Jawboning South Africa: 
THE POLICY SET, NO PROGRAM YET

“We have a policy but we don’t have a program,” an American official told reporters as Vice President Mondale huddled with Ambassador Young before meeting South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Vienna.

Puzzling as that statement may sound, it reflects the Carter technique: take a highly visible moral stance that will please liberals, blacks and idealists and then negotiate concrete steps that will promote the long-range stability of US multi-national corporate interests.

Where Kissinger disdained moral lectures, they are the name of Carter’s public game. Where Kissinger ignored Soweto as the key to the Rhodesia crisis, the Carter team takes pains to make majority rule for all of Southern Africa a public objective even while negotiating with Vorster on the steps to take for Namibia and Rhodesia.

A Response to Challenges

This new posture flows from an urgency the Administration feels to dismantle apartheid before it is blown apart by revolution. Three political challenges are generating a need for a solution that will make revolution seem unnecessary and racist fascism seem counterproductive:

1. Since June of 1976, internal African revolt dormant since the early 1960’s has broken out again in South Africa, at a deeper level. The killings, detentions and torture of prisoners have only solidified political support for actions aimed at destroying the apparatus of racist rule: the police stations, the busses, the liquor stores and the schools. The possibility of effective general strikes exists. Thousands of young South Africans are leaving to get training for armed struggle.

2. At the same time, capitalist-oriented African states such as Nigeria are demanding that the West divorce its capitalism from racism. On March 22, Nigerian Commissioner of External Affairs Brigadier Joseph Garba warned:

“We are all aware of the magnitude of investments by some countries in racist South Africa … Nigeria would not hesitate to take retaliatory action if and when we deem necessary.

Nigeria’s practical importance is not being cavalierly dismissed. Secretary of State Vance told the NAACP on July 1st: “Trade with South Africa in 1960 was 39 per cent of our commerce with Africa. Now our trade with Nigeria is double the value of that with South Africa.” Nigeria supplies some 15 per cent of US imported petroleum and its oil-swollen revenues make it a greater potential market than South Africa.

3. At home, Carter must satisfy blacks and liberals who elected him that he is eliminating racism in his foreign policy. On the other hand, he must avoid, if at all possible, a damaging political fight with the rising power of the right wing in Congress. Such a fight would be inevitable if he decided to sacrifice or abandon US trade with or investment in South Africa.

Encouraging “Progress” Inside South Africa

To meet these challenges, the Carter team has launched a series of new initiatives that seeks to support liberal South African businessmen for whom racism is counterproductive, satisfy blacks in this country and in Africa that “progress” is being made, and so defuse the revolutionary struggle that is building.

In part, the new initiative seems to parallel and reflect the sense of new caution which the Eastern finance capitalists who backed Carter feel about the viability of South Africa. David Rockefeller, the creator of the now-famous Trilateral Commission, announced in April that Chase Manhattan Bank would no longer make loans that “tend to support the apartheid policies of the South African government or re-enforce dis-
criminatory business practices." This kind of gingerly, selective and moralistic disengagement is also the Carter approach. Rockefeller and Harry Oppenheimer, the man who invited Andy Young to visit South Africa, are also known to be business associates and to share a liberal corporate perspective.

The first step in the new Carter initiative was a highly visible explanation of US opposition to apartheid. In 1½ hours Mondale told Vorster that South Africa should make progress toward "full participation" in its political and economic life. Only in response to a later press question did he spell out that full participation would necessarily have to mean "every citizen should have the right to vote and every vote should be equally weighted." While he did not lay down a road map or a time table, he did suggest specific first steps: change in the pass laws, release of political prisoners and calling of a multi-racial conference.

If progress does not occur, US-South African relations would deteriorate. State Department spokesmen had told the press that the United States was thinking about certain options if South Africa didn't move:

- removal of military attaches
- ending intelligence exchanges
- denial of tax credits for taxes paid by American companies to South Africa
- denial of visas to certain South Africans
- curtailing of Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees

The second step in the initiative was assigned to Ambassador Young. His task (one among many) was to promote the new posture in South Africa itself, encouraging South African liberal businessmen led by Harry Oppenheimer, the mining magnate, and black moderates like Gatsby Buthelezi, executive of the Zulu homeland.

