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Lesotho is a tiny mountainous country, a constitutional monarchy, surrounded completely by South Africa. It has a pathetically poor population of 1 million who live on 12,000 square miles of land. About 200,000 of the adult men live as migrant workers in South Africa. The country received its independence in 1966 from Britain, after an election held in 1965 had yielded the following results: out of an Assembly of 60, Basutoland National Party 31; Basutoland Congress Party 25; and Freedom-Marena Ton Party 4. The election campaign had been marred by violence, intimidation and vitriolic slander. Chief Lebua Jonathan, the leader of the Basutoland National Party (B.N.P.), although receiving blatant support from the South African regime, lost his election contest. Before he could assume his post as Prime Minister he had to win a by-election in a safe seat, vacated by one of his loyal party members. Thus Jonathan's party was returned to power, having received 41.6% of the vote.

The B.N.P. is a conservative, anti-communist party supported strongly by the churches, whites, and South Africans. Its policy towards South Africa has been one of unembarrassed collaboration. The Basutoland Congress Party (B.C.P.), led by Ntsu Mokhehle, is a party with close connections with the African National Congress of South Africa. The party leans to the left. It is detested by the whites and South Africans who believe it is the spearhead of Chinese Communist penetration in Southern Africa. The Party's policy towards South Africa, accepts Lesotho's absolute economic dependence but would strive to steer away from the South African whirlpool and build strong links with independent Black Africa guided by Pan-Africanist ideals.

After an eventful five years marked by clashes with the King in which he was placed under house arrest, Jonathan faced new elections. The campaign was relatively quiet. Jonathan threatened districts with no development aid unless they voted for him and managed to get several of the opposition candidates arrested including Mokhehle of the B.C.P. On Tuesday, Jan 27, 1970 the country went to the polls. In the following days results were announced. Mokhehle claimed victory. Jonathan faced defeat and couldn't bear to lose. Not waiting for the final results to be announced, he declared a State of Emergency; arrested about 50 opposition
politicians, including Mokhehle, put the King under house arrest and illegally suspended the Constitution. Admitting the coup, Jonathan claimed that the threat of International Communism and imminent violence and subversion prompted his action. In reality, of course, he just would not accept defeat in a democratic election. He went on to claim that Western Democracy was not fitted to Africa and that he would write a new Constitution.

Lesotho lives on British aid and the present agreement runs out in a few weeks. Britain has not recognized Jonathan's new government and could use its economic influence to get the arrested politicians released and constitutionality restored. South Africa has assembled police on the Lesotho borders and many powerful figures in the administration are white South Africans. Its influence is clear.

Jonathan's trump card is South African power, and to save his own neck he would probably sell his nation to the South Africans, providing he would remain chief puppet of the state.

The Basuto are a tough fighting people and having lost that election, Jonathan has chosen to fight them. He is in for a rough time. But watch South Africa very carefully.

In this brief article I would like to give the outline of the answer to three interesting questions. Why did these wars begin? What has happened to them? Who has most helped the Portuguese dictatorship to keep these wars in being?

Some words by Eduardo Mondlane, the outstanding Mozambique leader who was assassinated a year ago, provide a sufficient answer to the first question. They occur on page 125 of the book he wrote just before his death: The Struggle for Mozambique (Penguin Books, London & Baltimore, 1969):

"By 1961 two conclusions were obvious. First, Portugal would not admit the principle of self-determination and independence, or allow for any extension of democracy under her own rule, although by then it was clear that her own 'Portuguese' solutions to our oppressed condition, such as assimilation by multi-racial colonatos, multi-racial schools, local elections, etc., had proved a meaningless fraud.

"Secondly, moderate political action such as strikes, demonstrations and petitions, would result only in the destruction of those who took part in them. We were, therefore, left with these alternatives: to continue indefinitely living under a repressive imperial rule, or to find a means of using force against Portugal which would be effective enough to hurt Portugal without resulting in our own ruin."

THE STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

by Basil Davidson

Although the colonial wars of Portugal in Southern Africa and in western Africa (Guinea-Bissau) have become the largest, longest and most destructive wars that Africa has ever known, with the single exception of the French colonial war in Algeria, people in the outside world seem to know surprisingly little about them. One can think of a number of reasons for this ignorance; yet the fact of it continues to astonish.

War began in Angola in 1961, in Guinea-Bissau in 1963, and in Mozambique in 1964. All three wars have continued to grow in size and destructiveness. Today the Salazar-Caetano regime in Lisbon has a total of upwards of 150,000 Portuguese troops in action, including airforce and naval units. There are about ten million people in Portugal. If one makes a comparison with America's population of about 200 million, and so multiplies 150,000 by 20, this shows that the Portuguese military effort is the equivalent of an American effort in Vietnam that is actually about six times the actual size of America's effort there, at least in terms of the numbers of troops involved. And if it is true that the Portuguese have not been able to deploy America's vast and terrible means of mass destruction, it is also true that they have done their best in that direction: in January 1970 it was nearly ten years since the Portuguese airforce first began using napalm against defenseless village populations.
By 1961 it was clear, in other words, that any meaningful form of national liberation for the peoples of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique would have to be the work of armed and violent resistance. Any other course could only mean ruin and defeat, or else an outright surrender to the persistent racism and dictatorship of the Portuguese regime.

But how to begin and to continue armed resistance against this ferocious and powerful oppressor? No quick or easy answer was found to this. There is no space here to tell that story. Those who want to know it will find it in Mondlane’s book, in my own Liberation of Ovine (Penguin Books, London and Baltimore, 1969), and in a number of reports and documents concerned with Angola since 1961. Briefly, though, it was found by each of the nationalist movements that have proved steadfast and effective (the MPLA in Angola; the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau; FRELIMO in Mozambique) that the key to successful armed resistance must lie in detailed and arduous political work and preparation among the populations of these territories. This political preparation proved extremely difficult. “But without it,” Amilcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC, has said, “nothing of lasting value can be done” in guerrilla resistance to a powerful enemy. “This political preparation is the toughest, most daunting, but also most important aspect of the whole campaign for national liberation.” Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA, has said the same.

After long political preparation, each of these movements proved able to develop successful guerrilla warfare against the repeatedly reinforced armies of Portugal. For various reasons the PAIGC, in Guinea-Bissau, was able to do this first, and has since had the clearest success. But FRELIMO and the MPLA have gone far in the same direction. By 1969 the PAIGC had secured control of about 2/3 of Guinea-Bissau, and driven the Portuguese out of all but about 1/20 of their fortified strongpoints and garrison-towns. FRELIMO had likewise secured control of large regions of the northern provinces of Mozambique, those of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, and made significant progress in the province of Tete. In Angola the MPLA, after many setbacks, had succeeded in developing a powerful armed resistance in the eastern and central provinces of that vast country. Perhaps the best evidence of this military efficacy lay in the continued reinforcement of the Portuguese armies, and in the communiques issued from time to time by the Portuguese commanders.

All three movements, at the same time, had used their liberated zones to begin laying the foundations of new social and political structures, organising the people in elective village committees, founding schools and clinics, training teachers, nurses, doctors and other technicians. These new structures can be said to be genuinely revolutionary, both in respect of the traditional historical structures of these peoples, and in respect of the colonial structures imposed by the Portuguese. All this has been, on any reckoning, a major achievement, and also a very hopeful one.

