South Africa Invades Angola

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— in Force

Serial
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South African troops at the Ruacana Falls hydroelectric project in Angola. Despite the fact that this site has not been subjected to military attack, it was used as a pretext for the South African invasion of Angola.
The following speech was delivered by Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania at Oxford University, England on November 19, 1975

I have talked on the American continent, in Asia and Australia, and in very many countries of Europe, about different aspects of the struggle against racialism and colonialism. I have been doing so since five days after the independence of Tanganyika, when I first addressed the United Nations as the Prime Minister of a free country. I continue to talk about colonialism and racialism not only because, like Mount Everest, they are there, but also because, unlike Mount Everest, we must together remove them from the face of the earth. (And I shall be speaking on this subject again today. For Oxford University and its graduates are not unimportant in the development of attitudes; and Britain has more influence in the world than a small, weak, and young country like Tanzania.)

We in Tanzania have no ambition to be the liberators of Southern Africa. Nor do we ask other countries to undertake this task. We do not believe that one country can ever free another. We do not believe that any people can be given liberty. They can only be assisted or hindered in getting freedom for themselves. Equally, however, we do not believe that a people can ultimately be denied liberty. For man is so constituted that he will not rest unless he feels that he has freedom and the human dignity which goes with it. Otherwise he will, sooner or later, by one means or another, fight for his own freedom within his society, and for the freedom of his society from outside domination. The history of the world, and of every nation, is at bottom a story of man’s struggle to reconcile the need for order in a technologically changing society with his demand to associate as a free individual on terms of equality with other men.

Tanzania’s interest in the freedom movement of Southern Africa, therefore, does not arise out of any belief that our people have a God-given mission to free others. If that were the case the world would rightly look upon Tanzania as the African danger to its peace; messianic concepts of duty have done more damage to real liberty in the world than any deliberate evil intention. And, as I hope to make plain before I finish speaking, we have not yet solved the problems of making freedom a reality within our own borders.

Yet we are free in one sense. We govern ourselves: We elect our own government and Parliament; we determine the direction of our own development. We make our own mistakes, and achieve our own successes. For Tanzania is one of the many states of Africa which owes its present existence to the world-wide anti-colonial movement after the 1939-45 World War. We campaigned for our independence. We would not have achieved it in 1961 had we not campaigned with determination. But our celebration was not just a consequence of our own efforts. We benefited from the fact that colonialism had become unacceptable to the world; its inconsistency with the principles of human equality and freedom had become widely acknowledged. And even now, our continued independence owes more to broad acceptance of the principles of national freedom than to any defence capacity of our own. So anything which strengthens the acceptance of the principle of national independence is of importance to us; anything which weakens it is of concern to us.

Thus, as we see it, the right to independence either exists for every nation, or it does not exist for Tanzania. Tanzanians have no superhuman virtues which are denied to the people of Rhodesia. The people of Namibia have no less right to solve their problems of disunity for themselves than have the people of Portugal, of Lebanon, or any other long-independent state whose peoples are divided along linguistic or ideological lines. And black men in Dar es Salaam or Lusaka or Lagos, have neither more or less right to human dignity than those of Johannesburg or Pretoria or Capetown. What we claim for ourselves we have to accept as the right of others. While others are denied such rights our own hold over them must be insecure.
But although our weakness and our blackness make obvious our responsibility to support other Africans when they struggle for freedom, the same connection exists for older nations and peoples of other colors. Europe has had the evils and dangers of racialism terribly demonstrated within its own borders. And colonialism in Africa is only an older—and more long-lasting—version of the attempt made by Nazi Germany to occupy, dominate, and control the rest of Europe in its own interests. Africa is not unique in its problems. Nor is it any more possible to confine them to Africa than it was to limit the effects of the European conflict to the borders of that continent. Racialism and colonialism in Africa are of world-wide relevance. The question which has yet to be answered clearly is how the rest of the world is going to react to the freedom struggles in Southern Africa.

For the peoples of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa do not accept their subordinate human status. In South Africa the struggle in its modern form goes back to the formation of the African National Congress in 1912. In Rhodesia the first African Congress was established after the 1914-18 war. And although nationalist organization is more recent in Namibia, the efforts of the traditional African leaders to get redress for their grievances goes back to the beginning of the League of Nations Mandate.

The demands for dignity and freedom made by these organizations were expressed peacefully—and were time again and again met with violence. Yet the effort to organize politically continued—and indeed still continues. Serious people are very reluctant to revolt against their government, however unrepresentative and unjust it may be. While there is any hope of change for the better they will normally work for that change within the law as laid down, whoever has made that law. But when all hope of change is denied because the very principle of freedom and equality is denied, and when the laws prevent the peaceful expression of opinion, then the people are confronted with a clear choice. They either acquiesce in their oppression and humiliation or they commit themselves to an armed struggle.

The Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 was, therefore, merely restating the obvious when it said that over the objective of freedom and racial equality “We would prefer to negotiate rather than to destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa.”

Yet the Armed Freedom struggle had already started. The peoples of the Portuguese colonies had been driven to acknowledge that without a willingness to kill and be killed, their demand for freedom would make no progress. The Rhodesians had come, with even more hesitation, to the same conclusion and were preparing themselves for war. The Lusaka Manifesto was thus a twelfth hour offer to talk. It stated clearly—almost in words of one syllable—“If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.”

The Lusaka Manifesto was drawn up by the States of East and Central Africa. It was endorsed by the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations. The Liberation Movements accepted it. But the Governments of South Africa, of Rhodesia, and of Portugal ignored it.

So the Armed Struggle in the Portuguese colonies was intensified. The preparations for a guerrilla war in Rhodesia were speeded up. And the result we now know. As a direct consequence of the fighting in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau, the Caetano Government in Metropolitan Portugal was overthrown, and the new Army Regime accepted the principle for which the Freedom Movements had been fighting. So the fighting stopped. The independence of Guinea-Bissau—already declared and operative in large parts of the country—was recognized. Frelimo agreed upon a transitional, handing-over period of ten months and negotiated about the details of Mozambican independence. In Angola, however, the damage of the Portuguese struggle to retain power could not be undone; the disunited nationalist forces came together only for long enough to get agreement on a date for independence and then began fighting each other. The people of that unhappy country are now paying the price of succumbing to the tactics of those who seek to dominate others by dividing them.

Independence in Mozambique appeared at first to achieve what the Lusaka Manifesto had failed to do. The Government of South Africa indicated a willingness to talk, on one subject, on the basis we had set out—that is on the basis of how, not whether, majority rule would come in Rhodesia. In accordance with the Lusaka Manifesto the Governments of Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana, therefore, accepted the responsibility of acting as intermediaries with the Rhodesian Nationalists, with Vorster accepting a similar function with the Smith regime. It is these discussions which gave rise to talk of a detente by South Africa and our denial of detente.

In accepting this function my colleagues and I were facing up to the facts of life in Southern Africa and the tripartite nature of the problem there. Rhodesia is a British colony. For all practical purposes, however, Britain surrendered its power there to a racial minority in 1923; it has consistently refused since then to assert its authority. Knowing this the African States still refused to recognize the Declaration of Rhodesian independence in 1965. We are against colonialism. We have no objection in principle to a unilateral declaration of independence—that was not the problem. But it was no representative of the Rhodesian people who declared independence in Rhodesia. It was a de facto authority whose power rests on a racial structure of politics and economics and which is committed to maintaining that racist minority domination. Under these conditions we would have refused to recognize the independence of Rhodesia even had the British Parliament legalised it.

As far as we are concerned, therefore, Rhodesia remains legally a British colony. But in fact, as distinct from theory, it is quite obvious that the issue in Rhodesia will be decided on the basis of comparative power. And the contenders are the minority regime of Ian Smith backed by South Africa and the nationalist movement backed by the other independent states of Africa and non-racialists elsewhere in the world.

When the South African government let it be known that it was willing to accept the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia and implied that it would use its influence to that end, it was therefore logical for the free African border states to investigate, further. For Rhodesia cannot survive without South African backing; if that were to be withdrawn it appeared likely that there might be no further necessity to fight for freedom in Rhodesia.

I do not need to go through the twelve months of alternate optimism and realism since then. It has become quite clear that even now Smith is not ready to negotiate meaningfully. He has not accepted the principle of major-
ity rule in Rhodesia. And it would be absurd to expect that South Africa will fulfill Britain’s responsibility and will use force to bring about majority rule. South Africa is still refusing even to apply economic sanctions against the illegal regime.

So we are forced back to the alternative strategy outlined in the Lusaka Declaration of 1969. This said, “But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors.” Unfortunately, but inevitably, the armed struggle in Rhodesia will have to be resumed and intensified until conditions are ripe for realistic negotiations. And the Freedom Fighters of Rhodesia, like those of Mozambique, will demand Africa’s support.

We very much regret the need for war. It can only bring dreadful suffering to the people of Rhodesia—both black and white. It will, therefore, leave a heritage of bitterness which will make the eventual development of a non-racial democratic society in that country very much more difficult. But we can no more refuse support to the Rhodesian Freedom Fighters now than Britain could have refused support to the Resistance Movements of Europe during the 1940s.

In the light of Portugal’s changed policy, African states also probed South Africa on the independence of Namibia. For South African leaders had been quoted as saying that they accepted the principle of independence for this Trust Territory. And Namibia is under direct de facto South African control. Ian Smith’s peculiar stubbornness and the apparent death-wish of the Rhodesian whites could not complicate a move towards genuine independence for Namibia. All that is required is for the South African government to accept the decisions of the United Nations and arrange to pass control of the territory to the U.N. Commissioner for Namibia.

It has now become clear, however, that the South African Government is not thinking in terms of true independence for Namibia. It is not willing to relinquish control to the United Nations; it is not willing to negotiate with the nationalist movement of the territory. Instead South Africa is intensifying its attempt to divide the people along tribal lines, and it is trying to retain control of Namibia at the same time as posing as a convert to the cause of anti-colonialism.

The evidence for this assessment has mounted in the last few weeks. For South Africa has been using Namibia as a base for its troop incursions into Angola and as the staging post for mercenary activity in that country.

For the present, therefore, it appears that in Namibia, as in Rhodesia, the Freedom Movement will have to intensify the armed struggle before any serious negotiations are possible.

In the freedom struggles of Rhodesia and Namibia, the world outside Africa may dislike the methods adopted by the Liberation Movements, but it cannot challenge the aim of ending colonial domination. But we also demand freedom in South Africa. Yet South Africa is an independent state. It is absurd to pretend otherwise. And the whole world has accepted—at least in theory—the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of independent sovereign states.

Nonetheless, Africa in general, and Tanzania in particular, claims that the world cannot ignore what is happening within South Africa, and that it should act to secure change within that independent state.

South Africa is a tyranny. It is not the only tyrannical police state in the world, not even in Africa. There are too many of them. Yet we do not urge external intervention in these other states; on the contrary, we have bitterly opposed it. At the height of Tanzania’s expressed hostility to the atrocities and the injustices in Uganda, we made it clear that we would nevertheless condemn external intervention.

Nor could we justifiably make a claim to have built a Utopia in Tanzania. We call ourselves a democratic and socialist state. In reality we are neither democratic nor socialist. The Patrons of democracy and the Cardinals of socialism have no idea how much sympathy I have with them when they ridicule and dismiss Tanzania’s claim to democracy or to socialism. Democracy and Socialism require a mature and popular awareness of the dignity and equality of men and women; a dynamic and popular intolerance of tyranny; a degree of maturity and integrity in those entrusted with responsibility for the institutions of State and Society; and a level of national and personal affluence which Tanzania and Tanzanians do not possess. Many of our people suffer from permanent malnutrition and all the mental and physical illnesses which go with it; their poverty and general ignorance make a mockery of talk about human freedom. We have the village tyrant and the insensitive bureaucrat. We have the habits of arbitrariness; some as the lingering vestiges of colonial rule, others of our own making. We have judicial procedures which to say the least leave a lot to be desired. We have a law on the Statute Book under which an individual may be detained without trial. We have the traditional prejudice and discrimination against women. We still have a love of exerting authority and an intolerable degree of submission to authority. And we have also a level of incompetence and even irresponsibility which often makes nonsense of our claim to be implementing policies in support of equality and human dignity.

Some of these evils can be accounted for by our inheritance of national poverty and backwardness; others can be explained by reference to the fragility and inexperience of our young institutions; and others by downright evil-mindedness. But whatever the explanation, they are all there. Our people suffer from them. And while they exist we are rightly condemned for them.

But we are seriously trying to build a democratic and socialist state. We seriously believe that we cannot be democratic without being socialist, and vice versa. I think that we have something we can show for our democracy; and something we can show for our socialism.

What we are being condemned for is the gap between our actions and our declared commitment to socialism, and the democracy and personal freedom which are inseparable from true socialism. We are being criticized for failures to live up to the principles we ourselves have proclaimed. We believe this is true of Britain, the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., China, India, and all other countries which call themselves democratic—however they define that word. Our self-criticisms and the criticisms of others are related to the ideals we proclaim and to which our nations are committed.

South Africa has no such gap between its principles and its actions—or if there is a gap it is one about which all free men rejocie. For the South African government is the only one in the world which has, as its fundamental purpose, the separation of men according to their physical characteristics and the perpetuation of domination by one race over another. It is color and accident of birth—the one thing over which no human being has any control, which is the basis of South African tyranny. It does not
matter much what you do—unless you defend the principles of human dignity—what matters is whether you are classified as Black, Brown, or White. That will determine your political and economic life—by order of the Government and in accordance with its doctrines. In this, and in no other way, South Africa is unique. Yet this singularity is so fundamental that it cannot be disregarded.

Racialism as an attitude of mind cannot be eliminated by force. It exists among every people and can be seen in every nation. There are black people in Britain who suffer from racialism; and, despite the evidence of our recent elections, there are white and brown people in Tanzania who experience it. But the societies and state organizations of Tanzania who experience it. But the societies and state organizations of Britain, of Tanzania, of the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., of India, and so on, all fight against the expression of racialism. And when they give way to it, we condemn them with their own words and their own principles. In South Africa the state propagates racialism; it proclaims it as its philosophy. South African institutions, laws, police, and its economic organization, are all designed for the central purpose of upholding apartheid and the privileged lives which White South Africans have built upon the deliberate humiliation of Non-White South Africans.

South Africa is a sovereign state. But the equality and sovereignty of independent nation states must not be accepted as cover behind which racialism can flourish. For racialism is a poison which spreads from man to man and country to country. The victim of racialism too often becomes a racist himself, and those who sympathise with the victimized are only too prone to take vengeance on others as innocent as themselves. The basic equality of all mankind is too fundamental an issue to the future of the world for other nation states to ignore the racist structure of South African society.

