Draft of Wilson/Rhodesian proposal (Tiger-made) to end UDI crisis was submitted to British/Rhodesian Cabinets with understanding that it could not be changed, that both must decide by Dec. 5. Wilson's Cabinet approved document Dec. 4. New York Times - Dec. 5

Smith announced RG's decision to reject "working document" proposals. RG agreed to principles/procedures for new Constitution but would not accept demands for British control during transitional period. NYT - Dec. 6

Smith criticized Wilson's rigidity on procedure, claimed that HMG's proposals amounted to demand for unconditional surrender and insertion of "Trojan horse" into Rhodesia. White youths greeted news with pleasure, talked of a republic. Associated Chambers of Commerce, consistently in favor of negotiated settlement, expressed disappointment and feeble hope that wiser councils might prevail, especially in the UK, now that RG has shown its acceptance of HMG's 6 principles. NYT - Dec. 6

In House of Commons Wilson announced RG's rejection of draft proposal and British request through Caradon for meeting of UN Security Council. Foreign Secretary Brown would take charge of request for mandatory sanctions against selected list of exports, perhaps some imports, and HMG would seek to control situation in order to avoid major confrontation in all of Southern Africa. Heath criticized Wilson for "excessive" demands of Smith over method by which Rhodesia would return to legality." NYT - Dec. 6

General condemnation which will greet Rhodesia's rejection of settlement with Britain will not alter tragic situation there. Rhodesia is, in fact, independent. Government representing 220,000 white people is firmly in charge of 4m Africans.

Pointless now to argue over HMG's strategy. It did what it could, which was insufficient... Rhodesian debacle has confirmed Britain's status as fading power... Possibility of UN military initiative is too remote to be worth weighing.

Rhodesia's defiance of law/decency, while encouraging its powerful friends, has left its opponents without feasible counter-move in sight. Whites there must inevitably reap whirlwind, but who can say how or when? Washington Post - Dec. 6

"It is hard to say which is the more astonishing -- that the Smith Cabinet rejected it or that the British Cabinet accepted it." (British Cabinet was almost unanimous in accepting working paper; only Barbara Castle asked awkward questions. Wilson insisted that Royal Commission would safeguard Africans.)

The "working document" provided for 2 stages: 1) 4 months' interim during which independence constitution would be agreed, legality/normality restored, and acceptance of constitution by Rhodesian people as a whole ascertained. 2) Then independence would be granted.

The "guarantees" during this first stage: 1) Smith government would be broadened to include 5 ministers (2 African) from outside RF, selected by
Smith and Wilson. 2) A Defense/Security Council (all Rhodesians except 1 rep. of BMG) would advise on law/order. 3) Political activity would return to normal, and the 400 political detainees would be released (if cleared by "impartial" tribunal appointed by Rhodesian govt. including 1 British rep.) 4) Royal Commission would pass on the acceptability of settlement to people as a whole. Makeup of Commission was not specified, nor whether its findings binding. During 4-month period all sanctions would be lifted.

If independence then granted, all above safeguards would be removed; present govt. could be reconstituted, censorship reimposed, etc. African progress towards majority rule would still depend on their getting education/property qualifications for A roll. Constitutional braking mechanism would make possible veto (but only by very narrow margin) or any changes in composition of Parliament; Africans would have at most 17 B roll seats, plus 8 elected Senate seats (and 6 seats reserved for chiefs who are govt. employed) -- a total of 25, and barely enough to forestall 3/4 majority required to amend these clauses (there would be 93 seats total). (In article entitled "This New Rhodesia" by Secretary of Internal Affairs Nicolle idea of developing Senate in which African chiefs could be represented was proposed. Johannesburg Star - Nov. 26)

Further, there was to be right of appeal against constitutional amendment, first to commission in Rhodesia, then to Privy Council, London.

Final guarantee would have been "Treaty of Guarantee" between Britain/Rhodesia; but no terms for it were specified, certainly no automatic right of intervention. Idea of stationing British troops in Rhodesia was dropped.

