite of Botha's harsh words, Treurnicht was still able to force Botha into a stand-off over the issue at a decisive Cabinet meeting, indicating the strength of the verkrampte wing within the National Party and the weakness of Botha's commitment to change.

The verkrampte policies are generally thought to have a lot less support among the white population as a whole than they do in Parliament. A recent newspaper poll, for example, showed Botha outdrawing Treurnicht by better than 10 to 1. But Treurnicht's position was strengthened recently by support from former Prime Minister John Vorster and former Information Minister Connie Mulder. While both of them were forced to resign in 1978 on account of the Information Department scandal, they still represent important centrist and conservative forces in the National Party. Vorster emerged from retirement in March to attack Botha's reformist policies and defend separate development as the "salvation" of South Africa; anyone who disputed that, he said, "was no friend of the country, of the Afrikaner or of the white man." Mulder has been stumping the country for his new National Conservative Party warning that Botha will turn South Africa into "a second Rhodesia."
The Limits of Botha's Strategy

These conflicts within the Afrikaner National Party have made it difficult for South Africa to put on the necessary front to convince the western world that it is changing. South Africa needs to attract foreign investment in order to maintain its high rate of economic growth. It courts the confidence and support of the West by proposing to change the face of apartheid and thus allay fears of revolutionary change. The Financial Mail, representing the interests of South African business, recently urged Botha to move forward with his reform strategy despite opposition from the right wing of his party: Quoite clearly, Botha must—without delay—move to assure South Africa's foreign friends that he has not been neutralized by the Treurnicht bogey.

While Botha's reform rhetoric is liberal for the benefit of international consumption, his actions are conservative at best. He recently dissolved the elected Coloured Representative Council and replaced it with another one appointed by the government. He also sharply rejected the demands for Mandela's release and backed down on some of the limited concessions on political rights for urban blacks, "coloureds" and Indians which he himself had proposed.

Black South Africans see through the thin veneer of Botha's reforms. Johnnie Makatini, the ANC representative to the U.N., insists that this strategy now, more than ever, is likely to fail: It's going to be very hard for them to get a South African Muzorewa in any case, because the political awareness of the people of South Africa does not lag far behind that in Zimbabwe... Some years back the plan to develop an African strata with some stake in the system might have worked temporarily. Now it is just too late.

Even before the Zimbabwe elections, leaders such as Ninito Mollana and Thozamile Botha warned the black population that government-sponsored concessions did not lead to liberation. Buoyed by Mugabe's victory, blacks will be more resolute in pressing for real change. After all, as one Soweto youth observed, "If the people of Zimbabwe can be liberated, why should we not be liberated?"

The Struggle for Economic Independence

Political independence without economic independence is incomplete.

Robert Mugabe

The victory of the liberation forces in Zimbabwe and the end of the war will have a great and lasting impact on the neighboring frontline states. Just as Zimbabwe quickly turned its attention away from the liberation war and towards the tasks of national reconstruction and reconciliation, so too did the frontline states turn their attention towards their own pressing economic problems.

The frontline states contributed a great deal both diplomatically and strategically towards Zimbabwe's liberation struggle but they also suffered a great deal as a result. This is especially true of Mozambique and Zambia which harbored the liberation forces of ZANLA and ZIPRA, the armies of ZANU and ZAPU, and the majority of the 250,000 Zimbabwean refugees who fled the war. They were subjected to innumerable cross-border raids and air attacks from the Rhodesian security forces which claimed hundreds of civilian lives and destroyed millions of dollars worth of infrastructure.

Zimbabwe War Damaged Frontline Economies

In Mozambique, schools, clinics and houses were burned and peasants were forced to flee from their farms along the fertile border area. Important material resources such as cement were diverted away from domestic use towards the war effort. Transport, communications, electricity supply and flood control were all seriously disrupted by more than 350 Rhodesian military assaults on Mozambique since 1976. The estimated cost of repairing the infrastructural damage alone is over $50 million. In addition, Mozambique's compliance with U.N. sanctions cost the country over $500 million in rail and port fees. The annual cost to Mozambique of maintaining sanctions was equal to one-third of the pre-independence annual import bill. It is little wonder then why there are chronic shortages and long lines at shops.