Politicians and statesmen of the developed countries of the world have been agreeing that apartheid is a terrible thing and condemning it in words ever since 1948. But they have continued trade, cultural contact, and diplomatic relations with South Africa, as if it were a normal member of the international community. The words have therefore been regarded as political face-saving; the South African Government has been able to shrug them off as irrelevant. For if you think a man has smallpox you do not mix with him, treat with him, and ask him kindly to cure himself without passing the disease to you. However sorrowfully, you isolate him; and if he refuses to take medicine for his disease you force it down his throat for your own protection.

No other single nation state has the right to intervene militarily in South Africa, and certainly Tanzania is not planning a Liberation War against that country. But the racist government of South Africa is, by its daily actions, preparing the conditions for an internal revolution. For you cannot humiliate and oppress men and women for ever without them asserting their humanity in the only way left open to them, that is, by revolt. So there are now and there will in the future be, South Africans of all colors—who risk torture and death in the fight against the whole structure of the racist society.

In Tanzania believe that those who are genuinely opposed to racialism should help those who fight racialism. Because South Africa is an independent state, some governments and organizations may feel inhibited from direct support of those who seek to overthrow the South African system. But nothing in international law demands that the rest of the world should support the South Afri-
BREYTENBACH SENTENCED FOR TERRORISM

Breyten Breytenbach the Afrikaans poet who was detained August 19th, has been convicted for “the offence of participating in terroristic activities” and sentenced to nine years imprisonment. He was found guilty of plotting to establish Black rule and furthering the aims of communism. Breytenbach, who has lived in Paris for the last several years, entered South Africa on August 3 under false name and in disguise. He was detained as he was attempting to leave the country.

The indictment states he was involved in the establishment of a secret organization named Okhela. Okhela was alleged to be a white organization directly linked to the African National Congress, one of the South African liberation movements.

Breytenbach was accused of numerous acts concerning the building of an infrastructure that the ANC and Okhela could use in armed struggle. This included inciting four persons (subsequently detained) to learn secret methods of communication, ways of avoiding detection by the police, methods of forging documents, self-defense, sabotage such as cutting phone or high voltage power lines, and setting up radio broadcasting stations.

Breytenbach was also accused of encouraging the four to help arrange for people to leave or enter South Africa illegally, to provide safe mailing addresses and to set up an underground print shop. Allegedly he also asked Karel Tip of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) to help set up political discussion cells. He was also charged with trying to get Paulus Mare and Karel Tip to help import explosives.

Formation of Okhela

The “Okhela Manifesto”, which was produced in the trial as evidence, analysed the nature of the South African struggle in the following terms:

“... in terms of a clearer understanding and conception of the needs that the developing struggle indicates, and based on the experience of a few comrades, it was decided to create an organisation of white South African militants called OKHELA. This organisation is called upon to play a specific role within the National Liberation Front being constituted.

“We derive our legitimacy from the African National Congress who requested us to form this organisation.”

Referring to organisational structure the manifesto says:

“The conditions under which the struggle is fought makes it imperative for us to be clandestine so as to be effective. The needs for clandestinity, security and effectiveness define the structures and the functioning of our organisation.

“Our immediate objective is to participate in the national liberation of South Africa which in itself is lifting the first barrier barring the road to the revolutionary transformation of South African society.”

The manifesto continues:

“Our Aims are:

“a. To provide ‘invisible support’—materially and politically—to the Liberation Movement.

“b. To develop the tradition and means which will enable us to fulfill our special role, to build our organisation to be both flexible and resilient, an organisation which can take the initiative for action and ‘create the facts on the ground’

“c. To acquire all the necessary techniques and experience for underground struggle—logistical support, information, communications etc.; to accumulate these experiences, transform and adapt them to our needs; and to transmit them by having the necessary training facilities.”

Breytenbach pleads guilty.

Breytenbach pleaded guilty to the charges made against him and did not contest the evidence of the state witnesses brought against him. According to the Prosecuting Officer, Percy Yutar, Breytenbach had “expressed genuine regret for his actions.”

A number of people were named as co-conspirators on the charge sheet, but were not brought to trial—some of these so named were: BRETEN BREYTENBACH @ DICK BAREND SCHUITEMA @ NICO WATERBAK
The Council (CRC) remains unclear following the firing of COLOURED COUNCIL towards each other. The three movements have often had bitter feelings - South Africa in recent months, involving both members of SASO, and other black organisations. In one recent trial in Johannesburg the brother of the accused, Frank Molobi, refused to testify, and was jailed for his action. A full report of the trials will appear in next month's issue.

Other political trials.
There have been a number of other political trials in South Africa in recent months, involving both members of the African National Congress and Unity Movement. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Unity Movement. The ANC and the PAC are recognized by the UN and the Organization of African Unity, the Unity Movement is not. PAC spokesman David Sibeko denied that any merger had taken place. However, he restated the PAC's position of "seeking unity with all progressive forces that are generally opposed to apartheid and settler colonialism in South Africa." Further, he stated that this position "has now received a positive response from some leading members of the African National Congress and Unity Movement."

"The Pan Africanist Congress remains hopeful that our compatriots from the other organizations will continue to work expeditiously for a common front because such a front is an important pre-requisite for the successful prosecution of a people's war," said Sibeko. In the past the three movements have often had bitter feelings towards each other. (Statement issued by the PAC at the United Nations, November 14, 1975.)

COLOURED COUNCIL LEADER FIRED
The future of the Coloured People's Representative Council (CRC) remains unclear following the firing of Labour Party leader Sonny Leon, Chairman of the Executive of the CRC. The Labour Party is the majority party in the CRC which is made up of elected members and members appointed by the South African government. The firing of Sonny Leon is the latest in a series of events following the adjourning of the CRC in September. (See Southern Africa, December 1975.)

Following the adjourning of the CRC it was announced that the CRC Executive and Prime Minister B.J. Vorster would meet to discuss the future of "coloureds" in South Africa. Coloureds, (people of mixed racial ancestry) do not live on bantustans but live in segregated townships. Coloureds have no representation in the white South African parliament, but are forced to "express themselves" politically through the CRC. Vorster has proposed that the CRC Executive be given "cabinet status", and that the CRC and the white Parliament each have responsibility for the affairs of their community, coloured and white respectively. There would be an Inter-Cabinet Council to consider issues that effect both groups. Under Vorster's plan the Inter-Cabinet Council will work on the basis of consensus, but if a consensus can not be reached, the white Prime Minister will rule on the matter.

The official ideology behind the Vorster plan is that every ethnic group has the right to control its own affairs. This right would supposedly be violated if a single parliament existed representing two ethnic groups (or all ethnic groups if the black population was also included) because either one ethnic group would dominate or several would join together for short term gain in a marriage of convenience. In reality, of course, the white minority exercises absolute ultimate power over all groups.

The talks concerning Vorster's plan reached a deadlock when, according to Sonny Leon, Vorster failed to give details about how such a system would work. Vorster claimed that such details should be worked out between the two groups. It was unclear that any plan based on these principles would be acceptable to the CRC. Following the meeting Leon said, "The Prime Minister made it clear that the government will not depart from its policy of separate development. Therefore, in no circumstances can we expect to be part of the law-making process of our country."

The confrontation was heightened by the fact that the CRC had not approved a new budget before its adjournment. By November 7 the funds would be completely gone, including a R88 million ($101.20 million) advance, making it unable to pay salaries of 25,223 employees and grants and pension money to 148,298 others.

Minister of Coloured Relations Dr. van de Merwe empowered Sonny Leon to pass the budget personally, but Leon refused to do so. Upon Leon's refusal to pass the budget he was fired. The other four members of the CRC Executive resigned in protest.

Dr. van de Merwe did not wish to authorize the budget himself, since that would underline the extent to which the white government controls the political affairs of the coloured people and would expose the emptiness of the South African government's policy. Sonny Leon on the other hand did not wish to be put in a position of supporting the current CRC or the government's policy. He said "a vote for the budget is a vote for apartheid." Leon and the Labour Party won the last election by promising to destroy the CRC, which most coloureds think is only a tool of apartheid and not an effective way to exercise their political rights.

The aim of the Labour Party is full representation in
the white parliament. But Prime Minister Vorster recently made it clear that this was out of the question, at least for the present.

The next major development is expected to be the report of the Erica Theron Commission, set up to inquire into the relations between coloureds and whites. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 25, Nov. 1, 8, 1975; Comment & Opinion, Johannesburg, Oct. 31, 1975; Washington Star, Nov. 12, 1975; Africa News, Nov. 24, 1975)

STRUGGLE OVER PRESS CONTROL

Louis Luyt, a right wing South African millionaire, bid $13 million in an attempt to get a controlling interest in the South African Associate Newspapers (SAAN). Mr. Luyt is identified with the ruling Nationalist Party, while SAAN publishes five newspapers that are critical of the Nationalist Party government. Among the papers published by SAAN are the Sunday Times, the Sunday Express, the Rand Daily Mail, and the Cape Times.

The matter first became public through an account published in Die Beeld, a daily pro-government newspaper that announced that Mr. Luyt planned to bid for a majority of the shares. In a front page editorial the following morning the Rand Daily Mail said that if Luyt was successful “a devastating blow will have been dealt to the cause of the press and public freedom.”

At first Luyt claimed he had made the move for financial reasons and that SAAN had become a sitting duck due to its financial position. SAAN is said to have lost R250,000 in the first half of 1975 and did not declare a dividend. The price Luyt offered per share was far above the market price.

Luyt said that if the papers came under his control they would not be the mouthpiece of any particular party. But he did say that he was “going to have a say in who’s going to be appointed or stay where he is.” He said he felt that SAAN’s newspapers were harming South Africa abroad because of their reportage of events in South Africa and that he was interested in “moderating” such reports. The SAAN newspapers, while hardly radical, are critical of some aspects of apartheid.

Luyt announced that he has several backers abroad, including at various times Axel Springer, a right wing west German publisher, and John McGoff, a right wing American who owns over fifty papers in the mid-west.

McGoff, who recently failed in an attempt to buy the Washington Star, says he became involved for “both business and political reasons.” McGoff is a personal friend of South African Minister of Information Connie Mulder, with whom he jointly owns a farm in the Transvaal. McGoff also has official ties with the South African Department of Information as a sponsor of the Fair News-in-Sport campaign and is a trustee of the Foreign Affairs Association which brings sympathetic opinion makers from the U.S. to South Africa.

Another interesting aspect of the attempted takeover occurred when opposition party leader Sir de Villiers Graaff, leader of the United Party (UP), put his considerable wealth behind Luyt. The SAAN papers have been increasingly critical of the UP over the years and at one point even suggest that Sir de Villiers resign from the UP because of his inability to make it a viable opposition. The papers have switched their support from the UP to the newly-formed Progressive Reform Party.

Sir de Villiers’ backing of the takeover was conditional on two points: that his family trust, Graaff Investments Nominees, would be given a seat on SAAN’s board and that decisions to change editorial policy would be unanimous. Such collaboration between the Nationalists and the UP (the traditional opposition) has the effect of making the Progressive Reform Party the official opposition. (For more background on the relationship of the UP to the PRP see Southern Africa, April, June, July, August, 1975)

The takeover attempt failed after the major shareholders in SAAN, the Abe Bailey Trust and the Argus Company refused to sell their shares. However, there are some indications that the backers of the takeover will now attempt to set up their own English language paper. Most pro-Nationalist papers are printed in Afrikaans. (Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 10, 1975; the Los Angeles Times; Nov. 4, 1975; Comment & Opinion, Johannesburg, Oct 31, 1975.)

SOUTH AFRICA SEEKS FACE LIFT

Titus Mambola, a black South African track star, has been invited to participate in the 51st international San Silvestre road race at Sao Paolo, Brazil. “This is the first time South Africa has had an invitation to this event, and we consider it quite a breakthrough” said Hannes Botha of the South African Amateur Athletic Union. South Africa has been barred from much international competition, including the Olympics, because of the apartheid system’s gross inequities in opportunities for blacks as compared to whites. Recently, South Africa has been sending “multi-national” teams and black athletes abroad in order to improve its international image. (New York Times, Nov. 9, 1975.)
One of South Africa’s main interests in improving its image abroad is to attract foreign capital. Part of its campaign involves advertising. The November 10th issue of Business Week contains a 29 page advertising section on South Africa devoted to attracting foreign capital. “South Africa has never defaulted on an overseas loan obligation. Overseas investment capital is not regarded as a form of economic neo-colonialism but is welcomed as an essential ingredient in maintaining satisfactory economic growth,” states the ad. It continues, “return on foreign investment in South Africa is among the highest in the world. Moreover, despite the posturings of the lunatic fringe (i.e. the liberation movements—ed), foreign investment is welcomed even by the most virulent opponents of the government.” (Business Week, New York, November 10, 1975)

THE TRANSKEI AND THE UN

The General Assembly’s Special Political Committee approved by 100 votes to zero a resolution condemning South Africa’s establishment of bantustans or tribal homelands. The resolution stated that bantustans were designed to consolidate apartheid and perpetuate white minority domination in South Africa.

Eight countries abstained: Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United States and France. Thirty four delegations were absent, including several of the sponsors of the resolution and South Africa. The resolution is expected to be ratified by the General Assembly, which now has 143 members, and will effectively bar the homelands from U.N. membership after “independence.”

The first of the homelands to become “independent” will be the Transkei this year. (See Southern Africa December 1975.) Transkeian Chief Minister Kaiser Matanzima said that he planned to apply for U.N. membership anyway. “It amazes me and my people that this organization, which professes to have the interest of the underdog at heart should blatantly discriminate against such a black nation in Southern Africa,” Matanzima said, continuing that the U.N. was “tarring the Transkei with the same brush as it tars the Republic.” Until such time as the Transkei is admitted to the UN, foreign relations will be handled on a bi-lateral basis, said Matanzima.

TRANSKEI TO GET PORT

In another development related to the Transkei, it has been announced that Port St. Johns would be handed over to the Transkei when it becomes independent. Ironically, the whites could stay if they wished since the Transkei will be “multi-racial. However, the white population has voted overwhelmingly to let the government buy up their houses and turn them over to blacks.

Port St. Johns will provide a usable but totally undeveloped port for the Transkei. (Daily News, Tanzania, Nov. 11, 1975; Comment and Opinion, Oct. 31, 1975; Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 1975; Times of Zambia, Sept. 25, 1975)

APARTHEID HAS MOST WHITE SUPPORT

In a recent poll of white South Africans 68 per cent answered “no” to the question “Would you be prepared to live here (South Africa) under a black government?” Of the Afrikaaners, 78 per cent said “no”, while 57 percent of the English speakers said “no”.

