Africans Push US/UK to Back Own Plan

Long accused of weakness and indecision regarding the liberation of Zimbabwe, Britain and the United States are now facing an acid test of their own purposes. The internal settlement has led the African states to challenge them. If the Patriotic Front and the frontline states now accept the Anglo-American proposals, what are these two mediators prepared to do to deliver Ian Smith and his new black partners to an equal acceptance?

The dilemma the West faces stems from a high degree of unified and determined African diplomacy in the face of western attraction to the internal settlement. At the United Nations, the African group was able to obtain a March 14th resolution rejecting the settlement as “illegal and unacceptable” by a 10-0 vote. The five western members abstained, maintaining the solid front that has become the hallmark of Western diplomatic tactics in the last year.

Up until that point and even after it, both British and American governments had expressed support with reservations for the internal settlement. Secretary Vance had echoed the British in calling it a “significant” step, and President Carter had stressed its congruence with the points of the Anglo-American proposals.

In mid-February, British Foreign Secretary Owen appears to have offered Ndeabingi Sithole British help if Sithole could bring Nkomo into the internal settlement. According to notes released by Sithole, Owen urged him to make Nkomo an offer that would break him away from Mugabe.

Frontline Pressure on the Patriotic Front

Meanwhile, the frontline states put concerted pressure on the Patriotic Front to accept key points of the Anglo-American proposals they had heretofore rejected. The London Observer’s David Martin claimed on April 2nd that an unpublished agreement had been reached:

- to accept a British Resident Commissioner subject to certain checks and balances for a six-month transition, and
- to allow a United Nations military force to police elections

Martin claims that Mozambique’s Samora Machel played a key part in convincing Mugabe to go along with these new concessions.

Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Owen will meet the Patriotic Front in Dar es Salaam on April 15-16 to continue discussions of the Anglo-American proposals. Vance then hopes to meet with Muzorewa and Sithole perhaps on the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe. In the end, Vance and Owen hope to get all of the parties to come to another Geneva-style conference in May.

But Will the US and UK Deliver Smith?

The crucial issue is whether the West is prepared to compel Smith to hand over power to a British Resident Commissioner, and to accept the Anglo-American proposals. Although the United States and Britain could put pressure on Smith and his ally, South Africa, by withholding oil from South Africa, they have no intention of doing so. Big business and conservative political support for the internal settlement forbid it.

The British Labour Party faces rising working class anger against non-white immigrants that could spell trouble for the party in the future if it seems to be too tough on the Rhodesian whites. In the United States, the new right challenge has raised the spectre of the Soviet Union and Cuba taking over Africa. Republicans will campaign this fall against Carter’s Africa policy, and demand “effective military and other aid” to Africans who oppose the Cuban forces, and support for the “pro-western black majority” who signed the Rhodesian internal accord. Ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, Clifford Case, introduced a resolution March 9th calling for serious and impartial consideration of the internal settlement.
Within the Carter Administration itself, key decision-maker Brzezinski is a long-time cold warrior who does not wish to see sanctions against South Africa, as he and Carter made clear in Lagos on April 2nd.

Under these circumstances, the British and the Americans will only go through the motions, it would seem, of trying to mediate the struggle. "We've got to try," said one official to Graham Hovey of the New York Times. "This is what the Africans expect." But without pressure a negotiated end to the fighting in Zimbabwe is only a dim possibility.

**Will There be a Wider War?**

With strong South African backing, Smith probably figures, and the Patriotic Front fears, that the internal settlement will eventually win Western support and defuse the fighting. In order to prevent this scenario, the frontline states may now be prepared to accept the Anglo-American proposals as the lesser of two evils or at least to keep the West talking. The frontline states have almost as much to gain from a speedy end to the 11-year war as the people of Zimbabwe. In the midst of their own economic difficulties, they have committed much of their scarce resources to the liberation struggle.

Economic sabotage is a potential weapon in the West's arsenal if the frontline states do choose to support a prolongation of the guerilla struggle. Zambia, which is in serious economic difficulty, has applied for IMF help. A cut in Zambian defense spending that would make it more vulnerable to Rhodesian forays may be an IMF precondition. The British Economist urges that bilateral aid be conditioned on Zambia's getting Nkomo into the internal settlement. With Mozambique also concerned to get aid from western countries, the West's potential leverage is very great.

