EDITORIALS & PERSONAL COMMENTS

The Observer - April 10, 1966
"U.N. and Rhodesia"

Mr. Wilson's action in asking for mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter does not go far enough. He asks for an embargo on oil alone, despite the fact that the Smith regime still profits from mineral exports. He requests authority to act only against Portugal, if necessary, ignoring South Africa's more serious breaches of the oil embargo.

These steps are not likely to deter South Africa; moreover the Election has strengthened Mr. Wilson to the point where the only risk he runs is that sanctions may fail, and he may in the end be compelled to bargain with Smith or resort to force. "Britain's standing in the U.N., and in Africa, has already been greatly harmed by the weakness of her efforts to end the Rhodesian rebellion. The time has come for Mr. Wilson to stop fudging the Rhodesian issue."

The Economist - April 9-15, 1966
"Make up your mind, Dr. Verwoerd"

The one fixed point in all the shady proceedings surrounding the circuitous voyage of the tanker that reached Beira on Tuesday has been "that the ship is under charter to a South African company and has been throughout. And this is also true, it appears, of the second tanker, the Manuela, which on Tuesday reached the Mozambique channel with a similar cargo of oil, of similar origin and by all indications, with a similar purpose. Thus, however, this episode develops, it symbolises the hard reality behind the Rhodesian rebellion . . . It is South Africa that has the resources and the will (to offer the Smith regime help) . . . Since November, the Smith government has steadily become more and more dependent on South African aid, which has taken many forms in addition to the well-publicised private supply of petrol. . . . Mr. Smith's chances of earning any useful amount of foreign exchange with tobacco clearly depend on South Africa's readiness to buy far more than it needs for itself -- and on South African success in reselling the tobacco. At the same time the Smith regime has evolved in a direction that must reassure any white South African who actually believed its initial pronouncements about dealing fairly with all races and upholding democratic or Christian values . . . The silencing of protest has been carried at least as far by Mr. Smith as by Dr. Verwoerd, in regard to both parliament and press . . . ."

"In a sense, the British and South African elections have freed both ruling parties' hands to Mr. Smith's detriment. The Labour party need no longer take such pain to keep the Tories either with it or at least helplessly divided on Rhodesian issues. The Nationalists, on the other hand, no longer need to worry (if they ever did) about being outbid by the United Party. Dr. Verwoerd can now look coolly and objectively at his real interest in sustaining a rebellion on British territory . . .

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The question now is whether and how far, in order to make sanctions really effective against the rebels, sanctions would also have to be applied to South Africa and Portugal. And the cumulative evidence of five months shows that this extension would indeed be necessary... Whatever subtleties the lawyers may detect in the formulae about sanctions contained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the layman may yet conclude that the matter is really quite simple. When a rebellion on one state's territory is kept going only by another state's massive aid to the rebels, a breach of the peace, rather than a mere threat to it, exists --- and in the rough old days, a casus belli would have existed too..."

"In the past Dr. Verwoerd has counted on the extensive entanglement of interests between Britain and South Africa to ensure that Britain would resist any international move against him. Now he seems very close to a position in which Britain might well soon be placing itself at the head of such an international action. Is this what he really wants? If so, there seems no way of avoiding an imminent showdown. If not, he must make up his mind quickly -- and ditch Mr. Smith."

The Christian Science Monitor - April 11, 1966
"Editorial"
"It would be naive to assume that what the British propose will necessarily be enough to bring about soon what the British are committed to. On the other hand, there is no reason to avoid giving the British proposals a trial: if it works, all Rhodesians, black and white alike, would be spared much... The British remain the only government people in a position to move effectively in Rhodesia. They have committed themselves to move in the right direction - and moving now."

The New York Times - April 11, 1966
"Sanctions on the High Seas"
The British seizure of a Greek tanker only "dramatizes the effort to constrict Rhodesia's economy. It would be unrealistic to consider it in any stronger light because Rhodesia can manage without oil from that source, thanks mainly to South Africa's help... Nevertheless, it was a psychologically effective thing for Britain to do --and especially so because the United Nations Security Council had formally authorized such action. The African who heads the council this month and the African delegates who abstained from voting on the authorization resolution displayed poor judgement in trying to block the move." Yet this oil blockade does give P.M. Wilson greater power even though any economic pressure "cannot be truly effective without support from South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique and Angola." The problem is multiplied by the fact that Rhodesia is "self-sufficient in essentials like food or coal for its industries."

