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Their Role in South Africa's Crisis
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SOUTH AFRICA'S BANTUSTANS AND THEIR LEADERS:
What Role in the South African Crisis?

by William Minter

At the end of October the world will be treated to an official milestone in South Africa's apartheid policy—the "independence" of the Transkei. While it is unlikely that this South-African-sponsored event will meet with official recognition, the South African government hopes that it can serve, at least in the Western countries, as a sign of "progress"; a model of African advance under South African auspices, a buffer against changes which threaten "progress", can serve, at least in the Western countries, as a sign of this South-African-sponsored event will meet with official milestone in South Africa's apartheid policy—the area only for a limited contract period. His low wages were based on the minimum necessary to keep such a work force going; the families were expected to cope for themselves.

Thus it was not surprising that artificial measures had to be applied to force workers into the wage sector. Among the first of these measures was the imposition of a hut tax in the rural areas, which compelled workers to enter the money economy even when they had been self-sufficient. Overcrowding in the reserves has caused a steady decline of agricultural possibilities, forcing the workers to abandon the land, but the hut tax remains in effect as added pressure.

The institutionalization of the migrant labor system and the elimination of African rights in South Africa as a whole (accompanied by the creation of nominal "rights" in the reserves) have proceeded by stages. The Natives Land Act of 1913 allocated certain areas for Africans, prohibiting them from acquiring land in other parts of the country. The Stallard Commission in 1922 defined the basis for the system of "influs control" in a much-quoted statement: An African "should only be allowed to enter the urban areas, which are essentially the white man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister". The most systematic implementation of this principle has been in the post-war years, with the introduction of migrant labor to manufacturing industry in addition to the mines; the years of political dominance by the Afrikaaner Nationalist Party.

In purely theoretical terms the logical goal and culmination of the "apartheid" or "separate development" policy might be the complete separation of the racial groups—on this model all of the African population would end up living in independent Bantustans, and presumably appropriate areas would be found for the Asian and Coloured populations as well. That would imply, of course, that whites themselves would provide the working force in the "white" areas. Nationalist Party leaders have never been under this misapprehension. The policy is not complete removal from the "white" areas of the African population, but removal of any economically useless African population, and achievement of the perfection of control and elimination of African rights required for channeling the remaining population as needed.

But the Bantustans have not only an economic but also a political function, which acquires more prominence the greater the threat to white rule. The policy has a political importance at the level of propaganda, both domestic and international: while the Africans may be deprived of their rights in the "white" areas, goes the argument, that is only to ensure them their own identity and full rights in their "own" areas. Following African resistance in the 1950s came the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959; Transkei "self-government" in 1963 followed the international pressure after the Sharpeville massacre and
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bantustan</th>
<th>Proportion of &quot;tribe&quot; in the Bantustan</th>
<th>Population of the &quot;tribe&quot; living in another Bantustan</th>
<th>Percentage of the &quot;tribe&quot; living in another Bantustan</th>
<th>Population of other &quot;tribes&quot; in the Bantustan</th>
<th>De facto population density (per sq. mile)</th>
<th>De jure population density (per sq. mile)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bophutha-Tswana</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>283,905</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>13,957</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>33,128</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>39,417</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>23,000(N. Ndebele)</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
<td>138,140</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwaqwa</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>7,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>83,106</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>25,131</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>35,955</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Ndebele</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. This figure relates to Xhosas generally.
4. i.e. the percentage of the total number living in a Bantustan.

**Sources**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bantustan</th>
<th>&quot;Tribe&quot;</th>
<th>Area (hectares)</th>
<th>Area (sq. miles)</th>
<th>Number of pieces</th>
<th>Number of pieces after consolidation</th>
<th>Population of the &quot;tribe&quot; in the Bantustan</th>
<th>De jure population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bophutha-Tswana</td>
<td>Tswana</td>
<td>3,754</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>1,658,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>5 (plus black spots)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>924,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazankulu</td>
<td>Shangaan (or Tsonga)</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>234,000</td>
<td>649,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu</td>
<td>Zulu</td>
<td>3,144</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,057,000</td>
<td>4,026,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowa</td>
<td>N. Sotho (N. Ndebele and Pedi)</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>(N. Ndebele) 47,000 (Pedi) 899,000</td>
<td>2,019,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qwaqwa</td>
<td>S. Sotho (Shoeshoe)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>1,254,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>Xhosa</td>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,651,000</td>
<td>3,005,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>3 (plus 1 black spot)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>239,000</td>
<td>358,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>Swazi</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>3 (plus about 10 black spots)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Ndebele</td>
<td>S. Ndebele</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>233,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NB.** Figures may not coincide exactly due to rounding. Some of the population figures are inconsistent and vary according to the source.

**Notes**

1. This refers to consolidation proposals set before Parliament on 27 April 1973, and accepted on 5 June 1973. Amended proposals presented in 1975 are substantially the same.
2. One piece of the Ciskei is now to be linked with the Transkei.
The banning of the African nationalist organizations. Similarly, the escalation of the southern-African struggle in the mid-seventies has stimulated South Africa's rulers to accelerate Transkei "independence" and increase the political prominence of the Bantustan leadership.

The political significance of the Bantustans goes beyond that of a face-saving maneuver to impress the West, however. By defining African political existence in tribal terms and establishing political and administrative structures based in the Bantustans, the South African government has consciously promoted division within the African ranks, as separate Bantustans compete for land or government monies. It has also created a strata of leadership which, in spite of its occasional defense of African interests or disagreements with the South African government, is dependent on that government for its existence, and able to serve as a buffer against more radical forces.