Young delighted liberal South African businessmen in Johannesburg by proving that a civil rights leader could be an apostle of capitalism:

... the places where I see the naked being clothed, the places where I see the sick being healed are the places where there happens to be a free market system.

Young encouraged them to believe in their own power to overturn apartheid:

... when in Atlanta, Georgia, five banks decided that it was bad for business to have racial turmoil, racial turmoil ceased. Because those five banks controlled the loans to all of the businesses in the community. And since that day everybody's enjoying the prosperity of the market system.

He was not arguing for a redistribution of wealth; on the contrary, his point was that if the economy grows fast and draws some blacks into the consumer market and into a black elite, blacks wouldn't overturn the system in spite of its inequalities:

When blacks became a part of the free market system in the South ... blacks had very much a stake in it. The tragic irony is that nothing was taken from the whites but the income gap between whites and blacks actually expanded. But blacks were so much better off then they ever thought that they would be.

Will it Work?

Already the American press is picking up every hint of possible progress that may be a response to the Carter initiative. Several prominent Afrikaner politicians are now proposing certain reforms. The Minister of Sport, Piet Koomhof has advocated (as have others before him) that South Africa move toward a Swiss-style federation in which African urban areas would get some local political rights and, with the homelands, would share in defense and foreign affairs. Foreign Minister Botha and Agriculture Minister Schoeman have advocated dropping the laws which forbid inter-racial sex or marriage. Even more significant is a planned meeting of black, white and Indian leaders aimed at possible creation of a multi-racial government for Natal province.

But such progress is far less than what liberation requires. Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress told a World Conference on Apartheid on June 18th: "When the enemy puts on your uniform, waves your flag and shouts your slogans, one must be very careful. We want power transferred to the majority and the economy restructured to benefit them. Armed struggle is the only way to achieve this."

Meanwhile the South Africans were demonstrating that they could match Carter's tactic of strengthening allies in South Africa by linking up with internal allies in the United States. Foreign Minister Botha led a counter attack against Mondale's alleged advocacy of one-man, one-vote as threatening "our destruction." In a flying visit to the United States he met with 300 American businessmen and with the right-wing Congressmen and Senators who are generating opposition to majority rule in southern Africa. He returned saying that the Carter Administration had now changed its tune. It wasn't emphasizing majority rule really; it was just promoting a human dignity and freedom all over the world.

In view of this demonstration of right-wing skill, it is very important that pressure be mounted on Carter from the other direction. This spring, six major Protestant denominations have challenged US corporations to get out of South Africa. A campaign to stop US banks from lending to South Africa is getting into gear. But neither Congress nor the Administration is hearing much on southern Africa except from the right wing. The demand has to be total withdrawal until majority rule. Surprisingly enough, the home town paper of Jimmy Carter's and Andy Young's banker friends put the case in stronger terms than the Washington Post or the New York Times:

We have talked for years to Ian Smith, to John Vorster. For years blacks in the nations of Africa have
The West's Namibia Demarche

Even while the United States was striking a loud public posture against apartheid, it was carrying on intense but quiet negotiations with the South Africans to produce a Kissinger-style "breakthrough" on Namibia.

In January, 1976 the United Nations Security Council had adopted Resolution 385 calling on South Africa to withdraw its forces and administration from the territory it illegally occupies, to release all political prisoners, to co-operate in setting up UN-controlled and supervised elections, and to recognize the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia. This resolution was a moderate compromise, setting a minimum for a peaceful alternative road to majority rule.

South Africa never responded positively to Resolution 385. Instead, it re-enforced its military presence, and, throughout 1976 and into this year, it organized a constitutional conference consisting of two delegates from each of the ethnic areas which the South African government has set up in Namibia. It was called the Turnhalle after the Windhoek gymnasium in which it met. While Turnhalle proclaimed that it was setting up an independent Namibia, it was widely seen as legitimating the bantustan structure which South Africa had set up to ensure control by the whites.

