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EDITORIAL
WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE DONE

In a large advertisement in the New York Times (and many other leading newspapers, including 20 black weeklies) of Wednesday, January 13, 1971, the Polaroid Corporation states that (1) it hopes it might enlighten South Africa by continued business relations and (2) that it will urge its distributors to adopt a non-discriminatory policy towards their black employees and to encourage black advancement to executive positions.

Unfortunately, South African whites have shown tremendous resistance to enlightenment. In fact, they are proud of their granite-like lack of compromise. Although trade with western countries has grown rapidly, increased contact with liberal western businessmen has been matched by an increased draconian repression at home. The dehumanization of Africans into "labor units" proceeded as fast as the bureaucracy could manage it.

It is possible to give Polaroid the benefit of the doubt for naive, wishful thinking on the first point; but with the second part of their proposal they must be judged as ignorant, or worse, as perpetrators of a gross deception.

In South Africa it is against the law NOT to discriminate. By law you MUST have separate entrances, separate toilets, separate drinking fountains, washrooms, eating facilities, ... ad infinitum. The Factories, Machinery and Building Work Amendment Act of 1960 empowers the government to order the provision in factories of separate entrances, clocking-in devices, pay offices, first-aid rooms, protective clothing, crockery, cutlery and work-rooms for the various races. Unless they break the law (which in South Africa could be defined as "terrorism"), Polaroid cannot practice non-discrimination. Under the 1967 Terrorism Act, "embarrassing the administration of the affairs of the state" (i.e. opposing apartheid, as Polaroid wishes to do) will be assumed as intent to commit "terrorism," and under this act one is guilty until one proves oneself innocent.

Equal job opportunities are also impossible, under law. Many jobs are set aside for the white race exclusively. It is unthinkable to have a black in a job superior to any white. No black could be a vice-president because then all whites would have to be presidents. The government has stated explicitly that it must renounce all competition between black and white for the same job. Mr. B. J. Schoeman, speaking in Parliament, said: "In regard to the non-European [blacks], the unhealthy economic competition which is gradually arising and which will become more and more intense should be entirely eliminated. My party maintains that this can only be done by fixing a definite quota for Europeans and non-Europeans in unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled occupations in industry." The job reservation regulations have done just that.

Unless the Polaroid distributors stoop to criminality, their black workers will continue to occupy the menial jobs, with no hope of promotion. At the November, 1970 Nationalist Party Conference, Mr. Marais Viljoen, the Minister of Labor, said he would act within hours if any white worker anywhere in South Africa was placed under the authority of a non-white. A director of Frank and Hirsch, Ltd. (Polaroid's distributors) denied that they would effect a policy of equal advancement or that it existed at present. The director, Mr. O. J. Berman, said: "We are governed by the laws of the country. Would they allow the existence of such a policy? It is not possible."

Finally, Polaroid regards education for blacks as the key to change in South Africa. The government agrees, and it has set up an education system for blacks to achieve exactly the opposite of Polaroid's intention. Let us quote the words of Dr. Verwoerd, the late Prime Minister who set up the system: "There is no place for him [the Black] in the European [white] community above the level of certain forms of labour. ... For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community. ... Until now he has been subject to a school system which drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze." Polaroid is going to have a tough time leading anyone into green pastures through education.

Polaroid, South Africa is no place for you. Your distributors have said that they cannot possibly carry out your directives. There are some things that in South Africa you just cannot do.
FEATURE ARTICLE

The following is the last half of a statement prepared for the House Hearings on Southern Africa (spring 1970) by Gail Moran, former chairman of the Southern Africa Committee. The first half of this statement was printed in the January 1971 issue of Southern Africa.

U.S. POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

SOUTHERN AFRICA

"Let me solemnly here and now affirm that since 1963, the United States has prohibited the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment or materials for their manufacture and maintenance. And I would also like to take this occasion to reaffirm that the United States has faithfully kept, and intends to keep, its commitment banning the sale to South Africa of all forms of military equipment." (Ambassador Christopher H. Philips, Deputy U.S. Rep. in the Security Council, Jan. 30, '70. Press Release US/US-10(70), Jan. 30, '70)

The Security Council on 23 July condemned all violations of its arms embargo against South Africa and called upon States to strengthen the embargo by undertaking a number of measures. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 12 in favor to none against, with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom, United States). (Southern Africa, Vol. III, No. 7, Sept. 1970)

The South African Digest (publication of the Information Service of the Government of South Africa) carried a large picture of the President of the South African Government Agency (the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research—CSIR) with an American woman representing the U.S. Army Topographical Command. The two officials were examining a South African Tellurometer, a distance-measuring device which South Africa sold to the U.S. Army several years ago. (South African Digest, Aug. 7, '70)

On October 15, 1969, Congressman Coughlin accused the U.S. of continuing to sell Lockheed C-130 (Hercules) transports and spare parts to South Africa. Other small parts being sold to South Africa include nominal Munitions List items, such as radio receivers and test equipment, destined for South African Airways. When asked about this the State Department responded: "The Congressmen's information appears to be substantially correct." (Letter from Oliver S. Crosby, Country Director, Southern African Affairs, Department of State, Nov. 18, 1969)

"The U.S. Government is unalterably opposed to the racial, or apartheid policies of the South African Government."

The U.S. subsidy to the South African Government through the sugar quota has totaled $5 million a year. ("U.S. Subsidy to South Africa: The Sugar Quota," American Committee on Africa)

"We fear that South Africa's present course, unless soon moderated, can lead only to disaster for all its peoples. Our spokesmen at the United Nations and from many other platforms have repeatedly denounced the policy of apartheid—

A U.N. resolution in 1962 requested all member states not to grant landing rights to any aircraft public or private operated under the flag of the racist South African regime. 1969 saw the inauguration of a South African Airways flight between Johannesburg and New York. Congressman Diggs pointed out, "By not acting to repeal a Civil Aeronautics Board decision to grant landing rights to South Africa, President Richard M. Nixon has insulted the entire non-white world. (Southern Africa, Vol. II, No. 5, May, 1969; Congressional Record, April 21, 1969)

A 1963 U.N. resolution urged member states to refrain from supplying oil to South Africa. Mobil, Standard Oil of California (CALTEX) and Esso control some 44 percent of the market for all petroleum products in South Africa. Mobil and CALTEX also own two of the country's three major refineries. (Southern Africa, Vol. II, No. 5, May, 1969)

"U.S. representatives in the Republic of South Africa use all appropriate occasions to express U.S. views on this problem in the hope that we can persuade South Africa to modify its racial policies—"

The entire embassy and consulate staff in all of South Africa is white. No black American has ever served in South Africa. The U.S. also maintains a tracking station in South Africa. The South African Government was reported to be very pleased with the appointment of a Southern Conservative, Mr. John Hurd, as U.S. Ambassador to Pretoria. (Reuter, June 11, 1970)

"The United States is firmly committed to use its best efforts to encourage South Africa to change these policies and live up to its obligations under the U.N. Charter. . . . The United States Government neither encourages nor discourages private U.S. investment in South Africa." (Department of State, Background Notes on the Republic of South Africa, October, 1968)

Firestone Tire and Rubber Company has announced plans to build a $10 million factory at Brits in the Transvaal. This is a "border area" and will be a "border industry." Firestone will have access to cheap labor, will help the South African Government push its border industry plan. That is, this major American corporation is involved in increasing industrial production without threatening the status quo.
Firestone is just one of the over 400 American companies that profit from South Africa’s racist policies. Total U.S. investment in South Africa is about $800 million.

U.S. News and World Report surveyed U.S. and Canadian businessmen in South Africa. Forty percent of those surveyed would have, if eligible, voted for the Nationalist Government [white Afrikaner]. Sixty percent indicated that South Africa’s racial policies represent “an approach that is, under the circumstances, at least an attempt to develop a solution.” “The American adapts quickly to living under a system of total racial segregation. He is often frank to admit that he enjoys it.... ‘Look, here I’ve got five servants,’ says an executive of one of the top U.S. companies. ‘Do you think I could have five servants in New York? Here I’ve got four polo ponies and I play polo every weekend. Could I do that in New York?... Whether I approve of apartheid or not is irrelevant.’” (U.S. News and World Report, April 22, 1968)

The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. David Newsom, visited South Africa in November, 1970. On arrival, Mr. Newsom stated: “We came today with no other mission than that of getting to know better this part of the African continent. We look forward with considerable interest to the many discussion we expect to have with South African officials and with a wide variety of other prominent South Africans.... I am confident that we will learn a great deal that will be useful to us in meeting our official responsibilities.” (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 7, ’70)

South African Comment on Mr. Newsom’s visit: If asked, Mr. Newson will deny that U.S. policy towards South Africa has become more favorable under the Nixon administration. “The denial should not be taken too seriously.... The facts are different of course. South Africa’s more dedicated enemies know this. That is why Congressman Charles Diggs is so disgruntled about the trend of events.... That is why the State Department’s new council of advisers gives greater weight ... to the voice of American businessmen than to the academics whose demands for ‘benevolent pressure’ in the ‘60’s were becoming decidedly more frustrated and less benevolent as the years passed. Carl Rowan ... might have overstated the case when he told Congressman Diggs that in South Africa, American businesses were holier than the Pope in their observance of apartheid, but he made a point.

“Against this, and much more, must be weighed a programme of aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which remains miniscule by comparison with South Africa’s dominance in these countries; and the discouragement of American investment, which barely existed anyway, in South West Africa....” (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 7, ’70)

U.S. POLICY

In March, 1969, the Secretary of State verbalized U.S. support for self-determination, majority rule with minority rights, and human equality in southern Africa. In February, 1970 Secretary Rogers made a trip to Africa. The aims of that trip can be summarized in the Secretary’s own words: “To show a new interest in Africa on the part of the United States.” (New York Times, Feb. 8, ’70) However, the United States is not interested in increasing its political influence on the continent. (New York Times, Feb. 10, 1970)

That the United States has that influence is clear. Waiting until the very last possible moment, the United States finally closed its consulate in Rhodesia. Six other nations immediately followed suit. (New York Times, March 3, ’70)

Secretary of State Rogers: The United States will take no active role in the liberation movements in southern Africa. There is a limit to what the United States can do. (New York Times, Feb. 13, ’70)

Eduardo Mondlane, assassinated leader of FRELIMO, said before his death that the liberation forces have many needs but none “so great as a change in U.S. policy toward Portuguese colonialism. Friends of freedom and democracy throughout the world cannot comprehend why the United States does not move to the forefront in this struggle for freedom. It is inconceivable that the U.S. must remain silent and secretive to placate Portugal.” (John Marcum, Africa Today, March-April, 1969)

Secretary of State Rogers: The United States does not want to gain influence but partnership and friendship. (New York Times, Feb. 8, ’70)

The Nixon Administration has decided to give tacit support and encouragement to South Africa’s “outward” aid policy. (Star, Johannesburg, Feb. 21, ’70) South African officials ... have every reason to be encouraged by President Nixon’s Foreign Policy address. (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, Feb. 18, ’70)

Mr. B. Blankenheimer, Commercial Officer of the U.S. Consulate in South Africa, recently said to the Executives’ Association in Johannesburg: “South Africa, with its technology, with its skilled manpower, can be the industrial workshop of the continent, and I feel that South African economic ties with Africa must inevitably expand.” (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 24, ’70)

Secretary of State Rogers: The United States deplores governments based on racial discrimination but “we do not believe violence is the answer. We believe in peaceful change.” (New York Times, Feb. 19, ’70)

Portugal, in return for renewing the lease of U.S. military installations in the Azores, is asking for a weapons-modernization program which would cost $200 million over the next five years. Current U.S. military aid to Portugal, a NATO ally, is $1,030,000 a year. (Newsweek, Aug. 25, ’69)
While the Secretary of State was out of the country, the President of the United States made his major foreign policy statement. He had this to say about Southern Africa: "Clearly there is no question of the United States condoning, or acquiescing in, the racial policies of the white-ruled regimes. For moral as well as historical reasons, the United States stands firmly for the principles of racial equality and self-determination. . . . Though we abhor the racial policies of the white regimes, we cannot agree that progressive change in southern Africa is furthered by force. . . ." (New York Times, Feb. 19, '70)

United States policy in southern Africa does not support self-determination, majority rule or human equality. U.S. policy in southern Africa is based on the values of racism and capitalism, that is, money before people.

In the background notes that the State Department issues on South Africa and the Portuguese colonies there is a section on the history of the territory. These sections begin: "The first European to reach Angola was . . ." "Portuguese Guinea was discovered in 1446 by the Portuguese mariner . . ." "The history of Mozambique is closely linked to the early voyages of the Portuguese navigators . . ." "Although the Portuguese discovered the Cape of Good Hope in 1488, permanent white settlement did not take place. . . ."