Conditions in the Bantustans

The area allocated for the Bantustans is roughly between twelve and thirteen percent of the total area of South Africa—exact figures are not available, as "consolidation" programs involving purchase of "white" land, and elimination of "black spots" in white areas are still under way. Some seven million Africans live in the Bantustan areas, according to the 1970 census; eight million are reported as living in "white" areas. (These figures are not generally regarded as very reliable, but do give a rough approximation.) The Bantustan area includes no major, urban, industrial, or commercial center. Some mineral resources, recently discovered, are still in Bantustan areas; others, such as a strip of coast in KwaZulu with titanium, have been removed and reclassified as "white". In any case, royalty payments are payable to the central government and not to the Bantustan.

Basic statistics about the Bantustans can be seen in Table 1, and from their location in the outline map. The economic conditions there must be judged against the fact that already in the 1920s they were judged as over-populated...
lated and unable to support the existing population. The Tomlinson Commission, which in 1954 laid out a government plan for economic development of the Bantustans, noted that per capita income had been declining for twenty years; recent estimates indicate that the trend has continued. The Tomlinson Commission recommended reduction of the population density. Instead, government measures have intensified the use of the Bantustans as dumping grounds for “surplus” urban population; the migrant labor system continues to be the basic support for the Bantustan economies; and the government promotion of Border Industries and white investment in the Bantustans only serves to add a supplemental use for the rural cheap labor force.

The daily economic reality for the vast majority of the people living in the Bantustans is the struggle to survive on the corn and millet produced by exhausted and eroded, often arid land, and on the remittances from family members working in “white” areas. Hardship is continually increased by the government’s removal, consolidation, and planning schemes: Africans, especially women, children and old people removed from “white” areas, urban and rural, and relocated in the Bantustans—some to seek a way for themselves with family or friends, others in government-sponsored “resettlement schemes” in remote areas devoid of facilities for living or for making a living; people are also continually moved around within the Bantustans, as “consolidation” programs tidy up the borders between “white” areas and “black” areas, and rural areas are “planned” to group scattered Africans into settlements, ostensibly to permit a more intensive use of the agricultural land. It is estimated that almost two million people were removed from “white” areas during the 1960-1970 decade. Plans evidently call for removing some four million more in the next few years. Removals within the Bantustans are estimated to have affected as much as two-thirds of the total Bantustan population so far.

An estimated average per capita income of $97 per year (1974) for the four largest Bantustans gives some indication of the economic level of the people (lower than in the vast majority of independent African states). Just as significant is the fact that the situation is worsening. The conditions are perhaps best portrayed, however, not by statistics but by films such as Last Grave at Dimbaza (Dimbaza is a resettlement area in the Ciskei) and personal accounts, such as Cosmas Desmond’s The Discarded People (Penguin, 1971).

Both economic development and the Bantustan government budgets are under the control of the South African government. Economic development is oriented by the Bantu Investment Corporation, and other similar bodies such as the Xhosa Development Corporation. These are controlled by the South Africa Bantu Trust, a government agency. While the 1954 Tomlinson plan envisaged industrial development, its architect has said that essentially nothing had been done until 1970. The Bantu Investment Corporation was established in 1959, and in 1970 white private investment was permitted in the Bantustans.

Companies lured to the “homelands” or to the border areas adjacent to them by government concessions and the promise of a labor force even cheaper than in the rest of the country have made little impact on unemployment in the Bantustans, estimated at something like 25% (Johannesburg Star, January 24, 1976). An article in the Afrikaans business publication Volkskans (June 1976) headlined the Bantustans, “where labor is no problem” and where “there are numerous concessions”.

This penetration by white enterprise in the Bantustans has touched the agricultural sector as well, provoking further displacement of Africans. The result: measurable advance in Bantustan production, employment for a few (without even the minimum wages applicable elsewhere in South Africa) and even more miserable conditions for the majority.

Political Role of the Bantustan Leaders

Since the granting of “self-government” status to the Transkei in 1963, seven other Bantustans have reached that stage. The structure of power is similar: administrations based on Legislative Assemblies with majorities of chiefs or other appointed members, the senior levels of the civil service filled with South African officials, the ultimate responsibility and authority resting with the South African central government. The appointed chiefs are widely regarded as the agents of the South African government, while opposition is firmly dealt with under detention powers similar to those in the rest of South Africa.

Nevertheless, the Bantustan authorities are put forward as the spokespersons for African interests, leading to a variety of positions taken in public life: negotiation for increase of their own role and power, and for African interests vis-a-vis the South African government; defense of “moderation”, “patience” and the possibilities of action within the system against more radical African voices.

Internationally the Bantustan leaders have travelled widely, arguing that international boycotts and violence against the South African system prevent reforms and badly needed investments in the “homelands”. The most notable have been Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu and Chief Kaiser Matanzima, of the Transkei; with Buthelezi occasionally being labelled a “radical” in contrast to Matanzima’s long-term close collaboration with the South African authorities. In the 1973 strikes in Natal, Buthelezi and his aid Barney Dladla several times took on the role of mediators between workers and management. And Buthelezi’s statements, at one time critical, at another warning against extremism, have often focused discussion in the white South African press about African opinion and leadership.

At the end of 1973, Bantustan leaders meeting in Umtata, in the Transkei, reached agreement on a black federation to be based on the existing Bantustans, but open to expansion. The Umata conference also called for more rapid transfer of power to the Bantustan governments, and repeal of the influx control system in South Africa. Chief Matanzima used this forum to predict independence for the Transkei within five years.

In March of 1974 the Bantustan leaders met together for the first time with Prime Minister Vorster. The response to their complaints was promises to study the various issues; however the Prime Minister made it clear that despite their insistent demand for more land it would be impossible to expand the areas allocated in the 1936 Land Act. These talks were hailed as significant progress and the beginning of a dialogue. After a similar summit the following year, the Prime Minister agreed, to hold further discussions at a later date. Issues of land or of the rights of urban Africans were not resolved, and plans went ahead for independence of the Transkei.