The West has repeatedly refused to approve of any United Nations sanctions against South Africa to force her to move out of Namibia. On October 19, 1976 France, the United Kingdom and the United States for the second time vetoed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

Ambassador Young and the Carter Administration are under intense pressure to produce a solution to the Namibia question so as to avoid another veto. Young told Mozambican journalists in Maputo that he was personally opposed to a mandatory arms embargo because it would be futile, since South Africa is already self-sufficient in arms. But at the same time there is speculation that the West has told Vorster that he cannot count on Western vetoes forever.

The Western-South African Agreement

The five Western powers in the Security Council now hope they have worked out the major points of a compromise deal:

1. South Africa has scrapped the Turnhalle constitutional scheme.
2. Instead, South Africa would appoint a single Administrator General for Namibia with legislative and executive powers to set up an election for a constituent assembly. The Administrator would be a South African judge without political affiliation, who would be responsible to the State President of South Africa.
3. Political prisoners would be released by the Administrator General. A panel of four jurists, two of whom would be South Africans, would resolve disputes about who is a political prisoner. One of the non-South Africans would chair and have a decisive vote in the event of a tie.
4. The United Nations would appoint a representative of the Secretary General to supervise the election process to see that it is fair, and to negotiate details for release of prisoners.

SWAPO’s Reaction

The West is now busy selling its "breakthrough" to the United Nations and SWAPO. Resistance to the scheme will center on these points:

1. South Africa insists that it must maintain troops in the territory "so long as a threat exists" to the security of the territory.
2. By maintaining control over the administrative machinery of the election process, South Africa will in fact be granted the very control which the Security Council had demanded be in UN hands. Supervision of the election by a small UN force is unlikely to be an adequate safeguard. SWAPO has reiterated that the electoral process must be UN controlled, as provided for by Resolution 385. "Anything short of this is unacceptable," according to SWAPO's UN representative, Theo-Ben Gurirab.
3. The West has so far been silent while South Africa takes steps in its Parliament to detach the only deep-water port in the territory, Walvis Bay, and annex it to South Africa's Cape Province. "Walvis Bay belongs to South Africa and there must be no doubt about that whatsoever," declared Prime Minister Vorster. SWAPO and UN legal experts insist that Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. Walvis Bay in South Africa's hands would mean that South Africa could control the flow of Namibian trade.

While initial SWAPO reactions are negative, Dirk Mudge of South Africa's Turnhalle group has declared himself to be quite satisfied. South Africa would effectively be in complete control until the "free" elections are held and there would be no "improper interference" from the United Nations. He was convinced that Turnhalle would win in an election. Most observers believe that any free election would result in a SWAPO victory.

The fact is that the West is employing the same tactics that Kissinger used to create a "solution" in Rhodesia. By creating a "compromise" with the racist regimes, the West seems to be taking a positive step forward which the liberation movements would be unreasonable to resist. In addition, the West is playing the role of the entire United Nations, which has the unique responsibility to administer Namibia. Also, the existing power
structure, declared illegitimate time and again, is in effect declared legitimate to effect a transition to "independence" and majority rule.

SWAPO's internal wing on June 20th quite correctly labelled the West's initiative for what it is: "a condonation" of South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory.

On the surface, the scheme bears a resemblance to the transition formulas of the Portuguese de-colonization. There too troops were not withdrawn and high commissioners were left in place. But the difference is that South Africa has not suffered military defeat as Portugal did. Indeed, in the view of Hannes Schmidt, the editor of the Windhoek Advertiser, South Africa has no intention of getting out of Namibia, election or no election:

It looks as if South Africa has decided to fight its war here in South West. Caprivi is the aircraft carrier which holds the key to southern and central Africa.
prospects for the assistant secretaryship that Moore got, but some State personnel reportedly find her too independent. She has won a reputation as an outspoken advocate of decreasing governmental relations with South Africa.

After serving on State's Legal Affairs staff for Africa for two years, Butcher became the consultant to Diggs' House Africa Subcommittee. She drafted a bill for Diffs making companies ineligible for federal contracts if they have unfair employment practices in South Africa. As co-chair of the Democratic Party Platform Africa task force, she almost single-handedly got a statement into the platform calling for denial of "tax advantages" to companies in South Africa and Rhodesia "who support or participate in apartheid practices and policies." She and several others went to Plains last July to brief Carter on African policy. Butcher will be responsible for the growing security supporting assistance program for southern African countries.