Furthermore, with the Soviet Union and Cuba deeply preoccupied in Angola and the Horn of Africa, help from that quarter will not come quickly, even if the frontline states want it. In that case, Africans will have to liberate Zimbabwe, as they have always known they must. While the guerilla war has succeeded in liberating some areas of the country, the struggle promises to be hard and long. It is certainly far from over. ■

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**Campaign Update:**

STOP Eximbank Financing of Apartheid

Debate continues in Congress over whether to end US Export-Import Bank financing to South Africa. This campaign has won increased public support from unions (including the AFL-CIO, United Auto Workers and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers), churches, civil rights and anti-apartheid forces in this country.

On February 9th the House Banking Subcommittee on Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy held hearings on the Eximbank-South Africa connection. Witnesses testified from business, Congress, unions, the anti-apartheid movement, as well as a banker from South Africa. The hearings turned into a heated debate on the broad question of corporate disengagement.

Supporters of ending Eximbank financing to South Africa see Eximbank as bolstering rather than undermining apartheid. They point out that Eximbank credits go to strategic sectors of the South Africa economy such as iron and steel, coal mining, and civilian aircraft which may be used for military purposes. They feel that this type of international ostracism is the only way South Africa will be forced to change. Rep. Andrew Maguire (D-NJ) has said that it is time for the US to take "one, specific, concrete economic step after decades of moral rhetoric" against the Pretoria regime.

Those opposed to cutting Eximbank links with South Africa claim that African workers might suffer, completely ignoring the growing African calls for US disengagement. They voice concern that American workers will also lose jobs, but the fact is that cutting off Eximbank involvement in South Africa will not hurt overall US exports. They also claim that sanctions don't work, referring to Rhodesia, overlooking the fact that south Africa and the US and other Western nations deliberately broke sanctions.

Rep. Maguire introduced a bill last October which would end all South African financing. Rep. Paul Tsongas (D-MA), a member of the Subcommittee, is planning to introduce similar language as an amendment to HR 11384, the Eximbank authorization bill. The Subcommittee considered the bill April 13, and the full Banking Committee has to act on it by May 15th. Then it will go to the full House in mid-summer.

Although the Administration is still reluctant to take concrete steps against South Africa, if Carter does decide to act, it may be by cutting off Eximbank financing. It could be used as a "stick" option on South Africa if Vorster is not willing to accept the Namibia proposals made by the five Western Security Council members. The US might also offer to end Eximbank credits as a compromise to a black African push for full economic sanctions.

We have a lot of organizing to do, directed at both President Carter and Congress! The "Stop Eximbank Financing Apartheid" leaflets are still available (5c each, over 50).
The Selling of the Internal Settlement

Last year, Robin Moore declared himself the American Ambassador to Rhodesia and opened the "Crippled Eagles" Embassy in Salisbury to serve American mercenaries. Today, he's promoting the internal settlement.

It sounds like quite a switch—from supporting mercenaries in Ian Smith's army to acclaiming an agreement that its participants say signals a genuine transfer to majority rule. But Moore is just one of a strange group of new "converts to majority rule" who are mounting a campaign in the United States to get President Carter to endorse the latest Rhodesian accord.

Moore's propaganda push opened with an ad asking "Why [does]... Andrew Young insist that this terrorist leader be one of the heads of the newest nation in southern Africa?" Moore was quite pleased with the ad, which featured Joshua Nkomo in uniform. He told one reporter, "They'll think Andy Young is supporting Amin. Who the hell knows one nigger from another in this country?"

The Right-Wing Connection

Consistent with his personal racism, most of Moore's appeal is to the organized right, which has supported the white supremacist Smith regime since UDI. Working out of an office in Westport, Connecticut, Moore is using networks nurtured by the Rhodesian Information Office to spread his propaganda across the country. Although he wants to get back to Salisbury, Moore says, "Right now the battle is here."

The main ally in this battle is "the conservative element in this country," according to Warren Lucas, a sometimes employee of Moore who has just set up the tax-exempt Crippled Eagle Foundation in Washington. The "domino theory" is a Lucas favorite; he says if Rhodesia "falls," South Africa will be next, then Europe and the US.