To the question “Would you be prepared to live in South Africa if it were ruled by a multi-racial government?” 49 per cent of the white population said “yes”, with 38 per cent of the Afrikaaners responding “yes” and 62 per cent of the English speakers responding “yes”. (Los Angeles Times, Oct. 29, 1975)

ECONOMICS

BANTUSTAN CONSOLIDATION PUT OFF

Apartheid, and its inconsistencies, often create strange bedfellows. Thus white farmers who own land within designated “homeland” areas together with homeland leaders are annoyed by the South African Government’s announcement that it has frozen future purchases of the whites’ land because of an “unforeseen depletion in funds.” Apparently a number of white land owners whose “white spots” lie in Bantustan territory, had already planned new purchases outside the “homelands” and fully expected the government revenue. A number of “homeland” leaders were not even informed of the government decision. In order to fulfill the various land acts which grant Africans a mere 13 per cent of the land area of the Republic of South Africa, the government had already purchased 10 million acres of land belonging to Whites, but there are 2 million acres more to go. There are a few leaders, particularly those of the KwaZulu and Lebowa Bantustans who do not advocate the elimination of “white spots” but want the land to be included within their Bantustans, thus creating more racially integrated “homelands.” A spokesman for the opposition United Party said that the government policy to delay the purchase of white land and therefore the consolidation of the Bantustans casts a cloud over the whole program of independence for the “homelands.” (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 18, Nov. 1, 1975; Los Angeles Times, Oct. 23, 1975)

In reaction to white outrage an official of the Bantu Administration and Development said that land purchases will hopefully soon resume. There are 9,000 landowners who must still sell their land, but he admitted that consolidation will not be complete in the Transkei before its slated “independence” in October, 1976. (Star, Nov. 8)

DUTCH END BANTUSTAN AID

The Dutch International Development Financing Or-
ganization (NOVIB) which receives 75 per cent of its funding from the Dutch Government reversed a prior decision to fund projects in the South African "homelands." The change in policy evolved after pressure on the socialist government to recognize the fact that the Bantustans cannot be considered separate "developing countries" eligible for aid, but are an integral part of the apartheid South African scheme. Such policy bodes ill for South Africa's attempt to foist independent Bantustans onto the international community for recognition and aid. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 18, 1975)

In an opposite tact apparently "Arab funds" amounting to R100 m ($115 million), are being channeled into the "homelands" at a less than 10 per cent interest rate for 10-20 years. Details on the exact country source of the monies is unknown, although the London firm representing the funds states the group has already invested in Nigeria, Senegal and the Ivory Coast in housing and small cottage industry projects. (Cape Times, June 16, 1975)

URBAN HOUSING HITCH

"The provision of sufficient housing for the Bantu is of national importance and affects us all," stated I.P. van Onselen, Secretary of the Bantu Administration and Development. (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 1975) Another way of creating the apartheid reality of a stabilized, yet controlled labor force has been evidenced in the government's new policy towards urban black home ownership. The government announced with great fanfare that Blacks would be able to "own" their own homes on a 30 year lease basis in African townships. But now it appears that there is a very significant Catch 22 clause in the legislation. The ability of a Black to purchase the house will be determined by whether s/he has become a citizen in a "homeland." Provisional housing arrangements may be made for those Africans for whom it takes more time to get Bantustan citizenship, but the idea is clear. An African may lease the land and home, sell his or her life in a town, maybe even be slightly settled. But never are such men and women permanently legal residents; they can always be sent back to a "homeland" and are controlled like so many chess pieces of the South African chess board. According to a Star editorial (Oct. 30, 1975) the "homeland" leaders did not push for citizenship prerequisite to ownership.

In other housing news, the Minister of Community Development said that 60,000 housing units should be built for Whites, Asians and Coloureds within the next five years, stating disapproval of temporary single room or shell structures. On the other hand a Bantu Administration official said that what architects and planners should develop for Africans was "a better type of hostel accommodation or other type of temporary residence for our migratory laborers" where leisure time activities would be available and the houses constructed better and larger. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 25, 30, Nov. 1, 1975)

WAGE GAP BETWEEN COLOURED AND WHITES INCREASES

The pressure for more skilled labor, has meant the elevation of a number of Coloured workers into new positions, yet despite the alteration in job status it has been revealed that the gap between Coloured and White earnings has increased by 42 per cent between 1970 and 1974. In 1970 the average monthly wage for Coloureds was R77 ($88.5) and for Whites it was R268 ($308). In 1974 it was R127 ($146) for Coloureds and R399 ($459) for Whites. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 25, 1975)

The African and White wage differences are also growing despite the greater increases percentage-wise of African wages in certain sectors. A Rand Daily Mail study of August, 1975 states that any decrease in the gap will take time because of the inflated level of white wages to start and the continued growth in the cost of living.

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Average Monthly Wage

Housing conditions in a tin shanty town in Cape Town
In mining African wages rose by 148 per cent between April 1973 and April 1975. Whites by 48 per cent; in manufacturing, construction and electrical industries Black wages went up by 60 per cent and White wages by 28 per cent, but the white cost of living rose by 25 per cent and Black poverty datum level (University of Port Elizabeth Statistics) for people in the Rand area rose by 49 per cent. One of the worst areas was the clothing industry (textiles has been a major strike focus in the Durban area since 1973) where African wages rose by 20 per cent but White wages were up by 27 per cent. (Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, August 9, 1975)

BLACK UNION PETITION DRIVE IN DURBAN

The Trade Union Advisory and Coordinating Council (TUACC) has launched a campaign to gain recognition for its member black unions both by management and the government. It is circulating a petition to workers and hopes to get 50,000,000 signatories. It will be presented in 40-50 factories where the unions function.

The basic struggle for workers rights continues. 600 workers were locked out by the management of the Natal Cotton and Woollen Mills after they had protested and gone on strike over the policies of a new personnel manager. Police and dogs were used to prevent the workers from returning to their jobs. The management brought in laborers from other areas. (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 1975)

MORE ON GOVERNMENT “INDUSTRY COMMITTEES”

The draft bill outlining the role of Industry Committees has been sent to 200 employer and employee organizations before finalization. (see Southern Africa, Dec., 1975) The plan is clear as the South African Government radio commented: “These committees will provide Black workers with all the principal advantages of trade unionism, while eliminating its disruptive potential which has become manifest, even in sophisticated, homogenous societies such as Britain.” (SABC Current Affairs, Oct. 29, 1975)

The committees will function on a regional industry basis, be made up of full time workers (ie eliminating union officials protected from job elimination), and the workers will come from already company/government approved works and liaison committees. One of the important organizations in the plan is the Central Bantu Labour Board, and the government now plans to appoint one Black to this board. The Financial Mail termed the over all plan a “spot of oil for an outmoded machine” but still harbored hopes that it would lead to government recognition of full union rights. The SABC program about the Industrial Committees constantly stated that the aim was to secure industrial peace. That false peace has been broken seriously over the last two years by 500 or so strikes. Government Industrial Committees are but one means to contain workers while trying to give them an illusion of power. (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 1975; Financial Mail, Johannesburg, Sept. 5, 1975; SABC Current Affairs, Oct. 29, 1975)

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD

South Africa is predicted to produce 1.95 million tons of sugar in 1975-76. It has just signed a new accord with Japan for that country to import some 350,000 tons per year from 1976-1978. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 25, Nov. 11, 1975)

South African Airways, a government company, is the world’s largest buyer of Special Performance Boeing 747 jumbo jets and has ordered six such planes. They will enable non-stop flights to Europe and avoid the awkward political problem of refueling in Africa. At the opening of a new British Airways office in Johannesburg, Minister of Transport, Mr. L. Muller said that such aircraft had increased South Africa’s trade and tourism with Europe. (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 18, 1975)

A South African Marketing Company has been established in New York City (200 Park Ave., Pan-Am Bldg., 25th Fl) to expand South African exports to the United States. On the other side there have been some problems with South Africa importing US goods because of the policy of the US Export-Import Bank not to allow South African importers full long-term credit service. Rather it can offer only medium term insurance and guarantees. This policy (which pro-South African government and business people have tried to change) may affect a current order of $800 million. But the Exim policy has not had an adverse effect on South Africa’s purchase of US goods in the past. In fact US exports have doubled since 1972 and are already above the total 1974 figure of $1,100 million. The Exim restriction is merely a slight thorn in the side of business people—one on a smaller scale but not unlike other anti-apartheid policies stated by the US such as adherence to the UN arms embargo against South Africa. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 18, 1975; South Africa Digest, June 20, 1975)

The US company, Kopers, and the South African quasi-government steel agency, ISCOR, have formed Iskop in order to produce coal tar products. Each owner has put in R250,000 initial investment ($287,000). (Financial Mail, Sept. 19, 1975)

A huge South Korean steel mill project will use $3.6 million worth of South African equipment. The exports were aided by the SA Government’s Industrial Development Corporation. South African trade with the Andean Group (Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) has jumped from the 1973 figure of R16.6 million ($19.2 million) to R36 million ($41.4 million) in 1974. (SAFTO, July, 1975)

Gold Fields of South Africa, which has several Brazilian subsidiaries, has acquired 34 per cent interest in a Brazilian iron ore company, Minas d’el Rey Dom Pedro SA. (Star, Nov. 8)

Such developments indicate South Africa’s greater concentration on the so called “Second XI” group of developed countries which include Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan. (Star, Nov. 8)

MINING PICTURE

The Northwestern Cape area is predicted to become “a major economic factor” in South Africa, possibly earning R1,000 m ($1,115 m) a year in foreign exchange through the export of minerals. Phelps-Dodge, an American company, has discovered copper-lead-zinc ore bodies; Newmont-Ookiep, Rio Tinto Zinc, and Johannesburg Consolidated Industries are also involved. Ultimate removal of the ground wealth depends on the creation of the transport and water supply infrastructures.

South Africa’s dependence on mineral exports was stressed at a conference of the Associated Scientific and Technical Societies held in September. Statistics show that despite the drop in earnings from copper and floor-spar, the value of metal exports were up some 23 per cent...
during the first half of 1975 over the previous year, and although the growth is not as great as before the international recession, earnings from minerals such as manganese, nickel, vanadium, zinc, asbestos, platinum and uranium were up. The devaluation of the South African rand (see Southern Africa, December, 1975) will also aid mineral export earnings with an expected R700 million ($805 m.) more per year because the sales will earn more in rands than previously. But the mines are also hit by problems of greater internal labor costs and the rise in the cost of imported goods. (Star, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 27, Oct. 4, Nov. 1, 1975)

Gold Hopes
A big part of the anticipated revenue from minerals depends on the future of gold and various South African officials are predicting optimistically that the current lower price of gold on the fluctuating world market will eventually be reversed, returning to a level above $170/ounce over the next 18 months. Even if the price drops to $130/ounce it is expected that of the R700 million more in minerals revenue, R500 million ($570 m.) will come from gold. The picture may not be so bright, as indicated by public reaction, the drop in the price of gold shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange by some 37 per cent since January 1975 and the decreasing revenues and profits to the gold mines themselves.

South Africa is promoting the sale of gold through many different channels, calling it a hedge against inflation. The South African Chamber of Mines marketing agency, Intergold, has mounted efforts to sell Kruggerands (1 troy ounce gold coin valued at the current gold price) in coin shops, banks and brokerage houses in the United States. The coin sold well in Europe and now with it legal for Americans to buy gold, South Africa hopes that despite a lag, Americans will join in the private gold fever. In September the South African Reserve Bank, South Africa’s rep to the IMF and the Chamber of Mines held a symposium on gold at New York’s Hotel Pierre. (Star, Johannesburg, Sept. 13, 27, Oct. 18, Nov. 1, 1975; San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, Nov. 2, 1975; Times, London, Oct. 14, 1975; Daily News, New York, Sept. 25, 1975; Scope, October, 1975). Anti-apartheid groups have called for people to boycott the sale of South African gold coins.

Overall predictions on gold and other minerals with economists’ and politicians’ interpretations of length of local and international inflation, internal revolutionary trends, and labor problems.

MORE REACTION TO ANTI-INFLATION PACT
The South African Government will spend R2 million ($2.3 million) to educate its public about anti-inflation measures. The measures, as agreed to by a coalition government, business and labor leaders (see Southern Africa, December, 1975), involve voluntary controls on wages and profits, along with all sorts of schemes to increase productivity.

The liberal press reflects the hope that some of the stress on greater productivity will become institutionalized. The Cape Times comments:

“Under the manifesto wages and prices are to be curbed, government spending pruned (at last), training boosted, married women given inducements to work, immigration stepped up; and there are signs of further breaches in the apartheid dike, in greater use of black labour and temporary arrangements to allow more blacks to come to the cities to work. There is a wise acceptance that the burden of wage restraint must not fall on those on or below the breadline.

On one point it is hoped that ideologists in the Government will finally get the message. This is the time when discriminatory practices and activities should be quietly mothballed. To have workmen painting Whites-only signs, bureaucrats pondering applications for all-race audiences, builders making separate entrances and police snooping around to discover multi-racial sex is a colossal waste of time, money and man-power. The country can no longer afford these idiocies. We hope their disappearance will be a by-product of the war on inflation.” (Cape Times, Oct. 8, 1975)

The Government has been forced by its anti-inflationary wage restraint to develop a “poverty guideline” wage figure. Officials deny that the figure (R125 month or $143) constitutes a poverty datum line, but it will be used as the minimum wage level in terms of the anti-inflationary
DEFENSE

SOUTH AFRICA IS AT WAR IN ANGOLA

To the accompaniment of increasingly hysterical anti-communist propaganda, South Africa is at war in Namibia and Angola. (For details on South African military operations in the former, see the Namibia section.) Were the entire situation not so critical, the thrust of this propaganda and the attempts to justify South African aggression would be ludicrous: South Africa, vindicating apartheid and racism by fighting side by side for “Africa for Africans” against the “Red Menace,” South Africa, at last showing its worth to the rest of the continent; South Africa, long the victim of unjust prejudice and hatred, taking up the standard of the West in the “East-West conflict” (a simultaneous simplification and escalation of the Angolan conflict that is apparently no less appealing to white South African fervor despite its incongruity with other projections.)

Although the U.S. press has been reluctant to deal with the subject, South African troops have been in Angola since early August of 1975. The initial pretext for an invasion involved the “protection” of Kunene River hydro-electric sites by South African troops. October saw further South African military incursions into Angola for the purpose of destroying SWAPO camps. “Hot pursuit” of SWAPO militants thus became an added pretext for military operations which, according to South African officials, might have to range up to 200 miles inside Angola. By the end of the month, there was considerable confusion in press reports as to whether a mercenary column or South African regular forces were actually engaged in the battles which were bringing about an abrupt change in the military balance and securing MPLA-held towns and districts for UNITA or FNLA. According to the most recent authoritative reports, a column of Angolan, Portuguese, South African, British and American mercenaries numbering about 2,000 men actually led the assaults, with FNLA/UNITA troops moving in behind. From around October 23, however, a half-regiment of South African regular forces numbering at least 1,000 men was also operating in Angola, equipped with some 36 armored cars, 125 Unimog trucks and armored personnel carriers, jeep-mounted recoilless rifles, mortars and automatic weapons. The column’s stated orders were to gather intelligence for a full-scale invasion. Helicopters accompanied the column for supply purposes, with American-made C 130’s being used for transporting heavy loads to troops deep inside the country.