The Portuguese have failed to win these wars because the Africans of these territories have shown great courage, capacity for constructive self-sacrifice, and power of self-organisation. That this is so will be seen by anyone who reflects on the nature of these wars. They are wars fought by volunteers, for the idea of a conscripted guerrilla supposes a contradiction in terms. The volunteers are village Africans, people who only yesterday were supposed to be incapable of self-defence, political understanding, or ability to organise against European masters.

Yet the Portuguese, though stretched to the utmost of their strength, have been able to continue these wars, and, as things go now, seem likely to be able to continue for a long time further. This is because they have had, and continue to have, massive military, economic and political aid from their Western allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Any notion that Portugal does not use NATO military supplies to fight its colonial wars in Africa is the purest moonshine. Portugal is using a whole range of arms and armaments, from jet-bombers to helicopters, from napalm to fragmentation bombs, from electronic equipment to bazookas, which are made and supplied by France, West Germany, Britain and the
United States, as well as by lesser powers in the "free world." I recommend anyone who wants to know the details to get hold of an excellent and most factual pamphlet, Portugal and NATO, just issued by the Dutch Angola Committee, Klarenburg 253, Amsterdam (price 3 shillings or 50 cents). Here are the facts of NATO aid set forth from the basis of NATO and other official or orthodox sources.

The colonial wars of Portugal are vicious enterprises in which many other countries have their share. How long are we going to allow this to go unnoticed, unacted against?

(Written especially for readers of "Southern Africa: A Survey of News and Opinion" by Basil Davidson.)

Twentv-two Africans are on trial under the Suppression of Communism Act. One of the key witnesses in that trial, Mr. Philip Golding, is a British subject. After giving evidence, he was released and is now back in London. The Guardian carried a special report of the facts surrounding his involvement in the trial. It illustrates well the quality of justice in South Africa.

Mr. Golding was arrested at 8:30 a.m. on May 17. His apartment was searched and some of his possessions were taken by the police. He was taken to the Compol building, interrogation center of the security police in Pretoria. Major Swanepoel, head of the interrogation squad, questioned him. The interrogation room was about 10 feet square. Metal shutters covered the single window so that it was impossible to tell whether it was night or day. Golding was made to stand throughout most of the questioning. He had fingers jabbed in both eyes and was punched in the jaw. He was kicked in the back and karate chops were used on him. He said that after this assault he lost track of what happened and did sign a statement.

His interrogation lasted for 48 hours and was conducted by relays of policemen, after which he was put in solitary confinement. He was finally able to see the British Vice-Consul but could not tell him of his mistreatment because they were not allowed to be alone together. "In this way," Mr. Golding said, "I gave evidence against four Africans, one of whom was the closest friend I had in South Africa. Under the circumstances I have described in detention, the words truth and justice are meaningless to me. I am sure that in certain aspects I committed perjury and that in others I misled the court.

"Yet whatever the physical and emotional pressures on myself, they were considerably less than those on non-white witnesses or defendants. I am white and I enjoyed the fullest representations of a major Western country." (The Guardian, 1/9/70) The trial will resume in February.

Dr. Albert Herzog Fined for BOSS Silence

Dr. Hertzog, leader of the newly formed right wing party, the Herstigte Nasionale Party (reconstituted National Party), was tried for refusing to substantiate a statement he made concerning the Bureau of State Security. (See Jan. issue) He was found guilty of refusing to give evidence before the Commission of Inquiry into State Security and was fined R50 or 50 days. He was given a suspended sentence for 12 months on condition. Dr. Hertzog is expected to appeal the case. He claims that he is being discriminated against for political motives. However, the verdict will not directly affect his political career. He will not be required in terms of the Electoral Act to vacate his parliamentary seat, and he remains eligible to stand for Parliament in the April general election. The Electoral
Act prohibits a person from retaining a seat in Parliament or running for election if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment without the option of a fine (Jo'burg Star 1/2)

Publications Banned and Embargoed

Two English Sunday newspapers, the "People" and the "News of the World" and the "History of the 20th Century," Vol. 85, have been banned in South Africa. The two newspapers have been banned on a weekly basis since Oct. 5 but now the ban has become permanent.

In addition, 2,500 copies of Dr. Margaret Ballinger's From Union to Apartheid have been embargoed and await a decision from the Publications Control Board. The book was not printed in South Africa, for reasons of cost and to allow simultaneous release of the British and American editions. The publishers of the book say they were completely surprised by this action because the book "was a purely factual history of the events in South Africa." (Johannesburg Star, 12/28/69)

The author, Dr. Ballinger, was a member of Parliament, beginning in 1938. For 22 years she represented the Africans of Cape Eastern. Her book traces the history of both African and Coloured representation in Parliament and the erosion of even that indirect voice and vote. (Jo'burg Star, 1/10/70)

Apartheid Causes Shortage of Skilled Workers

Skilled workers, especially in the building trades, are in great demand. There are simply not enough of them. Yet, South Africa's labor laws prohibit a rational solution to the problem. Two Coloured men have been found guilty in the Johannesburg Magistrate's Court for working as carpenters on the outskirts of Johannesburg. The job is reserved for Whites. The Coloureds were working for R2.40 and R3.60 a day. The minimum wage for White carpenters is R10.45. It is no wonder, editorializes the Star, that in these circumstances non-Whites are employed throughout industry in jobs supposedly reserved for Whites. And nearly everyone including the Government, turns a blind eye to what is happening because the economy demands it. As the Star sees it, "The real danger to White workers is not the intrusion of Coloured labor, but of cheap labour that undercuts civilized standards of pay." (Johannesburg Star, 1/17/70)

Moving of Indians Condemned

The Indian Traders of Bethal are being forced to move to a new area under the terms of the Group Areas Act that declared Bethal a white area. The move is being forced, despite the fact that both Indians and whites oppose it, as it is in keeping with the government's policy of "separate development." The Indians face certain ruination if they are moved because the new area offers no hope of making a living. Even the white businessmen are protesting against the removal. The chairman of the Bethal Chamber of Commerce said that the removal would result in grave danger to the Indian community, which would face possible starvation. There was nothing to be said in favor of the proposed removal and it should be opposed on humanitarian grounds. (Johannesburg, Rand Daily Mail, 1/6/70)

Nationalists Begin New Decade Soberly

The Afrikaans paper, Die Beeld, has warned that the Nationalists begin a year and a decade which will provide the party with the most serious struggles and testing that it has faced since the early 1940s, that is, before it came to power. Prime Minister Vorster's New Year message reflected this mood. He referred to "opponents on all fronts." He warned that unless moral standards were raised and forces of destruction fought, there was little reason for comfort in the year to come. (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 1/5/70)

The Herstigte Nasionale Party on the right provides a new worry to the Nationalists. They can no longer afford to pursue their "outward policy." It is expected that when Parliament reopens on Jan. 30, they will find themselves with much less room to maneuver. (Sunday Times, Jo'burg, 1/18/70)

Efforts will be concentrated on defeating the HNP; politics will focus on issues on the right. That means that other more crucial issues will be ignored. Thus, the facts that the Bantustan program has bogged down, that economic integration is increasing and that separate development is not working, will not be faced. (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 1/17/70) One wonders about who there is in South Africa who is willing to face those realities.
SPORT

Tennis: The Ashe Affair

The expulsion of South Africa from the International Lawn Tennis Federation (ILTF), and a complete boycott of tennis in South Africa by the world’s major players are the likely consequence of the South African Government’s refusal to grant a visa to Arthur Ashe, the Black U.S. No. 1 (who won the Australian Open title on Jan. 27).

