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Members of the Young Pioneers Welcome the first Ambassadors to Guinea-Bissau in the South
Front (photo: Stephanie Urdang)
FIGHTING THE OTHER COLONIALISM: THE WOMEN'S STRUGGLE IN GUINEA-BISSAU

by Stephanie Urdang

In April and May of this year, I spent four weeks inside liberated areas of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and some four more weeks with PAIGC in Dakar, Conakry (the Party headquarters) and Boke, near the border, the party administrative center.

The purpose of my visit was to look at the part that women are taking in the revolution, and the fight for women's liberation within the broader struggle. For three weeks I accompanied Teodora Gomes, Political Commissar of one of the regions* of the South front. For another week, after a break in Conakry, I was in Boe Oriental, a sector of the East front. During this time I visited schools, hospitals, medical posts, peoples' stores, villages, and interviewed many women all the way along—peasant women from the villages, members of village councils, teachers, directors of schools, nurses, regional responsables.** I stayed in political and military bases, at schools, at hospitals and once in a village. Except for the bombing raids, I sometimes felt I was on a holiday. Plentiful food, comfortable beds, lots of sleep. Even the many, many hours of walking in the forests and more quickly across the open plains and rice fields, I at times found very invigorating. The scenery could be spectacularly beautiful when the forest would open out onto the plains at dusk or sunset. I left Guinea-Bissau in love with the country and its people, inspired by the success of the ongoing struggle, and the growing militancy of the women in regard to their own liberation.

I went with the view that an important measure of the success of any process of social change is how the exploitation of women is acknowledged and how the struggle for the liberation of women is related to the struggle for the liberation of the society as a whole. I went hoping that what I would find would be very positive in this regard. I did. PAIGC has long stated that the need for women to free themselves from domination must be seriously taken into account in their overall program. "Our revolution cannot be successful without the full participation of women," said Amilcar Cabral. On the other hand I did not expect to find 50 percent of all work done by women. I know that the struggle for women's liberation is a long one, that they have both the traditions of the society and the treatment of women under Portuguese colonialism to combat. What I wanted to see was the process by which PAIGC is trying to achieve its goal of a society without exploitation of any kind.

Two Colonialisms

"In Guinea-Bissau we say that women have to fight two colonialisms, one against the Portuguese, the other against men," said Carmen Pereira to me on my second day inside the country. She is the top woman in the Party, being on the PAIGC Executive Council of the Fight, and the Vice-President of the National Assembly of the new State. She is responsible for the social reconstruction program of the whole South front. I had slept the night at her base, Donka, and spent a few hours with her in the morning.

Two colonialisms? This is not a new concept, but I was interested to find it expressed here, and to find it reiterated by many women, and men, throughout my trip. It forms the basis for the theory and the practice of the PAIGC regarding women. I am struck by it because, as we women in Europe and North America try to grapple with the development of a coherent theory, the very concepts we are using are found in a revolutionary situation such as Guinea-Bissau.

The need for a women's struggle was one recognized from the start of the revolution. A Party directive states:

"Defend women's rights, respect women and make them respected; but convince the women of our country that their liberation should be their own achievement, by their work, attachment to the Party, self-respect, personality and steadfastness before everything that could be against their dignity."

Although men are seen as colonialists, they can not be seen as the enemy in quite the same way that the Portuguese colonialists are. In fighting the first colonialism, the enemy is easily identifiable. Although, always insisting that it is not the Portuguese people who are the enemy, the identification of the enemy as the Portuguese Government which is perpetuating that colonialism is clear enough. In what ways are men, perpetuators of the colonialism of women, the enemy? As was often said to me—we are fighting to change men's minds. This process is part of our overall struggle to build a new society. It is not simply a struggle against men; men are not seen as the enemy as such.

For Women Life Was Doubly Hard

Given that this is the Party's perspective, and the perspective of the women, most of them to whom I spoke extremely militant, how does the fight against the second colonialism manifest itself?

In order to understand what changes are being wrought through the social reconstruction program of the Party, some sense of what is being fought against is helpful.

I asked many women what life was like living under the

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* Guinea-Bissau is divided into three fronts—South, East and North. Each front is divided into regions, each region into sectors.

** Responsible is a term used for Party members who are responsible in their work for a particular area of the struggle—hence health responsible, responsible for education, for justice. Political responsables are called 'Political Commissars.'
Portuguese. In the south I spoke to a Balante woman, Bwetna N'dubi, who was one of the first women mobilized and a member of the first village council. She is now an elected regional deputy, acting as liaison between the population and the member of the National Assembly for the area—also elected. She has had no formal education and cannot read or write.

"My family were peasants and they worked in the rice fields and grew rice. When they needed something they took rice to the Portuguese stores and traded it, or sold it for money. But they had no way of knowing the cost of the product they were buying, and the Portuguese paid whatever they wished for the rice. There was nothing they could do about it. If you argued about the price, you would be beaten. With the money you received you had to pay taxes for everything—palm trees, domestic animals, land. If you were unable to pay the taxes, you were beaten and put in jail. Then to pay for the land, your family would be taken by force and made to work for nothing." She went on to describe how she had been forced as a young girl to work on the construction of a road, without pay, living in the forest, and supplying her own rice. Those who tried to escape were beaten severely. She added, "we had no possibility to go to school—there were no schools. Neither were there any hospitals or doctors."

For women, life was doubly hard. "Women suffered more under colonialism than men," a young woman director of one of the main schools in the country, Jacinta de Sousa said to me. They had to contend with the colonialism of men as well as the Portuguese. Women's work was extremely hard. Besides contending with the effects of Portuguese colonialism—women as well as men were rounded up for forced labor—they had to produce food, including many hours of pounding every day: collect water, which could take many hours; wash clothes, cook, care for the children, work in the rice fields; bring food to the men working in the fields; clean the huts. Additional burdens would be placed on them if the men were away under forced labor to the Portuguese—very often the case. Their work was never ending and physically arduous. In addition the traditional customs effecting women meant they were treated as inferior, and expected to remain in the background. Their husbands were chosen, by their fathers, and they could not leave them, even if mistreated. Polygamy was common, particularly amongst the Muslim group.

During the four weeks I spent in the country I witnessed vast changes. There are schools, hospitals, clinics, peoples' stores, elected peoples' tribunals. The rate of infant mortality due to disease has decreased, people have enough to eat, they are well dressed in comparison to photos I saw taken at the beginning of the war, and they do not pay taxes. All necessities of life are provided for, and free. "Today we have everything we need," said Bwetna N'dubi. And this comment was echoed again and again by all the women I spoke to.

And changes as women?
In a Fula village in the East, in answer to my question about this, I was told, "But look, before it was out of the question for me to talk to visitors. Or to speak in front of men. Now I am talking to you, and men are right here. Does this not show you how much freer we are?" And they spoke about how men are now helping to a greater extent with the children, with fetching water, with other household tasks. And in addition the Party has fought hard against traditional customs which oppress women—such as forced marriages, polygamy, lack of divorce for women, and general attitudes to treating women as inferior.

It was clear to me, endorsed by the enthusiasm and respect shown to the Party, that PAIGC has been instrumental in bringing about remarkable changes in the lives of the population in general and of women in particular. And all in the space of one decade.

Doing 'Man's Work'
In addition to the changes mentioned above, women
are taking on responsibility and becoming leaders—inconceivable before. Involvement of women in the Party, in the struggle, in social reconstruction grows steadily each year. But how did they begin? What made this rapid progress possible?

At the time of mobilization, when the trained mobilizers went into the countryside to win the support of the peasants, they raised the question of women's liberation and the need for equal rights. At first only a few women would attend the village meetings called by the mobilizer. But these women would tell others what was said and encourage them to attend meetings. Gradually more women gained enough confidence to go themselves, and the word spread further. "I first heard about women's rights at the beginning of mobilization," said Bwetna N'dubi. "I understood what was being said immediately, that equality is necessary and possible. Today I work together with men, having more responsibility than many men. This is not only true for me. I understand that I have to fight together with other women against the domination of women. But we have to fight twice—once to convince women and the second time to convince men that women have to have the same rights as men."

Once the armed struggle had begun and the first areas of the country were liberated, village councils were elected in each village to attend to the organization of the day-to-day life of the village, and to act as a liaison between the population and the Party. The Party insisted that at least two out of five members of the councils be women. In this way, it was assured that women would be brought into the leadership at a village level, and through experience gained there could later enter broader fields of responsibility. But given the traditions, this ratio would not have been readily supported, by either sex. A simple tactic was used to assure that women would be included on the council. Each village councilor was assigned a particular task. Women were to be responsible for providing food (rice) for the guerrillas—an extension of 'women's work' and hence quite acceptable. My first reaction when told this was slight disappointment. I wanted women to be chosen on their own right. But I was being naive. A long history of detrimental customs and traditions must be overcome. As Fidelis Cabral, Commissioner of Justice said to me, "You cannot change overnight all the customs of the people. They will turn against you." It is precisely because of attitudes like these, that PAIGC has been so extraordinarily successful. And now there are women vice-presidents and presidents in the village councils, and women who have responsibility beyond the village. Bwetna N'dubi is a testament to this. She was extremely confident and articulate. "For me personally there have been many changes in my life," she said. "For example, sometimes I have to leave my home for up to three days at a time on a Party mission and my husband has to stay at home. This would have been impossible before. I feel I have changed personally from my experience, I have much more confidence. Before life was very difficult for women, but the Party brought new ways and a new life for women. However, it is important for women to fight to defend themselves and their rights."

Much of the success in the changing of attitudes is due to the consciousness, from the very beginning of the struggle, of the need to liberate women in all ways. It was an ever present topic of discussion at village meetings. I was told how consistently Amilcar Cabral spoke about it with the population and with cadres. This is borne out by an address of Cabral's at a village meeting in 1966, which Chaliland quotes in his book on Guinea-Bissau.*

"Comrades, we are going to place women in high-ranking posts, and we want them at every level from the village committees up to the Party leadership. What for? To administer our schools and clinics, to take an equal share in production and to go into combat against the Portuguese when necessary. . . . The women and girls will go into villages as nurses or teachers, or they will work in production, or in the village militia. We want the women of our country to have guns in their hands. . . . "Comrades, young girls are going to be coming into the villages from our bases. But don't let anybody think that these girls are up for sale as brides. They will get married if they wish, but there will be no forced marriages. Anyone who does that is worse than the Portuguese. These young girls are going to work in the villages, go to school, be in the militia, and the Party will exercise complete control. . . . "Women must hold their heads high and know that our Party is also their Party."

**Women in the Army—if necessary?**

This brings me to the question of women in the army. I seldom saw women armed. And those that I did see were political cadres* not members of the army. Cabral said (above) "to go into combat against the Portuguese when necessary." When I asked Carmen Pereira why women were not in the National Army (FARP) she said, "but it is not necessary." At first this puzzled me. Why is something that is necessary for men, not necessary for women? But maybe for PAIGC, as a result of their particular experience, it is not necessary. It was explained to me that they feel that, due to the biological differences between the two sexes, women do not make as good soldiers and find it extremely hard to keep up with the men in combat. In the early days of the war, women fought with men. Now they are members of the local village defense militia, and perform important support functions for the national military. Guinea-Bissau is a small country and there were

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* "Cadre" is used here to mean an active political member of the Party, in training.
more men than needed who wanted to join FARP. This is in contrast to Mozambique and Angola where the size of the countries necessitated the fullest involvement possible in the army; where FRELIMO for instance, has had a women’s detachment to their army. I seemed to be puzzled. PAIGC has had to fight a war, the most efficient army possible had to be a priority. But there is no doubt too, that guns and power are usually equated. And I wondered, seeing guns everywhere just what effect this would have on the girls and boys growing up? But on the other hand the women of Guinea-Bissau are militant in their fight for their liberation. And they are vigilant of the impact that guns and power will have on the girls and boys growing up. But on the other hand, I wondered, seeing guns everywhere just what effect this would have on the girls and boys growing up? But on the other hand, the women of Guinea-Bissau are militant in their fight for their liberation. And they are vigilant of the impact that guns and power will have on the girls and boys growing up.

Building a New Society

And now the Party and the State can continue with full concentration on the program of social reconstruction. This facet of the overall struggle has always been stressed as being as important as the armed struggle itself. In what ways had this affected the role of women?

One of the bases for the new society is on the one hand the eradication of traditions of the people which go against the principles of the Party and are hence exploitative, while on the other hand giving renewed status to their culture and national history. A Party directive states: "Oppose without violence all prejudicial customs, the negative aspects of the beliefs and traditions of our people. Oblige every responsible and educated member of our Party to work daily for the improvement of their cultural formation..." Among the negative aspects which effect women are forced marriages, lack of divorce for women, and polygamy. Marriages arranged by parents are virtually non-existent now. And divorce is a possibility for everyone. I was told that at the beginning of the struggle, many women joined the Party in order to escape the fate of an arranged marriage, or to procure a divorce from a man they did not love and had been forced to marry. The Party thus played an important role in providing protection for women when they first began to resist the customs that oppressed them. Now divorces are heard by the People’s Tribunals, one elected by each village or group of villages. Overcoming the practice of polygamy is a lengthier process. "We have to move, but we have to move slowly," commented Fidelis Cabral. "The custom has been with us for generations and we cannot change it in an instant." It is not possible to demand that all men divorce their wives, barring one. But at village meetings and in talking with the population, cadres are told that the Party is against the practice. For members of the Party, polygamy is not permitted, even for practicing muslims. But for the whole population such limitations cannot be placed. However any man who loses his wife through divorce or death cannot replace her, unless he only had one in the first place.

But for PAIGC the eventual key to erradicating all negative traditions and entrenching the new society is education. The need for it is a constant theme. In the same address by Cabral, quoted above, he says "parents may no longer refuse to send their children to school. The children are caught up in chores... But the children need to go to school just as the parents need the children’s help.... I am an engineer. Perhaps there are people present who are smarter than I. But there are not engineers among them because there were no schools. The Party wants to give all the children of our people a fair chance. Our people’s main enemy is Portuguese colonialism. But any adult preventing the education of our children is also our enemy." But it was not so much the resistance to sending sons to school that the Party found it had to contend. It was sending daughters. Jacinta de Sousa told me: "The problem is with the fathers. The girls are needed in the house to help their mothers, and they won’t allow them to go to school. The politics of the Party is against this, and things are changing. But it is still a very big problem, particularly in this area which is Fula [Muslim]. Our Party places great emphasis on the children because they are the future of our country. Political commissars go to the village and explain why education is so important, particularly for girls. They stress that we want to reconstruct a free society, a society without sex discrimination."

In all the schools I visited there were far fewer girls than boys, on the average about 25 percent. However in Conakry at the Pilot School, the highest grade school, one third of the students were girls. This is an encouraging percentage given that it is from here that students go abroad for further study.

In order to help overcome the detrimental traditions, and to enable the students to become well versed with and understand the PAIGC program, time is set aside each week at all schools for political education. The question of the domination of women and the need to fight against it is regularly discussed. "We especially insist on the rights of women to the boys," said Jacinta de Sousa, "so that they understand that what they have learnt in their own homes regarding women is not true. The boys come to school with the opinion that they are superior."

A Glimpse of the Future

It was the consciousness of the women’s struggle that I found in the women cadres that I met, that gave me a...
glimpse of the future. As much as Bwetna N'dubi and village councillors I met epitomized the changing situation for peasant women, so did many of the young women cadres epitomize the new society that is emerging. Articulate, militant, confident, they spoke with ease for peasant women, so did many of the young women village councillors I met epitomized the changing situation and I felt was significant. Teodora Gomes, 17 at the beginning of the struggle, felt that this had been a grave problem, but a diminishing one. “Women are not like women.”