"This does not mean that sanctions are futile or that the wearing, nerve-racking impact of partial isolation and moral ostracism will not in time have a weakening effect on Rhodesia. It cannot be doubted that the white minority... is fighting a losing battle... In Africa, in the last third of the twentieth century, white supremacists are not going to rule over the black majority indefinitely."

"The whites today are strong and dominant in Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, but the 'winds of change' are blowing. They will doubtless prove
more effective in the course of time than oil sanctions or a trade embargo. But the British deserve support, most of all by the African nations, in their efforts to speed that change."

THE CRISIS AT BEIRA; THE OIL EMBARGO and U.N. ACTION

Chronology of Events:

APRIL 7th

The Times, London: The British members of the Lonhro Company are meeting with the board of directors of the company to decide what is to be done with the tanker (Johanna V) at Beira. The Portuguese government said it would not interfere with the transport of merchandise for any African country through Portuguese territory. It also said it would not take the initiative in securing oil for Rhodesia. The British maintain that as there are no facilities for pumping oil directly from the tanker to the pipeline, such an installation would be taking the initiative. Also the use of new storage tanks would be a similar act. The Portuguese Government insists that the new tanks are for the storage of oil for use in Mozambique only.

The Captain of the Johanna V, Pavlos Charitides, has had his forfeited for life and will be committed for trial by the Greek Government. The owners of the ship are liable to a $30,000 fine. The ship's papers and flag will also be confiscated by the Greek Consul in Beira, thereby making the tanker a pirate ship. The penalties will be imposed whether the oil is discharged or not. A second vessel, the Manuela, a Greek ship has been warned to stay away from Beira.

African nations have been asking for mandatory observance of economic sanctions against Rhodesia via the UN Charter, Chapter 7. Uganda today offered a refinement of the proposal, limiting the mandatory sanctions to oil only. No agreement was reached in the sanctions committee meeting.

The New York Times: Lisbon insists that it will keep an open door policy in Mozambique, despite British pressure. "The major risks, according to diplomatic sources, would be an extension of a UN embargo against Portugal", if oil were allowed to be pumped to Rhodesia. Oil has not been pumped from Beira since December 31, 1965, when the crude oil supply was exhausted. Nevertheless the Portuguese have maintained the policy of "giving landlocked countries free access to the sea," refusing to support the oil embargo.

The British Foreign Office believes that no activity in Beira indicates that the Johanna V is preparing to dock and discharge its crude oil, although tomorrow morning it will be able to move with the high tide. The Manuela has been sited 600 miles from Beira and should arrive in two days.

Although force was not considered in the Johanna V case, the British insist that the action taken does not constitute a precedent. Reasons given for not using force were: 1) to avoid loss of life, 2) that there is "no basis in international law for the use of force on the high seas." The British Daily Express thinks lack of using force is humiliating for the British Navy. They cited the precedent of President Kennedy's action against the Russians in Cuba.
APRIL 7th: The New York Times (Cont.)

The Security Council of the U.N. was called to consider the Rhodesian matter.

APRIL 8th

The New York Times: "Arthur J. Goldberg led a two hour 'sit in' tonight (April 7th) in the Security Council chamber in an attempt to bring about an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Rhodesian situation." He was joined by "fellow protestors" from Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Japan, Nationalist China, Argentina and Uruguay. France and Jordan were also in favor of an early meeting, thus bringing the total to ten nations. Mr. Moussa L. Keita, President of the Security Council, and a representative from Mali began action on the British request for a meeting. But the meeting was delayed because the African states who are not Security Council members wished to discuss the matter among themselves in order to seek a consensus. This delay "is something new in UN practice and procedure, because it could make it impossible to call an emergency meeting."

APRIL 9th

The Times, London: Britain failed to get a Security Council meeting today (April 8th) to discuss the use of force against oil tankers. Mr. Keita of Mali, President of the Council for the month, is postponing the meeting until he hears the views of the African nations which want a consultation among members of the Organization of African Unity before calling a Security Council meeting.

The Portuguese Foreign Minister made clear today that the new storage tanks at Beira will not be used to take oil destined for Rhodesia. Permission to take the oil directly from the Johanna V to the Umtali pipeline has not been requested. The second tanker Manuela appears to be heading for Durban.