The Bantustan leaders seem willing to present verbal opposition to the South African system, even as they aid
The Transkei is the most compact of the Bantustans, ampt leaders, like the South African government and except for the Transkei-not represented at the meeting of “homelands”, thereby losing any rights in the urban areas. No response had been forthcoming from the government before the popular uprisings.

One of the concessions reportedly granted in August was the right of blacks to purchase indefinite leasehold rights in South Africa’s urban townships. Previous government plans called for an option of 30-year leasehold rights, conditional upon urban Africans taking up citizenship in their respective “homelands”. However, permission to open a business or professional practice in the urban areas still depends on holding “homeland” citizenship. The urban land, moreover, remains the property of the Bantu Administration Board. Bantustan leaders had protested against these measures and failure to eliminate the provision that urban Africans will automatically become citizens of “their” tribal “homelands”, thereby losing any residual rights in the urban areas. No response had been forthcoming from the government before the popular uprisings.

In late August the Bantustan leaders issued a statement “In response to the continuing cry of deep frustration and despair of our people throughout the Republic”. Noting that if the Prime Minister had heeded their appeals for reforms at earlier summits, the violence would not have taken place, they issued a new appeal for a change of heart by the government and agreement to black demands. They called for the release of detained black leaders and for a new meeting with the Prime Minister. Except for the Transkei—not represented at the meeting—and Bophutatswana, they rejected the plans for “homeland” independence.

The momentum of the struggle in South Africa is such that the Bantustan policies cannot successfully serve, as the government intends, as a brake and a diversion. The Bantustan leaders, like the South African government and its Western allies, are responding to events rather than controlling the pace and direction of change. However the attempt to use the Bantustan strategy is likely to be accelerated rather than abandoned, as in the case of the Transkei.

The Transkei’s Role

The Transkei is the most compact of the Bantustans, with the longest history of “self-government”; the South African government’s model of what a “homeland” should be. Before the inauguration of the “homelands” policy, it had a territorial council (Bunga) with elected members and some limited authority—similar to British rule in some areas of tropical Africa. The Bantu Authorities Act (1951) dismantled this system, transferring authority to appointed chiefs.

In 1960 and 1961 the Transkei was the scene of a violent revolt against the chiefs, resulting in the imposition of Proclamation 400, a “state of emergency” regulation which is still in force. In spite of an election victory by opponents of the new Transkei Constitution in 1963, the South-African-sponsored candidate, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, gained a majority by virtue of his support among the appointed chiefs. More than a decade of Matanzima’s rule has enabled him and his supporters to break down and intimidate the opposition.

As “independence” approaches (South Africa has set the date for October 26), resistance is still effectively curbed, and dependence on the South African authorities firmly entrenched.

In June of this year the editor of a Xhosa language newspaper in Umtata, the Transkei capital, was arrested under the Terrorism Act. Critical of the Transkei government, he was accused of having recruited Africans to leave South Africa for guerrilla training. In July nine members of the opposition Transkei Democratic Party were arrested, including its leader and its only two representatives in the Legislative Assembly. New Legislative Assembly elections are scheduled for September 29, and Matanzima seems determined to leave no openings for even token
opposition.

As late as fiscal year 1974-1975 only 14% of Transkei government revenue came from local sources; the rest was supplied by the South African government. South African government officials still play key roles in the administration, and are expected to continue to do so after "independence." A small army is being trained, to be commanded by white officers sent by the central government. In short, as Chief Matanzima himself said in February 1975, "The only practical difference independence will make to the average Transkei citizen is that they will carry Transkei passports instead of Republic passports." 2

In fact, Africans of Xhosa background in "white" South Africa are to be forced to carry Transkei passports, like it or not. The Transkei Constitution prepared for "independence" included a clause imposing Transkei citizenship on all Xhosa in South Africa, except those associated with the Ciskei, another "Xhosa homeland". Thus they would be officially foreigners in the rest of South Africa, another step towards complete loss of rights. The Transkei Assembly, after popular protest, did amend the draft constitution in May to eliminate this provision, but the South African Parliament's Transkei Independence Act still provides for this automatic transfer of citizenship, regarded by the South African government as basic to its "separate development" policy.

However little difference the new Transkei status may make to its average resident, it may have some impact in the international arena. The "international community" seems to be virtually unanimous in rejecting the validity of Transkei "independence", just as the unilateral independence of Rhodesia has been rejected for the last decade. As with Rhodesia, however, one can expect the ranks of official non-recognition to be broken by less formal but substantial ties with the major Western powers.

South Africa seems to hold out little hope for Transkei recognition by many countries or its admission to the United Nations. Rather, its efforts are concentrated on international bodies more heavily weighted towards Western influence—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Economic Community, and key economic and government sectors in the Western countries. It is in these circles, as well as in the arena of Western public opinion, that South Africa hopes to first establish the "independence" of the Transkei.

In the United States a Friends of the Transkei organization has been set up, headed by Mr. J. A. Parker, a black public relations executive and self-styled protege of ultra-conservative Max Yergan. Among the material being distributed by this group is an article from the June 1976 Military Review, which proposes the Transkei as "key to US Naval Strategy in the Indian Ocean". Sources in Washington confirm that the article, although not reflecting an official position, does represent a Pentagon trial balloon, and a proposal which they are pushing within the administration. The Xhosa Development Corporation placed a loan of $14 million for the Transkei on the Euro-currency market in June. Managers for the loan are believed to be New York's Citibank and Hill Samuel of London. The South African Digest has hailed this as an important step towards international recognition of the Transkei.

The Transkei's new status is intended to focus attention both internationally and domestically away from the issues of the South-African system as a whole. To some extent it can succeed. In early September there were reports of Sotho people living in the Transkei protesting against incorporation into this Xhosa area, and for relating to the South Sotho OwaOwa Bantustan. Insofar as conflicts can be channeled in such inter-tribal disputes, the opposition to white minority rule in South Africa is that much weaker. Insofar as this new stage in the Bantustan policy gets support internationally, it will weaken the international solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa.