This official understanding of African history is a symbol of U.S. policy in Africa. History is stated in white terms. When Nixon makes a major policy statement on Africa, the white South African government welcomes his approach stating that much of it was in line with South Africa's own thinking. (Dr. Hilgard Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs, News From South Africa, No. 8, Feb. 25, '70) The Africans who are committed to self-determination, majority rule, and human equality express dismay over U.S. policy. "We think there is no reason not to support us in our fight. The U.S. accepts the principles on which we base our fight." So says Amilcar Cabral. (New York Times, Feb. 20, '70)

But does it? The United States verbalizes support for the principles the liberation movements are fighting for. However, the United States does not believe in self-determination. It has consistently acted to dictate the means that can be used to achieve independence. The means that the United States will allow Africans to use are always means that will assure continued white dominance of Southern Africa. In the Portuguese territories the United States goes so far as to dictate that Portugal should have a continued role in Africa and that Portugal, the colonial power, the usurper of the rightful power, should establish the institutions which will mold life in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. That is, African means, African institutions, African determination of future alliances are not allowed.

The United States also claims to want no political influence in Africa. It dictates the terms by which change can come, perpetuating an oppressive status quo which is exactly what U.S. business interests want in Southern Africa. What is the logical conclusion of the remarks of a Secretary of State who says he is going to Africa to show increased U.S. interest in the continent, but a total disinterest in increased U.S. political influence? The interest must be economic. And as has been shown, U.S. economic involvement in Southern Africa clearly supports the white minority regimes.

Fortunately, the future of Southern Africa is not in the hands of the United States, but of men and women who are willing to give their lives to free their countries. U.S. policy hinders them. U.S. policy disillusion the people in the United States and Africa who really care about freedom. What earthly right does the United States of America have to tell Africans that progressive change in Southern Africa cannot be furthered by force? How can the United States wonder at the disillusionment of blacks, of the nations of Africa and Asia, of all men and women who DO believe in self-determination, majority rule with minority rights, and human equality?

MOTIVE—MPLA PHOTO ESSAY
Feb. issue

February is the tenth anniversary of the armed struggle in Angola, and the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the MPLA (Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola), one of the major liberation movements. To mark these anniversaries, motive magazine has published the first American interview with Agostinho Neto, president of MPLA. Also in this issue is a photo-essay shot last fall in Angola of the day-to-day life of the liberation movement, as well as poems written by Neto himself.

Copies of this special issue ($1.00) as well as a full-size poster marking the anniversaries ($1.00) may be ordered by writing motive magazine, Box 871, Nashville, Tenn. 37202. Please enclose check.
FURTHER RESTRICTIONS TO BE IMPOSED ON URBAN AFRICAN

A new Bantu Affairs Administration Bill has been drafted and will be presented to Parliament this year. The government is emphasizing the greater mobility it will give to urban African laborers. At present, an African is forced to work and live in the same municipality. To change work locations is to risk losing the right to live in an urban area. The lack of mobility of urban Africans has long been a serious problem.

According to the new bill, municipalities (the equivalent of local city government) will be relieved of responsibility for housing Africans, for influx control (determining the number of Africans allowed in any particular “white” area), and for labor bureaux. The government will set up “Administrative Areas” which will incorporate a number of municipalities. Each of these will be controlled by a board to be appointed by the Minister of Bantu Administration. It will therefore be possible for an African to live in one municipality and work in another, as long as both fall under the same Administrative Area.

While increased mobility is a desirable condition, the dangers of the bill are overwhelming. The boards which administer the larger areas will be tightly controlled by the Minister of Bantu Administration. He can remove members at will. All functions of these boards will be secret. No Africans will serve on the boards. In fact, this greater mobility will be counteracted by greater restrictions on the individual, and hence greater oppression.

As would be anticipated, Africans had no voice in this new bill. Not even the authorized Urban Bantu Councils were consulted, in spite of the fact that the bill, if passed, will have great power over all “non-homeland” Africans.

White critics of the bill see it as a move to take African affairs out of the hands of anti-government municipalities. More important, the move is part of a ten-year program which will include rethinking the whole administration of Africans outside the homelands, and which may lead to “independence” for Bantustans already experiencing a degree of self-rule. Also this program will implement the final removal of all rights for Africans in “white” areas.

The implications of the bill are that the government will have the right to remove all African FAMILIES from urban areas. These families have previously been referred to by government spokesmen as “surplus laborers,” because they reside in the “White” area as part of the Black labor force.

Further, African farm labor will be classified “Surplus labor” in the cities, could be “conscripted” to work on white farms under this bill. The power, given to the Minister of Bantu Administration, under this bill are so wide that the Sunday Times calls him “the Czar of African Workers.” (Sunday Times, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, ’70)

The African “townships” or “locations” are ugly and bare, without adequate plumbing, electricity, or water.

VIOLENCE IN SOWETO

In what a police spokesman described as “moderately quiet” weekend in Soweto, 14 Africans were murdered and 21 robbers took place during the Christmas weekend. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 27, ’70)

COLOURED’S FUTURE UNCERTAIN

The Minister of Coloured Affairs, Mr. J. J. Botha, said: “We [the Whites and Coloureds] shall have to find and follow the road ahead together. A separate state for the Coloureds... is not the policy of the Government... undoubtedly not... I regard it as my duty to the creation of a spirit of trust and co-operation between the Whites and the Coloureds.” (Assembly Hansard, Sept. 29, ’70)

The Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr. M. C. Botha: “They [the Coloureds] have their own road and their own destiny—not nearer to the White but away from them... This implies a national home
To call the Coloureds by a different name is just a attempt at calling the Coloureds Bantu or Englishmen. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 170.)

These two, obviously conflicting statements, have caused a great deal of concern among Coloureds and among members of the Nationalist Party. Mr. Loots has been forced to state very openly that the Nationalists do not have a final solution to the Coloured problem. However, neither integration into the establishment of a coloured homeland is the solution. (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, Dec. 7, '70)

Adviser Dr. Hiltrad Muller, the Foreign Minister, stated very openly that Coloureds would have less freedom than Africans because they would not have their own homeland. (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, Oct. 26, '70)

Representatives of the Coloured Community were particularly upset by Botha’s remarks. Tom Swartz, leader of the pro-government Federal Party and Chairman of the Coloured Persons Representative Council executive, called attention to Loots’ September statement to refute Botha. Mr. Sonny Leon, leader of the Coloured Labor Party and Opposition representative in the Coloured Persons Representative Council, called Botha’s statement "ultra-racialist." (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, Dec. 2, '70)

COLOURED PERSONS REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL (CRC) ENDS SESSION

The CRC has just completed its second session. It was called into being by the Nationalist Government.

The session ended with unanimous demands for equal pay for equal work, compulsory education, adequate housing, and better conditions for farm laborers. (Cape Argus, Dec. 5, '70)

That these are urgent needs is only too obvious. More than 50 percent of the Coloureds in the Western Cape live below the bread line. Thirty-three to 45 percent of the Coloureds in the greater Cape Town area do not live in houses at all. Seventy-five percent of the homes are terribly overcrowded, and many people live as squatters in the bush. (Cape Argus, Dec. 8, '70)

NO COLOURED FOR WHITE BUSES

The Johannesburg City Council asked that Coloureds be allowed to drive "white" buses. They were refused by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal stated that although it was doubtful whether the general public would always be against being driven by Coloured drivers, their use would nevertheless create a situation where "the slightest incident" could lead easily to "serious emotional outbursts." (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 28, '70)

"I did warn you, you know — you Coloured people can never have the ultimate freedom envisaged for the African group."
ZAPU/ZANU ALLIANCE PENDING?

According to the Standard of Tanzania (Dec. II, '70), ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union) “appeared to be leading towards a rapprochement following secret negotiations between the two parties.” The negotiations followed a widely circulated report that leaders of both movements, Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) and Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU) were ready to step down in favor of new united front leadership. National chairman of ZANU, Herbert Chitepo, and ZAPU vice president James Chikerema indicated that a front was desirable and they were working toward such a goal, but neither of them would confirm the report which said that Robert Mugabe had been agreed upon as the leader of the new front leadership. A faction of ZAPU, led by Publicity Secretary T. G. Silundika, denounced the front move as a “fabricated fallacy.” A subsequent report in the same paper (Dec. 16, '70) said that a ZAPU district meeting in Kitwe, Zambia had called for the expulsion of any leaders who did not support unity.

“GALLANTRY AWARDS”

Meanwhile on the fighting front there seems to be signs of increased activity. According to the Guardian (London, Oct. 28, '70) diplomatic reports in London indicated that African nationalist guerrillas engaged Rhodesian forces in close combat on many occasions in incursions across the Zambezi valley. Reports indicate that the Smith regime has been giving many gallantry awards to men fighting in the valley. “Most of the awards to 62 members of the security forces were for bravery in battles with terrorists in the Zambezi Valley.” In his address opening the new Parliament, Clifford Dupont hinted that “the battle against African nationalist guerrillas would soon enter a new phase.” He urged the strengthening of the armed forces. Diplomatic reports, in London also indicated that South Africa has recently “increased its military and para-military assistance to Rhodesia in the face of mounting African nationalist guerrilla activity.” Reports showed that there were now 3,000-4,000 South African troops and policemen operating with the Rhodesian army along the Zambezi valley.

SANCTIONS WAR NOT LOST

On the sanctions front it seems as though the battle is not completely lost yet. The Times (London, Oct. 9, '70) said in an in-depth feature article: “Sanctions have clearly failed in their announced objective of bringing about political change. . . . But their effect on the economy is another matter altogether. They have produced a shortage of foreign exchange which now appears to be crippling.” Smith has called for a “slow down” of expansion of the private sector, and a move to curtail allocation of foreign exchange to private industry. The report indicates that this move will enable the government to put badly needed foreign exchange into developing the infrastructure which now can hardly cope with the enormously increased demands. Foreign currency has also been needed for importing capital equipment for developing secondary industry.

Agriculture, which used to be the mainstay for export earnings, has been crippled by sanctions, especially the tobacco industry. Lord Alport, a prominent conservative and former High Commissioner to Rhodesia, who recently visited Rhodesia, urged that “until it had been proved that sanctions had failed every effort should be made to implement them.” (Shortage of currency is a problem that many developing countries have faced and should not be looked to as the only blow to fell the Smith regime. Many governments have survived this kind of problem over long periods.)

WHITES OFFERED FARMS

According to the New York Times (Jan. 13, '71) the Rhodesian regime is offering 38 newly developed farms to white settlers between the ages of 25 and 45. Each of the settlers will be given a good house and electric power on irrigated land. The farms vary between 300 and 400 acres plus an extra 100 acres of undeveloped land for farm labor. A later report in the same paper (Jan. 17) points out that the African people under Chief Tangwena, who have been resisting eviction from their ancestral homeland for the past five years, have finally lost their fight. The same report also tells of the closing of a private farm near Salisbury. The farm was owned by a white farmer who had turned it into an integrated farm cooperative under the leadership of a veteran British missionary, Guy Clutton-Brock. The agricultural cooperative named “Cold Comfort” was closed under the orders of Settler president Clifford Dupont. An African manager of the farm, Didymus Mutasa, was detained without trial last November.
PORTUGUESE MILITARY OFFICERS DEFECT TO SWEDEN

Six lieutenants of the Portuguese Army declared in a statement to the Swedish press that even officers in the Portuguese military no longer believe a victory is possible in the African wars. The six men, all in their late twenties, were trained as technical engineers and decided to flee the army and seek asylum in Sweden when their applications to return to civilian life were rejected by the Portuguese Army. This is the first time that so many officer deserters have been willing to publicize their anti-establishment attitudes. They chose Sweden because of its history of asylum for anti-draft and anti-military people and its support for the African freedom movements. (The press conference was held on the very day the soldiers were due to board a troop transport to Africa after completing training.) The officers stated that 15,000 men had evaded the draft and left Portugal in 1968. Of significance in their press release was the fact that Portuguese officers get "specialist training in the U.S. and are then used as instructors..." and that N.A.T.O.-supplied napalm and aircraft are used by the Portuguese in Africa. The press conference was sponsored by the Socialist Democratic Youth Movement which plans to initiate a campaign for liberation movements. (The Swedish Social Democratic Party gives funds to FRELIMO and PAIGC.)