The New York Times: The British are seeking international approval to use force to prevent oil being off-loaded at Beira, but the Security Council meeting was delayed by the acting President. He was criticized and pressured by the United States and Britain to convene the meeting immediately. (The article spent 2 columns on reprimands of Mr. Keita)

Portugal accused Britain of trying to make her a scapegoat in the Rhodesian affair. A Portuguese communiqué rejected "responsibility for a situation which could never have occurred or developed against the will of Britain." It pointed out that "the oil aboard the tanker was supplied by international companies, whose names are known and who could have stopped the supply at the origin," plus "the destination of the ship was given as being Rotterdam and Dalar, but it was known before hand that the order had not been made in either of these cities." The Portuguese have agreed though that the new storage tanks in Beira will not be used for Rhodesia-bound oil.

The Johannesburg Star: Two ships of the Portuguese navy waited three miles out from Beira to escort the Manuela into port until it became clear that the oil tanker would not be able to evade the British blockade. Meanwhile in Beira tension ran high and George Vardinoyannis, captain of the Ioanna V, insisted that he would discharge his 10,000 tons of crude oil only at Djibouti, Fr. Somaliland. However, there is no
refinery at Djibouti to handle his cargo. Capt. Vardinoyannis has been engaged in secret discussions in Beira with Mozambique Investments, a commercial concern formed in December and given Portuguese approval to erect oil storage tanks in Beira. Joining these talks have been Col. Andrew Leslie, Secretary to the Rhodesian Ministry of Transport and Power, and Mr. Rudolph Raphaely, a Johannesburg businessman closely connected with the firm which chartered the Joanna V in March. Portuguese security forces and police are closely watching the 6 storage tanks and the pipeline to Umtali after rumors of possible sabotage.

Rhodians continue to express their gratitude to South Africa for gifts of petrol. This week a South African Cabinet Minister will receive a scroll with about 10,000 signatures from Bulawayo and a copper plaque featuring Cecil Rhodes, Dr. Verwoerd, and Ian Smith.

The New York Times: After Britain asked the Security Council for a mandate to use force to prevent sea-borne oil from reaching Rhodesia three African states attempted to broaden the mandate by calling for the use of military action to bring down the Smith regime. Britain naturally refused this alternative in line with her past policy and she has the power to veto it within the Security Council even if the more radical amendment has the nine affirmative votes necessary for passage. The Council met on Saturday the 9th and Lord Caradon, the British representative, said that discussion on the fact that the meeting was delayed could be postponed in view of the emergency of the oil issue. He said that time was getting short but that the unloading of the oil at Beira could be stopped if the Security Council acted.

Apollo K. Kironde of Uganda submitted the African amendment to the British resolution. He said that "the situation in Beira is a symptom, not the root cause of the failure of sanctions. The root is at Salisbury." The worst amendment in the eyes of the British would be one asking her to "employ all measures including the use of armed force to bring down the settler minority in Rhodesia." Another only slightly less palatable one would authorize Britain to prevent the transport of oil or other merchandise into Rhodesia thus probably requiring her to use force to seal the borders between Rhodesia and South Africa and Mozambique.

Arthur Goldberg "counseled the Africans to be patient" and asked that the Council "proceed practically to do what we can agree upon" before debating more controversial measures. Ambassador Goldberg and Lord Caradon both criticized Mr. Keita's delaying of the calling of the meeting while Mr. Kironde and the Soviet representative Mr. Morozov said that the Acting President has simply used his rightful "discretionary powers" to consult with other members before acting.

The old tanker Ioanna V has been anchored in Beira harbor since Tuesday and everyone is waiting for it to discharge its 18,700 tons of crude oil. Most European residents of the port town are anxious to help Rhodesia. At this time exports of chrome from Rhodesia and copper from Zambia are on the docks waiting to be loaded on freighters. Beira handled almost 5 million tons of cargo last year and the revenue from handling of goods in transit was Mozambique's primary source of income. The next most important revenue source is the Rhodesian tourist trade. 5,000 white Rhodesians are in Mozambique at present for the Easter holidays.

