

SOUTHERN AFRICA NEWS BULLETIN

Committee on Southern Africa, National Student Christian Federation, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027. Room 754.

RHODESIA NEWS SUMMARY

Week of April 21-27

EDITORIALS

The Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

The Rhodesian break with London recently must not be seen as an act of desperation in the face of defeat at Beira. Rather, it is a notice to Wilson that Smith is confident, and willing to escalate the struggle if need be. "If this should lead to a reappraisal in London and open the way to a new approach, a ray of light may yet penetrate the gathering gloom."

The Observer - April 24, 1966

"Waiting for Dr. V."

"Everybody caught up in the Rhodesian crisis is now in a fix-- Mr. Smith, Dr. Verwoerd, Dr. Salazar, the African leaders, the United States, the United Nations, and most of all Mr. Wilson."

The current talks between Verwoerd and Smith show scant hope of forcing Rhodesia into negotiations; the main problem for Britain is to persuade both men that she means business with sanctions. The fiction of Rhodesia as a purely domestic concern must be abandoned once and for all, and Britain must commit herself to support of full international sanctions against Rhodesia, and against anyone who violates them.

Obviously there are dangers involved with such a policy. "But the best hope of avoiding a head-on clash with South Africa is to show willingness to contemplate it. The only other alternatives are appeasement or military force."

Sunday Express - London - April 24, 1966

It praises Dr. Banda of Malawi for telling Rhodesian Africans that violence and sabotage will get them nowhere. It quotes the Malawi leader's demand for negotiation, discussion and compromise. The paper goes on: "If Mr. Wilson had half the sense of little Banda, he would stop worrying about every fruitless growl that comes from an African power. He would not allow himself to be pressurized step by step towards war with Salisbury. Indeed, he might even pay heed to Banda's firm and statesmanlike advice by coming out openly for compromise and seeking fresh talks with Mr. Ian Smith."

SANCTIONS, BRITISH POLICY & DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

A. Sanctions:

The Rand Daily Mail - April 21, 1966

"Is it not, in fact, the oil supplied by South Africa that is defeating sanctions at its most critical point, the oil embargo?...And if the oil lift is 'normal trade' why have the tanker cars had their identification marks painted out, why has there been so much fuss about diplomatic spies at Beit Bridge and why does the S.A. B.C. rail at the 'Rand Daily Mail' for publishing details about this 'normal'

traffic? We have done this because South Africa is being committed to a course of action that holds immense dangers and we believe that the public should know what is being done in its name. In short we are systematically and deliberately helping to break the United Nations oil embargo against Rhodesia and therefore run the grave risk of that oil embargo and perhaps general sanctions being extended to us. This is what the present diplomatic exchanges between London and Pretoria are about. And this is what the public needs to understand which it can do only if it knows what is going on. It certainly won't find out from the S.A.B.C. and the Nationalist Press."

New York Times - April 22, 1966

In a debate in the House of Commons Mr. Wilson revealed that he had turned to the Security Council concerning the tanker *Manuela* after the Greek government had refused permission to the British to seize the *Manuela*.

New York Times - April 23, 1966

Britain has asked West Germany and Japan for greater cooperation on sanctions. According to British figures, these two have the worst record. Imports in both cases have dropped 70% however.

The Observer - April 24, 1966

"Wilson faces worst challenge to sanctions" by Colin Legum

By now it is clear that South Africa has "no intention whatever" of retreating from its 'normal trade' policy with Rhodesia. "Dr. Verwoerd's tactics are now quite clear. He refuses to assist in making sanctions work against the Rhodesians; but at the same time he refuses to take responsibility for their lack of success."

Mr. Wilson "is still actively but gently probing away" at South Africa, while the 36 African States at the UN have called a private meeting for this week." If by the time they have formulated their demands South Africa has not yielded, it may be impossible "for Britain to avoid accepting proposals to extend mandatory sanctions to South Africa. Britain would not veto such a proposal although France might. But even a veto could not save it from being carried in the General Assembly."

Such a step is likely to lead to South Africa's withdrawal from the U.N. The worst British and American fears are not that the U.N. will go too far in Rhodesia, "but rather that it may be committed to tasks beyond its capability to perform;" if this happened, it could seriously discredit the U.N.

The Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

The focus may soon shift from Beira to Lourenco Marques. Lourenco Marques has a refinery of its own producing 500,000 tons a year. Petrol from the refinery has undoubtedly been going to Rhodesia although the refinery management may not know about it - officially. They have been supplying their South African subsidiary and the Total Oil Company. It is thought that much of that petrol is being reconsigned to Rhodesia, coming back by rail through Komatipoort to the junction at Mcalamba and then north across the Rhodesian border at Malvernia. But a sea blockade of Lourenco Marques would be more crucial for Mozambique than the one at Beira, and would involve South Africa, as a client, more directly than before.

B. British Policy and Talks:

Die Volksblad - April 21, 1966

"There are all kinds of speculation about the talks held in Pretoria on the Rhodesian question...What the precise nature of Wilson's request to Dr. Verwoerd is and whether there was talk of covert threats from the British side should South Africa

not be prepared to limit its aid to Rhodesia and thus help to hasten Rhodesia's fall, is something we do not know. What we do know, from experience especially with regard to Rhodesia is that the British premier will stop at very little to reach his goal...if he cannot attain his aim in Pretoria, and we cannot see how he can, the question arises whether he would not again be prepared to take refuge at u.n.o. and try and obtain decisions, such as those against Rhodesia, against South Africa as well. Should such a step be considered, Wilson will have to bear in mind that South Africa, unlike Rhodesia, is a different nut to crack, that Britain is economically weak and can ill afford to start an economic war with South Africa. While there may be speculation on possible British action, one does not have to guess too much about South Africa's answer to the British premier."

Die Burger - April 22, 1966

"It seems as if a little progress in the Rhodesian question has been made now that the British Government has secretly contacted Salisbury through a high British official...This shows that Mr. Wilson is very much aware not only of the necessity for negotiation but also of the political power of the cry that there must be negotiation. By sending an envoy to reconnoitre in Rhodesia at a high level and the British Prime Minister saw to it that he was provided with an answer to the cry for negotiation...He could now tell them (his opposition) that he, like Noah, had not only sent out a dove but that the bird had returned without finding any signs of hope. "

Die Transvaler - April 22, 1966

"Whatever the nature and the content of the message which the British Ambassador in the Republic, Sir Hugh Stephenson, brought to Dr. Verwoerd there is one specific fact about which there is no doubt. That is that the Republic will not allow another state to prescribe what it must do and what it must not do...The Republic is not prepared to help place a noose around Rhodesia's neck."

The Times - London - April 22, 1966

Mr. Wilson said today that Mr. Duncan Watson, the senior Commonwealth Relations official who visited Salisbury last month was authorized to speak to Mr. Smith. There had been no response from the Rhodesian regime. A second Commonwealth Relations official, Mr. John Hennings, was sent to Salisbury and is still there with Watson's same instructions. The only condition laid down by the British Government was that the talks should not simply recognize an illegal regime. Mr. Wilson also said that six cargoes of crude oil had been purchased to follow the Johanna V. Ten or more tankers were going to be chartered to break the embargo - all of this at the time of the U.N. mandate.

New York Times - April 22, 1966

In a debate with Opposition leader Edward Heath, Prime Minister Wilson disclosed that he had twice sent representatives to Rhodesia empowered to open negotiations. But Smith had refused to talk.

The Christian Science Monitor - April 23, 1966

"Rhodesia issue sets off verbal duel in Commons"

"Arguments might be summarized as follows:

Mr. Heath: First, last December you assured the Commons that you would not "promote" a United Nations resolution invoking mandatory sanctions. Why have you changed your policy?

- Mr. Wilson: Our U.N. resolution was not promoted by us so much as forced upon us. It forestalled more extreme U.N. action by other countries. Would you have preferred us to argue over semantics rather than taking action to prevent oil being landed at Beira and sanctions collapsing?
- Mr. Heath: Second, we are not convinced that all alternatives were exhausted before the Chapter 7 U.N. resolution was sought. Your officials were still in discussion with the Portuguese and Greek authorities.
- Mr. Wilson: A limited use of the U.N.'s Chapter 7 was the only course left open to us. Greece was very cooperative; but the Greek Government stopped short of letting us use force to halt the Ioanna V.

And the Portuguese Government was not prepared to close the oil pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia. We even then knew that six tanker loads of oil had already been purchased for Rhodesia, and the number of tankers chartered to bring it to Beira was in double figures.