I spoke to them (and others at different points in my trip) about many things concerning women. Did they feel that there were any innate differences between women and men? No, was the consistently emphatic answer. Women and men are capable of doing the same work, of all kinds, from bringing up children, to doing housework, to becoming engineers. There were biological differences, but this did not mean that there should be difference in political rights, or in work that did not require excessive physical strength.

Did they feel that men treated them as sex objects, that this was something to fight against? I got two slightly different responses to this, from women of different ages which I felt was significant. Teodora Gomes, 17 at the beginning of the struggle, felt that this had been a grave problem, but a diminishing one. “Women are not like shirts,” she told me Cabral used to say, “you put on one today, another tomorrow.” He insisted that women be treated with respect by the men joining the Party, that if they flirted around casually, he would tell them to get married. “There were many, many marriages in the early days of the Party,” told Teodora, with a delighted laugh. But now things were changing, she said. And certainly as I watched her and other women with men cadres, it was quite clear to me that they were being treated with the respect of comrades. I could sense nothing but equality and self-assurance between the two sexes [and I feel that this would have transgressed the language barrier if present]. Coming from a situation where women have to fight constantly against this, I found it a pleasure to watch. While Teodora openly recognized the problem as one to fight against, the younger women of 19 and 20 felt that it did not exist, that it had already been overcome. They were nine, ten years younger and their experience was almost of a different generation, a generation that had grown up under the PAIGC. Talking to the women at the school, they emphasized the comradeship. They felt free to have lovers if they so wished, could obtain contraceptives from the hospital in Boke and elsewhere, but did not feel that men approached them as if they were sex objects. Fina Crato told me that for four years she had studied filmmaking with three PAIGC men in Cuba. At all times she was treated as an equal comrade. This perception was endorsed by Jacinta da Sousa and Maria da Goia in their work with men teachers. The point was demonstrated. During the discussion Jacinta suddenly stopped and listened to a class being held nearby. She jumped up and walked with firm steps to the class. The teacher was a man, and older than her. He was apparently teaching outdated geometry. She discussed it with him briefly, her authority obviously accepted, and he proceeded with the lesson along a different track.

The number of women in all fields of work has been growing steadily. They receive strong encouragement by the Party to take on more and more responsibility, and in turn are demanding this themselves. There are women nurses (and heads of hospitals), political commissars, regional health responsables, teachers (and directors of schools), radio communications technicians, and women involved in political work among the population, in villages and beyond. I spoke to women in all these fields. Their dedication to the Party and their country, their enthusiasm about their work, and the way in which they articulated the need for the liberation of women was extremely impressive.

Eleven and a half years after the launching of the armed struggle, PAIGC is in the process of achieving independence. But the people do not believe that independence means the end of the revolution. There is a long road to travel yet. There is the emerging new society that must still be fought for. And there is yet the goal of a society free from exploitation, free from sex discrimination to be reached. “Our revolution cannot be successful without the full participation of women.” Year by year this participation is growing. That I could see it in process was fortunate. And very, very inspiring.

Many—women and men—expressed the view that it will be a long struggle. That long after the last of the Portuguese soldiers have left their shores, their struggle for a new society, for a new woman will continue. And so it continues.
PROGRESSIVES GAIN AT UNITED PARTY EXPENSE

Dr. Alex Boraine has become the seventh Progressive Party M.P. by defeating his United Party opponent by 34 votes in a by-election in Pinelands. The by-election was held because of the death of the previous M.P. Boraine’s victory follows the success of the Progressive Party in the General Election in April in which the Progs increased their seats from one to six.

In a parliament with 170 seats, seven seems like an insignificant number in relation to the ruling Nationalists who hold 123 seats. However, a number of analysts are suggesting that the official opposition United Party is seriously threatened by the Progressive success and that at least 20 other seats could easily be taken from the United Party by the Progs.

The United Party is seriously divided, and there has been open dissatisfaction with its leader Sir de Villiers Graaff, who is insisting that he has no intention of stepping down. If the divisions in the UP are not healed, and the Progs continue to gain ground it will mean an increasing polarization among the country’s Whites. The Progs are a liberal party, favoring a qualified franchise that would enable wealthy and landed Blacks to vote. (The number of such Blacks in South Africa is, of course, exceedingly small.) (Star, Johannesburg, June 15, 1974; New York Times, June 14, 1974; Christian Science Monitor, Boston, May 20, 1974)

BLACK DOCTORS REFUSE PAY SUBSIDY

For a time, black and white doctors working under the Johannesburg City Council, received the same pay. But when the Transvaal Province took over the medical and dental clinics in which the black doctors worked, it cut their salaries.

In an action that one commentator called “a magnificent gesture,” white Johannesburg doctors announced that they would voluntarily make up the black doctors’ pay losses for an indefinite period.

The six black doctors, all of whom work in the huge township of Soweto, have rejected the "magnificent gesture" of the white doctors. One of them said, "We feel we do not need preferential treatment to the rest of the black people, most of whom are paid much less than the average black doctor gets." (Anti-Apartheid News, London, June 1974; Star, Johannesburg, April 27, 1974)

CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH

According to Deputy Minister of Bantu Development, Raubenheimer, white South Africans must face the fact that more Africans from the Bantustans will come into the urban areas looking for work. Raubenheimer was speaking at a conference on the problems of development of the northern part of South Africa. At the same meeting, the managing director of the Bantu Investment Corporation spoke of the cost of creating jobs in the Bantustans. Dr. J. Adendorff said that government and private industry would have to find about $78.4 million annually to supply work to new employees in the northern Bantustans. It costs about $11,000 to create a single work opportunity in industry in the north.

Financial dependence on "handouts from the Republican government make a mockery of the concept of self-development and independence of our people" said Hudson Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of the Gazankulu Bantustan, speaking at the same meeting. Ntsanwisi stressed the importance of creating jobs within the Bantustans, saying that unless the majority of the population could be employed within, the Bantustan was clearly unviable economically. (Star Johannesburg, June 15, 1974)

CHIEF GATSHA BUTHELEZI: PLAN FOR A FEDERAL SOUTH AFRICA

Tanzania Radio’s chief political commentator, Mr. Gora Ebrahim, has recently accused Buthelezi and other Bantustan leaders of being “puppets” of the Vorster Government. Others, including a number of US liberals, call Buthelezi the voice of the future of black South Africa. There is no question that Buthelezi, precisely because of his prominence, is an important figure whose position deserves analysis. In January, 1974 Buthelezi read a paper to the South African Institute of Race Relations, explaining his plan for a federal South Africa. The paper received much attention within South Africa and is summarized and analysed here.

According to Buthelezi, a Federal System is needed in South Africa because of the deepest concerns of both Blacks and Whites. Blacks contributed to the building of present day South Africa. They demand a place in that society. There is an implied loyalty to South Africa, a desire to be a part of the sophisticated, technological, consumer society that is “more advanced” than the rest of Africa. Whites, for their part, are afraid of loosing their privileged economic position and their high standard of living.
Buthelezi’s solution to the problem of white fear and black desire for participation is to put aside questions of ideology and get down to what he calls practical matters. The question of power should be avoided. “This seems,” he says, “to be the actual point of conflict between White and Black. . . .This issue [that of a central parliament and who will control] which bedevils any mutual understanding and mutual confidence could at least be postponed for several generations.”

Instead of dealing with the question of power, the economic development of the bantustans, which will become “constituent independent states” should have highest priority. Although this will be costly, it will not be as costly as the present defense budget, which, presumably, would no longer be necessary.

Federal System

Three types of states would make up Buthelezi’s Republic:

1) States in which the interests of some African ethnic groups are paramount.
2) States in which the interests of the white people are paramount.
3) Special or Federal areas which are multinational in character or in which no particular group interests are designated.

Whites owning farms or other property would be allowed to continue living in an African area as “non-citizens” of that “state.” Pass laws would be abolished. According to Buthelezi, South Africa has reached such a high level of economic development that the old influx control regulations and pass laws are not needed. As an alternative, he suggests that it is time to work a system of labor and employment exchanges similar to those used in Europe, the so-called “guest-worker” plans.

Finally Buthelezi insists that local power should be paramount for the foreseeable future, and that the popular will should be the base of that power. In addition, each state would have its own police or para-military force to patrol its borders and protect its property. Exclusive control of the police and military by the White as at present, is a source of great distrust and resentment of Black toward White. (“Towards Federation,” Chief Gatsha Buthelezi; South Africa Outlook: Cape Town, March, 1974)

Analysis:

Buthelezi’s program can be criticized on two levels. First, if one accepts for the purpose of discussion the federal idea, there are flaws in his outline. One wonders, for example, if Buthelezi knows what “guest-worker” programs have meant to masses of workers in Europe.

It is the third category of “Special or Federal Areas” that raises the most doubts. Who will people in those areas be loyal to? What will legitimize power in those areas? If the constituency is multi-racial then surely there must be some kind of multi-racial “local” body to govern. This multi-racial solution is the very one that Whites continually reject. Further, most Blacks in South Africa do not live in the bantustans, and would fall into this category. So the multi-racial areas would be dominated by Blacks, a hard reality for Whites to accept. Of course, there Of course, there is a way out: massive land redistribution, allocating to the Blacks a percentage of the land equal to their percentage of the population. Again, something it is hard to believe the Whites would ever agree to. (Buthelezi does call for significant land redistribution.)

The problem in the “Special Areas” points to the second and more fundamental criticism. Buthelezi’s belief that questions of ideology and power can be postponed for generations is false. By refusing to deal with them he is guaranteeing the perpetuation of the present situation. Whites will hold power and run the country according to their ideology. They will do so until they are challenged by an alternative ideology that is powerful enough to force a change.

However, in spite of the problems with Buthelezi’s outline and his obvious political naivety, it may be a mistake to dismiss his scheme too quickly.

Prime Minister Vorster clearly dislikes Buthelezi’s outspoken criticism of Nationalist policies. Vorster, on the other hand, is well aware of what is happening north of his borders. He knows that without the cooperation of the African population, South Africa could not win a war against a strong guerrilla force coming in through Mozambique. Thus, Vorster needs Blacks like Buthelezi, Blacks who are deeply committed to an ideology that is not, finally, at fundamental odds to Vorster’s own. That is to say, Buthelezi wants to participate in South Africa as it is, to be a part of the Western capitalist economy that exists. For white South Africa to maintain itself over the long haul, it needs Buthelezi—Blacks who will fight the guerrillas for them.

If it is true that Vorster’s agents are financing political opponents to Buthelezi, then it may be true that Vorster is sealing his own fate. For nothing less than the demands that Buthelezi is making will be enough to buy off the masses of the African population. To give less is to have the game change, the rules determined by a different set of players.

Especially now, with a new and fluid situation in Mozambique, the future may be more open than it has been for years. Leaders who have taken the ideological and power questions seriously, who want nothing less than a social, political and economic revolution, those will be the leaders who dictate the terms of the “discussion.” White South Africa will have lost a powerful ally if it helps to undermine the position of Black leaders like Buthelezi.

BRITISH BOYCOTT OF SA TV PLANNED

Although not yet stated officially, it appears that Equity, the British Actors Union, has decided on a ban of South Africa. It is also indicated that other organizations associated with making programs for TV may choose the same course. In that case, South African TV, when it opens next year, would not be getting British programs. (Guardian, London, June 24, 1974; Star, Johannesburg, June 18, 1974)

PRESSURE FOR A BLACK BISHOP FOR JOHANNESBURG?

Anglican officials have announced recently that the election for the Bishop of Johannesburg has been postponed for three months. There is speculation that the reason for the delay is the pressure from all Blacks and some white priests to have a black Bishop. (Johannesburg, Star, June 15, 1974)
SPORTS

Mr. Norman Middleton, president of the (non-racial) South African Soccer Federation, recently applied for a passport to attend a meeting of FIFA, the world soccer body. The Government was prepared to grant him the passport on the condition that he would not “harm South African sport while overseas.” Mr. Middleton has refused to give such an assurance. Commenting on the Government’s decision, the Star, (Johannesburg) wrote that the Government’s “action creates as much adverse publicity for South Africa and the weaknesses of its sports policy as Mr. Middleton might have done in person.” (Times, London, June 30, 1974)

South African Rugby teams have fared very poorly against the touring Lions team from Britain. Observers feel that sports boycott leading to lack of practice at international level, has resulted in lowering of the standard of South African rugby. (Times, London June 30, 1974, Guardian, Manchester, June 24; Star, Johannesburg, April 8, 27, 1974)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

with Israel:
Evidence of cordial relations between South Africa and Israel continues to appear (see Southern Africa, June, 1974). In September, General Moshe Dayan and his wife, Rachel, will visit South Africa. The two-week tour will include Durban, Johannesburg, Cape Town, and probably a stop in the Eastern Cape.

With U.S. and Europe:
With lobbying through law firms the name of South Africa’s game in trying to achieve its purposes in the U.S. (see Southern Africa, June, 1974), a New York firm, Casey, Lane and Mittendorf, has been working on the retention of the sugar quota—an agreement that requires the United States to buy a specified amount of South African sugar at prices well above those set by the world market. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.) has introduced legislation to end the subsidy.

In other news that pertains to South Africa’s relations with the US, Mr. Gerald Sparrow, the director and only publicly known member of a secret international organization called the “Club of Ten”, revealed during an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation, that Americans are among its largest contributors. The organization’s primary function is to promote South Africa’s image in the United States, Britain, Scandinavia, New Zealand, and Holland. This propaganda so far has mainly taken the form of advertisements appearing in major newspapers of the United States and Europe.

In Britain, it has been speculated that the “Club of Ten” is really a front for the South African Government. Former employees of the South African Embassy in London, who prefer to remain anonymous, told the Guardian that the ads were prepared and financed in South Africa. A copy of an advertisement, headed “Geheim” (Secret) would be transmitted on direct teleype ink, called DEX, from Pretoria to the Embassy in Trafalgar Square. The copy is then retyped on a single plain piece of notepaper. Security cleared secretaries are told to make no copies. The senior officers that do know about the ads are instructed not to talk about them. They are required to sign the South African Officials Act. Once the draft is received, Mr. Gerald Sparrow goes to South Africa House from his home in Brighton. The approved text is then handed to him in the director of information’s office. Within days, the advertisements appear in the press. Although precise channels of the ads, which have cost $140,000 in Britain alone, are not known, it is believed that Pretoria routes the funds through friendly organizations, which in turn, disperse them.

Gerald Sparrow maintains that the major financial backers are not South African officials, but individual United States and European contributors, and wants them to reveal themselves. He, however, will not release the information himself. “We have many supporters in Europe and Amercia (and elsewhere) who resent the denigration of South Africa to the exclusion of other matters. There is nothing secret about their names, but I am not prepared to give that sort of information over the phone.”

If it is found that the South African Government is indeed financially supporting the “Club of Ten”, it will be very embarrassing, since that government is trying to promote itself as a progressive “Western” nation with nothing to hide.

Another form of South African propaganda masquerading as independent opinion is a news magazine, entitled To the Point. The magazine is printed in Holland, in English and is free of charge, although it receives some advertising support from such companies as South African Airways, IBM, KLM, and Dunhill. The senior editor of To the Point is John Poorter. His predecessor was Eschel Rhoddie, an influential aide of Information Minister Mulder.

With Mozambique and Angola
In a joint news conference held in June Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia and John Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa, were asked their feelings about an all black government in Mozambique and Angola.