In early December, the “disappearance” of a South African Air Force plane over Angola necessitated the first admission on the part of South Africa that its planes were flying missions there.

Around mid-November, the South African column already inside Angola was ordered to join and support the mercenary column and was told that a second unit of South African regulars—an armored unit—would be arriving to enter combat on behalf of anti-MPLA mercenary forces. Also a half regiment (1,000 to 1,500 men) of this unit is equipped with at least a dozen armored cars, 100 light tanks, up to 100 armored personnel carriers and trucks, recoilless rifles, mortars and atomic weapons.

As of early December, it was completely apparent that the military forces of apartheid, using Namibia as a staging ground, were deeply involved in war against the MPLA—involving with regular troops and supplying UNITA/FNLA and the mercenary column with arms, fuel, transport, logistic and intelligence information. The attempt to wipe out SWAPO forces in Namibia and southern Angola has been undertaken more or less simultaneously, while increased involvement of western powers, and in particular, of the US, is being courted vigorously.

Sources in Lusaka, Zambia, estimated that between 3,000 to 6,000 South African regular forces were engaged in the total military operation by late November, and that 3,000 to 4,000 additional troops were being prepared for an even greater escalation of the war, and for the increasing transformation—a direct result of South African involvement—of the Angolan conflict into a conventional war.

By mid-November, the South African press was describing the movements and attack routes of South African troops within Angola, and citing an ITN film report concerning an alleged meeting between UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and Prime Minister Vorster. In a response that tended to validate these same reports, the South African Government invoked powers under the Defence Act to ban all mention of the actual South African military presence in Angola in South African publications.
Speaking in a television interview, the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, called for co-operation between the countries of Southern Africa to “resist Russian communism.”

Mr. Botha said there were already signs among Southern African countries and other African states which showed clearly that there was an awakening to “the unasked for interference on the side of Russian communism.”

OGGENDBLAD, Pretoria (November 18) supports Defence Minister P.W. Botha’s appeal “that the West takes another look at South Africa.”

PRETORIA NEWS, Pretoria (November 17), urges that “all South Africans – Black and White – should be made aware of the issues and their consequences” in a situation which now has “all the elements for a bloody military showdown.”

BEELD, Johannesburg (November 18) warns that the United States will have to take decisive decisions if Russia is “aiming at a stranglehold” of “the Cape sea route.”

THE STAR, Johannesburg (November 17), fears an African Vietnam, in which South Africa “will be fighting alongside Africa, for Africa.”

Effectively muzzled in terms of the details of South Africa’s military involvement, the thrust of South African press reports remained unmistakable in its intent to gear the public for war, while official statements justifying South African aggression began to multiply. The propaganda is no less disquieting for its uncomfortably familiar ring. The South African images tend to be cruder and the underlying purpose more blatant than one has come to expect in the US press and typical official statements (whether one remembers the years spent justifying Vietnam or considers more recent attempts on the part of Kissinger to prepare Americans for more direct US intervention against the “Russian-backed” MPLA, “communist threat”); but the similarities are there. Examples, [see box:] taken from Comment and Opinion (Nov. 21, 1975) should suffice to give readers of Southern Africa a taste of the developing war psychosis and “savior” mentality present in South Africa, and, it is hoped, an acute consciousness of all signs and signals that US government and military officials are preparing the American public for an escalation of US involvement on the side of South Africa. In this regard, it must be noted that in the last weeks of November, the US carrier Independence was supplied with contingency orders to carry out air strikes over Angola should this be deemed necessary. The Atlantic Fleet carrier force in question was in the vicinity of the Azores as of late November, and the Independence has been supplied with Sidewinder missiles, napalm and anti-personnel fragmentation bombs. It carries 90 F-4 Phantom jets for delivering the missiles, napalm and fragmentation bombs within a 1200 mile range. (Confidential UN reports, Nov. 2 and 23, 1975; Observer, London, Nov. 16, 1975; New York Times, Dec. 2, 1975; Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1975; Guardian, London, Nov. 18, 1975)

ENRICHED URANIUM: A POTENT APARTHEID WEAPON

In recent months, white South Africa’s plans for its rich uranium deposits (the world’s second largest deposit, or 23 per cent of the world’s known supply) have surfaced to public view through a variety of sources, the most perceptive of which have noted the serious implications of South Africa’s emergence as a source of nuclear power in an energy-hungry world, (see this month’s feature) The U.S. played a key role in the early development of South Africa’s nuclear capacity and potential, having trained dozens of South African scientists at Oak Ridge and assisted in the building of South Africa’s first nuclear reactor (a U.S. design) at Pelindaba. In September last year, the role of West Germany—the Bonn Government, the state-owned Society for Nuclear Research, and the State-controlled STEAG company—in assisting apartheid in developing technology for a uranium enrichment process very similar to the German “Becker nozzle process” was exposed, to the acute embarrassment of the West German Government, by the African National Congress of South Africa. (ANC Pamphlet, “The Nuclear Conspiracy: FRG Collaborates to Strengthen Apartheid.”)

Formal announcement by the South African Government of plans to build a uranium enrichment plant capable of producing material for atomic weapons followed in November. Claiming that South African scientists had “invented” an enrichment method that is 40 per cent cheaper than that used in U.S. plants, South African Minister of Mines, Piet Koornhof, announced that the plant will be in operation by 1984.

Possession of a relatively inexpensive method for uranium enrichment plus an abundant supply of the necessary resource gives South Africa’s white minority regime a powerful double-edged sword. Atomic weapons, or the capability to produce them, both for use and sale is the more obvious edge of the sword. Less obvious, but more ominous in terms of power potential, is the extent to which the apartheid regime will henceforth be able to insinuate its coveted resource and technology into the growing energy requirements of the rest of the world. The U.S., to date in control of the enriched uranium market for electric power, will, by the 1980’s, have South Africa as a competitor in the field, and if the most conservative estimates of U.S. requirements prove correct, will need to buy enriched uranium from South Africa to fuel its own plants.

While disclaiming any intent to use its uranium as a political weapon, A.J.A. Roux, President of the South African Atomic Energy Board, admitted that in helping to relieve world energy problems, South Africa would “naturally . . . look at the countries friendly to South Africa in the first place.” (New York Times, Nov. 23, 1975) Two countries have already shown themselves ready to court South Africa in order to secure favorable terms for the purchase of South African uranium. Although the Bonn Government is still very touchy on the subject, South Africa’s first full-scale enrichment plant is to be built in cooperation with a West German firm. France may also join in, while Iran, which hopes to have 20 to 25 of its own atomic power plants in operation by the end of the century, is reported to be signing an agreement with South Africa for the purchase of 700 million to one billion dollars worth of uranium. Central to the agreement would be Iran’s part-ownership of the first South African enrichment plant, which is expected to cost
at least one billion dollars

Charges that NATO has been involved in the development of South Africa's nuclear capacity appear to be based primarily on information concerning the role of L.T. General Gunther Rall, a key figure in the West German-South African nuclear connection, who until his resignation under pressure last October, was also Bonn's representative on Nato's Military Committee. More generally, NATO's concern and contingency plans for the "protection of the Cape Route" makes it appear likely that the organization welcomes South African nuclear development, and may well have had a hand in it. The NATO powers are signatories of the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; South Africa is not, and is therefore not under the same formal restraints in terms of nuclear weapons production. It is difficult not to conclude that the NATO powers look upon this situation with considerable satisfaction.

FOREIGN POLICY

SOUTH AFRICA AND INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES

During the past year the South African regime's "detente" strategy has produced a mixed political reaction from the governments of the independent African states. Only a very few African governments, like the Ivory Coast—which is expected to open an embassy in Pretoria and has urged other African governments to do likewise—have openly deserted the cause of the South African liberation movement. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 25, 1975) Most African governments have come to realize that the Apartheid regime's policy of "detente"—the invitation to engage in "dialogue"—is a total ruse and a trap to coopt them into aiding the maintenance of the oppression of Black South Africans.

However, the Zambian government's policy toward the Apartheid regime raises the most questions. On the one hand, Zambia's Foreign Minister, Rupiah Banda stated before the UN General Assembly that "Zambia is committed to the total liberation of Africa. In the context of southern Africa, this means an end to the White minority and racist domination and the realisation of majority rule." In further clarification, Mr. Dunstan Kamana (a member of the Zambian UN delegation) told the UN Special Political Committee that "Zambia totally rejects such references [to "detente"] in so far as they relate to its [Zambia's] own contribution to the liberation of southern Africa. We have never engaged in any detente exercise with South Africa... Our contacts with South Africa in the last year have been limited to and have been only for the specific purpose of seeking a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia on the basis of majority rule." But, on the other hand, Zambia is not totally avoiding economic ties with South Africa. It has been reported that the Zambian government has agreed to accept a no interest loan (the actual amount has not yet been disclosed—from South Africa. The first repayment on this loan will not be due until fifteen years hence. There is speculation that this loan is a South African reward to Zambia, for Zambia's cooperation in the Rhodesian negotiations which have the objective of preventing the true liberation of the people of Zimbabwe. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 18, 1975; Times of Zambia, Lusaka, Oct. 15, 1975; WBAI, New York, Oct. 19, 1975) With regard to Zambian acceptance of South African fin-

nancial aid, it must be noted that South Africa does not limit its "detente" policy to diplomatic maneuvering alone, but always sweetens the trap with economic rewards.

Meanwhile other African leaders have maintained their opposition to the Apartheid system of South Africa. In early September, Presidents Nyere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique released a joint statement which said that "despite South Africa's muchvaunted detente policy, the Africans in South Africa continue to suffer the indignities of racial discrimination and to be denied all opportunities for human development and fulfillment... [and reaffirmed their] total moral, material and political support for South African national liberation movements in their struggle for a society free from racial discrimination and founded on human equality and dignity." (Financial Times, London, Sept. 10, 1975) The Kenyan Foreign Minister, Munyua Waiyaki stated before the UN General Assembly that "we reject dialogue because we strongly feel that it would grossly harm the struggle of the African people for self-determination, whilst bestowing the seal of recognition and respectability on the racist regime and the various policies of South Africa." Similar official positions were taken by other African governments, such as Botswana, Lesotho, Niger, and Senegal, on the issue of "dialogue" with South Africa. (Times of Zambia, Lusaka, Oct. 15, 1975; Zambian Daily Mail, Lusaka, Sept. 27, 1975; Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 18, 1975)

Analyzing the root causes of the 1974-75 South African "detente" campaign, Mr. Joseph Nhlanhla (of the African National Congress of South Africa) wrote that the "whole trick of so-called dialogue was the creation of the United States, British, and French imperialists... The imperialist investments in South Africa are more than the combined investments received by all African countries from the same sources. The main idea is to impose the Pretoria regime as a fait accompli and to use South Africa... to infiltrate and neo-colonise the continent... In this way they could... [weaken the OAU's] positive role in the anti-imperialist struggle. Now it is clear that the strategy of imperialism hangs on the acceptability of the Pretoria regime, as an independent African state interested in the solution of the continent[s'] problems... South Africa is not an independent state nor an African one as it is presently constituted. Politically South Africa considers itself an appendage of Europe. The so-called independence of the regime purportedly granted [by the British] was done... in the face of strong opposition and of over two and a half centuries of relentless armed struggle [of the African majority].... So by its very nature the South African regime is not African... How can South Africa be said to be independent when the majority of her people are slaves in their own country...?" (reprinted in African Agenda, Chicago, Aug-Sept, 1975)

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES

The South African Apartheid system's profitability as a market for Western goods and investments continues to determine Western policy toward South Africa. Upon welcoming South Africa's new Ambassador to France, Mr. Louis Piennar, the French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing stated that he favors increasing the trade ties of the United States, British, and French imperialists... The imperialist investments in South Africa are more than the combined investments received by all African countries from the same sources. The main idea is to impose the Pretoria regime as a fait accompli and to use South Africa... to infiltrate and neo-colonise the continent... In this way they could... [weaken the OAU's] positive role in the anti-imperialist struggle. Now it is clear that the strategy of imperialism hangs on the acceptability of the Pretoria regime, as an independent African state interested in the solution of the continent[s'] problems... South Africa is not an independent state nor an African one as it is presently constituted. Politically South Africa considers itself an appendage of Europe. The so-called independence of the regime purportedly granted [by the British] was done... in the face of strong opposition and of over two and a half centuries of relentless armed struggle [of the African majority].... So by its very nature the South African regime is not African... How can South Africa be said to be independent when the majority of her people are slaves in their own country...?" (reprinted in African Agenda, Chicago, Aug-Sept, 1975)
from the African National Congress, African governments, and Western anti-Apartheid movements, the Western Governments still refuse to prevent the export of entire nuclear energy plants to South Africa. It is not only the West Germans and the French who are involved in the nuclear power negotiations. A Dutch consortium is also bidding for the contract to supply South Africa with a 2000 Megawatt nuclear power station—a project which is reported to be worth $858.8 million. Meanwhile the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Max van der Stoel stated in Parliament that his Government’s policy is to keep open all channels of communication because his Government did not want to miss any opportunities provided by continued dialogue. (With the possibility of an $858.8 million contract, one does not need to guess the kind of “opportunities” to which he was referring.) Additionally there are reports that a Japanese company, Sumitomo Electric Industries will be building a nuclear power station in South Africa. The company denies the report. (Star, Johannesburg, Oct. 25, Nov. 1, 18, 1975; Tanzanian Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 25, 1975)

The South African rulers are not satisfied with the current level of Western investment. Desiring to encourage an increase in such investment, private and governmental delegations have visited various Western countries. In late October and early November, a delegation of four Nationalist Party Members of Parliament visited Great Britain with the objective of stimulating greater British investment in Apartheid. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief Minister of the KwaZulu “Bantustan”—fulfilling his role as the Apartheid regime’s African puppet—spent three weeks in Canada on a tour sponsored by the Anglican Church. While in Canada, Buthelezi stressed his usual theme, the need for Western investment in the “Bantustan” areas—that is, increased complicity in the oppression of the Africans of South Africa. A delegation from the South Africa Foundation consisting of Dr. Jan S. Marais (the Foundation’s President), Mr. Sandy Wagner (Dr. Marais’ assistant) and Mr. John H. Chettle (the Foundation’s Director for North and South America) was in Washington D.C., where they met with senior officials of the State and Defense Departments, the editorial boards of the New York Times, Washington Post, Time, and Newsweek, leaders of the AFL-CIO, and members of the Senate and House of Representatives. In all these meetings, the delegation emphasized that the South African regime requires U.S. assistance if the strategy of “detente” were to succeed, the desirability of increased economic investments, and South Africa’s “strategic” position in the Cape route. (Star, Johannesburg, Nov. 1, 1975; South Africa Foundation News, Oct., 1975)

namibia

THE WAR

Namibia has become the corridor to and staging area for South Africa’s intervention in the war in Angola. Charges of South African involvement in Angola leveled by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA, which now has established the Peoples Republic of Angola based in the capital city of Luanda) have been confirmed by a number of Western newsmen. Reuters correspondent Fred Bridgland, wiring from Lobito, Angola, reported: “I have spoken to white soldiers with South African accents in armoured cars hundreds of miles north of Angola’s border with the South African administered territory of South West Africa” (Sunday Times, London, Nov. 16, 1975).

