RHODESIA NEWS SUMMARY

Week of May 12-18

Editorials, Comments, and Resolutions

New York Times, May 12

Drew Middleton in an article entitled "Racist & Colonialist Regimes Pose Issue in Africa" indicates that Rhodesia recognizes that multiracialism may solve their problem but they do not care for the mulatto tendencies in Angola and Mozambique.

South African shipments of oil have kept Rhodesia's machinery well oiled. Shops in Salisbury are full of South African products. The Rhodesians still stand in the movie theatre when the music plays, "God Save the Queen." American businessmen testify to the well-fed and housed Africans, whom the Rhodesians and South Africans feel will give "lip service to Black African desires" but will not do anything. Their confidence in the viability of this position is confirmed by belief that they can control any internal uprising with their security police. Even sanctions have turned the moderates toward leadership from South Africa.

On the other hand, the whites see that the Africans are faced with military and political impotence, having one recourse open to them - "Educate and multiply." Even the least informed see the day when the Black African with overwhelming numbers will have power to demand their right to participate in the government.

Resolution released April 17, 1966 by the British SCM

It is clear that the present level of voluntary sanctions as approved by the United Nations will not be successful in bringing about the return to constitutional government and the achievement of majority rule. Therefore we envisage a series of stages of action against the illegal regime. Believing the action taken should never be greater than is necessary for the purpose, we nevertheless feel that in the event of failure of any one stage progress to the next is inevitable unless Britain is to abrogate her responsibilities to the people of Rhodesia. The stages are as follows:

(i) There should be mandatory sanctions against the supply of oil to Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories being forced to make a clear decision as to whether to support the U.N.

(ii) If either country refuses to support mandatory sanctions the next action should be an oil blockade of appropriate ports.

(iii) If this fails then a total trade embargo against Rhodesia should be made mandatory.

(iv) If this fails a total trade embargo against appropriate countries should be applied.

(v) If this fails then direct military intervention by Britain in Rhodesia under U.N. authority becomes inevitable. If there is a breakdown of law and order in Rhodesia, or a real threat of guerrilla infiltration into Rhodesia, we recognize that direct military action will have to take place immediately.

Rand Daily Mail, April 30, 1966

"Whether or not Dr. Verwoerd played any significant part in getting exploratory talks between Britain and Rhodesia started - and suggestions that he acted as mediator
seem far-fetched - he undoubtedly had strong reasons for wishing that the deadlock would end and that Southern Africa should slip lower down the list of priorities engaging the attention of the major Powers of the Western World and of the United Nations.

...For while it is perfectly true that the last thing either Britain or the United States wants at this time is a direct confrontation with South Africa, there were pressures slowly building up that might have made this unavoidable at some point. Dr. Verwoerd was as conscious of this as anyone...

There was a serious danger that this...would generate over the next two months the worst possible kind of atmosphere for the World Court's judgment in the South West Africa case expected some time in July. For even if involvement in the Rhodesian issue or an adverse judgment from the World Court, considered separately, would not have provoked international action against South Africa, the two issues coinciding might well have done so.

SANCTIONS AND OIL


"Antonio Patricio, Acting Chief Delegate of Portugal (to the U.N.) denied today that the Portuguese territory of Mozambique had become the chief source of oil for neighboring Rhodesia.

Mr. Patricio said that a report to that effect from London, published by the New York Times May 5, "has no basis in fact." He pointed out, in a statement, that Mozambique's consumption of oil was 200,000 tons a year, compared with Rhodesia's 400,000 tons. The statement said that it would be impossible for the Portuguese territory to provide oil to Rhodesia without increasing its imports or practicing rigid self-denial, and that it has done neither.


London - May 10 - An authoritative source said today that more gasoline unquestionably was now reaching Rhodesia through Mozambique than directly from South Africa. The source said the Transvaal in northern South Africa normally gets much of its petroleum from Mozambique. Lately, he said, large amounts of gasoline have been moved into South Africa - apparently to conceal its ultimate destination - and then shipped to Rhodesia through Mozambique.