Mr. Vorster replied, “All that we are really interested in is good rule. It is not in our interest that there should be chaos in any neighboring country; we want stability and we want good rule. It is not for us to prescribe what sort of rule.” Mr. Vorster also said that the situation does not particularly worry him.

Mr. Smith added that he was prepared to work with anybody as long as they are working constructively in the interests of Southern Africa.

In another interview, Dr. Mulder, Minister of Interior and Information said that South Africa is willing to work with an all black government as long as that government accepted South Africa’s position. (Star, Johannesburg, June 15, 1974; Africa News, Durham, May 20, June 27, 1974; Guardian, London, June 10, 1974; Financial Times, London, May 30, 1974; Daily Telegraph, London, May 27, 1974; Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, May 30, 1974)

SOUTH AFRICA INTENSIFIES OIL SEARCH: PROGRESS REPORTED
In the mid-1960’s, South Africa took extraordinary precautions to protect itself against a possible international embargo. The most crucial aspect of these precautions was the stockpiling of oil reserves. Currently, with the Arab oil embargo still in effect against South Africa, the white government has intensified its search for the valuable black crude.
In June, it was revealed that the government is planning to more than double its grant to Soekor, the South African Oil Exploration, from $11 to $30 million. Two rigs are scheduled to be working off-shore, one in the South Atlantic region and one in the Indian Ocean coastal region.

A new well being drilled off the west coast, near the mouth of the Orange River, has been described by a Soekor official as "extremely promising." This find involves not crude oil but pure methane gas. Chevron, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California and Texaco, is in charge of the exploration effort, and Chevron officials are described as very encouraged by the prospects.

The oil South Africa has been stockpiling is being stored in abandoned gold mines, as well as large storage tanks. Estimates vary from two to five years as to the length of time South Africa could survive a total oil embargo. With so much mineral wealth, geologists have long thought that the potential for finding oil in South Africa was great.

But to date none has been found, and the Republic remains somewhat vulnerable because of it. The Arab oil embargo, imposed last December at the request of independent African nations who gave their full backing to Egypt and Syria in the October Mid-East war, has not gone unnoticed in South Africa. Sale of gasoline has been restricted to about 60 hours a week, and the national speed limit was reduced to 50 mph.

But, South Africa uses oil for only about twenty per cent of its energy requirements—a much higher dependence on coal than most industrial nations. And a close economic relationship with Iran (which has investments in South Africa's petroleum industry) has helped insure a steady flow of crude despite the Arab ban.

Clearly, oil self-sufficiency is a top priority for the white regime. The recent intensification of exploration is a recognition that this goal is no less important than it was a decade ago. (AFRICA NEWS, Durham, July 25, 1974; South Africa Digest, June 28, 1974; Financial Times, London, June 19, 1974)

US TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA ESCALATES

United States exporters are selling to South Africa at a higher rate than ever before, according to a report from the US Department of Commerce. During the first five months of 1974, US exports to South Africa were nearly 40 per cent greater than they were during the same period in 1973. World Trade Outlook, a Commerce Department publication, says the level of exports may reach $1 billion by the end of the year.

The Johannesburg Star reports that the Department's estimates may be too low, since they use a projected growth rate of 4 per cent for the South African economy. The South African Reserve Bank, says the paper, foresees a growth rate of 7 per cent for the current year.

The Commerce Department assessment is that South Africa is fast becoming one of the major importers of manufactured goods in the world. The prime reason is said to be the income the country receives because of recent high gold prices and the export of other valuable natural resources. (Star, Johannesburg, July 27, 1974)

MINISTER OF DEFENCE, P.W. Botha on a recent visit to the border, talks to South African Soldier

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEFENCE STRATEGIES: AN OVERVIEW

"Vigilance On The Border"

The doors [of the South African Air Force C160 Transall troop-carrier] swung open. . . . hundreds of splendid-looking South African soldiers were perched atop armoured vehicles and trucks. Armed to the teeth, the casual-seeming attitude of the troops belied their obvious state of instant combat readiness.

"It was a wonderfully reassuring sight. Here indeed were solid men at the front. . . . South Africa's fighting border is in good hands."

And here indeed was the rhetoric of wartime, employed in this case in the South African Digest (June 21, 1974) report of the response of the first official South African press party allowed to visit Mpacha Air Base in Namibia's Caprivi Strip. In the forested areas of Caprivi near South Africa's border with Zambia, national servicemen are trained for the South African Defence Forces (SADF) under "active service conditions." And all along the border, South African men in arms patrol and watch for "terrorists" who with "presumptuous cheek" say they wish to liberate South African Blacks from colonialism. (South African Digest, June 21, 1974, quoting Minister of Police, J.T Kruger)

Until recently, and for the past six years, the borders South Africa shares with northern neighbors have been the responsibility of the police. In June, however, border defense was officially turned over to the SADF, whose army and air force have in fact already been deeply involved in the face of increasing unrest in Namibia, intensified guerrilla action to the north, and, most recently, the Portuguese coup.
Except for a small section of land designated as part of the Zulu Bantustan, most of South Africa's border with Mozambique contains white-owned farms. Here, where African mine worker unrest has added to the sense of insecurity among Whites, the Transvaal farmers have become acutely concerned about their own defenses—a concern shared by civil defense officials and demonstrated in the installation of an integrated alarm system linking isolated villages, frequent farmers' meetings, the distribution of pamphlets on security, and the stepped up training of commando units. (Star, Johannesburg, March 23, 1974) Here too, as in other border areas, police units are being replaced with regular army troops. In addition, five new towns are to be built between Songo and Malvernia near the Transvaal-Mozambique border. These will be spaced along the projected route of power lines from the Cahora Bassa Dam and are intended to serve as both security and maintenance bases. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, April 2, 1974)

The Limpopo River provides a natural frontier separating South Africa from Botswana, and this has been supplemented by a barbed wire fence. In contrast, the flat scrubland which characterizes both densely populated Ovamboland (northern Namibia) and neighboring southern Angola has always made trans-boundary movement relatively easy despite the fact that this 250 mile border is also fenced. (Guardian, London, May 3, 1974)

Blacks Recruited, Anti-insurgency Training Intensifies

The Portuguese coup affects South Africa in numerous ways, but one of the clearest consequences is that South Africa can no longer count on Portuguese assistance in the monitoring of its borders with Angola and Mozambique. The placement of South Africa's borders on a war footing has therefore been accompanied by the intensification of "anti-terrorist" training programs in both the army and police forces and by an historic step in SADF policy. For the first time in its history, Blacks are to be recruited into the army and equipped with FN rifles. In an address to journalists visiting the Caprivi Strip, Minister of Defence P.W. Botha implied that Black soldiers would be recruited through the Bantustans when he said: "I hope that our Bantu, our Black governments and Black nations will play their part towards achieving and perpetuating conditions of peace and security." (Star, Johannesburg, June 15, 1974) In the meantime every six weeks 300 black and white policemen are being given training in weapons, tactics, and guerrilla psychology at South Africa's anti-guerrilla school in the northeast Transvaal near Groblersdal. 6000 men have passed through the course so far and it is the government's aim to have every policeman in the country complete it eventually. (New York Post, July 3, 1974) In a Star article (Johannesburg, April 20, 1974) much was made of the fact of "Whites and non-Whites training together in bush warfare," but all facilities are of course segregated and it is interesting to note that the Blacks employed on the Caprivi border are, like the dogs used, termed "trackers." (South African Digest, June 21, 1974)

Arms, Men and Atom Bombs

South Africa's military strength is indisputable. Between 1970 and 1973, its army more than doubled from 44,250 to 109,300 men. During the same period, tank strength increased from 300 to 800, jet fighters tripled to 116, two submarines were added to the one possessed, and three more warships joined the fleet of six. (RECON, July, 1974) Moreover, Dr. Louw Alberts, vice president of the South African Atomic Energy Board officially verified in July what has been "an open secret for the last four years," namely, that South Africa (with the assistance of scientists from the Institute for Nuclear Research in Pelindaba) has developed the technology for producing enriched uranium. South Africa, which possesses about a quarter of the "western world's" known uranium resources has been developing its reserves since the 1950's when the US began buying South African uranium for its weapons program. South Africa's "secret" process to enrich uranium is thought to be a modification of a West German process, developed in a pilot plant at Valindaba in the Transvaal during the last three years. (Washington Post, July 12, 1974; RECON, July 1974)

For the racist South African regime, uranium resources provide not only the potential for nuclear weapons but a powerful bargaining tool in the face of a world energy crisis. Most western European countries and the United States will be heavily dependent on uranium supplies after 1970 because a large fraction of all the electricity generated in these countries will come from nuclear power plants which use enriched uranium as a fuel. The supply of uranium will become as critical as the supply of oil is now. On June 30, 1973, the Observer (U.K.) reported that France, which has already provided South Africa with submarines, missiles, fighter planes and helicopters, is negotiating the sale of a 1,000 megawatt French nuclear reactor in exchange for South African uranium, non-ferrous ores and other raw materials. Should such a transaction be concluded, it will be interesting to see how French President Giscard d'Estaing explains it in light of his May pledge to the National Assembly to stop all arms sales which contradict "the liberal mission of [France's] diplomacy" of "supporting throughout the world the cause of freedom and right of peoples—and I mean peoples—to determine their own future." (Guardian, London, May 31, 1974)
In the meantime, the British Labour Government's decision to halt further arms supplies to South Africa, which includes a refusal to supply the last in a batch of seven Westland Wasp helicopters contracted 'under the Conservative Government, has provoked threats of retaliatory action on the part of the South African Government. At stake is the Simonstown agreement, reached 28 years ago, under which the British Royal Navy has been allowed to utilize the strategically located Simonstown Base near Cape Town in exchange for helping to equip the South African Navy. Prime Minister Vorster has now threatened to 'review' that agreement, while the president of the South African Shipbuilders' and Repairers' National Association has warned that France would take orders for ships and equipment if Britain did not. British Prime Minister Wilson pointedly dismissed the latter argument in terms of 'the traditional apology of the prostitute through the ages— if I don't do it, someone else will.' (Financial Times, London, May 22, 1974) For his part, South African Defence Minister has announced that South Africa will build its own warships and speed up its drive to become independent of Britain for arms. And in a radio interview, Admiral Hugo Biermann, chief of the South African defence forces, insisted that South Africa was not dependent on foreign markets for weapons required for its national security. (Times, London, June 17, 1974; Guardian, London, June 12, 1974; Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, June 12, 13, 1974; Daily Telegraph, London, May 31, 1974; Star, Johannesburg, May 25, June 8, 1974)

South Africa's Trump Card: NATO at the Cape?

In official statements concerning defence and security, South African Government and-military spokesmen are at pains to emphasize that current preparations for war are purely defensive and that South Africa harbors no designs upon nor ill will toward northern neighbors, be they black or white governed. The difficulty of squaring such statements with the facts of South African military presence in Rhodesia and Angola/Mozambique notwithstanding, the constant theme reiterated is that South Africa will not initiate aggression but is fully ready to meet the threat of "terrorist" aggression from the north.

For several years now however, a much wider and potentially ominous scenario has been stressed for the consumption of the "western bloc" and in particular, for the US and its NATO allies. The motion picture projected portrays communist-backed (hence, read Chinese and/or Russian domination) black (read a threat to white western civilization) "terrorists" bent on gaining control of the Cape sea route, with Russian warships closing off all access to the Indian Ocean and hence to oil supplies vital to the European and American economies.

It is now abundantly clear that the US and NATO officials are and have been for some time sufficiently alarmed by this scenario to be giving serious consideration to defense agreements with the apartheid regime and to engage for over a year in secret contingency planning for military operations in the Southern Africa area. These facts were revealed in an unpublished report prepared by economist Sean Gervasi and others for the UN Committee on Decolonization. The report indicates that last June, NATO ministers issued a secret communique authorizing the Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic region (SACLANT) to prepare for contingencies "outside the NATO area." Technically, NATO activities are only authorized north of the Tropic of Cancer, but the UN report suggests (and NATO spokesmen deny) that the way is being prepared for the setting up of a "counter-intervention" force in the South Atlantic with South African cooperation. Direct cooperation with South Africa is necessitated by SACLANT's conclusion that NATO forces alone are not sufficient to deal with the area.

Specific US concern over the Russian presence in the Indian Ocean has recently been demonstrated in secret talks between US and British officials over Indian Ocean strategies, the reappearance in July of a US naval squadron in that area, and in the release of a survey, commissioned by the US Navy, which deals with US energy requirements and sources of supply in the context of the vulnerability of sea lanes. According to this report, the most likely development in a crisis would be an "undeclared war by Soviet submarines against Western shipping around the Cape of Good Hope." (New York Times, July 24, 1974; Daily Nation, Nairobi, May 15, 1974; NATO Review, Belgium, June, 1974; Guardian, London, May 20, June 6, 1974; Los Angeles Times, July 3, 1974; Muhammad Speaks, June 28, 1974; Daily Telegraph, London, May 24, 1974; Observer, London, May 19, 1974; Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1974; Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1974)

Should the US and NATO powers bind themselves to defense agreements with South Africa on the assumption that western interests are best served by the presence at the Cape of a strong, fervently anti-communist (albeit totalitarian and racist) government, the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa will assume dimensions that are terrible indeed to contemplate.
ANGOLAN LIBERATION UNITY—HISTORY AND FUTURE?

After talks in May and June between the three Angolan liberation movements, prospects for building a united front among them appeared favorable, according to Times of Zambia reports. However moves toward unity then foundered. Initiatives for the unity meeting between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA apparently came from other interested African leaders and not from the liberation movement leaders themselves. Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Mobutu of Zaire, Kaunda of Zambia and General Gowon of Nigeria were instrumental in bringing representatives of the three movements together in Lusaka on May 26. After the meeting Daniel Chipenda of MPLA, Jorge Sangumba and Miguel Puna of UNITA and Holden Roberto of FNLA were seen embracing at the Lusaka airport and although no official communique was issued from the talks, it was assumed that the beginnings of an Angolan united front had been worked out. (Times of Zambia, Lusaka, May 27; May 30, 1974)

Shortly after the Lusaka meeting, MPLA published an official response to the Times of Zambia reports that a “declaration of unity” had not taken place at the May 26 meeting. The letter stated that “MPLA had signed no unity agreement with UNITA and FNLA.” The letter reasserted MPLA’s desire for unity, but a “true unity which is the only efficient way by which the true independence of Angola can be achieved.”

Earlier in a June 1 interview in Brazzaville, Congo, Dr. Neto said that one of the basic conditions for unity between MPLA and FNLA was the release of MPLA members arrested and held in Kinshasa by FNLA. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, June 1, 1974)

Meanwhile there were reports that MPLA and the Portuguese had held unofficial talks inside MPLA-controlled territory and a Luanda radio station reported that a cease-fire agreement had been made and that MPLA would suspend military operations and concentrate on electoral politics. (Africa News, Durham, June 24, 1974) On July 1, Dr. Neto denied these reports and said that fighting will cease only when MPLA leaders are fully convinced of Portugal’s willingness to cede independence to Angola. He added that fighting will be stepped up in the eastern region and in Cabinda. (Africa News, Durham, July 1, 1974) Holden Roberto also denied that unity between the movements exists and was quoted as saying the FNLA operations would be stepped up and that it was prepared to fight for another 13 years if necessary. (New York Times, July 14, 1974)

Similar reports of a cease-fire between Portugal and UNITA were denounced by FNLA who said the agreement had been signed and announced simultaneously in Luanda and Lisbon. UNITA has not formally responded to this report. (Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, June 19, 1974)

But in late July hopes were revived for some sort of unity when a meeting was called in Bukavu, Central Africa Republic by the four concerned African leaders.