An Associated Press wirephoto of November 14 (which was printed in the November 15 New York Times) is captioned: “This shot of white troops alongside a Panhard armoured car near Lobito, Angola, was snatched by a London ITN TV camera crew, who were told they could not film. ITN’s Michael Nicholson reported yesterday that white troops with South African accents were fighting alongside UNITA troops in Angola. He said ‘We had no definite proof that they were regular white South African soldiers. But we now have confirmation that the South African army has a base camp at a town called Sa da Bandeira, which is south of here, but over 250 miles inside Angola’ (from Namibia, ed. note).

David Martin cables: “Here in Lusaka there is increasing evidence that the South Africans sweeping north from Namibia since 23 October are regular members of the South African armed forces...the view in Lusaka is that the logistical support the column is receiving could come only from South Africa. Other evidence, both from eye-witnesses and through diplomatic channels, supports the view that the troops are South African regulars” (Observer, London, Nov. 23, 1975).

The New York Times of November 22 prints a Reuters dispatch from Lusaka which says: “Informed diplomatic sources said here today that South African regular troops were fighting many hundreds of miles inside Angola (again, from Namibia, ed. note) in response to a build-up of Soviet arms worth at least $110 million within the last 12 months...The information, which came from a number of sources, said South Africa’s reluctance to admit its participation in the Angolan war stemmed from high-level divisions of opinion in South Africa on the extent to which it should involve itself in the Angolan crisis. At the moment, officials favoring South African military involvement are winning the day.”

David Ottaway of the Washington Post writes from Johannesburg: “It is already public knowledge here that South African security forces are being bolstered all along the Namibian-Angolan border, that regular South African Airways planes are being used to ferry troops to bases in northern Namibia and that some units and officers have been put on standby alert” (Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1975). Ottaway says sources in Lusaka estimate from 2,500 and 6,000 South Africans are taking part in supporting both FNLA and UNITA in Angola and in fighting troops of the South West Africa People’s Organization of Namibia (SWAPO). “In addition, these sources believe an additional 3,000 to 4,000 troops are being readied to intervene in Angola.”

The American correspondent refers to a front-page story in the Afrikaans newspaper Die Burger “official mouthpiece of the ruling National Party. The newspaper said that South African defense forces had launched a major assault of guerrillas of SWAPO in the southeastern region of Angola and that the struggle against the
Namibian nationalists would escalate to the extent that SWAPO 'tries to merge its struggle' with the Soviet-backed Popular Movement in Angola.'

Ottaway filed a story from Lusaka (Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1975) saying there was speculation in the Zambian capital about a South Africa-Zambia 'deal' to suppress SWAPO activities. He says that reports from Angola "say the South African army is taking full advantage of its involvement in the civil war there to search out and destroy SWAPO camps throughout an area nearly a hundred miles deep into southern Angola and stretching all the way from the Atlantic ocean to the Zambian border." Sources close to SWAPO here say the South Africans have even rounded up 500 to 600 Namibians living as far north in Angola as Nova Lisboa and Porto Silva and have taken them back to Namibia. While the exact nature of South African operations against SWAPO guerrillas is not known, Pretoria has announced the deaths in the past month of 11 South African officers and soldiers in clashes with Namibian nationalists.

Namibia's English-language newspaper, the Windhoek Advertiser, of November 19, reports that South African Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller, speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London said it was no secret that South African troops and aircraft were at present in Angola—to guard units of the Cunene River dam, a hydro-electric development agreed upon by Pretoria and the former Portuguese colonial regime. (See Southern Africa, October, 1975).

"Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha confirmed tonight that South Africa had troops inside Angola, but denied they were supporting troops opposed to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. He said in a statement issued in Pretoria: 'I do not know who is advising the different movements in Angola or who is providing them with logistical support. We are advising ourselves and providing our own forces with logistical support... He did not say precisely where the South African forces were in Angola" (New York Times, Nov. 29, 1975).

Pieter Botha, South African Minister of Defense

(In the same issue, on the same page, of The Times, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is quoted as saying at a Washington news conference: "To the best of my knowledge, the South Africans are not engaged officially.")

**GEHEIMPROJEKT "TURSWVELLE"**

Secret project "Threshold", reports the October 27, 1975 issue of the German magazine Der Spiegel, is a military base the South African regime is hurriedly developing in the northern part of occupied Namibia. The joint army-air force installation is located at Grootfontein, some 240 km below the border with Angola.

For years SWAPO has warned of South Africa's military buildup in Namibia, especially at Grootfontein. Grootfontein was the site of a camp for recent refugees fleeing the war in central and southern Angola and there were repeated reports of active recruiting going on there, of former Portuguese army men. Grootfontein was certainly the staging area for the mercenary combat group which swept into Angola and drove up the Atlantic coast above the port city of Lobito.

"Threshold" ('"Turschwelle" in German, '"Drumpel" in Afrikaans) now comprises airplane hangars, storage depots, an air force headquarters and a transportation complex for the 16th Support Command, says Der Spiegel. Under construction are living quarters, gasoline storage tanks, fire fighting station, a cinema, sports fields and kitchen facilities for white and black personnel and their dependants. There will be a communications system and a railway spur. Altogether the base will consist of 152 buildings as well as covered shelters for mobile weapons and other war materiel. Threshold is due to be completed in February 1976.

Der Spiegel says: "The project is a clear violation of the mandate of 1920, which the United Nations has revoked but which South Africa still considers in force. The agreement explicitly states that in South West Africa 'no military or naval bases or fortifications may be erected'."

**MILITARY MATTERS**

The Windhoek Advertiser of November 26 reports rumors that "the massive Grootfontein airport project, one of the largest of its kind on the African continent, is to be scrapped. As the shadow of the Angolan menace looms larger over South West Africa, this project could constitute a bastion...". A puzzling story, particularly since South African and Namibian newspapers are crowded with war news and troop movements. The Advertiser has for two weeks carried photos of troop convoys heading north, soldiers crowding trains, a mysterious South African Airways 707 paused at the local airport. A former Windhoek trooper was reported "shot in the border area" and another said to be wounded; eleven members of the South African security force were stated to have been killed "in the border operation area this month" (Advertiser, Windhoek, Nov. 28, 1975). There has been a great deal of restiveness amongst the South African and Namibian press over Defence Act restrictions in reporting on the war and military movements.

**"CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE"**

The South African sponsored 'constitutional conference' adjourned its second session on November 14 after a five day meeting (Advertiser, Windhoek, Nov. 17, 1975). Committees will continue to work on housing, public amenities, welfare services and education, and report back to the next plenary scheduled to begin March 2, 1976. Another committee, on "political advancement", was postponed. In some intra-white political hatcheting, Dirk
Mudge, head of the white delegation to the 11 “ethnic group” conference, was replaced by A.H. du Plessis, leader of the National Party of South West Africa, who resigned from the South African cabinet in order to toughen up the white contingent.

“SANITIZING” THE BORDER

“Good progress was being made with the removal of squatters from the border area between the northern homelands in South West Africa and Angola where an area of no-man’s land between five and six kilometres would be established” (Advertiser, Windhoek, Nov. 18, 1975). The South African occupation official interviewed said a commission would investigate the removal of “more permanent” inhabitants. This follows an October announcement that all people would be cleared along a 250 km frontier security zone. (Southern Africa, December, 1975)

TRIAL

AFRICA NEWS reports eight men were brought to trial December 1 in Windhoek charged with violations of South Africa’s Terrorism Act. Their names are not yet known. The Windhoek Advertiser reported on November 20 that 30 African political prisoners were to be flown into Windhoek that day, under strong security guard, for interviews with Erwin Griswold, former Solicitor General of the United States, who had been sent out to South Africa and Namibia by the Lutheran World Federation. The latest certain news from sources list 29 names of Namibian detainees known to be held by the South African police. Most of the prisoners are Lutherans. The Southern African News Agency, an association of freelance journalists, reports nine nurses from Engela, near Oshikango close to the Angola border were arrested in late October.

Pastor Zephania Kameeta, principal of the Lutheran Paulinum Theological College at Otjimbingwe, Namibia, has written a pastoral letter which is being given worldwide distribution. He was recently detained under the Terrorism Act while an ill man; he has since been released. He says: “The struggle in our land has not only to do with the liberation of Namibia, but it goes further and deeper than that. The presence of the South African Government is not just a political question, but it is a threat to the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Thus I see it as the task of every Christian to work for the knocking down of this government. In this country which claims to be Christian you can be a Christian ten thousand times over, but if you are not white you are treated like a dog.”

zimbabwe

EDSON SITHOLE DETAINED

African National Council Publicity Secretary, Edson Sithole, who was reportedly kidnapped last month is being held by Rhodesian security forces. ANC President, Abel Muzorewa, said that Sithole has been tortured and that he has been on a hunger strike since his arrest, fearing that he might be poisoned. Sithole was last seen being bundled into the back of a van in Salisbury on October 15. Muzorewa said that ANC supporters saw Sithole in a police station, although Rhodesian authorities deny that he is being held. (Guardian, London, Nov. 3, 1975; Tanzania Daily News, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 2, 1975)

U.S. MERCENARIES REPORT EXPERIENCES

The Christian Science Monitor carried a special interview with Frank A Sweeney, Jr., a college graduate and Vietnam veteran who spent three years as a mercenary in Rhodesia. Sweeney is one of the estimated 50 to 400 Americans who have gone to Rhodesia to “fight communism,” for adventure, for the money, or simply for a job.

Sweeney was a corporal, earning $900 a month. His travel was paid by the Rhodesian government. He said that his detachment took many prisoners, most of whom were court-martialed. Others, alleged to have committed atrocities against the local population were less fortunate. “We shot ’em right there in the bush...” Sweeney said.

Back in the U.S., Sweeney is enthusiastically recruiting for Rhodesia’s security forces. Such mercenaries are a source of great embarrassment to the U.S. Government. Officially, Washington strongly disapproves of Americans serving in the armed forces of the illegal Rhodesian government; but it claims that it lacks specific evidence necessary to take legal action against the soldiers. (Christian Science Monitor, Boston, Nov. 18, 1975)

MUGABE SUPPORTERS SPEAK OUT

A group of guerrillas training in Tanzania has issued a document criticizing the leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa in the ANC. They call them ineffective and have asked the Organization of African Unity and the governments of Tanzania and Mozambique...
to give them the arms and weapons which the Chinese have sent for use in the liberation struggle. The signers of the document say they will take orders only from Robert Mugabe, who is now in Mozambique working with guerrilla cadres. Mugabe has been associated with the ZANU faction in the ANC, but he has stayed somewhat aloof from the current Nkomo/Muzorewa split. (Africa News, Nov. 3, 1975)

NKOMO-SMITH TALKS
Preliminary discussions on constitutional issues were described as “fruitful” by representatives of the Rhodesian government and delegates of Joshua Nkomo’s segment of the African National Council, who met in Salisbury on October 31. These were the first talks held since the ANC split in September, leaving one group under the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa and the other under Nkomo. (See Southern Africa, October, 1975)
The Rhodesian delegation included Ian Smith and several ministers. Nkomo led his group which included Josiah Chinamano, vice president; Aristone Chambati, deputy secretary general; and Willie Masururwa, publicity secretary of the Nkomo ANC faction.
The talks were denounced as “useless” by Bishop Muzorewa, who is now staying in Lusaka. Supporters of the Muzorewa-Sithole segment of the ANC held a rally in late October in Salisbury a few days prior to the Smith/Nkomo talks, attracting over 35,000 people. This show of strength was to reaffirm support for Muzorewa and Sithole within Zimbabwe after Nkomo had called a meeting which elected him leader of the ANC.
Nkomo’s meeting with Smith was held five days after Nkomo’s trip to Zambia to talk with President Kaunda and after Smith had flown to Pretoria to talk with Prime Minister Vorster. These conversations undoubtedly reflected renewed interest in a joint initiative on the part of Kaunda and Vorster to resolve the Rhodesian deadlock created in part by heretofore unsuccessful, unrealistic and divisive “settlement” talks forced upon Zimbabwe nationalists and the Smith regime. Nkomo refused to comment on whether he and Kaunda discussed the ANC split and whether Kaunda gave any indication of recognizing him as leader of the ANC, Nkomo said both he and Kaunda agree that nothing short of majority rule is acceptable in Zimbabwe.
Nkomo commented on what he meant by majority rule: “When I say majority rule now, I mean we want basic human rights for our people who are here.” Nkomo is calling for a transitional government lasting “a matter of months,” not a number of years.
Smith said on nation-wide television that Nkomo’s call for black majority rule need not be taken too seriously.

angola

Mozambique recognized the People’s Republic of Angola immediately. Marcelino dos Santos seen with Agostinho Neto

NOVEMBER 11th—INDEPENDENCE FOR ANGOLA
“Our movement will take Luanda before November 11th”, Holden Roberto, President of FNLA, told reporters just weeks before Angola became independent and Luanda, its capital, remained firmly under MPLA control. (Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris, November 16, 1975) Although Portugal did not formally turn over power to any one of the nationalist movements, just days before the November 11 date for independence, the Portuguese High Commissioner in Angola re-activated the Presidential Council of the defunct Transitional Government when an MPLA President was presiding. When the Portuguese handed over state power to what it termed the “organs of state”, it was in fact weakly legitimizing an MPLA government which took power and has proclaimed the People’s Republic of Angola with Dr. Agostinho Neto installed as President. (Africa News, Nov. 3, 1975)

On November 9, two days prior to independence, MPLA President Neto travelled to Lourenco Marques to meet with leaders of FRELIMO, PAIGC and MLSTP of Sao Tome and Principe. Neto received a tumultuous welcome in the Mozambican capital. In the meeting, the leadership of the former Portuguese colonies expressed their solidarity with the MPLA and discussed the difficult situation facing Angola just prior to independence. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 9, 1975)

Portuguese withdrawal from its first and last African colony took place ahead of schedule with a minimum of fanfare. The last Portuguese High Commissioner, Admiral Leonel Cardoso, presided at the simple ceremony which lowered the Portuguese flag for the last time at the 16th century fort of Sao Miguel 12 hours ahead of schedule at noon on November 10. Cardoso said in his final statement that Portugal was ceding independence to the people of Angola who “in the long course of battle against colonial domination have proven their desire for liberty”. Cardoso, a liberal in the Portuguese political spectrum, had replaced pro-MPLA Rosa Coutinho. In his remarks he was careful not to mention any of the national liberation movements
Admiral Leonel Cardoso ceding independence: “their desire for liberty proven.”

by name, but lamented the failure by the O.A.U. and the U.N. to bring about any settlement or coalition government prior to independence. *(New York Times, Nov. 11, 1975)* The issue of how Angolan independence was to come about caused sharp division between moderates and leftists within the Portuguese ruling establishment. There were even rumors of a left-wing coup in Portugal that would cede power to the MPLA on November 11.