Right now, the anti-communism of Moore's and Lucas' appeal is probably striking an unusually responsive chord. A month ago, when the war in the Horn of Africa was in the daily headlines, Zbigniew Brzezinski began to "link" progress on SALT to a decrease of Soviet involvement in Africa. Carter made warnings against further Soviet involvement a major theme of his Africa trip in April. Republican National Committee Chairman Bill Brock has also announced that the Republicans intend to make the Soviet role in Africa a 1978 campaign issue.

American Businessmen Influence the Agreement

American business interests with a long history of support for Rhodesia are also playing a significant role in shaping and selling the internal settlement. E.F. Andrews, Vice President of Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, is another apparent convert to the Salisbury accord. Since 1971, Andrews was the principle lobbyist who helped to enact and retain the notorious Byrd Amendment allowing the steel industry to import Rhodesian chrome and nickel.

Now that it is inevitable that there will be an African government in Zimbabwe, Andrews is trying to influence who will lead it. According to David Ottaway of the Washington Post, "knowledgeable black nationalists" believe that Andrews broke the February deadlock in the Salisbury negotiations by convincing Bishop Muzorewa to accept a critical compromise on the election of 28 whites to the new Parliament. Muzorewa told a visiting group of American Methodists in mid-February that "an American businessman" told him that Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU was prepared to enter into a deal with Smith if Muzorewa was not. Within 48 hours after meeting Andrews, Muzorewa agreed to Smith's electoral proposals. (ZAPU sources deny that Nkomo was prepared to deal with Smith.)

Even before the recent round of negotiations, Andrews was trying to prepare the way for moderate, pro-business black rule. He and Allegheny-Ludlum masterminded and funded a program at Pittsburgh's Carnegie-Mellon University to train a group of Africans who would form the core of a new Zimbabwean government. There was just one problem—the students weren't told of the political intent of the program; when they found out, most left in protest.

The internal settlement's American corporate backers are also helping with the "PR" campaign in the United States. Union Carbide, which owns chrome mines in Rhodesia, hosted and paid for a reception for Bishop Muzorewa in New York attended by representatives of 25 corporations during the Security Council debate. Muzorewa told his audience: "Some countries shout militant language but when you go to visit you find they are starving to death. We are going to be practical... We should not nationalize any industry for the sake of nationalizing it. All government actions must lead to a rational economic system that contributes to the reconstruction of the nation."

The Key Role of the Africans' Agents

Most Americans aren't going to be convinced to support the internal settlement because it meets right-wing and business interests. It is up to the Africans who signed the accord to try to show that the agreement is going to serve African interests.
Neville Romain, a South African-born American businessman and self-professed CIA agent, has been working for Rev. Ndabangeni Sithole at least since Sithole returned to Salisbury last July. One of his most recent “accomplishments” is the drafting of a “GI” bill which is supposed to win the guerrillas away from the Patriotic Front, by promising them money, training and jobs. But just six months ago he wrote a novel with Robin Moore which portrays the freedom fights as dealers in dope and terror.

Romain is spending the next six months in the US lobbying for the internal settlement. His Washington headquarters is the office of Kent B. Crane. Crane worked for the CIA in Zanzibar in 1964 and Ghana in 1965-67, and was Vice President

Agnew’s foreign policy advisor. Crane is a hard-driving man who rose fast through the government bureaucracy. He is in a good position to help Romain with political contacts. Romain is proud of his Republican connections, and already claims to have influenced Senator Dole to introduce a resolution backed by 11 other Senators urging the President to endorse the internal settlement.

Romain’s connection with Crane raises the interesting question of the possibility of CIA involvement in the promotion of the Salisbury agreement. It seems quite possible that the CIA may at least be trying to keep its hands in with the African leaders who have joined Ian Smith in the transitional agreement.

Carter Courts Africa, Doesn’t Act on South Africa

In the first official visit ever made by an American President to Sub-Saharan Africa, Jimmy Carter spent four days in Nigeria during his recent trip through Latin America and Africa. Carter has been feeling pressure from a number of different quarters because of his “wait and see” approach to southern Africa, and the Nigerian trip was meant to help gain acceptance for his Africa policy. But, by not dealing with South Africa, the goodwill generated by his visit may be short-lived.

The pressure on Carter comes from several sources.

Nigeria is rapidly becoming important to the US because of its oil. It is the world’s seventh largest producer and the second largest supplier to the US. Nigeria has become a more important US trading partner than South Africa. The United States would definitely like to establish closer economic and political ties with Nigeria.