It is a decision which Mr. Vorster’s Government has taken coldly and deliberately. Ashe, who has been one of the more moderate leaders of the movement for breaking down the barriers between Black and White in American sport, had given an undertaking that if he was allowed to go to South Africa he would not speak publicly on any subject except tennis.

He had made clear his opposition to apartheid, but he had also promised that he would not use a visit to South Africa to criticise Government policy.

No one expected the South African Government to allow him to play in Johannesburg. Victory by a Black would upset the Republic’s delicate balance of racial relations. There would be Black cheers if he won. White supremacy would be threatened and undermined.

The ILTF warned South Africa about her racist policies in July and appointed a special committee to keep watch on the South African Lawn Tennis Union.

The South Africans’ position in the Davis Cup is also in jeopardy. Half the countries in the European zone have refused to play against them because of apartheid or because they fear that a visit from the South Africans might provoke demonstrations.

A special meeting of the Davis Cup Nations’ Committee in London on March 23 will consider “the exclusion of any country whose presence is likely to endanger the competition.”

The South African Government’s decision was announced by Mr. Frank Wiring, the Minister of Sport, who blamed Ashe’s “general antagonism towards South Africa.” He did not refer to Ashe’s promise not to engage in political activities in South Africa but quoted his statement that he wanted to go there “to put a crack in the racist wall.”

“Mr. Ashe’s present desire to compete in South Africa cannot be reconciled with his active support of the move to exclude South Africa from the Olympic Games in 1968.”

There had been considerable disappointment about the decision in official circles. The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. William S. Rountree, was told of it by Mr. Vorster himself and Mr. Alastair, president of the USLTA said he thought that the special meeting of the Davis Cup Nations’ Committee might also be turned into a special meeting of the ILTF so that South Africa could be expelled from the competition and the Federation at the same time.

Cliff Drysdale, South Africa’s leading player, who led the South African Player’s Association’s support for Ashe’s entry, said that being expelled from the Davis Cup would be only one consequence of the Government’s action: “The present rugby demonstration will be only a picnic compared to what future South African teams and individuals are going to face.”

The U.S. Department of State expressed great regret. Ashe’s application had the backing of the Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers.

Senator Diggs (see Dec. issue of Southern Africa) made the statement in the Senate that the U.S. should refuse to grant visas to all South African sports figures wishing to come to the U.S. for sports events as a protest to the refusal of Ashe’s visa by the South African Government.

Rugby: Who’s Keeping Score?

Aside from which team has been winning the various matches between the touring Springboks and the British home teams, the tally books should include the following:

1) In game one against Oxford the threat of public demonstrations forced the game to be switched to a new location announced only at the last minute. Three hundred demonstrators were present.

2) In game two about 2,000 anti-apartheid demonstrators “fought running battles with 1,000 police.”

3) Game three saw the presence of 600 demonstrators.

4) The fourth game was halted for five minutes by anti-apartheid forces.

5) Game five saw only minor harassment by about 150 demonstrators.

6) 1500 demonstrators interrupted game six for 6 minutes when 200 of them invaded the pitch. They later attacked a police station seeking the release of 15 of their companions.
3000 protestors "swarmed over barricades and fought police officers in the biggest and bloodiest demonstrations yet", this in game seven.

Security caused officials to cancel the eighth game in Belfast on Nov. 29, 1969. (Christian Science Monitor, 11/28/69)

The latest demonstrations involving about 7,000 protestors was led by Bernadette Devlin, MP, Conor Cruise O'Brien and the solid, middle-aged members of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union pipe and reed band. It was called the largest demonstration march Dublin had seen. (Observer, 11/11/70)

Golf: Whites Only

Papwa Swegolum, a leading non-white professional golfer, who has encountered financial difficulties due to limited opportunities for a non-white under apartheid, will receive sponsorship to compete in international events after having been banned from playing in the South Africa Open. The Indian golfer is being sponsored by wealthy Indian businessmen. His exclusion from the South Africa Open was announced as a Government decision by Minister of Planning, Dr. Caral de Wet, who said that "no mixed sport between whites and South African non-whites, irrespective of the standard of proficiency of those involved, shall be practiced locally." (New York Times, 1/17/70; Rand Daily Mail, 1/19/70)

Commenting on this, Gary Player, prominent white South African golfer, said that he had called off an offer to sponsor Papwa overseas "in the fear that he would have been accused of 'trying to buy popularity.'" He said this after having been under fire from South African newspapers for making his proposal. (Johannesburg Star, 11/21/69)

INSIDE RHODESIA

The Case of Nicholson and Gallagher

John Roger Nicholson, former financial editor of the Rhodesia Herald, and Alfred Trevor Gallaher, a local attorney, have been convicted of contravening the Official Secrets Act and the Emergency Powers (Counter Espionage) Regulations and were sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment and four years' imprisonment respectively, both with hard labor. The two were found guilty on the charge of collecting information "intended to be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy." More specifically, they were alleged to have passed on vital information relating to the effect of sanctions on the economy to an agent of an unnamed enemy country.

Who was this "unnamed enemy power"? The Johannesburg Sunday Times reported that the two men were in the employ of the U.S. Government (1/1/70). The allegations were vehemently and immediately denied by the U.S. Government. However, two London dailies claimed that the Sunday Times article was correct.

Then on Jan. 5, the London Telegraph scooped a report from its Salisbury correspondent in which it claimed that the secret information had been passed on to the UN Special Committee responsible for enforcing sanctions. In the article, it was reported that £9,000 had been placed in Nicholson's account in the foreign country concerned, believed to have been the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York. Further, the article stated that the iniquitous Special Branch had information that some 20 other persons were on the payroll of the C.I.A., but that a lack of evidence prevented them from making further arrests.

So the matter remained suspended between allegation and denial. Then on Jan. 16th, both men were suddenly released from jail and put aboard a plane destined for London. A Rhodesian Government statement announcing the move stated that advantages would accrue to Rhodesia which would "outweigh all other considerations." Next day, British newspapers speculated that in return for the release of the two men, the U.S. Government might have agreed to relax the sanctions regulations on the import of Rhodesian chrome, or to keep the Salisbury Consulate open. (The Star, Weekly, Jo'burg, 1/17/70)

(For a discussion of the significance of the U.S. Consulate in Rhodesia, see the January issue of Southern Africa.)