Salisbury, Rhodesia - May 14 - Few people know how seriously Rhodesia's economy has been affected by sanctions imposed following the nation's declaration of independence from Britain.

The biggest changes are those affecting the country's banking and external payments system and its trading relations. By good management, sound conservative banking and considerable initiative and improvisation, Rhodesia has managed to overcome the worst financial sanctions.

On the trading side, however, the task has been much more difficult, especially where the commodities concerned are in reasonable supply in world markets, as is the case with Rhodesia's main agricultural exports - tobacco and sugar.

What is happening is a major realignment of virtually all Rhodesian trade. The effects of this realignment extend to South Africa, Zambia, Britain and the United States perhaps more than any other countries. . . Zambia has been trying to reduce her dependence on Rhodesia by increased imports from South Africa mostly but also from Britain, Japan, Western Europe and the U.S. Rhodesia has depended on Zambia for its main export market for manufactured goods. Although Zambia is still buying essential materials from Rhodesia such as foodstuffs, building materials and coal, Zambia is actively seeking for new sources of supply for these.
Deprived of the Zambian market for clothing, textiles, footwear, iron and steel products and autos, Rhodesian manufacturers have had to turn more to their internal domestic market and to South Africa.

Within the manufacturing industries themselves, it is estimated that about one-third of the country's clothing and textile factories are on short time—some of them on half time. The two auto assembly plants that assemble B.M.C. and Ford passenger vehicles have reduced their output two-thirds.

No export information is being published and the many rumors are unreliable. It is clear though that most of the country's base mineral exports—asbestos worth $30 million and coal worth nearly $5 million—are still being sold without any great difficulty. On the agricultural side, the main headache has been tobacco. Rhodesia is the second largest exporter of Virginia tobacco after the U.S. and the withdrawal of the two main British buying concerns—Gallaher and Imperial Tobacco—from the Rhodesian market because of British sanctions has meant the abandonment of the normal auction sales and their replacement by a system of support and reserve prices that means the Government-backed tobacco corporation has to buy any leaf not taken up by the commercial buyers at the minimum prices. While this protects growers to a very great extent, it does not help the external selling of the crop. What little evidence there is suggests that sales have not gone well. In fact, even Government officials admit that tobacco represents the country's main problem. Indeed, it is unlikely that informal talks with Britain would have started had it not been for the comparative success of the tobacco sanctions. Since the announcement of informal talks, however, it appears that the tobacco has been selling rather better than before, but even today little is being exported, which poses serious balance-of-payments difficulties.

Because of the reduction in exports, Rhodesia has had to use severe import controls to keep imports 25 per cent or so lower than normal. The main sufferers from import controls have been Rhodesian-based agents of British and American companies while the benefactors have been local manufacturers as well as South African, Japanese and West European concerns that have moved in to supplant the British supplies. Prime Minister Ian Smith has said on more than one occasion that the new trading links that developed out of independence will be retained even after the withdrawal of sanctions. The Finance Minister, Johan Wrathall, has suggested that Rhodesia may not rejoin the sterling area once the economic war ends.

Few Rhodesians except those employed by import businesses have been affected by import controls. Those who have felt the pinch have been buyers of luxury goods, some sporting goods and foodstuffs such as chocolate and breakfast cereals. The reverse side of this coin is the damage that has been done to Rhodesia's exports to Zambia and to a much lesser extent, to Malawi. The Zambian market was worth some $100 million last year. While it is possible—though difficult—to see Rhodesia reaching agreement with Britain, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to see any rapprochement with Zambia. The one certain result is that Zambia will never again allow herself to be so closely tied to and dependent on Rhodesia. This means not only a permanent dislocation of trading relations but also the eventual disappearance of cooperation in air and rail transport and perhaps in the production of electric power.
Sanctions and Oil (Cont.)