Nigeria, and most of black Africa, are critical of Carter’s policy toward South Africa. Gen. Obasanjo was very disappointed that the West had not taken punitive economic actions against South Africa. Nigeria, militant in its concern, has recently withdrawn all government deposits from Barclay’s Bank of Nigeria, owned by Barclay International. They have also demanded that corporations in Nigeria that also do business with South Africa reduce their ties with South Africa or lose Nigerian contracts.

Carter is being pressured by business not to impose any form of economic sanctions against South Africa. Business is trying to propagate in the US media the idea that there are changes occurring in South Africa, which obviate the need to apply sanctions.

The dominant conservative element in the Republican Party has seized upon the presence of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa as an important issue for this fall’s election. Conservatives say the US lost Angola and Mozambique to the “communists,” and they don’t want to lose Rhodesia.

Carter Tries Balancing Act

Carter’s visit to Nigeria was considered by the US as a positive overture, and a way to establish closer ties with a regional

power. The Nigerians want to be co-operative with the US, yet maintain an independent role in that relationship. Gen. Obasanjo and Carter agreed, in a joint communiqué, that the internal settlement in Zimbabwe was “illegal” and “unacceptable.” Carter announced that the United States was prepared to call immediately for another round of talks on Zimbabwe, based on the Anglo-American initiative (see other article).

Although the right wing wants an internal settlement, Carter hopes that he can show the conservatives that an “all parties” solution in Zimbabwe will minimize the Soviet and Cuban presence. He and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, are launching verbal Cold War attacks on the Soviets and Cubans. These remarks are received coldly by the Nigerians, who during their civil war with Biafra, received assistance from Russia and were not Soviet puppets.

US Under Nigerian Scrutiny

While diplomatic efforts in regard to Zimbabwe and
Namibia is going on, Carter is as reluctant as Kissinger was to do anything about South Africa. Some State Department sources had said Carter would announce in Lagos a policy change on South Africa, since the Administration has supposedly been “studying” economic relations for more than a year. But Carter said nothing new. Instead, Brzezinski rationalized the status quo: “We have the view that political change may be beginning to occur in South Africa itself, in the sense that there is rising a greater awareness to accommodate and that it would be inopportune to take certain measures prematurely.” But Nigeria recognizes that any cosmetic changes do not strike at the heart of South Africa’s separate development strategy. Carter showed his differences with Obasanjo when he said, “I think the General would be more inclined to take additional embargo actions against South Africa than we would.”

Obasanjo will probably go along with what Carter is proposing for Zimbabwe and Namibia, but Carter knows that Nigeria is firm in its criticism of apartheid, and has potential economic leverage over the US which it may not be reluctant to use. As the Director General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, A. Bolaji Akinyemi, said after Carter’s speech to that organization, “The greatest honor I can bestow upon our guest is not to ignore him. In the days and months ahead every word is going to be analyzed and dissected and, Mr. President, we will keep you informed.”

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**NAMIBIA: Internal Settlement Seems Likely**

Western diplomats are now frantically trying to salvage something from their year-long effort to find an internationally acceptable plan for peaceful transition to majority rule in Namibia.

**South Africa Walks Out on the West**

Western plans got a rude jolt in mid-February when South Africa abruptly walked out of widely-heralded “proximity” talks at the United Nations and launched an angry television attack on the United States for “selective punishment” of South Africa. Up to that point, US negotiator Donald McHenry’s prediction that Namibia was “perhaps the easiest southern Africa nut to crack” seemed quite credible. Throughout the fall and winter careful groundwork had been laid for a compromise proposal which the five western powers on the Security Council circulated privately a week before the meeting. Far from giving all the points to SWAPO, the UN-recognized representative of the Namibia people, the proposals made serious inroads into UN Resolution 385, adopted in early 1976 as a compromise statement of the essentials for a just solution in Namibia.

The new western proposals called for:
1. A special representative of the UN Secretary General to “satisfy himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of the political process” leading to “free elections” for a constitutional assembly. Control of the electoral process and administration, however, would rest with the South African Administrator General.
2. A phased withdrawal of South African troops over a 12-week period, except for 1500 who would stay in two northern bases until after the elections.
3. A finesse of the question of who owns Walvis Bay.

