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We have received some very beautiful letters, particularly from prisoners, in response to our mailing to our free subscribers. We wish we were able to answer them all, but we just don’t have enough workers. However we do appreciate them. THANK YOU. It’s good to know how well the magazine is received and we certainly will not be removing names from the list unless we know that a prisoner is no longer there to receive it. A Luta Continua!

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It is not the Cubans who block the path to freedom...

Henry Kissinger has not suddenly discovered Southern Africa. Remember the National Security Memorandum in 1969? That reflected Kissinger’s view of the future of Southern Africa quite clearly: “The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists.”

Kissinger was wrong, massively wrong. His arrogant politics had not allowed for the strength of the people’s struggle. Within five years politically directed armed struggle had destroyed white colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique and history had made a joke of Kissinger the prophet.

It is important to recognise that Kissinger had not simply miscalculated—as anyone trying to predict the details of history may do. He had made a deliberate choice—continued white rule was infinitely better—in his view—than what he saw as the alternative, namely “increased opportunities for the communists.” He did not, at any stage, propose what he now proposes to counter the “Cuban threat” i.e. some kind of massive U.S. action—which would have been directed against the white supremacists. And he did not propose it because he regarded the system as strong enough to last, and was not unhappy with the consequences and effects of the continuation of that system—stability, strong economic, political and military linkages with the U.S. and its allies. In his view a successful black liberation struggle involved too many risks—risks for the future security of United States interests; the question of the future of the African people seems totally unimportant to Kissinger.

It is in that light we need to look at his present fulminations about the “Cuban presence” in Africa. The issue now in Southern Africa is the same as it was in 1970—and Kissinger still prefers continued white rule to what he regards as an unallowable alternative. In Mozambique and Angola have lit the fuse for even greater explosions in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Any regular reader of this magazine will have seen the sparks leaping—strikes, boycotts, increasingly militant speeches by shrewd Bantustan leaders who fear that the people are leaving them behind, and in Zimbabwe and Namibia the renewal of armed struggle.

The Cuban presence offers the promise (or threat) of an acceleration of the process of the destruction of white minority rule. But the changes occurring in Southern Africa are and will increasingly be changes produced out of the struggle of the people; the directions chosen will be those determined by the political decisions of the people and their leadership, not any external power. Kissinger’s fury now has nothing to do with a desire to protect African freedom—that is obvious. What is sometimes forgotten is that it does not simply arise out of his “global view” but is quite precisely located in his view of the desirable future for Southern Africa. He has always opposed the destruction of white rule—and it is that threat he recognises and fears now.

Kissinger, and the U.S. interests he represents are fundamentally opposed to the establishment of free, politically and economically independent societies in Southern Africa. They have a rich prize to defend—and they will, with ferocity. The current “crisis” may disappear, as the South Africans pull out of Angola to re-entrench themselves in Namibia, while the Kissinger projected Cuban invasion of other parts of Southern Africa does not occur. But there is in fact an ongoing real crisis that those concerned for the African liberation struggle must constantly remember. That is the crisis engendered by the coming confrontation over continued white minority rule. As the liberation movements grow in strength, and sharpen their attack, the U.S. and its allies will seek many ways of helping the reactionary regimes. They may not always do this with bellicose announcements—but seek rather to prop up white control and divide black attack quietly; that may be even more dangerous for the liberation movements. It will be an important task to keep monitoring overt and covert U.S. actions in the time to come.
A REPORT ON THE 1976 ANGOLA SEMINAR IN HAVANA, CUBA

by Prexy Nesbit

"EN CUMPLIMENTO DEL DEBER INTERNACIONALISTA:"

In November of 1960 the late Patrice Lumumba wrote in a letter to his wife, "History will one day have its say; it will not be the history taught in the United Nations, Washington, Paris, or Brussels, however, but the history taught in the countries that have rid themselves of colonialism and its puppets. Africa will write its own history, and both north and south of the Sahara it will be a history full of glory and dignity."

The people of Angola led by the MPLA have of late contributed many magnificent pages to that history. Most recently, they added further lines to those pages, when from February 26 until February 28, assisted by the Cuban government, they met in Havana, Cuba with 26 US citizens to discuss the situation in Angola. Also discussed at the two day session were ways in which the people of the USA could assist the Angolan people in their struggle "to maintain the territorial integrity and unity of their country."

The delegation of US citizens, the majority of whom were black or "third World," was made up of seven representatives of the working press and representatives of nineteen organizations in the United States. The organizations represented a broad spectrum of political approaches ranging from the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee to the American Friends Service Committee. Several were organizations whose sole political work was related to mobilization on behalf of Southern African liberation movements. The organizations represented at the Seminar were: the Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workers of North America (AFL-CIO); American Committee on Africa; American Friends Service Committee; Black Economic Research Center; CASA-General Brotherhood of Workers; Coalition of Black Trade Unionists (NYC); Coalition for a New Foreign Policy; MPLA Solidarity Committee; National Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Movement for African Liberation; National Conference of Black Lawyers; National Council of Churches (Africa Office); Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño; Prairie Fire Organizing Committee; Third World Coalition/Southwest Workers Federation; Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guine (CCLAMG)/US Out of Angola Committee (Chicago); Venceremos Brigade; Washington Office on Africa; Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; and, Youth Against War & Fascism. The following specific questions will be forthcoming from the various organizations present.

The formal talks held during the several days of meetings were both useful and inspiring. They were conducted in Portuguese, English and Spanish. The commendable job done by the comrade-translators made it possible for in-depth consideration and discussion about questions raised by either the MPLA delegation or by the US participants.

The Seminar was organized in such a manner by our Cuban hosts that there was time for small groups of us to meet leisurely and at great length with various members of the MPLA delegation. In this way various members of the USA group were able to gain particularly insightful knowledge about specific questions such as, the founding and initial organizational structure of OMA (Organization of Women of Angola) or the formation of JMPLA (Youth of the MPLA). (Various pamphlets on these and other specific questions will be forthcoming from the various organizations present).

The structure of the seminar also permitted a great deal of latitude about recording and transcribing the deliberations of the meetings themselves. The seminar—contrary to certain broadcast journalists' hallucinations—was not a secret meeting in Havana bringing in the underground cadre of the MPLA from their various operations in the States! Most, if not all, of the deliberations are going to be reproduced in forthcoming issues of the various newspapers and magazines present. (The Black Scholar intends to publish a pamphlet which will contain the transcript of all the deliberations). Lastly, in the months to come there will be an outpouring of fresh and valuable information about the history and character of the Angolan liberation movement.

zine; and the San Francisco Sun Reporter. One free lance labor journalist was also in attendance.

The MPLA delegation was small, but impressive. Making up the three person contingent were: Commandante Dibala, born in Cuanza-Sul Province, was military commander of the Eastern Region, is presently political commissar of the Eastern Front and a member of the Central Committee; Ms. Olga Lima, born in Huila Province, served as guerrilhadora in the Eastern Front and is now Director of Political Affairs for the Department of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Cabinet; and Pedro Zinga Baptista, who was a member of the First MPLA Congress, and did much of his political work as a member of the clandestine forces inside the FNLA in Zaire until he was exposed, imprisoned, tortured and finally escaped back to Angola in early 1974.

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1 translation = "in compliance with internationalist duty..."
It is difficult to summarize the content of the seminar. The Angola delegation spoke about priorities of the Angolan revolution such as production, education and health. Discussed as well were: the threat of continued guerrilla activity by the so-called “organizations,” FNLA and UNITA; the role which would be offered to the multinational corporations in the new Angola; and the internationalism of the Angolan people, their commitment to a continued role in the struggle to free the remainder of Southern Africa from direct oppression and to liberate the African continent from a more invidious and indirect form of oppression—exploitation of one person by another, a phenomenon not limited by skin coloration.

All of us came away with three distinct and indelible understandings. First, neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union liberated Angola. The military victories over the puppet organizations, UNITA & FNLA, were the result of a long process of struggle, one which was first and foremost political. Political in the most profound sense that it instilled in people an appreciation of why they struggled, who the enemy was and the type of new society they wanted to construct. This process, this development of consciousness, was not easy. Rather, it was marked by grave losses, periodic crises and a generalized extreme amount of sacrifice. None of us present will forget the seriousness and bereavement in the delegation’s voices when they described life in Luanda as that capital faced the South African US-equipped blitzkrieg from the South and the forces of the FNLA/UNITA from the north.

A second understanding is that the new People’s Republic of Angola is not in any fashion going to forsake its internationalist duty to support the struggle for liberation in the remainder of Southern Africa. At the same time, and this is the third point, the critical importance of internal political struggle was constantly underscored. Angola is not going to free Namibia. It is not going to free South Africa or Zimbabwe. The PRA is fully prepared to assist those peoples, such as SWAPO-led Namibians, with any means necessary, including the force of arms. But first and foremost, the gaining of national liberation must be the result of the people seizing their own history, and then, as in Angola, Mozambique & Guine defeating through armed struggle the forces of oppression and imperialism.

Whether it was the Commandante, Olga, or Pedro speaking, all of us from the USA were struck with the clarity and precision of the Angolan delegation’s remarks. Rich with a grasp of the historical meaning of their struggle and that of other peoples in the world, their comments showed that they had spent years studying and reflecting upon different questions. When asked, for instance, about the stance taken towards Angola by the People’s Republic of China, theirs was neither a flippant or bitter response. Nor was it a highly rhetorical denunciation of the Soviet Union or “Maoism.” They prefaced their comment by citing their deep respect for the Chinese revolution and their admiration for the works of Mao Tse Tung (which incidentally they had studied in depth “whilst being a little busy,” i.e., waging the 15 years of armed struggle against the Portuguese government). They continued on to ask the question how it was that a socialist country could be in the trench with-the enemy. What was it in the Chinese experience, they asked, that led China to its erroneous analysis? If the position was derived from the Sino-Soviet quarrel, then why did China not take a neutral stance as opposed to supplying arms and tanks to the CIA/PIDE-paid and inspired bandits known as FNLA/UNITA? They concluded by saying that the door remained open for China to now re-analyze the situation and make the proper adjustments.

In short, then, we can say about the MPLA delegation that their quality—and I think this is a statement all 26 of us could agree upon—as individuals reflected the strength and resonance of the MPLA as the sole expression of the Angolan people’s struggle for national liberation and dignity.

A part of the conference was spent listening to reports by the various US organizations present about their work in the States, especially activities concerned with the mobilization of solidarity for the struggles in Southern Africa. In this respect we quite pleasantly surprised ourselves. Though coming from divergent political viewpoints, there emerged a clear set of consensus points around which we could work and plan. There were also blatant weaknesses that we shared. One such was the need for our support work to broaden its base to a much larger audience in the United States, particularly, reaching out to North American black and Third World (Latin, Asian, Native American) communities. Another expressed need was that of reaching out more to the working class white and trade unionist communities.

Hence a major focus for ongoing work by the USA delegation is that of disseminating more information and more accurate information to a much broader audience.
about the reality of the Angolan people’s struggle. The following were some of the other areas of discussion by the USA delegation. Ultimately they were adopted as goals for future action pending further discussions by our various organizations and pending the gathering in of other organizations and individuals in the States who either had worked or would work on behalf of the Angolan people’s struggle:

1. A lobbying and informational campaign to press for US diplomatic recognition of the PRA.
2. Material support campaigns to raise money for medical services, fertilizers and agricultural equipment, and possibly educational supplies.
3. Effort to dispel myths about the MPLA and Angola.
4. Informational and lobbying campaigns to pressure against a US economic boycott of Angola.
5. Arranging for a visit by an Angolan delegation to the USA and pressuring the State Department to grant them visas.
6. Informational and lobbying campaigns to prevent military aid to Zaire and South Africa.
7. Broadening the base of support for Angola by organizing regional meetings leading to a national working conference on Angola to be held in May.
8. The formation of a national coordinating committee to begin the process of planning a national conference on Angola and to facilitate coordination of the work of the groups represented at the Havana conference on the above agreed goals for future action.

At the seminar’s end Commandante Dibala was asked for his evaluation. He called it a “positive step.” Clearly it was. As one of the American delegates said, “the discussions with our Angolan brothers and sisters gave us a knowledge and vision which will inform and resuscitate our USA work which is in solidarity with Angola. At the same time, the grace and hospitality of our Cuban brothers and sisters provided us with a model by which we can further both our solidarity work and our work towards building a better society in the USA.”

But any effort at evaluating the 1976 Havana Angola Seminar must include another point. That point is the particular historical significance of such a conference being held in Cuba. It is not simply that Cuba, by splendidly hosting this conference, was “in compliance with its internationalist duty;” nor is it simply that it was part of “bearing the (revolutionary) standards for the non-aligned countries of the Third World,” as journalist Herbert Matthews recently wrote in the New York Times (March 4, 1976). It is more than either of those.

The significance of Cuba’s hosting the seminar for the MPLA is better understood in terms of what it means for the Cuban people. One evening at the National Stadium watching Taofilo Stephenson box, some of us in the American delegation were talking with a 12 year old Cuban student—a member of the young Pioneers—She was white looking, a point of little meaning in Cuba but of value for those of us approaching the subject from a US perspective. Upon learning who we were, she told us that her sister had volunteered to go and build houses and fight imperialism in Angola because “Angolans were a sister people in trouble from racism and imperialism!”

The twelve year old that evening, as did other children we encountered, taught us something. For if, as various analysts have pointed out, one function of imperialism is to rob people of their own culture, their own history, Cuba’s impressive acts of solidarity in Angola are achieving the goal of helping the Cuban people understand and resume their own history, their own culture.

When this chapter of the Angolan people’s history is finally written one might hope to see included in it the following passage written in Tricontinental magazine in August, 1968, by Amilcar Cabral. He wrote thanking the Cuban people for their support of the struggle in Guinea-Bissau. Closing with it is a way of echoing and reinforcing a similar sentiment which we the American delegation unanimously felt and expressed about the seminar and its results, about the MPLA delegation, about our Cuban hosts, about the ongoing struggle of the Angolan people:

“We ask for any and all aid that any people can offer us … As part of this aid we point above all to that of Africa … We want to mention the special aid given to us by the peoples of the socialist countries … we believe that this aid is a historic obligation, because we consider that our struggle also constitutes a defense of the socialist countries … We also want to lay special emphasis on the untiring efforts—sacrifices that we deeply appreciate—that the people of Cuba—a small country without great resources, one that is struggling against the blockade by the US and other imperialists—are making to give effective aid to our struggle. For us, this is a constant source of encouragement, and it also contributes to cementing more and more the solidarity between our Party and the Cuban Party, between our people and the Cuban people, a people that we consider African. And it is enough to see the historical, political and blood ties that unite us to be able to say this. Therefore, we are very happy with the aid that the Cuban people give us, and we are sure that they will continue increasing their aid to our heroic national liberation struggle in spite of all difficulties.” (TRICONTINENTAL, VIII, Sept-Oct, 1968)

A VITORIA E CERTA.
QUE VIVA LA MPLA.
RECOGNITION FOR ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT MOUNTS

The People’s Republic of Angola under the leadership of the MPLA has won decisive recognition from the member states of the Organization of African Unity and became the 47th member of that body.