The trial of Nicholson and Gallaher, and indeed their sentencing, would indicate the Rhodesian government's willingness to repress any information inimical to the interests of
the white minority. Zimbabwe News noted wryly: that the white settlers were shocked to discover their own government was "perfectly capable of administering on white people the same dose of fascist medicine that until now has been reserved for the treatment of the 'lawless blacks'... Notwithstanding the fact that thousands of Africans have been jailed, hanged, detained and/or restricted under similar or even more draconian laws, quite a good many white settlers had the gall to profess 'shock' at 'what has happened to our government.'" (11/29/69)

African Unemployment Growing in Rhodesia

Despite the Government's repeated claims that the future looks rosy, the chairman of the Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia, Sir Donald Macintyre, warned that "the situation as regards African employment leaves no room for complacency." He went on to say that what modest advances had been made in increasing the number of employed Africans had to be viewed against the background of 35,000 African males entering the labor market each year. (Rhodesia Herald, 11/30/69)

Alister Sparks, writing in the Rand Daily Mail (6/21/69) put the matter more succinctly: "As this situation worsens it could become a security hazard. So far Rhodesia has had little difficulty containing the threat of guerrilla insurgents along the hot and inhospitable Zambezi valley, thanks largely to the cooperation of the local African tribesmen. But rising unemployment could change that, especially if accompanied by a feeling of bitterness among an African population that for 16 years has been led to believe that it will be drawn into political partnership and is now being rebuffed with a semi-apartheid constitution."

Meanwhile, apartheid continues to be ruthlessly implemented as the illegal regime solidifies its position. When the complicated land tenure bill becomes law soon, 240,000 Europeans will control more than half the land in Rhodesia. Not surprisingly, the European "segment" will include every town, city, industrial plant, and mile of tarred road. The majority Africans will be left the chaff. The new land distribution scheme will allot 175 acres for every white man and a mere 10 acres for every African.

No one familiar with the white minority regimes in southern Africa is surprised about that. What is causing some minor stir among the whites, however, is the fact that the bill will confer arbitrary and sweeping powers to control the movements of every person in the Republic on the Minister of Lands. Under the terms of the proposed law, the Minister may prohibit Africans from entering a post office, a cinema, or a park in a "European area" and it can prevent Europeans from attending church in "African Areas."

Apartheid in Education

In response to the above law, a delegation of church leaders met with three government ministers and voiced their concern that Africans attending school in European areas might now be excluded. The Sunday Star (12/14/69) reported: "The ministers gave the leaders their impression that this in fact was their hope and that permits in multi-racial private schools would be withdrawn."

The executive committee of the University College of Rhodesia issued a statement that beginning March 1971 the special relationship with the University of London should be "brought to an end progressively." Henceforth, students registered at Rhodesia would be granted degrees by London. Beginning 1971, the College will take up the status of an independent University by awarding its own degrees. (Rhodesia Herald, 12/20/69)
British Impose £100,000 Fine for Sanctions Evasion

"Britain's example in prosecuting those suspected of evading U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia is outstanding," said Mr. Stewart, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in the Commons recently. He stated that eight out of nine prosecutions had been successful, that most important against Platt Bros. (Sales) which had been fined £100,000 for shipping textile machinery worth £200,000 to Rhodesia. Mr. Stewart stated that apart from Malaysia, the U.K. was the only government taking legal action against companies evading sanctions.

A reliable source that cannot be named because of the extreme punishment (up to 15 years in jail) for sanctions-busting information leakage, has informed us that an American Company, Chrome-Carbide Co., is now loading two ships in Beira with chromium which comes by rail to Beira from Selukwe, Rhodesia. This chromium is to be shipped to the United States. The same source also said that it is well known that Rhodesian tobacco is let out through Malawi, disguised as Malawian tobacco, then sent to Zambia, Congo, etc.

U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Speaks Up

An interesting statement was made by David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to the House Committee on Africa on Oct. 17, 1969.

Newsom's statement, an apology for the present U.S. position regarding Rhodesia, contained his philosophy for continuing sanctions. A strong theme in his speech was containment of Communism.

"The course of these events is of grave concern to us. A continuation of the Rhodesian regime's present policies and course may well lead to increasing racial tensions and possibly widespread violence. Politically motivated Rhodesian Africans are likely to turn increasingly to extremist leaders and seek the assistance and cooperation of countries, including Communist states, which are willing to support extremist measures.

"Faced with this situation, for which there is no obvious or easy solution, the United States has come under strong criticism from various quarters. The Africans and many in this country have not understood why more dramatic action against the Smith regime was not possible. They call for military intervention, and sanctions against South Africa.

"At the other extreme, it is argued that we should support and cooperate with the Smith regime. Proponents of this position would have us ignore our obligations under the United Nations Charter, arguing that the regime is anti-Communist and in power.

"Neither course is consistent with the U.S. national interest. We seek peaceful solutions, and we do not wish to create new or expand existing areas of armed conflict. We believe Communism cannot be held back by an enclave philosophy, but only by a broad recognition of human rights and dignity and by the espousal by and identification of Western nations with these values."

The Mozambique Revolution - The Battle Continues

In the most recent issue of Mozambique Revolution (Oct.-Dec. 1969) a war communique dispells what it calls the "fashionable" tendency to denigrate FRELIMO by showing that true progress in a revolutionary situation can only be measured by looking at "the theatre of action." The communique reports military actions for the period of August through October, 1969. In Cabo Delgado Province there were 33 successful military operations during these months, 167 Portuguese soldiers were killed and 31 military vehicles destroyed. A number of actions were mine explosions aimed at "wearing down the morale and sapping the energy of the army by concentrated and incessant activity in one particular area...." On Oct. 20, the Portuguese post of SAGAL was attacked, and on Sept. 15 an enemy aircraft was shot down at Nanyoka in Cabo Delgado. The Mozambique Revolution exhibited photographs of
News From the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE)

The Oct.-Nov. Military Bulletin of the Angolan National Liberation Front (related to GRAE, with headquarters in Kinshasa) accounts three major fronts; the North Central (Santa Crete, Dande and Kanakana regions); the North East (Lunda area), and the Eastern Front (Kassai region). In the latter area the press release cited the shooting down of two enemy planes and the killing of 87 Portuguese troops.

GRAE has offered an exchange of prisoners in an appeal to the government of Spain for the release of Eduardo Cruzeiro, member of the Committee of Free Portugal, in return for the release of a PIDE agent captured by GRAE. Cruzeiro has been held in Spain since August 1968 and is about to be returned to the Portuguese Secret Police (formerly PIDE, now DGS). (Le Progres, Kinshasa, Jan. 15, 1970) reprinted by Angola Office, U.S.A.)