One must hypothesize that Wilson and his Cabinet believed that this settlement would really be acceptable to African majority in Rhodesia; it was a free gift to Smith. Observer - Dec. 11

Earlier, Kaunda had called for majority rule in Rhodesia before independence. Timing must be worked by Rhodesians as a whole, under British guidance: "we cannot expect majority rule tomorrow." Britain must control army/police. Kaunda did not repeat earlier threats to leave Commonwealth. Observer - Dec. 4

Wilson had revealed for first time offer of Act of Union "whereby until majority rule had been observed, Rhodesia and Britain would become one country with Rhodesians (European and African) elected to our parliament playing their full part in all our affairs while Rhodesia still enjoyed full domestic self-government". Wilson called this an offer of unparalleled generosity in history of Britain and Commonwealth. This offer was made during summer and again on the Tiger. London Times - Dec. 7

Editorial: The issue is plain: whether 95% of Rhodesian people will live under racist dictatorship, or whether other 5% will agree to peaceful transition to govt. by consent. So far, Britain's persuasion/coercion have failed. Sanctions have been limited, persuasion has primarily increased African fears of sell-out.

Africans' only effective guarantee is presence of an outside military power. Britain will not introduce this by force, and if persuasion fails, the Africans will turn elsewhere for military assistance: to the UN, and if that fails, ultimately perhaps to Russia or China. If Cold War thus came to Africa, cost would far outweigh present risks involved in tightening sanctions against Rhodesia and even SA as well. Observer - Dec. 4

Why Smith and Co. said "No": Smith's part in breakdown is puzzling; some Rhodesians jibe at him as simply messenger between Wilson and RG. He did not fight "small right-wing cabal" in RG cabinet on return from
HMS Tiger; he placed working paper before them: 9 were for acceptance, 3 against (Harper, Internal Affairs; Larner-Burke, Law/Order; Graham, Agriculture); within 2 hours the settlement had been rejected. Request for extension of deadline, as well as acceptance of proposed Constitution, were purely tactical moves.

Smith has always tended to yield to his strongest associates; but now there is indication that right-wingers are dissatisfied with him; a replacement move launched July/66 may not be dead.

The extremists count on help from SA/Portugal -- but the latter is not in position to do much.

Guerilla action in Rhodesia seems more likely now; in last 6 months, ca 100 guerrillas have been arrested after crossing Zambezi.

Editorial: Only Smith and colleagues saved Britain from disgrace of giveaway settlement. HMS Tiger "working document" did not provide for essential element of consent by majority of Rhodesians. This consent could not have been insured either by the Constitution or the Royal Commission as proposed by document.

The Rhodesian problem cannot be settled by Britain alone, nor in isolation from SA. Our shaky economy needs help, thus international support for sanctions is essential. Sanctions can be applied in stages: 1) selected list now proposed by Britain; 2) include oil; if SA and Portugal defy this, act against Mozambique. 3) act against SA first by means of oil embargo; her reserves are limited. Thus there is hopeful middle ground between submission and confrontation with SA.

Europe's responsibility for Southern Africa has deep historical roots, can be likened to America's responsibility for deep South; both are neo-slave societies. The colonial system must be unraveled, and more humane relations between Africans and Europeans substituted. Thus Commons debate on Rhodesia had air of parochial unreality: Labor's talk of legality and loyalty to the Queen, as well as Tory isolationism. We are no longer world's policeman, but we are still its citizens. Observer - Dec. 11

Results of poll conducted in Britain by Opinion Research Centre, on behalf of Africa 66: 54% feel Rhodesia should remain British responsibility, 34% feel it should be handed over to UN; Only 7% would care "very much" if some African countries left Commonwealth on Rhodesian issue; 70% would care "not much" or "not at all". Less than 10% "cared deeply" about Rhodesian problem, and there are many contradictory views. When given list of 6 issues, and asked to name 2 of interest/concern to them, only 8% included Rhodesia. Thus it is important to emphasize content of apathy on the issue in interpreting results. Observer - Dec. 4

Smith on TV appealed to Wilson for Royal Commission to test Rhodesian opinion on latest independence terms. Commission would be free to go anywhere, see anyone, no censorship. He believed that still a hope HMS would not go to UN. Mandatory sanctions would have little more effect on Rhodesia than present ones. London Times - Dec. 7