- Mr. Heath: Third, you fail to appreciate that by calling the situation a "threat to peace" and using Chapter 7 for the first time you have greatly increased the danger of the crisis getting out of Britain's control. Do you intend to go further and ask for mandatory sanctions on South Africa?
- Mr. Wilson: We refused to act until we were able to act under the rule of law and not against it. We have the U.N. behind us, unlike the Conservatives at the time of Suez. This was the only way to stop the situation getting out of Britain's control. As for South Africa, we are having talks with them right now, and I can say no more than that.
- Mr. Heath: Fourth, you are in favor of "all means" being used to achieve a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war. But for Rhodesia you have failed to open the way to talks and held out for unconditional surrender. Why? Rhodesia's Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, is reported to favor talks. If so, why do you not take his advice?
- Mr. Wilson: We would all like a negotiated agreement. But this cannot mean sacrificing the principles which your own party and mine have all along insisted upon. There is at present no basis for talks.

We have given Rhodesians every opportunity to talk. Duncan Watkins, a senior Foreign Office official, was empowered to receive representations from anyone during his recent visit to Rhodesia, so long as this did not involve recognition of illegal independence. He spoke to many people in and out of the government. Nothing came of it. Our present representative there has similar powers. The only reaction so far has been Mr. Smith's decision to throw him out."

The Sunday Times - April 24, 1966

"Qualified informants said today that the British leader had expressed his view to Dr. Verwoerd that the continued survival of Mr. Ian Smith's regime would escalate into a Black-White crisis on an international scale far beyond Britain's capacity to control it. In such a situation, Mr. Wilson indicated that South Africa will inexorably be sucked into the firing line and, indeed might even replace Rhodesia as the major target of Afro-Asian and communist attack."

New York Times - April 27, 1966

Wilson announced today that talks will be renewed with Ian Smith. The talks will be "informal, directed only to see whether a basis of negotiations genuinely exists."

Rhodesian sources do not think Mr. Wilson is now requiring they renounce their Unilateral Declaration of Independence, even though Wilson said he would not accept a settlement that condoned "the illegal act of secession without guarantees to the black majority."

The Times - London - April 25, 1966

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe, British Liberal spokesman on Commonwealth affairs, is bound for Rhodesia with assurance of a meeting with Clifford Du Pont, the Officer Administering the Government.

April 27, 1966: Mr. Smith responded to questions about the visits of Mr. Watson and Mr. Hennings. "I was certainly not prepared to lay any of my cards on the table before the United Kingdom Government had indicated even that they were prepared to come to the table." He said he had always been and still is prepared to talk. Mr. Smith said he would talk with no preconditions -- not even recognition of Rhodesia's independence.

Mr. Thorpe saw Sir Roy Wellensky today and is due to meet with P. M. Smith tomorrow.

OTHER COMMENTS: (abstracted from "British Weeklies", British Broadcasting Corp. overseas service, British Information Services)

The Manchester Guardian Weekly: "Britain disagrees with South Africa over many things, but none is nearly as important at the moment as the need to stop the flow of oil across Beit Bridge. We have to make the oil embargo effective, not least to convince African opinion at the United Nations and elsewhere that the white nations are in earnest about Smith. Dr. Verwoerd and his people do not subscribe to our objectives; but if they are wise, they will recognize that if the embargo fails, the real pacesetters in Rhodesia, the impatient ones, will be the Africans. . . . It would be pointless, nevertheless, to underestimate Dr. Verwoerd's difficulties. To impose restrictions at Beit Bridge would be to incur the wrath of almost every white man in the Transvaal. . . . If Dr. Verwoerd should act, he would be risking a good deal; but he should act, all the same."

The News Statesman: "Dr. Verwoerd might defy or evade the U.N. decision. If he did the next step would be logically to deny oil to South Africa. This could be done without the necessity of a naval blockade by cutting off the oil at source. South Africa's needs, unlike those of Rhodesia, require large-scale supply by the major oil companies and could not possibly be met by pirate tankers. Certainly to apply sanctions to South Africa would be a major decision. Among the factors that might inhibit resolute actions are the major effect on the British balance of payments of a decline in exports to South Africa. The risks would be much greater for Dr. Verwoerd, whose present secure position rests on a booming economy, and a correctness in international law that enables him to keep the evils of apartheid relegated to the status of an internal matter."