To quote one of the officers: "The Portuguese people does not want war and understands more and more that the war is unjust. Even responsible officers do no longer believe in victory. Massacres take place in Portuguese Africa. Villages are burnt down. An officer and 30 men can do what they want." (Dagens Nyheter, Sept. 17, '70)

Three other officers were reported to have defected to Belgium. They also said that western aid to Portugal including South African helicopters keep the Portuguese war effort alive. They stated that military desertions from all three colonies were on the increase and that the South African helicopters were used to evacuate the wounded from Angola and Mozambique. The wounded are then taken to South African hospitals. (Guardian, London, Dec. 24, '70)

UNITA RELEASES TWO PORTUGUESE PRISONERS

UNITA spokesman, Jorge Sangumba, announced in London that the movement had captured three Portuguese prisoners, who had trekked 45 days with a 5-man UNITA patrol from interior Angola to Zambia. The female prisoners, a girl of 7 and woman of 29, were repatriated to Lisbon after negotiations with the Zambian Red Cross Society and the International Red Cross. The release of the other prisoner, a Portuguese soldier, is being discussed. Sangumba in
BOYCOTT OF PORTUGUESE PRODUCTS IN U.S. REBUKED

The boycott of Portuguese products called for by Imamu Baraka (the former Leroi Jones) after the invasion of Guinea stimulated a reaction in the Portuguese-American community of Newark, berating the action as "unfair tactics." At a meeting of 800 people, spokesmen especially denounced Mayors Gibson (Newark) and Hart (East Orange) who had backed the boycott idea, and seemed to interpret the action by the black community as an offense to the Integrity of Portuguese-Americans. (Newark Evening News)

INVASION OF GUINEA:
PORTUGAL STILL REFUSES TO ADMIT RESPONSIBILITY

Portugal continues to deny any involvement in the invasion of Guinea. Notícias de Portugal quotes an interview with Governor Antonio Spinola (see testimony below), who says, "I myself was surprised by the news from Conakry. I found out from the news that it concerned mercenaries, some from the Republic of Guinea itself, dissidents from Sekou Toure, and other foreigners." The interviewer continued, "But they claim the presence of Portuguese." General Spinola, "I know nothing. I don't have information to explain it." Asked in another interview about the testimony of Lt. Januario, General Spinola replied that the man had been convicted of killing a fellow soldier, and was therefore a criminal fugitive. He did not, however, explicitly contradict the testimony.

AND IS WORRIED ABOUT ITS JUNIOR OFFICERS

In a year-end address to staff officers, Gen. Viana Rebeiro warned against anti-war sentiments among young officers and N.C.O.'s drafted after finishing their university or technical school training. Many of those establishments, he said, are "veritable centers of subversion," opposing the defense of Portugal's overseas territories.

REACTION AMONG AFRO-AMERICANS

In spite of the attitude of the establishment media on the Portuguese invasion of Guinea, information about the invasion has reached black groups. In Newark, black organizations have called for a boycott of Portuguese-produced tomato paste, sardines, olive oil, and wines. (Washington Post, Nov. 16, 1970). The Washington Afro-American (Dec. 15, 1970), in an editorial entitled "Right On, Guineal" noted that various black organizations around the country have taken steps to boycott Portuguese goods, and commented that "Once again the United States has literally stuck its head in the sand on an issue that involved a white nation in black Africa."

NEW PAMPHLET ON CABORA BASSA

"Cabora Bassa" by Sietse Bosgra (of the Angola Comite, Netherlands).
English edition available from:
Dambusters
89 Charlotte Street
London W1P 2DQ, England

OFFICER'S TESTIMONY REVEALS DETAILS OF PORTUGUESE INVASION

On November 27, 1970 the U.N. Security Council Special Mission to Guinea interviewed some of the 70 prisoners captured by Guinean forces in the Portuguese invasion. One of the most revealing testimonies was that of Lt. Joao Januario Lopes, an African in the Portuguese forces, who turned himself and his company in to the Guinean authorities rather than attacking the airport, as were his orders. Lengthy excerpts from his testimony follow:

PRISONER LOPES: My name is Joao Januario Lopes. I was born on 5 Dec. 1945 at Bissau. On 5 May 1966 I entered the Practical School of Cavalry at Santaren. I was a recruit in that school. After three months I went to the Sergeants Training Centre at Tavira, Portugal. I was a recruit in Santaren for nine months.

After nine months of instruction, I was mobilized by the regiment—Regiment No. 15 at Tavira. I was there until 16 April 1967. On that date I embarked to come to Guinea. The journey lasted five days. On May 1 we arrived in Bissau, but my battalion only disembarked on May 1. After that we were in barracks at Bra, and were part of a force which is under the Chief of the armed forces of Guinea. We then went to Mansoa in order to complete the operational phase; and after one month and 15 days we went back to Bissau, from where we departed to the sector of Teixeira Pinto.

When we arrived at Teixeira Pinto, the battalion had to wait; but since I belonged to an operational company, I was transferred to the following three places in succession: Pelundo, Jol and Co.

After that, our mission was almost completed, but an additional effort was required of us: they had to open the road between Mansaba and Farim, and three combat groups from our battalion were sent there for that purpose.

After my stay in Mansaba I went back to Bissau, where, because I had already served the maximum time, I went back to my battalion among my comrades. After that, our commander invited us to serve an additional period.

That time, that additional period of time, is the period that I am now serving; but because I had a fever and was tired, I spent some time on the continent—in Portugal; and on Oct. 21 I went back to Bissau.

After spending two days in Bissau I was asked to
wait for transportation at Bafata. There we received a note which said that we must have our company ready for a possible departure. When we were at Bafata we were waiting. We were ready to leave the camp, and we waited for a week. After three or four days a note arrived that stated that the personnel had to be ready to leave for Enchale. That trip took place, and we went to that place for a period of ten days.

Our activity during the ten days was patrolling. After those ten days we went back to Fa. We led a normal life in that place, and in view of the fact that the commander was not there and the major was not there, I was the person with the highest rank. There was no commander and no major. We waited for a while, and one day a note came which said: "Prepare the group; prepare automobiles in order to receive 40 men who are coming from Bissau."

The group arrived at our place. There was a major, a captain, and 28 men. The major and the captain congratulated me. They said "There are no problems," and the personnel was reinforced. The commandant said: "We are going to prepare this"—that is to say, the company; but I didn't know what to do. Then they said: "You must get ready; get the people ready." And I asked: "For how many days?" They said: "We are going to be out for 10 or 15 days," and I asked them to prepare the clothing necessary to be out for 15 days—to be out where, though, we did not know.

This happened on Friday, and on Monday we left. We left from Fa Mandingo to Babadinca. We left Fa at 8 a.m. Then we got to Chim, and we had to wait half an hour. Therefore, an L.D.G. came—a military launch. After Chim, this L.D.G. transported us to an island called Suga. The trip lasted 6 or 7 hours, and we arrived the next morning. The boat reached that place, but we didn't disembark. The island was on the left side. A message arrived by radio saying that the personnel which was on board couldn't land and that the personnel that was on land had no permission to contact the people on board.

Then there was great confusion among our people, because everyone was asking: "Where are we going?" and the people would answer: "I don't know." The commandant himself said, "I don't know," and our spirits started to decrease, because they didn't tell us what was going to happen; we didn't know with any certainty what was going to happen, so the confusion grew.

There were theories that we were going to go to Como; others said we were going to Cape Verde. Still others said we were going to Teixeira Pinto.

When one day was left before we had to go, we received an order. We had been at sea for four days. The order was to land and leave our weapons and uniforms there because they were going to give us others.

I was the first one to land, and I saw many people join; so I began to mistrust the situation. I was wondering: where are they from? And I didn't know. But I met a young boy who told me that Conakry was their land, and I said: "Are we going to take them there?" And he said: "Yes, you will take them there and they will stay there."

When I was back on board I told my comrades what had happened—what I had found out. I asked them: "Do you know where we're going?" And they said: "We're going to Conakry; we're going to take these people there. Would you agree to this?"

I wouldn't, and they all answered: "No, we're not in agreement." The sergeant didn't agree; the soldiers didn't agree. Even a major, who was there, didn't agree.

And then a commandant came—his name is Commandant Galvao—and he had the major imprisoned because he was insubordinate, and he had him taken to Bissau.

After the major was away for one day, he returned with a general and with Galvao, and they told us: "Look, we aren't going to remain there; all we're going to do is take these people over there. We leave them; we go back. The company, of course, is capable of doing this. Those of you who refuse will be put in gaol for two years."

Then we started thinking of our families. We told the officers: "But listen: If we go there and we attack the Republic of Guinea, then they would be entitled to do the same thing to us. They might want to come
back and kill our relatives. Then would you be happy with that?” I myself have no mother, but I have an old father, and I have a 3-month-old son, and my whole family is there, and we were all asking about these things.

There was more confusion, and the officers tried to convince the men. They said: “These people that you are going to take there, they’re the owners of the land; they have arranged things with the others who are already there. There will be no problems, and this is the only solution to the Guinea war.”

The general assured us that our families would not be forgotten—that they would be very well treated if anyone had a stroke of bad luck. As for me, I said: “I can’t have this stroke of bad luck, because I have a brother in Guinea, and if things turn for the worse, I’ll stay in Guinea.”

They said: “No, of course there won’t be any problem. All you have to do is take these people there. The operation can even be cancelled if it should not be successful.” They themselves counted on 95% of success. Therefore we came.

When we saw that there was no other way out, we had to take a chance, and we came. The forces that called themselves of the Republic of Guinea were made up of 150 men, approximately. They were the people we were going to bring here. My company was also made up of 150 men, and the detachment of special marines was made up of 80 men.

These forces were sub-divided into small groups. Each group was assigned to a boat. There were six boats.

As I was saying, we were divided into small groups, and we each took one ship. The ship I was on—I believe, but I’m not sure—left first. Each boat left at a different time. Now, we left there at eight in the evening and we arrived here at ten on the next evening—that is, more than 24 hours later.

When we arrived and we began seeing the lights of Conakry, a strange thing happened: many of the people didn’t know where we were going; others didn’t believe that we were coming here; and they began to judge that we were going towards Cape Verde and that the lights we were seeing were the lights of Cape Verde; and I thought to myself: “Oh, if you only knew where we are, instead of in Cape Verde.”

When we came within sight of the red light which indicates that land is there, they came to call us. At least they came to call me, because I travel by sea with difficulty: I vomited very much during that trip, and Captain Morais came to see me.

He had died his skin black. Then he told us: “You’re going to jump to shore”; and I said: “What do you mean, jump to shore? We were told that it’s the others who will go to shore.” And he said: “We can’t do otherwise; those are the orders we have.”

There were six small boats on board. They were thrown overboard into the sea. The men were divided into small groups—one small group to each of the six boats. I myself did not have a group; I was going as an assistant to the Captain. The Captain was in a boat which was in front, and I was in a boat which was in the rear.

When we got into these boats we went towards the land, and when we were near land, we saw two small boats which I assumed were fishing boats, and I spoke to the Captain—Captain Morais—and I said: “Look, these people will give the alarm,” and he said to me: “Don’t worry; don’t be afraid”; and I said: “I’m not afraid. If you’re a man, I’m a man, too.” That was the conversation with Captain Morais of the paratroopers.

When we got to shore we disembarked, and we were then told that our mission was to attack the airport and to destroy the MIG’s. They told us that Commander Galvao had to destroy the headquarters of PAIGC; that another group was going to destroy the post office; another group was going to destroy the broadcasting station; and others were going to places that I don’t know.

We were left by a wall. We climbed the wall, and then I saw the airport, and I stopped and made a signal for my people to stop. The Captain who was with me was in front of me. He went on, and he didn’t notice that we had stopped, and he lost liaison with us; and I said to the soldiers: “Is this what we are going to destroy”—showing them the airport—“which we ourselves have built—which our brothers have built? I’m not attacking. Anybody who doesn’t wish to attack, stay with me”; and there were 24 men with me, and no one wanted to attack, and they stayed with me.

All the soldiers accepted my decision. I said: “Let’s go down towards the beach. I myself don’t want to go back to Guinea, where I’ll spend two years in prison Those of you who so wish may go back.” So we went to the beach, and we saw that there were no boats left. I said: “Let’s stay here until the morning. Then we can present ourselves to the Chief of the Republic of Guinea.”

All the other men said that they agreed, and I asked them to put down their weapons. Then, in the morning, I saw a young man who seemed to be a civilian, and I told him I wanted to go to the—I don’t know whether I went to what you call here the popular militia or the guards, but I went and I explained to them. I said: “I came on this invasion; I didn’t obey my orders. I want to stay here. Do with me what you like.”

And they came, and I surrendered the weapons, and all of my comrades showed that the firearms hadn’t been shot at all. They could see from our ammunition that we hadn’t shot at all; and that’s how we are here now.

All these statements have been stated by myself before God. If I haven’t said anything else, it’s because I don’t know anything else.”
BOSTON BLACK COMMUNITY GIVES $10,000 TO SOUTH AFRICAN MOVEMENT:

Polaroid Corporation, which has been under severe press and local attack for its presence in South Africa, got another blow when half of its $20,000 contribution to the United Black Appeal group of Boston was granted to the O.A.U. Liberation Committee for South Africa (Rand Daily Mail, Dec. 18, '70). At a community meeting in Roxbury, Mass. various proposals for the use of the grant were discussed and it was finally decided to split the grant between the South African liberation movement and a black group in Cairo, Ill. (The report in the Boston Globe of Dec. 30, '70 did not pinpoint the recipient as the ANC.) Polaroid was reported to be "shocked" by the decision, particularly since the activities of the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement against the company's South African ties had included the demand that Polaroid give its South African profits to liberation movements. Polaroid denied that the company's original decision to give $20,000 for the first time to the United Black Appeal was related to the Polaroid-South Africa controversy aimed at diffusing black community anti-corporate feelings. Polaroid announced that its decision to give the money was decided on September 23 prior to the early October action of the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers. The United Front commented that Polaroid's gift was in fact a public relations gimmick trying to "prevent comment from the black community about the controversy."