Prior to the MPLA’s victories against the South African invasion force and the imperialist-backed FNLA and UNITA in January and February, half of the OAU countries had already recognized the Angolan Government. Outside of Africa, recognition had come from the Soviet Union, Cuba, the socialist countries of East Europe and a large number of progressive third world nations. The extension of MPLA military control across Angola, regaining the south and recapturing the Benguela Railroad made it clear that MPLA is firmly and finally in control of Angola.

Following this, the Angolan Government gained support from several Caribbean nations and from western and northern European nations bringing the total number of recognitions to over 70. (See list of countries at end of article.)

While the military victories were decisive, important diplomatic gains also turned world forces in the direction of the MPLA Government. For example, the early, strong support from the Nigerian Government was critical in bringing many non-aligned African countries to the support of the MPLA. After Nigeria recognized the PRA in December, Nigeria said that it “would spare no effort to give the Angolan people the moral and material support they may need.” (Radio Lagos, Dec. 20, 1975) The Nigerian government sent diplomatic envoys to various African countries to explain Nigeria’s stand and to encourage support for the MPLA. In part, Nigeria’s effort played a significant role in the gaining of half of the OAU’s member states to support the PRA at the OAU emergency meeting in Addis Ababa in January.

It has been speculated that the attempted coup in Nigeria in February which resulted in the assassination of General Murtallah Muhammed, a major figure in pressing for the support and recognition of the Angolan government was planned outside of Nigeria, involving the complicity of the CIA and the Foreign office in London. Nigeria’s bitter response in January to President Ford’s letter, which threatened to cut off aid if Nigeria recognized the PRA, exhibited Murtallah’s defense of Nigerian sovereignty from imperialist pressures. This correspondence was published in the Nigerian press and succeeded in generating much popular support for the recognition. The failure of the coup attempt has only strengthened Nigeria’s stand on Angola and suggests an anti-imperialist direction by the government which replaced General Gowon.

On February 6, Cameroon became the 25th member state of the OAU’s 46 member body to recognize PRA, thus clearing the way for OAU recognition. (Daily World, New York, Feb. 6, 1976) According to the OAU charter, recognition by a majority of the members states entitles a government to full recognition by the OAU, and on February 10, Pres. Idi Amin Dada of Uganda announced that his country would recognize PRA-MPLA as the sole legitimate government in Angola. The Republic of Togo immediately followed suit. As current Chairman of the OAU it was incumbent on Amin to extend recognition. In his statement to Angolan President Agostinho Neto, Amin said that reconciliation among the different liberation forces is now necessary and that UNITA and FNLA are “not enemies of Africa”, adding that all foreign forces in Angola should be withdrawn immediately. (Radio Kampala, Feb. 10, 1976)

Popular support for the Angolan Government grows even where official governmental is missing. Students of the University of Zambia have called on their government to recognize the People’s Republic of Angola and to condemn the South African invasion and defend the assistance of Cuba and the Soviet Union in the Angolan struggle for independence. The Nairobi University Students Organization announced its recognition of the Angolan Government, deploring South Africa’s aggression and condemning “all those traitors who side with Africa’s number one enemy, South Africa” (Daily News, Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Jan. 20, 1976)

The United Nations Observer Mission of SWAPO announced that SWAPO recognizes MPLA as the legitimate Government of Angola and that it looks forward to further, mutual cooperation between them. (SWAPO Communiqué, Feb. 8, 1976)

Meanwhile the US has indicated that it will withhold diplomatic recognition as long as Soviet and Cuban forces remain. John Tratton of the State Department said that the US still considers the military situation in Angola uncertain. “I do not think it has been established who is in charge or who controls the situation on the ground in Angola”, he said. (Providence Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1976) Other State Department officials have admitted that the US will eventually have to recognize the Angolan Government just as it did with Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

Zaire Adds Its Recognition

A significant victory on the diplomatic front for the People’s Republic of Angola came with the recognition of by the government of Zaire. The Zairian government had been the principle support of the FNLA (led by Holden Roberto) during the period of the armed struggle and in the Transitional and post-Independence periods was a vigorous opponent of the MPLA. In recent months, Zaire spearheaded efforts to stop pro-western African governments from recognizing the Government.

The agreement signed by Angola’s President Agostinho Neto and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire after meeting in Congo-Brazzaville in late February spelled out the relations between the two countries in many respects.
The People's Republic of Angola has also received strong support from the population living in areas temporarily under UNITA/FNL/SA South African occupation. When the Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Angola retook a territory, they appealed to the soldiers of FNL/UNITA to turn in their weapons. A majority did so and are now free and contributing to the society the Angolan government wants to build. (People's Republic of Angola Report, Havana Conference).

**MASSACRES**

Now that the MPLA-led government has gained control over most of Angola, the true story of the South African backed FNL/UNITA occupation is beginning to come out. The MPLA has found numerous mass graves from massacres, and stories of horror and torture are common.

After extensive travels in the south of Angola, Jane Bergerol of the Observer, London reports: "At its worst, the FNLA/UNITA alliance deliberately set out to eliminate its civilian opponents; at best, the alliance leaders were either unable or uninterested in controlling their armed forces, allowing wholesale destruction and murder."

One MPLA official in Huambo was shot dead in front of his five children. For several days UNITA would not allow a burial and his body remained where he had been killed. But, besides MPLA officials, UNITA killed children and other civilians. Homes were ransacked and looted. UNITA soldiers set up "control points" at various places along roads and demanded tolls for passage. Further, writes Bergerol, in Lobito "UNITA's Jorge Valentim had set up what local mestizos and whites described as a Hitler-type elimination of non-blacks." This contrasts to the situation now. The MPLA military presence is not large and there have been no mass arrests by the MPLA. Rather, the main emphasis of the MPLA is on reconstruction.
"Nobody can estimate with any accuracy the number of civilians shot by UNITA and FNLA troops," writes Bergerol, "But the total must be counted in many thousands, as far as I can judge more than the number of military deaths in the war." (Observer, London, March 1, 1976)

ANGOLA AND THE US

Since the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly 323 to 99 to cut off funds for CIA intervention in Angola on January 27, events, such as the MPLA victory on the battlefield, have reduced the immediate significance of US policy toward the Angolan struggle. Nonetheless, the denouement of the Washington debate on Angolan policy has revealed some prominent trends in the reformation of US policy toward southern Africa and the Third World, provoked by its failures in Angola.

Secretary of State Kissinger has seized the initiative in this reformation, despite the stinging rebuke he received from Congress over covert intervention. He has done so by distorting the facts and history of the Angolan situation, by forcefully defining the larger issues raised by the war there, and by chiding Congress for its lack of responsibility in the affair which President Ford echoed when he said Congress "lost its guts" on Angola.

Kissinger, in his January 29 testimony to the Senate and a press conference February 13, continued to present the Soviet Union and Cuba as the "culprits" in Angola—despite well-established facts to the contrary. "Our principle objective has been to respond to an unprecedented application of Soviet power achieved in part through the expeditionary force of a client state." In Kissinger's version, the Soviet Union had violated detente, and if the US failed to counter such violations with force it would only invite more of the same.

Kissinger's second point has been that the US was doing the Africans a favor: that Zaire and Zambia, among other African states, wanted us to intervene, and that we had intervened on behalf of the "majority" in Angola—a simplistic and much exaggerated claim. One corollary of this point has been more explicit recognition of the obligation to aid and support "moderate" African states—like long-time client Zaire and new-found ally Zambia. Little has been said of the US other "African" friend, South Africa, though the implications of the US emphasis on "stability" in southern Africa are clear.

In Congress, it was expected in early February that the Administration would seek overt assistance to FNLA and UNITA, since covert help had ostensibly been cut off. In fact, the welter of mercenary-recruitment reports here and abroad in January and February made it doubtful that the CIA had in fact ceased its covert operations. The prospects for an overt aid request had faded by mid-February in light of the crumbling position of the US Angolan allies, but both houses of Congress had to deal with previously introduced legislation which would establish procedures for considering such overt aid. The vehicles were amendments to the military aid bill. The full Senate adopted a provision—passed through Committee back in December—giving Congress an option to veto any request for overt aid. The House International Relations Committee moved February 17 to adopt a stronger position, requiring specific Congressional authorization for further aid. This passed despite some last-minute hand-wringing, (and a substitute motion) by liberal human-rights stalwart Don Fraser, who argued that it was "human decency" to give the President "flexibility" in helping the Angolan "majority." The full House is expected to adopt the stronger, specific-authorization language. Which version prevails in the House-Senate conference may depend not on Angola but on the precedent which Congress wishes to set for dealing with the Angolas of the future.

The overt aid amendment represented the high-water mark for the House International Relations Committee in its deliberations over Angola. The same day, February 17, an amendment cutting the Administration's vastly increased military aid proposal for Zaire back to last year's level was withdrawn by its disunited sponsors, Representatives Harrington of Massachusetts and Bonker of Washington. (A floor amendment to this effect may still be offered.) Most of the Committee probably was more supportive of the Zaire aid package after the US defeat in Angola as a way of "preventing another Angola." The following day, moderate Republican Paul Findley of Illinois introduced another amendment condemning Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola as "completely inconsistent with any reasonably defined policy of detente" Findley cited "Russian intervention in Portugal, or the Middle East; now Angola, perhaps next Zambia. The trend is unsettling and argues in favor of increasingly stern US responses..." Kissinger could not have put it better. The Committee adopted it unanimously.

Such behavior may seem surprising in light of the huge votes in both houses prohibiting covert intervention in Angola. Some scratching below the surface, however, can put these apparently conflicting attitudes in proper perspective.

Firstly, the large negative votes in Congress were cast in opposition to the Administration's specific conduct in the Angolan case—that is, the decisions taken in secret, by the Executive alone, to involve the US heavily in a major civil war, over the objections of Administration African experts and on the side of weak and poorly-organized allies. When those allies began to lose and the US role increasingly exposed, Congress voted in revulsion against
what looked very much like a second Vietnam. Many members voted against the style of the operation, that is, Executive War; they did not necessarily reject the policy of support for one of the factions.

Secondly, many members felt that the US must pursue its "interests" in Africa in a more sophisticated, subtle way. This reasoning was summed up by Representative Preyer of North Carolina, recently returned from Africa, who explained his vote to cut off CIA funds by the following analysis:

"The basic problem we face in Africa is how to bring home the dangers of Russian imperialism to the uncommitted African nations without appearing to act like an imperialist power. Our credibility in Africa depends on our image as a friendly and disinterested power. We avoid any appearance of imperialism and any appearance of racism. In my judgement, the present United States approach in Angola is the wrong way to do this, while Kenya points toward the right way to do it." (emphasis added)

Thirdly, some members seemed to feel embarrassment at the speed with which MPLA drove to victory after the Congressional cut-off funds. In short, they seemed to be put on the defensive by "lost your guts" and similar charges.

While there is emerging general agreement between Congress and the Executive, that the Angola scenario must not be repeated, there is some difference over how to prevent it.

One strategy following from Representative Preyer's rationale is to foster the development and strength of "moderate" black states in the region—in other words, as non-revolutionary and as independent of the Soviet Union as possible. The leaders of Zambia and Zaire will be the chief beneficiaries of this approach. Their emissaries have already combed the Hill, seeking and finding much support for aid to bolster these regimes now that the "Marxist contagion" is allegedly threatening them from Angola. The Administration, of course, wholly backs this policy, and may have actually encouraged the African leaders to do their lobbying job for them. In any case, Kissinger has indicated that "the Administration almost certainly will approach Congress for a considerable increase of arms aid to other African countries, especially Zaire and Zambia." (Washington Star, Feb. 19, 1976)

A variation on this approach, espoused by several on the "Left" in Congress, is a new "realism" in dealing with liberation movements. Thus, the US should not have isolated MPLA as the enemy, which only increased its "radicalism" and reliance on the Soviets. Prominent spokesmen for this approach have been Senators John Tunney and Dick Clark. Tunney sent an aide to Luanda in January to confer with MPLA and serve as go-between for MPLA and the State Department and Clark will hold hearings this month on US relations with the liberation movements. So far however, this strategy of improving relations with liberation movements has not been tied to cutting US support to their oppressors in power.

The logical extension of communication with the MPLA advocated by Tunney and Clark and others is US diplomatic recognition for the People's Republic of Angola under the MPLA. Over 70 nations have already taken this step, including the majority of Africa, our NATO allies, Japan and Canada. Although the State Department has permitted Gulf and Boeing to resume their business dealings with Luanda, (see below) Ford and Kissinger have indicated they will not budge on recognition until the Cubans leave and MPLA is recognized by Zaire and Zambia. However, this "realistic" approach is reflected by the Administration's recent statements on Rhodesia. The US says it is now putting its full weight behind the negotiations between Smith and Nkomo, the latter who is seen now to represent a moderate position. This recent interest is in marked contrast to the lethargy shown by the Administration last fall, when it had an opportunity to pressure Smith to negotiate through restoration of full economic sanctions against his illegal regime.

Another and more ominous development in the wake of Angola is the rush by conservatives to the side of the defeated South African regime. At least 28 Senators have written a letter to President Ford urging a general re-evaluation of US policy towards South Africa, to include a relaxation of trade restrictions and a lifting of the arms embargo. The Administration, pressed not only by Senators but by industries who would benefit from a new stance towards the PRA is currently considering restoring full Export-Import Bank facilities for South Africa (see article in the United States and Southern Africa section).

All sides profess the desire for peace and stability in southern Africa. But even if the "realists" were successful and helped to bring moderate black governments to Zimbabwe and Namibia, for example, their hopes will probably be dashed on the bedrock of white South Africa. No moderate and peaceful road to majority rule is in view there.

GULF REOPENS NEGOTIATIONS

Backed by US State Department approval, the Gulf Oil Corporation has reportedly opened negotiations with the government of the People's Republic of Angola aimed at the resumption of the company's operations in the enclave of Cabinda. (Washington Post, 26 Feb.)

Under State Department pressure late last year, Gulf shut down its Angolan wells, which represent from eight to ten per cent of the company overseas profits. The move was part of a clear attempt at economic sabotage against the MPLA government. Concurrently, the State Department cancelled approval for the sale of two Boeing 737's to the Angolan commercial airline, TAG. The recent State Department move, following on the heels of recognition of the P.R.A. by most Western European nations was prompted by fears that the lucrative Cabinda concession would be turned over to another company. The Italian firm ENI (AGIP) had even sent a representative to Luanda to talk with the MPLA. The French were reportedly also very interested in the concession.

The MPLA made it clear that they would only negotiate with Gulf on their own terms. One immediate concession has to be made: Gulf must release the $125 million quarterly payment that has been held in escrow since the Cabinda operations were shut down. If the MPLA does decide to allow Gulf to resume operations, the contract which Gulf negotiated with the Portuguese colonial regime will have to be re-negotiated to bring the company's operations in line with the current policies of the People's Republic of Angola.

SOUTH AFRICAN AND NAMIBIAN INVOLVEMENT

The forces of change in Southern Africa have been vastly strengthened by the Angolan victory. Accelerated by the South African intervention in Angola and by a welding together of revolutionary movements, the war of liberation stands poised at the environs of Pretoria's
occupied territory of Namibia.