Rhodesian Government published blue book stating Britain's unwillingness to accept any reasonable settlement with Rhodesia; document reaffirmed Salisbury's openness to constitutional provisions but not to interim arrangements proposed by Wilson. NYT - Dec. 10

SANCTIONS

SA and Portugal indicated that they still consider themselves free to choose their own relationships with Rhodesian regime, independent of any mandatory UN sanctions. Vorster made SAG's position known in interview with Hamburg newspaper, Die Welt. NYT - Dec. 6

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SECURITY COUNCIL

Rhodesia twice requested chance to be heard in discussions of Britain's proposal on basis of being independent state and 2nd party to dispute, but Security Council rejected requests. NYT - Dec. 8

British Foreign Secretary Brown urged Security Council to apply mandatory sanctions to 12 Rhodesian exports: asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat, meat products, hides, skins and leather. He also asked for prohibition on sale of military supplies or materials for their manufacture; ban on shipment of above commodities, and cooperation of all concerned. The last was plea for SA cooperation and accompanied reiteration of Britain's desire to confine action to Rhodesia/avoid confrontation with SA, her 3rd largest trading partner. Brown indicated UK would not oppose any proposal to include oil provided it were "acceptable" to his delegation. Goldberg indicated US support of British position.  

House of Commons voted 353 - 244 to uphold Labour's policy on Rhodesia and approve measures being presented at UN. House of Lords, defeated similar motion 100 - 84, striking blow to Wilson's prestige but not affecting his ability to act. NYT - Dec. 9

Several countries, including France, appealed to SA to intercede in effort to prevent selective sanctions vs. Rhodesia from escalating into international crisis. NYT - Dec. 9

Zambia's Foreign Minister Kapwepwe, attacked British proposals as weak, implied British collusion with Smith regime, urged sanctions on all Rhodesian exports/imports (including oil). Zambian expenditure caused by economic dislocations of past year would amount to about $54m., nearly half normal budget, but British aid came to only $39m. ZG believed only British military intervention could assure constructive change. Brown replied such total bans were not acceptable. Reaction of UN delegates to Kapwepwe's speech was mixed; some agreed, some thought he was "extravagant," some felt he was abusive. NYT - Dec. 10

Editorial: Kapwepwe's remarks were hysterical/unfortunate, involving accusations of ineptitude/bad faith on part of FMG.

Kaunda said weak British proposals showed continuation of the "sell out." NYT - Dec. 10

Industrial/business leaders urged Smith to make final attempt to settle crisis out of their concern for the impact of sanctions. NYT - Dec. 10

Japanese delegate to UN indicated Japan's support of British and US positions, and openness on "acceptable" amendment on oil. NYT - Dec. 10

Goldberg reaffirmed United States support of Britain in Security Council. He praised Britain's "decolonization" record, stressed real power in sanctions proposed, indicated US willingness to assume cost of banning Rhodesian pig iron, chrome ore, tobacco, and other Rhodesian goods. He did not mention oil, which worried African delegations, some of whom wish oil alone added to present list of sanctions, others wishing ban on trade with all of southern Africa. Goldberg laid special stress on UN authority to act under Chapter XI in an effort to answer US critics in business. He
also stated that discrimination had intensified in Rhodesia under Smith and that US would not recognize Smith regime. NYT - Dec. 13

"Washington supports mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia because it feels American influence in all of Africa would be seriously weakened if it did not."

Officials say that unless London and Washington solve Rhodesian crisis "the Communist world will move in all over Africa to pick up the whole bag of influence", thus indicating Washington would even support eventual British force against Rhodesia. Degree of support remains to be seen: Officials are anxious not to have to send fighting men but might give logistical encouragement of some kind.

Washington's current view is conditioned by competition with Communism in Africa; unless Smith ultimately accepts London's terms, black Africa could well decide that only Communist powers could break the impasse.

Primarily, of course, the crisis is Britain's burden. But, American officials say, the cold war implications also make it one of the touchiest issues Washington now faces. Anything less than a Rhodesian backdown means trouble.