A report from Athens outlined a shippers' scheme to break the U.N. Oil ban on
Rhodesia. The operation to bring oil to Rhodesia began in late January when a South African who is head of the A.C. Morrison company of Johannesburg together with a top Rhodesian official arranged with a Greek company to bring 300,000 tons of crude oil to Rhodesia. The operation was "camouflaged" via the use of various Panamanian companies and required the purchase of three tankers. Each was scheduled to make nine trips to Beira. The first, the Manuela (formerly the Marivenus which flew a Liberian flag) was bought for $658,000 and put on a Greek register. It loaded with 14,000 tons of oil at Bandar Mashur, Iran and seems to be headed for Beira until last night when the Greek master informed his Government that the Manuela was destined for Rotterdam via Durban, South Africa. A second ship Ioanna V (formerly the Arietta Venizelos) was chartered to take 18,000 tons of oil to Beira. The Venizelos S.A. owners fearing trouble over the Rhodesian embargo amended its destination to read Rotterdam. It was then decided that the combine should buy the ship at Gibraltar before it would have turned north to go to Rotterdam. The bill of sale for $1.1 million (which included the oil on board as well) was signed in New York and the tanker was assigned to the Varnicos Corporation of Panama. She was renamed Ioanna V and went to Dakar, Senegal for refueling. Since the Greek Government as of March 12th has forbid all of its ships to deliver oil to Rhodesia via Mozambique or South Africa even those ships with prior commitments the ship's Greek register was removed when she came to Beira and her captain, Pavlos Charitides, lost his certificate. The tanker was then placed on a Panama register by her owners.

The third ship is the Norwegian Bjortangen which was renamed Nicos V and bought by the combine also, but her whereabouts is unknown. Mr. Nicos Vardinoyannis announced in Athens that he is the agent for these ships at Piraeus, the Athens port, and that it was his function to buy Persian Gulf oil for them. But he denied that he owned shares in the tankers and that he was trying to break the oil embargo. He said that the owners and charterers directed the ships' destinations. Yet it is interesting that Mr. Vardinoyannis' brother, George, went on the Ioanna V in Dakar and actually took control of the boat. Nicos also announced that he had been suspended as the agent for the Manuela but that he thought it was being sent to Beira. The Greek Ministry of Merchant Marine has ordered this tanker to stay out of Beira even if her owners ask her to go to the Mozambique port.

The Manuela has been cited, reported Reuters, 300 miles south of Beira on its way north.


As the final Security Council resolution was not published in full in most of the local newspapers it is included here.

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1277th meeting, on 9 April 1966

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions Nos. 216 of 12 November 1965 and 217 of 20 November 1965 and in particular its call to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

Gravely concerned at reports that substantial supplies of oil may reach Rhodesia as the result of an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further
Crisis in Beira (Cont.)

Security Council resolution (Cont.)

tanker which may lead to the resumption of pumping through the CPMR pipeline with
the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities;

Considering that such supplies will afford great assistance and encouragement
to the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to remain longer in
being,

1. Determines that the resulting situation constitutes a threat to the peace;
2. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to permit oil to be pumped through
the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia;
3. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil destined
for Rhodesia;
4. Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels
reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route
for Beira;
5. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of
force if necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying
oil destined for Rhodesia, and empowers the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the
tanker known as the Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo
is discharged there.

UN Security Council Meeting, April 9, 1966. / Provisional verbatim record, S/PV.1277/

There are several interesting facts about this meeting which have not appeared
in most of the public reports. One of these is the fact, revealed in the speech of
Ambassador Gershon Collier of Sierra Leone, chairman of the Committee of Twenty-Four,
that the committee had sought to bring the matter of the infringement of sanctions
to the Security Council after its meeting on Wednesday (April 6th) but was dissuaded
from doing so by the British representative, who maintained that the time was not
ripe. The next day the British then requested an urgent meeting of the Security
Council. As Ambassador Collier expressed it, this delegation (U.K.) is found "the
very next day assuming a grave air of urgency, running here and running there, making
solemn statements, sitting in and sitting out, to dramatize to all who might be
watching its so-called anxiety for urgent Security Council action . . . . What adds
poignancy to the whole episode is the fact that on 6 April 1966, when the United
Kingdom delegation made a statement in our committee, . . . , the facts surrounding
the tankers were even then well known to the delegation. No new element intervened
the next day to justify this sudden burst of energetic concern for the fate of
Southern Rhodesia." Thus the British call for a Security Council meeting was seen
by many as an attempt to divert attention from the oil going to Rhodesia through
South Africa, and this conjecture gains probability from the fact that nowhere in
any of the statements by the U.K. delegation during the debate is there any mention
at all of South Africa, in spite of the fact that one of the amendments offered by
the three African members of the Security Council /Uganda, Nigeria, Mali/ reads,
"Calls upon the Government of South Africa to take all measures necessary to prevent
the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia." All of the amendments directed at
strengthening the resolution were defeated by abstentions, 7-8 or 6-9, and the
resulting resolution referred only to oil at Beira.