Had Transkei "independence" come in the absence of the popular uprisings all over South Africa, it might even have bought a bit more time for the white minority system. Fortunately, its phoniness and its irrelevance to the central issues of the struggle in South Africa will now be quite clear.

Footnotes:

1 Quoted in Barbara Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustans (1976), p. 10.

2 Quoted in Rogers, Divide and Rule, p. 48.

References and Readings: The most recent pamphlet dealing in detail with this subject is that by Barbara Rogers mentioned in the footnotes. It is published by the International Defence & Aid Fund, in London, and is available in the United States for $1.95 from the Africa Fund, 305 E. 46 St., NY, NY 10017. Another older pamphlet with much information is Muriel Horrell, The African Reserves of South Africa (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1969). There is another International Defense and Aid pamphlet from 1969 describing "Resettlement"—The New Violence to Africans. Govan Mbeki, South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt, (Penguin, 1964) deals with the early sixties revolt. Mbeki was an African Nationalist Congress leader in the Transkei, and has been in prison for more than a decade.

South Africa

POLITICS

Political Struggle Intensifies

The political struggle in South Africa has intensified. In June the demonstrations that swept from Soweto to black townships and Bantustans throughout the country appeared to be spontaneous outbursts of black rage. They were directed only at the symbols of the white government: the schools, clinics and administration buildings set up for "Bantu" use. But by August the target had shifted to the weakest point of the white minority: its total dependence on black labor.

In mid-August the African National Congress (ANC),
widespread belief to have lost much of its influence when most of its leaders were imprisoned in the early sixties following the Sharpeville massacre, called for a strike by black workers in Soweto, the largest township in South Africa. Young militants carried the call for a black boycott to train and bus depots, exhorting workers not to ride into Johannesburg. The police turned out as well, ostensibly to protect the workers, but as in all previous confrontations, violence quickly erupted. The police began firing on the demonstrators, who hurled stones and bottles at the trains and buses, and set some on fire. Many demonstrators were killed by police fire, the "official" estimate being put at 29.

Although press reports have claimed that older Blacks do not support the militants, many did join in the boycott. "Many of those who stayed away from work evidently have done so out of sympathy with the strike," reported the New York Times, (Aug. 26). Certainly a number of people, much smaller than the Government had hoped, stayed away only from fear of violence at the depots. Some industries, such as garment manufacturing, were brought to almost a complete halt, while numerous news articles told of white housewives scrubbing their floors for the first time in their lives when black maids failed to report for work. According to the Washington Post, "rough estimates put the number of Africans participating in the boycott at between 100,000 and 150,000—somewhere between one-third and one-half of the total African workforce in the Johannesburg metropolitan area." The strike occurred at a particularly bad time for the South African economy which is suffering from drastic reductions in the price of gold. The country's only other real wealth besides gold lies in its use of cheap black labor.

The strike began on Monday, August 23. By the middle of the week the white government was forced to rely on a desperate strategy of encouraging violence among blacks to contain the demonstrations, which no amount of police brutality or jailings could seem to control. Large groups of Zulus, from the migrant workers hostels, had continued to report for work. Because most of them must send money back to their families in the impoverished Bantustans and stay in Soweto only temporarily, many of them did not support the strike, although they shared the full-time residents' bitter hatred of apartheid. When several migrant Zulus were killed in fires and stone-throwing melees, bands of their fellow workers joined together to protect workers who wanted to go into Johannesburg. The government response was to set about provoking clashes between the Zulus and other black residents. Several days of fighting ensued and the death toll rose even higher. The press tried to imply that Blacks were spontaneously attacking each other, but in a call for black unity a few days later, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of the KwaZulu Bantustans accused police authorities of instigating the clashes. Several local African papers had made the same accusation.

Buthelezi claimed the police gave the Zulus marijuana, encouraged them to kill demonstrators, and provided trucks to carry them to areas where demonstrators were gathering. All reports indicate that the police did nothing to stop the attacks until it appeared they were losing control of the Zulus, at which point they opened fire on them, appearing to have "restored order in Soweto."

Buthelezi, in his speech, took a more openly militant position than previously. He told reporters that the entire white population would be answerable for "the sins committed against Blacks in their name." This new stance reflects the pressures on Bantustan leaders to move away from their apparent acceptance of the apartheid system. The student militants have denounced the Bantustans as an integral part of apartheid. Buthelezi and all the other "homeland chiefs," by agreeing to implement Bantustan "independence," are seen as collaborators. They are in danger of losing what little credibility they have if they do not support the strikes and demonstrations to some extent.

A week earlier, before the new round of clashes began, Buthelezi and officials from six other Bantustans had met in Johannesburg and issued a statement criticizing the government for not heeding their previous warnings "concerning the granting of permanent rights for urban Blacks." The statement went on to say that if the
government had listened to them, "this conflagration which engulfs the whole country would not have taken place."

The statement is a contradictory combination of radical and conciliatory statements. The radical demands were for an end to discriminatory race legislation and the release of detained leaders. But there was also a plea for a meeting with Vorster to "discuss, the present state of the country."

The Transkei Bantustan did not participate in the meeting. Kaiser Mantanzima, Chief of the Transkei, has been implementing the detention without trial provisions of Proclamation 400 (1960) himself, to round up political opponents before the Transkei elections in October. Most of the leadership of the opposition Democratic Party were detained.

While Bantustan leaders issued confused statements, several clearly militant leaders were interviewed by the Western press. Tsietse Mashinini, 19 year old president of the Students Representative Council in Soweto, told English television interviewers that "the people are no longer interested in having equal rights.... Even if the white man's regime would give concessions to our people, they are no longer interested in that. All they want to do is to hit at the system and to hit very hard."