A communique issued after the meeting announced that two of the movements, MPLA and FNLA, promised to present a united front for peace talks with Portugal. And there seemed to be some ironing out of internal MPLA problems which have emerged over the past months, as shown by the division of the movement into three factions led by Neto; Daniel Chipenda, a former Central Committee member; and by Mario Andrade, one
of the early party founders, and his brother, a priest, long incarcerated in Portuguese jails. The composition and political complexities of the divisions are not known, nor exactly how the groups will dissolve or resolve their differences. The Bukaru accord was signed by the four presidents, by OAU Secretary General W.A. Mbouamoua, FNLA leader Roberto and representing MPLA, Neto, Chipenda and Genti Viani. (Vokskrant, Amsterdam, July 30, 1974)

In another move towards unity, the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, said that his movement will only negotiate with the Portuguese in conjunction with the other two movements. He also denied the widely publicized report that UNITA had agreed to a unilateral cease fire with Portugal. (Africa News, Durham, August 1, 1974) The magazine, Afrique Asie, has just published what it calls genuine copies of correspondence between Savimbi and Portuguese Angolan military personnel revealing close collaboration between the two. UNITA has blamed the Soviet Union and MPLA for these reports. (See Afrique-Asie, July 8-21, 1974 and "UNITA Rejects Afrique-Asie’s Allegations," July 19, 1974)

INSIDE ANGOLA

General Franco Pinheiro, head of the Portuguese command in Angola, said that all Portuguese offensives in Angola have been terminated. "There is no more defoliation, no more destruction of crops—all of this is finished," he said. The General disclosed that safe-conduct has been extended to all members of the liberation movements. The General insisted that peaceful conditions must exist in Angola before any referendum on Angola's future could be held. (New York Times, June 2, 1974)

And in the first week of June, strikers brought Angola's Benguela Railway to a standstill. Several hundred black and white railworkers went on strike for higher wages. The same week 1000 employees of Angola's largest shipyard went out on strike for wage increases. (Star, Johannesburg, June 1, 1974)

In the short time since the April 25 coup an estimated 40 political parties have emerged in Luanda. No white group openly calling for a UDI has emerged. Many of the white groups can be characterized as having some commitment to a multiracial, independent Angola with acceptance of black majority rule. Other white groups favor federation with Portugal, but fear a referendum on a one-man, one-vote basis would defeat the proposal. (The Observer, London, June 9, 1974)

Since the mass violence erupted in Luanda however, the political complexities of white politics and the consolidation of the right has altered the former appearance of peaceful co-existence. (See Reprint from The Observer on killings in Angola)

Talk of independence is rife in Cabinda, but it is somewhat different from discussions of total independence for Angola that are going on in other parts of the country. The Democratic Party of the People of Cabinda and the Union of the People of Cabinda have joined forces and formed the Union of the People of Cabinda and this group is in the process of deciding whether it will favor independence from Portugal or federation with Portugal. Gulf Oil may yet have something to say in the matter since it extracts 7.5 million tons of crude oil annually from Cabinda's offshore oil rigs. (New York Times, June 3, 1974)

A group of 150 Portuguese soldiers stationed in Cabinda have sent a taped message to the MPLA office in Algiers declaring that they have refused to continue fighting in the province and that they demand full independence for all of the Portuguese African territories. (Guardian, New York, July 10, 1974)

WHITES SLAY AFRICANS IN ANGOLA

by David Martin

(Reprinted from The Observer, London, July 28, 1974)
At least 300 African civilians have been killed or wounded by white extremists in Luanda, capital of Angola, in the past fortnight according to eye-witness accounts reaching Europe.

Marauding bands of white shopkeepers, taxi and truck drivers have hauled grenades into crowds of Africans, including women and children, and shot them from passing cars.

Africans have retaliated by looting and burning white-owned shops in African ghettos. But, although a list of more than 90 dead Africans has been compiled by a Dutch couple who saw some of the killing, only two whites are known to have died.

The racial clashes, the worst in Angola since 1961 when over 50,000 Africans are said to have died, have forced Portugal's military junta to recall Angola's Governor-General, General Silvino Silverio Marques, a right-wing hard-liner.

The dismissed Governor, known to Africans in Angola as 'SS General Marques' was appointed only last month. He was also Governor when the late Dr. Salazar was President and is a brother of one of the junta's seven members.

The violence erupted on 11 July after a white taxi driver was found shot dead in his car in Luanda's African Cazenga ghetto.

Because nobody in the area heard shots and because whites don't go there at night, Africans believe he was killed elsewhere and dumped in Cazenga.

However this was the signal for the extremists. Whites shooting from moving cars killed two Africans that afternoon. Taxi drivers went to the Governor's palace brandishing arms saying that if they were not protected they knew what to do.

That night, between 9 p.m. and 11 p.m., more than 200 whites went into Cazenga and 44 Africans were...
Four young Angolans, who asked for their names to be kept secret, described to me in London last week details of what happened. They said a bus-load of Africans was stopped by whites at a make-shift road block. The occupants were fired on and grenades thrown into the vehicle, killing 11 people and maiming others. There were more shots at pedestrians from cars; one man with a shotgun stopped and fired into a crowd of playing children, wounding several.

Next day more than 1,000 Africans tried to march with three of the corpses to the Governor's palace, but there was more killing when troops headed them off. General Marques and the Commander-in-Chief of Angola, General Franco Pinheiro, were warned about the violence but sources in Luanda say that no effective action was taken to control the white extremists.

The Dutch couple who made the list of dead, wounded and missing were Mr. and Mrs. Paul Stall. They say the killings continued nightly until 15 July. At 10 a.m. that day 6,000 African soldiers marched to the Governor's palace demanding that they should be re-armed to protect 'our brothers and sisters'.

Several thousand African civilians following behind were stopped by white commandos and military police.

As the crowd stood waiting for the soldiers to return a taxi driven by a European approached with three Africans in the back. There were shouts of 'traitor' from the crowd. The commandos and military police fired shots over their heads. Then, according to Mrs. Stall, shots were poured into the crowd from a nearby building. The official communique said 12 civilians were killed, but she counted 30 corpses and scores of wounded.

General Marques tried to blame the violence on black extremists of the African nationalist movements, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). But, as both have condemned retaliatory violence by Africans and more than 90 Africans have been listed as killed compared with only two whites, this does not ring true.

Africans and liberal whites in Angola believe the violence is being instigated by a movement called United Resistance of Angola (RUA) which was blamed for many of the killings in 1961 but has been dormant.

MILITARY REPORTS

Despite General Pinheiro's proclamations that a Portuguese cease-fire is in effect, MPLA reports that military operations continue in the eastern region and in Cabinda district.

Major operations in Cabinda in late June left six Portuguese soldiers dead and 12 wounded and subsequently 26 Angolan soldiers in the Portuguese army deserted to the MPLA. On June 13 in the Kaio area, MPLA shot down an enemy helicopter, and in the Mexico district on the eastern front, MPLA anti-aircraft guns severely damaged a Portuguese PV2 carrying out patrol flights. MPLA reports that Portuguese bombing raids continue in Cabinda; during the first week of July villages along the way from Sanda Massala to Caio Nguembo were raided. (MPLA War Communiques, Dar Es Salaam, June 17, 21, 22, 23; July 3, 4, 1974)

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS—FRELIMO, THE PORTUGUESE AND THE MOZAMBIQUE RIGHT-WING

The Portuguese Government has now openly committed itself to negotiate with FRELIMO as the logical outgrowth of General Spinola's late July speech pledging independence for the colonies and UN Secretary General Waldheim's subsequent discussions with Portuguese officials in Lisbon. (See reprints of speeches). A joint communique published at the close of Waldheim's visit promised independence for Guinea-Bissau, negotiations with FRELIMO and opposition by the Portuguese Government to "secessionist attempts in the colonies. . . ."

In Mozambique right wing forces have been mobilizing; some under the leadership of businessman Jorge Jardim, who is rumored to be in touch with the famous 1960's Congo-based mercenary, Michael Hoare. Groups connected with Jardim and his interests were said to be functioning near Vila Pery in Mozambique east of the Rhodesian border. Jardim himself is now resident in Malawi, a move which caused the Portuguese Government to break off relations with once former friend President Banda. The London Observer has also reported the existence of a group opposed to a negotiated independence with FRELIMO called the CDM. It is composed of Mozambican professionals who feel betrayed by the current government in Lisbon, labelling the Armed Forces movement white liberal to Maoist in political outlook.
CDM people interviewed believe that its position was, however, supported by other elements in the Portuguese Government in line with Spinola himself, and believe they will get support for forming a united front of Blacks and Whites opposed to the "yellow peril" represented by FRELIMO and its allies in Portugal. CDM is well heeled financially and plans to take over various Mozambican interests such as some liberal newspapers.

In early August it was announced that Portugal has pledged itself to fight, if necessary with liberation forces, against secessionist movements in the colonies. This is one of a number of indications of various forms of FRELIMO-White cooperation in Mozambique, in line with consistent FRELIMO policy unopposed to continued white presence in the country. It was reported, for example, that black dock workers in Lourenco Marques refused to load cargo of whites wishing to leave the colony. In military zones it appears that the Portuguese Army has in some sectors become virtually inactive and that garrisons have been pulled out of many northern areas. There is at times an informal cease fire similar to what occurred in Guinea-Bissau and relationships between local FRELIMO cadres and whites, for example in the removal of land mines. Farmers in some areas have appealed to FRELIMO for protection against roving bands of people bent on taking advantage of the state of flux. There have been a number of huge rallies in support of FRELIMO with both white and black spokespersons, in Lourenco Marques and as far north as Tete. Meanwhile Portuguese soldiers have been less and less willing to fight and a group of soldiers in Macossa sent their commander a manifesto indicating support for FRELIMO and a refusal to continue fighting.

The new conditions in Mozambique, the consolidation of the right, the overwhelming popular support for FRELIMO point to a future still replete with complexities. A Portuguese Government official, Victor Alves, predicted independence in Mozambique by April 25, 1975; the first anniversary of the coup in Lisbon. Such predictions do show perhaps a will, but not a clear way. (New York Times, August 5; Washington Post, July 30, August 2; 5; Observer, London, July 21, August 11; Times, London, July 27; Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, June 28; Daily Telegraph, London, July 24; African News, Durham, July 25, 29; August 1, 1974)

NEW PROVINCE REOPENED BY FRELIMO—OTHER MILITARY NEWS

Samora Machel, President of FRELIMO, announced the reopening of the military front on July 1 in Zambezia Province in central Mozambique. Very soon after the armed struggle began there 2,000 had joined with FRELIMO. Only July 12, the town of Morrumbika, near the Malawi border in Zambezia was captured from the Portuguese after a three day battle. This is the first major town actually seized and held by FRELIMO since the beginning of the war ten years ago.

Various railway lines throughout the contested zones of the colony have remained important targets. In the last week of May, a goods train was blown up on the Trans-Zambezi Railway to Malawi, derailing 15 of the 30 cars and closing the section of track between Beira and Inhambinga. At least two, but possibly three other incidents occurred on the same rail link during the latter half of May. In July, a mail train and over a mile of track were blown up in the area of Vila Cabral, Niassa province.

Transportation links with the Cabora Bassa dam project on the Zembezi River in Tete province, have received heavy blows. Vila Grouveia, the main stopover on the road between Vial Pery and the dam site, has been under siege for about two months. Supplies must be brought in by air or heavily guarded military convoys. June 26 saw a new attack on the Tete line in northwest Mozambique, approximately three miles from Malawi. Six hundreds yards of track was badly damaged and all traffic was stopped on the link between the Moatize railhead at Cabo Delgado and the Trans-Zambezi line from Beira to Malawi. This line carries most of the supplies for the Cabo Bassa project. On both July 11 and 15 the Tete line was again attacked, and twice closed for the necessary repairs. Due to such FRELIMO advances, little use has been made of the electricity produced by the dam already. Furthermore the twin power lines supposed to carry electricity to the Transvaal region of South Africa, run through 500 miles of lightly inhabited country in which FRELIMO is already active. The Portuguese protection plans for these lines include heavy ground and helicopter patrolling, plus clearing of the brush on either side of the lines.

Despite such activity, numerous redeployment of troops since the April 25 coup, to troubled areas of Mozambique, FRELIMO has won significant victories. Many Portuguese soldiers have been killed. Mozambicans have been freed from aldeamentos (strategic hamlets). The enemy camps of Nhatsakala (Mandie region) were attacked. At least 19 Mauser rifles and 166 rounds of ammunition were captured. Towards the end of the month a bridge over the River Inamago, on the road between Mapagade and a timber mill owned by a Rhodesian, was destroyed. During April, several concentration camps were attacked, freeing 24 people and killing several Portuguese soldiers. Army posts were also assaulted during which time ammunition was captured and some enemy troops were killed. In May the Portuguese military camp connected with the aldeamento of Malemia-Matenda about 21 miles from Vila Cabral, was stormed. Fourteen enemy soldiers were killed and 33 Mozambicans liberated. 12 guns, two radio transmitters, uniforms and documents were captured. The purpose of this camp was to "secure the safety" of the workers of the Tameco Company, assigned to pave the road between Vila Cabral and Maniamba. On May 29 a cotton plantation was attacked, 15 miles west of Inhambinga and 93 miles north of Beira. The entire labor force of 30 Africans was freed, while crops, the laborers' housing, two cotton storage sheds and several motor vehicles were destroyed. In early June a Portuguese patrol was ambushed near Inhambinga. Finally in July the key railway centers of Inhaminga itself, and Vila Fontes both in Macina y Sofala province, were heavily assaulted in a continuing offensive. (Africa News, Durham, July 1; Anti-Apartheid News, London, June, 1974; Christian Science Monitor, July 18, July 16; Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, June 4; Daily Nation, Nairobi, May 21; Daily News, Dar es Salaam, May 28, 30; July 2; Daily Telegraph, London, June 17; Guardian, New York, July 24; Star, Johannesburg, May 17, 29; June 1, 8, 15; Times, London, May 31, June 1, 27, 1974)
MORE ON MASSACRES

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate tales of massacres of civilians in Mozambique by the Portuguese, was convened in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania early in June. The Commission began its work to study the accusations concerning the villages of Wiriyamu, Mucumbura, and Inhaiminga. Many more examples of massacres were uncovered in the process however, as well as the involvement of Rhodesian troops. Several witnesses including two children between the ages of 10 and 13, told of atrocities which occurred at four villages "too small to be marked on most maps"—Naveta, Likayoyo, Nankuda and Kunguluwa Mwema. These villages were attacked by at least one bomber and four FIAT jets. Furthermore, two Tanzanian doctors gave witness to the rumors that Portuguese troops poisoned the wells of Mozambican villages in an area of Tete province last year. They stated that more than 1,000 Africans died as a result of this action.

Several FRELIMO members have testified before the Commission. Joaquin Ribeiro de Caravallio stated that Portuguese troops killed or wounded 200 civilians in northern Mozambique between 1965 and 1973. Estevao Joao Almeida reported the deaths of 60 men, women and children locked in a building set on fire purposely by Portuguese troops. This occurred at Namutanga village in northwestern Mozambique, during January 1965. He had escaped through a small hole in the wall, and still carries the scars where a flaming timber fell on his back. Later on, he was joined in the bush by an old man who had seen 26 people of a nearby village lined up and shot by Portuguese soldiers. Other members of FRELIMO denounced the new Portuguese regime for slaughtering civilians between June 9 and 13 of this year. Schools, hospitals, farms and granaries at Namwembe in Nangande district and at Miteda, Mwatide, Matembalale and Iteko in the Mueda district of Cabo Delgado province. Nine persons were murdered at Miteda alone. Since the new regime at least 24 attacks by Portuguese colonialists, using troops and planes, have occurred against civilians in Cabo Delgado province. FRELIMO has also accused the colonialists of stepping up terrorist actions against nonmilitary populations in an attempt to blame the attacks on FRELIMO, and thus discredit the liberation fighters. In a radio report the organization announced that it has discovered that one terrorist group under the Portuguese is commanded by Zeca Caliate, a traitor who deserted from FRELIMO in 1973.