Rand Daily Mail, April 4, 1966
"Summing up sanctions" by Allister Sparks

"Now that the antagonists in the Rhodesian struggle have decided to reopen negotiations, it is an appropriate time to start drawing the lessons that are to be learnt from Britain's experiment in bloodless coercion. Sanctions failed against Mussolini. Have they failed against Ian Smith, too? The short answer is that they have not, for a Rhodesian victory would have seen Mr. Smith go his way, thumbing his nose at the world and giving no further thought to negotiations with Britain. Whatever may eventually emerge from these talks, it is the pressure of sanctions that is bringing Smith to the table.

Yet neither can it be said that sanctions have been a success, for this operation was intended to do more than persuade Rhodesia to talk. . . it was hoped that a quick, clean blow would jolt the Rhodesians back to their senses. . . But in this he (Wilson) has failed utterly. Rhodesian attitudes have changed, but in the wrong direction; sanctions have hardened and embittered them. The old prejudices have been intensified. Worst of all the moderating, liberalising influence of mother Britain has been severely damaged and largely replaced by the harsh embrace of racist South Africa.

The tragedy of this failure is that it was avoidable. The machinery of sanctions may have been new and untried, but the psychology of outside intervention is very well documented indeed. Every time the U.S. Government has coerced any part of the Deep South into obeying a Supreme Court order for desegregation, teams of psychologists and sociologists have swept in to record the responses of the community. . . It has been found that when the amount of pressure used is insufficient to force compliance, then the community hardens in its resistance and in its racial attitudes . . it is the worst of all possible results and means that it will take longer than ever to heal racial wounds. . . On the other hand, if the pressure is enough to force compliance, then the community tends to adapt itself to the inevitable. Prejudice suddenly becomes unfashionable and liberals begin to emerge from the most surprising quarters. But there is a danger here, too. If too much pressure is used, then compliance becomes mechanical and sulky. . . The amount of pressure must be just enough to make people recognise the inevitability of change but not so much as to remove from them the feeling. . . that the decision to change was really their own.

It is apparent from this that Mr. Wilson's Rhodesian failure was due to the use of inadequate pressure. At no time have the Rhodesians had any sense of the inevitability of change and so they have felt no need to adapt. It is my belief that had Mr. Wilson flown in troops the morning after U.D.I., he would have been far more successful in producing the kind of change he wanted. . . whatever they may say. . . the Rhodesians would have had no eagerness to fight, especially against superior forces.

TALKS AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS

Press Digest, No. 18, May 12, 1966
"Exploratory talks between Britain and Rhodesia"

After referring to reports that the African states wanted the Security Council of the U. N. to apply stronger measures against Rhodesia and thereby apply pressure on Britain to be hard on the Smith Government, Die Bruger (9/5/66) said "We hope that Mr. Wilson will resist the request of holding the pressure exerted on Britain now as a sword over the talks." The people who wished Britain to do this had no "contribution to make to an honest attempt to find a solution through negotiations."

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"Unless Mr. Wilson and his colleagues... are prepared to concede to the demand of White Rhodesians and then simultaneously reject the demand of the non-White states of Africa, it will be difficult to reach an agreement," commented Die Transvaler (10/5/66)

The Economist, May 14, 1966
"Quiet Talks, Loud Voices"

"On Wednesday the Rhodesian rebellion was six months old. The British-Rhodesian talks that started in London two days earlier were described as purely exploratory, but Mr. Smith sent an impressive team of representatives to take part in them... As they opened, Zambia's foreign minister denounced them as a "most shameful move" that could lead only to Rhodesia's black population being sold "down the river" He then flew on from London to New York, where next day the African group of United Nations member states asked for an immediate meeting of the Security Council.