Polaroid, in addition to press statements, circulated to the media a Roxbury Bay State Banner editorial which condemned the use of the $30,000 as a "breach of trust" and "irresponsible conduct." (Boston Globe, Dec. 30, 1970)

NEW ACTIONS IN BRITAIN:

The momentum in Britain which resulted in the successful prevention of South Africa's cricket team touring England in the spring has transformed into various active organizations, including the formation of a group entitled Action Committee Against Racism which plans to use direct action tactics such as those used in the "Stop the 70 Tour" for other targets. These targets will include trade with South Africa, race in Britain, and apartheid sport. An immediate target on the British scene is the International South African Trade Center in London. Another group, the Young Liberals (whose Vice President Peter Hain once chaired "Stop the 70 Tour") plan to paste the sticker "DANGER—PRODUCT OF APARTEID" on goods sold in British stores which originate in South Africa. Britain's National Union of Students is conducting an anti-Barclays campaign because the bank is involved in Cabora Bassa. (ACAR press release, 21a Gwendolen Ave., Putney London, S.W. 15; Washington Afro-American, Dec. 15, '70; and The Times, Oct. 31, '70).

NIGERIA PLEDGES ARMS TO LIBERATION COMMITTEE OF THE O.A.U.

The Sunday Telegraph (London) reported that at a meeting of the heads of state of the Organization of African Unity in September, the Presidents of Tanzania and Zambia (Nyerere and Kaunda) in the re-establishment of good ties with Nigeria urged the latter state to contribute arms and ammunition to the O.A.U. Liberation Fund. It reported that Nigeria's pledge to the Fund will be in materiel form rather than money, given Nigeria's massive amount of military equipment (mainly British). (Rand Daily Mail, Sept. 21, '70)
The Churches and Southern Africa

Canon Collins Supports "Dialogue"

The East African Standard of Dec. 7 reported a statement made by Canon John Collins, Precentor of St. Paul's Cathedral in London, in a recent sermon. Known as an outspoken anti-apartheid campaigner, Canon Collins nevertheless stated that he believed—as did the Archbishop of Canterbury—that Britain should try to establish a dialogue with the supporters of apartheid. While seeming to justify the final resort of the oppressed black masses of southern Africa to counter-violence, Canon Collins admitted that “the more we build bridges, successively year by year, the lot of the bulk of the population of South Africa, which is Black, has been getting worse and worse.” In spite of that fact; he still feels these “bridges” should be built.

Security Police and the Church

Dr. P. J. N. Smal, a Dutch Reformed Church minister of a church near Johannesburg, recently turned away an African who sought to worship there. The African was accompanied by a white Lutheran minister, Dr. M. Braun. Within an hour of being turned away from the church, Dr. Braun was questioned by the security police.

Professor J. Verkuil (Missionsiology, Free University of Amsterdam), a leader of the Reformed Church of Holland, also disclosed that when he was in South Africa recently his telephone was tapped. Most of the people with whom he talked were later questioned by the security police.

It has also been disclosed that at a Methodist Church congress held in Johannesburg’s African township a month ago to discuss the Church’s affiliation with the World Council of Churches, most of the delegates were followed by security police. A number of the persons present were questioned at length about their political sympathies.

In the Cape, several “Coloured” clergymen of the Dutch Reformed Mission Church were visited by the security police after they had written anti-apartheid letters to the press.

When Archbishop of Canterbury Ramsey visited South Africa recently, his allegations of police interference in church affairs were denied indignantly in the pro-government press. (Guardian, London, Dec. 21, 1970)

South African Anglicans Stay in WCC

The Synod of the Church of the Province of South Africa (Anglian) decided by 140 votes to 6 on Dec. 11 to remain a member of the World Council of Churches, but it will withhold its grant of R550 ($770) until reasons for the Council’s decision to grant financial aid to southern African liberation movements have been explained.

The Synod recognized that “frustration and despair, which have impelled sons of southern Africa to take drastic action against their own countries, is a judgment upon our failure to embody God’s righteousness in relationships between man and man in our society.” Further, it confessed that the church had been ineffectual as an agent of change and called for Synod members to work for a Christian fellowship where racial discrimination had no place. (Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 12, 1970)

United Presbyterians Take on Gulf Oil

Three Gulf shareholders, on their own behalf and on behalf of the Southern Africa Task Force of the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., have submitted four resolutions to be introduced at the 1971 Gulf shareholders’ meeting this spring.

The resolutions would (1) recommend that Gulf’s Board establish a committee to study Gulf’s involvement in Angola and report back to the Board and to the shareholders; (2) amend the bylaws to provide for enlargement of the Board of Directors and transfer of the power to determine the size of the Board itself to the shareholders; (3) amend the bylaws to provide for disclosure to the shareholders of any corporate charitable contributions; and (4) amend the corporate purposes in the Articles of Incorporation to provide against any Gulf investment in areas under colonial rule.

This Presbyterian action is the result of months of careful consideration as to the best way for Presbyterians to protest Gulf Oil Corporation’s support of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. Gulf holds a major oil concession in Angola (Cabinda) from which Portugal secured taxes and royalty payments (as well as valuable fuel for her war machinery) from Gulf in 1969 totaling $11 million. According to Portugal’s Diario de Governo, Series 1, 1967-70, her total military budget for her war against the Angolan
Gulf's 1969 military budget was $44 million. Gulf estimated Portugal's military budget in 1969 as only $24 million, but even using Portugal's larger figure, Gulf's contribution to Portugal in that year was equivalent to one-fourth of the amount Portugal used in her war against the independence movements of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

The Presbyterian action seeks to press Gulf, through legal, corporate channels, to withdraw all involvement in colonial areas, since such involvement can only be interpreted as support for the colonial powers which benefit from it. If the move is successful, it will be a precedent for U.S. businesses placing moral values before economic profit. President J. B. Dorsey of Gulf Oil has made several speeches referring to the moral and social responsibility of business, including his November, 1970 speech at the Columbia University Business School in which he said: “that business has a responsibility to society which transcends the traditional business purpose of making money . . . that maximum financial gain . . . drops to second place whenever it conflicts with the well-being of society.”

The Presbyterian resolution is designed to test the sincerity of Dorsey's remarks, and the true impulse of U.S. corporate interests.

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**INDEPENDENCIA OU MORTE VENCEREMOS!**

**CELEBRATE THE 10th ANNIVERSARY OF THE BEGINNING OF THE ANGOLAN REVOLUTION**

**MPLA DAY – FEBRUARY 4**

*Viva Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola!*

*A LUTA CONTINUA!*
At The United Nations

GUINEA ACCUSES PORTUGAL OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION

According to a telegram received by Secretary General U Thant from President Ahmed Sekou Toure of the Republic of Guinea on December 19, the Guinean government continues to be plagued by alleged Portuguese attacks. The message reported that serious danger still threatened the “territorial integrity, peace and sovereignty” of Guinea. The aggression originated from a program called Operation 554/70 and is not being abandoned by the aggressors.

The message continued that huge military formations are massed along the Guinea borders with Senegal and Portuguese Guinea and that their air space is constantly violated.

Sekou Toure alleged that further preparations are being made to occupy the air fields and attack the populations of Conakry and nine other areas.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA RESOLUTION

The General Assembly adopted a resolution on December 3 calling on all States to ensure “the immediate interruption of any existing means of transportation to and from Southern Rhodesia,” under the terms of the Security Council resolution 277. The Assembly noted the urgency of the situation arising from “the intensification of suppressive activities against the people of Zimbabwe....” It called on all states and international organizations “to extend all moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements of Zimbabwe,” and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people to attain their right to freedom and independence “by all means at their disposal.”

The Assembly condemned the apartheid policies of the “racist minority regime” in the area. The Assembly further asked the United Kingdom to provide humane treatment for prisoners of war and civilians in wartime. The vote on the resolution was 79 in favor to 10 against (Australia, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, and U.S.A.) and 14 abstentions.

This action by the General Assembly followed the failure of the Security Council to adopt a draft resolution on Southern Rhodesia this past November. This proposal (which was vetoed by the United Kingdom) called upon the United Kingdom, as the administering power, not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia without the fulfillment of majority rule.

The resolution would have further urged that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia remain in force and that the Council deplore “the attitude of those states which have persisted in giving moral, political, and economic assistance to the illegal regime.”

NAMIBIA RESOLUTIONS

The General Assembly adopted three resolutions on Namibia on December 9, 1970. Resolution 1 affirmed the independence of Namibia and condemned South Africa for refusing to withdraw from the area. The primary articles of the Resolution would have the Assembly:

- Reaffirm “the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence” and the legitimacy of their struggle against the foreign occupation of the Territory;
- Condemn the Government of South Africa for the extension of the internationally condemned policies of apartheid to the Territory, and its policies aimed at destroying the unity of the people and the territorial integrity of Namibia through the creation of the so-called separate “homelands”;
- Condemn the Government of South Africa for its persistent refusal to comply with the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and to withdraw from the Territory;
- Condemn the support given to South Africa in the pursuit of its repressive policies in Namibia by the allies of South Africa and, in particular by its major trading partners and financial, economic and other interests operating in the Territory;
- Call upon the governments concerned “to cease immediately any assistance to and cooperation with South Africa”;
- Call again upon the government of South Africa to treat the Namibian people captured during their struggle for freedom as prisoners of war in accordance
with the Geneva Convention of 1949;

—Endorse the measures taken by the Council for Namibia with a view to the issuance of identity certificates and travel documents to Namibians, and appeal to all States which have not already done so to communicate to the Secretary General their willingness to recognize and accept such documents for purposes of travel to their countries;

The vote on the Resolution was 95 in favor, 5 against, (France, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, and United States), and 14 abstentions.

The second resolution would have the Assembly establish a comprehensive United Nations Fund for Namibia. The Secretary General would report to the next session of the General Assembly on the development, planning, execution, and administration of this money. An interim grant of $50,000 would be made in the meantime. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 104 in favor, 2 against (Portugal, South Africa), and 8 abstentions.

Resolution 3, which was adopted without objection, drew the attention of petitioners on Namibia to United Nations reports and resolutions.


For several years now the U.S. and Britain have been less than happy with the way voting has gone in the Colonialism Committee (popularly called the Committee of 24). This unhappiness culminated in their withdrawal from the committee on January 11, the first time the U.S. has taken such an action.

Both the U.S. and Britain have been members of the committee since its formation in 1961. However, the other members of the committee, representing many nations of the Third World, have been in the majority and have been able to pass a number of resolutions and recommendations against which the U.S. and Britain strongly objected. In addition, the U.S. refused to accompany other committee members to Africa in 1968, labeling the trip “extravagant” and of doubtful value. The 21 delegation members took testimony from leaders of the Southern African liberation movements.

The General Assembly had established the committee in order to accelerate the campaign against colonialism, which had begun in 1960 by the adoption of a “declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and territories.” Portugal and Britain were among the few remaining colonial powers at the time, and were thus understandably the brunt of much of the Committee’s criticism.

When asked why the U.S. had withdrawn from the committee, Mr. John Stuart of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. said that “We felt the committee was not fulfilling its mandate and that it was being irresponsible by advocating violence.” Mr. Stuart also responded, when asked if he thought the Portuguese were waging war against their African colonies, that “there have been some incidences reported,” but that “that is a matter for the State Department.”
DEFENSE

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENSE POSTURE

ARMS FROM BRITAIN

"Abhorrence of apartheid is a moral attitude, not a policy, and it is certainly not a categorical imperative against any contact with South Africa and with South Africans." (Prime Minister Edward Heath in defense of arms sale to South Africa, Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 17, 1970)

Having announced his intention to resume sale of arms to South Africa in June, 1970, Prime Minister Heath has still not announced an actual agreement. He has indicated that the final decision about sale of arms will not be made known until after the Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers to be held in Singapore in January. Informed opinion remains divided in predicting the nature of that decision, so it is at least possible that Heath will reverse his decision. Two signs in recent months show that he is investigating ways he might withdraw from his commitment.

(1) On Nov. 3 Heath said he was considering "leasing" arms to South Africa, instead of selling them. And on Nov. 21 the House of Lords spokesman for foreign affairs said that Britain would have "no reason" to sell arms to South Africa if the United States would agree to cooperate with Britain in building a naval base on the Diego Garcia Islands in the central Indian Ocean. The U.S. State Department has said that this plan is under review.

The fact that he has postponed the decision this long is indication that the massive opposition to resumption of arms sale has made some impact.