New York Times Takes Angola in Stride

Marvive Howe, now veteran reporter on Portuguese happenings for the New York Times, ran a story on Feb. 1 entitled "Angola is Taking Rebels in Stride." Commenting on the Angolan revolution, Howe quotes a Portuguese resident of Angola, "We've gotten used to the war...it's become a habit," and then the colony's Governor General Rebondo Vaz, "The war has been stabilized." But after this initial declaration of the ineffectiveness of the 9-year old Angolan struggle, reporter Howe fails to show the facts supporting these interpretations. On the contrary, she admits that the Portuguese military sees an intensification in the military activities of the MPLA, in southeastern Angola near the Zambian border and moving to the north and west. There are an estimated 7,000 guerrillas in both the southeast and the north. In addition, internal urban opposition to Portugal and support for the freedom fighters is mentioned as shown when the government arrested 60 people in Luanda in Oct. 1969. The prisoners included students, intellectuals and workers, such as shoemakers who provided goods to the revolutionaries. Although Howe does speak of Portuguese attempts to make Angola a tourist attraction and to accelerate economic development, the essence of her report belies the statement that Angola (read Portugal) is taking the rebels in its stride. When 55,000 troops are placed in Angola and more than 15% of the Portuguese budget is allocated for colonial wars, it is a pretty expensive "habit."

Portuguese Biafran Bedfellows

The Tragedy/Irony of Power

With the apparent demise of the Biafran Republic, there have been several news items about Sao Tome, the principal island of relief flights and no doubt others from outside into the Biafran enclave. The importance of the island to those concerned about colonialism is that Sao Tome is, of course, a Portuguese colony.

In the Jan. 1970 issue of Africa Report, Rene Pelissier records the irony of Sao Tome's role as "a base for putting down nationalist movements [in the Portuguese colonies]...and for aiding Biafran nationalism." Sao Tome, a colony since the early 16th century, was virtually ignored by the Portuguese until the latter 19th century when coffee and cocoa plantations were established. Angolan Africans were brought to the island (and its sister, Principe) under a slave labor contract system, and in the 20th century, Mozambican and Cape Verdians were added to the population, some for so-called criminal offences, but most basically to fulfill the plantation owners' labor needs.

Stresses within the three-tiered population of white Portuguese, mulattos (the longest inhabitants) and Africans led to open conflict in 1953, when the Portuguese tried to force the mulatto group to work and attempted to increase tension between the black and mixed populations. A great number of islanders were jailed, and an estimated 50 or more killed in an incident called the Batepa War. In 1960 the African Liberation Committee of Sao Tome and Principe (CLSTP) was formed, and for a while worked out of Accra, Ghana.

Its major obstacle, of course, is communication with the islands and overcoming the Portuguese divide and rule policy.

The New York Times on 1/29/70 reported that the Portuguese Government had just signed a contract with a U.S. oil company for exploration rights of Sao Tome. The
economic importance of the whole of western Africa for oil corporations, plus the West's defense strategy including the key Portuguese occupation of the Azores, the Cape Verde islands, Sao Tome, Angola, Mozambique indicate other reasons for the U.S. kid gloves approach toward Portugal.

CONFRONT GULF IN ANGOLA
An appeal to Readers.

Last month's survey contained an extensive article on Gulf Oil's involvement in Angola. We are asking those who (1) individually hold stock in Gulf or (2) have friends or family who own Gulf stock or (3) who are associated with institutions with Gulf stock in their portfolio, to write us immediately and tell us if you are able to come to Pittsburgh for the April 28th meeting or are willing to transfer your proxy to the Southern Africa Committee who will send a representative on your behalf.

The time is short. Stockholders must make their decision regarding proxies by March 15. Write the Southern Africa Committee or call 212/870-2278.

Upswing in Guerrilla Activity in Zimbabwe
A number of British and South African papers have carried stories about the Jan. activities of ZAPU-ANC guerrillas (Salisbury communiques stress the presence of African National Congress guerrillas). Apparently a new contingent of guerrillas entered Rhodesia about Jan. 3 (earlier they had fired on a Rhodesian boat patrolling the Zambezi). Their area of infiltration is estimated to extend from Victoria Falls on the western end of Lake Kariba. The Rhodesians claim to have killed nine or more guerrillas during Jan., while 2 members of the Rhodesian force have lost their lives.

The major guerrilla actions have occurred in a dawn attack Jan. 15 on the Victoria Falls airport with firing on Air Rhodesia buses and the airport terminal, and another encounter with South African "police" forces 60 miles west of the city where four "police" were wounded. Later in the month Salisbury reported that 1 African Rhodesian soldier had been killed. (Sunday Tribune, Druban, 1/18; Guardian (UK), 1/27/70).

The Times of Zambia of 1/19 tells a slightly different story - from ZAPU's point of view: "ZAPU announced that 13 Rhodesian and South African troops were killed in raids on Victoria Falls-Wankie on Jan. 16. In the raid on Victoria Falls airport ZAPU destroyed two helicopters, a light plane, killed 5 Rhodesians, while in a simultaneous attack on a South African base in the Wankie region led to the death of 8 South Africans."

And according to the New York Times (1/30/70), Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith is not taking the matter lightly. Claiming that captured guerrillas "proved" Zambia's complicity with recent incursions, he indirectly threatened Zambia with reprisals unless she stopped "provocative behavior."

Earlier, in December, the London Observer correspondent, Angus Macdonald, reported his observations of ZAPU guerrillas on the north bank of the Zambezi River (reprint, Washington Post, 1/4/70). Macdonald writes that ZAPU has between 500 and 2,000 trained guerrillas. Reconnaissance cadres are stationed along the north bank of the Zambezi to check on Rhodesian activity across the river, and to establish through forays food and weapons caches on the other side, as well as to lead guerrillas through the northern Rhodesian bush region. Macdonald praises the ZAPU soldiers as well equipped with various camouflage outfits: AK-47 rifles of Russian design but Chinese manufacture; Czech bazookas, incendiary bombs, radio transmitters, etc. The soldiers are extremely disciplined and carry no badges of rank. Each has undergone a minimum of nine months training, at present carried out primarily in Algeria or Tanzania under ZAPU instructors. It is ZAPU's understanding that the "battleline" of Southern Africa, from the Zambezi border with Rhodesia through Mozambique is defended mainly by South Africa - South African boats, helicopters and jets...her defense rim.

Castano/Nixon Collusion
Stock N 4213-30-Ol
1-4 MFES Part N 30 EOL-1-A
The above were the markings on the "Portuguese" plane shot down by FRELIMO fighters in Mozambique after it had been bombing villages with napalm. Such material evidence should leave no one in doubt as to whether Portuguese NATO allies are in fact supporting the colonial wars.

With new leaders in both countries, all the indications are that even closer economic and military ties between Portugal and the United States are to be anticipated. Apart from the close personal friendship between Nixon and Caetano, the most important factor is Portuguese strategic position for the location of American bases. The importance of the Azores Base is proving a trump card for the Portuguese militarists, particularly at a time when Spain's financial demands may force the closure of American bases there. Portugal has indicated that she would welcome the transfer of those bases - on certain conditions. An article in South Africa's Johannesburg "Star" of November 23, 1968 stated that Portugal had asked for American support, or at least neutrality vis-a-vis her African wars, as a condition for the continued use of the Azores and in addition would welcome the U.S. transfer of her Spanish bases if the U.S. provided "some form of material support for Portugal's wars in Africa, together with industrial investment at home."

Moreover, the Azores base has become even more important because the Americans have extended and deepened the harbor of Vila de Praia da Vitoria several miles away in order to establish a base there for Polaris submarines instead of at ROTA (Spain).