APRIL 11th
Crisis at Beira (Cont.)

APRIL 11th

The Times, London: Prime Minister Wilson said that violations of the oil sanctions may lead to the use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and that he has no intention of unilaterally putting a naval blockade around Beira. This must be an international decision he said.

The U.N. Security Council voted 10-0 (with 5 abstentions by the U.S.S.R, Mali, Bulgaria, France and Uruguay) to authorize the use of force by Britain to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia by sea through Beira. (See text above) The tanker Manuela has been intercepted by the British and has changed her course, no longer heading for Beira. The Johanna V is still at anchor in Portuguese waters near Beira. She may be seized by Britain if she discharges the oil.

The New York Times: The British warship Berwick intercepted the Greek ship Manuela and placed an armed party aboard. The Manuela is now turned away from Beira.

Because of the oil blockade the pipeline to Rhodesia has not been used. The pipeline company has a majority of Portuguese on the board of directors but the British own the controlling stock interest. The owners of the Manuela are thought by the British to be a front for Rhodesian interests and there appears to be a close relationship with the Johanna V.

The Greek Government today endorsed the British interception of the Manuela. "The master lied to us, saying his destination was Rotterdam by way of Durban and the Cape. There is no doubt that he was heading to Beira.

APRIL 12th

The Times, London: The Johanna V has been a week in the Beira harbor holding 18,000 tons of crude oil aboard. Today it moved up only 30 feet from the pipeline to Rhodesia. Captain George Vardinoyannia was reported as saying that he did not have any plans to unload the oil. Rumors are that the tanker moved into portside to take on water while others say that it wanted to unload some oil "so that she would ride high enough in the water for propeller repairs." It was also reported that the Captain had left his ship to go on a holiday while his vessel was in the port, while the Greek agent of Johanna V said in Athens that Captain Vardinoyannis had been called home. He also commented that the tanker had moved into the port in order to prevent the ship from capsizing. It is reported that Portuguese authorities are pressing the captain to unload the cargo but the Athens agent told him to only do so under written orders from the Portuguese. When the tanker tied up at the dock a number of Portuguese residents and Rhodesian tourists cheered. Armed guards are patrolling the wire fences which surround the wharf.

The Portuguese Government confirmed that the Johanna V was asked to dock in the port because of the risk of capsizing. The captain had also wanted fresh provisions and he "was considering his situation and that of his ship in the face of the threats that had been made."

The brother of Captain Vardinoyannis confirmed reports that his brother had flown to Johannesburg for business reasons, and that the ship was now flying a Panamanian flag. This is because the Greek consul at Beira boarded the tanker and removed the ship's Greek documents thus striking the ship off the Greek register.

The Portuguese Government said that it would make a thorough examination of the
Crisis in Beira (Cont.)

APRIL 12th

The Times, London (Cont.)

Security Council resolution. Another diplomatic exchange occurred between the British Ambassador in Lisbon, Sir Archibald Ross, and the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In London the Portuguese are being told that any attempt to bring the oil to Rhodesia would "set off a train of events in the United Nations and elsewhere that would be very difficult to control." It was also said in London that the owners of the Johanma V realize that under the Security Council terms the ship will be detained after it leaves Beira if the oil is unloaded. At the moment Britain cannot take any physical action to prevent the oil from going to Rhodesia, she can only apply political pressure. But there is confidence that no more tankers will be able to enter Beira.

The Manuela which was intercepted 150 miles from Beira on Sunday was reported to be heading for Durban. The 11-man British naval guard has been taken off the ship.

Lord Caradon reported to U Thant for transmission to the Security Council that Britain had diverted the Manuela from Beira and that the tanker was either headed for Lourenco Marques or Durban. Both of these ports have rail connections with Rhodesia. The question is -- what if the oil is discharged at one of these ports and how can one find out its destination? "In such admittedly hypothetical circumstances the chances are that Mr. Keita, the President of the Security Council for this month, will act much more promptly to convene the Council than he did last week at Britain's request." There are indications that Britain's request for sanctions of limited force may be used by the Security Council for greater mandatory sanctions against South Africa and perhaps Portugal."