Throughout the evening of the 10th of November MPLA independence celebrations were held at the First of May soccer field in the heart of Luanda. A crowd, estimated to be between 15-20,000 cheered as members of MPLA’s Women’s Battalion, the Pioneers and other MPLA mass organizations performed in preparation for the proclamation of Angolan independence at midnight. At midnight, the new Angolan flag was raised—incorporating the sign of a cog-wheel and machete against the red and black MPLA colors. Fireworks were set off and MPLA shooting displays marked the celebration which continued into the early hours of the morning. After the raising of the flag, Dr. Neto, now President of the People’s Republic of Angola, took charge of the ceremony and began to outline the new government’s internal and foreign policy.

The first priority, he said, would be to “expel the mercenaries from South Africa, Zaire and the Portuguese fascists who are fighting with them”, and then to unite Angola from the southernmost province of Cuando to Cabinda in the north. He called on the people of Angola to prepare themselves for the revolutionary struggle against the forces of “international imperialism” invading the country.

Neto went on to outline the basic principles of the new government of the People’s Republic of Angola which include: 1) MPLA control of the state political apparatus; 2) worker self-management in industry; 3) priority given to agricultural development; 4) non-alignment in foreign policy. The MPLA mass organizations of workers, peasants, women and youth will form the basis for administration of state programs, once peace is restored. *(New York Times, Nov. 12, 1975; Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1975)* MPLA has indicated to the OAU Conciliation Commission working on Angola that it intends to create a government of national union, once the invaders are repulsed from Angola, that would include non-MPLA personalities who have “shown in the past patriotism and competence”. *(Tanzania Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 14, 1975)*

Over 60 states accepted the MPLA invitation to the November 11 independence celebrations. Forty-four African nations, 13 Socialist and three western European countries agreed to attend. *(Tanzania Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 7, 1975)* According to reports in the western press approximately 20 delegates were actually present at the independence celebrations *(Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1975)*. In general, western press accounts have focused on the “chaotic and ill-prepared” take-over of power, and a New York Times editorial proclaimed the newly independent Angola as the country “Least Likely to Succeed.” *(New York Times, Nov. 10, 1975)* MPLA has ousted reporters from two Portuguese news agencies and from the British Reuters News Service for falsely inventing a story of an assassination attempt on the life of President Neto on Nov. 11. *(New York Times, Nov. 16, 1975)* This irresponsible news reporting was viewed by MPLA as disruptive and directed against the new republic.

At the time of writing more than 25 nations have recognized the People’s Republic of Angola with several committed to military aid for the immediate crisis and others offering developmental aid.

MPLA Women’s Battalion

"HUAMBO" GOVERNMENT FORMED

For some years FNLA and UNITA have fought each other in the rivalry between the Angolan liberations movements, but in the period immediately preceding Angolan independence a treacherous and no doubt highly tenuous alliance has been formed between them. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, who broke away from FNLA and Roberto in 1967, has not only come to terms with FNLA
and Zaire, but with forces of reaction, including South Africa and former Portuguese fascists, who are presently waging a conventional war to attempt to remove MPLA from state power.

On November 11, the FNLA backed by China and Zaire, and the pro-western UNITA announced the joint formation of a "Democratic People's Republic of Angola", using a progressive name to disguise their reactionary politics. The announcement was made in Kinshasa, Zaire. "Independence" celebrations were also held and a 24 member "National Revolutionary Council" was formed. An interim capital located at Novo Lisboa (the name has been changed by FNLA-UNITA to Huambo, its name before the Portuguese changed it in 1928) was announced. Novo Lisboa has been a stronghold of UNITA. The largest town controlled by FNLA, Carmona, was not selected possibly because of the recent MPLA offensive in the north, while FNLA-UNITA mercenary activity has picked up in the central and southern regions.

Presumably Zaire has recognized the "Huambo" government, although no official reports yet confirm this. At this writing no other country has extended official diplomatic recognition to the FNLA-UNITA coalition government.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Within two weeks of the emergence of the People's Republic of Angola, more than 25 nations have recognized the new government. First to recognize the independent regime was the Soviet Union, and a Soviet Embassy has been opened in Luanda. A number of progressive African countries have so recognized the MPLA government including all of the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, along with Guinea Conakry, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Togo and Gabon. A number of European Socialist countries have recognized including Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Sweden is alone among Western European countries; Iraq and Syria in the Middle East; Cuba and Brazil in Latin America; and Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Republic of South Vietnam and Democratic People's Republic of Korea are among the non-African nations to recognize. (Daily World, New York, Nov. 16, 1975; Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 15, 1975) Conspicuously absent from the socialist camp was recognition from the People's Republic of China, but with China's support of FNLA this is unlikely. However China has not yet officially recognized the FNLA-UNITA government either. [Ed. Note: China has since officially withdrawn its support of FNLA].

The enigmatic Idi Amin, currently serving on a rotation as Chairman of the OAU, sharply criticized the Soviet Union for its "intervention in Angolan politics." Chairman Amin neglected to mention the considerable "intervention" of the U.S. through its chief central African ally, General Mobutu, or the "intervention" of the Chinese as supporters of FNLA, or the invasion of Angola by South African troops. The Soviet Union, whose aid to Uganda has increased since Amin's government turned from its Zionist and British backers, reacted to the criticism by temporarily suspending diplomatic relations with Uganda. In a matter of hours Amin withdrew his threat to retaliate by severing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union saying that he merely wanted a new Soviet Ambassador in Uganda. Zaire also threatened to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union after it reportedly received critical diplomatic notes on Zaire's involvement in Angola.

Meanwhile President Sekou Toure of Guinea (Conakry) has called for the resignation of Idi Amin as Chairman of the O.A.U. because of his refusal to recognize independent Angola under MPLA. Similar messages were broadcast over Conakry radio in Guinea referring to Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda and Zambia who have also failed to recognize P.R.A. (Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 13, 1975; New York Times Oct. 31 and Nov. 13, 1975) President Toure said that Africa is clearly drawn up into two camps, one supporting MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola, and the other lined up behind imperialism led by Idi Amin. Strong support for the People's Republic of Angola has been openly proclaimed by President Marien Ngouabi (Congo-Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of the Congo, who has been landing arms in his country for transport to MPLA bases inside Angola.

In a separate action the OAU has censured Daniel Chipenda, Vice-President of FNLA, for accepting South African aid, and UNITA's use of South African troops is presently under investigation.

MILITARY UPDATE

In Luanda the slogan "A Luta Armanda Continua" (the armed struggle continues) is written on walls and windows and reminds Angolans that only the first phase of the national liberation process, the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, has been won. The current phase, the struggle between progressive and reactionary nationalist forces within the country has taken on more serious proportions since the Portuguese intention to withdraw became apparent after April 1974. More Angolans have died in the last year's fighting between the rival movements than in all the years of the anti-colonial war. Now with South African regular forces, Portuguese and Zairian mercenaries fighting a conventional war against the Angolan People's Republic, more are perishing at the hands of an invading force. The MPLA has called up all men between the ages of 18 and 35 to combat the foreign invasion.

MPLA would be in a far stronger position to consolidate its power throughout Angola were it not for the factor of large numbers of South African and Zairian troops, aided by former Portuguese fascist elements, now calling themselves the Portuguese Liberation Army (ELP). (Observer, London, Nov. 2, 1975) The presence of South African troops, rumored only two months ago, has been confirmed by the non-partisan O.A.U. Angolan Peace Commission and by a British film crew which has photographed the mercenaries. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Oct. 26, 1975) Neto has charged that in some areas of Angola the MPLA is fighting only mercenaries. (Africa News, Nov. 6, 1975)

Summary of Military Reports from the Central and Southern Regions

Late in October, just weeks before the date of Angolan independence, the mercenary army heavily supplied by the South African military began its systematic advance into southern Angola. The mercenaries, South Africans and Portuguese ELP fighters, were accompanied by Daniel Chipenda's force and other FNLA regulars as well as UNITA troops. The column swept across the Angolan border from Namibia and took the town of Periera de Eca. The column is said to be led by officers of the right-wing Portuguese Liberation Army. From there the column, numbering between 1500-2000 men, swung north
and took the town of Sa Da Bandiera. The column then divided—part headed west to take the town of Macamedes and part headed north to capture the town of Quilengues. The FNLA-UNITA-Mercenary army met little resistance from the MPLA whose troop strength concentration is in the north. Macamedes, for example, was defended by only 100 MPLA soldiers. (Observer, London, Nov. 2, 1975)

According to one western reporter on the scene, these towns can be taken or re-captured using limited forces, and an MPLA counter-offensive can not be ruled out.

The column, termed the “international brigade of fascists” by the MPLA, then advanced to the key port towns of Benguela and Lobito. After heavy fighting the towns were captured by the combined FNLA/UNITA force aided by the mercenaries. At about the same time (early November) MPLA reported that it had repulsed an attempt by South African, Belgian, Brazilian and Zairian troops to march into Cabinda. (Times of Zambia, Lusaka, Oct. 26, 1975) The advance of the column continued after Angolan independence and the town of Novo Redondo, 225 miles south of Luanda, was captured, and the capital city’s main source of electric power at Cambembe Dam 125 miles south of Luanda was feared in jeopardy.

Most recently: FNLA/UNITA claimed to have captured Malange, 265 miles east of Luanda. (Providence Journal-Bulletin, Nov. 16; Nov. 22, 1975) This column, spearheaded by 64 combat vehicles from the U.S., in two weeks cut a swath of 625 miles into southern Angola capturing towns and ports only weakly held by MPLA. Some analysts believe that MPLA’s counter-offensive will occur soon and that its strategy has been to draw the mercenary army deep into Angola leaving them far from safe rear areas.

Summary of Reports from the North

In the north the MPLA has maintained control of Luanda and kept back FNLA attacks intended to seize the city before independence. MPLA has scored some advances in the north as well. Just prior to independence MPLA announced that it had captured Quibaxe and Piri, two towns midway between Luanda and the northern FNLA supply at Carmona. This drive advanced MPLA’s position into traditional strongholds of the FNLA.

Meanwhile Cabinda remained quiet, but it is felt that the oil-rich enclave will not remain so for long. Zaire announced that it had sent troops to the Cabindan border and a FLEC army of some 2000 is believed to be planning an invasion. (Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1975) President Ngouabi of Congo has announced that his troops would assist in the defense of Cabinda if foreign mercenaries invade the enclave. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar Es Salaam, Nov. 5, 1975)

The MPLA is disturbed by the fact that Gulf Oil Co. is moving its headquarters from Luanda to Cabinda in anticipation of the enclave becoming independent. Mobutu’s designs on the enclave are well-known, and Mobutu has claimed that Cabinda is not part of Angola.

ASSISTANCE BY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO MPLA-PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Times have changed since the CIA-backed mercenaries intervened in the Congo in 1961. With the heavy involvement of South African troops, the Portuguese fascist ELP and African troops on the side of reaction, the response of the socialist camp has been to step up aid to prevent another Congo. Mozambique is reported to have sent 250 troops from FRELIMO’s ranks; Cuba is reported to have sent an estimated 1000-1500 fighting men and advisers to aid MPLA; and the Soviet Union reportedly had 400 military advisers in Angola. Guinea Bisseu may also send troops, according to sources close to MPLA. (Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1975)

The Soviet presence is consciously held down. The MPLA reportedly has turned down an offer of a major arms-lift because Soviet military personnel would be operating out of Luanda airport. Direct Soviet involvement has not been requested, as has assistance from socialist African countries and other progressive, non-African countries. In the case of Cuba, it is appropriate to remember at this time the links between Angola and Cuba via the Atlantic Slave trade. The Cubans are thought to be aiding MPLA troops on the northern warfront, in Cabinda, in several eastern towns and in the coastal towns of Port Amboim and Benguela. (Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1975)

In a communique issued in Lusaka, UNITA claims to have captured 20 Russians and 35 Cubans in a battle in November for the town of Malange. At this writing there is no independent confirmation of this report. (Providence Evening Bulletin, Nov. 22, 1975)

“The war of resistance would go on for many years”, said Lopo da Nascimiento, Prime Minister of People’s Republic of Angola. “Our cities may be destroyed, our comrades will die, but we will never let ourselves be compromised by imperialism or neocolonialism”. MPLA has been prepared since it began armed struggle in 1963 for a protracted war until Angola is truly independent. “A Luta Armanda continua”

the struggle continues

MOZAMBIQUE

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

A new organization has been created in Mozambique to ensure that power remains in the hands of the peasants and workers. The People’s National Security Service will work in close cooperation with Frelimo and the Mozambican People’s Liberation Forces (FPLM) and is answerable directly to the president. It will promote and defend national independence and unity, discourage tribalism, regionalism and racism. The new security organization will attempt to safeguard the people against oppression and all forms of exploitation. The People’s National Security Service will also work with police organizations of other countries in the fight against crime and help the Immigration Department in the control of foreigners entering the country. In addition it will help develop the political consciousness of the people with the aim of enabling them to understand the interests of the nation. (Daily News;
On August 3, 1975 a solemn commemoration was held in Bissau at the Piliguitu docks where the Portuguese had shot down fifty striking dockworkers in 1959. This event marked the turning point in the program and ideology of PAIGC, from focussing on organizing workers in the towns and peaceful demonstrations, to the goal of armed struggle and total revolution. More festive events were held in late September at the Second anniversary parade of national independence. The parade included tanks, armored personnel carriers, missile-launching vehicles, and helicopters. This equipment was much more sophisticated than last year’s parade. It is considered to be an effort to reduce the size of the armed forces while keeping up high military strength. (AFP, Paris, Oct. 3, 1975)

President Luis Cabral noted that the national priorities are planning and economic development and while “we have started at zero, and need everything, we are optimistic”. Top concerns are:

- achieving the goal of national unity
- increase in agricultural production
- re-integration of people who supported colonialism
- encouragement of people to return to their farms
- preservation and development of social and cultural achievements as in the liberated areas during the war years
- move toward the 1976 elections for the National Assembly

Elsewhere low production and a balance of trade deficit have been noted as chief problems which should soon be overcome as both old and new lands are put into production. Fishing and agriculture hold the greatest promise in the immediate future for economic development. All major land holdings have been nationalized and the “credit” system for workers has been abolished. Unemployment still remains a problem for those who were linked to war-service industries. While the import of basic foodstuffs falls under national control the two large Portuguese monopolies are cooperating with Guinea-Bissau and have not been nationalized. (Christian Science Monitor. Oct. 3, 1975)

Visitors to Guinea-Bissau have lately included the Nigerian patrol boat, NNS Hadeela which paid a friendship call to Bissau. (West Africa, Lagos, Oct. 6, 1975) The regional delegate of the International Red Cross also stopped in Bissau from October 15-19 as the first visit by a member of his organization. Talks were held about founding a Guinean Red Cross Society. (Red Cross Information Notes, Geneva, Oct. 29, 1975)