(2) In early Sept., the O.A.U. condemned Britain (as well as France and West Germany) and appointed a delegation to visit Heath to inform him of the O.A.U.'s position, which worried the Conservative government sufficiently to dispatch a secret envoy to sound out African leaders (Daily Nation, Sept. 13, 1970). African leaders have castigated the arms deal in no uncertain terms, especially those from Commonwealth countries: Kenyatta of Kenya, Obote of Uganda, Nyerere of Tanzania, Khama of Botswana, and Kaunda of Zambia. According to the Sunday Nation (Nov. 8, 1970), India and Nigeria have also joined forces to block Britain's plan, and even Canada's Trudeau has voiced his opposition. Kenneth Kaunda has said that instead of collapse of the Commonwealth, England would be expelled if she pursued the sale of arms.

Within Britain itself pressure on the Heath government has been strong. In a survey cited by the Africa Bureau, 17% of the British population favor sale of any arms, 22% would sell only weapons useful for external defense, and 48% would sell no arms at all. (X-Ray, Oct. 70). In October the Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsey, wrote to Heath on behalf of 100 Anglican bishops condemning the arms sale. Also in October the Labor Party's Annual Conference condemned sale of arms and offered full support, both moral and material, to anti-racist groups fighting against South Africa and to liberation movements in Portuguese Africa. Former Foreign Secretary Denis Healty has also deplored the arms sale and has stated that South Africa poses a greater potential threat to world peace than the Middle East.

On Oct. 25 an anti-apartheid rally drew 25,000 from all over Britain to Trafalgar Square. Bitterness toward Britain has become particularly great because Heath's arguments for the necessity of the arms trade have been so thoroughly demolished. The argument that South Africa must have naval resources to protect the Cape route from Russian domination is not accepted by the Nixon administration. The Cape route hardly passes through a bottleneck as it rounds Africa, being 1500 miles wide, and with a fleet numbering from 2 to 20 ships, the Russians cannot pose a serious military threat to ships rounding the Cape. Whatever threat the Russian navy may pose is diplomatic, a threat which cannot
possibly be countered by South Africa, whatever the size of its navy. Heath's other argument, the economic advisability of arms sale, will not hold water either. The Africa Bureau estimates that Britain stands to gain only about $72.96 million over the next 4-5 years which cannot compare favorably with the threatened loss of existing and potential trade with black Africa. Zambia has already held up two large contracts with British firms. England's exports and imports with black Africa ($862 million and $1,338 million respectively) far outstrip trade with South Africa (where exports are $698 million and imports are $722 million—Manchester Weekly Guardian, Oct. 23, 1970).

In short, Africans cannot believe British arguments that the arms sale is necessary for its self-interest. The Standard of Tanzania writes: "Mr. Heath has made great play of the necessity to act in the British interest. All but the most partisan observers would agree that it is in the British mercantile interest not to neglect or imperil trade with black Africa for the sake of a deal which has no apparent strategic significance and little commercial profit, not to mention moral considerations." (Oct. 28, 1970) Thus, regardless of what Heath says about his "abhorrence for apartheid," African nations can only view arms sale as a decision to throw in its lot with the white minority of Southern Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA

A report in early November from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, an independent body set up by the Swedish government, has given further documentation of the fact that South Africa is becoming an armed camp. According to its report, "South Africa received 40% more arms than all the other nations of Africa south of the Sahara." These arms came principally from England, France, and the United States. (Standard of Tanzania, Nov. 3, 1970)

Despite the existing high level of arms imports, the South African government is banking heavily on the proposed arms sale with Britain. It is not only the fact that South Africa will increase its arms supplies from Britain that is important, for after all France would readily fill the gap. It is the moral victory that South Africa desperately needs. As world opinion against apartheid increases, demonstrations of friendship such as these are of utmost importance to her. The Christian Science Monitor (Nov. 18, 1970) reports that South Africa is enlarging its naval facilities at Simonstown to include berthing for 6 more warships and an aircraft carrier, and a 9-acre submarine basin, and it is also considering building a new base at Durban. South Africa has negotiated with the Malagasy Republic for docking facilities at Diego-Suarez on the northern tip of Madagascar, and Africa Confidential (Sept. 4, 1970) reports that facilities are already in the process of being built.

A witness

At a FRELIMO military base in Mozambique:
Mr. Peter Spacek, E.A. Correspondent of the German Democratic Republic Broadcasting System, examines captured G-3 guns, NATO type.
South Africa has also negotiated for docking rights with Mauritius to the east of Madagascar, where the United States and Russia already land. The Sunday Guardian (Nov. 20, 1970) reports that after the arms deal with Britain is finalized, South Africa will begin negotiations with Argentina, New Zealand, Brazil and Australia to form a S.A.T.O pact. Clearly these are all steps in South Africa's plan to become recognized as an important link in the West's defense strategy.

The building of the Diego Suarez base 500 miles southeast of Dar-es-Salaam reveals another facet of South Africa's defense policy and gives the lie to South Africa's professed concern about the Russian threat to the Cape, since the base is 2,000 miles to the northeast of the Cape. Facing Dar-es-Salaam, the Diego Suarez base will be useful for keeping watch on shipping into that port, blockading it if South Africa thought that necessary, and breaking up any blockades which might be imposed upon South Africa. The placement of South Africa's airbases also reveals that South Africa's real defense worries are about Africa to the north, not the Russian navy. It has, recently asked Malawi to provide it with landing facilities in Lilongwe, which would supplement its existing airbases in the Caprivi Strip and along the Rhodesian border.

The threat that these northern-looking bases pose has not been lost to black Africa. In September Prime Minister Vorster openly threatened to invade any nation which he felt was harboring guerrillas. "If those large-scale plans which are being made against South Africa and the building up of terrorist forces which it envisaged and which will be carried out, become a reality and terrorists enter South Africa from certain countries, we shall resist them and if they are put to flight, we will pursue them right into the countries from which they came." (South African Digest, Sept: 25, 1970) Kenneth Kaunda has reported that invasions already occur daily in the form of two reconnaissance planes which South Africa send over Zambia each day. (East African Standard, Sept. 26, 1970). Both Zambia and Tanzania recognize that they would be virtually defenseless in the case of a substantial strike from South Africa and are consequently building up their own defense systems. Zambia is equipping itself with SAM missiles purchased from Britain, and Tanzania is negotiating with China for jets and with Eastern Europe for a defensive missile system (Africa Confidential, Sept. 4, 1970).

A December report in the New York Times (Dec. 28, 1970) gives further data about South Africa's aggressive posture toward black Africa. Mozambique sources have reported that on at least two occasions the South African government has offered concrete military aid to the Portuguese authorities in their wars against liberation forces in Africa. "The South Africans were eager to take an active military role with ground and air units in the Portuguese campaigns in both Angola and Mozambique."
FRANCE

During the fall of 1970, France has found itself more embarrassed than usual by its sale of arms to South Africa. The O.A.U. resolution condemning France and Germany as well as Britain brought to light what is not generally known in France—that it is the principle supplier of arms to South Africa and the most flagrant violator of the U.N. sanctions. (Cf. Southern Africa, Oct. 1970 for a detailed rundown on French arms sold to South Africa.) Subsequently, France’s largest trade union, the Confederation Gene
rale du Travail, has protested against France’s policies toward South Africa and Portugal and the racist South Africans. (Standard of Tanzania, Nov. 3, 1970)

The O.S.U. resolution induced a French promise to review all arms sales with South Africa, and when Kaunda visited Pompidou in October with a detailed description of French arms sold to South Africa, Pompidou promised to cease all sale of helicopters and to reconsider all other arms which have potential use in guerrilla warfare, particularly small arms and armored cars.

But according to the Christian Science Monitor (Oct. 26, 1970) South Africa did not take Pompidou’s promise seriously. Mr. Botha, minister of defense, said South Africa was already self-sufficient in small arms—“as far as infantry is concerned we do not need to import weapons, and we produce armored cars ourselves.” In the Christian Science Monitor’s opinion, “The limited embargo is unlikely to cast a shadow over future sales of arms not covered by the ban. South Africa has traditionally very friendly relations with France...” Subsequent events have borne out that judgment. Since Pompidou’s promise, France has agreed to sell South Africa 30 more Mirage-Milan jets, a short take-off, ground attack jet capable of speeds of mach 2. It has continued to sell Panhard armored cars. The Guardian (Dec. 18, 1970) feels that, as a consequence, Pompidou’s promise has been rendered “almost worthless.” But the most significant development, it feels, “is the guided missile, particularly the sea-to-sea ‘Exocet.’” Its ground-to-air equivalent, “cactus,” is being developed in South Africa, with Pretoria paying more than 3/4 of the cost.” Furthermore, if England returns the arms to South Africa’s market, France is not likely to allow its own sales to be undercut.

A Swiss trial in late November has given further evidence of France’s willingness to violate the U.N. arms sanctions. Members of the Oerlikon-Buehrle Company, on trial for illegally exporting arms to Africa, the Middle East and Malaysia, including $21 million to South Africa, revealed that they had sold the arms to South Africa by obtaining falsified licenses given to them by “high French officials.” Dr. Alexander Gelbert said that “France did not follow the U.N. embargo on arms to South Africa. My French contacts told me they were supplying huge amounts of weapons to South Africa and they were willing to help Oerlikon-Buehrle to do so too...” (East African Standard, Nov. 25, 1970)

UNITED STATES

There is continuing evidence that the United States supplies material to South Africa which has obvious military value. The Stockholm report indicated that the United States had sold $1.24 million worth of military equipment in 1969. Probably this is the same amount listed in the Congressional Record (Oct. 15, 1970) as $3.1 million in Pentagon sales. The State Department has claimed this did not represent a violation to the arms embargo since this material was probably spare parts and non-military supplies such as radio receivers and test equipment. (American Committee on Africa release, Oct. 22, 1970) To classify equipment sold by the Pentagon as “non-military” seems fanciful.

In September, David Newsom, assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, revealed another method whereby the U.S. government plans to circumvent the arms embargo. He announced that the United States “would consider licenses for limited numbers of small unarmed executive civilian-type aircraft” (rumored to be Lear jets). South African press understood the military potential of this sale, since it paraphrased the Newsom announcement to say that Newsom has agreed to make the jet aircraft to the “South African Defense Force.” Light aircraft have long been useful to the South African military, and the 1969 White Paper on Defense contemplates acquisition of more light reconnaissance aircraft.

The American jets will be particularly useful to the militia-like force called Air Commandos. Started in 1964, it is made up of private pilots commissioned in times of emergency and war, and numbering about 240 Light aircraft such as Cessnas and Paupers (also acquired from the U.S. since the embargo) have been used by the Air Commandos for training of pilots in military maneuvers, reconnaissance, radio cooperation with ground police forces, coordination with army air force activities, practice bombing with grenades and light bombs, and interception of escaped prisoners.

Newsom’s decision to license the sale of executive jets, however, has not satisfied U.S. aircraft manufacturers. In a report in November to the Commerce Department, the National Export Expansion Council said that “South Africa’s strategic location at the tip of the African continent, especially with the Suez Canal closed, seems deserving of important consideration when arriving at decision on aircraft sales.” The report criticized the U.S. interpretation of the U.N. resolutions embargoing arms to South Africa and urged the sale of anti-submarine aircraft to South Africa. It criticized the reduction in sale of military aircraft, since military aircraft sales would build a market for civilian aircraft. It felt that the Defense Department was becoming over-sensitive about its reputation as a warmonger through the sale of military hardware to developed nations. It hoped that the sale of commercial aircraft would continue because marketing possibilities were so good. (East African Standard, Nov. 25, 1970)
Assistant Sec. of State Newsom and Beverly Carter visited South Africa late in the year—the fact that Mr. Carter (who is Black) was given a visa being taken as another sign of the gradual victory of "enlightenment" in South Africa. Newsom's report on his return stressed the need to keep and build contact with South Africa. "We came away with the conviction that no matter how strongly one may feel against the system, we should not penalize those who are seeking to change it by throwing a curtain around them and their country." He went on to encourage as much contact as possible between the two countries.

Thus, in the name of defense of change, the U.S. plants itself firmly in the path of all real change; on the side of what is, against the side of what will be.

A NEW IMPERIALIST IN AFRICA

South African newspaper headlines in the last months of 1970 made strange reading. On all levels—economic, military, political, diplomatic—operation outreach accelerated dramatically. South Africa is bent on becoming a great power in Africa; the full picture is still concealed, but the following summary of some major and minor episodes may help to sketch the rough outlines of what must inevitably be a very ugly picture.