Another spokesperson, identified as a "colored intellectual in his thirties," said, "these kids do not want any concessions or any reforms. They don't want to modify the system. They want to do away with it." He said also that people were no longer afraid to go to jail or be killed. "This wave of protest, despite the deaths, lacks the morbid sense that surrounded Sharpeville."

Towards late August "Coloreds," as South Africa calls its people of mixed racial background, began to demonstrate also—not just against the apartheid laws that restrict their own lives, but in solidarity with black protestors. A number of Coloreds held a demonstration at the University of Western Cape, their only major university. Demonstrations were later held in the townships and finally groups of youths managed to slip past police cordons into the main shopping areas of Cape Town, where white shoppers were treated to a dose of tear gas when police tried to disperse the Coloreds. This was the first time demonstrators had reached white areas and was especially significant because Cape Town has a large white population compared to other South African cities. (New York Times; Washington Post; Rand Daily Mail; Star, Johannesburg)

THE APARTHEID REGIME'S IMAGE BUILDER

The continuing rebellion of African students and workers in South Africa is causing much worry in the apartheid regime about its image in the west. South Africa's rulers are concerned that if South Africa's policies receive too much adverse publicity in the western press, pressure will be exerted in these countries to sever political, military and economic ties with the apartheid regime. Ken Owen, Washington correspondent of the Star writes that in US official circles Prime Minister Vorster's "image...of being the only man capable of deflecting Southern Africa from a course of disaster has been badly tarnished." (Star, Johannesburg, August 16, 1976)

Due to this "tarnished" image, the South African propaganda agencies are intensifying their campaign to convince the western public that the majority of black South Africans "are satisfied" with their oppressed condition. The South Africa Foundation, with links throughout the west and permanent representatives in London, Paris, Bonn and Washington is one of the main private propaganda agencies. During 1975 the Foundation spent $1 million on advertising the apartheid regime's political position. This was a threefold increase from its annual budget of only a few years ago. Although the Foundation has an official reserve of $2.1 million, its actual resources are unlimited since its president is one of South Africa's leading bankers. The Foundation also subsidizes organizations such as the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association, the Deutsch-Sudafrikanische Gesellschaft.
West Germany (which also receives financial aid from the South African Department of Information), the Jan van Riebeeck Stichting of Holland, the Comité France-Afrique du Sud, the Swiss-South African Association, and the Vienna Committee of the South Africa Foundation in Austria. Currently, it is working on establishing similar groups in the US, Canada, Scandinavia, and New Zealand, and a permanent representative is scheduled to be appointed to Brazil.

One propaganda technique of the Foundation is to build upon already existing top level contacts between its members and political leaders of other countries. It also invites "key international figures" to visit South Africa, giving them "advice" on itineraries and introducing them to South African politicians and business leaders. The Foundation uses foreign residents in South Africa to pressure their own governments and publishes two journals, South African International and South Africa Foundation News. The Government's constant themes are that "disengagements and trade sanctions do not serve the cause of social progress in South Africa" and that South Africa is "strategically important" to the west because of the Cape route and South Africa's mineral resources, trade, investment, and tourism. (Star, Johannesburg, July 24, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS ALLIES

The attitude of the South African press towards the US Democratic Presidential nominee, Jimmy Carter, ranges from one of expecting a shift in US policy to a "stronger" anti-apartheid position to one of regarding campaign speeches and platforms as inaccurate indicators of actual policies after the election. The Sunday Times writes that "as a southerner, who is still regarded with a measure of suspicion by the American liberal establishment, Mr. Carter could well use the Southern African issue as a means of proving his anti-racialism credentials. For Pretoria, it spells pressure." In contrast the Die Transvaler notes that "the Democratic candidate in the American presidential election takes a fairly strong anti-South African line. . . . It remains to be seen however to what extent such sounds should be taken seriously. . . . History has proven so often that a political leader when he eventually comes to power acts much more carefully when he faces the realities of a given situation." (Comment and Opinion, Pretoria, July 23, 1976)

Meanwhile, the apartheid regime remains confident that the current African resistance will not harm its very secure ties with the Ford Administration. The South African Minister of Information, Connie Mulder, stated that diplomatic contacts between South Africa and the US were increasing, since, according to Mulder, "the sea route around the Cape could be endangered and fall into the hands of the Communists. That cannot be afforded by the United States or any of the western powers. . . . We will be acceptable to the US irrespective of the fact that we will still carry on with the fundamental issues of our own policy." (Star, Johannesburg, August 14, 1976)

From September 4-6, Vorster and Kissinger will have their second planned meeting on southern Africa in Zurich. The talks center upon how to maintain white minority economic privileges in Namibia and Zimbabwe through a minority settlement. Afterwards Kissinger will tour Africa with the possibility that he will actually visit, South Africa. (W.B.A.I., New York, Aug. 30, 1976) (See US and Southern Africa, this issue, SA)

In Israel, opposition to political, economic, and military ties to the apartheid regime is becoming stronger. Israeli Communist Party, Meir Pa'il asked the Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres to explain the reports that Israel will sell two Sa'ar Four class missile boats to South Africa, and that 50 South Africans were being trained in the operation of these boats. (See SA Defense) Until then the military deal had been a total secret. Pro-apartheid forces together with Israel and the apartheid regime, are embarrassed by these efforts of Mr. Pa'il and Ms. Friedman of the Independent Socialist Movement to expose in Parliament the growing ties between Israel and the Apartheid regime. They would like to have these ties grow secretly, without any publicity. In fact, these policies were supposed to be closely guarded secrets. (Star, Johannesburg, July 24, 1976)