President Agostinho Neto of the People’s Republic of Angola, speaking to members of the Congolese Labor Party in Brazzaville, said: “We cannot limit ourselves to our own independence. Our people will extend their actions to liberate other countries like Namibia, at present occupied by the racists, and Rhodesia, which can achieve independence only through armed struggle” (Post, Washington, March 2, 1976).

This follows an early February visit by Mr. Sam Nujoma, the president of the South West Africa People’s Organization, to Luanda, during which SWAPO stated its recognition of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as the legitimate government of that country. In a press interview, Mr. Nujoma said that “South Africa is planning a minimum strategy of creating a buffer ‘Greater Ovamboland’ 40 miles inside Angola from the Namibian border. The SWAPO president related how his Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia had played its part in the Angolan struggle by harassing and capturing South African soldiers moving northward into Angola. He also charged Pretoria with resettling Portuguese refugees in southern Angola to help build up white support for the buffer state (Observer, London, Feb. 8, 1976).

The Washington Post of March 2 also reports: “The UN High Commissioner for Namibia said yesterday that he does not think that the United Nations would interfere if Cuban or other foreign troops helped guerrillas in that territory to fight South African rule, which is in violation of UN orders. Sean MacBride, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, said Western countries that supply South Africa with arms had encouraged the occupation of Namibia under conditions that he said were “worse than those in Communist countries.” The Washington Post writes that the Commissioner’s comment “was one of several suggestions that Namibia may be the next target for guerrilla warfare” and that the council of ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa declared it would furnish SWAPO with “all necessary political, military and logistic aid”.

Officials in Cuba stated that their country would support the people of Namibia in their fight against South African rule, saying Cuba would continue to provide aid for its “sister peoples on the continent of Africa in their armed struggle against colonialism and for national liberation. . . . The independence of Namibia and the definitive elimination of the violations of human rights committed by the racist regime must be accomplished by means of the forced expulsion of the fascist Pretoria troops and the establishment of a SWAPO government” (Times, London, Feb. 24, 1976).

Meanwhile Pretoria has been attempting to reach an accommodation with Luanda. South African journalist Stanley Uys writes: “In a race against time, the South African Government is shaping a peace plan that will enable it to withdraw its 4,000-5,000 troops from Angola before the advancing MPLA-Cuban force engages them in armed conflict. . . . The plan is based on recognition by South Africa of the MPLA as Angola’s Government in exchange for an assurance that South Africa’s ‘interests’ in Angola will be safeguarded” (Observer, London, Feb. 15, 1976).

South Africa’s desperate hope was based on an indication in mid-February that the Angolan government might consider an arrangement, a Wan hope in view of President Neto’s Brazzaville statement. Pretoria has three major ‘interests’ with regard to any agreement with the PRA over Namibia: 1) the refugees in the occupied 40-50 mile zone in southern Angola, 2) the Cunene River hydro-electric scheme at Ruacana on the Namibia-Angola border and dams, irrigation canals and power stations up to 15 miles inside Angola, and 3) prevention of growing pressure by SWAPO soldiers in the ‘buffer’ zone and across the border (Observer, London, Feb. 15, 1976; Times, New York, Feb. 13, 1976; Sunday Times, London, Feb. 29, 1976).
South African Minister of Defense Pieter W. Botha admitted for the first time that up to 5,000 Pretorian troops were in Angola in a press interview with an American correspondent on February 3. He said the soldiers were patrolling the southern Angolan "buffer" zone stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Zambian border, a distance of over 750 miles. "They will stay there", he suggested, "until a new Angolan government assures Pretoria that it will not provide bases for terrorists striking across the border into Namibia. . . . Up to now, the government has hinted that it is only hanging on to a bulge around the South African-built dam and power complex on the Cunene River. Botha barely mentioned this complex, making it clear that Pretoria's real concern is incursions across the border" (Post, Washington, Feb. 4, 1976).

The Washington Post dispatch includes the following on the interview with Botha in South Africa: "South Africa's intervention in Angola", he said, "has the blessing of several African states and at least one 'free world' power." He refused, despite repeated questioning to identify the power as the United States, saying "I would be the last man to destroy our diplomatic relations with the United States".

"There have been repeated stories in the press here that the Angolan adventure was arranged by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and its South African counterpart, the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). But Botha said, "If it were so, it was not the only channel".

"Informed sources here say that the U.S. encouragement was delivered by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the resigning U.S. Ambassador to the UN, to his South African opposite number, Pik Botha, and also by U.S. Ambassador William Bowdler to Prime Minister Jonn Vorster."

The South African defense minister has been talking tough about Pretoria's "responsibilities" in Namibia "to ensure a peaceful constitutional evolution in contrast to the Russian-Cuban revolution in Angola". The South Africans engaged in combat with both Angolans and Cubans in Angola. One report from the 'buffer' zone says the South Africans "are upset at the wide-spread belief in South Africa and abroad that their troops were given a bloody nose by the Cubans. In fact their troops, and especially the national servicemen, appear to have performed well" (Star, Johannesburg, Feb. 21, 1976; Post, Washington, Feb. 18, 1976; Sunday Times, London, Feb. 29, 1976).

The South African press is full of estimates and guesses and talk of impending conflict. An example is a column in Namibia's Windhoek Advertiser of February 23 by a former RAF air commodore about the strength and skill of the South African (and Rhodesian) air force and its capability to interdict aggressive ground forces, especially armor, in the Namibian desert.

SOUTH AFRICA ATTEMPTS TO CREATE A REFUGEE ISSUE AT THE UN

South Africa has tried to use the Angolan refugees in the southern part of the country as pawns in a clever propaganda move, but the plan has backfired. In a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN in January, South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilgard Muller, claimed that South Africa had been taking care of up to 13,000 Angolan refugees in South Africa and Namibia, at the cost of over $5 million. At the time of writing, Muller declared that his government was still providing for more than 2,800 refugees at three locations "near the Angola-South West Africa border." Another, 2,200 refugees were at Walvis Bay. Since Portugal had undertaken to repatriate all Portuguese citizens, Muller was asking the UN Secretary-General to request the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to assist in solving the problems of all other refugees.

South Africa's efforts, however, were exposed a little later, when it was forced to admit that the refugee camps were actually located inside Angola, in the areas still occupied by South African troops. In a strong protest addressed to the Secretary-General, the Cuban representative to the UN, Alarcon, condemned South Africa's maneuvers as "an exercise in cynicism as clumsy as it is futile, [seeking] to confuse public opinion and to conceal the aggressive and totally illegitimate actions which the racist authorities are taking against the peoples of Angola and Namibia, and to disguise them by invoking so-called 'humanitarian' objectives." The Cuban representative argued that if the people involved were in fact refugees, they had obviously been displaced in the course of South Africa's invasion of the southern half of Angola. Past experience with "strategic hamlets" both in Vietnam and Portugal's ex-colonies should make the UN wary of agreeing to any form of support. Furthermore, in view of mercenary involvement in Angola, one should also raise the question whether the setting up of "refugee camps" might not "be linked with the mobilization of international murderers, in the pay of imperialism..."

Whatever these South African-controlled camps are in reality, it is obvious that according to Muller's request, would have meant implicit recognition by the UN of South Africa's occupation of the southern sector of Angola. The move was bound to fail, and in fact was turned down by the Secretary-General. In a mildly-worded letter, the UN Secretary General avoided dealing with any of the substantive issues involved, rejecting the request on the grounds that "the United Nations could undertake programmes of humanitarian assistance in a given country only at the request of that country, and in co-operation with its competent authorities." (UN documents S/11938, 11970, 11983, 11992).

CALL FOR UN MEMBERSHIP

Sierra Leone and Guinea have called for the PRA's admission to the UN this year. While no formal application has yet been submitted, the rapidly growing number of countries recognizing the PRA (including now most of the Western countries) makes it likely that this will be done in time for the next session of the General Assembly. In the meantime, the recent meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers (at which the PRA was officially seated for the first time) has decided to seek a meeting of the Security Council to discuss South African aggression against Angola. (Diplomatic World Bulletin, New York, February 23, 1976; UPI-Addis Ababa, March 1, 1976)

INSIDE ANGOLA

An emergency international conference in solidarity with the Angolan people was held in Luanda in early February. The conference was called by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization and coincided with the 15th anniversary of the launching of armed struggle by the MPLA (February 4, 1961). Delegations from over 80 countries, including the US, attended. (Daily World, New York, Feb. 3, 1976) At an earlier meeting of the
organization in Aden, People’s Democratic Yemen, called on all nations to denounce imperialist aggression in Angola, to demand the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and to recognize the government.

As the military situation has stabilized, the government is moving ahead in national reconstruction giving up priority to agricultural development of the countryside since 85% of Angola’s population are peasants.

In the cities, especially Luanda, the ‘Poder Popular’ campaign continues its work of political education through the newly organized Department of the Organization of the Masses (DOM). DOM offices are found throughout the country and are related directly to the MPLA Central Committee. Political education classes are organized through DOM which also acts as a clearinghouse for the resolution of local problems. DOM will help with medical and education information for programs which the MPLA is running. As Comrade Tinito told a London Times reporter, “We are moving from the colonial phase to the anti-colonial phase—we must transform the structure of our society and the minds of the people through the DOM program”. (The Times, London, Feb. 2, 1976)

**south africa**

**POLITICS**

**THE PROBLEM OF RHODESIA**

South Africa is confronted with new dilemmas following the closure by Mozambique of its border with Rhodesia (see Zimbabwe and Mozambique sections). South Africa is Rhodesia’s only remaining outlet to world markets. Both exports and many of Rhodesia’s imports had travelled via Mozambique, including gasoline and other petroleum products. A serious problem is also posed by the increased fighting between the Zimbabwean liberation movement and Rhodesian forces. Reportedly the main point of entry for the Zimbabwean liberation forces has been via Mozambique.

South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster faces strong internal pressure to come to the Rhodesian Government’s aid. Many whites in South Africa have relatives in Rhodesia. The Vorster Government, itself the target of international actions, has repeatedly made it clear that it opposes measures such as sanctions. But at the same time the apartheid regime, which is seeking detente with black Africa, does not want to be seen as the major violator of the Rhodesian sanctions.

“The closing of the border and the stopping of commercial traffic between Rhodesia and Mozambique causes certain immediate problems for both countries,” said South African Prime Minister Vorster on March 4, the day after Mozambique’s action. Vorster went on to say that “quite a number of other countries in southern Africa, including Zaire and South Africa” would have to adapt to the new situation. Further, he warned that this could be “the spark which will cause the smouldering fires of friction to flare up.”

It is precisely because South Africa does not wish to be consumed in Rhodesia’s flames that it has sought detente with the rest of Africa. For quite some time South Africa has been putting considerable pressure on Smith to reach a settlement with the African majority in Rhodesia. To this end, last year South Africa withdrew its paramilitary police from Rhodesia. South Africa also informed the Rhodesian government last year that it could not handle any additional Rhodesian cargo, a statement reiterated after the border closure. Rhodesian businessmen have found it increasingly difficult to get South African firms to fill out the necessary forms which list Rhodesian goods as South African thus allowing Rhodesia to avoid UN sanctions.

Another important aspect, not lost on Vorster, is that the victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique and more immediately MPLA in Angola, where South African troops were beaten, has increased the militancy of Blacks in South Africa. South Africa can not afford to be a loser in

**MAP**

Mozambique’s closure of her border with Rhodesia has severed rail connections to the ports of Beira and Maputo which handled 60% of Rhodesia’s trade.

Only rail routes now open to Rhodesia connect with South Africa. One passes through Botswana and the other is a new direct line.

The Benguela railway, vital to copper shipments by Zambia and Zaire, has been closed since August because of war damage to the Angolan section and a stoppage of port operations at Lobito.

For Zambia, there is an alternative route, the TanZam railway to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The line was completed in October, but part of the roadbed needs strengthening before it can carry copper. Shipments would be limited by extreme port congestion at Dar es Salaam.
another ‘no win’ war. Militarily, South Africa cannot simultaneously fight against SWAPO in Namibia, protect its long border with black Africa, maintain repression at home; and continue to have enough skilled whites to operate the economy. Simply put, Rhodesia is expendable, detente abroad and repression at home are not. (New York Times, March 5, 1976; Washington Post, March 5, 1976.)

PROPAGANDA DRIVE
The South African Government is planning a major propaganda campaign around the Transkei, one of the nine African “homelands”, which is set for independence in October 1976. Aimed at the Americas, Europe and Australia, the campaign will include several new publications and a film on the Transkei. In addition, foreign journalists and television teams will be invited to South Africa to report on events in the Transkei “homeland”.

“The idea as far as we are concerned is just to make the Transkei known to the world as it becomes independent and to show opinion formers, decision takers, the media, businessmen and academics what the Transkei is like,” said Secretary of Information Dr. Eschel Rhoodie. “The Transkei is proof of the formula. This is how it can work for other homelands too,” he concluded.

What Dr. Rhoodie failed to mention was that the African population has had no say in this proposed balkanization of South Africa and that the liberation movements are strongly opposed to the plan. All the homeland areas combined comprise only 13 per cent of South Africa’s territory although 70 per cent of the population are now supposed to consider these areas their “home.” It is worth pointing out that opponents of apartheid are constantly denied entry to South Africa or the Transkei.

A major aspect of the South African propaganda campaign will focus on an attempt to rebut criticism that the Transkei will be economically dependent on South Africa. A typical answer to this criticism was given by the Transkei’s future “Prime Minister” Kaiser Matanzima. “There are so many sovereign countries in southern Africa that are economically dependent on the Republic. Lesotho is dependent on South Africa, and so is Swaziland and so is Botswana and so is Malawi. We shall not be the first.”

However, Matanzima fails to point out that, unlike such countries as Lesotho and Swaziland, over half of the “citizens” of the homelands actually live and work outside the homelands.

There is no prospect that the homelands will be able to provide employment for all or even a significant majority of the African workers. The Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC) has created only 16,000 jobs in the last ten years while some 17,000 men from the Transkei come into the labor market each year; as many women also work the number of jobs created by the XDC is extremely small compared to African needs.

The South African economy depends on black workers in its industries, mines and farms. In short, the South African government has no intention of actually repatriating all Africans to the homelands. The homelands are to remain as pools of cheap labor, dividing Africans ethnically and by giving some more privileged positions, and diverting political energies into “homeland politics.” (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 17, 1976; South African Scope, South Africa, Dec.-Jan. 1976.)
WHITES DEBATE BLACKS LOYALTY

A major debate is going on among white South Africans over whether or not Blacks will help in the “defense” of South Africa. Since no one really expects the Russians or Chinese to invade, the real debate is about how much support the government can expect in fighting liberation movements.

Colin Eglin, leader of the opposition Progressive Reform Party, said in the South African parliament “We can only defend ourselves if 25 million South Africans stand together. Everything is going to be in vain unless we can get the 21 million Blacks helping in the defense of the country.” He said that this could only be expected to happen if changes were made so that Blacks felt they have something worth fighting for.

“Far too many black people see what is happening in the north and Angola as part of the process of liberation from discrimination within South Africa,” Eglin said, continuing, “I believe many of the black people of South Africa are getting silent satisfaction out of the successes of the MPLA.”

Several Black organizations have come out openly in support of the MPLA [see Southern Africa, March 1976].