The Zambian economy was similarly affected by the war and by sanctions. The economies of Zambia and Rhodesia had been closely linked in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Malawi) prior to 1964 and it was difficult for Zambia to sever those ties and find alternatives, especially in the area of transportation. Zambia not only suffered the consequences of closing the border with Rhodesia but also the disruption of the Benguela railway through Angola, congestion at the port of Dar es Salaam at the head of the TAZARA railway and finally, the destruction of Zambia's own roads and bridges by Rhodesian air attacks. In this situation Zambia's foreign debt multiplied while its foreign exchange reserves shrank to nothing. Early in 1979, Zambia was forced to open its border with Rhodesia in order to avoid economic collapse.
in order to encourage greater food crop production. In the past government policy has tended to favor the 40 percent urban population and the mining industry at the expense of the rural peasantry. The government of Mozambique initiated a nationwide campaign in February against bureaucracy, corruption and inefficiency in order to unclog the distribution bottlenecks so that goods and services could flow more easily to the workers and peasants. President Machel acknowledged that government control had moved too rapidly. "The state should not sell matches," he said.

Frontline States Attempt Regional Strategy

The southern African states as a whole are faced with the long-term question of their dependency relationships with the developed capitalist countries including South Africa. They are still largely locked into their colonial role as exporters of agricultural or mineral raw materials and importers of manufactured goods. There is little trade among the frontline states because most of them are producing essentially the same commodities (coffee, tea, sugar, beef, cement and textiles).

Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe each has a greater volume of trade with South Africa than with all the rest of Africa. Zambia's trade with South Africa, for example, is over three times as great as with the rest of Africa.

The frontline states have begun a concerted effort to confront their economic problems. In July, 1979 they convened the first Southern African Development Coordination Conference at Arusha, Tanzania in order to launch a campaign to secure their "economic liberation." In order to reduce their external dependencies, they decided to devote special attention to strengthening regional cooperation.

When Zimbabwe elected its first majority rule government, a special summit meeting of the southern African nations was called in Lusaka, Zambia to approve the resolutions put forth at Arusha. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe attended this meeting at the beginning of April as his first official visit outside Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe's independence permitted the expansion of this

Resolutions of the Lusaka Summit

There were two major aims of the Lusaka meeting. The first was to form a collective front to protect the independence of each state against the efforts of South Africa to draw individual members into a South Africa-dominated "consellation of states." The other aim was to establish a firm basis for future economic co-operation among independent southern African nations. The summit approved three resolutions in the area of agricultural development including regional pest control, research on production in semi-arid areas and preparation of a food security plan.

The summit also agreed to set up a regional transport and communications commission in Mozambique, noting that without an adequate system "other areas of cooperation become impractical." The placement of the commission headquarters in Maputo acknowledges the critical role which Mozambique is expected to play in the regional transportation network. The port of Beira which lay essentially idle since the Rhodesian border was closed, can serve the landlocked nations of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi and Zaire. Maputo, which has one of the best natural harbors in Africa, can handle traffic from Zimbabwe and Botswana. Mozambique has already expended large sums of money to upgrade its port facilities and to repair the railroads leading to these ports.

The objectives of economic independence and regional co-operation which the summit set forth are ambitious. The summit declaration concluded that "economic liberation and development in southern Africa cannot be attained easily or speedily." The nations attending the summit set up a southern African development fund and will be seeking contributions from international agencies and western countries.

Newsbriefs

South Africa Hearings Held in House

The House Foreign Affairs Committee's Africa Subcommittee is currently holding investigative hearings on US relations with South Africa. The hearings, chaired by Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), are the first in two years to focus on South Africa.

After looking at human rights violations, the homelands, policy and whether current reforms are "real or cosmetic," the hearings will emphasize economic relations with South Africa. General Motors, Ford, Citibank, Coca Cola and Mobil Oil are expected to testify, as are Rev. Leon Sullivan and opponents of the Sullivan fair employment approach. The last hearing will examine US policy options toward South Africa.

The initial testimony from State and Defense Department officials revealed almost nothing new, except for an admission by Assistant Secretary Richard Moose that South Africa is giving military assistance to UNITA in southern Angola. Reps. Solarz and Bill Gray (D-PA) criticized Moose for the lack of substantive change in policy toward South Africa during the Carter Administration. The only hard questioning came from Rep. Howard Wolpe of Michigan, who pressed for an explanation of apparent government complicity in the sale of artillery shells to South Africa by the Vermont-based Space Research Corporation.

Whether any of the Subcommittee Democrats will introduce legislation on South Africa following the hearings is still unclear. Rep. Solarz is traveling to South Africa in July, and will probably wait until after that visit to decide whether to introduce any bills.

Ad Hoc Monitoring Group Begins Prisoner Project

The 48-member Congressional Monitoring Group on Southern Africa "adopted" 50 non-violent political prisoners, detainees and banned persons in South Africa in March. A co-chairman of the group, Rep. Thomas Downey of New York, said that threatment of political prisoners would be a sign of whether or not the South African government is "serious about reform."