The Institute for the Study of Conflict which has CIA links issued a report which calls for western support of South Africa. It totally identifies the defense of Western interests with "a stable and militarily strong South Africa." The author of the report, Dr. Peter Yunke has been linked to BOSS—the South African version of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., and supported the police massacre of students in Soweto. (W.B.A.I., Aug. 18, 1976)

ECONOMICS

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD

"Things go better with Coke" in South Africa. The international Coca-Cola company is taking over 82 per cent of British Schweppes in South Africa. (Star, Johannesburg, August 14, 1976) Vernon Jordan, Urban League Executive and a member of the Board of Directors of Xerox Corporation was recently sent to South Africa by Xerox. Jordan returned advocating a more active role for US companies in South Africa in influencing white rulers there. He recommended no US investment in the Bantustans unless corporate guarantees for equal pay and amenities, and no increased US involvement without similar opposition to apartheid. This liberal approach toward the massive presence of U.S. money and technology in South Africa corresponds well with overall US policy recently articulated by Secretary of State Kissinger, who is now busy appealing to black groups and individuals to support his Southern Africa thrust. (Star, Johannesburg, August 14, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA AND INDEPENDENT AFRICA

The National Union of Tanganyika Workers has asked the Tanzanian Government to deny landing and berthing rights to any aircraft or ship which enjoys similar rights in South Africa. (This position was called for by the Africa Labor Organization, a council of OAU Ministers of Labor). If the action is successful, then KLM and SwissAir will be denied rights to land in Tanzania. If other African countries follow suit, then most western airlines will have to choose between maintaining their flights to South Africa, or their tourist trade with the rest of Africa. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Aug. 18, 1976)

However, the apartheid regime has not yet abandoned its historic dream of political and economic control from the Cape to Zaire. To achieve this objective, "liberal" South African capitalists advocate the "transfer of power" to "moderate Black leaders" as a neo-colonial solution in Namibia and Zimbabwe which the west will not find embarrassing to defend. (Star, Johannesburg, July 31, 1976)
An Australian firm, Protector Safety Industries, is pulling out after nine years in South Africa citing the "uncertain long range political future in South Africa," as well as economic factors. The South African press is stressing that Australia was the major loser in the July Australian trade union boycott of South Africa. (See Southern Africa, September, 1976) Australia's estimated losses run to $9.2 million, mainly in automotive parts which may not be re-ordered because of the slump in the South African auto business (see below). The primary effect on South Africa was the loss of $575,000 to South African Airways. (Star, Johannesburg, August 7, 1976)

Israel's links with South Africa are expanding since Vorster's trip to Israel last spring. Commenting on the visit of an Israeli industrial productivity expert to South Africa, a South African businessman said, "This is the first expert of world fame we have had in South Africa for a long time." (Star, Johannesburg, July 31, 1976). There have been a number of economic missions between the two countries. Israel is particularly interested in purchasing South African coal, and South Africa is reportedly planning to help build an Israeli railroad from the Red Seaport of Eilat to the interior. (Star, Johannesburg, August 7, 1976)

Japan will be one of the prime buyers of South Africa's minerals including a $17.2 million order of titanium slag to be exported through the new Richards Bay harbor. The massive Japanese firm, Mitsubishi, is selling a 5,000-ton antarctic survey vessel to South Africa, while South Africa's ship builders, Brown and Hamer, are building $13.8 million worth of ships for Norway's oil interests. (Star, Johannesburg, July 31, 1976)

"Economic ties are the best way of building up behind-the-scenes contacts and keeping Black governments from doing anything more than talking against us," stated a South African businessman with confidence. (Star, Johannesburg, July 24, 1976) It is estimated that a dozen African states have direct import ties with South Africa while 12 others have "sporadic" links after transfer through other African middlemen.
THE GOLD PLAGUE

The international price of gold bullion dove to its lowest since 1973, down to $104.75 an ounce as of August 27, 1976. Since September when the Rand was devalued it has gone down from $135 an ounce to below $110, costing a $529 million loss in South Africa’s balance of payments. Each $5 drop in the gold price means a $115 million annual loss in the reserve values.

The decline in price is attributed to a number of factors including the IMF sales of gold with a planned third auction on September 15 aimed at funding loans for underdeveloped countries. Less private demand for coins and gold bars is evidenced with the decline in the sale of Krugerrands (gold coins). Despite the lower price and less sales, the Chamber of Mines plans to spend R3.5 million on a campaign through the Public Relations agency of Doyle Dane Bernbach in New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco. “The go ahead [for the campaign] when gold is so low is another indicator of how badly South Africa needs to keep foreign exchange earnings going . . .” (Star, Johannesburg, July 24, 1976) West Germany and Switzerland are other targets for Krugerrand sales, but Germany may increase their price above cost by a value added tax.

The gold price drop is taking its toll. Although some mines (i.e. Anglo Transvaal) have maintained profits through increasing production, mining higher grade ore, and better black labor utilization, some 16 other mines have working costs per ounce which run above the current gold price per ounce. The Government will be called upon to save these mines, primarily ones which became economic to operate when the gold price was high.

The gold industry is interconnected with multiple aspects of the wider economy. It employs 396,000 persons, provides an important source of revenue for the Government, and is a major buyer of South Africa’s goods and services. (See graphic)

Blame for the problem has been placed on the “gold euphoria” which infected South Africa several years ago, meaning too much Government spending. But also, besides the recent IMF sales of gold, there has been increased supply on the market from USSR sales (300 tons in 1976) and the general thrust by the United States to demonitize the role of gold pushing the dollar into a stronger position as the main currency for international transactions. With the lower price there has been more industrial and jewelry demand for gold, but gold mining stocks have dropped one third in 1976.