The plan was also silent or vague on a number of key points such as the strength of UN forces.

The West appeared momentarily stunned and embarrassed by Ambassodor Botha’s hardline stance. Since the West does not want South Africa in the culprit role if the talks break down, Botha’s walkout was awkward, especially after the expectations of the West had been built up.

Botha may not have been prepared for a surprising switch in SWAPO tactics. Under pressure from the frontline states, SWAPO came with concessions in hand. While its well-prepared diplomats insisted that the issue of Walvis Bay could not be finessed, SWAPO was willing to let 1500 South African troops stay in southern Namibia and to submit its forces to UN surveillance. SWAPO also agreed to release its own detainees outside the country.

Ambassador McHenry characterized SWAPO’s concessions as “major movement,” movement which Botha may not have been able to respond to without further instructions.

**Is the Gap Bridgeable?**

Overall, the gap between the parties has been considerably narrowed. According to SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, the two crucial issues are South Africa’s refusal to reduce its troops to 1500 and to pull them out of northern Namibia, and Walvis Bay. It may even be that if the UN peacekeeping forces are sufficiently big, SWAPO could accept South African forces in the north. But Walvis Bay has got to be accepted as part of Namibia, by the West and by South Africa.

In the final bargaining now going on in Africa, Ambassador Young and the frontline state Presidents appear to have lined up SWAPO to go along with almost all of the western proposals, contingent, however, on the West’s commitment to impose sanctions on South Africa if South Africa refuses to buy the plan. But that commitment has not been made and is unlikely to be made.

**South Africa Prepares for Own Plan**

Although western diplomats are now approaching South Africa to obtain a final reading on their proposals and are trying to build support for them among “moderates” such as Namibian church leadership, their chances of success seem very slim. All signs point toward South Africa’s determination to execute its own internal settlement before the end of 1978.

To the Point, a South African-financed news magazine, says that South Africa will not accept a UN military presence greater than its own because a UN-controlled election would mean a SWAPO government. South Africa has simultaneously launched a fresh propaganda war against SWAPO, challenging the West to repudiate its as anti-democratic and revolutionary. By contrast, South Africa is ballyhooing its own plans for ethnically-based elections as “one-man, one-vote.”

Meanwhile, South Africa has beefed up its military forces in Namibia to more than 50,000. The South African police, who would be responsible for law and order during the transition and the elections under the Western plan, are now protecting
pro-Turnhalle rallies while SWAPO or anti-Turnhalle rallies are harassed and broken up.

The most important new complication arguing for a hardening of South Africa’s position is the assassination of Herero chief Clemens Kapuuo on March 27th. The persons responsible may not be known. SWAPO has denied having ordered Kapuuo’s death, but it could have been the work of Ovambo individuals with SWAPO loyalties seeking revenge for the death of 23 Ovambos killed in recent fighting in Windhoek. It could also have been the act of a South African agent provocateur. In any case, it deprives the South African government of the one Turnhalle figure who could command Namibia-wide respect if not following. It also enhances the prospect of a mounting bloody war for control of the territory. South Africa has been quick to blame SWAPO and to point to “tribal” fighting as justifying the need for their own military presence.

These signs point toward the failure of the Western initiatives on Namibia. When the UN Special Session of the General Assembly meets April 24th on the Namibia question, SWAPO’s reasonableness could well bring forth a very forceful African-led push for economic sanctions against South Africa. While the West will try to avoid having to veto such a call, it will be hard put to come up with an acceptable implementation of its own proposals unless it does so.

President Nyerere put the challenge to the West in his own pithy way. David Ottaway of the Washington Post reports that Nyerere told Andy Young on March 31st: “We have delivered our clients and now it is up to you to deliver yours.”

### NEWSBRIEFS

**Carter Requests Aid for Black States**

The Carter Administration is requesting $70 million in development aid and security supporting assistance for southern Africa for fiscal year 1979. Although this figure is $38 million less than the current year, the Administration insists it doesn’t represent any lessening of interest in the region. This year it includes only identified projects, unlike last year’s unspecified regional fund. At the same time, AID is preparing for a greatly increased US and international aid program for the region in the future.