One possible massacre which needs more investigation was described by a Portuguese soldier of the 31st Paratroop Battalion. He said that members of the DGS (secret police) shot more than 200 Africans before him during February and March 1974, in the area of Inhaiminga. A Dutch missionary collaborated his story saying that there were five mounds which had mysteriously appeared during that time nearby the same town. This came after he had seen white men (some of whom were recognized as DGS members) driving up to the area in trucks. A South African Star reporter went to investigate the situation and found four more mounds with the aid of a black civil administration employee. The latter said that he saw villagers being taken to the area, also, by truck. These people are still missing. Finally, the mounds are approximately 22 yards in diameter. And although set close to two new roads, the reporter was told by a hunter that they were not of the type usually left by road construction. The incidents are said to have occurred just prior to the April 25 coup in Portugal.

By mid-June, the hearings were closed. The provisional conclusion of the Commission was that enemy troops did indeed massacre people at Wiriyamu in 1971, as well as in many other places in the colony. Lisbon was heavily criticized for not aiding the investigations. The final report should be released in September, 1974. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, June 18; Guardian, New York, June 24, July 17; Star, Johannesburg, May 25; Times, London, June 1, 4, 6, 15; Washington Post, June 2, 1974; Radio Report, text—ME/4626/B/8)
**MOZAMBIQUE AND SOUTH AFRICA**

With the possibility of an independent Mozambique with a black government gradually coming closer to reality, South Africa has shown signs of uneasiness. Such a government would probably apply sanctions against the creators of the apartheid. In an effort to retain friendly relations with the colony which could carry over to the independent country, South Africa has begun to stress its economic interdependence with Mozambique. Of the $458 million of foreign exchange Mozambique receives, South Africa pays $203 million; of that $93 million for Mozambican miners in Transvaal gold and $93 million for rail and harbor dues paid for commerce channelled from Transvaal through Lourenco Marques.

South African support for and financial involvement in the Cabora Bassa dam project is growing. The dam located on the Zambezi River in Tete province of Mozambique, will supply much of the Transvaal and beyond with electric power. The South African LTA Construction Corporation has been awarded the contracts for three new civilian engineering projects near the dam itself: preliminary work in connection with a possible north bank power station; 220 kw transmission lines between Cabora, Tete and Chibata (near Vila Pery); and three sub-stations. Part of these new contracts are being financed by the South African Export Credit Scheme.

South Africa is also hoping to tempt Mozambique with an agreement called the Mozambique Convention. In 1928 it was signed by both countries insuring South Africa all the miners for the Transvaal area which it might need from Mozambique. The Portuguese colony receives half of the miners yearly wages in gold which is sent to Lisbon, and the miners are paid in paper currency. This has become a major windfall for Portugal because the wages are paid in gold bullion at the official price, yet Portugal is able to sell it at the much higher free market price. In early July after considerable student protests, the government of Mozambique stopped a gold shipment due to be sent to Lisbon and a cabinet member resigned. Gold shipments were apparently renewed in spite of strong local feeling that Mozambique and not Lisbon should benefit from the South African monopoly over the miners. South Africa may try to use this agreement and the monies involved to keep an independent Mozambique happy, but FRELIMO has indicated its position on stopping the export of labor to the mines. (Africa News, Durham, June 20, July 15; Financial Mail, Johannesburg, April 11; Guardian, New York, July 27; Observer, London, June 16; Star, Johannesburg, June 1; Times, London, July 11, 1974)

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**PORTUGAL SEEKS SOLUTIONS**

Slowly but steadily Portugal seems to be consolidating the democratic freedoms that were promised her by the Armed Forces Movement that overthrew the Caetano regime, putting an end to almost 40 years of dictatorship.

The young officers who led the military coup and prepared a program for the change of political and social structures at home and decolonization in Africa seem to have decided to see that it carried out, in spite of opposition from the many collaborators of the old regime still in influential positions in the country.

Portugal is still faced with the main problems that brought the fascist regime to an inevitable crisis, forcing the armed forces to intervene. A solution to the colonial problem seems to have become closer when President Spinola announced on July 27 that Portugal was prepared to grant independence to Angola and Mozambique, and to recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, declared on September 24 of last year. The losing wars being fought in Africa were one of the main causes of dissatisfaction among military and civilians alike.

The state of the ailing Portuguese economy is, and will be for some time to come, a cause for concern. The chaotic organization inherited from the former regime and the archaic system of production and distribution of wealth perpetuated by Salazar and Caetano are likely to hinder any attempts at an immediate solution. The end of decades of fierce repression against trade unions resulted in labor unrest during the first months of the new regime. Unemployment is being forced by employers who are using it as a way of retaliating against labor demands for better wages and working conditions. Firings are being directed chiefly at workers from the colonies, most of them from the Cape Verde islands, who were brought to Lisbon as cheap labor to balance the drain of manpower through emigration and desertion from the ranks of the colonialist army.

The establishment of democratic structures in a country that had not had them in half a century and the exposure of Fascist elements long entrenched at all levels of administration, are another area of concern. On July 9 the first Provisional Cabinet fell as Prime Minister Palma Carlos and four of his Ministers resigned. Political observers in Lisbon reported that the country was on the brink of seeing dictatorship restored as Carlos and Spinola attempted to force early elections and to strengthen their positions. The process of decolonization has been a cause for friction between Spinola and the Armed Forces Movement. Spinola advocated autonomy for the colonies but not full independence. In his book, *Portugal and the Future*, he proposed the formation of a Federation of Portuguese States, with Lisbon remaining the seat of power in matters of defense and external affairs. The Armed Forces presented a program that includes full independence for the African Colonies as one of its main points.

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**portugal**
Spinola suffered a major setback with the appointment of a new Cabinet dominated by young officers who, on being sworn in, once again pledged their decision to carry out the program of the Armed Forces. Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, "the brain of the April 25 coup," heads the new cabinet that maintains some resemblance to the coalition of the first Provisional Government, but has more young officers in key positions. A new operational unit, the COPCON (for Comando Operacional do Continente) was formed and given powers to immediately frustrate any attempts at restoring fascist influence by elements of the former regime. It is significant that the head of COPCON is Major Othelo Saraiva de Carvalho who participated in the Lusaka negotiations with Frelimo. A Major until recently he was promoted to Brigadier-General hastily to assume the new high post, for lack of a reliable senior officer. Thus, the movement of the Armed Forces appears to be holding power in Lisbon. It is still uncertain who forms it or how it operates, but no doubts remain that Spinola is playing the role of a ceremonial figure. (New York Times, June 21, July 10, July 12, July 18, July 19, 1974)

SPINOLA PLEDGES FUTURE AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE
ANTONIO DE SPINOLA, PRESIDENT OF PORTUGAL, IN A SPEECH TO THE NATION, JULY 29, 1974 [THE MOST IMPORTANT PARTS, AS SELECTED AND BROADCAST BY RADIO PORTUGAL, JULY 29, 10.00 p.m. EDT]

Portugal today is living through a great hour of her history. . . . The time has come to inform the Portuguese in Europe and overseas with regard to the formal declaration of the recognition for the people of the overseas territories of the right to the right of their own destiny in their own hands, to concretize the policy of autonomy which we have always defended as a peaceful people, which we are.

The President of the Republic then recounted a resume of what the historic attitude of Portugal has been with regard to the Overseas Territories. He recalled the spirit of adventure of the Portuguese people and the process of improving the living conditions in foreign lands.

The President of the Republic recalled the liberalization which represented the attitude of the first years of the Republic, and the outing of that liberalization approved . . . by the former regime, which leaves the Portuguese to pay for those errors with suffering.

General Spinola went on to underline that nations cannot be limited to mere hunting grounds. In the 1960's, the situation of draft resisters who left Portugal reportedly harbors over 100,000. Sweden, Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Brazil, Canada, and the United States, along with Eastern European countries gave asylum to many thousands more.

A main problem for which a solution has yet to be found, is the situation of draft resisters who left Portugal on account of their opposition to the colonial wars. Portuguese draft evaders and deserters can be found practically everywhere in the world. France alone reportedly harbors over 100,000. Sweden, Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Brazil, Canada, and the United States, along with Eastern European countries gave asylum to many thousands more.

In May a "general amnesty" was granted to draft evaders on the condition that they return to Portugal to serve in the military. A few complied, but the vast majority refused to return, alleging that the colonial situation, that had prompted their departure in the first place, still existed. An early end to the colonial wars would probably motivate many of the deserters to return.
THE FORGOTTEN COLONIES

The settlement of the question of independence for the three major African colonies will bring to light the status of the remaining Portuguese colonies.

Timer, Macau, the Sao Tome and Principe Islands will eventually sever their ties with Portugal. In the Azores Islands, where the strategic Lajes Base is maintained by the US Air Force, many favor the continuation of ties with Lisbon, but movements for the autonomy or independence of the islands have already been established.

J.A.

SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCLUDES VISIT TO PORTUGAL

Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim visited Lisbon between 2 and 4 August by invitation of the President of Portugal, which was conveyed to him in New York by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During his stay in Lisbon the Secretary-General was received and had conversations with the President of the Portuguese Republic, General Antonio de Spinola, on matters of international concern, and in particular relating to African territories administered by Portugal.

The Secretary-General also was received and had conversations about the same issues with the Prime Minister, Colonel Vasco Goncalves and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mario Soares. The meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs were also attended by the Ministers of Defense and Interterritorial Coordination, Lieutenant-Colonel Mario Firmino Miguel and Dr. Antonio de Almeida Santos.

The Secretary-General explained the position of the United Nations on the question of African territories under Portuguese administration, as reflected in the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, as well as the views expressed to him on this question by the heads of African States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and leaders of the liberation movements.

In the course of the conversations on the subject of cooperation with the United Nations, ways and means of possible United Nations assistance in the process of decolonization were also discussed, with a view to promoting the social and economic well-being of the population of these Territories.

The Government of Portugal elaborated its position on these issues, within the context of the new Constitutional Law No. 7/74 of 17 July 1974 and President Spinola’s statement of 27 July on the African Territories administered by Portugal, as reflected in the following communication:

Text of Communication

(1) Co-operation with the United Nations

"The Government of Portugal, reaffirming its obligations with regard to Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter, and in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) containing the ‘Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, pledges full co-operation to the United Nations in the implementation of the provisions of that Chapter, the Declaration and the relevant resolutions in respect of Territories under Portuguese administration.

(2) Territorial Unity and Integrity

"The Government of Portugal reaffirms its recognition of the right of self-determination and independence for all overseas Territories under its administration. It pledges full support for the territorial unity and integrity of each Territory and will oppose any secessionist attempts or attempts of dismemberment from any quarter.

(3) Guinea-Bissau

"(a) The Government of Portugal is ready to recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau as an independent State and is prepared to enter forthwith into arrangements with the Republic of Guinea-Bissau for the immediate transfer of the administration.

"(b) Accordingly it will give its full support to the application of Guinea-Bissau for United Nations membership.

(4) Cape Verde Islands

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right of the people of the Cape Verde Islands to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard.

"In accelerating the process of decolonization in the Cape Verde Islands the Government of Portugal is prepared to co-operate closely with the competent organs of the United Nations.

(5) Mozambique

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right of the people of Mozambique to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard. In furtherance of this declaration of principle the Government of Portugal, which previously had established contacts with the representatives of FRELIMO, will take immediate steps to enter into negotiations with FRELIMO, with a view to accelerating the process of independence for the Territory.

(6) Angola

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right of the people of Angola to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard. It is the intention of the Government of Portugal to make early contacts with the liberation movements so that formal negotiations can commence as soon as possible.

(7) Sao Tome and Principe

"The Government of Portugal fully recognizes the right
of the people of Sao Tome and Principle to self-determination and independence and is prepared to implement the decisions of the United Nations in this regard.

"(B) Co-operation with Specialized Agencies

“The Government of Portugal expresses the hope that since it has taken concrete steps to comply fully with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) the General Assembly of the United Nations may reconsider its previous decisions on the matter and enable Portugal to participate fully in the social, economic, financial and technical programmes of the United Nations and the specialized agencies as well as in the activities of those bodies.”

The Secretary-General greatly appreciates the invitation which the President of Portugal extended to him to come to Portugal. The talks with President Spinola and at all levels were conducted in a frank, constructive and friendly atmosphere. The Secretary-General assured the Government of Portugal that he would bring the contents of the communication to the attention of the competent organs of the United Nations and the parties concerned.

republic of guinea-bissau

INSIDE GUINEA-BISSAU

Despite the lack of a formal conclusion to the war, an unofficial ceasefire on both sides has been observed since the end of April. PAIGC soldiers and Portuguese occupation troops began to meet, and some of the PAIGC soldiers were granted leave to visit families and friends in the towns of the country. In the major cities of Guinea-Bissau the support of PAIGC became open, with PAIGC stickers, slogans, and initials written on numerous buildings. Some streets have been informally renamed in the nationalist spirit. (New York Times, June 25, 27, 28, 29, 1974)

Immediately after the April 25 coup d'état, truckloads of Africans waving PAIGC flags were seen in Bissau and were permitted to pass through military checkpoints. During the Algiers talks in June a demonstration of more than 1,000 people rallied at the Portuguese military headquarters in Bissau and called for recognition of the Republic. Similar demonstrations have also occurred in Lisbon and in the Cape Verde Islands. (Africa News, June 20, 1974)

Portuguese soldiers and African commandos in Bissau have explicitly stated their reluctance to fight any longer against the PAIGC. A tape received by the PAIGC from such soldiers said “if negotiations do not bring immediate results we shall negotiate with the PAIGC ourselves.” (Guardian (New York), July 17, 1974)

PORTUGAL, THE UN AND GUINEA-BISSAU

During August it became clear that de jure recognition of the PAIGC as Guinea’s government was only a matter of time. The Portuguese Governor of the country admitted that Portuguese occupation had become a passive presence, where it was not actually cooperating with PAIGC policies. And Portugal’s UN Ambassador, Viega Simao, told the Decolonization Committee that his country would work together with the UN. Portugal also said it was prepared to support the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the UN—a position which would make a Security Council veto by any “great power” very unlikely. (Africa News, Durham, July 29, August 1, 1974)

All of these manoeuvres became obvious following the speech of Gen. Spinola guaranteeing African independence (see reprint this issue), and the announcement made by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim after his two-day visit to Lisbon in early August. Waldheim announced that Portugal was ready to give Guinea its independence and support its UN membership, waiting now only for the format for transferring power to the Republic. A solution to the continuing problem of the Cape Verde Islands and their status in relationship to Guinea and to Portugal, given strong Western strategic concern for the islands, has not been publicly stated. Guinea-Bissau has submitted application for UN membership which should proceed without difficulty through the final General Assembly vote in the fall. (New York Times, August 5; Africa News, Durham, August 5, 1974; See Reprint of UN Press Release on Secretary General Waldheim’s Lisbon Speech)

INSIDE THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

The PAIGC strength in the poverty and drought-striken Cape Verde Islands was shown in the third week of May. PAIGC slogans were abundant and sympathizers showed support, especially in Sao Tiago and Sao Vincente. In the city of Praia a major demonstration was put down by military police when demonstrators calling for independence clashed with handfuls of anti-nationalists. Later the demonstrators sought to hoist the PAIGC flag and lower the Portuguese banner. Police warned that they would shoot indiscriminately unless this action was stopped. Altogether eight demonstrators and one policeman were injured and, at least, one person was killed. Leaflets circulated in the islands stated opposition to the Lisbon position to isolate the islands from the negotiations, and opposition to a government effort to isolate the Cape Verdians from their African brothers and sisters. (Washington Post, May 22, 1974; O Seculo (Lisbon), May 21, 1974)

By the end of May the Legislative Assembly and the Consultative Junta were suspended in the islands which were reported as then being “completely calm.” (Agence France Presse, May 24, 1974)
US Plans

It is suggested in Afrique-Asie that the Pentagon has prepared a top secret paper outlining a scenario for an American strategic presence to be established in the islands before 1980. Such claims are associated with the reports that a special CIA "coup d'état team" which reportedly functioned in Chile, has now moved into Lisbon. Clearly the Pentagon is very nervous about the developing situation which could affect its global interests.