The US attitude, officials say, is not merely blind support of an ally. Rather, it is the outgrowth of American policy to support the principle of government by the consent of the governed. Christian Science Monitor - Dec. 7

US plans to invoke 20-year old UN Participation Act for first time to support embargo on Rhodesia: Act gives President powers to enforce SC approved sanctions. He may move immediately, but must "report" his actions to Congress. If this happens, Senator Eastland may have hearings, which probably would not influence Administration, but would give white Rhodesia good forum for propaganda. British officials are confident that the Act will virtually dry up key imports from Rhodesia; so far, US "voluntary" sanctions have been little more than gesture. (US imported more from Rhodesia 1966 than 1955). Observer - Dec. 11

A stroke of the President's pen will be the only action necessary if the US supports a UN call for mandatory economic sanctions. Congress would not be required to act, officials say. If the Security Council should vote the use of armed force then congressional action will depend on the exact wording of the resolution. The Council could either bind all members to use force, or it could merely recommend that they use it. If the Council recommends, then the President would be free to decide whether to act or not. If the Council does bind members, then Congress will have to act. Any Congressional debate on Rhodesia would be lively one, although the President could probably win approval if he left no doubt he wanted it. Christian Science Monitor - Dec. 12

Nigeria, Uganda and Mali backed by India and Pakistan, proposed to the Security Council amendments to British plan to prevent by "all means" the transport to Rhodesia of oil and oil products, and to add coal and all manufactured goods to British list of 12 exports. Caradon indicated that this raised "new and difficult issues" for Britain and that HMG was less opposed to proposal to urge all UN countries to halt any movement of oil, since this would take onus off Britain. Observers indicated potentially dangerous implications of ban on coal for Zambia. NYT - Dec. 14

Comment:
Although Britain politically had to register indignation at Smith, and risks its prestige internationally by not ending Rhodesian rebellion, prospects for the effectiveness of her present policy are not good. Statistics might

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indicate that ban on tobacco, etc. would be effective, but it was just such statistics that provided arguments for measures taken 1 year ago, the chief effect of which has been to solidify white opinion in Rhodesia behind Smith. Few think that the pound could be maintained at its present level if sanctions were extended to SA; even the $100 m. cost of measures against Rhodesia alone is half the foreign-exchange costs of the British Army on the Rhone, one of the most important sources of the UK's desperate balance-of-payments problem.

Sunday Times (London) indicated Labor Government had abandoned any chance of winning by ruling out use of force, and it was now time to substitute "realism" for "high moral tone." NYT - Dec. 11

United States Government should register its opposition to Rhodesia's unprincipled stand and do nothing to sustain or encourage it. But questionable whether US should encourage imposition of sanctions merely to be on side of angels. Guiding considerations should be whether Washington believes that UN's precedent of sanctions is a good one and whether it believes sanctions will be enforced. It is not a time for posturing and empty gestures.

Washington Post - Dec. 9

Circumstances are too complex, area too remote from vital American concerns to demand more of US than the kind of support that the British, for example, have given this country in Southeast Asia.

The US, whatever its critics may say, does not aspire to be a global policeman. It wants to avoid a massive confrontation of black and white in Southern Africa - and it certainly should not be in the forefront of any such confrontation. World Journal Tribune - Dec. 11

Rhodesia's exports to the US increased to $19.0 m. 1966, from $15.4 m. 1965. During same period they decreased from $24.0 m. 1965 to $14.0 m. 1966, in the case of the UK and from $90.8 m. 1965 to $77.2 1966 in case of Zambia. Total Rhodesian exports declined from $397.6 m. to $224.0 m. SA is Britain's 3rd largest recipient of exports with $731 m. The US receives $1.4 billion, Australia $785 m. and Germany $714 m. NYT - Dec. 11

Efforts to Beat Sanctions

There is increasing concern in Southern Africa for joint action in face of any future sanctions: 1) urgency in informal conversations of SA, Portugal, Rhodesia about economic unity; 2) report for Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (the most important group of Afrikaans-speaking business/industrial leaders in SA) urging development of common market in southern Africa; 3) extension of Portugal's territorial waters to 12 miles from shore, permitting communication within "Portuguese territory" of ships travelling Durban-Lourenço Marques; 4) Rhodesian reinforcement of air defenses along border with Zambia, in anticipation that latter will request British military aircraft. NYT - Dec. 9