... At this stage, the avowed purpose of the talks is merely to see whether there is now a basis for more extensive negotiations... The former Rhodesian member of parliament, Mr. Hardwick Holderness, now in Salisbury claims to have found astonishingly wide support for the idea that parliamentary strength should be equally divided between the white and black communities, a majority on each side being required for all legislation. Such a concept may seem hazy; but it is far more realistic than the claims still being made by Mr. Smith and his associates... that 'the Africans' actually support the Rhodesian Front's seizure of independence. If such claims were in any way true, Mr. Smith could accept the British government's six principles here and now."

Johannesburg Star, May 14, 1966
The talks about talks were resumed yesterday (Friday) afternoon. A Commonwealth Relations Office spokesman said he thought they would continue into next week.

B. United Nations Reactions
The Economist, May 14, 1966

"The draft resolution that the (African) group presented calls on all states to boycott Rhodesia completely and calls on Britain both to 'abolish the racist minority regime,' by force if necessary, and to give the colony 'an administration consistent with the aspirations of the people.' It was noted that this wording makes no specific demand for the immediate introduction of a 'one man, one vote' constitution. Initially, several of the African states did not endorse the draft, or the request for a Security Council meeting. There may be quite a lot of feeling in their group that... the better course for the moment is just to hang out warning signs and wait to see what, if anything, the London talks yield."

The Times, London, May 18, 1966
The application of Mr. Smith's regime to take part in the U. N. proceedings has been refused. In the hearings of the Security Council, Simon Kapwepwe, Zambian Foreign Minister, urged Britain to use force to end the rebellion.
"Rhodians' Bid Spurned by Thant" by Drew Middleton

Secretary General Thant rejected today Rhodesia's request to speak in the Security Council debate on the use of harsher measures, including force, to topple the independent regime of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith. Nigeria, Uganda and Mali, on behalf of 32 African states submitted a draft resolution to the Council calling on Britain to take "all necessary measures, including the use of force," to "abolish the racist minority regime" in Rhodesia. The resolution also asked Britain to use sea, air or land forces to prevent oil and other supplies from reaching Rhodesia.

The Secretary General, acting unilaterally, refused Rhodesia a hearing. The Smith Government cabled Mr. Thant yesterday asking that its Minister of Justice, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, be allowed to participate in the debate and requesting a postponement of the debate until he arrived. Mr. Thant did not reply to the cable, on the ground that the Security Council on several occasions had declared the Smith regime illegal.

Chief S. O. Adebo of Nigeria, who presented the African resolution, noted that
Prime Minister Wilson had assured the world that any negotiations would be conducted through the Governor of Rhodesia but "that this was not being done." Chief Adebo told the British delegation that it was time for Britain "to face up to the facts" and not to stand in the way of the punitive measures proposed in the draft resolution. Britain's talks with the Rhodesian Government drew the fire of a number of speakers. The Zambian Foreign Minister, Simon Kapwepwe, said the negotiations were tantamount to recognition of the Smith regime, which proclaimed Rhodesia's independence on Nov. 11, 1965."

The Observer, May 15, 1966
"Rhodesia row with Africans expected at U. N." - Colin Legum

On May 17, Lord Caradon, Britain's U. N. representative, is expected to oppose the crucial clauses in the nine point resolution presented to the Security Council by 30 of the 36 African States. The main objection is to clause 5 which would commit Britain to take appropriate measures under Chapter 7 to prevent any supplies from reaching Rhodesia. This would mean the use of force and the risk of a direct confrontation with South Africa, and Britain will accept neither at this point.

African leaders understand this reluctance, but do not see how Britain can continue to have faith in sanctions when South Africa continues so obviously to flout them.

A further issue in the U. N. debate will be the Anglo-Rhodesian talks in London. African fears of a sellout have been reinforced by Mr. Kapwepwe, Zambia's foreign minister, and relations between Zambia and Britain "are at a perilously low level." But a Cabinet directive will prevent Lord Caradon from disclosing anything about the talks. It is not likely that they have made progress in any case; the most the British can hope from the talks is that they will split Smith's Rhodesian Front between those who are willing to compromise, and those who feel that Rhodesia can survive without making concessions.