The United Nations Scene

Ambassador Young's role in Africa policy formulation has been covered extensively elsewhere, but a few points are worth stressing. First, President Carter believes that Young will become a "hero" in the Third World. Carter said in a press conference on June 14th:

[Third World nations] now look on the United States as having at least one representative . . . who understands their problems, who speaks their language . . . I think we have a new sense in the minds of those kinds of peoples of caring about them and to a major degree it is because of their trust in Andy Young.

Second, the appointment of Young, his assistant Don McHenry, Goler Butcher and several other lower-level officials fulfills Carter's commitment made in the Democratic platform to involve black Americans in decisions affecting Africa policy. Their appointments alone are seen by some as evidence of a new policy.

Third, Young has helped to create, and has come to symbolize, the new tone of US southern Africa policy. As such, he came in conflict with a number of career people at State, including Habib and Schaufele, early in the Administration. The most often cited example is Zaire, where Young advocated a modest US role backing up the French and Moroccans and Schaufele wanted greater direct involvement. But now there seems to be more of a consensus, among the new southern Africa team, and at a higher level among Carter, Vance, Mondale and Brezhinski.

While Young sets the tone of southern Africa policy, his deputy Donald McHenry is deeply involved in details. He led the US delegation to South Africa in April and May to negotiate with the South Africans about Namibia. He also helps plan and carry out the difficult politicking on southern Africa at the United Nations.

McHenry has worked on southern African issues for a long time. In 1972 he investigated US corporate practices in South Africa as an international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. This trip formed the basis of a recently-published book, which he worked on at the Carnegie Endowment at the same time Tony Lake worked there. From 1963-71 McHenry worked for the State Department. His appointment in 1969 as an officer-in-charge of the Office of United Nations' Political Affairs gives him useful experience for his current job.

The Vice President's Role

Vice President Mondale may have appeared on the southern Africa scene for only one episode. He was assigned the task of telling South Africa about the new thrust of US policy, which he did at his meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna in May. Robert Schrum speculates in New Times that Mondale was brought in to oversee Africa policy until Schaufele was replaced by someone more in tune with the current Administration. Whether Mondale continues in this role remains to be seen.

Young Preaches Non-Violence, But Few Are Converted

When Andy Young left a meeting with Mozambican President Samora Machel in mid-May, he told a reporter, "I have just learned the full weakness of my position." This unusually candid statement (even for Young) during his week in Maputo as the top US representative to the United Nations conference on Zimbabwe and Namibia reflected the persistent difference between African countries and the West on the current struggle in southern Africa.

The conference wasn't planned for a confrontation. Western states have boycotted most previous UN conferences on southern Africa, and it was assumed that they would do so again when the UN Committee on Decolonization and Council for Namibia began plans for the Maputo conference. But Young and his colleagues decided that, this time, the US should participate, and Britain and other European countries reluctantly followed the US lead.

Africans Support Armed Struggle

The purpose of the conference was to express solidarity with the liberation movements of Zimbabwe and Namibia, and to plan a strategy for United Nations actions in the upcoming session to support their struggle. The principal theme running through the African speeches was that armed struggle must be supported as the main weapon of the liberation movements. Speakers from other Third World countries and socialist states concurred. Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley put it clearly:

The Rhodesian racists have made one thing clear; they will not yield to moral suasion nor even to partial pressure. Unless there is a dramatic change in world response, we must conclude that armed struggle provides the only realistic path to a solution.

The liberation movements did not reject negotiations out of hand, but judged that so far they have consistently failed. Robert Mugabe, co-leader of the Patriotic Front, called the Geneva conference last year a "disgraceful farce," and said that there should be no direct US participation in any future talks. This would "intensify the superpower rivalry in Zimbabwe" and could lead to the US insisting "that the situation in Zimbabwe move in its favor." "... the Vietnamese experi-
ence is still fresh in our minds . . . In 1955, the US attended the Paris Talks on Vietnam. The next thing was that the US had taken direct colonial control of Vietnam and in the 1960’s engulfed the Vietnamese people in one of the most savage . . . wars the world has ever seen.”