MINE STRIKE THREATENED

Another aspect of the gold situation is the general position of black and white labor in the mines. The White Mine Workers Union has received a strike ballot from its workers ostensibly because the Chamber of Mines, the management factor, has not granted the workers a five-day week as promised in 1975. The agreement was reached only after the conservative MWU agreed to concessions allowing Blacks into jobs formerly reserved only for whites. However, mine-related artisans’ unions are not agreeing to concessions for Blacks and the Chamber of Mines cannot move to the shorter week without all workers’ agreement. But a reporter for the Star thinks that in fact the MWU and the artisans are in collusion, and that the Chamber will eventually be forced to grant the five-day week to the artisans unions without concessions to Blacks and then the MWU will back off its former
concessionary attitude but will still receive the benefit of the shorter week. The Government has delayed the strike, beyond a few wildcat ones, by instituting a Commission of Inquiry. But the current influence on the five-day week issue will be not only the union, but the state of the economy, especially the price of gold, as a lesser work week will tend to increase costs.

IMF LOAN

The answer to the drop in gold and thus in foreign reserves has been the growing dependence of South Africa on international financing and loans. With South Africa's internal decisions to right the balance of payments, the IMF has approved another loan to South Africa in Special Drawing Rights worth $172 million. Another rumored source of support is a $500-600 million loan from Iran over the next five years with a low interest rate and covered by 6.25 million ounces of collateral in gold based on a gold price of $80 per ounce.

The next IMF auction in September will differ from the first two because the names of buyers will be announced and the gold will be sold at bid price and not the lowest price. There may be growing pressure from pro-gold nations such as France, and even the USSR and smaller nations eager to give the IMF loans, to prevent further falls in the gold price. The IMF may be forced to stretch out the sales or somehow intervene to prevent too drastic plummetts. A US Citibank report posits the price running between $60 and $150 an ounce.

"South Africa cannot loan indefinitely on its golden crutch" is a constant reminder in the SA press. (Pretoria News, July 21, 1976) World economics, political developments external and internal to South Africa, and a volatile labor situation have made the collapse of the "golden crutch" only a matter of time. South Africa knows this, and is attempting to diversify its economy and secure other forms of international support, but gold is still a key indicator for the future. (Star, Johannesburg, July 17, 24, 30, 31, August 7, 14, 16, 1976; New York Times, July 22, August 2, 25, 27, 29, 1976; Africa News, Durban, July 29, 1976; Guardian, London, August 3, 1976; Pretoria News, July 21, 1976)

DEFENSE

ARMS EMBARGO VIOLATED

France has agreed to sell South Africa two Corvette escorts (small destroyers). The sale of the escorts is in violation of the United Nations arms embargo of South Africa. Under the UN embargo all nations are asked not to sell any weapons to the white minority regime.

France has its own arms embargo against South Africa which was announced with great fanfare when French President Giscard D'Estaing visited Zaire in August, 1975. However, naval arm sales were exempt from the embargo, and the manufacture of French arms under licence in South Africa is also allowed.

Mr. Dominic le Louarn, French Embassy Counselor in Lusaka, Zambia, defended the sale, saying: "The escorts will be used to defend South Africa's territorial waters and will have nothing to do with the perpetuation of apartheid or frontier wars." (Star, Johannesburg, Aug 14, 1976)

France is not the only country from which the South African Government is getting arms. According to reports from Israel, between two and six long range gunboats armed with sea-to-sea missiles are being built at the Haifa shipyard for South Africa. Fully armed, the boats cost $18 million each. In addition, fifty South African "civilians" are in Israel being trained to operate the gunboats.

In exchange, Israel will get from South Africa one million tons of coal a year. Included in the coal deal is an agreement by Israel to provide South Africa with advanced military electronic equipment. Israel, in turn, gets much of this technology from the United States. (New York Times, Aug. 18, 1976)

Namibia

OPERATION "COBRA"


Operation "cobra" was a massive sweep in June by five battalions of South African infantry supported by helicopters across the no-mans-land strip along the Namibian border with Angola and well below it. Bill Anderson, a 21-year-old resident of Cape Town, gave an eye-witness account of the nature of the military operation and the conduct of his fellow soldiers.

"Every male over the age of puberty was brought in. The orders were to kill those who ran and arrest those who did not run. All the arrested men were beaten, tortured and interrogated without exception."

"... Torture began almost at once when the suspects were brought back. The first few were interrogated by a section of 10 South African police inside the tent of battalion HQ. I saw the troops beating the suspects with rifles and fists and kicks for two hours before they were taken into the tent. All the troops were welcome to join in the beating. Whenever torture was going on, either in battalion HQ or in the open space behind, a crowd would gather to watch. I would not watch but every night I heard the screams."

Anderson relates that a tent serving drinks to regular soldiers was set up in the field. "Torture would begin when the club closed. Officers boasted in front of me of using field telephones for electric shock torture to the genitals, nipples and ears.... I often saw young boys being roughly manhandled and kicked. They were blindfolded. Some were about 13 and some a little older."

"A good 90 per cent of the troops in my battalion cooperated. The bulk of my company took part in the beatings—it was spoken of as a pleasure."

Corroboration came from a number of sources. Another South African serviceman told a Guardian reporter in Cape Town that he had heard of Cobra, although he himself was involved in another operation—'Eagle-Ops', a helicopter sweep on a house by house check ranging over the Ovamboland region looking for people without identity cards. "Those who could not produce them were arrested and sent to the military camp at Oshakati. He confirmed the existence of a detention centre at this camp, where, according to reliable witnesses, torture is
used to extract information from those detained.” (Manchester Guardian weekly, Sep. 5, 1976).

This same unnamed soldier "also revealed the existence of elite units, known as 'recce' troops, that had taken part in the attack on the guerrilla base of the South West Africa People’s Organization at Sialola in Zambia on July 11 (see Southern Africa, Sep., 1976). The British paper reports that the 'recce' troops "have also been acting as military advisers to UNITA and FNLA units in southern Angola", conducting guerrilla warfare against the Peoples Republic of Angola.