C. Commonwealth Reactions

The Times, London, May 12, 1966

Another meeting of the Commonwealth sanctions committee will be held tomorrow to keep the African Commonwealth nations informed of the progress of the Rhodesian talks.
C. Commonwealth Reactions (Cont.)

Chicago Daily News, May 14, 1966
"Commonwealth Nations Fear British Sellout in Rhodesia." by Max Freedman

"The preliminary talks on Rhodesia are being held in an atmosphere of the most qualified optimism. Neither side expects an early decision that will enable real negotiations to begin... The African members of the British Commonwealth with the powerful support of India, have mounted a campaign to discredit the talks on the ground that they are preparing the way for a 'deliberate sellout disguised as a settlement in the interests of racial peace.'... the African states are trying to hold the British government to the pledge by Prime Minister Wilson to the Lagos Conference in January. At that time Wilson said there could be no final settlement unless binding and agreed obligations were assumed by the white minority in Rhodesia to admit the black majority to its due place in the political, economic and educational life the country... The views of India and the African members have been given to Secretary of State Dean Rush by a Commonwealth emissary in a personal interview. There is discontent here that Rusk regards the Rhodesian problem as a family quarrel in which the United States cannot intervene effectively and may not be able to move at all because of opposition in Congress. It is the Commonwealth view that the United States will have to face a more difficult and dangerous Africa if there is betrayal of African interests in Rhodesia. The Commonwealth would like the U.S. to use its influence in London before wrong decisions are made. Thus far they are disappointed with Rusk's answers."

INTERNAL RHODESIA

A. Political

The Observer, May 15, 1966
"Secret Talks in Salisbury" by Roy Perrott, Salisbury

"Informal talks began in private in Salisbury today on the plan for a new Constitution devised by Mr. Hardwick Holderness, the Salisbury lawyer and former liberal politician. A number of 'interested parties' will be there, but the Smith regime is ignoring the talks."

The plan attempts to avoid total white or African dominance in the government and thus allay the fears of both sides; seats would be split 50-50, and the Africans would have an immediate share in government. "Some Africans to whom I have talked comment favourably on the idea," but do not believe Smith would accept it.

Those "who claim to know the recent thinking" of the African nationalist leaders in restriction camps say that they are "anxious to get a fair settlement before sanctions ruin the economy." they would accept "a moderate initial advance for Africans so long as it is a real one which cannot be abrogated by the Smith regime." The rival ZANU and ZAPU leaders are said to be ready to settle their differences.

"At the same time a more militant philosophy is believed to be developing among the younger restrictees." If the talks fail, the latter's position will be strengthened. Among the more liberal whites, the realization is growing that for African economic and social progress to become a reality, white attitudes will have to basically change. The key problem areas are education and employment and they are inter-related.

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Internal Rhodesia (Cont.)

A. Political (Cont.)

The Times, London, May 12, 1966

Mr. Hardwick Holderness, a Rhodesian born lawyer and friend of Garfield Todd has suggested that the political solution to Rhodesia's problems could be reached by a parity of black and white representation in Parliament. Legislation, he suggests would require a majority approval. Executive power would rest in a separately elected presidential authority.

May 14: Twenty Africans were sentenced today to hard labor and ten years imprisonment after being found guilty of being saboteurs trained in Russia, China and North Korea. Another was given five years at hard labor. All were found guilty for preparing an African nationalist attempt to overthrow the government. Seven others are under custody for trial on May 27 for planning to blow up the Beira-Umtali pipeline and to kill white farmers. These seven were alleged to have admitted that they were trained in guerilla warfare in China, Egypt and Tanzania. Twenty-five more Africans have been placed under restriction adding to the 360 already restricted and the 58 known to be detained.