It seems rather significant that as soon as Caetano came to power negotiations on the Azores base were reopened at his request - in order to obtain more assistance for the colonial wars. In exchange for an extension of the Azores treaty, Portugal is said to have demanded $200 million worth of arms to be supplied in five years.

At the present time both parties are still negotiating.

(Quoted from Mozambique Revolution, Oct.-Dec. 1969)

NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO SOUTH AFRICA

by J. B. Vorster, the Prime Minister

".....We have...much to be thankful for. On the terrorist front it has been quiet, in spite of the fact that certain countries, organizations and even the United Nations tried its best to fan the flames. We are however always on our guard and ready for all eventualities.

"Thanks to the responsible conduct of our workers, and young people, we were spared the wave of strikes, unruly behavior and demonstrations that plagued most parts of the world. We could thus maintain a satisfactory rate of growth and again experience peace and quiet in our country and I can foresee no reason why this state of affairs should not continue in 1970.... The past decade can indeed be labeled the greatest in our history.

"There are encouraging signs that we are nearer to a solution of the frustrating gold problems and that is bound to lead to a better international understanding on the economic front. It remains a fact, however, that South Africa has opponents on all fronts; opponents who will not hesitate to make use of all opportunities to undermine or embarrass us. And in this connection it must be understood that what is taken exception to is not the policy of a particular political party but that it is our fundamental outlook and way of life which is the root cause of this enmity.

"We again experienced this enmity on all fronts from religion to sport, and people, how well-meaning they may be, should take that into consideration when they foreshadow developments they know cannot take place. To make futile promises solves nothing and in the long run creates more ill-feeling than the doubtful advantage it has for the moment. We have never yet forced our way of life on to the world, but on the other hand we cannot be dictated to, how we should run our affairs in South Africa. It is preferable rather to break off relations openly if differences cannot be bridged, than to yield. But it must be understood that there are certain issues which outweigh others and if we are forced to chose, we will not hesitate to make our choice.
"It must not be deduced from this that I am unduly pessimistic because we are continually making progress and winning friends, but recent happenings and circumstances make it imperative that there be no doubt as to where we stand.

"...It is a mistake to see a communist behind every bush, but it is an even greater folly to close one's eyes to the steady encroachment of the communist sphere of influence and the destructive results of the permissive society. Unless moral standards are raised and the forces of anarchy and destruction are fought, whenever and wherever opportunity presents itself, I see little for our comfort in these years to come.

"...It remains an undisputed fact that the free world must, in plain language, pull itself together if it wants to survive. We must learn that license is not freedom; that the welfare state idea can, if allowed to go unchecked, kill initiative, self-respect and sense of responsibility of people; that we can become so tolerant of the evil and the immoral, that we are devoured by it before we realize it; that we can become so international that we don't know and don't care where we belong; that we can become so soaked in materialism that we lose our soul; that we can become so engrossed in demanding our rights that we forget to do our duty; that we can be so busy with our problems and proud of our achievements that we can forget our maker, our calling and our eternal destination.

"Let us therefore pause for a moment at the end of the old year, and let each one of us renew account of stewardship so that we can steel ourselves to meet the demands of the year 1970, as realistic, balanced and disciplined people who realize that our future can only be secured by hard work and responsible actions; but above all people who realize that the weakest can be strong, that the poorest can be rich and that the loneliest can be secure if we put our trust in God, our Father."

NOTES ON THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES

Portuguese casualties: The minimized losses reported by the Portuguese from July 3 to October 31, 1969, amount to 278 killed and 276 wounded. Of those killed, 91 were reported from Guinea-Bissau, 116 from Angola, and 71 from Mozambique. The Mozambique figures do not include militia. Nor are the reports of wounded given for Mozambique.
"Terrorism Trial" II: A Shadow Trial

The Namibia News (published by the South West Africa People's Organization) reveals a few more aspects of the second Namibian "Terrorist Trial" (reported in the Oct. 1969 issue of Southern Africa) in which five Namibians were sentenced to life imprisonment, a sixth to 18 years (the question of an appeal for 3 of the men is still pending), and 2 others acquitted. According to the Namibia News the trial fits into a tradition of South African "shadow-trials," in that it was "obvious that the interest of the defense counsel was not in the men he defended, but in the welfare of his fellow white South Africans." Putting recent happenings into a romanticized picture of South African history and permitting only 3 of the 8 accused to speak in court, the counsel allowed the case to become "an exercise in eyewash and deceit."

Genuinely moving testimonies, however, came from some SWAPO men who were forced to appear as state witnesses. As Namibia News reports: "One man was asked if he would murder his father if SWAPO ordered him to do so. He answered, 'If my father had committed a crime which is an injustice in the eyes of the people, and SWAPO instructs me to murder him, I would do so.'" Another witness described how he was hunted down by an Army helicopter shooting at him.

The Case of Namibia at the United Nations

On Jan. 30, the Security Council took one more step to further U.N. inaction on the Namibia case by calling for the formation of another committee to look into the matter. For over three years now the U.N. has been trying to oust South Africa from its "illegal" presence in Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa. The Committee of 24, the Fourth Committee (Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories), and the Council for Namibia have all concentrated on the problem. In August, 1969 the Security Council ordered South Africa to withdraw from Namibia by October 1, or else. The "or else" turns out to be the formation of another committee—an ad hoc committee of experts whose function it will be to submit by June 1st recommendations "for such effective and appropriate steps as may be taken by the Security Council." Some of the specific problems which should be considered by the committee are (1) the possibility of applying the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (the use of economic sanctions or military force) against South Africa; (2) the possibility of setting up a U.N. fund to which all tax revenue of foreign economic concerns in Namibia will be paid; (3) the possibility of introducing special visa regulations by member States concerning travel to Namibia; (4) the possibility of having U.N. passports issued to Namibians recognized by all member states; and (5) the possibility that passports from Namibia will only be valid when accompanied by a U.N. visa.

Aside from calling for the formation of this ad hoc committee, the January 30 Security Council resolution (which was passed 13-0 with Britain and France abstaining) asks "all States, particularly those which have economic and other interests in Namibia, to refrain—in any dealings with respect to Namibia—from recognizing any right of the Government of South Africa to act on behalf of the territory," a request which, under the present circumstances, would be impossible to carry out.

So the effect of the resolution should be just about nil. The discussion was, however, made lively by an exchange of accusations between the U.S. and Soviet delegates over the nature of U.S. economic ties with South Africa. According to the New York Times (1/31/70) the main intent of this mild resolution was to
regain the unanimity of the Council; last year when the Council set the October 4 deadline, both the U.S. and Finland (in addition to France and Britain) abstained.

Sinister Undercurrents

Meanwhile, according to reports emanating out of various sources in Nairobi, there are forces abroad which are hoping to use Namibia in an appeasement issue between Black Africa and White-ruled South Africa. Kenya's Sunday Nation tabloid (1/1/70) claims that a pact between South Africa and the Organization of African Unity could be finalized after world reaction to a document allegedly prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, outlining tentative proposals for a settlement, had been assessed. (Also after South Africa's prime minister Vorster has won the April elections.)