Robert Sobukwe, the banned leader of the Pan Africanist Congress, one of the South African liberation movements, told Bernard D. Nositter of the Washington Post that Mozambique had shattered the myth of ‘white South African invincibility. “Sobukwe” wrote Nositter, “hopes and expects—like most blacks here—that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola will triumph in Angola.”

It was put very clearly by a black man who lives in the Soweto township but works in Johannesburg when he told New York Times correspondent Michael T. Kaufman “It makes us all think. In Rhodesia, they are talking and after 10 years they have nothing. In Angola and Mozambique they fought and they have won.” (Star, Johannesburg, Feb. 21, 1976; New York Times, Feb. 21, 1976; Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1976.)

NEW SECURITY COMMISSION

Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster has proposed to parliament the establishment of a Parliamentary Internal Security Commission (Priscom). Priscom is necessary, according to Vorster, because South Africa is in danger from the “enemy” at home.

Priscom was designed to draw opposition members of parliament directly into the process of repression. However, the Progressive Reform Party (PRP) opposes the measure while the United Party (UP) opposes it in its present form.

Under the current plan the commission will investigate cases put before it by the Government through the State President. The commission, which will operate on a variety of sources of information, including BOSS, the Bureau of State Security, is expected to meet in secret. Witnesses will not necessarily know what person or organization is the object of the investigation, even if it is themselves. Witnesses will not be allowed legal representation. Failure to testify will be punished by a six months jail sentence, which can be renewed for continued refusal of cooperation.

While the bill is assured of passage because of the absolute majority held by the ruling Nationalist Party, it is unclear what amendments Vorster will accept in order to get UP members to sit on the commission. Whatever the result of the parliamentary debate, Priscom will soon become the newest part of South Africa’s repressive security apparatus. (Star, Johannesburg, Feb. 21, 1976; Sunday Times, London, Feb. 29, 1976.)

SASO NINE TRIAL

The trial of the SASO 9, who face a minimum sentence of 5 years if convicted, has been postponed until the end of March, following a defense motion for dismissal. The nine are leading members of the Black Consciousness Movement and the evidence against them consists of poems, articles and plays. They are not accused of any act of violence but rather of trying to provoke violence through their writings.

One of their plays portrays the shooting of 69 Blacks in the Sharpville massacre; a magazine article declared “Hitler is not dead, he is likely to be found in Pretoria.” The following is a verse in a poem:

To weep is a waste of glorious time.
Time to grab arms
And aim them at
The blue-eyed enemy
Lurking in the bushes.

Such language coming from Blacks is very alarming to Whites who for years have benefited from the system of apartheid but have recently seen the collapse of Portuguese colonialism bring radical black governments to the borders of South Africa. Indeed, the SASO 9 are not the only Black Consciousness leaders to be arrested and detained.

The nine were among those arrested in September 1974 for their part in a pro-FRELIMO rally. In jail over a year, they have been held in solitary confinement and tortured. Professor Morand, an observer for the International Commission of Jurists, reported that one of the accused "was thrown into the air by two police officers and left to fall heavily on the cement floor." As a result, "he has suffered from pains in the lumbar and pelvic regions and from permanent headaches." Because of this and other abuse Professor Morand reports that the accused’s “physical and mental health has been severely endangered. On February 3, 1975, for the first time in his life, he had an epileptic fit.”

Despite such tortures and long imprisonment, the South African Government has failed to break their spirit. The nine come into court singing “we don’t care if we are arrested, even if we are killed.”


INTERVIEW WITH WINNIE MANDELA

The following interview with Winnie Mandela, who recently had banning orders lifted against her for the first time since 1962, was conducted by the Southern Africa News Agency (SANA). Ms. Mandela is the wife of the African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela who is serving a life sentence on Robben Island. The Mandela’s have spent less than four months together since their marriage over 17 years ago. Winnie Mandela is a leader of her people and has served several jail sentences including 17 months in solitary confinement in 1969-70.

SANA: It has often been suggested that Black women in South Africa constitute the most exploited and oppressed group in the world: Could you elaborate on this? What could be their role in bringing about meaningful change?
WINNIE MANDELA: I don't think that there is a country where women are as exploited as in this country. The Black woman has to put up with the laws. She is faced with this and she has no status at all. She can hardly own a home; in fact the death of her husband means the automatic loss of her home. She has no rights whatsoever just the same as a child. She cannot participate politically. She is supposed to build the nation, she forms the majority of mothers in this country, yet she is in the most hopeless situation to try and bring up children in a society riddled with racial hatred. It is so hopeless that she cannot play any meaningful role within the political structure today.

SANA: Do you see any possibility for a change in the role of Black women?

WINNIE MANDELA: There was an attempt in Durban [see Northern Africa, March 1976], as you know, which was in a way an historical occasion. Having 200 delegates, representing 200 various organisations proportionally speaking, it was the first time that there were so many Indian, Coloured and Black women representatives of the Black races in this country. This was proof of an attempt to look for a solution, some solution that perhaps lies somewhere, where a mother can try and bring about some kind of social change. Whether that can be within the social structure as it stands, time alone will tell.

SANA: Could you give an evaluation of or comment on the Natal Women's Federation Conference and what came out of it?

WINNIE MANDELA: What we managed to do at the conference was to co-ordinate and consolidate Black women's organisations with a view to developing and improving Black communities.

SANA: To switch to another subject, could you comment on the significance of the recent widespread detentions and political trials and general use of security legislation with special reference to the Terrorism Act? It seems to be unprecedented. Is an analogy to the 1960's possible?

WINNIE MANDELA: Well it goes back to what we said originally. As far as I am concerned Black-White relationships have deteriorated terribly in this country. If you look at the histories of the people who have been detained, each one of them has in some way or another identified with Black sympathy and the attempt by the Government is to destroy any kind of genuine Black oriented "liberalism", as they would refer to it. We have the highest regard for some of the Whites who were involved in the detentions because they have identified themselves with our aspirations and the attempt by the Government is to destroy that, to drive the races farther and farther apart. This is unfortunate, but on the other hand it does promote Black consciousness because those people are very, very involved.

SANA: One last question, Mrs Mandela, could you say something about your own plans now that you are unbanned?

WINNIE MANDELA: Being banned and unbanned is really one and the same thing. There is effectively absolutely no change. I really do not regard myself as any freer than I was yesterday. The only difference is that I am able to speak to you today, in the presence of a third person.

(Southern Africa News Agency, Cape Town, Jan. 1976.)

PASS LAWS STILL ENFORCED

Despite much talk about "change" from South African Government officials, the pass laws are still being strongly enforced. According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, 511,163 Africans were sent to trial for violations of the pass laws during the year ending June 1974. During that time these cases represented over 20 per cent of all cases sent for trial, the equivalent of 1,400 cases for every day of the year.
African agents are. England for formal liaison with South African security officials in documents have been stolen. Scotland Yard has had twelve or so burglaries although confidential papers and of the South African and Namibian liberation movements apparently been breaking into the apartments of members BOSS BREAK-INS which is real, but department manager said doing a large business in TOYS were white. for the year ending June 1974 was 2,474,066. Eighty investigating the matter. No arrests have followed the in the last twelve months and the British parliament is concluded Hilary Bayback of the Johannesburg Children's Hospital. “The children are obviously playing out something playing war. “The children are obviously playing out something which is real, but I wouldn’t like to see it over done,” concluded Hilary Bayback of the Johannesburg Children’s Hospital. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 4, 1976.)

BOSS BREAK-INS

BOSS, the South African Bureau of State Security, has apparently been breaking into the apartments of members of the South African and Namibian liberation movements in England.

Several break-ins and similar incidents have taken place in the last twelve months and the British parliament is investigating the matter. No arrests have followed the twelve or so burglaries although confidential papers and documents have been stolen. Scotland Yard has had formal liaison with South African security officials in England for 15 years and knows who most of the South African agents are.

The “burglars” seem very well informed. Last week when leaders of the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO, were meeting in London on policy matters an official’s hotel room was robbed and papers taken while he and other SWAPO officials were out to dinner.

Several cases involving African National Congress leaders have shown similar patterns. John Gaetsewe, an ANC official, had his apartment broken into while he was in Canada. The most recent incident in February of this year involved the theft of important confidential documents from Moses Garoeb, a member of SWAPO. All signs point to BOSS, as the focus of all these burglaries was not valuables but organizational papers. (Sunday Times, London, Feb. 29, 1976.)

ECONOMICS

HOMELAND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT

A third review of African Bantustans by the Bureau of Economic Research, Bantu Development, which surveyed conditions in the Ciskei, reveals many of the same basic problems that plague the other “homelands.” Only 55 per cent of the Ciskei’s population of 935,000 people live in the “homeland” itself, and only 20 per cent of this group can be considered “economically active.” Half of the labor force is employed in white areas which leaves only 50,000 people employed in their own Bantustan—just five per cent of the registered Ciskei populace. The wages of those who work in the white areas, either as commuters or migrants, add up to 71 per cent of the tiny Gross National Income of the Ciskei, while the products and profits of their work stay in the white areas.

The South African Government is investing R84 million ($74 million) in the “homeland,” a jump of 39 per cent over 1974; but still industrial growth within the Ciskei and in the adjacent border areas has been slow. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 24, 1976) Prof. Frederick Tomlinson, who led the Commission which blueprinted the original concept of the Bantustans in 1955, has blamed the South African Government for the lack of “homeland” development from 1956-70, attributing this to the State’s refusal to allow white involvement in the development process.

Prof. Arnt Spandau of the University of Witwatersrand has worked on issues of black unemployment and estimates that 1.3 million rural Africans, mainly in the “homelands” are unemployed; in other words about 25 per cent of the people in the Bantustans are without work. The problem is growing. From 1972-74 the Bantustan male black potential labor force grew by 113,000 per year, but only one sixth of these workers will find jobs through Government development corporations.

Agricultural statistics reflect the same acute economic poverty. Thus the Bantustans produce only one fifth of the food needed for their inhabitants. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 24, 1976)

SEX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AFRICAN WOMEN

One out of three African workers is a woman. In 1976 there were 1,880,000 such female workers, while in 1969 only one in five was a woman. Forty six per cent of African women of working age are employed (compared to 38 per cent for white women), and labor mainly in the agricultural and domestic service areas, although women
are increasingly found in commerce and manufacturing sectors also. Sex discrimination in wage structures is rampant, and more and more women are being drawn into industry to replace black men as even cheaper labor. The official government Wage Board's policy is to set wages for women 20-30 per cent lower for an equivalent man's job, particularly in the manual labor field. Some unions have pressed for less discrimination, but the old arguments that men are more able, stable, and less often absent still hold sway. (Financial Mail, Oct. 24, 1975)

**REVIEW OF 1975 BLACK LABOR SITUATION**

The argument that economic progress and growth will somehow destroy the substance of apartheid bears its ugly, head time and again. A Star reporter, Sieg Hannig, claims that the anti-inflation pact which government, business and unions signed in 1975 is affecting job reservation, influx control and other "holy cows of bureaucracy". He points to the end of restrictions on Coloureds in the Building Industry and the apparent relaxation of conservative white unions' attitudes towards black advancement in return for concessions involving the achievement of a five day work week and other benefits. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 10, 1976)

Hannig's optimism and interpretation of events must be balanced by other facts. In the anti-inflation pact language, for instance, there is reference to giving Africans a chance for more skilled opportunities in the border areas or in the Bantustans, but there is a key proviso related to these exemptions from the normal non-African control of skilled jobs. It is (in the White Paper on Decentralization) that "exemptions will be granted on certain conditions: workers of different national groups may not be employed on the same level of work; separate facilities must be provided; Blacks cannot supervise Whites; there may be no displacement of white workers; and in these Border Areas no Bantu (sic) apprentices will be trained." As the Financial Mail comments, "Apartheid wins again." (Financial Mail, Oct. 10, 1975)

While it is true that inflation and its consequences did cause some rethinking on the part of South African officialdom, the anti-inflation campaign and other economic adjustments needed within the system have not established South Africa on a path away from apartheid, but have rather begun a process of rationalizing the system to fit the new economic needs.

**RAISING THE PRICE OF MIGRANT LABOR**

The countries which are the main suppliers of workers to South Africa have met, according to former Minister of Labor, Joel Moitse of Lesotho. He stated in an interview that Lesotho had initiated discussions with Malawi and Mozambique, and that there was discussion at the Organization of African Unity about setting up a "labour secretariat for Southern Africa" to deal with migrant labor issues of wages, houses, and family. Half of Lesotho's male workers migrate to South Africa (some 80,000 men) and Moitse pointed out that "South Africa has been the sole beneficiary of the system." He said that although morale had been boosted by increased wages over the last year, there was still need for career stability and skill growth, and for family living among workers, beginning with the higher grade laborers. Moitse believes that despite South African Government opposition to family life for migrants, the companies and the sources of labor, like his country, can change the situation. Moitse's ideas go beyond a Labor Secretariat to include a strong role for each supplier government to act on behalf of its workers in settling disputes and negotiating working conditions. He said that such a government role was not aimed at replacing Lesotho union organizing. After his dismissal from the Lesotho Cabinet, the Lesotho Government registered a Lesotho Mine Labour Workers group; two thirds of whom are migrants, but its activities are not known. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 31, 1976)

**GOLD HEADACHES**

The international price of gold has remained below the $150 mark, dropping below what South Africa regarded as a floor level price of $135/ounce on European markets in mid-January. But, says Minister of Finance Senator Horwood, another devaluation of the Rand is not necessary and the price still remains above its 1973 level. (Plunges in the gold price led to a huge rand devaluation in September, see Southern Africa, December, 1975)

South Africa relies very heavily on selling gold to earn foreign exchange. The hoped for increases in foreign exchange and government tax receipts resulting from more gold sales after devaluation have not materialized as expected, and some are questioning such heavy dependence upon gold for solving South Africa's balance of payment and government deficit problems.

South Africa has received international assistance with its foreign exchange deficits, including IMF approval to purchase currencies worth 80 million Special Drawing Rights or R82 million ($100 million) under a special standby credit arrangement to aid the South African current account deficit. It is significant that the arrangement comes at a time when certain European business people have begun to question the continued stability of South Africa's economy, as a result of events in Angola and other political turmoil. Commented one English newspaper: "The South African economy may well be brightened in a more permanent way than the post-Sharpeville era produced." (Sunday Times, London, Feb. 22, 1976) It is clear that the IMF plays a role supportive of the status quo in South Africa. As a Star article states, "the country's basic monetary and fiscal policies have the Fund's blessing . . ." (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 24, 1976) (New York Times, Jan. 11, 18, 1976; Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 17, 24, 1976; Die Vaderaand, Johannesburg, Jan. 18, 1976)

**THE ECONOMY—GUNS OR BUTTER?**

South Africa's trade deficit increased by seven per cent from 1974 to 1975 as a result of both the increased cost of imports after devaluation and the failure to boost exports as much as desired—in part a result of the continually depressed world market situation. The actual volume of imports decreased but the cost rose some 31 per cent. Foreign debts also increased some R145 million ($167 million) as a result of devaluation.