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The Spectator: Sir Edgar Whitehead writes, "A solution is only possible if Britain is prepared to make sacrifices for a constructive, as opposed to a destructive policy. Both races must be assured that their vital and legitimate interests are guaranteed and protected by Britain. If the peace and progress of Central Africa is to be assured, the solution must be one that can be accepted by Zambia and Mozambique, by Malawi and South Africa. It must be a solution which will enable Rhodesia to be governed without recourse to emergency powers and with the consent of the government. I still believe an act of union between Britain and Rhodesia is the only way to creative peace in southern Africa."

C. United Nations

New York Times - April 22, 1966

The Special Committee of 24 on Colonialism adopted a resolution calling on Britain to use force to depose the Smith regime. The resolution also condemned South Africa and Portugal for giving aid to Smith. The vote was 19 affirmative and 5 abstentions (Italy, Britain, U.S., Australia, and Denmark). Those that abstained said that such a resolution was appropriate only for the Security Council.

New York Times - April 23, 1966

The U.S. formally protested the delay in calling the Security Meeting earlier this month. Mr. Goldberg's letter expressed particular concern that a precedent not be established by Mr. Keita's action.

CONDITIONS WITHIN RHODESIA

A. Political Conditions:

New York Times - April 22, 1966

The Rhodesian Parliament extended for three more months the state of emergency proclaimed last November. The vote was 43-13.

The Times - London - April 21, 1966

Riot squads of police fired over the heads of Africans in Harare Township two nights ago. A number of arrests were made during the disturbances, possibly caused by lack of white maize for the African diet. Nobody was injured. A petrol bomb was thrown into an African clinic in Mufakose. Cars were stoned in Highfield, Mufakose, and Kambazuma townships. The minister of local government attributed the incidents to hooligans.

Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

Police fired shots over the heads of a mob in Salisbury; all is now reported quiet. Although there are no reports of trouble from other areas, there has been police movement in the Eastern Districts, and a report indicates that Africans with imported arms have been arrested in Umtali.

Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

Mr. John Gaunt, Rhodesia's representative in South Africa, said that in the event of the use of force against Rhodesia, they would fight. He was speaking at a lunch meeting of the Executives' Association of South Africa. He also said concerning Rhodesia that given capital and immigrants "there is no place in the world more prosperous or better for a man to make his fortunes."

The Observer - April 24, 1966

"Rhodesian courts punish Africans for UDI protests"

Reports of Rhodesian court proceedings reveal that only now many incidents are coming up which took place at the time of UDI last November; they show "considerably more active African opposition" than has gotten through the censors.

"It is clearly established that there was a mutiny among soldiers of the Rhodesian African Rifles immediately after UDI." Between 110-120 men were involved; the identity of over 45 men serving prison terms (18 months to 5 years) is known.

Five Africans are charged with an attack on a Minister in the Smith Government, Mr. McLean. "There were nine other attacks on European motorists at the same place."

"There are numerous police records of attacks on crops, cattle and farm buildings, in all parts of the country." Eight Africans have been sentenced to 12 years

in prison for destroying tobacco crops, to mention only one of several cases. A former hospital orderly was jailed for eight years for burning down a European women's club. "This was the only thing I could do to show my disgust for Smith's UDI, which was made against the wishes of the people of this country," he said.

In the Nkai area, police are trying to mop up 500 Africans in the bush, who have sabotaged telephone and electricity installations and made night attacks on farms. There is police activity reported in several other areas where attacks of various sorts have taken place.

"The international Confederation of Free Trade Unions says that 37 trade union leaders are now under restriction or in prison."

The Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

The Rhodesian Government has eased its censorship restrictions by repealing the three measures introduced in February. These regulations include the banning of blank spaces and notices that a publication has been censored, and the right of Government censors to change material. This action comes a week after Rhodesia's Constitutional Council described them as inconsistent with the declaration of rights.

The Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

"Sentiment in Rhodesia" - by a staff reporter of the Star)

- African M.P., J.S. Rubatana says that the policies of the Smith Government are undoubtedly for white supremacy in spite of his claims.

- The Queen would probably be booted today in Rhodesia.