The western states tried to convince the liberation movements and African states to accept and participate in the western-initiated negotiations on Zimbabwe and Namibia. British Foreign Secretary Ted Rowlands reiterated official British policy: “We believe that ways must be found to resolve the remaining problems of Rhodesia and Namibia (as well as the racial conflict in South Africa) by negotiations. This is the heart of our policy . . . For us there can be only one way to assist in freeing the suppressed majority.” “Britain is ready. Let us lose no time.” His speech went over like a lead balloon.

Young Delivers a Civil Rights Sermon

Young decided on a different tactic, that the best way to induce African support for negotiations was to try to prove the credibility of western intentions. He dispensed with his prepared speech, and proceeded to “discuss . . . the credibility of our policy and why I think these policies represent something of a revolution in the consciousness of the American people.” Almost his whole speech was about the United States, and why the experience of the US prepared it to take the lead in southern Africa. “We have known those struggles [which Africa faces] ourselves and somehow we have been able to come through them.”

Young claimed that the United States has overcome racism, “southern colonialism” and “domestic imperialism.” (Several Africans said in private that Young assumed that none of the Africans he was addressing knew the United States very well.) The civil rights movement used boycotts to overcome racism, so that “it was [from] many of the multinational corporations that we maligned, that we somehow gained our first impetus for freedom and support . . .” The colonial status of blacks in the south had been overcome because, with the election of Jimmy Carter, “the hands that used to pick the cotton had now picked the President,” putting “the south in charge of the nation.” Young claimed victory over “domestic imperialism” because, after Watergate, corporations can no longer “buy the American government” with huge campaign contributions. Therefore, Young asked the delegates to “respect us when we are true to our own experiences,” and accept US-led negotiations and a “combination of pressures and incentives” for the minority regimes in southern Africa.

These were not new themes for Andy Young, particularly his analogy between the civil rights struggle in the US South and the current liberation struggle in southern Africa. But his words had a different impact, since this was his first major speech on southern Africa to a largely African audience. He was addressing people like Robert Mugabe, who was sitting right in front of him, when he said that a six-month boycott in which Africans in Zimbabwe bought only food and medicine “would bring an impact on the Smith regime equal to that of armed struggle.”

Africans Disagree with Young’s Analysis

Mugabe, and all the African delegates I spoke with, rejected Young’s analysis of the struggle in southern Africa. Mugabe told reporters immediately after Young’s speech that their fight against colonialism—against settlers who had taken up guns to protect their exclusive control—could not be compared to the civil rights struggle when black Americans fought to gain rights guaranteed by the Constitution. He also reminded the mostly-American journalists that Zimbabweans had sought independence through non-violent means for decades, without success. Armed struggle was the final stage, and the Patriotic Front could not turn back from it. Mugabe said Young “just doesn’t understand the history of our struggle.”

Ambassador Leslie Harriman of Nigeria also disputed Young’s position. Harriman worked closely with Young at the United Nations during earlier debates on southern Africa, but here he said that he was disappointed with Young’s speech: “I would have listened ten years ago with some patience, but instead I listened today with considerable irritation.” Harriman also told reporters that he was disappointed that Young had “nothing new” to say to Mugabe in a private meeting that he had arranged between them immediately after Young’s speech.

President Samora Machel of Mozambique explained to Young before his speech that progressive Africans view the struggle in southern Africa as one against colonialism and economic exploitation, and not as a racial conflict. Afterward, Machel reportedly asked Young not to make any more “racist speeches” in Mozambique. In a private meeting with Young, Machel also tried to speak to his view of armed struggle as only destructive. Using the drama of an effective teacher, Machel told Young ironically that the Fretilin members with whom he was sitting had all enjoyed killing Portuguese during the war. He then stopped abruptly and explained why armed force had been a necessary component of their struggle. Young came out of the meeting visibly shaken.

Does Maputo Foreshadow a Confrontation?

African delegates were disappointed that Young had nothing new to say about US policy. Expectations had been raised when Carter said the day before that the United States was prepared to take “strong action at the UN” against South Africa if it did not withdraw from Namibia. Rumors circulated that Young would announce that the US would no longer veto a Security Council resolution calling for a mandatory arms
embargo against South Africa. But instead, they heard nothing to be optimistic about, and saw evidence of continuity in American politicking on the conference resolutions.