May 14: ZANU officials in Dar said revolutionary forces in Rhodesia killed two whites near Fort Victoria on Tuesday. They said notebooks and cameras of journalists were seized by the police.

A small group of Rhodesian lawyers, including Sir Robert Tredgold, former Federal Chief Justice, will meet in Salisbury this weekend to discuss Hardwick Holderness' proposal for a new constitution.

May 16: The Smith Government has agreed in principle to a request from the University College that students under restriction should be restricted to the campus so they may continue studies.

May 17: Mr. D. Madzimbamuto, an African detainee in Rhodesia, filed for writ of habeas corpus on the ground of unlawful detention. The hearing of the application is to be resumed. The basis for the claim is the illegality of the Smith government.

May 18: A white Rhodesian couple were murdered today at their farm near Hartley, seventy miles from Salisbury. Their two children were found safe. Security forces are looking for the murderers.

Johannesburg Star, May 14, 1966

A Star photograph shows two hand grenades, packs of explosives, cartridge and detonator captured by Rhodesian forces from ZANU infiltrators in Sinoia. Russian lettering appears on the boxes.

B. Economic

The Times, London, May 12, 1966

Much criticism has arisen in Rhodesia over the recent price rise in petrol. The farmers union president complained that the 8/- a gallon rise will cost his industry £500,000 a year. The Motor Trade Association sharply criticized the Smith Government for their action. A £1 duty has been introduced on cars crossing the Mozambique border where cheaper unrationed petrol can be purchased. The Motor Trade Association denies any connection with the duty/
Internal Rhodesia (Cont.)

B. Economic (Cont.)

Johannesburg Star, May 14, 1966
"Petrol Prices rocket in Rhodesia"

The price per gallon of petrol rose ls 3d and diesel fuel went up 7d. Various
types of paraffins and fuels were up. The importing of petroleum is now under
license instead of the general license category, and even Rhodesians going to Mozam-
bique through Umtali must pay an import duty of L1 for car and 2s 6d per motorcycle if
they return within two days. This is mainly aimed at Umtali area residents who travel
into Mozambique to buy petrol. Only gift petrol can enter Rhodesia duty free, but
customs will be continually applied where the fuel is for individuals and associations.
Tourists can bring their own petrol into Rhodesia if they declare it at customs or
they will be given enough in Rhodesia for their own use.

"Long term loan for Rhodesia"

The Reserve Bank of Rhodesia announced that the Government will float at long
term £4,500,000 loan on June 1st. It will be at 62½% at par, and the proceeds will
help finance the Government development program and for maturing stocks. Another
Southern Rhodesia loan matures on July 15 at 3 3/4 % and holders are being offered
conversion into the new stock.

ZAMBIA

A. Political

Johannesburg Star, May 14, 1966

Zambia is involved in a subversive scare threat involving right-wing elements
and Communists, to the point that President Kaunda has promised to put the agents on
an island in Lake Bangweulu, according to the Star. The attacks have been against
the Copperbelt, Barotseland and the Royal Air Force Regiment stationed in Zambia.
The President has not said that Communists are involved but rumors are that they
are active in the Copperbelt. There are also, it is said, white agents from Rhodesia
and South Africa spreading pro-Smith propaganda. Agents from Rhodesia are said to
be trying to stir up a secessionist movement. And also they are said to have agents
among the R.A.F., trying to make they uncooperative in the interests of Zambia. Six
people have been restricted recently and the President has threatened to deport more
whites and give the Minister of Home Affairs greater power over Commonwealth citizens.
He has restricted four men who started the Barotse National Union, a breakaway from
the U.N.I.P. One is a self-admitted Communist. Thus it seems that Zambia is having
trouble on all sides. The copperbelt is ground for racialism and tribalism, with so
many recent disturbances and strikes, while the R.A.F. officers are not happy in their
surroundings.