The South African Reserve Bank summarized the condition of the economy in a recent quarterly bulletin stating that it has "in general remained in a downward phase . . . for more than a year." (South African Digest, Jan. 16, 1976) Barclays Bank reports that South Africa faces increased government deficits, spiralling inflation, and excessive import bills, and the Stellenbosch Bureau of Economic Research predicts that in 1976 the economic growth rate will be only two per cent while inflation will reach 12 per cent. The Minister of Economic Affairs, Chris Heunis, announced after a meeting with government, white union, and business signatories, that the anti-inflation pact of September, 1975 will be extended.
another six months after its end of March deadline. Union representatives were reluctant to extend the agreement because they felt that the workers had taken the brunt of the austerity measures while profits and prices had risen. Black workers suffer even more in periods of rising prices as their income is insufficient to start with and is spent on basic needs like food and transport—cutting down buying power means going hungry.

Some economists and journalists are pointing to increased defense expenditures as one cause of South Africa’s continuing economic problems. The increase in military spending over the last year (R256 million or $294) is more than the total spent on Bantu Education (R151 million or $174 million)! Despite promises to the contrary the Government plans to increase all expenditures still further in 1976, borrowing heavily on local and capital markets (some R1,125 million or $1,293 million). There are fears that this will increase inflationary pressures, cutting down the value of individual buying power as prices rise.

It is likely that in the South African context the choice made will be “guns and butter—Whites only.” (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 13, 27, 1975; Jan. 17, 24, 31; Feb. 7, 1976; The Friend, Bloemfontein, Jan. 10, 1976)

**INVESTORS DUMP SOUTH AFRICAN SHARES**

The Union Bank of Switzerland, one of the country’s three leading banks, is reported to have sold all its South African shares in the last three weeks of February. The Union Bank has in the past taken a leading role in promoting South African loans on the Swiss market.

Recently Swiss investors have been large sellers of shares connected with South Africa. The shares sold include gold, financials, industrials and DeBeers (diamonds). On the international bond market South African Eurobonds suffered large losses in the last week of February, with falls of up to 9%.

In London British investors joined the panic selling of South African shares and prices of even the “best” gold and diamond shares fell sharply.

The selling seems to have been triggered by South Africa’s exposure over Angola, the collapse of South Africa’s detente with African States and increasing black militancy throughout Southern Africa. (Sunday Times, London, Feb. 29, 1976)

**FOREIGN RELATIONS**

**SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES**

Although Angola’s liberation has caused some Western interests to reconsider their relationship with the Apartheid regime—as evidenced by the Swiss banks selling all their stock in South African industries (WBAI, New York, Feb. 24, 1976)—most Western leaders refuse to recognize the reality that it is only a matter of time before the events of Mozambique and Angola are repeated in South Africa. No amount of window-dressing can change the nature of the Apartheid system. However the prospect of earning the enormous profits still possible under the Apartheid system propels the Western interests to extend their links with South Africa and to collaborate in the cosmetic maneuvers.

British economic and political ties with the Apartheid regime are increasing. The British Overseas Trade Board announced that the Merseyside Chamber of Commerce trade mission arrived in South Africa on Feb. 8, 1976. This is only the first of a total of 20 British trade missions that are expected to visit South Africa during 1976. (British trade missions had been in South Africa during 1975.) Additionally British firms will participate in five South Africa trade shows. British Petroleum granted £210,000 to the Rand Afrikaans University to establish a chair of energy economics. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Conservative Party’s chief spokesperson on economic affairs, justified British-South African trade relations by stating on a SABC television program that “whatever we may think about [South Africa’s internal policies] ... all parties are committed to the view that trade between the two countries is in the interests of both of us.” (In 1975 British exports to South Africa amounted to over $1,580 million.) The Guardian, which unofficially functions as the British Liberal Party’s newspaper, openly advocated a Western defense of the Apartheid regime. To make possible it advises the Apartheid regime to adopt certain superficial reforms so that the close alliance with the Apartheid regime will not be embarrassing to the Western Governments. In February the Labor Government officially hosted a three week propaganda tour by Mr. Mope, Chief Minister of the QwaQwa Bantustan, Mr. Ndao, Minister of the Interior of the Transkei, and Mr. Kanye, the Kwa Zulu Counselor for Community Affairs. Britain, along with France, West Germany, US, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, refused to support the UN resolution (November, 1975) which condemned the Bantustan policy and called on all governments to not to have any dealings with the Bantustan governments. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 17, 24, 7, 1976; Guardian, London, Feb. 17, 1976; Anti-Apartheid News, London, Jan./Feb., 1976)

Transkeian Cabinet Minister Miss Stella Sigcau visited Britain in February at the invitation of the Labor Government, along with other Bantustan Ministers.
Other countries, such as France, Israel, and Japan, also want to expand their economic dealings with the Apartheid regime. Mr. Francis Ricaud, the Secretary General of the Conseil National du Patronat Francais—the French equivalent of the American National Association of Manufacturers—has urged a doubling of French trade with South Africa. Figures for the eleven months prior to November 1975 show that French imports of South African goods amounted to $298.2 million and French exports to South Africa amounted to $453.6 million, an increase of nine per cent over the previous eleven months. Reporting on Japanese attitudes Mr. Norihisa Yamamoto, the associate editor of President (a Japanese monthly business magazine) said that Japanese businessmen consider it necessary to invest in South Africa in order to ensure a stable supply of natural resources for Japanese industries. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 31, Feb. 7, 21, 1976)

Meanwhile, Iran—the proxy country designated to safeguard US interests in West Asia—seeks to create a political-military alliance with the Apartheid regime in order to create an area of stability extending the northern region of the Indian Ocean to the southern region of Africa. Iran already has substantial economic ties with South Africa. South Africa is dependent upon Iranian crude oil supplies and it is Iran’s defiance of the Arab oil boycott against South Africa which prevents this boycott from damaging South Africa’s economy. The National Iranian Oil Company holds a 17.5 per cent interest in the NATREF refinery—a SASOL project. Iran provides technical experts and 70 per cent of the NATREF refinery’s crude oil needs. Additionally, Iranian capital would like to gain a participatory interest in South Africa steel processing industry. South Africa is the primary supplier of cement to Iran, and ISCOR and the Iranian Government are embarking on a joint venture to build a steel mill in Iran.

SOUTH AFRICA AND INDEPENDENT AFRICA

Unwilling to confront the truth, the Apartheid regime is making the Soviet Union a scapegoat for the increasing disintegration of South Africa’s “detente” strategy in Africa. But it was the South African regime’s own actions—its invasion of Angola, and the amendment of the Defense Act of South Africa to include all of Africa south of the equator—which has exposed the fact that the continued existence of the Apartheid regime is a danger to all Africans. The Apartheid state is not satisfied with oppressing Black South Africans, with subjecting them to abject poverty and the deprivation of all political and human rights, but wants to tie much of Africa into the Apartheid system, extending economic domination via political “detente” wherever possible, or “hot pursuit” where necessary. President Nyere of Tanzania recently stated that he regarded South Africa’s threat to invade any country which South Africa believed to be harboring guerrillas as a direct challenge to the freedom of Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, and Zambia: “We will not allow our countries to be treated like South African colonies.” (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 17, 1976; Guardian, Feb. 9, 1976)

When the Apartheid regime senses any degree of disunity among the African states it is overjoyed. Indeed one of the objectives of the “detente” strategy has been to create such disunity. The South Africans saw the deadlock at January’s OAU Summit Conference as a victory for them. Thus Die Burger could write that “[only] certain countries are making a fuss in Addis Ababa and elsewhere.... Not so long ago just about the whole of Black Africa would have become hysterical if this tune had been beaten on the anti-South African drum. But no longer.... This points to great progress which South Africa has made, in Africa in recent times.”

The visit in February of Leeto’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. C.D. Molapo and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. O.T. Sefako, to South Africa to have discussions with the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hilgard Muller, and Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Brand Fourie, gave the Apartheid regime the hope that “detente” was still a possibility. President Kaunda’s declaration of a state of emergency was cheered by the Apartheid regime. The Oggenblad declared that “the Zambian declaration of a state of emergency is a diplomatic thrust that is very much in South Africa’s favour.... It may justifiably be expected that the Zambian authorities will act sternly against the SWAPO nests in the south that were the ulcer that frequently burst to overflow into Caprivi and South West itself. This, too, is in South Africa’s favour. Moreover... Zambia has... indirectly strengthened its alliance with Pretoria.” Similarly the Star commented that “Zambia’s stability is crucial to the whole detente operation and to prospects for peaceful political solutions in Rhodesia, South West Africa—and South Africa.” (Comment and Opinion, Pretoria, Jan. 16, Feb. 6, 13, 1976)

DEFENSE

US ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA BROKEN AGAIN

Safair Freighters, a section of the Government-controlled Safmarine Company, has announced the purchase and delivery this year of six American Lockheed Hercules aircraft worth over $50 million. This brings Safair’s Hercules fleet to 16—one of the largest in the world.

For three years, Safair was virtually grounded due to protests over competition from South African Airways. Now, however, S.A.A. is assisting Safair with maintenance while a $5 million hanger/workshop complex is built for the latter at Jan Smuts Airport.

We can only speculate as to how and why the “difficulty” between S.A.A. and Safair has been so graciously resolved on behalf of Safair’s future expansion. What we can be sure of is that, as the Sunday Times of Johannesburg (Jan. 18, 1976) puts it, the Lockheed Hercules is “an extremely versatile aircraft.” It has a carrying capacity of 20 tons, travels 480 km. per hour, and can land on a very small airstrip, provided it is long enough. More important still, for our purposes, is that what is designated a Hercules “freighter” in reference to the Lockheed-Safair transaction has another name. It is also known as a C-130, and is specifically designated, (for example, in terms of recent Lockheed sales to Egypt) a military transport. To quote the New York Times (March 4), the C-130, or Hercules, “has been a major workhorse in the Air Force for years. It can take heavy loads and land and take off on rough terrain. It was widely used during the Vietnam War.”

More directly to the point in terms of Lockheed sales to South Africa, C-130’s were used as military transport in the Angolan conflict following the massive invasion of South African regular forces on behalf of the UNITA/FNLA attempt to crush the MPLA. It is reasonable to
assume that Safair’s fleet of 16 C-130’s will find its way into future conflicts wherever and whenever the South African Government deems it necessary.

SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PURCHASES

The British Marconi Company has signed a contract with the South African Department of Defense for nearly $20 million for the sale of a sophisticated communications system called Tropospheric Scatter. The equipment will be related to the Silvermine complex near Cape Town and will have portable components as well. It is believed that the system can be used to detect persons and weapons in an anti-guerilla struggle. The liberation movement of Namibia, SWAPO, had protested to the British Government. (Amandla, Dublin, January, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA’S DEFENSE SPENDING SKYROCKETS

During an eight months period ending in November, 1975, the South African Government’s expenditure exceeded revenue by $1400 million, due to massive defense requirements. The deficit was almost as high as the budget estimates for the full year. By November, with four months left in the fiscal year, the Defense Department had already spent 73 percent of its allocation—an allocation that was more than twice that of the previous fiscal year. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 3, 1976)

FOR DEFENSE, SOUTH AFRICA TERMED “AFRICA SOUTH OF EQUATOR”

In a Defense Amendment Bill published in South Africa’s House of Assembly on January 28, the definition of military service has been extended to include service for the prevention or suppression of “terrorism,” while “South Africa” has been defined as “Africa South of the equator.” “Terrorism” is further defined as “terroristic activities in the Republic or directed against the Republic or any authority in or inhabitants of the Republic.”

In redefining “South Africa,” the Bill is aimed at ending confusion over whether the written consent of servicemen must first be obtained before service in Southern Africa outside the Republic. Under the Defense Act as it stood previously, South African servicemen were liable during war time for service against the enemy anywhere in South Africa, whether within or outside the Republic, but their written consent was required for service “outside South Africa.” With the enactment of the present Bill, the South African Defense Force can, in effect, be deployed anywhere south of the equator to intervene in armed conflicts in which the opinion of the State President threatens or may threaten the security of the Republic. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 31, 1976)

An article in the Natal Witness (Comment & Opinion, Feb. 13, 1976) cites an indemnity clause of the Bill that also warrants attention. This clause frees all members of the Defense Force on active duty from all criminal liability for acts committed during service. Defense Minister Pieter Botha, in explaining the need for this clause, argued that “operational commitments” prevented soldiers from attending judicial inquiries into deaths resulting from “the process of combating terrorism,” and that further, it was not advisable to subject soldiers “to the worry of a possible criminal prosecution or civil process for acts done in good faith and in the execution of their duties.”

In rejecting both of Botha’s public reasons, the Natal Witness concludes: “Coupled with the concept of a secret compensation board to handle civil claims against members of the Defence Force, the concept of criminal indemnification is a patent attempt by the Minister to shut off the last source of information available to the public on the activities of the Defence Force, with its traditional deviousness, has again failed to come clean on its true motives.”

The hostile indignation and suspicion which comes through in the above statement is characteristic of much of public and press expression since South Africa’s intervention in Angola. The suspicion and fear of the South African public, that the whole world knew better than they what South Africa was doing in Angola, came to a head in early February with the publication in the Washington Post of an interview with Defense Minister Botha conducted by the Post’s Bernard Nossiter. In effect, it appeared that Botha had provided Nossiter with information concerning the extent of South Africa’s military involvement in Angola which he had consistently refused to supply to his own Parliament or press on the grounds of “security.” (see Comment & Opinion, Feb. 13, 1976)

XHOSA ARMY BEING TRAINED

Senior South African Defense Force personnel are being transferred to a new military base at Umtata in the Transkei to begin training of a Xhosa army from April 1, 1976. Last December, Defense Minister Botha announced the establishment of the base at a passing-out parade honoring, among others, 70 Xhosa soldiers who had completed four months’ basic training. Chief Minister of Transkei, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, responded to Botha’s announcement by saying that it was one of the proudest moments of his life. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 13, 1975)
TERRORISM TRIAL

The trial of six SWAPO supporters charged under South Africa’s Terrorism Act began in the seaside resort town of Swakopmund on February 16. The three women (nurses at a Lutheran Church hospital) and three men are accused of taking part in activities aimed at overthrowing “the lawful administration of South West Africa” and “undermining law and order” in the Territory. One is alleged to have assisted the assassins of Owambo Chief Minister Filemon Elifas last August. Among the “terrorist” acts portrayed are delivering money, purchasing a radio and a landrover, providing blankets, and presenting a dress, soap, and sanitary napkins to “a female member of the group of people who intended to violently overthrow the South West African state” (Southern African News Agency, January, 1976; Advertiser, Windhoek, Feb. 16, 1976).

A telex communication from the Lutheran World Federation in Geneva described a demonstration by 300 friends of the accused and how they were assaulted by club-swinging police: Three people were bitten by police dogs. An Irish attorney is observing the trial for the International Commission of Jurists.

The trial is expected to last from four to six weeks. Costs for the defense will run to over $50,000. The Lutheran, Anglican, and Roman Catholic churches are attempting to find this amount.