ECONOMIC EXPANSION

Until a few years ago, South Africa needed to import capital constantly to maintain economic growth. Its exports were primarily raw materials, gold, diamond, and agricultural products which it supplied to the major industrial countries of the world. That is changing. Internal economic growth, the development of sophisticated diversified industries ranging from auto, heavy engineering and arms to clothing and canned foods, makes it imperative for South Africa to seek new expanding markets—the need is intensified by the narrowness of its own internal market, as 4/5 of the population live on starvation wages. There is also South African capital seeking profitable investments. Apart from the direct economic profits to be reaped from trade and investment in Africa, the South Africans recognize the strategic political and military fruits that can be harvested from increasing independent Africa's economic dependence on South African wealth. There are side benefits outside Africa too—act in a recognizable way, extending the hand of "economic friendship" to the underdeveloped countries of Africa in the same way (and for the same reasons!) as the United States does in Latin America, and the powers that count in the West will be happy to announce to their people that "there are liberalizing influences at work in South Africa" while they share in the profits that are made in Africa.

Die Burger, major Nationalist government newspaper, had this to say on the importance of the outward moves: "Our road to improving relations with the West runs through Africa. We will be able to get on with London, Washington and Paris to the extent in which we in Southern Africa—inside as well as outside our borders—can establish patterns of coexistence that would guarantee greater peace and development."

MALAWI

Malawi was an early example of the South African technique of economic penetration and consequent semi-control of an independent African state. Private investment and huge government loans for the construction of a new capital and railway line have paid quick super-dividends in the form of a military airbase and constant Banda support for South Africa in international and African councils.

MALAGASY REPUBLIC

The new agreement with the Malagasy Republic (off the coast of Mozambique in the Indian Ocean) is another giant step in the march outwards. After long secret negotiations dating at least as far back as May 1967, the Malagasy Republic granted landing rights to South Africa Airways aircraft enroute to Australia, and sent a trade mission to South Africa in 1968. Private business interests seized the proffered opportunity; in July 1970 a mining consortium, including South Africa's Anglo American, announced that it was taking a hard look at some nickel ores in the jungles of Madagascar (Barron's, 31 Aug. 1970). The South African Foreign Trade Organization (SAFTO) sent a mission to look at possibilities. Finally, on November 14, 1970 the South African government made its announcement, front page banner headlines carried the news of the triumph: "South Africa to Aid Madagascar Tourist Industry:"
Diplomatic Link Possible." (Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 14, 1970). The official communiqué announced that the South African government had decided to grant loans and export credit facilities worth some $6 million towards extending the island's airport, developing its road network, supplying electricity and water, and building a luxury tourist hotel in cooperation with Southern Sun Hotel Corporation of Johannesburg. The statement adds: "The conclusion of these arrangements will lead to the strengthening of cooperation between Madagascar and South Africa in matters of common interest."

The sums involved are relatively small, but the agreement is regarded as so important that the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs himself flew to Tananarive to sign it. Leading South African economist Frans Cronje saw the agreement as opening wide the door for South Africa to conquer markets in Africa, the Middle East and "Far East and even the Common Market." (Madagascar is an associate member of the Common Market.) (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 28, 1970)

The Malagasy agreement is particularly significant because it paves the way for an approach to the rest of Francophone Africa now linked together in the Organization of the Community of African and Malagasy States (O.C.A.M.). Not unexpectedly, Malagasy President Tsiranà was among the first African leaders to come out in support of Houphouet Boigny's call for dialogue with South Africa. (East African Standard, Dec. 3, 1970) and South Africa Foreign Minister Muller quoted the leaders of Malagasy and Mauritius as men who said they had "no objection if Great Britain sold weapons to South Africa." (News from South Africa, Oct. 30, 1970)

There are other pointers to the growing success of South Africa's expansionism.

"SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE TO AFRICA DOUBLED" (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 21, 1970)

The extent of this trade is concealed by all parties, but the Ivory Coast, Congo Brazzaville, Congo Kinshasa, Ghana, and Kenya are among the most important African States (excluding Zambia, which is in a special position) reported to be involved in trading with South Africa. (Anti-Apartheid news, March 5, 1970)

In GABON South African millionaire Louis Luyt has taken a share with the French government and a major French oil company in a $7 million hotel project. (East African Standard, Dec. 3, 1970)

In CONGO (Kinshasa) South Africa's Anglo American, in a consortium with American Standard Oil, has just won a vast new mining concession from under the nose of Union Miniere du Haut Katanga. (Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1970) Following on this came an announcement that a South African company had been awarded a contract worth close to $1 million for the supply of mining equipment made in South Africa to a copper mine in Katanga. (South African News and Press Review, Oct./Nov. 1970)

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

South Africa, public and private, is sinking vast sums of money into Angola and Mozambique. The most spectacular example is the building of the Cabora Bassa Dam and hydro-electric scheme. Some of the reasons for this are obvious—strengthening Portugal in Africa, creating a buffer zone between South Africa and possible guerrilla attack, creating a sub-continent electricity grid that links South Africa to Rhodesia, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and putting South Africa in control of the switch. There are other less obvious ramifications, including the possibility that South Africa also hopes to tie African countries as far north as the Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania to this source of electrical energy.

Thus South Africa is trying to extend its economic and political leadership in Africa; at the same time it intends to maintain its fascist apartheid system internally. Indeed, the outward strategy is designed inter alia to PROTECT that system from attack. IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITSELF, SOUTH AFRICA MUST UNDERMINE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE AFRICAN STATES. This is the crucial factor in the new outward policy.

POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY: How to Win Friends and Influence Presidents.

South Africa's economic power is bringing responses at two levels: (1) The old imperialists (England and the U.S.) already have their own large vested interests in preserving South Africa as a flourishing profitable enterprise. They might well like to see minor modifications in the system—less glaring oppression would make the system more palatable and possibly even more stable—but fundamentally they recognize the basic coalescence of interests between themselves and the white ruling class. There is a new dimension being added as the South African economy grows in strength—'reliable' South Africa can in fact be used to re-conquer or consolidate the hold on Africa.

(2) States in Africa seeking economic assistance to import materials, equipment, capital or technology will find South Africa a willing and capable source. It is one of the bitter ironies of this situation that in fact South Africa holds a key to the future true liberation and independence of Africa—a FREE South Africa, no longer in thrall to the imperialists, could play a tremendous role in Africa, serving as a workshop for much of the continent. In fact, Africa has a very real interest in the South African revolution, but few of the independent States now have the type of leadership who see the situation in those terms—for too much of Africa is still closely tied to the old system of Europe and America.
South Africa’s outward policy had brought some startling responses by the end of 1970.

In September, Prime Minister Vorster, in a dramatic speech in the South African Parliament, offered to negotiate non-aggression pacts with any country in Africa—adding that "South Africa would fight terrorism in any African country which appealed to her to do so." (There are ominous echoes of "invitations" which the U.S. "responded to" in Southeast Asia.) Finally he stressed that "South Africa would pursue terrorists beyond South African borders right into the country from which they had come." (Cape Times, Sept. 16, 1970)

There was no direct response in Africa to this invitation, but for the next month the South African press was filled with speculation and rumors about signs of cracks in the wall of isolation surrounding South Africa, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran the second Islamic country with which South Africa has established such ties (the other is Lebanon) was hailed as a major coup for Vorster’s outward policy. (News/Check, Oct. 16, 1970)

**CALL FOR DIALOGUE**

The real bombshell exploded early in November, when President Houphouet-Boigny of IVORY COAST announced that he planned to call an African summit meeting to urge direct talks with South Africa because he considered that force would not solve the problem of apartheid. His government would contact all African Heads of State individually to urge such discussions with Pretoria and Portugal. Measures adopted so far, including the banning of arms, the breaking of diplomatic relations and forbidding landing rights to South African aircraft were "tragic" and "ridiculous" he said. Negotiations with South Africa would not be easy, "but we shall be patiently active." "The only invasion of South Africa that I would like to see should be that of African diplomats." (The Times, London, Nov. 5, 1970)

The South African press was jubilant. Foreign Minister Muller told a Nationalist Party conference that this showed an increasing realism and the emergence of a new spirit in Africa. Within a few days there was support for the Dialogue from GABON, NIGER, DAHOMEY, UPPER VOLTA, TOGO, and MALAGASY, all Francophone countries and members of O.C.A.M. There are still close relations between France and her ex-colonies and it is clear that France, South Africa’s major supplier of arms, played a significant role in the negotiations preceding the Ivory Coast announcement. The Rand Daily Mail had this to say: "Some circles in Paris claim that the policy has been master-minded by Mr. Pompidou personally. It is thought significant that the Ivory Coast President who wants to call a summit on South Africa said that the arms embargo was entering the..."
realm of the ridiculous. France is known to be anxious to maintain her valuable arms contracts with South Africa while at the same time keeping friendly ties with black Africa. One way out of this seeming paradox would be for black African states to state that the isolation of South Africa is an absurdity.” (Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 6, 1970)

The East African Standard took the theme further: "Mr. Burger, South Africa's Ambassador to Paris, was previously head of the Africa division of the Foreign Ministry and is known as the architect of his government's attempt to break its isolation in Africa. Thus it is not surprising that one year after his appointment to Paris, the meeting ground of so many French-speaking African leaders, he should have made his first big breakthrough. France must have given Mr. Burger every encouragement." (East African Standard, Dec. 3, 1970) The Standard goes on to discuss Houphouet-Boigny's possible reasons for the Dialogue call, apart from French pressure, and points out that the Ivory Coast, home of the so-called 'economic miracle' of the sixties in Francophone Africa is in need of a new influx of capital and trade and may well look to South Africa as "the way to keep the Ivory Coast economic miracle on the boil."

In South Africa, Stanley Uys, seasoned political commentator, made one of the most interesting observations of all: "The real motive behind the conciliatory gesture of the French-speaking states is clearly to deflect Africa from its collision course with the white-ruled south and split Africa into two camps." (Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1970)

GHANA too gave its support. Prime Minister Busia, who made a similar call for dialogue a year ago, and who has already relaxed the Nkrumah ban on South Africans and South African goods, said in a press conference while visiting Canada: "A dialogue might eventually lead to a democratic government in South Africa which would grant citizen rights to all persons regardless of colour" (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 14, 1970).

By the end of November, the South African press was predicting that the next step in the Ivory Coast might be the granting of landing rights to South African Airways (now forced to fly around the bulge of Africa, using only Portuguese-controlled territory for landings), and the Johannesburg Star pointed out that Abidjan had been treating South Africans with great hospitality for more than a year—including allowing U.S. aircraft being ferried to South Africa to land "without any problems." (Dec. 5, 1970)

There has been strong opposition to the call for the Dialogue from Tanzania, Zambia, the Somali Republic, the Maghreb countries, and many others. It is clear that the establishment of the Dialogue will cause open rifts, but Houphouet-Boigny has already indicated his attitude on this. When he made his call for the Dialogue he said, "I entirely approve of the position taken by Malawi and by Madagascar. We must be realists. Malawi cannot simply sacrifice itself on the altar of African Unity." (East African Standard, Dec. 3, 1970)

The crude threat contained in the invasion of Guinea by Portuguese forces created a "backlash" in Africa which has quieted open discussion of the Dialogue. It may well be necessary to wait a while—there is an O.C.A.M. meeting scheduled for January at which the Ivory Coast had originally planned to present its proposal for approval—with a good chance of success. The chances are less good now, and Houphouet-Boigny, a wily diplomat, may well postpone raising the issue immediately.

Whether it is discussed this month or next, the new trends are emerging clearly—the issue is not just APARTHEID, it is far greater than that. The prize is AFRICA.

U.S. RESPONSE TO THE OUTWARD POLICY

1970 saw a flood of U.S. newspaper reporters and other distinguished visitors in South Africa. Some were very critical of the brutalities of apartheid, but the South African government seems to be learning that such criticism is not necessarily dangerous. None of the commentators saw any "hope" for change from internal African revolution—many wrote about the possible liberalizing effects of economic growth, of contact with the outside world, etc.
IN MEMORIAM – EDUARDO CHIVAMBO MONDLANE

“There cannot be a partial or a peaceful struggle against colonialism... it must be a war, because our enemies want it to be a war, they who would not come to consider us men in any other way. Since the essence of their relations with us and our country is violence, they don’t understand any other form of being. And it must be a war because we want it to be a war, we who want to assert our identity over any form of violence. Only through a struggle to death can we come out as a new people with a real strength.”

Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane
President, FRELIMO, 1962-1969
Assassinated February 3, 1969
ACTION GUIDELINES

The following is a list of actions we believe would contribute to the achievement of majority rule and self-determination of the peoples of southern Africa. To this end, the actions are designed to work toward two major objectives: the strengthening of anti-colonial and anti-racist forces within southern Africa and the withdrawal of support by the United States and European powers of those colonial and racist regimes.

The list is by no means exhaustive, nor are any priorities assigned to the actions. Rather, it is intended to be a sampling from which persons and groups may choose according to their resources and judgment. Although many of the actions can be carried out by individuals, such as writing Congressmen or making financial contributions, it is presupposed that the most effective action would be carried out by organized groups.