Although so far no one outside of the Nation has claimed to have seen the document (the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office has denied knowledge of it; so has South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs), the Nation quotes from it, stating that South West Africa "is the only possible issue around which an initial rapprochement between African States and South Africa could be worked out. The Nation also outlines the various proposed conditions of the pact.

South Africa, according to the report, would have to (1) allow all South West African students to return home without fear of persecution; (2) lift all restrictions on peaceful political activity; (3) agree to hold a U.N. supervised referendum to determine whether the people of South West Africa want to be governed by South Africa or whether they want to be guided by the U.N. towards independence; (4) post a U.N. representative in South West Africa to supervise the referendum.

In return for these guarantees, the Nation continues, South Africa asks that the OAU (1) forge closer trade and technical ties with South Africa and open channels for agreements in the areas of health, agriculture, communication, transportation and power; (2) open political and diplomatic channels on all levels with South Africa "which would have the effect of easing attacks on South Africa's domestic policies in the U.N. and in international forums;" (3) agree that neighboring territories would not tolerate any guerrilla activities aimed against South Africa.

Whether or not this particular document exists is less significant than the possibility that such negotiations might actually be taking place in the high levels of the OAU, the South African government and the U.N. That South Africa would be involved is not at all surprising; Prime Minister Vorster appreciates the value of good relationships with Black Africa; he also knows that a Namibia made "independent" without a struggle would always be dependent on South Africa. Still, the immediate rationale for South Africa bothering to entertain the compromise is unknown.

The possible involvement of the U.N. and the O.A.U. in such negotiations has far more sinister implications. SWAPO has often expressed fears that Namibia would be given a phony "independence" (see Nov. issue of Southern Africa, pp. 10-11, or that a U.N. decision to name a "Namibian government in exile" and grant Namibia a seat (this course of action was proposed by the Indian chairman of the U.N. Council for Namibia in August, 1969) would divert world attention from Namibia and allow the U.N. to avoid its responsibility there.

That the OAU might indulge in such negotiations seems preposterous. But those who would like to see Black Africa as weakening in its resolve to free the continent of white minority rule, can point to the following passage of the Lusaka Manifesto (which was accepted by the OAU Summit Conference in September):

"If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing change."

This passage was in fact quoted in an article titled "Liberation by Negotiation/Guerrillas Fear OAU Manifesto" in the Natal Daily News of 1/14/70. What is finally interesting, though, is that this article is also datelined Nairobi (and comes from the Los Angeles Times News Service). That a rumor about the future of Southern Africa and the OAU should come out of Nairobi is not a new phenomenon.
And so perhaps the whole thing is just that: a rumor. But for those seriously concerned with Southern Africa, even rumors can be of crucial importance.

SWAPO Leader Dismissed

The South West African People's Organization has expelled its vice-president, Mr. Louis Nelengani, and replaced him with Mr. Bredan Simbwaye who has been detained since 1964.

Mr. Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's President, said that Mr. Nelengani's dismissal was due to his collaboration with the South African government. He had appeared as a state witness at a trial of SWAPO freedom fighters in Pretoria in 1968. (The Guardian, 1/8/70)

Call to Christian Responsibility

Seventy prominent South Africans, churchmen and laymen, recently distributed a "Christian election manifesto" to 5,000 white ministers of all denominations throughout South Africa, to disseminate to their parishioners during the three months before the general election.

The manifesto makes a plea to South African voters to consider carefully their political allegiance and gives them guidance, "in the light of Christian principles," on how to cast their vote.

Their aim is to stress to the white electorate that the election is "a matter of profound Christian responsibility" and to point out where the "real moral responsibility lies." A spokesman for the group said: "The manifesto was drawn up as a result of spontaneous feeling among an increasing number of concerned Christians that voters should be made aware of the real moral issues involved in our own country.

Some of the major points made in the "message to Christian voters" are:

(1) Every Christian has an inescapable political responsibility, especially those who have the vote;

(2) It is the Christian's grave duty and responsibility to examine thoroughly the policy of every political party in South Africa and to acquaint himself with its implications.

(3) Every Christian must give account to God about his giving or withholding of support for any particular political party and its policy.

(4) In obedience to God, no Christian can support a political policy which is based on unjust discrimination on arbitrary grounds of color, race, religion, or sex.

(5) No Christian can support a political policy which, for its practical implementation, unavoidably involves open or concealed injustice towards any individual or population group; a policy which essentially diminishes, offends or injures the human dignity of any citizen, must be totally rejected by Christians.

A spokesman for the group said that the theologians participated in the belief that it is nonsense that the church should not "meddle" in politics. "Christianity has everything to do with politics." Through the document it was hoped that the voting public would realize that election day was a matter of profound Christian responsibility.

The manifesto was sent to the leaders of the four political parties with the hope that they would take note of it and grant interviews to deputations. Neither Mr. Vorster, the Prime Minister, nor Dr. Albert Hertzog, leader of the Herstigte Nasionale Party, acknowledged receipt of the document. Sir de Villiers Graaff, leader of the United Party, received the deputation but advised them against publishing the document because certain passages in it would involve them in their capacities as dignitaries of their Churches in party politics. Dr. Jan Steytler, head of the Progressive Party, gave the manifesto his support.

The moderator of the General Synod and of the Cape Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church--Dr. J. S. Gericke--said he preferred to ignore the manifesto. He commented: "I don't even want to take notice of these people." He preferred not to comment on the manifesto because he wished not to give "unnecessary publicity" to it. (Daily News and Sunday Times, 1/18/70)
Priests Condemn Church Support of Apartheid

Five African priests recently criticized the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa for supporting apartheid. They said: "The Roman Catholics pretend to condemn apartheid and yet, in practice, they cherish it. The Church practised segregation in her seminaries, convents, hospitals, schools, monasteries, associations, and churches long before the present Government legislated against social integration. The bishops, priests, and religions are divided on the question of apartheid."

The Catholic Archbishop of Pretoria, the Most Rev. J. C. Garner, would not comment on the statement.

The priests are members of the Boys' Association of St. Peter's Seminary in the Transvaal. They published their statement, they said, because they found that all other avenues were closed to them.

The priests asked, among other questions, "Why should our townships be dominated by the White clergy and African priests be dumped in the bush, in nonviable parishes?"

The statement appeared a few days after the publication of a "Christian Election Manifesto" (see above).

(The Guardian, 1/24/70)

A NEW ANGLE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

African State Heads Meet in Khartoum

The final communique of a gathering of the fourteen east and central African heads of states who met for several days in late January, called for more aid to the southern African liberation movements and the establishment of a committee to study the activities of foreign firms functioning in Southern Africa (New York Times, 1/29/70). In line with this Assembly to give maximum publicity to the latter move, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, was established as a publicity organ by the supported by Uganda, Tanzania and Guyana, felt Secretariat of the U.N. The unit provides it "improper" for Barclays and its chairman to special booklets on South Africa, as well as indulge "in political activity to the prejudice of the Republic of Zambia," and "in the advancement of the interests of the minority governments of Southern Africa," and that Zambia would consider this activity "in future considerations of the status and interests of Barclays Bank DC0 in the State of Zambia."