ATTACKS AND SECURITY

“Terror Attack At Okahandja” reads the front page headline in the Windhoek Advertiser of February 16. A young member of the white ‘commando’ militia and his wife were slain in a night-time attack on their farm some 40 miles from Namibia’s capital city of Windhoek. As with other recent attacks, becoming more frequent in the Territory, the attackers have not been found, even though Namibia is heavily patrolled by South African troops and police. A police reward of over $5,000 for information was increased to a total of over $50,000 by pledges from a group of businessmen for what will be known as the South West African Anti-Terrorism Fund. An appeal was made to the general public for contributions (Advertiser, Windhoek, Feb. 20, Feb. 24, 1976).

Farmers in the Okahandja district have sworn to stay, “no matter what the consequences”. A “boredag” (farmers’ day) gathering, addressed by police and commando officers, was devoted to preparation for and prevention of attacks. Instructions given were: “use any weapon. The object is not so much to kill the terrorist, but to put him out of action” (Star, Johannesburg, Feb. 28, 1976).

The South African regime’s “Commissioner General for the Indigenous Peoples of South West Africa” announced that Black soldiers are in training to defend the Owambo and Kavango bantustans, both situated along the border with Angola. They were said to be the nucleus of “future homeland armies”. At the same time, the Commissioner revealed that the South African army had taken over full responsibility for control of the border. The South African Minister of Police announced in Pretoria that “a scheme for security of South West Africa was being brought into operation” (Star, Johannesburg, Feb. 14, 1976; Advertiser, Windhoek, Feb. 20, Feb. 23, 1976).

CHANGE AND THE “CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE”

The South African-sponsored “Constitutional Conference” is due to reassemble March 2, after a four-month adjournment. Four committees—on discrimination, education, economic, and sociological issues—have been holding closed meetings, and two have traveled about the countryside seeking first-hand knowledge. The conclave—called last September and composed of 11 “ethnic groups” selected by Pretoria and its operatives in Namibia—is coming under intense pressure, now that southern Africa is so changed a region after the Angolan war.

Black and Coloured delegates have been increasingly critical of Pretoria’s three-year timetable for “independence” for South West Africa and of the sporadic
Nkomo was quoted as saying that he welcomed the British intervention and that it had always been his view that "only Britain could give independence to this country." (New York Times, Feb. 25, 1976) Apparently the British move was a result of Nkomo's visit to London early in February, mentioned earlier in this article.

At the time of the arrival of the British delegation, the Smith regime admitted crossing the Mozambique border in "hot pursuit" of Zimbabwean guerrillas after a battle south of Umlati. The Smith communiqué claimed that 24 Zimbabweans had died and one Rhodesian soldier had been killed. The New York Times reported that the South African Government had warned Smith "that under no circumstances would it commit its own army to the defense of Rhodesia though it might continue to supply arms." (New York Times, Feb. 26, 1976)

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guinea - bissau

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The body of the murdered PAIGC Secretary General, Amilcar Cabral, was transferred from Conakry to Bissau on January 20, 1976, the third anniversary of his assassination. A special national mausoleum is now under construction in Bissau to house the remains of the great patriot.

On the education front Prime Minister Chico Mendes reported that the number of students in Guinea was nearing 90,000 from a bare 1,000 when the armed struggle began. In contrast to the 30 teachers that had been provided by the Portuguese colonial administration prior to the war, there are now 2,000 teachers throughout the country. There are almost 400 students enrolled in higher educational programs overseas. A national literacy campaign is under way throughout the country. This is being taken up seriously by all organizations in the country, in particular the armed forces, the unions, and political organizations. New books are being designed and introduced and many Portuguese army camps have been transformed into schools. (AFP, Paris, Nov. 28, 1975)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Guinea Bissau and its neighbor, Senegal, have just signed an eight-point program for cooperation in foreign policy, trade, transport, immigration, and culture. A joint commission has been established to meet every six months to discuss current issues relevant to the two countries. The program also includes a joint mutual aid and assistance commission which will meet four times a year to evaluate border problems. Citizens of either nation will be permitted to pass freely across the borders in pursuit of work. (New York Times, Jan. 10, 1976) An earlier meeting in November 1975 between the Senegalese Interior Minister and the Security Minister of Guinea Bissau provided for increased vigilance against the former puppet organization FLING (the National Liberation Front of Guinea), which has carried out sporadic unsuccessful raids into Guinea Bissau since independence. At least thirty FLING members were arrested in Senegal where they are to be put on trial in the coming months. Some minor border incidents have been reported at government posts in Guinea Bissau. The January 1976 agreements should help to curb any
offensive by the Zimbabwe United Peoples Army on several fronts along the Rhodesian border. Mugabe said the Peoples Army had 20,000 volunteers, and was growing in numbers. He also said it was supported by the A.N.C. in exile. The report quoted Mugabe as dismissing the attempts by Nkomo to settle by talks with Smith as a waste of time and saying that the solution would “now come out of the barrel of a gun.”

Shortly afterwards, there were reports from Salisbury that Rhodesian troops had fought with FRELIMO forces on the Mozambique border. The Smith communiqué said that the battle started after Mozambican troops opened fire “on a tsetsefly control unit astride Rhodesia’s border and hit a Rhodesian airplane.” (New York Times, Feb. 22, 1976) Thereafter, Mozambique’s President Samora Machel issued a warning that Mozambique would send its forces into Rhodesia because of the Smith regime’s border violations. (Guardian, London, Feb. 4, 1976)

British Diplomatic Mission to Salisbury

News of trouble on the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border coincided with an announcement from Britain that it was sending a diplomatic mission to Salisbury to consult with the Smith regime and the Nkomo faction on the settlement talks. David Ennals, the British Minister of State in the Foreign Office, said the mission was not being sent to negotiate a solution or to offer substantial proposals but “to find out whether Mr. Smith’s attitude was now such that there is any real possibility of our helping to promote a settlement.” The members of the British mission were Lord Greenhill, a retired Foreign Office civil servant, who previously acted as an intermediary between the British Government and the Smith regime; Tom McNally, political adviser to James Callahan, the British Foreign Secretary, and Patrick Laver, head of the Foreign Office’s Rhodesia Department. (New York Times, Feb. 25, 1976)

Lord Greenhill, head of the British Diplomatic Mission to Salisbury.

Smith reversed his previous refusal to talk to British officials with the “explanation” over Rhodesian television that because the British were “going behind my back to talk to other parties” he had no option but to invite them to “come in the front door, so to speak, and let us all participate together.” (New York Times, Feb. 24, 1976)
desegregation moves in Windhoek; such moves are virtually non-existent elsewhere in the Territory. Mr. C.F. Hartung declared "Whites must free themselves of the ideology of apartheid to which they had become slaves". Mr. A.J.F. Kloppers warned that the conference "must start to bear fruit, because time was little and bloodshed was imminent". A white South African law professor, who had attended the Dakar Conference on Namibia and Human Rights (see Southern Africa, March 1976) stated that a "Black majority government was inevitable... if we wished to be recognised as an independent state in the eyes of the international community". A white South African politician warned "that either the Whites in South West Africa lead the 'revolution' themselves or else they must accept the fact that change would come about through force of arms" (Advertiser, Windhoek, Feb. 26, 1976).

ECONOMIC STORMS AHEAD

The British Labour Party's executive committee approved a document calling for the British Government to amend or terminate a contract with Rio Tinto Zambesi company, owner of the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia (due to come into production in July 1976), to ensure that Britain does not receive uranium from occupied Namibia. The Foreign Office is on record as opposing any such cut-off because a half of Britain's supplies of the important element would be affected. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 31, 1976; Observer, London, Jan. 25, 1976).

The European Economic Community issued a policy statement which for the first time gave clear support to the nine-member group to the right of the Namibian (and Rhodesian) people to self-determination and independence (Times, London, Feb. 24, 1976).

zimbabwe

SMITH'S REGIME ATTACKS MOZAMBIQUE

Taking a far-reaching step against the racist Smith regime, Mozambique on Wednesday, March 3rd, closed the country's border with Zimbabwe and cut all communications including road, rail, air, and telephone links. In addition, all Rhodesian property was ordered forfeited by the Mozambique authorities. These measures were announced in a radio address by President Samora Machel and followed directly upon a raid by Smith forces on the Mozambique town of Pafuri. According to the Washington Post (March 4, 1976) President Machel said the Rhodesian attack was made with jets, helicopters, and artillery, and that the airplanes involved had flown over South African territory. The Washington Post also reported that President Machel listed Mozambican casualties as two dead and seven wounded but added that two of the planes had been shot down by the Mozambicans. The attack on Pafuri was characterized by President Machel as "an act of war, a war crime against Mozambique."

This action by Mozambique followed increasing conflict within Zimbabwe between the guerrillas and the Smith forces. On February 28, the Rhodesians reported having lost four soldiers in what was described as the "northeastern guerrilla-war zone." (New York Times, March 1, 1976). A few days later the New York Times reported that the Rhodesian military announced guerrillas had killed "three members of an all-black para-military force" in "eastern Rhodesia." (New York Times, March 3, 1976). This attack, according to the New York Times, was viewed in Salisbury as a significant step-up in guerrilla fighting in the eastern part of the country, and the fact that the guerrillas were uniformed "was viewed as another indication of the growing boldness of the black nationalistic forces." According to the Smith military, the nationalists had killed 21 Whites and 215 Blacks since December 1972, while the Rhodesians, so it was claimed, had killed 764 persons during this period. (See Mozambique for a report on President Machel's radio address to the nation.)

Nkomo/Smith "Talking Front" Falters

Talks between the Nkomo faction of the A.N.C. and the Smith regime were begun on January 6 and adjourned on January 8. On January 28, two black detainees, Arthur Chadzingwa and John Charisa were released, apparently through Nkomo's efforts. The two men, former officials...
future activities of this counter-revolutionary organization. (West Africa, Lagos, Dec. 15, 1975) While many Guinean refugees have already returned to Guinea from Senegal significant numbers still remain to be repatriated. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Aga Khan visited both Dakar and Bissau in January to discuss plans for the return of some 84,000 refugees from the long war of independence. (BBC, London, Jan. 21, 1976)

For years the PAIGC has been one of the most loyal supporters of the MPLA in Angola. Since the declaration of independence in the Peoples Republic of Angola on November 11, 1975, the people of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde have continued their strong support. The National Union of Guinean Workers (UNTG) at a conference with representatives of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) issued a communiqué which "condemned imperialist intervention of racist South Africa in the internal affairs of Angola" and also pledged their support for MPLA. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 17, 1975)

Relations between Guinea Bissau and France and Portugal have been improved with the signing of agreements on technical cooperation. With the French there are agreements on various development projects particularly in agriculture, telecommunications, and culture. Meanwhile the discussions with the Portuguese have centered on the finances of the National Bank of Guinea-Bissau relating to pensions and retirement programs. There was a "frank" discussion regarding administrative and technical assistance with a proposal to have bilateral financing of a fishing company. Relations between Guinea and Portugal cooled considerably as a result of the strong support for the MPLA by Guinea-Bissau and the vacillating stand taken by Portugal. (AFP, Paris, Dec. 16, 1975; Lisbon Radio, 1900 gmt, Dec. 11, 1975)

The Soviet Union has continued its support for Guinea-Bissau by handing over a number of Mig fighter aircraft which will form the basis of the Air Force. The aircraft were delivered at a military airfield following remarks by the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau. (AFP, Paris, Dec. 2, 1975)

The US State Department announced in January 1976 that it plans to open an embassy in Guinea-Bissau to serve that nation and the Republic of Cape Verde. Bearing in mind the election year, Senator Edward Kennedy has proposed that an embassy should be established in Cape Verde as well and that a Cape Veredian American should be appointed as the US Ambassador. If only a single embassy were possible Kennedy argued it should be in Cape Verde since many Americans are from that archipelago. A large proportion of the Cape Verdeans living in the US, live in his constituency. (Kennedy Press Release, Washington, Jan. 28, 1976)
Another problem facing the new administration is the stratification of urban areas into wealthy, mostly white centers surrounded by slum shacks of Africans—the "cement city" of businesses and comfortable dwellings and the "cane city" of slums. As President Machel put it, "The people still live in the city's back yard." This year, misery of shanty-town life has been heightened by the disruption of flood-waters.

Practically, the nationalization of housing, announced on February 3rd, makes available a large number of vacant property for immediate use. The many dwellings left behind by owners headed for Portugal or South Africa, as well as un-rented holdings by landlords, is a step towards changing the colonial pattern. FRELIMO recognizes, though, that implementation of the measure, including structures for administering the buildings and communal organizations to oversee them, is a complex process that will likely take some time.

Another important February 3rd announcement was the creation of a "solidarity bank," to which all people earning over $300 a month are expected to contribute one day's wage a month. The vast majority of others will contribute a lesser percentage. One bank purpose is to help cushion the effects of national disasters, such as the cyclone which struck southern Mozambique earlier this year. But it will also be used to support African liberation movements.

Today, Mozambique faces a difficult future. The economy is in bad shape. There is an acute shortage of trained personnel. Delays and inefficiencies common to all underdeveloped nations are also found here, exaggerated by the complex colonial bureaucracy left by the Portuguese. Yet still it is difficult at every point to create new structures, rather than to simply use the old existing ones.

Strangely, though, the feeling one gets in Mozambique today is not one of frustration, but of determination and patience. It seems to be a legacy of the discipline of the long war years, when the motto was readiness for a long march, that had to be approached step by step.

[Reprinted from Africa News, March 8, 1976]

SAMORA MACHEL RESPONGS TO ATTACK BY SMITH REGIME

Southern Africa received a copy of an unofficial translation of the address by President Samora Machel on March 3, 1976 in which he announced the measures to be taken against the attack on Mozambique by the Smith Regime. The following is a summary of the speech.

Samora Machel began by stating that "Mozambicans, men, women, old people, children are being killed, our territory is being attacked, our people are being massacred, the People's Republic of Mozambique is under attack." The President went on to explain that "the criminal and irresponsible regime of Ian Smith" had launched a war of aggression against Mozambique. This had followed a long series of armed provocations against the People's Republic culminating in "a large-scale attack against our national territory, concentrated against the village of Pafuri and Mavue." The attack took place on February 23 and 24, the latter including air raids. "Jets, bombers, helicopters, artillery and infantry troops participated in the attack."

The President listed the names of four people who were killed, including a baby of 18 months, and five who were wounded as well as one who was missing as a result of the attack on Pafuri. At Mavue three women and a child were killed and a child was wounded.

He stated that "the fighters of the Mozambican People's Liberation forces supported by the para-military forces of Customs and Immigration repelled the invader severely punishing him, shooting down two planes, a jet and a helicopter. Ten fighters suffered various injuries, two of them seriously. Two other comrades sacrificed their lives in defense of the People and our sovereignty."

The President characterized the act by the racist Selous regime as an open act of aggression, an act of war, a crime against peace and a war crime as defined by the International Nuremberg Tribunal.

To the question, why does Smith attack, Machel said that to answer correctly "we must say Ian Smith does this because this is what he has always done against Mozambique." He pointed out that when Smith proclaimed "pseudo-independence in 1965, he joined the Portuguese colonialist war of aggression against the Mozambican people. The President listed in detail the massacres, air attacks by the Smith regime prior to the Transitional Government period, turning to subversion during that period and then being intensified again following independence. Examples of "enemy actions" (which did not constitute an exhaustive list) in Tete Province, Manica Province and Gaza Province were detailed.