1. Direct support of African liberation movements.
   Contributions to liberation movements may be made directly to the movements (see Appendix II for a list of names and addresses) or through the Africa Defense and Aid Fund, 164 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016. Suggestions for fund-raising would include the usual methods: fund-raising parties, bazaars, benefit performances, solicitation campaigns, etc. In addition, several of the liberation movements have representatives in the United States; they would welcome opportunities to speak at meetings, show films, and arrange lecture tours.

   Direct support for the non-military and non-political aspects of the liberation struggle. There are several funds which provide aid for exiled refugees, legal defense of political prisoners, support of families which have members fighting in liberation movements, and education for refugees, families of liberation fighters, and residents of the liberated areas. Contributions could be made via the Africa Fund, 164 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016, or the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa, United Nations Building, New York, N.Y. 10017.

   The forces of the Right are constantly applying pressure to encourage further U.S. support for white-controlled regimes of southern Africa; there needs to be pressure from the other side to counteract the effect of the Right. There are a few
persons in the government who wish to reduce American support for racist and colonial societies of southern Africa, but they need to be encouraged, educated, and made aware of the extent of their constituency which would support them in any actions they might take. There are also a few laws and regulations and/or announced policies which could be implemented or utilized to effect changes in U.S. policy on southern Africa. For example, Ambassador Yost’s speech in May, 1970 at the U.N. indicating that the United States would “henceforth officially discourage investment in Namibia by U.S. nationals.” Such laws, policies, etc. might be used as a means to initiate conversation with representatives in government. Thus personal or group correspondence in the form of petitions, letters, telegrams, telephone calls, visits are in order. Such correspondence should be of a long-term nature (rather than one-shot) and should pose questions as well as make suggestions. A particularly effective way to bring southern African concerns to the attention of a Congressman is to invite him to speak to his constituents about some aspect of southern Africa, thereby insuring that he will do some research on the area. This technique has been employed once or twice with considerable success. To reach a larger Congressional audience, include pertinent articles on southern Africa to be included in the Congressional Record. If possible, make specific legislative proposals; it is usually most effective to do so by contacting a congressman’s legislative aide. For a list of suggestions of what to include in correspondence and a list of some of the more significant persons in government to receive them, see Appendix I.

IV.

Actions against U.S. economic involvement in southern Africa. U.S. corporate investment in southern Africa has played a vital role in strengthening the economies and military potentials of white southern Africa. U.S. corporations claim that their involvement has a liberalizing effect. This is clearly untrue. During the past ten years, in which U.S. investments have increased significantly, the South African government has considerably extended its program of apartheid by passing a series of repressive acts that have increasingly limited the human rights of black South Africans. While prosperity in general has increased, the position of the black South African laborer has grown more insecure, and in some sectors worsened.

A particularly egregious instance of the black man’s worsening position is the increasing number of removals of “superfluous” blacks from urban areas to the economically depressed reserves, resulting in the breaking up of many families. Likewise, during the past ten years, profits from American investments in Angola and Mozambique have significantly aided Portugal in its efforts to put down local liberation efforts. Gulf Oil Corporation has been condemned by the United Nations for “giving financial, economic, and military assistance to administering powers which are engaged in suppressing national liberation movements” in Angola. Willis-Kaiser jeeps are used by the Portuguese to combat African freedom fighters. Clearly it is the white minority which benefits from U.S. investments, not the black majority. Actions could include the following:

(A) Research the investment portfolios of the institutions with which you are involved (churches, universities, charitable organizations, etc.) Information about American corporations which invest in southern Africa can be obtained from the Southern Africa Committee, the American Committee on Africa, the Africa Research Group, and the CRV Africa Committee. Information on how to do research, especially in relating a corporation’s domestic policies to its overseas policies, can be obtained from the following sources:

i-“Research Methodology Guide” by the North American Congress on Latin America, “a comprehensive guide to research on the U.S. Establishment and its overseas empire”; more comprehensive than NACLA’s first manual; cost: $1.25 including postage; order from NACLA, P.O. Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, N.Y. 10025.


(B) Organize campaigns to pressure U.S. corporations to withdraw from southern Africa or at least oppose existing apartheid and colonial policies in southern Africa. Suggest that persons and institutions with stock in such corporations attend annual stockholders’ meetings to demand changes in corporate policy. The campaigns against Gulf Oil and General Motors (which have heavy investments in Southern Africa) are examples of this type of action which were employed in the spring of 1970. If use of the proxy seems futile, persons and institutions might publicly dispose of their stock in offending corporations.

(C) Stage public demonstrations, guerrilla theater, etc. against offending corporations at their plants, downtown offices, distribution centers, etc.

(D) Prevent any recruitment by offending corporations on your campus. In some cases, state or university laws against discrimination can be cited as justification for such action.

(E) Organize boycotts of southern African products, which include fresh fruit, jams, canned fish and meats, wines, sherries, “South African Rock Lobster,” and “SWAKARA” (South West African Karakul) coats. Local, regional and national dealers should be asked (and pressured where necessary) to boycott all products from southern Africa. For a more complete listing of southern African products, see Appendix III.
V.
Educational programs to raise public awareness of oppression in southern Africa.
(A) Set up teach-ins, emphasis weeks, worships, speaking tours, etc. Important dates in struggles for liberation such as Sept. 25, the beginning of armed struggle in Mozambique, or March 21, the date of the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa, might be used as the focus for such educational events.
(B) Set up literature tables, newsletter, speaking campaigns at schools, churches, and other public places.
(C) Respond to newspaper and magazine articles by writing letters to the editor or submitting responsive articles.
(D) Make sure that awareness of southern Africa is a regular and substantial part of university curriculum. Insist that books and periodicals about southern Africa are in local bookstores and libraries. Libraries should subscribe to the periodicals of African liberation movements, as well as other magazines dealing with southern Africa. See Appendix II for a list of the liberation publications.
(E) Start local education-action groups to launch on-going education and action against racism and colonialism in southern Africa.

VI.
Harrassing institutions symbolic of oppression in southern Africa, such as:
(A) The airline companies of South Africa (SAA) and Portugal (TAP).
(B) Agencies that promote tourism in Portugal or southern Africa.

APPENDIX I

A. Suggested Congressional actions to reduce U.S. support of racist and colonial regimes of southern Africa. Not all proposed actions require new legislation; for some there are existing laws, pending legislation, or announced policies which could be implemented or cited for justification. An asterisk in front will denote this kind of action.

1. *Either integrate the 84-member diplomatic mission to South Africa or terminate it. There is abundant legislation requiring racial integration in government-supported enterprises. If the federal government can force U.S. school districts to integrate, it can surely integrate its own diplomatic corps. One way this could be affected would be by amending the appropriations to the State Department so that no funds for an embassy would be issued until the Secretary of State verified that none of its personnel were operating under a situation of racial discrimination. The State Department would be required to issue annual reports regarding the racial procedures of its embassies and consulates.

2. Discontinue the U.S. missile tracking station in South Africa. Where necessary, alternative space facilities should be sought in Botswana and/or other independent African nations.

3. Cut off economic intercourse with non-self-governing territories or minority controlled regimes.

(a) *End the sugar quota for South Africa, which changed the sugar quota from Cuba and allows the annual importation of 30,000 tons of sugar. The quota should be allocated among neighboring black African nations, such as Malagasy, Mauritius, Swaziland, and Uganda.

(b) End U.S. support of Portuguese colonial control of Angola through the $50 million annual
30

coffee trade, amounting to one-half of Angola's exports. End the U.S. cashew trade with Mozambique, which accounts for 80% of Mozambique's annual export of that product.

c. The Export-Import Bank Act should be amended so that no credits, guarantees, or insurance subsidies are provided for corporations investing in these areas. Tax legislation should be amended to provide that all income from investments in these areas be denied the usual tax benefits for overseas investment.

d. Congress should voice its disapproval of any trade with these areas. The International Finance Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee should conduct hearings and investigations into the activities of the American mining companies, and their interlocking directorships, which operate in southern Africa. Pass legislation to prohibit new investment in these areas; require repatriation of existing capital and the divestiture of subsidiaries.

e. "The President should make clear how he intends to implement the stated policy of discouraging trade with and investment in Namibia, as Ambassador Yost promised in May, 1970. The Congress should put this executive policy in the form of law.

f. End all federal contracts with U.S. corporations which have subsidiaries in white-controlled countries of Africa.

4. "Reinforce the existing total trade embargo against Rhodesia by stationing observers in South Africa and Mozambique to insure that no American products are sent to Rhodesia. Strengthen the existing arms embargo, in accord with the U.N. resolutions of 1963 and 1964, against South Africa by extending the embargo to all material which would have potential military value, such as trucks, small aircraft, and raw materials of strategic significance. Prohibit any American citizens from lending technical expertise or other assistance to the indigenous arms industries of southern Africa.

5. In accordance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution, end all military support for Portugal. This would mean terminating the supply of arms to Portugal under the NATO pact, ending all bi-lateral arms agreements, such as maintenance of the U.S. naval base in Portuguese-held Azores, and discontinuing the training of Portuguese military personnel in the United States. End all kinds of economic aid to Portugal. Impose an embargo on all arms and strategic materiel to Portugal under the Export Control Act.

6. "Support the Diggs amendment to the Federal Aviation Act to require suspension of the permit of an air carrier (such as South African Airways) until it proved that there was no discrimination against those who wished to use it because of race.

7. Appropriations bills for the Atomic Energy Commission, National Science Foundation, the National Space and Aeronautics Administration, and the National Health Institute should require that these agencies confirm that none of their funds are used in cooperation with white-controlled regimes of southern Africa.

8. Pass resolutions supporting U.N. actions establishing administrative jurisdiction over Namibia. Suggest that the U.N. issue passports for Namibians; stamp all South West African passports "not valid unless stamped by the Council for Namibia."

9. Give refugees from the countries of southern Africa the same status as political refugees, as is granted to refugees from Cuba and Hungary.

10. Amend the Fair Disclosure Act so that imported products produced under conditions illegal in the U.S. should be so labeled. This would include products from South Africa produced under conditions of racial discrimination and by prison labor.

11. "Extend American aid to those black African nations threatened or besieged by white controlled regimes.

   a. Special aid and trade should be provided to those countries surrounded by white-controlled countries, including Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

   b. Zambia and Tanzania, independent countries threatened by the racist countries to the south, should receive special consideration for foreign and military aid.

   c. Zambia should receive economic assistance to allow it to break free from economic dependence on South Africa and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia).

B. Key persons and committees in government who could be contacted regarding southern African issues:

   Secretary of State William P. Rogers
   Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird
   Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom,
   Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom

Committees of the House of Representatives related to African affairs, and their chairman:

1. Full committee on Foreign Affairs: Thomas Morgan of Pennsylvania
2. Africa Subcommittee of Foreign Affairs Committee: Charles Diggs, Jr. of Michigan
4. International Organizations and Movements: Cornelius E. Gallagher of N.J.
5. Agriculture Committee: W. R. Poage, Texas
7. Transportation and Aeronautics Subcommittee:
8. Subcommittee on Aviation: Warren Magnuson of Washington
9. Senate Finance Committee; Russell Long of Louisiana
10. Senate Foreign Relations Committee: J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas
11. Subcommittee on African Affairs (Senate):
Thomas Dodd of Connecticut

12. Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization: James Eastland of Miss.

13. Subcommittee on Labor: Harrison A. Williams of N.J.


Influential members of the Senate who have shown a concern for Africa:

Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)
John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.)
Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.)
Edward Brooke (R-Mass.)
Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.)
Edmond S. Muskie (D-Maine)
Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.)
Adlai Stevenson III (D-Ill.)
John Tunney (D-Cal.)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)
Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.)
Edmund Muskie (D-Me.)

Apartheid"; also obtainable from the American Committee on Africa, Washington, D.C. office.

APPENDIX II

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, ADDRESSES*, PUBLICATIONS
(In some cases the mailing address represents the provisional headquarters.)

1. African National Congress of South Africa (ANC)
   a. Mailing address: P. O. Box 680, Morogoro, Tanzania
   b. Publications: Spotlight on South Africa, P.O. Box 1791, Lusaka, Zambia; Sechaba, 49 Rathbone St., London, W.1, England

2. Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO)
   a. Mailing address: Box 1493, Lusaka, Zambia
   b. Publication: Valient Hero, Box 1493, Lusaka, Zambia

3. Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
   a. Mailing address: B. P. 15274, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania
   b. Publication: Mozambique Revolution, B. P. 15274, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania
4. Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE)
   a. Mailing address: B. P. 1541, Kinshasa, Rep. of Congo
   b. Publications: A Voz Da Revolucao (in Portuguese with English translation; the information bulletin of the UPA), B. P. 1541, Kinshasa, Rep. of Congo; GRAE Information Department, B. P. 1320, Kinshasa, Rep. of Congo; O Mundo (information bulletin of the PDA), B. P. 8085, Kinshasa, Rep. of Congo.

5. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
   a. Mailing address: P. O. Box 1591, Lusaka, Zambia
   b. Publications: Information Department, P. O. Box 1591, Lusaka, Zambia

6. Pan Africanist Congress of Azania [South Africa] (PAC)
   a. Mailing address: P. O. Box 2412, Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania; 607A Grand Building, Trafalgar Square, London WC 2, England.