From Nov. 11, 1965, the day U.D.I. was declared and May 8th the British civil and
Royal Air Force has airlifted 12,000 tons of oil to Zambia at a cost of R6,660,000.
Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Bottomley revealed these figures in the House of Commons
in reply to an inquiry. It is presumed that he meant the lift and not the cost of
the oil, was included in this figure. If it was refined petrol, the cost would work
out at about R2.08 per gallon, although Mr. Bottomley commented that too many factors
were involved to calculate the cost per gallon for the British.
Zambia (Cont.)

Johannesburg Star, May 14, 1966, (Cont.)

The Star noted that British charter planes bringing oil into Zambia from Dar es Salaam will make the last trip on May 31st.

Officials in Dar disclosed that the carriage of oil over land through Tanzania to Zambia is being slowed up because of the lack of sound, leak proof oil drums. Most of the oil drums have been damaged due to overuse and the pounding they have received on the rough roads to Zambia.

The Times, London, May 13, 1966

President Kaunda said today that "blood has to be spilt" in Rhodesia to oust the Smith regime. He said the present talks will not amount to anything and force must be used.

May 17: President Kaunda returned from a meeting with President Nyerere in Tanzania. They discussed the Rhodesian crisis and Zambia's need to find alternate routes for exporting the copper. No details were given.

3. Economic

The Times, London, May 12, 1966

The Anglo American Corporation is believed to be on the verge of success with an experimental process to put much additional copper on the world market. The process involves refracting from oxide ores which are at present uneconomical.

The civilian oil airlift from Dar Es Salaam to Zambia will end in three weeks. The airlift cost about L800,000 a month. Land routes are now providing enough supply.

May 16: The Zambian Government has refused to permit the Rhodesian Railways Administration Exchange Control to continue to transfer surplus revenue in Zambia to Rhodesia where it is needed to meet the running costs. Zambian copper worth L10 million represents 25% of the railways annual revenue. About L1 a month is transferred from Zambia to Rhodesia to keep the rail system generally viable.

May 18: The Rhodesian exchange of the Rhodesia Railways has countered Zambia's move by demanding payment in advance in hard currency for all traffic through Rhodesia to or from Zambia. It is believed that the Zambian Government will refuse, bringing rail traffic to a halt.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS

A. South Africa

The Times, London - May 14, 1966

The South African Government owned iron and steel corporation is seeking ways to buy a controlling interest in the Rhodesian privately-owned iron and steel works at QueQue.

The Johannesburg Star - May 14, 1966

Dr. Muller, South Africa's Foreign Minister, said this week that
U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, should not allow himself "to be used as an instrument of attack against a particular state or states." He warned that U Thant had identified himself with extremist groups who want to impose sanctions against South Africa. This, he said, became obvious during the time of the Security Council debate on Rhodesia. And although these strong resolutions were not actually passed at this time, some were obviously aimed at South Africa. He also condemned the Swedish Government for similar suggestions of sanctions against South Africa. It seems that South Africa may not vote to support U Thant's bid for a second term as Secretary General because she does not feel that he is trying to preserve peace as an impartial agent.

From Die Transvaler: To the British, says the paper, the Rhodesia question is a world problem in which the white man may not have power over the non-white. "This is in accordance with the principles of socialism and liberalism. Rhodesia cannot be an exception." But to the white Rhodesians it is not a political problem but a "matter of life." "Everything which makes life worth while for them -- their religion, culture, views, traditions, language and civilisation -- depends on them exercising political power. It can hardly be expected that they should regard themselves as expendable . . . . Nobody who lives in Britain is regarded as expendable. Why does Mr. Wilson expect that the White Rhodesians would be prepared to accept this is a question to which he has not yet replied."

B. Britain

In Francistown, Bechuanaland, the British Diplomatic Wireless Service relay station is being improved to direct stronger programs into Rhodesia. These improvements, such as putting up a 400 feet aerial, were necessitated because the BBC broadcasts were being jammed in Rhodesia.