Rhodesian business men push ahead with efforts to expand production rapidly to replace imports, to make the country as self-sufficient as possible. "We can last indefinitely," declared RG Minister of Commerce and Industry Mussett. Whites in Southern Africa are doing their best to be prepared for whatever happens. Their best precautions occasionally have lighter side; e.g. a do-it-yourself beer-brewing kit sells in Bulawayo for $19.60, even though there is still plenty of commercially produced beer. But most siege preparations are deadly serious.

Oil supplies are major concern. Sources in Rhodesia estimate that stocks are sufficient for 10 - 12 months at current consumption rates.
But everybody is being urged to build up stocks. Expectation is that by end Feb. 1967, 18 months' supply will be on hand.

Diversification has been taking place at many firms. "Since UDI over 150 new projects have started operations," says Mussett. Indications are that overall output may be only 10% under 1965 record level. One of few industries seriously hurt has been autos; Rhodesia's Ford Motor Co. and British Motor Corp. plants, both which assemble vehicles from imported components, are turning out only a trickle of cars and say they may have to cut down completely by Feb. 1967. Wall Street Journal - Dec. 7

In year since voluntary sanctions taken against Rhodesia's trade, Rhodesia lost 40% export revenue; total probably fell from $400 m. p.a. to $280 m. 
Biggest "loophole" for Rhodesian trade is Zambia, which takes $84 m. Rhodesian goods p.a. 5A has been taking $2.8 m. p.a. of listed goods, and about $900,000 has been taken by Mozambique.

Rhodesia's total need for oil is only 400,000 tons a year. That is 8% of oil imported normally into SA whose demand for oil is itself rising at 10% p.a. SA has 2-year oil supply in reserve. Denial of oil, the most effective sanction in theory, could be the least effective in practice. C. S. Monitor - Dec. 13


INSIDE RHODESIA

"Our school year ends this December, and many of our students are preparing for their external examinations. The other night I was surprised to see candles burning in the classrooms at three in the morning.

"The employment situation does not look good for those who leave school. Some may go on to teacher training school and get jobs in denominational primary schools, but there are already over 600 applications in the teacher training school for only 64 openings. In addition the government has decided to reduce the number of grades in primary from eight to seven. Situations like this force church leaders to ask serious questions about the present government's educational policies and motivations.

Letter from teacher of African students - November 1966

AT TIME OF GOING TO PRESS NO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION HAD BEEN PASSED ON RHODESIA.
STEPS IN RHODESIAN CRISIS

Following are the key events in the crisis over Rhodesia's unilateral decision to declare itself independent:

1965
Nov. 11 Smith declared independence for Rhodesia after 42 years as British territory.
Dec. 5 OAU asked members to break diplomatic relations with Britain unless Smith regime unseated.

1966
Feb. 3 Salisbury Parliament approved independence constitution.
Apr. 9 UN Security Council authorized Britain to use force to prevent oil supplies from reaching Rhodesia.
May 9 First exploratory talks on negotiated settlement held in London by British and Rhodesian representatives.
June 2 Talks resumed in Salisbury. Zambia stopped importing from Rhodesia.
July Salisbury's university closed after detention of students and lecturers.
Aug. 28 Terrorist attacks began in Salisbury.
Sept. 15 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London gave Britain final chance to settle issue.
Oct. 13 Britain's final proposals were sent to Prime Minister Smith.
Nov. 10 UN General Assembly asked Britain to end rebellion by any means.
Nov. 20 South Africa warned of effect of mandatory sanctions on British-South African trade.
Nov. 24 Top Commonwealth officials rushed to Salisbury for "last talks."
Dec. 2-4 Prime Ministers Wilson and Smith held two-day conference on British cruiser off Gibraltar leading to "working document" to which both sides had to say yes or no. Britain promptly said yes.
Dec. 5 Rhodesia said no. Britain asked UN Security Council to meet on controversy.