The CIA plot could be implemented if the political instability of Lisbon were sufficient to permit such intervention. The most recent reorganization of the Lisbon military junta gives greater strength to the military and may very well prevent such an opportunity. At minimum the US will try to assure the "neutrality" of the Islands. (Afrique-Asie, June 10, 1974)

Zimbabwe

FRELIMO PROMISES HELP

Marcelino Dos Santos, speaking for FRELIMO in London, said that a FRELIMO-dominated Mozambique would adhere to United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia and to policies of the Organization of African Unity in an effort to aid in the continuing struggle for freedom in Southern Africa. It was noted that 60 per cent of Rhodesia's goods travel on railways in Mozambique; that hydro-electric power will soon be available for sale from the Cahora Bassa scheme; that over 100,000 Mozambicans now work in the mines in South Africa; and that Zimbabwean freedom fighters will want and need camps in Mozambique to finish their struggle to free Zimbabwe. All of these international concerns will be handled in accordance with OAU and UN policies. He summed up by saying, "We will always support all those in Africa and elsewhere who are fighting for freedom and independence." (Star Johannesburg, June 15, 1974)

GUERILLA STRUGGLE CONTINUES

While the hot war continues to be waged in the northeast of Zimbabwe, Uganda's President Idi Amin, at the OAU meeting in Mogadishu, called on committed countries to attack Rhodesia. General Imin said, "We want to teach the White Rhodesian minority regime the lesson that I have taught the British in Uganda." (Guardian, London, June 29, 1974)

In Zambia, the UNIP (United National Independence Party) in Chingola on the Copperbelt has told all Rhodesians that they are to collect $15,000 to aid in the freedom struggle. Those who do not give may lose their permits and licenses to practice their trades and businesses in Zambia. (Sunday Times of Zambia, Lusaka, June 9, 1974)

Ms. Fungai Tichavepeze, speaking on behalf of ZANU in Lusaka, called on Zimbabwean women to fight shoulder to shoulder with their men in the freedom struggle. She called on women to fight against the regime inside Rhodesia and to protest its injustices. (Times of Zambia, Lusaka, June 12, 1974)

Rhodesian security forces say they are confident they have the initiative against the guerrillas. They are beginning "Operation Hurricane" to clear-out the northeast war zone with search and follow tactics. The end of the rainy season will help, they say, as the cover for the guerrillas will be drying up. An extensive intelligence network is being set up with radio contact in every white farmer's home; informers are well-paid. Those who aid "terrorists" are now subject to life imprisonment or death. This, coupled with the mass removals of inhabitants in the area to "keeps" or protected hamlets is the strategy for victory designed by the white forces. (Times, London, June 6, 1974) However, the Portuguese military junta in Lisbon has told Rhodesia to stop all military pursuit operations into Mozambique in an effort to effect a cease-fire there. It is highly doubtful that the flow of ZANU guerrillas across the border can be controlled. (Star, Johannesburg, May 25, 1974) Rhodesia is continuing to build defenses along the border—lookouts, wire fences, clearings. (Daily Telegraph, London, June 6, 1974)

Two more guerrillas were hanged in Salisbury on June 21 for bringing arms into the country (New York Times, June 30, 1974) and the state of emergency in Rhodesia was extended for another year by the white parliament. The Rhodesian Front's Lardner Burke expressed the seriousness of the need to supply security forces with material and that it is even more difficult with the increased left-wing activity in Britain demanding tightening of sanctions. (Star, Johannesburg, June 22, 1974)
Landmines laid by guerrillas have killed a Roads Department engineer, and another vehicle hit a landmine north of Mt. Darwin where a number of people were injured. Bus drivers are no longer willing to drive into the northeast for fear of landmines. The manager of Maziveyi Bus Service, Mr. Motse, has suspended service in the area. (Star, Johannesburg, June 22 and 29, 1974)

*Anti-Apartheid News* interviewed two recent visitors to the northeast area who report that the guerrillas have the full support of the people in the area and that the security forces are given no help in their search for freedom fighters. Guerrillas are fed, hidden and protected by the people. They, in turn, warn the local people of landmines and other dangerous situations. (*Anti-Apartheid News, June, 1974*)

![Edson Sithode, Publicity Secretary of The ANC](image)

**SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS**

Three African National Council officials are in London for talks with British leaders about the future of Rhodesia. Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the ANC, had his passport impounded and cannot leave the country. Rev. Canaan Banana, Dr. Elliot Gavellah, ANC vice president, and Dr. Gordon Chavanduka, General Secretary of ANC have met with British Foreign Secretary, Callaghan and Under Secretary of African Affairs, Joan Lestor. The Birmingham Campaign for justice in Zimbabwe, headed by Canon Peter Hall, a former Anglican priest in Rhodesia, has suggested that all African groups—ZANU and ZAPU—should be in on the talks. (Star, Johannesburg, June 29, 1974)

The ANC has rejected Smith’s latest proposal which gave a token increase of six seats to Africans in the parliament. Shortly afterward, Edson Sithole, Publicity Secretary of ANC, was arrested in Salisbury. He was one of the leading figures against Smith’s proposals and his arrest has caused increased mistrust between Africans and the Smith regime. With the likelihood of a black government in Mozambique on his side, Muzorewa has said he will not re-enter any negotiations until all African nationalists have been released, including Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole and over 120 others. (*Washington Post, June 21, 1974; Guardian, London, July 2, 1974*)

Nkomo has been removed from the Gonakudzingwa restriction center near the Mozambique border to Salisbury maximum security prison. Sithole and other ZANU officials have been moved from Salisbury to Gwelo prison. (*Guardian, London, June 29, 1974*)

The London talks with Callaghan and Lestor included Prime Minister Wilson who stated in the Commons that all past settlement offers to the Smith regime in Rhodesia have been withdrawn by the British Government. He added, “There will be no consideration of any deal with the Rhodesian regime until we know that the proposals put forward are approved by the majority of the Rhodesian population.” (*Guardian, London, July 5, 1974*)

Mr. Callaghan, in an address to African Ambassadors and High Commissioners, said there are no secret talks under way with the Smith regime. He referred to the recent OAU declaration calling on Britain to cease clandestine talks with the Smith regime. (*Guardian, London, July 3, 1974*)

Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Ennals, told Commons that the British Government still does not support “terrorist” movements in southern Africa. (*Star, Johannesburg, July 6, 1974*)

**SANCTIONS NEWS**

Jordan has denied a charge that it is prepared to sell to Rhodesia 31 Hawker Hunter jet fighters from the Royal Jordanian Air Force. Rhodesian officials also denied the deal. The Rhodesian air force planes are 12-20 years old and parts supplies have been difficult to maintain. (*Star, Johannesburg, July 3, 1974*)

Japan has been severely condemned for sanctions breaking at the recent OAU meeting in Mogadishu. The African press has picked up the news and anti-Japanese resentment is spreading over Black Africa just as South Africa has drastically extended her trade relations with Japan. (*Star, Johannesburg, June 29, 1974*)

A group of experts from the nine Common Market Countries is preparing a study on methods of tightening sanctions. Member nations will be asked to enforce the measures, not the EEC itself. (*Star, Johannesburg, June 29, 1974*)

Air Rhodesia’s New York office is reported closed following a U.S. Treasury order issued last month under sanctions regulations which prohibits Renton Cowley, the manager, from receiving any more funds. Cowley had used the office for commercial use and had engaged in other sanction-breaking activities. (*Star, Johannesburg, June 22, 1974*)

**RHODESIAN ELECTIONS**

Following the rejection of the new proposals offered by Smith to the ANC, Smith called a general election for July 30, four months ahead of schedule. Unofficial Rhodesian Front comment said the main reason for calling it was to ensure a solid return of the R.F. to show the country’s African leaders that they have to deal with the R.F. in settling the constitutional affairs. Smith no longer accepts the ANC as representative of African opinion and is calling a “round table” discussion with more representative African opinion participating. The ANC has said it will boycott the round table. In opening the campaign, Smith issued a call for white solidarity and said, “We will not sell out. If that is the price, we would rather not have a settlement.” (Star, Johannesburg, July 13, 1974)
The only opposition is the Rhodesia Party, whose leader Mr. Gibbs said he would guarantee the racial minority in parliament a blocking right against constitutional changes, would repeal some discriminatory legislation, and would have a common voters roll based on high franchise qualifications. The Rhodesia Party is pushing a multi-racial image, but has been snubbed by the Asian, Coloured and African communities at large. A group of Coloureds in Salisbury formed a branch of the ANC. (Guardian, London, July 10, 1974)

Note: Smith's Rhodesian Front won all of the 50 white parliamentary seats, in most contests, by wide margins. In the city of Salisbury, however, where many Asians and people of mixed race voted, the Rhodesian Front won by only three votes. A more detailed account of the election will appear in the next Southern Africa.

ECONOMICS:
O.A.U. cites Japan for sanctions violations

A report issued by a special committee of the Organization of African Unity has named Japan as the number one sanctions-breaking nation. The study, released at the May summit meeting in Mogadishu, Somalia, says Japan has increased its trade with Rhodesia in the past ten years.

The controversy focuses primarily on Japanese imports of chrome ore. Although officially, Japan imports none from Rhodesia, a discrepancy in trade data points to sanctions busting. Japan's trade figure show a much higher level of imports from South Africa than are indicated by South African export figures. The difference, says the report, is made up of Rhodesian products re-labelled to indicate South African origin.

Reaction to the criticism in Japan varied. The foreign ministry, anxious to maintain good relations with independent African countries, proposed a ban on increased trade with South Africa. But this move was soundly blocked by the powerful Ministry for International Trade and Industry.

In early July, the government announced it was clamping down on trade with South Africa and Mozambique. All southern African trading, it said, would be subjected to close scrutiny to determine if any Rhodesian goods were being secretly imported. (AFRICA NEWS, June 12, 1974; BBC News of the African World, June 28, 1974.)

WHITES LOOK SOUTHWARD (AS USUAL) FOR ECONOMIC SUPPORT

The white population of Rhodesia may have chosen continued political isolation over accommodation with the African majority (as the recent election seems to indicate), but economics are a different matter.

Even the ardent isolationists in that isolated land must have some realization that the land-locked nation has to depend on neighbors for its survival. Most of Rhodesia's trade is currently routed eastward, through the Mozambican ports of Beira and Lourenco Marques (LM). But, the Whites now face the very real prospect of a hostile government in Mozambique in a matter of months, rather than years.

To the north lies Zambia, which has already severed trade flows. The Botswana rail line, on the western border, cannot handle the traffic.

So, the Rhodesians have opted for the only other alternative. Nine million dollars is to be spent to construct a new rail link between the southern Rhodesia town of Rutenga and the Beit Bridge on the South African border. (see map)

But, even the intensified construction plan will take about a year, and many current estimates are that Mozambique will have its independence before then. Already, Rhodesia's trade has been adversely affected by continuing strikes at LM and FRELIMO attacks on the Beira rail line. (Financial Mail, Johannesburg, May 30, 1974)

namibia

DETAINED SWAPO LEADERS

The US State Department, in a July 31 letter to the Episcopalian Churchmen for South Africa, outlined its efforts since February to obtain from the South African Government specific information about Namibians held incommunicado in detention. The communication provides latest details of the fate of 15 leaders of the South West Africa People's Organization.

The South African Department of Foreign Affairs, after repeated representations by the US Embassy in Pretoria, including a call by the American ambassador on Foreign Minister Muller and a diplomatic note, advised the Embassy that a total of 15 SWAPO and SWAPO Youth League members had been detained "under Article 6 of the Terrorism Act and that none of the detainees would be charged under the Terrorism Act." This response did not come until late June.

Nine of the 15 are still in prison. Mr. Thomas Komati, SWAPO Youth League leader and an applicant along with
Lutheran Bishop Leonard Auala and Anglican Bishop Richard Wood in consistent and hitherto unsuccessful attempts to have public floggings by Bantustan authorities stopped (Komati was himself publicly flogged in Ovamboland last year), was released in mid-July. He was immediately charged "with malicious damage to property because he wrote on his jail cell wall during his confinement." Mr. Kmoati pleaded guilty and was set free. A judgment is expected in the near future.

Ezriel Taapopi, SWAPO Youth League chairman, and the League's secretary, Joseph Kashea, went on trial in Windhoek, Namibia's chief city, at the end of May. The State Department report says: "They were charged under Section 9 (2) (b) of Ordinance 13 of 1962 with attempting to incite people 'to commit murder or to cause public violence or malicious damage to property in South West Africa'. They were found guilty and each sentenced on July 30 to five years with three years suspended. The case will be appealed."

Two detainees were released uncharged.

Mr. David Merero, national chairman of SWAPO inside Namibia, was released on bail on July 16. The State Department letter says "He was charged with possessing eight copies of a South African Communist Party journal, a Suppression of Communism Act offense".

The Star of Johannesburg in its weekly air edition of July 30, reports that the 57-year-old Namibian businessman must appear in Windhoek regional court on September 3. His bail conditions are: that he report twice a day to the police, that he not attend any public meeting and that he not leave the Windhoek urban area. His bail is 200 Rand ($300).

**CONVENTION SEeks RECOGNITION**

The Namibia National Convention, a coalition of seven organizations which are opposed in varying degrees to continued South African rule in the country, has announced that it will send representatives to seven countries in Western Europe in the near future. Clemens Kapuuo, the organization's Vice-President and well-known Herero leader, said that they would soon be sending representatives to London, Berlin and Paris, application to the South African Government for passports would be made shortly. The organization also intends to apply to the United Nations and the Organization for African Unity to be recognised as the only legitimate voice of the Namibian People. This would complicate matters since both these organizations presently consider the external wing of SWAPO as the only group representing the true interests of the majority black population of Namibia. (Star Johannesburg, July 27, 1974)

**OVAMBO EXODUS CONTINUES**

The flight of Ovambos across the border into Angola continues unabated and the latest section of the population to join the exodus is migrant-workers. The situation has reached such alarming proportions that white farmers attending the South West Africa Nationalist Party Congress voiced their concern to officials. Ovambo farm workers throughout Namibia were deserting in large numbers without regard to contract agreements apparently after receiving mysterious letters. Farmers expressed fears that they might have to give up farming if things did not improve. Some have even resorted to "stealing" workers from neighboring farmers to avoid the long drawn out contractual formalities. Police and officials admitted that they were doing nothing to remedy the situation. However, a South African Minister got to the crux of the matter when he told the farmers that they had only themselves to blame since they had done little to improve the lot of their workers.