The two frontline states closest to the west are slated to be the largest recipients: Zambia is to get a $20 million loan for purchases of American goods. (This amount is a tiny supplement to a $360 million loan which the IMF is expected to extend in the near future to help Zambia meet its huge balance of payments deficit.) $11 million is being requested for Botswana, which may be used to help it take over the railroad (currently owned and run by Rhodesia) that runs through Botswana linking South Africa and Rhodesia.

The Administration plans to increase humanitarian aid to refugees from Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa to $8 million. In FY 1978 assistance went in significant amounts only to exiles in Botswana and Zambia. Although by far the largest number of Zimbabweans are in camps in Mozambique, they have been excluded from the program, because House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Clarence Long rigidly applied Congress’ prohibition against aid to Mozambique to include aid to refugees in that territory. The scholarship program for exiles from the three countries, which has already provided funds for more than 350 students since June, 1976, will be expanded to $8 million, to fund participation of at least 250 more.

The Administration is also proposing a new program to train 300 Mozambicans in health and education in their own country. The FY 1978 request is for $500,000 out of a total project expected to cost $2.5 million.

The House Subcommittee on Africa has recommended a $20 million increase in the Administration’s request, to bring it closer to last year’s level. The Senate Committee will probably suggest a similar increase. The Mozambique aid request is expected to run into trouble in Congress, since conservatives are probably stronger than they were last year when they succeeded in blocking aid to Mozambique and Angola.

AID is currently conducting a Congressionally mandated $1 million study of possible development projects in the region for the next 5-10 years. Roy Stacy, the head of the study, has spent the last five years developing a regional plan for the Sahel in co-operation with other western donors and the recipient countries could well furnish the basis for his projected southern African plan. Stacy also served three years as regional program officer in Swaziland.

Stacy is travelling to Africa in April, where he hopes to win co-operation with the study from the Namibia Institute and the Patriotic Front. An earlier study prepared by the African-American Scholars Council drew charges from many quarters that the United States was arrogating to itself the responsibility for economic planning which properly belonged to the African countries and liberation movements. Stacy hopes this time to demonstrate that the analysis is impartial, need-oriented and done in consultation with the governments involved.

American black involvement may well play an important role in attempting to demonstrate that US programs benefit blacks both here and in Africa. AID Assistant Administrator for Africa, Goler Butcher, is insisting on a larger role for black contractors, not only in this study but in current AID programs as well. Pacific Consultants and a consortium of southeastern universities including Tuskegee are likely to produce the manpower and agriculture sections of the study. Two other minority contractors, Africare and the Phelps-Stokes Fund, are beginning projects in refugee relief and training.

When the study is completed in December, AID hopes it will furnish the intellectual rationale for Congressional liberals to argue that conservatives should support a regional aid strategy that could have a moderating influence on the politics of the southern Africa region.
Liberals Attack Arms Embargo

A small group of dedicated Congressional liberals is pushing the Carter Administration to tighten implementation of its arms embargo against South Africa.

After the November UN vote imposing a mandatory arms embargo, the President by Executive Order banned the export of all goods to the South African police and military. But the Administration continues to grant validated licenses for the export of light aircraft and other "dual purpose" goods to other agencies of the government and civilian purchasers, unless there is clear evidence that such goods will be used "directly or indirectly" by the military. Already, 70 to 80 Cessnas and Pipers have been sold to South African distributors since December.

In fact, the US cannot possibly insure that such planes won't be used militarily. Privately-owned planes are flown by civilian pilots in the South African Air Force's Air Commando units. Also, Defense Act No. 44 allows the government to commandeer any airplanes in times of emergency. The current regulations are supposed to stop the sale or use of American goods by the military and police through South African distributors, but a Commerce Department official told us, "When it finally comes out that [the embargo] is a joke, it's going to hurt our image."

While conservatives like Senator Goldwater promise South Africa that the whole embargo will eventually be shelved, Rep. Cardis Collins is hoping that the Congress will be convinced at least to end the "joke" in relation to aircraft sales. With 22 co-sponsors, she has introduced HR 10722 to prohibit the export of all aircraft, helicopters and their spare parts, as well as "non-military weapons" to South Africa. The bill also gives either house of Congress thirty days to veto the sale of any other goods, such as computers, which require a validated license.

Clark Issues Corporate Report

Two new voices from different corners called on the United States early this year to take economic steps to force South Africa to change its apartheid system.