In his letter Kaunda cited the role of the Bank's Chairman, Sir Frederick Seebolin, on the United Kingdom Southern African Trade Association (which has been active in trying to break the arms embargo on South Africa) and the bank's role in financing the pro-South African government journal Southern Africa. (Other banking efforts have gone towards increasing British investment in the Portuguese territories--e.g. the Cabores Bassa project.

The Zambian High Commission (London) circulated material on British financial involvement in Southern Africa, and the London Times of Jan. 16 rightly commented: "The publication of this material seems to be part of a general campaign to dispense with rhetoric on the race question in South Africa and to concentrate more on the hard-headed economic factors which govern policy."

United African action (or universal black action involving the Caribbean states) vis-a-vis British firms doing considerable business in Southern Africa but also heavily involved in independent African states would mean a new and significant form of pressure on the capitalist corporations which might eventually affect their home governments' strict support for southern African racism. (Daily World, 1/31/70 from London correspondent.)

NEW PUBLICATIONS AND BOOK REVIEWS

Apartheid in Practice
(29524 - Dec. 1969) 50 pages, ordered by writing to the Unit on Apartheid, United Nations Building, New York, N. Y. 10017.

In line with the decision of the General Assembly to give maximum publicity to the latter move, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambianaves of apartheid, the "Unit on Apartheid" informed Barclay's Bank in London that Zambia, was established as a publicity organ by the supported by Uganda, Tanzania and Guyana, felt Secretariat of the U.N. The unit provides it "improper" for Barclays and its chairman to special booklets on South Africa, as well as...
turning out monthly studies on apartheid.

New in their series of booklets is "Apartheid in Practice," an updating of a booklet, "This is Apartheid," done in 1959 by Leslie Rubin. "Apartheid in Practice" contains a quick series of two hundred items crisply outlining examples of what apartheid means to the lives of non-whites in South Africa. Several examples help make the point.

(1) "No African, lawfully residing in a town by virtue of a permit issued to him, is entitled as of right to have his wife and children residing with him."

(2) "A white man who tells a group of Africans that the apartheid laws are unjust and should be disobeyed is guilty of an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding $280, or imprisonment for not longer than one year."

Several hundred hard-hitting examples such as this serve to make apartheid a much more vicious reality to readers.

Portugal, NATO and Angola

A new, detailed pamphlet on Portugal and NATO is available for 50¢ a copy from the Angola Comite, Klarenburg 253, Amsterdam, Holland. The Liberation Support Committee, 117 N.E. 58th, Seattle, Washington, has a number of publications available on Angola, as well as posters and a filmstrip.

U.S./Southern Africa Relations: New Books

"Africa for the Africans"

by G. Mennen Williams

Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "Soapy" Williams, has written a book on his African experiences and his views of African policy (if Washington has an African policy now, it is a closely guarded secret). Much of the bulk of this book deals with appraisals of white policy in Southern Africa.

"He notes that Africans have lost a great deal of confidence in 'Great Britain' because of the shabby handling of white Rhodesia; and he asserts that if direct action is not taken it 'gives the lie to British and American expressions of opposition to racialism.' But having gone this far, Soapy leaves us hanging; he has no action to offer; he simply ducks behind British responsibility. And in South Africa itself he is invariably more concerned with humoring the aggressor than seeing the problem squarely from the victim's view. He notes that two million Eurafricans ("Coloureds") are in language, religion and way of life indistinguishable from the whites, except for the poverty, inferior education and traditional ills of a depressed group." And so he proposes that whites should begin by 'accepting' Eurafricans:

"What must be secured is a transition without violence to a condition that will assure rights for those now deprived as well as for those presently enjoying a privileged position."

Yet he provides no strategy for transition, and rejects such unviolant solutions as territorial partition, the cutting off of investment, or naval or enforced sanctions, since the situation is "not a present threat to peace."

He goes on: "We do not believe it appropriate for the United States to try to impose any specific formula, nor do we think it is a practical possibility for us to do so. We will support any reasonable formula agreed upon by a majority of the South African people."

Admittedly the atmosphere was different, but the U.S. managed to impose democracy on Japan, a less fascistic and more important country than South Africa. And how is a South African majority even to emerge, let alone agree, without some sort of revolution? "U.S. policy must steer an imaginative, but practical, determined but sensitive course."

Yet:

The situation has engendered a fatalistic belief among all factions that violence is inevitable in the long run.

Meanwhile he is gentle with the Portuguese, blaming their feudal attitude to Africa on their feudal attitude to themselves. He tells us that the U.S. "fully appreciates... Portugal's goal of a multiracial society," and that U.S. policy is to encourage a dialogue between Africans and Portuguese and produce a timetable for reform. The "dialog" suggestion was put forward by Senegal's President Senghor who offered himself as an intermediary and restricted Portuguese Guinean resistance use of arms.

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(Their armed bases are in Guinea.) Portugal's response was to bomb a Senegalese village, Samine, in November. American reaction was to abstain on a Security Council vote condemning Portugal December 9: (while France and Britain voted against Portugal). "We have," continues Williams, "refrained from providing or selling arms for use in Africa by either side."

Since NATO American aircraft, vehicles and weapons are the principal Portuguese armament in Portuguese Guinea,
Angola and Mozambique—and since Holden Roberto's guerrillas get U.S. help to counterbalance the MPLA's KGB supplies in Angola—Williams' line is hard to swallow!

"The Great Powers and Africa"

Waldemar Nielsen, previously with the State Department and now President of the African-American Institute, has written a book that can best be characterized as a critique of American policy by the "liberal establishment."

Nielsen argues that by the end of the Johnson Administration, "American and African-American relations had reached bottom"; and, of course, he wishes to reverse this course. Nielsen suggests that for its own sake, the U.S. must take initiative in forming a triangle of cooperation between Africa, Europe, and America. Regarding Southern Africa in particular, Nielsen demands that America "in its own vital interests" cannot stand on the sidelines while the battle develops in Southern Africa. He urges a bolder course against the racist governments there if it is to face the challenges within American society itself.

He writes: "The issues of Southern Africa, once the Vietnam agony is finished, are going to be the next foreign policy focus of the moral indignation of youth, the Negroes, and the American left. A policy of passivity and compromise now... can only reap another terrible harvest of bitter division in the United States in the future."

"Military intervention on the black side he rules out; but he urges a review of Portugal's NATO membership (and implicitly its expulsion) as well as a critical study of the whole range of trade, diplomatic and investment links with South Africa. Suggesting Washington should channel funds to the liberation movements through the Tanzanian, Zambian, and Congolese governments, he anticipates critics of this "intervention" by arguing this country has continually intervened on the white minorities' side with support in NATO, submarines to South Africa—and by passivity itself."
Tenth Anniversary Commemoration of the Sharpeville Massacre

March 21

Sharpeville commemorations are being planned. Contact the Southern Africa Committee for further information and literature.
SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

February 3rd and 4th are important dates.

On February 3, 1969 President Eduardo Mondlane of FRELIMO was assassinated by a bomb sent through the mail.

February 4th marks the ninth year since the beginning of armed struggle in Angola.

For both Angola and Mozambique, and for Guinea-Bissau, the struggle continues.

We express our solidarity with the peoples of Africa fighting against Portuguese colonialism.

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