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Elements to the right of the PAIGC have been problematical for the Bissau government. Some rightist opposition has been reported by President Cabral. (Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, Sept. 24, 1975) A report from Lisbon states that the government of Senegal has arrested 23 Guineans in the southern Casamance region for plotting against the PAIGC. Included among those arrested were eleven former Portuguese soldiers who are charged with planning to set up a clandestine guerrilla network. (Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, Sept. 28, 1975) In Bissau several dozen political prisoners on the right were given amnesty on the first anniversary of the Portuguese withdrawal. These prisoners had been arrested between April and October of 1974 after being charged with collaboration with the enemy. Those charged with war profiteering or capital crimes are still being held. (AFP, Paris, Nov. 1, 1975)
situation is still termed “disastrous” and “economically bankrupt” with an “alarming population exodus”, a “make-believe” economy, and little investment. (Gramma, Havana, Oct. 12, 1975)

The International airport at Cape Verde’s Sal Island was renamed the Amilcar Cabral International Airport on September 13, 1975, the 51st birthday of the man who founded and led the PAIGC until his assassination in January 1973 by agents of Portuguese fascism. (Jornal de Angola, Luanda, Sept. 27, 1975)

Luis Cabral

ON THE FOREIGN FRONT
President Cabral has denounced the foreign intervention in Angola and has called upon all African states to recognize the government of the MPLA as his country has already done. (AFP, Paris, Oct. 3, 1975) Relations with Algeria have expanded further with the creation of GUIALP, the Algerian-Guinean Fishing Company, which will be based in Bissau under 51% Guinean capital. The agreement may be renewed in six years (West Africa, Lagos, Sept. 15, 1975) President Cabral has travelled to Libya to thank the government for its support during the war and strengthen cooperation through agreements in the following four areas: culture, vocational training, joint agricultural ventures, and a fishing company. (Tripoli Radio, 1730 gmt, Sept. 5, 1975)

CAPE VERDE

ON THE ISLANDS
The Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cape Verde, Abilio Duarte, has recently concluded talks in Havana, Cuba where full diplomatic relations have already been established. While there, comrade Duarte called for support of Angola “without neo-colonialist infiltration”. On other matters he commented that there are already many aspects of unity between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, its sister Republic. There were strong links forged during the period of armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism when Cape Verdeans fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Guineans. Moreover unity functions through the existence of the same ruling party in both nations. Joint citizenship is granted to those born in either nation. Finally there is joint leadership and a common foreign policy.

Duarte noted that “austerity” and “food production” remain the guiding principles of the Cape Verde government. However the search for assistance will not be permitted to “limit our self-determination” and “sovereignty”. Despite the improvement of the economic conditions resulting from good rains this season, the

CAPE VERDEANS IN NEW ENGLAND
The large Cape Verden population in south-eastern New England has become divided over the events on the Islands. The Cape Verden, an English-language monthly newspaper has been particularly vicious and slanderous in its campaign of misinformation about the conditions in the islands. A recent issue stated that “the PAIGC hates Americans, but lose our money” and that the “nation of Cabo Verde is a NATZI Police state and through TCHUBA (an American-Cape Verden support committee), and other newspapers wish to infiltrate the Cape Verden Communities throughout the USA to gain support for their Communist Aims”. If this red-baiting were not enough, the author concludes that Africans of Guinea Bissau are being sent “to Cabo Verde to assimilate the different races into one group”. Evidently the history of the people of the archipelago is not known to the writer. While this information was presented as an editorial rather than straight news, it is clear that there is a sorry lack of accurate information about the true conditions in the Islands. (Cape Verden, Lynn, Mass., November, 1975)

THE REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
With independence at hand since July 12, 1975, when the MLSTP (Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe) took control there has been a degree of economic uncertainty. The leader of the MLSTP, Miguel Trovoada has noted that the islands are potentially rich in coffee and cocoa production but production has been disrupted. Prime Minister Trovoada recently made a short visit to the Ivory Coast for talks with the Minister of State, Auguste Denise and with the directors of the
African Development Bank regarding the possibility of his new Republic joining the banking system. (West Africa, Lagos, Sept. 15, 1975) Trovoada also stopped at Lagos from September 22-25 for discussions over the need of adequate manpower for agricultural production while trying to restructure the economy. Nigerian contract labor has been especially important in the islands’ cocoa output. (Lagos Radio, Sept. 23, 1975, 0600 gmt)

THE ZAMBIAN ECONOMY AND THE TANZAM RAILWAY

No traffic has come through Angola on the Benguela Railway since August. Zambia is trying to recover 777 wagons stranded in Angola. (Times of Zambia, Oct. 29, 1975) Zambia's biggest problem in the present crisis is the importation of essential goods. Two ships carrying 27,000 tons have been rerouted from Lobito to Beira. The goods will have to move by rail to Malawi and then by road to Zambia, just as the rainy season is making the roads difficult to use. (Financial Mail, Sept. 19, 1975)

The Tanzam Railway was officially opened at the end of October. It will not operate at full capacity, however, until July 1976, when sidings, signalling equipment, stations and access roads are completed. Rumors of great Chinese influence in Tanzania and Zambia as a result of the railroad have not been borne out. They reflect the anxiety of the disproportionately large Soviet and American diplomatic missions in Dar; the American mission includes 130 persons. The estimated 15,000 Chinese technicians have remained isolated during their work periods (averaging about two years for each worker) and most will have returned by July of next year. (Star, Oct. 25, and Nov. 1, 1975; Financial Mail, Sept. 19, 1975)

The Zambian Government expects no rise in the copper price for the foreseeable future and is telling Zambians to brace for more hard times. Several copper mines are uneconomic at the present price, but are being kept in operation for socio-political reasons. (Star, Nov. 1, 1975)

A major loan agreement with an international consortium is about to be signed by the Zambian Government to ensure that the mines continue production and meet their financial obligations. (Star, Oct. 25, 1975) Zambianization is now being applied in all companies falling under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Power, Transport and Works. This includes such giants as Shell Oil. The order applies to all positions under the managing directors of companies and thus includes the post of general manager. (Star, November 1, 1975)

ZAMBIA AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Zambia is putting the liberation movements on a short leash. The African National Congress of Zimbabwe has been moved from President Kaunda's guest house to government quarters at Mulungushi village on the outskirts of the capital, where the leaders are kept under guard and deprived even of the use of a telephone. SWAPO has been told to move from its base at a farm twenty miles outside Lusaka and to cease conducting all military operations from Zambian territory. The Government took into custody a consignment of Soviet weapons for SWAPO, according to reliable diplomatic and nationalist sources. The Liberation Center in Lusaka is now under military control. (The Sun, Baltimore, Sept. 21, 1975)

MERCENARIES IN BOTSWANA

Two American veterans of Vietnam, Joseph Belisario and Craig Acheson, were arrested in mid-September in a small town in central Botswana and are now serving six-month prison terms. The Government charges that
they were mercenaries working for the Rhodesian Secret Police and trying to locate guerilla bases in Botswana which do not exist. A South African journalist named Richard Walker talked with Belisario in the United States before his departure. Belisario, 25 years old, indicated that the State Department had urged him not to go. He and two others were determined to depart and brought with them the names of over one hundred other potential volunteers for Rhodesia. (Africa News, Oct. 29, 1975)

BREAKDOWN OF A UNIVERSITY

Following the nationalization of the Roma Campus of the University of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland (ULBS), the 70 Swazi and 65 Botswana students left Lesotho for their respective countries. Prime Minister Jonathan nationalized the campus after opposing the four-year extension of the term of the ULBS rector, New Zealand-born Cyril Rogers, and after a student strike protesting conditions at the Lesotho campus. His critics claim that he sought to Africanize the position in order to gain favor among students and staff at Roma, which is the largest of the three campuses of ULBS. (Tanzania Daily News, Oct. 27, 1975; The Guardian, Oct. 27, 1975; Africa News, Oct. 23, 1975)

SWAZILAND AND MOZAMBIQUE

Swaziland is adjusting uneasily to the new FRELIMO regime, which has labelled the Swazi government ‘capitalistic’ and ‘Western-oriented.’ Many Swazis admire the Mozambiquan revolution and contrast it with their ‘bloodless’ independence and compromising policies towards South Africa. Border controls at Nomahasha are very tight now, especially for Mozambiquans entering Swaziland. (Daily News, Johannesburg, Oct. 14, 1975)

at the united nations

REPORT ON THE THIRTIETH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

a) South Africa

The question of apartheid was discussed by the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly for several weeks during October and November. This is a Committee of the whole which meets once a year during the Assembly to deal with special questions (apartheid not being considered a colonial question, it does not fall under the terms of reference of the decolonization committee). The two South African liberation movements recognized by the OAU, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) participated in the Committee debates in terms of a resolution adopted at last year’s session, which granted them observer status for the duration of the apartheid debate. This means that the movement representatives can take the floor whenever they wish, but have no right to vote. The two movements have had observer status in the Special Committee against Apartheid (a permanent body composed of 18 Third World and Socialist countries) since early 1974.

The Special Political Committee adopted several draft resolutions, which are certain to be endorsed by the Assembly plenary. As in recent years, the resolutions express a position very close to that of the liberation movements. Although South Africa is still a member of the United Nations (the Western powers having vetoed a resolution for its expulsion in the Security Council last year), the General Assembly has declared that the South African regime is illegitimate and that the liberation movements are the authentic representatives of the people of South Africa. The Assembly has also declared that the struggle for liberation and self-determination under the leadership of the liberation movements, including armed struggle, is legitimate. This position was reaffirmed this year, in addition, the Committee affirmed this year that the United Nations has a “special responsibility” towards the oppressed people of South Africa. The clause, which aroused considerable controversy in the debates, is somewhat reminiscent of the concept of “international trust” applied to colonial peoples and appears to be a further step towards the assimilation of the South African question to the colonial question. The PAC representative, Edwin Makoti, in his speech before the Committee reiterated the PAC’s stand that South Africa is a colonial, not an independent and sovereign state, in that in 1910 there had only been a “transfer of colonial authority” from the British to the white settlers. So far, however, the liberation movements have not attempted to occupy the South African seat in the Assembly (left vacant this year because of South Africa’s decision not to attempt to participate in the debates, having been barred from last year’s Assembly).

In another significant resolution, the Committee has reaffirmed the United Nations’ opposition to the Bantustans “as designed to consolidate the inhuman policies of apartheid, to perpetuate white minority domination, and to dispossess the African people of South Africa of their inalienable rights in their country.” The resolution asks all Governments and organizations “not to deal with any institutions or authorities of the Bantustans, nor to accord any form of recognition to them.” It is important for the anti-apartheid forces at the United Nations to establish firmly the principle of no recognition to the Bantustans, since next year, if Vorster’s plans proceed according to schedule, the United Nations may be faced with a request for membership by an “independent” Transkei. (UN press releases WS/734; GA/AH/1335; GA/AH/1338)
b) Namibia

The question of Namibia was taken up in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly (also a Committee of the whole, dealing with colonial and trust territories) in October and November. The meetings were attended by the representatives of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) which has observer status in all United Nations bodies dealing with Namibia. During its debates, the Fourth Committee also granted a hearing to a representative from the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) which is not recognized by the United Nations.

The Fourth Committee adopted the various recommendations contained in the reports of the Committee of 24 (on decolonization) and of the Council for Namibia concerning future measures that the United Nations can take on the Namibian question. The measures were later endorsed by the General Assembly. In particular, a resolution called for "free national elections to be held in Namibia as a matter of urgency, under the direct supervision and control of the United Nations." The resolution reaffirmed the continued support of the United Nations for SWAPO as "the authentic representative of the Namibian people" and for the liberation struggle "by all means." It condemned the "so-called constitutional conference" convened by South Africa as a maneuver to consolidate its illegal occupation of Namibia, and re-emphasized the need for a total boycott of South Africa in order to force it out of the country. The resolution requested the Security Council to meet urgently again on the question of Namibia (which is still on the Council's agenda after a resolution calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was vetoed last spring). However, since any effective move against South Africa in the Security Council is likely to be vetoed again by the Western powers, the Assembly, in the resolution, seems to be developing alternative strategies. One is to call for the enforcement of the Decree for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, adopted last year, which makes it illegal to exploit, or trade in, any raw materials from Namibia, and makes ships carrying such cargo subject to seizure and prosecution in national courts. The resolution also asked the Council for Namibia to promulgate other decrees designed to protect the rights of Namibians. Any such decree, of course, is worthless unless member states of the United Nations are willing to implement it. However, as a strategy, it leaves more room for action than a request for sanctions in the Security Council, where it is certain to be vetoed. The Assembly resolution also placed new emphasis on publicity, especially through television and radio programs and even advertisements in the news media of members of the United Nations, and the Establishment of a "freedom radio" in an independent African state operated by Namibians and to beam to Namibia. Budgetary provisions, however, remain limited and it is doubtful that such programs will reach wide audiences.

A second draft resolution on the United Nations Fund for Namibia, devoted particular attention to the Institute for Namibia, which is in the process of being established in Lusaka. The Institute is headed by Godfrey Geingob, former SWAPO representative in New York, and its aim is to train Namibian cadres for the future administration of the country and to carry out research in various aspects of the Namibian economy and society. The resolution called for greater contributions to the Institute by states and United Nations bodies and other organizations; it also asked all United Nations agencies to provide technical, research and teaching personnel for the Institute. (United Nations press release GA/T/2133, document A/10358).

c) Southern Rhodesia

The Fourth Committee took up the question of Rhodesia in October. The debates were attended by a representative of the African National Council (ANC), which has observer status in the Fourth Committee and in the Committee of 24 for questions relating to Rhodesia. On the basis of a report submitted by the Committee of 24, the Fourth Committee adopted two draft resolutions (later endorsed by the General Assembly). The resolutions cover familiar ground. In the first resolution, the Assembly reaffirmed the principle of no independence before majority rule and stated that any settlement relating to the future of the territory must be worked out with the full participation of the ANC, which the United Nations considers "the sole and authentic representative of the true aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe." The Assembly called on the British Government, "as the administering power," to take "all effective measures to enable Zimbabwe to accede to independence." It demanded that the cessation of all immigration and recruitment of foreign mercenaries to Rhodesia; and the termination of all repressive measures adopted by the Smith regime. It also appealed for increased assistance to the people of Zimbabwe by the international community. The resolution was adopted by consensus, without objections—for the first time—by the British Government, whose representative declared that there had been "more of a spirit of accommodation" in this year's debate and that he hoped the resolution would convince Ian Smith that he was indeed an "international outcast."

The second resolution, adopted with several absten-
relations by the Western powers (including Great Britain and the United States), called for stringent enforcement of the sanctions against the Smith regime, especially concerning trade, travel, immigration, and the recruitment of mercenaries. The resolution specifically condemned the United States for its continued importation of chrome and nickel from Rhodesia, and called for repeal of the Byrd Amendment which permits such importation.