These showed the racist regime's insistence in "willing to launch a war of aggression against our People and our State", which resulted from its being isolated internationally and facing armed insurrection by the People of Zimbabwe. The Smith regime thus "tries to solve its internal contradictions by spreading out the conflict. Smith was trying to create the impression there was war in Zimbabwe only because foreign forces want this, thus imitating Portuguese colonialists and other aggressors who always denied the existence of liberation struggles.

Mozambique Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano flew to London and New York after the border closures to call for international assistance with the heavy financial burden that will result from this enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia.
The President announced as from March 3rd, the following specific measures had been taken, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity:

- All borders with the British colony of Southern Rhodesia are closed;
- All forms of communication with that territory are forbidden;
- Passage of persons and goods and use of air space to and from Rhodesia are forbidden;

- All goods belonging to the illegal regime, firms based in its territory and to its citizens who recognize the regime are confiscated.

Samora Machel called on the peoples of Africa, the socialist countries and friends everywhere who value freedom and peace "to support the people of Mozambique in the defense of our freedom and reestablishment of the just Peace in our zone."

In closing, the President said:

"We have started a new phase of our Revolution, a phase in which our sacrifice, our blood will, as in the past, fertilise, cement and consolidate our Unity, our Freedom, our Independence, our revolutionary conquests.

"Fighters of the FPLM and people, united will conquer the enemy; will smash the aggressor that violates Peace and comes to massacre our People."

SAMORA MACHEL ADDRESSES THE NATION

The anniversary of the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, founder of FRELIMO, has been declared a national holiday—Mozambican Heroes Day. Eduardo Mondlane was killed on February 3, 1969, by a bomb hidden in a package delivered through the mail. Mozambican Heroes Day was named to commemorate Eduardo Mondlane and all others who died for the revolution.

At a mass rally on February 3 in the Mozambique capital, President Samora Machel officially changed its name from Lourenco Marques to Maputo.

At the rally, the President announced the foundation of a national fund to "Help the oppressed peoples of the world." The fund priority will be for aid to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. Despite the difficult economic situation that Mozambique is experiencing in the battle to recover from the long years of Portuguese colonialism, this demonstrates the extent of the solidarity that the new government has for the struggles that are continuing in the rest of Southern Africa. The national fund will be placed in the new Solidarity Bank and will be built through contributions from all Mozambican salaried workers, of up to one day's salary per month, depending on income.

President Samora Machel also announced at the rally, the nationalization of all private homes and buildings in the cities and towns to "end social discrimination and promote unity among the people; to open the houses to all the people; and to allow for the organization of collective life in the cities and towns with a view to consolidate people's power."

Eighty per cent of all the buildings in the cities and towns are privately owned. Those buildings that were constructed through private investment, without public funds, will be compensated according to provisions of a 'legal diploma' which is to be announced.

Owners of buildings for whom rent was the only means of income will receive rent for the rest of their lives if they are elderly or physically incapable of working to support themselves or a family.

Until a special institution is created to perform the task, Montepio de Mozambique, one of the nationalized banks, will be responsible for collecting rent from all tenants and administering and maintaining the buildings.

The increasing radicalization of Mozambique under FRELIMO and the growing conservatism in Portugal has led to a break down in relations between the two countries. Portugal has accused Mozambique of disregarding "the spirit of the accord signed between the two countries": In an effort to put pressure on Mozambique the Portuguese airline TAP recently suspended its flights to Mozambique. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Feb. 3, 4, 5, 16; New York Times, Feb. 8, 1976.)
THE CRISIS IN ZAMBIA

In an address on Zambian television and radio January 28, President Kenneth Kaunda invoked a state of emergency, citing as reasons the internal economic crisis and external threats. In a rather obvious reference to the MPLA, Cuban soldiers and especially the Soviet Union, Kaunda said: “Africa has fought and driven out the ravenous wolve of colonialism, racism and fascism from Angola through the front door. But a plundering tiger with its deadly cubs is now coming in through the back door. The effects of foreign intervention are now being felt in Zambia.” He concluded his speech with the words: “We are at war. Make no mistake. We must respond in a warlike manner.”

The President said that the state of emergency would effect certain rights and freedoms of the Constitution, but that “the vast majority of the people in this country will never feel the difference.” He then issued a stern warning to “those who are fighting the Party and the nation, be they Zambian or foreign. . . . We intend to destroy them, root and branch. They will know what it is to live under a state of emergency.” (Times of Zambia, Lusaka, Jan. 29, 1976) Some of the immediate and underlying explanations for Kaunda’s step are obvious: raiding in the Western Province, demonstrations at the University, the problems of Zimbabwe, and the economic situation.

Angolan Problems

In January, many Angolan refugees began to move into the adjacent parts of Zambia. Guerrilla groups looking for food and shelter have raided in the area, resulting in the death of about a dozen Zambians, including three policemen. The atmosphere there is very tense and army strength along the border has been doubled, while roadblocks and searches have been instituted around Lusaka. (Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1976; Times of Zambia, Lusaka, Jan. 29, 1976; BBC broadcast, Jan. 29, 1976)

University Unrest

Unrest at the University’s East Road Campus in Lusaka ostensibly goes back to student demonstrations in support of the MPLA and against Zambia’s policy favoring non-intervention and coalition government in Angola. The Zambian Government claims that either the Russian Embassy or ‘pro-MPLA’ embassies played a part in the January 15 demonstration, perhaps by supplying MPLA uniforms and badges, that only a minority of the students were involved and that they were manipulated by expatriate staff and other ‘outside’ influences. Minister of Education Fwanyanga Mulikita has said that the regime will examine the status of the institution very closely to make sure that staff reflect and support the “aspirations of the nation.” In late January, the Government detained the 37 members of the Executive Committee of the Student Union and at least four faculty members under a ‘28-day’ statute. The faculty were George Siemensa, a Dutch lecturer, Dario Longhi, an Italian lecturer in social science, Robert Molteno, a Black South African lecturer in politics (see below), and Lionel Cliffe, a senior British lecturer in politics. Cliffe, 39 years old and a teacher at the University of Dar es Salaam until his arrival in Lusaka in 1974, was arrested at his home. Some reports indicated that Molteno’s wife, a lecturer in sociology, was also detained. On February 5, students demonstrated in support of the release of Cliffe and for the dismissal of two members of the African staff, Dean of the Humanities and Social Sciences Ndèm and Dr. Mukatwa, and on February 9 the Government closed the university and sent the students away. In late January, two British journalists, Bruce Loudun of the Daily Telegraph and Stuart Dalby of the Financial Times, were briefly detained and then released; they cited a “sad misunderstanding” and were allowed to stay on in the country. (Washington Post, Feb. 1 and 10, 1976; New York Times, Feb. 1 and 10, 1976; BBC broadcasts, Jan. 29 and Feb. 11, 1976; Observer, London, Feb. 1, 1976; Guardian, London, Feb. 3 and 10, 1976; Times, London, Feb. 6, 1976; Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Jan. 30, 1976; Lusaka Home Service Broadcast in English, Feb. 9-10, 1976)

A document obtained by the Guardian (London, Feb. 17, 1976) suggests additional or different motives for the student action and Government intervention. Robert Molteno, who as a member of the politics faculty saw much of the research proposals submitted by American academics, wrote in a paper submitted to a seminar at the UN’s African Institute for Economic Development and Planning that Zambia was heavily infiltrated by the CIA. While Molteno does take any previous liaison with the State Department as prima facie evidence of espionage, he has substantial facts to buttress his case. Dr. Stephen Goodman, former teacher at the University, has publicly acknowledged working for the CIA as a Southern African economic specialist. Mr. Claygett Taylor, transferred from the US Embassy in Lusaka in 1975, has been identified by

President Kaunda—“we are at war”—but who is the enemy?
Paul Gumane of COREMO as the conduit for CIA funds to the organization in an effort to develop a counter-weight to FRELIMO after the Portuguese coup of 1974. The politics faculty blocked a number of proposals by American academics to study the liberation movements based in Zambia, including a project designed by Professor Robert Rotberg of MIT in 1970 which said the following about its objectives: "To learn about the strategy and tactics of liberation movements is to gain knowledge about small-scale internal and external wars and how such wars may be promoted, contained or prevented." Rotberg's team is now studying Bantustans with the active support of the South African Government. Several of the blocked proposals were funded by the Ford Foundation.

Problems with Zimbabwe

The Zambian Government remains very concerned about the situation on its southern border and about accusations of a 'sell-out' of the Africans in Zimbabwe (see Southern Africa, March 1976). Zambian sources claim that the Soviet Union is channeling substantial money to one faction in the Nkomo wing of the ANC through Mozambique, where some former ZAPU militants are in training; if negotiations fail, the Russians would support this group in an armed struggle against the Whites and perhaps against the Muzorewa-Sithole faction supported by China. Similar sources claim that as many as 20 Soviet KGB agents may be operating in Zambia. (Observer, London, Feb. 1, 1976; Sunday Times, Feb. 1, 1976)

Zambian officials reacted angrily to a statement by Robert Mugabe of ZANU, given in an interview to BBC in London in late January, that President Kaunda had personally ordered the execution of 13 guerrillas and the torture and imprisonment of many others. They point out that some liberation movement leaders enjoy a comfortable life in exile while thousands of Zambians have died along the Mozambiquan and Angolan borders from land mines, incursions and other effects of the struggle supported by their country. They claim that the strife among the Zimbabwean factions, and especially those within ZANU, cost 400 lives. In the trial at the Lusaka High Court of some of the accused ZANU members, the prosecution has submitted evidence relating to the deaths of 16 Zimbabweans, killed apparently between December 1974 and February 1975. Fifteen of the bodies were exhumed at Petauke in the Eastern Province. The other, Edgar Madekorozwa, was allegedly killed just outside of Lusaka in February 1975 by a group led by Tyupo Chigowe, one of those on trial. In a statement from the Police Inspector ruled as admissible by the court, Chigowe admitted capturing Madekorozwa at the house of the late Herbert Chitepo before taking him by car outside the city. (Times of Zambia, Lusaka, Jan. 29, 1976; Guardian, London, Feb. 8, 1976; Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 24, 1976)

On the question of the Rhodesian border, it would appear that an increasing number of Zambian MPs and other officials are suggesting a re-opening as a way of solving some of the economic problems. President Kaunda made a point of rejecting the proposal in a speech on Jan. 25 to the UNIP Youth Brigade. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Jan. 26, 1976; Zambia Daily Mail, Jan. 26, 1976)

Economic Difficulties

On the economic front (see Southern Africa, January 1976, December and October 1975), the situation gets worse. 60,000 tons of copper have piled up at the Dar es Salaam harbor. Copper revenues will not even cover production costs this year, but the Government is not able to reduce the 60,000 persons employed in that sector because of social and political pressures. The regime can no longer subsidize maize and fertilizer, and the corn meal staple of the Zambian diet has recently jumped 110 per cent in price. General food prices may rise by as much as 60 per cent on the average and petrol went up 20 per cent in early February. Earlier predictions of a good maize harvest were premature; because of a cob rot, a declining maize hybrid, and Government failure to announce sufficiently early to farmers its intention to pay an increased price, new predictions put this coming year's production at 4.5 million bags rather than seven million, at least two million bags below Zambia's needs. Several development projects have been postponed. In response to all of these problems, the Government is talking about a major financial rescue effort with various donors, including the United States, and President Kaunda is urging his citizens to go back to the land and grow food. Kaunda has also outlined strong measures against those who hoard food and engage in currency fraud. (New York Times, Feb. 3, 1976; Guardian, London, Feb. 8, 1976; London Observer, Feb. 1, 1976; Sunday Tribune, Feb. 11, 1976; Star, Johannesburg Jan. 10 and 31, 1976). Zambia last exported over the Lobito railway, which used to carry 55 per cent of its exports and 45 per cent of its imports, on August 12, 1975. The cargo is apparently the same 7,000 tons recently reported as stuck in Lobito. President Kaunda has now said that MPLA seized the ship in Lobito harbor with the cargo. According to the German (DDR) news agency ADN, trains are now running again on the railroad. (New York Times, Feb. 13 and 21, 1976; Guardian, London, Feb. 8, 1976; Financial Times, London, Feb. 21, 1976; Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 17, 1976)

Recent reports suggest a more complex relationship to the Soviet Union and a possible shift of attitudes towards the MPLA. US intelligence sources, in the wake of Senator Tunney's statements about the findings of his aides after their Southern African visits, revealed that Zambia recently received eight T54 tanks and 20 amphibious scout cars from the Soviet Union. (New York Times, Feb. 13, 1976; Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1976) Early February was a period of intense diplomatic activity around Lusaka, involving a number of high officials from neighboring countries. On February 3 Mozambique's Foreign Minister Joachim Chissano delivered a message to President Kaunda. The Zambian Government at that time vigorously denied rumors of meetings of its officials with representatives from Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique and Zaire. A few days later Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Machel met in Kilimani, Mozambique; Tanzania and Mozambique presumably encouraged Zambia to recognize MPLA and to support new leadership within Zimbabwe rather than the Nkomo faction. (Guardian, London, Feb. 4, 1976; Financial Times, London, Feb. 16, 1976)

international organizations

AT THE U.N.

NAMIBIA ISSUE DELAYED AGAIN

As was to be expected, the Security Council again failed to reach any positive decision when it met on Namibia at the end of January. It was the first time that the Council had considered Namibia since June 1975, when a proposal to establish a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was vetoed by the three Western permanent members of the Council (US, Britain, France).

Despite South African aggression in Angola, the disclosure that South Africa is rapidly expanding its military installations in Namibia, and the growing repression against Black organizations in Namibia, the Western powers have continued to reject attempts to have the Council declare that the situation in Namibia represents "a threat to peace and international security." The Council, in fact, is empowered to adopt compulsory and enforceable measures only if such a threat is recognized to exist. The inability of the Council to act because of Western opposition has been the main stumbling block to effective UN action.

Consequently, the January meeting was again an exercise in futility. Diplomatically, a victory of sorts was achieved when the nine European Economic Community members circulated a position paper submitted to the Secretary-General in which they rejected South Africa's convening of a "constitutional conference" with the participation of Black puppet leaders as "not adequate." The EEC countries called for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, the release of all political prisoners, and self-determination with the participation of "all political groups," and under UN supervision. The sudden appearance of South Africa's ambassador at the Council meetings (reported in the March issue of Southern Africa) may have been due to nervousness over the European countries' step. Since the South African delegation did not attend the last session of the General Assembly, it may be concluded that its intervention in the Council was dictated by fear that the European countries' new attitude might convince the Council to stronger action.

The African members of the Council, however, appeared unwilling or unable to use the diplomatic space thus opened to push for more decisive measures than in the past. The conflict over Angola and dissensions within the OAU, still at their height at the time of the Council meeting, overshadowed the debate and clearly undermined the ability of the African countries to reach a decision on strategy concerning Namibia. Although the OAU, in a message to the President of the Council, had called for the adoption of sanctions, the resolution eventually put before the Council with the co-sponsorship of the African countries was quite moderate. The resolution, adopted unanimously, merely repeated the position already taken by the Council in the past, and postponed the issue again until August. (UN documents S/11945, S/11946, S/RES/385(1976)).