The five western members of the Security Council—US, Britain, West Germany, France and Canada—announced on the last day that "we find ourselves unable to associate ourselves with a number of provisions of the Declaration and Program of Action. To associate ourselves would prejudice the results of negotiations" on Namibia and Zimbabwe. They didn't spell out their objections, but a call for a mandatory arms embargo was reportedly among them, along with a call to national governments to enact legislation against recruitment of mercenaries; and a recommendation that the UN tighten sanctions against Rhodesia to include severance of communications links.

Young had said earlier that the declaration wasn't terribly significant, since "the UN deals in word power; the US deals in real power." The "real power" was economic, and he was helping to exert it by talking with New York bankers about their loan policies toward South Africa and meeting with 100 South African businessmen in Johannesburg. These steps, Young said, could have an impact on South Africa this year. An arms embargo, which he personally opposes as ineffective, or economic sanctions wouldn't.

The conference should give some indication of what to expect in the United Nations now on southern Africa, but the signals are not entirely clear. If the US can avoid a confrontation will probably depend on which position taken at the Maputo conference proves most effective: armed struggle or negotiations. If, for example, the west pushes South Africa to give up its administration of Namibia on terms acceptable to SWAPO and consistent with United Nations resolutions, African countries may not push at this point for firmer actions against South Africa. Lacking this, the US will have to put some real pressure on South Africa to back up Carter's statements of support for Namibian independence and South African majority rule. If neither happens, confrontation will be very likely.

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**Congressional Right Wing Attacks Black Africa**

Two years ago aid to southern Africa scarcely appeared in the foreign aid bill. This year, Carter's plans to greatly increase US assistance to southern African countries brought a strong right wing reaction. The leaders of the attack have been cultivated by the well-heeled South Africans and Rhodesian lobbies. While their efforts haven't completely succeeded, they are slowly making inroads that could seriously damage US relations with majority-rulled countries in the region.

### Two Right-wing Attempts to Kill Southern Africa Fund

No debate on the foreign aid bill was as fiery or as lively as that in the House on an amendment sponsored by Richard Ichord of Missouri to delete $100 million for the Southern Africa Special Requirements Fund. In a dramatic see-saw vote on May 24th, the House narrowly defeated the amendment by 208-204. The Fund is a reprogramming of the $100 million requested by President Carter for the Zimbabwe Development Fund. It is designed to address the problems of southern African countries caused by the economic dislocation resulting from the conflict in the region, to aid refugees, to improve transportation links interrupted or jeopardized by regional political conflicts, and to provide trade credits for the purchase of US products.

Ichord's arguments actually centered on the negotiations over Zimbabwe. A conservative who traveled to South Africa and Rhodesia in 1975, Ichord claimed to know more about Zimbabwe than the International Relations Committee, because he had talked to Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa on the scene. "I know for a fact that the Smith government is sensitive to the need for representative government and has made considerable strides in that direction...." He said that ZANU and ZAPU were minority movements based on "tribal" culture.

... For the most of black Africa, majority rule means one party dictatorships such as that existing in Uganda under Idi Amin, or some other type of primitive despotism... I ask this body, Mr. Chairman, who is to determine what constitutes majority rule? Is it black rule? Is it black factional rule?

Phil Crane of Illinois, a long-time defender of Portuguese and Rhodesian colonialism, supported Ichord.

The political conflict in the region is the direct result not of white minority government in Rhodesia but is in fact the result of the aggressive actions taken by the so-called front-line countries which we are contemplating rewarding under the provisions of this bill.

The liberal response from Congressman Diggs focused on the key role assistance would play in supporting the black-rulled states' legitimate economic needs:

Some [of these states] are among the world's least developed and most seriously affected by the rising oil prices, and food prices and inflation and all the rest...

When the right wing narrowly lost its fight to delete the $100 million, it was ready with back-up positions. Congressman Bauman (R-Md.) offered an amendment which defined "majority-rulled countries" as "only those 'in which there exists an established constitutional or legal system which... provides for the regular election of governing officials by qualified voters who are guaranteed the right to vote without any restrictions because of race, creed or color." It was clear from his use of the word "qualified" that he intended to compare Rhodesia's qualified franchise favorably to African countries which do not have western-style parliamentary systems. To avoid a tangled semantic battle, liberals offered a substitute amendment striking out "majority rule" from the description of states eligible to receive aid. The substitute was adopted by 238 to 173.