The New York Times: The Ioanna V pulled anchor and moved quayside where she could discharge her cargo of oil. The Greek Consul in Beira boarded the vessel with news that her Greek registration had been revoked. The port captain said that the ship had to dock at quayside because of the falling tides and that she would have to discharge some of the 18,700 tons of crude oil before she could leave. The Portuguese gave permission for the docking "in order to facilitate the normal movement of the port." The Portuguese Foreign Minister said that the Security Council resolution was contrary to the U.N. Charter.

The Manuela is expected to dock at Durban. South Africa, like Portugal, has not recognized the oil ban on Rhodesia. This tanker carries 14,500 tons of crude oil. The British Foreign Office believes that discharging the oil in S.A., refining it and shipping it to Rhodesia would be too expensive an operation. The British are not worried at this time about shipments of oil discharged in South Africa.

APRIL 13th

The Times, London: The Johanna V docked at Beira today and hoisted a Panamanian flag. Efforts to obtain a line to connect the tanker's supply to the Umtali pipeline are being made in Johannesburg. A Panamanian Government spokesman said today the ship's registration would be revoked if she discharged the oil. The Greek agent for the ship said, however, that the Johanna V was going to unload oil for Rhodesia and that the Panamanian Government allows ships to dock at Beira for such a purpose.

The Greek Government is filing charges against Britain for intercepting the tanker Manuela on Sunday. Conservatives in Britain believe that Mr. Wilson's policy on the oil embargo may lead gradually to the use of force in Rhodesia and that he is allowing control of events to pass out of British hands.

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Crisis in Beira (Cont.)

APRIL 13th

The New York Times: There were indications today that the Ioanna V would discharge some of her oil cargo. According to a port official approximately 2,000 tons would have to be discharged in order for the tanker to leave quayside. Four of the six storage tanks are now completely built, each with a 3,000 ton capacity. The short pipe is in position to be connected with the trunk line to Umtali.

The Manuela arrived in Durban, S. A. today but was not allowed entrance to the harbor, since there was no berth available.

The Government of Panama has revoked the provisional registry acquired by the Ioanna V announced the Panamanian Foreign Ministry Office today.

APRIL 14th

The Times, London: Work to complete two of the six storage tanks at Beira continues as the Johanna V waits with 18,000 tons of crude oil. The Foreign Ministry in Lisbon said they had no knowledge of the imminent unloading of the oil.

The Manuela slipped into Durban. The major shareholder of the company which owns the ship said that she was not bound for Beira.

COMMENTS & PRESS REACTIONS

The Chicago Daily News - April 9, 1966 (Max Freedman from London)

Quite plainly there has been a change of British policy on Rhodesia. "It is equally clear, though Wilson does his best to hide the fact, that the old policy has failed." . . . An analysis of the vote, not by political pollsters but by the Labor candidates themselves, shows that almost two-thirds of the British people want firmer measures in Rhodesia . . . What ever the reasons this state of public opinion permits Wilson to apply a much tougher policy. . . . It is the estimate of Wilson's advisers that Rhodesia, with the help of secret loans from South Africa, can survive the blockade for another 18 months. That means, in effect, that Rhodesia would have beaten the policy of sanctions - a revolt Wilson is determined to prevent, and more determined than even since the election. . . . It must be said that Wilson on Rhodesia is behaving with a prudent indignation that may - just possible - make a stronger sanctions policy work in defiance of all historical precedents."

April 11, 1966. (Milt Freudenheim)

"A sharp behind-the-scenes battle split American officials before the United States joined Britain in approving unprecedented U.N. Security Council action to enforce the Rhodesian oil embargo. . . . U.S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg won out against State Department officials . . . " Foreign diplomats reported that officials in Washington who are "European-minded" objected to the American vote, yet Americans at the U.N. were very pleased that both Nigeria and Uganda voted for the sanctions which passed with a 10-to-0 majority. One American said, "Only a few months ago, they would have been frozen in by the radicals who demanded all-out war on Rhodesia."

The State Department it seems, according the foreign diplomats, opposed the American support of the UN resolution because it 1) challenged Portugal and this country "has been threatening to side with French President Charles de Gaulle in the NATO crisis to retaliate for American slaps at Portuguese African policy, and 2) was a precedent in international law calling for mandatory sanctions.