Members of the so called "literate elite" are also still leaving. Among those to leave most recently are the leader of the Ovamboland section of SWAPO, Mr. J. Otto and four of his close associates. (Star, Johannesburg, July 27, 1974)

**BRITISH POLICY TO CHANGE?**

Sean MacBride, United Nations Commissioner for Namibia and an Assistant Secretary-General, in an interview on the "Voice of Namibia", the SWAPO broadcasting system which operates from Lusaka, Zambia, stated that he expected a total change in the United Kingdom's official policy towards Namibia before the recess of the British Parliament. He suggested that the UK was on the point of accepting UN jurisdiction over Namibia.

MacBride's comments were recorded in a UN press release of July 18. "At present," he stated, "the United Kingdom recognizes South Africa's unlawful occupation of Namibia as being valid, in spite of United Nations resolutions and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice." He noted that Britain would have observers at the trial of Ezriel Taapopi and Joseph Kashea, and that the United States and Sweden are already sending observers to political trials in Namibia.

The Commissioner said he believed that Namibia would have its freedom in two or three years time, and that events in Portugal, Angola and Mozambique were hastening the day of freedom.

**WARNING TO SETTLERS IN NAMIBIA**

Commissioner MacBride in the same "Voice of Namibia" interview warned the 62,000 Afrikaaner settlers in Namibia that, unless they rapidly mended their ways
and made friends with the people of Namibia, they would have to leave the country. "The settlers must readjust their thinking to the realities of the present-day world... If they are to stay in Namibia, they must accept majority rule... From discussions I have had with SWAPO, the Namibia liberation movement, I know these settlers could stay provided they accept the ordinary rules of life. Otherwise, there is no future for them in a free Namibia."

Mr. MacBride spoke also to the 40,000 German-speaking settlers in Namibia. "If they wish to remain in free Namibia, they will have to accept the basic rule of one man, one vote...if they carry on in the Nazi fashion, in which they now do, there is no future for them...They should join with the people of Namibia in seeking freedom for the country."

The Commissioner concluded his broadcast interview with a message to the people of Namibia: "With courage, perseverance and steadfastness, freedom is around the corner for the people of Namibia. All Namibians should give full and loyal and active support to SWAPO which has been carrying on the struggle for independence."

WALL STREET WARNING TO AMERICAN INVESTORS IN NAMIBIA

Mr. MacBride stated that Wall Street stockbrokers were discouraging investment in Namibia. (Sunday Times of Zambia, Lusaka, July 14, 1974) The UN Commissioner for Namibia, in Lusaka during the course of an African trip, said: "Before I left New York I had the occasion to read some of the confidential circulars by stockbrokers to all their investors advising them that recent events in Mozambique and Angola made it unsafe to have investments in Namibia." MacBride added: "Already there are signs that some western undertakings in Namibia are considering selling their properties they hold there."

REPORT OF MASSACRE IN CAPRIVI STRIP

The Guardian, Manchester, July 25, carried an article reporting that two Swedish television men on a clandestine tour of the Caprivi Strip in Namibia earlier this year had visited the site of a village where it is claimed more than 100 Africans were murdered during anti-guerrilla reprisals by South African paramilitary forces. The TV men filmed ruined huts, spent grenades, charred skeletons and other remains. Stills from the Swedish documentary were shown to the UN Commission on Human Rights taking evidence in London in mid-July.

NEIGHBORS

MAJOR RESHUFFLE IN LESOTHO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

An AFRICA NEWS reporter from Maseru reports that a reshuffle in the Lesotho Council of Ministers has been received with enthusiasm by the Civil Service while opposition politicians are not at all impressed.

The Lesotho Government had never enjoyed much support from the educated elite and civil servants in the country. Members of previous cabinets were people of very little academic education and were usually at loggerheads with the Civil Service which had to execute the Government's policies.

In the new Cabinet appointed in July there are more university graduates and civil servants than before. The new members have taken important ministries. The minister of foreign affairs is a college graduate and a former diplomat who served in London and Nairobi. The minister of industry and commerce was a civil servant and pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University.

Opposition parties are opposed to this reshuffling of the cabinet because they fear that civil servant appointees may be more efficient than former cabinet members, and may restore confidence in the Government, which would in turn make the Government want to preserve the status quo and so delay the return of the country to constitutional parliamentary rule.

The appointment of the new cabinet shows a big change in the Government's attitude towards employing all available resources in trying to solve a number of problems facing the country—problems like national unity and economic development. A number of older and politically influential cabinet members have been dropped or demoted to smaller ministries in favor of the career men.

Speculation is intense in Lesotho that an announcement will soon be made for a general election. The Government may now be attempting to improve its image by making use of qualified men and also by removing some of the ministers who may not be very popular and could cost the Party loss of power through ballots if they are retained.

SHELL EXPLORATION IN SWAZILAND

The giant British and Dutch owned corporation, Royal-Dutch Shell, is very active in mineral exploration in Swaziland. Shell Coal Swaziland was given a licence to prospect for coal, oil shale and radio active minerals throughout the country, a company official told the Wall Street Journal. (June 10, 1974)

BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, AND SWAZILAND SEEK GREATER MONETARY FREEDOM

The British colonial administration, which directed affairs in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland until about 8 years ago, left the three nations monetarily integrated with their giant neighbor, South Africa, at the time the three got independence. Now, they want more monetary freedom.

Swaziland has announced its intention to issue its own currency, called the emalangeni, beginning September 6. Botswana and Lesotho continue to use the South African rand as their official currency. Under the agreement concluded between the Swaziland Government and South Africa, the rand will remain fully convertible in
Swaziland, but the emalangeni will not enjoy reciprocal treatment in the Republic. Swaziland will deposit with the South African Reserve Bank one rand for every emalangeni it issues, which will give it a sound backing. The Bank will pay interest to the Swazi’s for the deposits.

Even more important, in terms of economic independence, are the current efforts underway to redraft the current informal agreement between the three small nations and South Africa. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are demanding a formal treaty. A major provision of the new agreement, they hope, will be the right of the three nations to guarantee foreign investors repatriation of dividends. This is a crucial condition for attracting the overseas interests all three nations are seeking to help develop their natural resources. (Financial Mail, Johannesburg, May 17, 1974)

ZAMBIA PAYS HIGH PRICE FOR SANCTIONS COMPLIANCE
Zambia’s decision to keep its border with Rhodesia closed will cost the country nearly $400 million by the end of 1975. This is the conclusion of a United Nations study conducted by Commander Sir Robert Jackson, coordinator of the UN Assistance for Zambia program.

Since January, 1973, Zambia’s border with Rhodesia has been completely sealed. Rhodesian leader Ian Smith initially closed the frontier, in an effort to force Zambia to stop guerrilla incursions into his country. Zambia, which has always denied that any guerrillas operate from its soil, responded by keeping the border closed even after Smith tried to reopen it.

Zambia appealed for international assistance in its effort to comply with United Nations sanctions. Jackson told the UN’s Economic and Social Council in Geneva that Zambia was paying a high price to protect and secure freedom in Southern Africa. He called for greater aid from the world community for Zambia. (Times of Zambia, Lusaka; Daily Nation, Dar es Salaam, July 16, 1974)

UNITED STATES and SOUTHERN AFRICA

HOUSE SANCTIONS VOTE NEARS
The House of Representatives Democratic leadership has scheduled a final vote on the Rhodesian sanctions bill for August 7, just a few days before debate begins on articles of impeachment of the President.

The chances of passage of S.1868 are still hard to judge. The bill’s proponents estimate that the House members are evenly split between pro- and anti-sanctions forces at this time, with about 65 members of the House still undecided.

Now that a vote on the sanctions bill is in sight, lobbying groups are flooding the Hill. Organized labor has started making visits to members of the House, and the United Steelworkers have put out a new booklet on the issue which they hope will once and for all dispel the myth that steelworker jobs will be lost if the sanctions is enacted. Meanwhile, lobbyists for the stainless steel industry continue to gain the support of some local labor unions on the basis that their jobs are at stake, and they are making much of the resulting split between the national and local union representatives.

The most important work to be done now for the bill is internal lobbying. While outside lobbyists from both sides will keep pushing hard, the fate of the bill now rests on the success of efforts by members themselves to pick up as many moderate votes as possible. Some of the bill’s sponsors believe that the bill should not go to the floor if it doesn’t look as though it will pass, on the ground that a negative vote will damage US relations with African nations at the United Nations and elsewhere. They suggest that it may be wise to hold off until the 94th session of Congress, which will undoubtedly be more Democratic and perhaps more liberal. However, if the vote is put off to January, the sanctions bill will have to begin over again in the Senate, a tremendous amount of constituency work will have been lost and the issue may well become moot in view of the rapid development of events in Mozambique.
If Mozambique were no longer Rhodesia’s channel to the sea, Rhodesian export system would be severely affected—although of course South Africa would have to pick up the slack.

CONGRESSIONAL STAFF VISIT SOUTH AFRICA

In its continuing effort to build support for South Africa among American policy-makers, the South African Department of Information arranged a trip to South Africa for the staff of five members of the House of Representatives this spring. The trip may not have gained many new friends for South Africa, however, because most Congressmen who were represented are already convinced Conservatives.

While in South Africa, the staff members spent the bulk of their time meeting with officials of the Nationalist government. The logistics of the trip were handled by the South African Africa Institute, an organization of "Africanist" academics.

The Congressional aides in the group included aides of two conservative members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee: Cletus Uhlenhott and Win Dennis, staff of Representatives’ H.R. Gross and Vernon Thomson respectively. Representative Gross is an outspoken rightist advocate of white rule in Southern Africa who is retiring this year. Representative John Buchanan, another member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was also represented by his research assistant, Benjamin Armistead. This is somewhat of a surprise, since Representative Buchanan came out in the fall of 1973 as a strong supporter of United States compliance with UN sanctions against Rhodesia. Apparently, however, Armistead is more conservative than his boss. The two other staff members were Ron Martinson, representing Representative Price of Texas, and Kenneth Black, Representative Goldwater’s administrative assistant.

Probably the most important person who went on the trip was Lewis Ingram, the legislative director of the Republican Steering Committee. The Republican Steering Committee, composed of 26 junior and senior Republicans, has significant influence over the Republican party position on legislative issues. As the Committee’s legislative director, Mr. Ingram could well be a strategically placed proponent of South Africa’s interests.

US IMPORT OF NAMIBIAN SEALS MAY GUT MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT

The Fund for Animals has exposed a US fur company’s plan to gut the protection afforded seals under the Marine Mammal Protection Act by importing baby seals killed off the Namibian coast.

The Fouke Fur Company of Greenville, South Carolina, the only large US processor of seal skins, has asked the Secretary of Commerce, Frederick Dent, to waive the provisions of the Act in order to enable it to import 70,000 baby seal skins from South Africa annually for the next ten years. Most of the seal skins will come from Namibia. Fouke brought in 50,000 skins last year under a one-year economic hardship exemption, but now it faces a shutdown of its baby-seal operations.

Under the Act, it is unlawful to import any mammal which is “nursing at the time of taking or less than eight months old, whichever occurs later.” Yet the Fouke Company and Commerce Department officials say that “nursing” means “obligatory nursing” and not “casual nursing”, a distinction which does not appear on the face of the statute or in its legislative history.

The Marine Mammal Commission, which is charged with supervision of the Act on its technical side, has pointed out that when a seal is eating other food and nursing, it still needs the mother’s milk. Furthermore, since there is inadequate data as to exactly when in September or October Namibian seal pups are actually weaned, importation of skins of pups killed under the South African program during June-October is illegal. The Commission believes that the South African seal program is pursued with a view to reducing seal interference with fishermen who view them as a nuisance rather than in accordance with any articulated management standards.

COMMERC DEPARTMENT VISIT PROTESTED

Nevertheless, the Secretary of Commerce is preparing to send representatives of the National Marine Fisheries Service to Namibia to view the seal killings to determine if the South African program in accordance with sound principles of resource protection and conservation and is consistent with the provisions of the Act. If he so finds, he apparently intends to issue a waiver of the protection of the Act not withstanding the flat prohibition of imports of nursing seals.

At the same time, the proposed trip flies in the face of the official US policy accepting the International Court of Justice’s opinion in regard to Namibia. According to a legal memorandum filed by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law with Secretary of State Kissinger on behalf of African groups and several church organizations, the opinion forbids special missions and diplomatic trips which take in Namibia as part of South Africa’s jurisdiction.

Protests against the proposed trip are beginning to come from prominent legislators concerned about ecology and justice in South Africa. Senators Williams, Mondale, Humphrey, Javits and Kennedy have all expressed deep concern. Congressman Digs has sent a strong cable to Kissinger.

The Fouke Company, however, has some powerful friends. Senator Strom Thurmond and Representative James Mann of Greenville have urged the company’s case.
relentlessly to Secretary Dent, whose family business in textiles in South Carolina and his personal loyalty to Nixon elevated him to his present prominence. If the matter of impeachment comes before the Senate in the fall, Senator Thurmond’s vote and influence will be important in trying to stem the tide of Senatorial opinion for removal from office.

State Department officers familiar with Namibia say that the issue of whether to interfere in the proposed investigation by Commerce will be left at the highest levels where political factors count. It may be that Kissinger, Nixon and Dent will have to sit down together and figure out the political importance of Fouke’s operations.

ECONOMICS

DOCKERS SEND BACK RHODESIAN CARGO FOR SECOND TIME

Picket lines and leaflet actions in a number of East Coast cities in July prevented the offloading of 56 cases (39,860 pounds) of Rhodesian nickel cathodes from the Farrell ship African Dawn. The ship was met with protests first in Boston where 150 demonstrators came out in the early morning of July 10. Actions in Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York followed. The same nickel cathodes were consigned to an Engelhard subsidiary, Phillip Bros., last December and not unloaded at that time because of a successful Baltimore longshoremen boycott. The attempt this time was to consign them to Farrell Lines itself, and as has been more and more the practice to falsify their certificates of origin. Also not unloaded from the Dawn were 6,614 pounds of iron castings. The ship was delayed in Baltimore for a day when 1,000 drums of ferrochrome with a South African certificate was not unloaded. The ferrochrome was finally taken off board but only after a strong dispute. The sending back of the nickel and iron castings marked the second time goods from Rhodesia have been returned to Africa, and a striking victory for the New York Coalition to Stop Rhodesian Imports in involving longshoremen in this action. (See Southern Africa, July-August, 1974)

The New York Coalition in increasingly involved in education, including leaflettings at the ILA hiring hall in Brooklyn. Members of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) have been consistently working with the Coalition in New York and other cities. M. Mudzi, visiting Executive Secretary of ZANU and US representative, Tapson Mawere, held a press conference in Baltimore in June in association with the rank and file workers and others organized to stop the unloading of nickel from the Moramclake. Also Mr. Mawere spoke at a protest which was held in front of the Rhodesia Information office in Washington on July 23. (Press Release, Boston Coalition, July 10; New York Coalition Information, July 13, 1974; Washington Afro-American, June 11, 1974)

NEW YORK TIMES LOSES SOUTH AFRICAN DISCRIMINATION CASE

The New York City Commission on Human Rights ruled on July 23 that the New York Times can no longer run advertisements for employment in South Africa because they are racially discriminatory and against New York City law. The case was brought before the Commission in October, 1972, by a group including the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), African Heritage Studies Association, One Hundred Black Men, and Judge William Booth, former Commissioner of Human Rights in New York, and current President of ACOA.