- The main talk of whites in Rhodesia is no longer the "servant problem," but Mr. Smith. They have "an air of infectious optimism."

- Farmers as a group are strongly behind Smith, although if the tobacco sales should go badly, sentiment might change.

The Sunday Express - April 24, 1966

"Speculation of another big day in Rhodesian history - Republic Day - is sweeping the country...The most fancied date is May 11, exactly 6 months after Premier Smith declared his country independent, but still owing allegiance to the Queen...The reason is the tough talk in the Queen's speech from the throne at the opening of the new session of the British Parliament last week. Even white Rhodesians who still profess loyalty to the Crown were dismayed."

B. Economic Conditions:

The Times - London - April 21, 1966

Additional funds totaling £1 million are being requested by the Parliament in Salisbury: £250,000 to subsidize sorghum and maize export losses; £100,000 each to the Army, Air Force and police; and £2,000 for unexpected costs for deportations; £18,000 for court expenses expected in future cases testing the legality of the Government.

Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

Reports from sources close to the month-old Rhodesian tobacco sales say that things are going "better than expected." One definite fact in spite of the secrecy is that the tobacco is "moving." Whether it is being bought by the Government-sponsored organizations or whether foreign interests and brokers are involved has been impossible to find out.

The state of the property market, now recovered from the initial shock of November 11, indicates a calm optimism in Salisbury.

Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

A consignment of 265,000 pounds of Rhodesian tea will shortly be placed on the South Africa market, with the cooperation of a marketing firm in Durban. The time of the marketing has been advanced because of Durban's "buy-Rhodesia" campaign.

Prospects for the synthetic oil industry in Rhodesia are not considered bright, although the technical experience gained from the South African efforts in this field might enable Rhodesia to bypass many of the problems involved.

A new company is being formed in Salisbury to produce handkerchiefs, which have not previously been made in Rhodesia.

c. Education:

The Times - London - April 22, 1966

A new 10 year plan for African education was announced today by the Minister of Education. A full primary course for all African children will begin in 1969. From there a two-year secondary course will be introduced, combining vocational and academic courses. By 1974, 37½% of primary school leavers will be taken into this secondary course. A four-year secondary course, with further opportunities for 6th form and university entrance work for bright pupils will be made available for another 12½% of the primary school leavers. The other 50% will be given opportunities to continue their schooling through correspondence courses. The cost of all this will be borne by the central and local governments, the pupils, and private assistance. The Government will limit its expenditure on African education to 2% of the GNP. By the late 1970's there should be 100,000 children on the four-year secondary plan and 250,000 on the two-year plan.

This should swell the A and B roll voters list, but it unlikely that the present requirements will be in force by the middle 1970's.

Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

-A Salisbury High Court judge has refused to stop the arrest of Josiah Mululeke and his return to Gonakudzingwa.

-No announcement has yet been made at the university on Dr. Adams's offer to resign the principalship because of the crisis caused by Mululeke's presence.

-Tighter controls on student meetings were announced because of a demonstration by African students.

-The ballot box for student body elections was stolen. There will be a new election.

INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS

A. South Africa:

Johannesburg Star - April 23, 1966

Mr. R. H. P. Cornell, chairman of the Friends of Rhodesia trust, announced that the association had raised over 134,000 in recent months.

The Observer - April 24, 1966

Dawie (the pen-name of the political commentator for the pro-Government Die Burger) says that Dr. Verwoerd will refuse to give Rhodesia the "death blow" which Mr. Wilson demands. He further advises South Africans to fasten their seat belts for a rough passage ahead.

Further evidence of intransigence: Eric Louw has urged South Africa to quit the UN; Die Burger calculates that the country has petrol stocks to last for two

South Africa(continued)

years. At the same time there is suspicion that Verwoerd may be working secretly to bring about talks between Wilson and Smith.

Die Transvaler(from Press Digest) - April 26, 1966

Mr. John Gaunt, Rhodesia's accredited diplomatic representative in South Africa, said that he hoped that the South African Government would shortly recognize the Rhodesian Government as the de jure government of Rhodesia.

Financial Mail(from Press Digest) - April 22, 1966

It is clear that South Africa's policy of frustrating the oil embargo is drawing it into the forefront of the Rhodesian situation. What is disturbing is that many welcome this, arguing that the confrontation with the United Nations might as well be now as later. They point to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, Britain's economic weakness, and the demoralization of the African states. Why not get it over with once and for all now?