NIGERIA TAKES MILITANT ANTI-US STAND

The new Nigerian ambassador to the UN, Leslie Harriman, seized the opportunity of a recent meeting of the Committee against Apartheid, to launch a strong attack against the United States. The Committee was paying tribute to the memory of Gen. Muhammad, the Nigerian head of state killed in an attempted coup in February. Harriman referred to a speech given by former US representative Moynihan at a UN press conference some months earlier, in which Moynihan had warned against a supposed Russian attempt to seize control of the oil routes around the coast of Africa with the help of various African countries, including Nigeria. Without saying so directly, Harriman strongly implied that the US was behind the attempted coup and thus was to blame for the death of Gen. Muhammad, a radical and quite popular leader who had been giving Nigerian politics a strong turn to the left. The anti-communist propaganda in Moynihan's speech, Harriman said, had been "believed" by some "naive" soldiers who were afraid that Nigeria's policies had become pro-communist. Indicating that the coup had strengthened the new government's resolve to continue in its militant pro-liberation stand, Harriman stated that Nigeria would not be "intimidated" by Western pressure. "We would like to warn, and place on record here, he said, that in the event of a liberation war breaking out in Southern Africa, Nigeria will answer the call on the side of the liberation movements." (UN press release GA/AP/533).

South African Panhard vehicles, manufactured under licence from France, spearhead invasion of Angola from Namibia. Despite this open aggression Western powers deny any "threat to the peace" exists.

General Muhammad—killed in coup.
THE O.A.U.

OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE MEETS IN MAPUTO

The OAU Liberation Committee held its 26th conference in Maputo (Lourenco Marques) at the end of January. It was in many ways an historic meeting, coming as it did only six months after Mozambique had won its independence through armed struggle and taking place practically on South Africa's doorstep. The meeting opened with a militant speech by Samora Machel, who delivered a strong attack against South Africa and Rhodesia. Machel called on all of Africa to unite in the struggle against imperialism and liberate itself from foreign domination and cultural subservience. The fight against imperialism, he said, had reached a new stage since the victories achieved by the African peoples against classical forms of colonialism had forced the enemy to change its tactics. The new stage required greater mobilization of the masses, it required more than just inter-governmental union, it required a broad, popular, anti-imperialist front. "This front must necessarily incorporate our natural allies, the socialist countries, who constitute the liberated zone of humanity, and the world democratic forces which are operational detachments of our struggle," Machel said. He also warned against the proliferation of liberation movements and called on the Liberation Committee to recognize in principle one single organization to the exclusion of all others, or if it is justified, to make an effort towards conciliation.

The meeting, which was also attended by nine liberation movements (including the African National Congress of South Africa, the African National Council of Zimbabwe headed by Bishop Muzorewa, and SWAPO), adopted two resolutions. The first appeals to the ANC of Zimbabwe to "intensify its armed struggle," exhorts all OAU members to give political, moral, and material support to that struggle and appeals to the heads of State of Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania to continue to intensify their efforts toward unification of the ANC. The second resolution expresses strong support for SWAPO's acceleration of the liberation process in Namibia and calls on the OAU and all progressive countries and organizations to support SWAPO.


U.S. and Southern Africa

FORD MAY WEAKEN EX-IM POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA

Over the last several months, US businesses, members of Congress, and the South African Government have been pressing the Administration to weaken Export-Import Bank policy towards South Africa. Recommendations from the State Department, Africa Bureau have reportedly already been passed on by Secretary of State Kissinger and the National Security Council. Cabinet level discussions are expected the last week in February, and a decision from the President is expected immediately thereafter.

The most recent pressure for a change in Ex-Im Bank policy started when the Fluor Corporation of California got a $1 billion contract for the construction and engineering of the South African coal gasification project, Sasol II. Fluor then made a request to the Export-Import Bank for a $225 million loan directly to Sasol, which is a South African Government-owned corporation, and for an additional loan guarantee in the same amount for the project.

A favorable ruling on the Fluor request would require two important policy changes. First, the prohibitions on loans and guarantees directly to the South African Government or a South African company would have to be revoked. Second, the maximum amount of any loan involving South Africa has been set at $2 million, and this would be exceeded by the decision. It is likely that the two requests are test cases to see whether the Administration will reverse the Ex-Im restrictions and then allow future financing for Sasol II and other South African ventures.

Fluor's contract from Sasol includes not only construction work but also a role in the procurement of additional contracts needed to complete the project. It appears that the South Africans have indicated to Fluor that other contracts will go to US companies (with commissions going to Fluor) if Fluor can help get a change in Export-Import Bank policy and open the way to US financing of the project. Therefore, Fluor and other possible contractors are waging an attack in Ex-Im policy directly and through the Congress.

In January at least 25 members of Congress requested a re-evaluation of Ex-Im policy concerning South Africa. In late January, a group of at least 21 Senators sent a letter to the President urging Ex-Im loans to South Africa as well as a re-evaluation of the US arms embargo policy. According to Africa News, reliable sources indicate that an additional seven Senators have signed the letter, bringing the total to more than a quarter of the full Senate. The 21 early signators included no surprises, although Senator Sparkman's participation was significant because he is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. If seven other Senators have joined the action, however, they probably include several important moderates. By preparing statements of the number of jobs that could be lost in particular districts if the contracts don't come through, Fluor has worked especially hard to get support from members of Congress whose districts include some of the firms that hope to win Sasol contracts.

This is not the first time the Republican Administration has considered weakening the Export-Import Bank policy. In a January 2, 1970 letter to President Nixon, written after the famed National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39 was issued, Secretary of State Kissinger recommended; "that you authorize full Ex-Im facili-
ties for South Africa and the Portuguese territories—avoiding, however, conspicuous trade promotion.” This decision was not fully implemented at the time, but one restriction was relaxed. That year, apparently as a result of the Kissinger recommendation, the Bank extended the term of insurance available to finance exports to South Africa from the previous maximum of five years to ten years.

South Africa has a vital interest in the change in policy from both a symbolic and actual point of view. Denial of loans to the government of South Africa has been viewed as an official statement of United States opposition to apartheid and an unwillingness to give direct economic support to the government which is responsible for it. Reversal of this public posture would be a major propaganda victory for the South African government.

ACTION NEWS & NOTES

SPRING CORPORATE-CHURCH PROXY SEASON OPENS: 1976

Twenty-six national Protestant mission boards and Catholic orders announced the filing of shareholder resolutions with ten corporations doing business in southern Africa on February 4th. The church agencies participating in the actions hold stock in these companies worth $14.7 million.

The resolutions deal with two new and eight older issues and companies this season. The new issues concern a massive expansion by Caltex of refining operations in South Africa and a planned $300 million, mining and smelting operation by Kennecott copper. The older issues concern Union Carbide’s continuing importation of Rhodesian chrome. The Southern Co.’s continuing contract to import South African coal, IBM & ITT’s sales to the South African government, Newmont Mining’s employee conditions at its affiliate, Tsumeb Copper in Namibia, and Phelps Dodge and Goodyear Tire’s operations in South Africa.

The resolution to Texaco and SoCal (which jointly own Caltex) calls upon them not to expand their operations, while the resolution to Kennecott urges them not to invest in South Africa. The resolution to Union Carbide calls upon the company to stop importing Rhodesian chrome while the resolution to The Southern Company calls on them to stop the coal contract with South Africa. The ITT resolution calls for stopping sales to the South African government, while the IBM resolution calls for the reporting of details on such transactions (a resolution to stop these sales did not gain the 3% vote in 1975 necessary for reintroducing the resolution this year). The resolution to Newmont calls for a report on how the company is implementing its professed “equal employment opportunity” policy at Tsumeb, while the resolution to Phelps Dodge and Goodyear calls for “disclosure” reports to shareholders on details of their South African operations. Precise details on the wording of the resolutions, the time, date, and place for the shareholder meetings, and proxy statements with arguments for supporting the resolutions are available from the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027 (212) 870-2283.

These resolutions provide a significant vehicle for symbolic confrontation between two large institutions, the church and business, over the morality of specific forms of investment in areas of southern Africa: a vehicle that should be used by activists within churches, universities and other shareholder groups that have some concern for their public posture. Yet clearly there are elements of moral and political expediency, if not hypocrisy behind the church campaigns. Thus it is more convenient to tell a company which is not already investing in South Africa not to do so, and to let sleeping dogs like General Motors, Ford and Chrysler lie. It is easier to buttress your arguments before the companies with quotes from Bantu-stan leaders, such as Gatasha Buthelezi (the Kennecott operation will be on land expropriated from the KwaZulu bantustan) than to put forth the position of the legitimate representatives, the liberation movements. It is easier to tell IBM and ITT not to sell to the South African government, than to tell them to get out. Period. It is easier to ask for reports from Goodyear and Phelps Dodge, in which the companies sell the wonderful values of their South African operations, than to issue a thorough, anti-imperialist analysis of their real role. It is more convenient to ask Newmont for 100 new houses for a select group of “boss-boys” at Tsumeb than to challenge the rape of the mineral resources of Namibia carried out by this company over the last quarter century.

Similarly, the kinds of arguments used to stop South African coal imports (America’s “free” miners shouldn’t have to compete with South Africa’s slaves) are hardly the type geared to build international solidarity among an oppressed class on both sides of the ocean against a common enemy. One wonders how many rank-and-file miners in the U.S. would step forward to proclaim just how “free” they are. One also wonders why no U.S. churches have seriously confronted their own complicity in the corporate rip-off of southern Africa and followed the courageous example of the World Council of Churches which divested its holdings and boldly aided the liberation movements. Indeed, one wonders, in retrospect, whether through pressuring for slight changes that would improve conditions for a handful of upwardly mobile black workers, whether the churches are not in fact blunting the real issues of imperialism and assisting the corporations in their long-term interests.

SUPPORT THE SASO NINE

The Pan African Students Organization in the Americas (PASOA) has launched support efforts for the nine members of the South African Students Organization (SASO) on trial in Pretoria (see Southern Africa this issue). They are calling for contributions to “The SASO Nine Defence Fund” (P.O. Box 467 New York, N.Y. 10025). PASOA held a demonstration outside the Harlem State office building and South African Airways in Manhattan Feb. 21, and a forum at Columbia University March 4. A partial list of supporters for this campaign includes the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, African Youth Movement, and the National Student Coalition Against Racism (leaflet).
CASTRO IN AFRICA

Despite the warnings of Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro is expanding his country's ties with several African nations.

On a March visit to Guinea (Conakry), Castro held talks with President Sekou Toure, with Angolan leader Agostinho Neto and Guinea Bissau's President, Luis Cabral. Prior to the Conakry visit, Castro stopped in Algiers for meetings with President Boumedienne and leaders of the Polisario Front, the guerrilla group that has declared independence in Western Sahara. Cuba has offered limited military assistance to the new Polisario government, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.

U.S. REVIEWS AFRICA POLICY

In preparation for this month's tour of Africa, State Secretary Kissinger has undertaken a review of several option papers drawn up by officials in the State Department and other government agencies. His conclusions may constitute the first formal, major reappraisal of US African policy since 1970.

Options outlined on the critical southern African situation range from a blockade of Cuba to military support for liberation movements in Rhodesia and Namibia. While aid to the guerrillas is certain to be overruled, a group of Senators who conferred with Kissinger on Africa policy last month were led to believe the Cuban blockade or a similar action against Castro's government is under serious study by the Administration.

FORD TO KEEP CURBS ON SOUTH AFRICA

A campaign started in February by 21 Senators seeking closer US ties with South Africa received a setback last month. Presidential aide Max Friedersdorf wrote a letter to the petitioning Senators saying that US policy towards South Africa would remain unchanged, since "limited communication" enhances America's ability to "play a constructive role between the governments of southern Africa."

An aide to Senator John Tower of Texas, who organized the pro-South Africa campaign, said the White House response was disappointing, and said the Senators would take further action on the issue.

Administration officials say the President has no plans to end the American arms embargo against South Africa, but another restriction—on direct Export-Import bank loans—is still under discussion in the White House. Some of the pressure to lift the loan ban is coming from the Fluor Corporation, which has contracted to help build a $2.5 billion coal gasification project in South Africa.

BORDER BLOCK HURTS RHODESIA

While Mozambique expects to receive as much as $49 million in annual compensation for the revenues it loses by enforcing UN sanctions against Rhodesia, the white regime in Salisbury is sorely in need of a similar friend to turn to.

London Observer writer David Martin says that a full 60% of Rhodesia's foreign trade was passing through Mozambique at the time of the break in ties. He says claims by the Smith regime that only 20% of its trade was dependent on Mozambique are not borne out by official records of Mozambique's Harbor and Railway authorities. Rhodesia's problems are compounded, reports Martin, by the seizure of 2300 railway wagons in Mozambique at the time of the border closure, which would cost some $43 million to replace.

NKOMO, SMITH REACH IMPASSE

Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and African National Council moderate Joshua Nkomo announced the breakdown of their constitutional talks on March 19, primarily on the issue of immediate black majority rule. Nkomo said Smith rejected proposed franchise qualifications that would have ensured a majority of blacks on the voters' rolls. Nkomo also revealed that the spurned ANC proposals called for the suspension of Parliament and the formation of a transitional government composed of equal numbers of ANC and Rhodesian Front members, with a British cabinet "chairman" holding the deciding vote.

Prime Minister Smith has solicited British intervention in the country's "constitutional crisis" following the breakdown of the Nkomo talks, but he has rejected British Foreign Secretary Callaghan's plan for a black majority government within two years.

Top Nkomo aide Josiah Chirmanano, meanwhile, said on a visit to New York that "second thoughts" on the part of Prime Minister Smith "could not be ruled out," especially if moderates in the white business and professional community bring sufficient pressures to bear. He said some whites "wouldn't mind majority rule" as long as "certain safeguards were provided," to prevent disruption of the economy.

BUTHELEZI REJECTS HOMELANDS

Kwazulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi created a major stir in South Africa by denouncing the entire homeland policy. In a March 14 speech to a cheering crowd in Soweto, Buthelezi said the Bantustan policy must be completely rejected, and charged that separate development is "nothing more than white baaskap (bossism)."

Buthelezi told his audience of 18,000 that "the pace of events and the struggle for liberation in southern Africa is gaining momentum." He said white rule is on the way out in neighboring Rhodesia and Namibia, and warned white South Africans that blacks "will not offer themselves as cannon fodder to protect white privilege."

BAROLONG WOMEN JAILED FOR HOMECOMING

South Africa has jailed ten women of the Barolong group in the northern Cape Province for returning to the homes from which they were forcibly removed.

The Barolong had been moved from what was designated a white area to a rural farm after losing a court battle. After moving, however, the group encountered a high infant mortality rate, and livestock deaths due to a lack of grazing land, so they decided to move back in small groups and try to avoid arrest.

The convicted Barolong women were given 60-day sentences.

NAMIBIAN SEALSkins BARRed

The Fouke Company, a South Carolina-based fur firm, has been blocked in its effort to import some 50,000 sealskins from Namibia. Robert Schoning, director of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), says importation from the disputed territory "would not be consistent with the foreign policy of the United States."

The NMFS ruling, which represents a victory for a coalition of Black Caucus members and Africa-oriented activists, stated that sealskin imports from Namibia "would be a contravention of our legal obligations and our long-standing policy of opposing South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia."
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