7. African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC)
   a. Mailing address: Box 298, Conakry, Rep. of Guinea
   b. Publications: PAIGC Actualites (in French), Box 298, Conakry, Rep. of Guinea

8. South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO)
   a. Mailing address: P. O. Box 2603, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania
   b. Publications: Namibia Today, P. O. Box 2603, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania; Namibia News, 10 Dryden Chambers, 119 Oxford Street, London W1, England

9. National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
   a. Mailing address: George Sangumba, 25 Ospringer Road, London NW5, England
   b. Publication: Information Department, P. O. Box 2246, Lusaka, Zambia

    a. Mailing address: P. O. Box 2331, Lusaka, Zambia
    b. Publication: Zimbabwe News, P. O. Box 2331, Lusaka, Zambia

11. Zimbabwe African Peoples union (ZAPU)
    a. Mailing address: Box 1657, Lusaka, Zambia
    b. Publication: Zimbabwe Review, 283 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1, England

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African and Southern African Periodicals:

- **AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL**
  5/33 Rutland Gate
  London SW7, England
  fortnightly; $25; students $15.

- **AFRICA DIGEST**
  2 Arundel St.
  London WC2, England
  6/yr.; air $7.50

- **AFRICA REPORT**
  530 Dupont Circle Building
  Washington, D.C. 20036
  $8/yr.

- **AFRICA TODAY**
  c/o Center for International Race Relations
  University of Denver
  Denver, Colo. 80210
  $6.50/yr.; students $4.50

- **AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT**
  John Carpenter House
  John Carpenter Street
  London EC4, England

- **ANTI-APARTHEID NEWS**
  89 Charlotte St.
  London W1, England
  surface: $1.50; air $3.00

- **SOUTHERN AFRICA:**
  A Monthly Survey of News and Opinion
  637 West 125th St.
  New York, N.Y. 10027
  institutions $6.00/yr.
  individuals, contribution optional

Newspapers of Southern Africa:

- **TIMES of Zambia, Box 69, Lusaka, Zambia**
- **ZAMBIA MAIL, Box 1421, Lusaka, Zambia**
- **THE NATIONALIST, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania**
- **THE EVENING POST, Baakens Street, Port Elizabeth, South Africa**
- **THE STAR (Johannesburg, South Africa), c/o Argus, 220 Central Park South, N.Y., N.Y. 10019**
- **THE RAND DAILY MAIL, Johannesburg, South Africa**
- **THE CAPE TIMES, Capetown, South Africa**
APPENDIX III
SOUTH AFRICAN GOODS TO BE BOYCOTTED

FRESH FRUIT
Cape fruit (or Cape grapes, etc.)
Golden Jubilee IMPI
Outspan IMPI
Fresh fruit imported from South Africa includes oranges, apples, grapes, pears, and lemons, as well as more "exotic" fruit such as avocado pears, guavas, pineapples, litchis or lychees, melons, apricots, peaches, mangoes, pawpaw, and several varieties of red and yellow plums.

WINES
(mostly sherry, but some table wines, including hock, dessert, port, brandy)
Alto Rouge Red Wine
Bitter Sweet
Burgoyne's Paarl Amber
Burgoyne's Veldt
Chateau Libertas
Essay 3-Star South African
Golden Cream
Grumbergen Stein
Hermitage
JVR
JVR Liqueur
Krissen-Cream
Krissen-Dry
La Residence
La Gratitude
Landroost
Nonsuch
Nigger-Brown
Oude Meester
Rembrandt
Richelieu
SAWFA Fine Old South African
Safari
South African Hock
South African Burgundy
Thenni Skraal
Van Der Hum Liqueur
Wonder Club

JAMS AND MARMALADES

Avalon
Cape Hill
Dwars River
Eimo
Fairest Cape
Golden Hawk
Gold Reef
Hardings Delight
Honeysuckle
Hugo
Ixi
Imco
Jax
Koo
Mountain View
Rockhill
Raya
Rff
Simba
Southern Pride
Summergloew
Summit
Travers Arcadia

CANNED MEATS
(including sausages and ham)
Apex
Armour Star
Baynesfield
Bek
Champ
Cymro
Double Crown
Eskort
Glenryck
Hennys
Honey cure
Longeborg
Maconochie
Orynx
Prats
Pri Ma
Ranch
Stormy Petrel
Union
Winray

CANNED FISH
(including crayfish and pilchards)
often sold as "Produce of South West Africa"
Atlantic
Carnation
Calmex
Cape Pride
Corsair
Glenryck
Jolly Roger
Siren
South African Rock Lobster
Stormy Petrel
Twinfish
Winged Wheel
Winray

CANNED FISH
(including crayfish and pilchards)
often sold as "Produce of South West Africa"

CANNED MEATS
(including sausages and ham)

CANNED FISH
(including crayfish and pilchards)

CANNED MEATS
(including sausages and ham)

CHEESE
(including cheddar and processed cheese sold by the pound)

EGGS
Blue Flag
Cockfighter
Farmers Union
(These are individually stamped "South African" but may be displayed or sold from containers marked "imported" by some grocers.)

IN ADDITION, A BOYCOTT OF ALL PORTUGUESE PRODUCTS IS ALSO URGED (especially Portuguese wines, sardines and other fish products, china and lace.)
APPENDIX IV

FILM LIST

ANGOLA

Angola: Journey to a War. NBC White Paper, 1962. 16 mm. 1 hr. Angolan coffee workers revolt; the uprising spread. The only documentary film yet available on the revolt—made by two Americans who crossed the Congolese border into rebel-held territory. Sidney Hillman Foundation award. (Available: American Committee on Africa, 164 Madison Ave., 2nd floor, N.Y., N.Y. 10016. 212/532-7300.)

MPLA Film Strip. 1969. Contemporary account of MPLA's struggle inside Angola. (Available: Liberation Support Movement, P. O. Box 15210, Seattle, Wash. 98115. Cost $4.00)

GUINEA—BISSAU


SOUTH AFRICA

Apartheid. U.N. 1967. 16 mm. 15 1/2 min. Filmed at the International Conference on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination, and Colonialism. Shows international concern and action against South Africa. (Available: Contemporary Films, 267 W. 25th St., N.Y., N.Y. 10001. 212/971-5851. Rental—$5.00, Sale—$75.00.)

Black and White in South Africa. National Film Board of Canada. 16 mm. 30 min. Shows South Africa's acute racial problem and examines motives for the creation of the apartheid policy. (Available: Contemporary Films, Rental—$8.00, Sale—$100.)

Come Back Africa. Lionel Rogosin. 1963. 16 mm. 1 hr. 24 min. The film classic made in South Africa portraying the transition of an African from rural to urban life with all the realities of human oppression in apartheid. (Available: Contemporary Films, Rental—$100-125.)

Heart of Apartheid. BBC. 16 mm. 39 min. Filmed in South Africa. Interviews with Africans and “Coloureds.” Revealing not only for what is said, but what is not said. (Available: Time/Life Films, 43 W. 42nd St., N.Y., N.Y. 10018. 212/520-3900. Rental—$25.00.)


Sabotage in South Africa. CBS Reports, 1962. 16 mm. 1 hr. Interviews with outstanding opposition leaders such as Nobel Prize winner Albert John Luthuli, as well as with Minister of Justice Vorster (now Prime Minister) and other top government officials. (Available: American Committee on Africa, 164 Madison Ave., 2nd floor, N.Y., N.Y. 10016. 212/532-7300.)

South Africa. ABC/TV Africa Series, 1967. 16 mm. 1 hr. each, 2 films. Pt. 1: Fruit of Fear—a social, economic overview. Pt. 2—One Nation, Two Nationalisms—a study of political apartheid, including the “Bantu” policy. (Available: Indiana University, Audio-Visual Center, Bloomington, Ind. 47401. 80/337-8087. Sale—$200 each.)

White Africa. BBC. 16 mm. 40 min. Revealing interviews, recordings and images of white South Africans, including a “Bantu Administrator,” liberals, etc. A striking study in attitudes. (Available: Time/Life Films, Rental—$30, Sale—$300.)

MOZAMBIQUE


ZIMBABWE


(Films provided by the American Committee on Africa request a $25.00 fee per showing to be paid to the AFRICA DEFENSE AND AID FUND, and for mailing charges (special handling, insured for $100) to be paid by the renter.)
## APPENDIX V

### AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTIES OF PORTUGUESE AFRICA

#### ANGOLA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Other Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOVIMENTO POPULAR DE LIBERDAÇÃO DE ANGOLA (MPLA)</td>
<td>Brazzaville</td>
<td>Dr. Agostinho Neto</td>
<td>Reverend Domingo Francisco da Silva, Vice-President Luis d'Azevedo, Jr., External Affairs Lucio Lora, Internal Organization, Brazzaville Office Daniel Chipendo, Dar es Salaam Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIÃO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDENCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA (UNITA)</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>Jonas Savimbi</td>
<td>Smart Chaka, First Vice-President Kanumba Mulyate, Second Vice-President Solomon Njolomba, Third Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNO REVOLUCIONÁRIO DE ANGOLA NO EXÍLIO –FRENTE NACIONAL DE LIBERDAÇÃO DE ANGOLA (GRAE-FNLA)</td>
<td>Kinshasa</td>
<td>Holden Roberto (President of GRAE)</td>
<td>Recario Neto, Vice-President (GRAE Minister of Information) Manuel Miranda, Secretary-General (President of FNLA Youth) Eduardo Pinick, Executive Committee (GRAE Minister of Interior) Ferdinand Dombafo, Secretary-General (GRAE Minister of Social Affairs) Pedro Godimpovi, Vice-President (GRAE Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. União dos Populações de Angola (UPA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Partido Democratico Angolano (PDA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emmauel Kussika (Vice-President of GRAE)</td>
<td>Ferdinando Dombafo, Secretary-General (GRAE Minister of Social Affairs) Pedro Godimpovi, Vice-President (GRAE Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MPLA da Cruz</td>
<td>Viriata da Cruz</td>
<td></td>
<td>Matias Migueis (deceased?) Georges Freitas José Bernardo Domingos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FRONT PATRIOTIQUE POUR L’INDEPENDANCE

DU KONGO DIT PORTUGAIS (FPKIP) consists of the following Bakongo secessionist groups:

1. Ngwizani a Kongo (Ngwizako) [São Salvador royalist]
2. Nto-Boko [collaborationist, originally linked to Congolese ABAKO]
3. Parti Progressiste Africain (PPA) [ex-Ajeunal, Bazombo youth group]
4. Rassemblement des Chefs Coutumiers du Kongo Portugais (RCCKP) [association of chiefs]
5. Union Progressiste de Nso en Angola [Sosso ethnic group]

### CONSELHO DO POVO ANGOLANO (CPA)

1. União Nacional Angolana (UNA) [Onimbandu, Chissamba-Nova Sintra region]
2. Partido Nacional Africano (PNA) [Chokwe, based at Tshikapa, Kasai]
3. Comité Unidade Nacional Angolano (CUNA) [Bakongo, Bembe-Carmono region]
4. Movimento Nacional Angolano (MNA) [Bakongo, Songo sub-group]
5. Union Générale des Travailleurs Angolais (UGTA) [breakaway from LGTA]

#### MOZAMBIQUE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Other Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRENTE DE LIBERDAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (FRELIMO)</td>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>Dr. Eduardo Mondlane</td>
<td>Reverend Uria Simango, Vice-President Marcelino dos Santos, External Affairs Lourenço Mutoaco, Finance Secretary Amos Sumane, Vice-President Joseph Chiteji, Secretary-General Alfred Chembene, Deputy Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMITE REVOLUCIONÁRIO DE MOÇAMBIQUE (COREMO)</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>Paulo Gumane</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

#### PORTUGUESE GUINEA

<table>
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<th>PARTY</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Other Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARTIDO AFRICANO DA INDEPENDENCIA DA GUINE E CABO VERDE (PAIGC)</td>
<td>Conakry</td>
<td>Raphael Barbosa</td>
<td>Amikar Cobral, Secretary-General Luis Cobral, Representative at Dakar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRENTE PARA A LIBERDAÇÃO E INDEPENDENCIA DA GUINE PORTUGUESA (FLING)</td>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>Benjamin Pinto-Bull</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACTION GUIDELINES

1. List of friendly Senators, Representatives, and other government officers
2. List of South African (and Portuguese) goods to be boycotted
3. Listing of U.S. organizations in the movement relating to Southern Africa issues
4. Listing of Films on Southern Africa available to persons and groups
5. Listing of Southern Africa Liberation Movements, addresses, and publications

SOUTHERN AFRICA COMMITTEE
c/o National Council of Churches, DOM, Africa Office
Room 612
475 Riverside Drive
New York, N.Y. 10027

RETURN REQUESTED