Senator Dick Clark, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, released a report on U.S. Corporate Interests in South Africa in late January, recommending that the Administration take a series of gradual steps:

- and government facilities, like the Export-Import Bank, which promote the flow of capital or credit to South Africa,
- deny tax credits to US corporations paying taxes to South Africa if these companies "...fail to act in ways consistent with American policy," and
- establish a set of investment guidelines and fair employment principles for US investors in South Africa.

Clark admitted that the proposals come up short of "extreme measures" such as complete economic sanctions or corporate withdrawal. He also hesitated to initiate any action himself in the Senate, probably for fear of a conservative filibuster. But he did not preclude the possibility of stronger measures in the future, if the South African government is not responsive. (The Clark report is available from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. 20510.)

Donald Woods, the banned former editor of the East London Daily Dispatch, lounged in Washington the following week. He argued that full economic sanctions are necessary but also proposed a series of steps that could be implemented gradually, beginning with denial of visas to more South Africans. Woods stressed a sense of urgency, owing to the entrenchment of the Vorster regime and the growing militancy of blacks. He was concerned that young blacks see which side Western corporate interests are on, and will look to the Soviet Union for assistance. He called on the US to put "all effective pressure" on Vorster to go to the negotiating table before racial war breaks out.

Davis Cup Draws Large Protests

Over four thousand people marched in Nashville, Tennessee and assembled at Centennial Park on March 18 to protest the participation of South Africa in the North American Zone Finals of the Davis Cup. The demonstration was sponsored by the NAACP. On the previous day over two thousand people, mostly black students from Fisk University, Tennessee State and Meharry Medical College, had marched to the Memorial Gymnasium at Vanderbilt University, the site of the Davis Cup tennis matches. This group, also including radical groups, church and peace activists, organized a rally and picket line, which they maintained all three days of the competition.

The speakers at the NAACP rally included Dick Gregory, Dr. Franklin Williams, President of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and chairperson of the Coalition for Human Rights in South Africa, Dr. Benjamin Hooks, Executive Director of the NAACP, Ossie Davis, Judge William Booth, President of the American Committee on Africa, and Bayard Rustin. In his speech Dr. Hooks called for an end to all US investments, and for total economic sanctions against South Africa.

Although the speakers did not acknowledge the need to support the southern African liberation movements, the crowd was urged to join the NAACP and to follow its leadership in anti-apartheid activities.

The anti-Davis Cup demonstration was one of the most significant anti-apartheid actions to date, it was well-organized, ideologically diverse and the large number of participants were co-operative in spite of the fact that there were two separate demonstrations. It was also effective. The Davis Cup was a financial disaster for Vanderbilt and the US Tennis Association, which sponsored the matches. Four thousand spectators were needed at each match to break even, but there was only an average of 1300 at each session. Also, Mr. W.E. Hester, President of the USTA, admitted on national television that the United States would not support South Africa's participation in next year's Davis Cup. According to Dr. Richard Lapchick, the chairperson of the American Co-ordinating Committee for Sport in Society, "...after Nashville, South Africa is through in international sport."

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Produced by: Tod Lockwood, Sister Janice McLaughlin, Christine Root and George Wright.
New Calls for Withdrawal

Two major national organizations, the AFL-CIO and the NAACP, have for the first time come out in favor of total US divestment from South Africa. These policies reflect the growing strength of the anti-apartheid movement across the country. Excerpts from their 1978 policy statements follow:

"The AFL-CIO Executive Council endorses the following further actions:
1. Ex-im Bank insurance and loan guarantees for South Africa, as well as other US government operations which promote the flow of capital or credit to South Africa should end.
2. US corporations should immediately divest themselves of South African affiliates, and sever all ties with South African corporations."

From the Preliminary Report of the NAACP Task Force on Africa to the National Board of Directors of the NAACP:

"XVII. The NAACP should work to discourage support of the government of South Africa. This may be done by . . . (C) urging American depositors in banks making loans to South Africa to exercise their privileges to withdraw accounts from such banks . . .

XVIII. The NAACP should maintain its call for economic sanctions against South Africa until all vestiges of apartheid are eliminated.

XIX. The NAACP should call upon US corporations to withdraw their investments in South Africa. The Association should press with equal force for the diversion of such US investments from South Africa to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to help develop and strengthen these small African nations and thus lessen not only their dependence on the minority regimes in southern Africa but also to lessen the threat of East-West confrontation."