Then came the second fall-back position. Crane proposed a prohibition of aid to Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania and
Zambia. He said that all four countries support guerilla activity which frustrates American and British efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia. In order to nulify the effect of this amendment without risking an up or down vote, Diggs proposed that the President could waive the prohibition if he "determines (and reports to Congress) that furnishing such assistance to that country would further the foreign policy interests of the United States." Diggs' language passed by a division vote, 65 to 34. Some conservatives such as Derwinski thought Crane had gone too far in lumping Zambia with the others. Zambia had been a "friend" of the West and was on "our side" during the Angola war.

Ichord tried to delete the $100 million again when the Fund came up in the appropriations bill on June 23rd. Liberals were clearly irritated by Crane's obstinacy, though their margin improved only slightly with a 209 to 199 vote. Ichord used basically the same arguments as before, and read letters from US citizens who feel that the US is supporting "communism, terrorism and dictatorship" in southern Africa. He cited Mugabe as an "out-and-out Marxist" and Nkomo as "brother-in-law" of Zambian President Kaunda.

Conservatives Cut Aid to Mozambique and Angola

Sensing that the House wouldn't pass a provision cutting aid to Zambia as well as Tanzania, Crane offered an amendment to the appropriations bill prohibiting use of US funds to finance, directly or indirectly, assistance to Mozambique and Angola. This amendment covers all bilateral aid programs, bilateral aid programs, Export-Import Bank credits, all international financial institutions and United Nations agencies. If it becomes law, it would prohibit US participation in such popular child-oriented programs as UNICEF grants in Mozambique.

Crane argued:

Nothing has happened . . . to suggest that Mozambique and Angola are any less Marxist than they were then [or] . . . that they are doing anything to stop Russian, Chinese or Cuban advisers from training guerillas or to cut the flow of Communist-produced arms to guerillas. All they are doing is providing weapons, training and sanctuary to guerillas at the very same time the United States and Great Britain are trying to work out a peaceful settlement of the situation in Rhodesia . . .

Bauman added:

Angola is serving as a base for Marxist operation against Zaire, an ally of the United States. Both of these countries are encompassed within the Soviet orbit.

But Representative Long of Maryland opposed the amendment, saying that "the situation [in southern Africa] is fluid, and we would like to leave maximum freedom in the hands of the Administration." Congresswoman Burke, a member of the Black Caucus, argued that Gulf Oil continues to operate in Angola in spite of its economic and political system.

Conservatives at Work in the Senate

Senate conservatives have the power of the filibuster, so a lot of compromises go on in the cloak rooms. Without debate or recorded vote, the Senate agreed to the House amendment to the security assistance authorization bill prohibiting aid to Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania or Zambial except by President's waiver. It also cut $20 million from the Special Require-ments Fund (including $10 million that was meant for Zaire), again without recorded vote. The Senate has yet to act on the appropriations measure in which the House denied aid to Mozambique and Angola.

Senate southerners have also taken on the cause of keeping the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington open. The US joined a consensus at the UN Security Council on May 27th in deciding that Rhodesia should no longer be able to transfer funds to a foreign country to operate an official information office. In response, the Senate adopted a "Sense of Congress" resolution stating that all foreign countries may maintain information offices in the United States. Derwinski has generated some similar sentiment in the House. He sent a letter in early June with 45 other Republicans asking Vance for an explanation of the expected closing of the office.

The Zimbabwe Development Fund and Zaire

The Senate and House agreed to retain the House language on the Zimbabwe Development Fund that the Fund should "further economic justice and development under a new government." But they kept the key Senate provisions that Congress "intends to authorize" money for the Fund "when progress toward such an internationally recognized settlement would permit establishment of a Fund." On Zaire, Congress authorized $15 million rather than $30 million in military credit sales that the Administration requested, and added that no assistance may be provided which would promote "any military or paramilitary operations in Zaire" unless the President determines it to be in the national interest.

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