"The American vote for force against Rhodesia oil embargo violators is a clear
precedent for a future clash with South Africa, which strong political and financial forces in the United States are determined to avoid. The time might occur when sanctions are imposed on oil arriving to Rhodesia via S.A. and "there is also an embargo on arms to South Africa that Africans want enforced by blockade." And in the near future will come the World Court decision on Southwest Africa and if the court rules against South Africa, "there will be great pressure on the United States to join compulsory enforcement sanctions as American officials long have hinted it would."

More radical Africans and Communists said that British action on the tankers was only a "hypocritical diversion" from the basic British failure to bring down the illegal Rhodesian regime. Britain hopes that the UN action will prove to Smith that they are serious and they are also "under pressure from Commonwealth Africans to succeed before July (when the next Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting will be held) at the latest."

The Observer - April 10, 1966 (Colin Legum)

In the Security Council, Britain aims at authority for three courses of action: to get help from "flag States" in diverting oil tankers from Mozambique ports, to authorize the Royal Navy to stop ships, by force if necessary, if the first step fails, and third to prohibit Portugal from expediting the transport of oil to Rhodesia if any is landed at Beira.

This raises six problems: 1) The challenge from the Afro-Asian states for tougher measures. 2) The question of US and French backing if Britain did ask for full sanctions under Chapter 7. 3) Portugal has publicly announced that she will not comply with sanctions against Rhodesia. 4) Mr. Wilson still inclines to handle the South African matter through diplomatic channels, but Dr. Verwoerd has announced his intention to ignore sanctions. 5) The Conservative spokesman for Defense, Mr. Enoch Powell, has accused Mr. Wilson of breaking a pledge not to blockade Beira. 6) The "adventures" of the Johanna V have revealed holes in the program of sanctions, and other countries than Portugal have been involved in her run.


Mr. Krock criticizes the Security Council's authorization of the British use of force against oil-carrying ships bound for Rhodesia because a violation of the Charter is involved. The Council cited Chapter VII of the Charter as its authority for action but this means that the use of such sanctions implies that there existed a "threat to the /world/ peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression."

"The assertion by Rhodesia, the target of the Council's resolution, of independence from the United Kingdom does not create any of these conditions. So the Council had to invent them to mask its real purpose of forcing the Government of this self-governing nation to set an early date for sharing its function with representatives of a largely primitive African majority of a land which the white settlers settled and developed." There are certain dangers inherent in this action "for the naval blockade sanction lays a foundation on which demands for even more irresponsible U.N. actions, involving the international activities of its principal sponsors, the U.K and the U.S.A."

If Chapter VII can be used in this case "it authorizes a similar blockade of the ports of South Africa . . . and such demands are logical extensions of the Council's perversion of Chapter VII, and clearly consonant with it." There are certain inconsistencies in American support of this action since where real "threats" to world peace exist, in U.S. opinion, such as the Communist regime in Cuba and the war in Vietnam, the U.S. Government has not demanded U.N. sanctions nor taken unilateral action to block the ports.
The New York Times (Cont.)

of these countries. "These inconsistencies demonstrate another which is implicit in
the Council's Rhodesia resolution. It is, that the U.N. is committed to "anti-
colonialism" only when the issue is racial discrimination."

The Times, London - April 12, 1966
"Oil Policy expected to bring clash with South Africa" (excerpts from African newspa-
pers on the Security Council resolution)

Salisbury: 'Rhodesia Herald' "Britain must have considered how results of her action
in the United Nations could spread. She must have realized -- and so should other
major powers -- that the United Nations action brings warfare close to Southern
Africa." The paper pointed out that the major thrust was against Portugal rather than
South Africa. "One reason for the plain discrimination may be that South Africa is
too valuable a market lightly to antagonize; another may be that the west hopes to
force Portugal out of any contemplated Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis."

Lusaka: 'Times of Zambia' The paper called the British boarding of the Manuela as
"ominous for the Smith regime" as well as for Portugal and South Africa.

Dar es Salaam: 'The Nationalist' welcomed the action and its editorial read, "Let's
have more" noting that "British warships patrolling the Mozambique Channel cannot
prevent oil reaching Smith via South Africa."

Lagos: 'The Daily Times' "It is yet to be seen how Britain, which still fails to
use force against Rhodesia -- its colony -- can possibly contemplate such action
against a sovereign state -- particularly Portugal, England's oldest ally.

Durban: 'Natal Mercury' The paper said that Britain's appeal to the U.N. was some-
thing "that Mr. Wilson and the British people will one day bitterly regret." The
British people should insist on the opening of talks with Salisbury before their
economy is endangered by the extension of sanctions against South Africa.