The New York Times has carried a number of ads for employment opportunities in South Africa. The Commission found that: “the evidence establishes that the employment opportunities offered by the advertisements are not available on a racially non-discriminatory basis and that Black citizens of New York City, who might avail themselves of such employment positions, would be subject to segregation in the facilities and accommodations of the workplace.”

It also refuted the Times arguments of protection under the First Amendment by stating that such ads were only “commercial speech,” and the paper’s claim that the Commission was interfering with US foreign policy affairs by citing the Supreme Court ruling that the courts are able to give a “routine reading” to foreign laws.
The American Committee issued a statement which said: "The ruling today is a landmark decision in protecting the people of New York City against the intrusion of the racial discrimination of South Africa's apartheid system. No longer will the "Whites Only" laws of apartheid be exported to the employment pages of the City newspapers."

The Times still states it is not discriminating by carrying South African ads, and received a stay on the enjoinder. It is appealing the case to the New York State Supreme Court.

It is hoped by the complainants that the New York City ruling will effect other states actions, and thus curtail the drive by the South African Government to lure white skilled immigrants to its country. (Release, ACOA, July 23; Africa News, Durham, North Carolina, July 28, 1974)

GULF BOYCOTT COALITION ON BOMBINGS

At a press conference on June 20 chairwoman for the Gulf Boycott Coalition, Pat Roach said in response to the earlier bombings of Gulf Pittsburgh headquarters:

"Although we do not condone bombing, let us look at this bombing in a wider perspective. Gulf has been supporting a government which has used every violent and inhumane means available in its' wars against the African people. Evidence of massacres of entire villages, napalming, and chemical warfare is readily available and is by and large ignored by the American public. But let the Gulf building be bombed, without personal injury to anyone and it becomes a personal affront to Americans. It should be no surprise that to Third World countries our image is one of profits before people!"

The importance of Gulf to the Portuguese economy is shown by the fact that in 1973 alone payments to Portugal rose to some $91 million. The Portuguese coup, she said, does not alter the coalition's aims at boycott and support for total change in Angola. The Coalition plans to open an office in England soon, thus expanding its role beyond the US and Canada. The new office address is: R. Righter, 24 Cranbrook Drive, St. Albans, Herts, England. (GBC Press Conference, June 20, 1974)

POLITICAL SING ALONG WITH WHITE SUPREMACY

A group of 25 young Mormon singers from Brigham Young University in Salt Lake City are spending their summer helping raise money for the South African and Rhodesian military. Performing in South Africa with the government Defense Forces Band, the American group's efforts will benefit the South African Border Defense Fund. In Rhodesia the concert monies will go toward the "Terrorist Victims Relief Fund". The US Treasury Department, under fire for its laxity in enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia, has given the Mormons a license for their expenditure of funds in the boycotted country. The Mormon Church has been under attack in recent years for its discriminatory policy of only allowing Blacks into the lower echelons of the Church hierarchy. (Africa News, Durham, July 18, 1974)

SA POLICE TEAM USA VISIT PROTESTED

Some members of the US Congress have objected to government aid to the Soviet police system. Yet 30 members of the South African police have for the first time been invited to the annual Police Olympics sponsored by Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco in late August. The Olympics involve forty domestic and foreign teams competing in track, field and marksmanship. South African police are of course integral to the police state structure, the enforcing of the infamous pass laws (whereby 1,000 Africans are arrested each day), and involved in anti-guerrilla actions in Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. The US invitation sanctions South Africa's public relations campaign, and the team itself tries to mirror that "new look" by including three Blacks (an African sergeant, Coloured detective and Indian constable). The Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa has called for protests against the visit, and local San Francisco groups are also being mobilized. (ECSA Release, New York, July, 1974)

NATIONAL ACTIONS

On July 27 demonstrations were held in New York and in San Francisco calling for Portugal to get out of Africa and for an end to US aid to Portugal. In San Francisco the group had representatives of the Socialist Workers Party, Attica Brothers Defense, and individual sponsors such as Ira Simmons of the Berkeley City Council. In New York a number of groups have been involved in the continuing protests. (See Southern Africa, July/August 1974)

CHURCH SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN CHANGE

The Lutheran World Federation which has historic links with the churches in Namibia voted at its annual meeting to support several Lutheran bishops in their dispute with the South African Government. (New York Times, July 28, 1974) The Massachusetts Conference of the United Church of Christ presented a resolution supporting the independence of Guinea-Bissau by its Task Force on Southern Africa. The resolution passed by a large majority. Several members of the PAIGC Committee of New Bedford spoke at the conference held in early May in Hyannis. The Task Force has sponsored a number of Southern African forums at churches in Massachusetts showing the film, A Luta Continua. For more information contact Mary Pottle, 15 Lochmere Ave., North Weymouth, Mass. 02191. (Share Sheet, Mass. Conf. UCC Task Force on Southern Africa, Vol. I).
book reviews


While all three of these books (Dr. Carter’s is actually a 62 page booklet) deal with Southern Africa each does so in very different terms and defines the area under consideration in distinctive ways. Dr. Carter adopts the more traditional approach with short chapters on Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the BLS Countries: Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, Namibia (South West Africa), and a longer chapter on the Republic of South Africa. The Africa Research Group, in its focus on power relationships, colonial domination and oppression, and the role of western-capitalist economic and military interests in maintaining the white regimes in Southern Africa includes Guinea Bissau in its framework and refers only in passing (and then in terms of their dependence on South Africa) to the BLS countries. Dr. Grundy, concerned as he is with examining the nature of international relations within Southern Africa as a “regional sub-system” omits Guinea Bissau but includes Zambia, Malawi, The Malagasy Republic, Mauritius, the Congo (Zaire) and Tanzania in his analysis. (Appendix I of his book is an informative discussion of his reasons for including these nations.)

But as suggested above, the divergent approaches taken by the authors of the works under consideration are by no means confined to geographic boundary definition. Both the Carter essay and the Africa Research Group book (which is an expansion and updating of a very useful and successful pamphlet first produced by ARG in 1971) are introductory in content and design; but while the former focuses on “prospects for change” in Southern Africa, the latter is specifically concerned with the nature of white domination on the one hand and the struggle for liberation on the other. Since I consider these two works to be directed toward a similar audience, I shall discuss them first and return to the Grundy volume later.

Dr. Carter can hardly be faulted for failing to predict the Portuguese coup, but her treatment of Mozambique and Angola suggests a failure to take very seriously liberation movements whose guerrilla forces have in recent years been steadily sapping the strength and will of the Portuguese army. Thus, while she identified “the determination and ability of the Portuguese to maintain their military effort in Africa” as “decisive for the future,” she was either unaware of or discounted evidence of army despondency, draft dodging and emigration from Portugal—evidence of just such an erosion of Portuguese “determination and ability” to hold on in Africa.

Although Dr. Carter writes with a skill and clarity born of long experience and extensive familiarity with Southern and particularly South Africa, it is doubtful that the uninitiated reader will glean from this booklet any real comprehension of the oppression and inhumanity which has characterized white rule in Southern Africa or the extent to which US policy, practice and investment has bolstered the racist regimes. Dr. Carter may be applauded for criticizing US Government policy as not being geared to the promotion of change; yet she shies away from the crucial next step: a clear enunciation of US complicity in the maintenance of the status quo.

There are other problems as well in what may be hailed elsewhere as a clear and balanced treatment of Southern Africa. On page 9, for example, Dr. Carter reports that in 1961 in Angola the UPA “massacred whites and Africans.” Portuguese troops then “retaliated with severe repression.” “Massacre” and “repression” are words of a different magnitude and different emotional responses. When the former is used to identify African action and the latter, non-African, racist feelings are subtly reinforced. And on page 34, readers learn that “Bantustan programs and the massive relocation of rural Africans...” the racial and ethnic maps...” In this neat phrase, there is no hint of the suffering and degradation inflicted upon Africans by a government policy that refers to African communities as “black spots” and herds and splits families like so many cattle bound for grazing (the Bantustans) and milking (the urban and mining labor force.) To a certain extent, Dr. Carter, in a specific section on Bantustans, comes to terms with the human factors involved, but even here a “few points” in favor of the system are carefully noted.

If this reviewer seems to be coming down too harshly on what is in some respects a useful booklet, it is because of a strong belief that writing for a beginning audience is a tremendous responsibility requiring continuous attention to the possible opinions and attitudes that the writer is bound to be shaping within her readership. In this context, and assuming that Dr. Carter was responsible for the Discussion Questions provided at the end of the booklet, I wonder in dismay at how the question “Do you think the treatment by Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa of their [emphasis added] blacks is a matter of international concern?” could appear in a work designed for the use of American students.

Race To Power examines (in 295 pages) the history and structure of the systems of white domination employed in apartheid South Africa and in the Portuguese-controlled countries; the specific effects of these systems on the African populations concerned: South African strategy in Southern Africa and with respect to the independent African states: Western, and particularly US economic and strategic involvement with and support for the regimes; and finally, the development of the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. For the most part, the Africa Research Group has handled a complex task very well. In those parts of the book where the discussion seems weak, the problem of compressing a huge subject into a paragraph or so becomes apparent. Surely, however, if one wants readers to understand the history of African politics in South Africa one doesn’t simply follow a discussion of the
ANC with a reference to the PAC as "another major African political party..." Similarly, the issue of oversimplification must be raised when, as in the chapters on the liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola, differences and divisions within and between various groups are passed over too lightly.

Finally, this writer must regret the ARG's decision to substitute extensive quotations from sources readily available in paperback (eg., Mondlane's The Struggle for Mozambique and Cabral's, The Revolution in Guinea) for a more analytical approach to the liberation movement section of the book. Still, this book provides on the whole a sound introduction to Southern Africa. The maps are good, the photos well chosen and the bibliography useful.

To turn to the third book under consideration, Dr. Grundy's Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa is concerned with the role played by factors such as race, ideology and violence in shaping international relations between the thirteen (in Grundy's definition) states of Southern Africa, and with the network of economic and political relationships existing between these states. In dealing topically with economic and transport relationships, regional trade patterns, private business arrangements, labor migration, and informal as well as formal political and diplomatic relations, Grundy has presented clear and informative factual details which illustrate above all the overwhelming economic power of South Africa vis-a-vis the other states. In the chapters covering the specifics of these relationships, excellent diagrams, tables and maps are provided. Because Grundy has chosen to treat topically aspects of international relations in which certain issues tend to overlap and reoccur, there is repetition in some of his discussion, particularly in the area of political and diplomatic relationships. In contrast, his chapter on "Revolutionary Thought and Revolutionary Practice" which is intended as a vehicle for introducing the subject of guerrilla warfare, is not particularly well integrated into the book as a whole, seems especially dated, and poses some questions concerning Grundy's sources and interpretation. The chapter which follows, "Lifelines and Tensions: The International Relations of Guerrilla Warfare," returns us to the major theme of the book and seems to have been more carefully designed to "fit" with the rest.

Unfortunately, Grundy does not concern himself with issues such as foreign investment, colonial and neo-colonial relations that have had, and continue to have an impact on international relations within Southern Africa. Still, students of Southern Africa can learn much from this book. It deserves serious, if critical, attention.

resources

A COA FACT SHEET, “U.S. Quota for South Africa’s Sugar—a Bittersweet Connection”, Background paper on South African sugar sales to the US, lobbying, sugar industry in South Africa. Available from ACOA, 164 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016, 10 cents.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES, “Prosperity ‘For Whites Only’: The Paradox of Economic Growth in South Africa.” A concise four page analysis of South Africa’s political, racial and economic situation with emphasis on why US investment does not mean social change, Africa Fund, 164 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016.

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United States and Canadian organizations related to the struggles for national liberation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, and in Southern Africa

Symbols: (E) Educational; (FR) Fundraising for support of struggles in Africa; (LA) Local action; (NA) National actions; (P) Publications, a literature list is available; (News.) Newsletter or magazine available usually through subscription; (R) Research. For more information, write the particular organization directly.

African American Solidarity Comm.—Box 1941, Chicago, Illinois 60690 (E, LA)
Africa Information Service—(new address)244 W. 27th St., New York, N.Y. 10001 (E, LA, P)
African Liberation Support Committee—Lynn Eusan Institute, Box 14093, Houston, Texas 77021 (NA, FR) Local chapters.
African Liberation Support Committee Research and Development—P.O. Box 5747, Nashville, Tn. 37208 (R)
American Committee on Africa—164 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016 (E, LA, R, P)
Amilcar Cabral Study Group—3733 Benton Blvd., Kansas City, Missouri 64128 (LA, E)
Arusha-Kenakri Institute—Box 17509, Chicago, Illinois 60617 (E, FR)
Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea—New World Resource Center—(both organizations are at 2546 N. Halsted, Chicago, Illinois 60614) (P.E)
Committee for a Free Mozambique—618th St., New York, N.Y. (E, LA, NA, News)
Committee on Southern African Liberation—119 College Place, Syracuse, New York 13210 (E, LA, FR)
Corporate Information Center—National Council of Churches, Rm. 846, 475 Riverside Dr., New York, N.Y. 10027 (P.R)
Episcopal Churchman for South Africa—14 West 11th St., New York, N.Y. 10011 (LA, NA, News)
Gulf Boycott Coalition—Box 123, Dayton Univ. Station, Dayton, Ohio 45406 (LA, NA, E)
Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization—475 Riverside Dr., New York, N.Y. 10027 (E, FR, News.)
International Defense and Aid Fund (American Branch)—#218, 1430 Mass. Ave., Cambridge, MA. 02138 (E, FR)
Liberation Support Movement (Bay Area)—Box 756, Berkeley, California 94707 (E, FR, LA)
Liberation Support Movement Information Center—Box 94338 Richmond, British Columbia, Canada (P)
Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa—731 State Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53707 (LA, FR, E, FR)
PAIGC/USA Committee—P.O. Box M365, New Bedford, MA. (E, NA, News, for free)
Pan African Liberation Committee—Box 298, Conakry, Republic of Guinea
Pan African Liberation Committee—Box 514, Brookline, MA. 02332 (NA)
Project Southern Africa—2280 South Knox Court, Denver, Colo. 80219 (E, LA)
Southern Africa Committee—244 West 27th St., New York, N.Y. 10001 (E, NA, magazine)
Southern Africa Committee/South—Box 3851, Durham, North Carolina 27702 (E, radio broadcasts, “Africa News Digest”)
Southern Africa Committee (Clergy and Laity Concerned)—1460 Pennsylvania Ave., Denver, Colorado 80210 (LA)
Southern Africa Ecumenical Project—475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027 (E, LA)
Southern Africa Liberation Committee of Governors State Univ.—123 South Pooia, Chicago, Illinois 60621 (E, LA)
Southern Africa Support Committee—Box 1206, Center East, Iowa City, Iowa 52340 (E, LA)
Southern Africa Liberation Committee—c/o UMHE, 1118 South Harrison, East Lansing, Michigan 48823 (E, LA, FR)
South Africa Information Group—Box 4443, Station E, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (NA, News.)
Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal’s African Colonies—121 Avenue Road, Toronto 5, Ontario, Canada (E, FR, NA, P)
Tricoentennial Film Center—333 6th Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10014
Washington Office on Africa—110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 (E, Lobbying)
United Church of Christ Southern Africa Task Forces—for a list, write Africa Dept., United Church Board for World Ministries, 475 Riverside Dr., N.Y., N.Y. 10027
United Methodist Southern Africa Task Forces—for a list, write Africa Dept., United Methodist Bd. for Global Ministries, 475 Riverside Dr., N.Y., N.Y 10027
Youth Against War and Fascism—250 Farragut St., Washington, D.C. (E, LA, P)
Pan-African Students Organization in the Americas—Box 467, NY NY 10025 (E, LA)
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