The Ad Hoc Monitoring Group was formed in the House of Representatives after the murder in prison of Steve Biko in 1977. Some of its members took a lead in the following year in advocating legislation to restrict Export-Import Bank financing to South Africa.
National Black Agenda Calls for Sanctions

More than 1000 Black leaders who met in Richmond, Virginia adopted a strong platform opposing all forms of economic support for South Africa as part of the National Black Agenda for the '80s. This is the first time a national Black organization has called for full trade sanctions against South Africa. The complete policy statement, adopted on March 1, reads as follows:

1. The United States should take measures to sever all economic, diplomatic, political and cultural relations with South Africa. These measures should include a ban on new investments by US companies, a program of tax penalties designed to require withdrawal of current investments, a ban on new bank loans to South African borrowers, and termination of all exportation to and importation from South Africa.

2. The US should submit and/or support a United Nations Chapter VII resolution proposing comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa on the grounds that South Africa's policy of apartheid poses an immediate threat to international peace and security and is in violation of the right of the people of South Africa to self-determination as guaranteed by the United Nations Charter.

3. Black American organizations and individuals should be strongly urged to render material and conceptual support to those African Liberation groups and African governments committed to the elimination of apartheid in South Africa.

4. The Congressional Black Caucus should introduce legislation which would prevent our national government from providing funding, supplemental or otherwise, to American corporations doing business with the Republic of South Africa.

Southern Africa Aid in FY '81

Aid to the southern Africa region, including Zimbabwe, may be less controversial this year than at any time in the recent past. Foreign policy priorities have obviously shifted to other areas. In addition, the overwhelming electoral mandate given to the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe and Mugabe's conciliatory statements toward the white community have taken the wind out of the conservatives' sails.

The Administration's request for $90 million for southern Africa in fiscal year '81 has gone through the House and Senate fairly well intact. Aid originally requested no money for Zimbabwe, since little contingency planning had been done before the election. But the House committee earmarked $20 million of the money already allocated for the region to go to Zimbabwe, and the Senate committee earmarked $30 million. In both committees, conservatives did not raise any objections to this aid. In addition, $20 million was found from FY '80 funds for immediate aid to Zimbabwe, mostly for refugee resettlement and reopening of rural health clinics and other reconstruction projects.

Zimbabwe Prime Minister Mugabe told the Washington Post that he was disappointed that the US has "retracted from [its] commitment" on the level of aid. During the Lancaster House talks, ZANU and ZAPU agreed to guarantee compensation for white land after Britain and the US made vague commitments to provide agricultural and economic assistance. Britain's $165 million over three years and America's $40-50 million fall far short of the $1 billion or so which is estimated to be needed for reconstruction and land redistribution.

Aid to Mozambique came under attack from Africa Subcommittee member Rep. Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.). She complained of alleged human rights violations there and about Mozambique's vote at the UN in favor of the Soviet position on Afghanistan. The Foreign Affairs Committee reduced aid for Mozambique from $9 to $6 million, but even this paltry sum is a slight improvement, considering that Mozambique has gotten nothing except food assistance in previous years.

Conservatives who attacked Zimbabwe during the last two years are now looking to Namibia. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee prohibited a $500,000 contribution to the UN Namibia Institute in Lusaka, Zambia which trains Namibian exiles in development and administrative skills.

If Nebraska Can Do It...

The Nebraska state legislature has passed a bill introduced by Senator Ernie Chambers excluding any corpora-
tions with investments in South Africa from the list of approved investments for state funds. The unicameral legislature adopted the bill by a vote of 28 to 0 in March.

Passage of this bill puts Nebraska in the forefront of a new and growing phase of the American divestment movement, focusing on state and local governments. Various forms of divestment resolutions are moving through other state legislatures as well. Massachusetts already banned new investment of state pension fund money in companies and banks operating in South Africa, and the legislature is currently considering a second bill to divest of previously-purchased stock in these companies. The Michigan state legislature will be voting soon on a bill ending all business with banks that lend to South Africa and to US corporate subsidiaries there, and a similar bill may be voted on in the Illinois legislature in their next session. In California, Governor Jerry Brown is setting up a state Public Investment Task Force to consider selling stock in companies involved in South Africa and investing instead in projects that provided needed services for the people of California.

Several cities, including Berkeley and Davis, California and Cambridge, Massachusetts have also voted in public referenda to take money out of banks lending to South Africa.

These state and city initiatives could make an important contribution toward creating the political atmosphere for national legislation banning further investment in South Africa. Along with student divestment actions and local campaigns targeting banks that lend to South Africa, local legislative campaigns can help build the movement against US corporation support for apartheid—from the grass roots up.

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