Press Digest No. 16 (from South Africa) - April 14, 1966

Natal Mercury: The paper reported that Dr. Carel de Wet, South Africa's Ambassador
in London was summoned by British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart. "No
official statement was made afterwards, but reliable sources said the meeting was
amicable and in no sense a 'showdown' or an expression of British disapproval of
South Africa's attitude to sanctions on Rhodesia. . . . it is believed Mr. Stewart
told Dr. de Wet that under latest British proposals for mandatory oil sanctions all
would be well with South Africa if she played the game."

Rand Daily Mail: April 14, 1966 - "South Africa is not likely to concede to British
demands to enforce the oil embargo on Rhodesia . . . this emerges from an aide
memoire presented to the British Foreign Office on Saturday by the South African
Ambassador in London . . . The document long and carefully worded, is believed to
have been prepared by Dr. Verwoerd himself."

Die Vaderland - April 12, 1966 - "Should Mr. Wilson really mean not to draw South
Africa into the blockade of Portuguese harbours, it should be crystal-clear to him
that his dispute would unavoidably move rapidly towards South Africa without our
assistance or responsibility . . . And we will make no compromise over principles
and the maintenance of our policy of normal relations with both Britain and Rhodesia."

Die Burger: April 13, 1966 - "It has become very late for a turnabout in British
Policy . . . . The British Government has already given way dangerously to the forces
seeking violent and revolutionary solutions in Southern Africa. It will demand a

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high degree of statemanship to return to a course which will point to negotiation and peaceful settlement rather than to their escalation of the clash to the whole subcontinent."

Cape Times - April 13, 1966 - "South Africa is profoundly affected by this, ... For 20 years our enemies have been using every device to bring this country within Chapter VII. They have failed as the combined result of the support of friends like the United States and Britain, and South Africans own proper and rigid insistence on keeping the letter of the law. The position now is that South Africa is a signatory to a solemn treaty requiring us to comply with the present and any future instructions of the Security Council in that body's attempts to beat the Rhodesians to their knees. What are we to do about it? What can we do about it, short of resigning from the United Nations? And can we do even that if the South West issue is regarded as a dispute to which South Africa is a party? Emotion and sentiment apart, South Africa must coldly assess whether Mr. Smith's regime can win, with or without South African support. If the answer is yes, there is everything to be said for an all-out effort by South Africa. If the answer is no, what sense is there in South Africa being involved in something which in the long run will not save Mr. Smith and might well leave South Africa in the position to which our enemies have tried to manoeuvre us for years? Dr. Verwoerd has played his hand coolly and properly. We hope that at this stage the natural and proper sentiments of the bulk of the electorate will not make him reckless."

New Statesman - April 8, 1966 (James Fairburn)

"He [Dr. Verwoerd] knows that if sanctions against Smith's illegal regime were made mandatory by the UN, and South Africa then flouted them, the Western powers would have to face the showdown which they are desperately anxious to avoid: sanctions against South Africa herself. Yet as long as present South African trade and aid to Rhodesia continues, or even increases, Ian Smith will not be brought down by non-mandatory sanctions, which Britain lacks authority to enforce. (written before the UN resolution) Verwoerd knows, too, that he could face an unprecedented international crisis over South-West Africa. ... a clear judgement by the International Court later this year could provide the occasion for the West to screw its political courage to the point of action. Verwoerd, freshly entrenched at home, may well prefer to discredit sanctions over Rhodesia before that point is reached."

Other Reactions: Portugal

The New York Times - April 14, 1966

Premier Salazar spoke at a ceremony where about 100 Angolans, mostly white, praised him for his fight against African terrorism. Most of his long speech was devoted to Portuguese determination to stay in Africa. He said that the Rhodesian situation may become a "vast fire with risks for all who believe they can remain immune because they are far from the flames."

Note: News on the internal conditions within Rhodesia and Zambia will appear in next week's issue because of the length of this segment and the additional feature of news on the Portuguese territories in Africa.

AMAX (American Metal Climax Inc.) also publishes a "Summary of Press Coverage on Southern Africa"

"This year's Hendrik Verwoerd Award is to go to Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd. The Verwoerd Trust Fund, set up to honor the Prime Minister and recognizes 'exceptional service,' announced the choice today." (NY Times - April 22)