The two resolutions taken together do not represent any significant change with respect to resolutions on Rhodesia adopted in recent years, reflecting a sense of uncertainty and frustration stemming from the on-again, off-again talks between Smith and the ANC, the internal controversies among the liberation movements which have come together under the ANC umbrella, and “detente” politics in Southern Africa. The resolutions basically reaffirm previous positions, and it would appear that the United Nations has adopted a “wait-and-see” attitude concerning the Southern Rhodesian question.

In a related development, the United States Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee on the question of American mercenaries convicted in Botswana of being on a mission for the Rhodesian Special Branch. Without denying the presence of American mercenaries in Rhodesia, Bennett simply stated that “my Government does not approve of service by any American citizen in the forces of the Rhodesian regime.” (United Nations Documents A/10359; A/4.793; press release GA/5398)

**United States and Southern Africa**

**State Department’s Latest Africa Shuffle**

The White House has announced the nomination of William Schaufele, Jr. to replace Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The announcement came on November 21 after months of speculation about who would replace Davis in the post (see *Southern Africa*, December, 1975). The Senate is expected to act quickly on the Schaufele appointment. The nomination will probably be uncontroversial, since Schaufele has years of experience in diplomacy with Africans at the United Nations, without having been involved on a policy level.

The third week in November the Senate confirmed the nomination of two Ambassadors to African countries: Walter Culter and James Spain as the new Ambassadors to Zaire and Tanzania respectively. Culter served in South Korea and Vietnam in the late 1960’s, and was most recently the Director of the Office of Central African Affairs, the area in which Zaire is considered by US policy-makers to be the cornerstone. In that position, Culter accompanied Sheldon Vance, special assistant to Kissinger, on his trip to Zaire last summer to mend US-Zaire relations, after Zaire’s President Mobutu accused the United States of having “financed and directed” a coup attempt against him and asked then—Ambassador Deane Hinton to leave. It was during that visit that the enormous aid package now in the works for Zaire was put together. In questioning from Senator Clark during the November 11 confirmation hearing, Culter stated that the $19 million military component of the aid package was needed for modernization of the Zairean forces and was not a response to specific events in the area such as the growing military confrontation in Angola. But Culter admitted that “I think their feeling of need for modernization has been increased because of the increased instability in the area.”

Tanzania will be Spain’s first Africa post and his first assignment on the Ambassador level. He is generally supportive of continued US economic aid to that country.

**US Admits to Intervention in Angola**

In closed-door testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 6, CIA Director William Colby admitted that the US is currently covertly supplying “rifles, machineguns, vehicles, and ammunition” to FNLA and UNITA in their fight against the MPLA.

Reports of the admission gave few details, but they gave credence to the growing body of evidence of US intervention in Angola. In the last three weeks, the western press has reported on significant US aid to UNITA and FNLA visible on the ground in Angola. The *Sunday Times* of London carried a story on November 9 saying that “it appears that the Americans and Belgians are now the biggest arms supplier for FNLA-UNITA. ... For several weeks there have been regular arrivals of large drooped-winged freighter planes with United States markings.” Reporters have seen US aircraft flying into UNITA-FNLA territory almost daily from Zaire, loaded with arms. In mid-November, reports of US personnel in Angola began to appear. David Martin and Tony Hodges reported in the *Observer* of November 16: “American mercenaries are helping the UNITA cause, too. An ex-Green Beret, named Skip, told me in Silva Porto that he had offered UNITA his services as a trained pilot.” The *Economist* the previous day reported that “a UNITA translator said that 15 Americans are training new recruits at Capola, north of Silva Porto.” Most of the white mercenaries fighting the MPLA are reportedly South African or Portuguese, but no one has established how they are being recruited or financed.

The Administration is becoming more outspoken in public about its Angola policy. Kissinger confirmed in a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on November 20, that the US is helping President Mobutu “do whatever he was doing in Angola.” While this amounted to a confirmation of indirect US assistance to UNITA and FNLA through Zaire, Kissinger has still not publicly confirmed US covert direct support to these movements. Instead, he is making vehement public statements about Soviet intervention, not mentioning that the US is intervening in Angola also. In a speech on US relations with the Soviet Union and China in Detroit on November 24, Kissinger warned the Soviets that “time is running out; continuation of an interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships.” This was a
Several members of the International Relations Committee are clearly disturbed by the Administration’s proposed aid for Zaire. They question whether US national security will be served by this aid. They question funding Zaire’s intervention in Angola on its own behalf and in collaboration with the United States, and cite human rights violations in Zaire itself.

turn-about in his position of only three weeks earlier when he down played the possibility of great power confrontation in Angola.

US officials have given more detailed explanations of US Angolan intervention before Congressional committees, explaining that US Angolan policy is closely linked with US support for Zaire’s President Mobutu. Kissinger said on November 6 that, while the US had “no interest in Angola except the independence of the Angolan people,” Zaire and Zambia depend on railways going through Angola, and in this situation, “we do believe it is important to make it clear to Zaire that we are prepared to be of assistance.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Clements testified on November 11 that the large military aid program to Zaire is also related to Angola: “The government in Angola could be important to Zaire. There would be consequences if we fail to respond which could be very serious.” In general, the Administration’s policy toward Zaire, and indirectly toward Angola, has the purpose of “strengthening Zaire’s regional influence in Central Africa.”

The Administration’s intervention policy in Angola is facing some opposition in Congress. Congressmen Michael Harrington (Mass.) and Don Bonker (Wash.) will offer two relevant amendments to the International Security Assistance Act, which comes before the House International Relations Committee the first week in December. One amendment would prohibit any assistance authorized by this bill and any covert assistance from being furnished directly or indirectly to any political group in Angola. The second amendment would prohibit the provision of any military assistance to Zaire until the President reports that Zaire has halted all military assistance to political groups in Angola and Congress has approved such report by concurrent resolution. There may be a third amendment offered by Congressman Diggs prohibiting assistance to Angola, without mentioning either Zaire or CIA covert operations specifically. There will be some restrictive amendments introduced in the Senate also, but the exact language is not yet available.

Representatives’ response to ending indirect and covert assistance to movements in Angola will depend largely on their judgment of the extent of the alleged “soviet threat” in southern Africa and on whether real US security interests are at stake. It will also depend on how extensive they believe the Angolan operations to be and on their view of CIA covert operations in general.

The third amendment prohibiting aid to Angola directly or indirectly will probably get support from some Representatives who consider themselves “friends of Africa” who are concerned about both opposing US intervention in Angola and not alienating Zaire’s President Mobutu. Congressman Charles Diggs and Edward Biester probably fall in this category.


MOYNIHAN IS DULPLICIOUS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICA

US Ambassador to the United Nations Patrick Moynihan has engaged in a series of moves for and against South Africa in the last month which have led some observers to conclude that the US is creating political cover for even closer relations with South Africa.

At the end of October, Clarence Mitchell, the head of the NAACP Washington office and a US delegate to the United Nations, said in a speech that the US deplored “the detention of persons whose only act is outspoken opposition of the system of Apartheid.” South Africa’s reaction was vehement. Prime Minister Vorster personally called Mitchell’s charges a “blatant lie” and challenged the US to name “even one person” imprisoned in South
Mr. Vorster has his policy wrong." Moynihan said that Mitchell would respond to the South African challenge later "in an appropriate manner."

South Africa's anger at Moynihan turned into pleas however, on November 12, when the United States introduced a resolution calling on the General Assembly to "proclaim an international amnesty by releasing all political prisoners." This move, which was characterized in the press as a "pet project" of Moynihan's, came right after the US cast its first affirmative vote deploring human rights violations in Chile. Moynihan called his move a broadening of the scope of human rights activities at the UN, and chastized UN members for their "selective morality" toward South Africa and Chile. According to the Washington Post of November 13, "Moynihan named no names, but said that 23 of the 60 sponsors of the UN resolution condemning South Africa and 16 of the 23 sponsors of the Chile resolution themselves hold political prisoners."

One African delegate to the UN told a Johannesburg Star reporter that "from South Africa's point of view, the situation represents a considerable improvement. It would be demonstrably wrong to suggest that South Africa does not stand to make big gains from all this." In retrospect, it appears that Moynihan's surprisingly strong support for Mitchell's statement exploring detention of political prisoners in South Africa was only a maneuver to throw Third World nations balance before he announced a rationale for closer US-South African ties. (Star, Johannesburg, November 15; Africa News, November 3)

**ACTION NEWS & NOTES**

**ACTIONS ON ANGOLA**

Actions in support of the MPLA increased in November in this country. The MPLA Solidarity Committee, whose statement of formation appeared in the December Southern Africa is producing a regular "Angola Weekly News Summary" to interested organizations, press and individuals, providing a critical alternative source of information on events there. Persons interested in receiving the bulletin should send their name and a donation, if possible, to the Committee at 825 West End Ave Apt 14F New York 10025, tel. (212) 863-3081.

The Committee sponsored a celebration in New York of the independence of the People's Republic of Angola on November 11 attended by 75 persons, and addressed by representatives from Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Principe, and Congo (Brazzaville). A forum on Angola will be held by the group December 12.

The Patrice Lumumba Coalition, organized by Pan African Skills Project head Irving Davis, picketed the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York charging that U.S. aid to Zaire was contributing to New York City's financial crisis. The coalition released news of anti-personnel material headed for Angola on U.S. ships, and held a forum in N.Y. in early November on Angola.

The Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (CCLAMG), in cooperation with other Chicago anti-imperialist organizations, sponsored a "Day of Solidarity with MPLA and Angola" Nov. 22 featuring films, a cultural forum and an education program featuring FRELIMO representatives Manuel Dos Santos and Sharufudine Khan and a panel discussion on "What is at Stake in Angola?"

In other cities, a Philadelphia Committee for Justice in Angola will sponsor a forum December 13, and the Southern Africa coalition in Boston will also focus on MPLA support work.

In Washington, Friends of Angola, a UNITA-support group distributed 5,000 leaflets outside the U.S.S. Embassy & the White House Oct. 25 calling Soviet involvement in Angola equally "racist, oppressive and dehumanizing as that of the U.S.". The leaflet urges that UNITA is brought to parity with the other movements, so that it will be in a strong position to demand a coalition government of all the patriotic forces in Angola (presumably this includes the FNLA with whom UNITA is now aligned). CORE head Roy Innis sponsored a party for UNITA representative George Sangumba in New York November, while rumors that CORE is recruiting black mercenaries for UNITA are circulating. Ironically, Innis sponsored a party for the ANC one month earlier featuring South African singer Miriam Makeba and announcing the formation of an organization called Americans for the Liberation of South Africa. The ANC is aligned with the MPLA.
SAC SUES THE FBI
The Southern Africa Committee, (SAC) publishers of this magazine, filed suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation in November seeking a federal court order forcing the agency to produce its files on the Committee. The Committee contends that release of the files is required under the Freedom of Information Act adopted this past year by the Congress.

Earlier this year, FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley confirmed by letter that the Committee was under investigation by the FBI, but refused to divulge the reasons, and denied the Committee's request for copies of all files collected. He claimed the Act allowed withholding the information when an organization is under current investigation, "the disclosure of which would interfere with enforcement proceedings."

Center for Constitutional Rights Lawyers Peter Weiss and Michael Davis appealed Kelley's denial to the Attorney General, on behalf of SAC. The Justice Department has not responded to the appeal within the deadlines set by the act; hence the suit. In an affidavit accompanying the suit, Gail Morlan, SAC president, noted that at least one other organization is being similarly harassed, and believes that the investigation is an attempt to press the Committee to register as a "foreign agent" under the old McCarthy-era Curran Act. The suit charges that the FBI's investigation is impeding the Committee's rights to free speech.

U.S. ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT UNDERWAY
An Anti-Apartheid Movement for the U.S.A. (AAM-USA) has recently been launched through a series of forums held in late November at universities in Washington, D.C. and Maryland. Earlier, a group of individuals circulated a proposal for the formation of the movement, which intends to create a cohesive chapter-structured organization, linked to the priorities of the liberation movements of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

The proposal calls for a national office including a representative of the African National Congress S.A., with emphasis upon considerable nation-wide travel. Constituencies specifically addressed would be students, trade unionists, blacks and women. A temporary steering committee has been established pending the holding of a first annual congress of the movement.

Persons wishing further information can write or call directly: AAM-USA, 138 Berkeley Place, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11217 tel. (212) 691-5240. The ZANU Support Committee in Norfolk has announced plans for an African feast to raise funds for ZANU.

Books Received/Book Reviews


Distributed by: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies,

Webster’s paper outlines the historic system of creating a “cheap, rightless and unorganized” labor force in the South African mines through the management monopolistic control over recruitment of workers, wage structure and restrictive legislation fundamental to South Africa such as the pass laws, labor laws, etc. The article covers the conflict between management’s need for cheap labor and the unionization of the white “labor aristocracy”; African industrial action including the refusal to be recruited; desertion and strikes; the continuing color-class conflicts and factors which prevented non-racial trade unionism; the development of the coalition and class alliance between white workers, industrial, mining and landed capitalists and the State; the African Mine Workers Union which led 74,000 miners on strike in 1946; and the post World War II situation in which the number of South African black workers decreased in the mines from 80 to 25 per cent as blacks moved to a more competitive job market in the manufacturing sector.

Resources

Namibia Packet A collection of material detailing many aspects of the situation in Namibia; including history, economic conditions, U.S. involvement, and recent events. $1.25 from Bay Area Namibia Action Group, 511 Frederick Street, San Francisco, California 94117. The Bay Area Namibia Action Group is a collective working in the San Francisco area to increase awareness of and support for the Namibian struggle for freedom.

Pamphlets: Apartheid Quiz (revised 1975), Zimbabwe Quiz, BOSS: The First Five Years, For Their Triumphs and Their Tears, and Bram Fischer (revised 1975). These 1975 pamphlets are available from International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (North American Committee), 1430 Massachusetts Avenue #201, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Dear Friends:

The struggle for liberation in southern Africa is far from over. While we have celebrated with much joy the independence of Mozambique and Cape Verde this year, and Guinea-Bissau last year, the struggle in Angola—despite its independence just this month—will continue as the war drags on. This coming year will be a vital one for Africa as the situation in Angola reverberates far beyond its borders and those of the neighboring countries.

The situation in Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa itself and the changing role of the neighboring countries, calls for broader coverage and analysis of these areas. *Southern Africa* will continue to provide this vital service to its readers, as well as report on growing involvement of the United States.

Publication of *Southern Africa* can continue only with your support. We urge you to resubscribe for 1976 without delay. We will have to remove non-renewed subscriptions from our mailing list to help bring down the cost, as of January.

Your subscription of $6.00 does not cover the cost of production. If you are able to, please send an additional donation or provide a prisoner with a subscription.

Towards total victory in Southern Africa,

A Luta Continua,

Southern Africa Committee

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