Pand Daily Mail(from Press Digest) - April 22, 1966

Commenting on Mr. Gaunt's remarks about an alliance between Rhodesia and South Africa, the Mail said "The pressure of events and of two electorates both thinking with their blood rather than their brains may yet bring the two countries sufficiently close together to make consideration of an alliance practical politics."

B. African

The Times - April 22, 1966

-Mr. William Gutteridge of the Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that African states of the OAU have little chance of making a concerted effort at invading Rhodesia by force. African armed forces - excluding S. Africa and Rhodesia - number 430,000. But only 150,000 are from south of the Sahara. He foresees a "liberation front" developing within Rhodesia, and the more the oil reserves dwindle, the less mobile the security forces will be.

-Dr. Benda again condemned use of force to overthrow Smith. He suggested that Guinea support the struggle for independence in Portuguese Guinea before tackling Rhodesia.

ZAMBIA

A. Internal Situation

The Times - April 23, 1966

Mr. John Mwanakatwe, Zambia's acting Labour Minister, accused "trouble-makers" responsible for unofficial strikes on the Copperbelt of being connected with "enemies outside the republic". Workers wishing to return to Nchanga mine will be given protection.

B. Copper

New York Times - April 24, 1966

Zambian copper producers today announced an increase in the price of copper to the market price at the London Metal Exchange. The action is in response to the recent increase from Chilean producers. The rising price lately has reflected strikes in both Chile and Zambia, the threat to supplies caused by the Rhodesian crisis, and the increased U.S. demand because of the Vietnam war.

The Times - April 25, 1966

Mr. Arthur Wina, Zambian Finance Minister, announced a new tax on copper exports. The Government will take 40% of all income over £300 a ton received by the mining companies. The present selling rate is £636 a ton. The Government will receive about £3 million a month from this tax.

British reaction to the increase in copper price was sharp. It is said that the price of consumer products using copper will increase radically, and that copper substitutes will be sought.

The Times - April 27, 1966

Union Miniere du Haut Katanga raised its copper prices in accord with Zambia and Chile.

Week of April 28 - May 4

EDITORIALS

The Economist - April 30, 1966

"The Rhodesian crisis has not been solved: it has merely been made capable of solution. It has taken five months just to get talks about talks. . .

. . . it is Mr. Wilson who has now most room to manoeuvre. But not all that much room. If he insists to the end, on any return to direct rule by the governor then there will be no agreement. . . So Mr. Wilson should be prepared to concede Rhodesian independence in the final settlement. That he can do. But the terms of that independence will be what matter. (The question of the Black African advance, its timing and manner)

Last November he declared: " It would take a very long time based on achievement, achievement by African politicians as well as European politicians, to secure the kind of free-working democracy in Rhodesia that is needed." Mr. Wilson should be no less realistic in his timetable now. That timetable should be an entrenched part of any constitutional settlement, and it should be entrenched in a manner that allows the black Africans themselves to act in defence of their rights. This means that the 'blocking third' of black African parliamentary representatives must be established with legal independence.

. . . Mr. Wilson has been wise to recognize that Mr. Smith's government is the only body to talk to."

The Observer - May 1, 1966

Mr. Wilson could not very well have rejected Mr. Smith's initiative for unconditional exploratory talks. They will "clear the air" and deprive Mr. Wilson's Tory critics of their best weapon. The initiative came at a time, moreover, when it was clear that South Africa would not end its policy of undermining the sanctions. Mr. Wilson can count on no help from the U.S., France, or West Germany in a confrontation with South Africa. Mr. Wilson could not realistically ignore this fact.

If the talks succeed, the crisis will be solved and the showdown with South Africa postponed. But if they fail, it will be very awkward. Therefore there is fear that Mr. Wilson will compromise. Neither side has much room for manoeuvre: Mr. Wilson's concessions must be acceptable to the majority of all Rhodesians, and Mr. Smith's must be accepted by the Rhodesian Front.

The suspicions of African leaders of entirely understandable - in view of the fact that the talks involve only white leaders, each of whom has reasons for wanting to disengage now. . . "the political reputation of Western man in Africa and also in Asia may depend on Mr. Wilson standing firm".