Anglican, Catholic and Lutheran clergymen have confirmed the use of torture and the shoot-to-kill policy of the South Africans in the International Territory of Namibia. A priest told a Guardian reporter in Windhoek of "three young boys who were cycling from Angola to Namibia who were shot dead early in August for being in the one-kilometre no-go zone along the border. The zone apparently had been cleared of all living creatures—people or cattle found there are shot on sight." (Manchester Guardian weekly, Sep. 5, 1976).

Namibian exiles have recounted time and time again in world forums such as the United Nations their personal experiences of detention and torture at the hands of the South African military and both local tribal and South African police.

Chief Minister Cornelius Ndjoba of the Owambo bantu stan and South African Defence Force chief General Magnus Malan both denied troops tortured and killed civilians during operations in northern Namibia. Ndjoba, who owes his position to the Pretoria regime, was quoted as saying his "government" requested the South African military presence and that his people are grateful for their protection (Johannesburg Star, Sep. 4, 1976; Washington Post, Sep. 1, 1976).

In Pretoria, Minister of Defence Pieter W. Botha invited the Guardian to send a reporter and a photographer to northern Namibia "as guests of South Africa and investigate the allegations they thought fit to publish" (Manchester Guardian, Sep. 2, 1976).

A vague invitation to other press was mentioned in South Africa’s official press memo. The Guardian’s editor printed a list of conditions centering around unescorted and free access to all areas in northern Namibia and to all people, civilian and military. Martin Walker, the newsman who had carefully worked on the story for weeks, was selected to visit Namibia. But Pretoria withdrew the invitation.

ORDEAL

A testament from a Namibian held in detention 255 days by South African security police has reached the world. Josef Zacharias was arrested in a country-wide sweep in October, 1975. He was tortured in an attempt to force him to become a state witness at the Terrorism Act trial of six SWAPO members, known as the Swakopmund trial. Zacharias, a shopowner, describes his ordeal: "My toe nail was pulled off with a pair of pliers, without giving
me anything that can prevent pain while you are suspended from the ground. . . . I was taken out of my cell by one officer known as Lieutenant Dippenaar who then started to beat me up and swearing at me very very badly, and also promised to kill me if I am not prepared to speak as they wish; but I stayed on my point not to speak against my friends”. Zacharias did eventually testify, but did not desert his friends, for the court sent him back to jail, charging that he had perjured himself. He was later released, when the state had own its case.

**SWAKOPMUND TRIAL APPEALS**

A South African supreme court judge sitting in Windhoek on June 25 granted an application for a special entry to be made on the record of the Swakopmund Terrorism trial which had resulted in the conviction of four SWAPO members, two of whom were sentenced to death. Disclosure of leaks of defense documents by members of the defense attorney’s staff (in his law firm) to the security police caused the case, with entry appended, to be sent to South Africa’s highest court, the Appellate Division (see Southern Africa, Sep., 1976). 

Word has been received that the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal against both their convictions and sentences by Mr. Aaron Mushimba and Mr. Hendrik Shikongo (both of whom received the death sentence) and Ms. Rauna Nambinga (given a seven-year prison term). Ms. Anna Nghihondjwa, who received the Terrorism Act’s minimum sentence of five years in prison was given leave to appeal her conviction. The appeal process is scheduled to commence in November.

**TURNHALLE TALKS**

The South African-sponsored “constitutional conference” at the Turnhalle building in Windhoek reached its first anniversary on September 1. Delegates from Pretoria’s designated eleven “ethnic groups” have meet off and on during that period, with the growing realization that the United Nations deadline of August 31 for a South African compliance with a Security Council resolution had to be met in some fashion. On August 18, the constitutional committee, headed by white Nationalist Party politician Dirk Mudge, announced with “reasonable certainty” that December 31, 1978, would be “the date for independence for South West Africa”. 

The committee listed a number of issues to be “negoti- tated” with South Africa: water and electricity supply; finance; security; and the status of Namibia’s only deep-water port, Walvis Bay, which South Africa claims as part of its Cape Province. The expected declaration of an interim government did not occur, nor was a draft constitution promulgated. There was no clear intent to declare Namibia as a unitary state—an essential building block insisted upon by SWAPO, other Namibian political groups and the United Nations. There was no mention of elections.

The announcement was condemned at the UN. Commissioner for Namibia Sean MacBride stated: “I regard it as a ploy to buy more time to set up a quisling government answerable to Pretoria. In view of South Africa’s conduct in Namibia I think the Security Council will not accept any elections which are not organized by the United Nations.”

Inside Namibia, the SWAPO foreign affairs secretary, Pastor Pestus Naholo, declared: “We call on our brothers in Africa and the whole international community to condemn this decision by South Africa through their puppets.” (Washington Post, Aug. 20, 1976).

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma restated his organization’s position again at Dar es Salaam on September 8. He rejected the Turnhalle talks and their groups as “puppets.” He said that SWAPO was prepared to discuss the handover of power in Namibia to SWAPO at an international conference, and that any Turnhalle people at such a meeting must be regarded as part of the South African delegation. (Washington Post, Sep. 7, 1976)

**UNITED NATIONS**

The UN Security Council met briefly on August 31, the deadline for a South African reply to that body’s January demand for compliance with a UN plan for its supervision and control of nation-wide elections for the International Territory. Substantive debate was postponed until September 22 when foreign ministers will be in New York for the opening of the next session of the General Assembly. The feeling for strong action against South Africa for its illegal occupation is rising, and mandatory sanctions against the Pretoria regime will surely surface.

This pressure, together with that of other events in Zimbabwe and in South Africa itself, are part of the growing United States government involvement in the region. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger now speaks frequently of a “settlement” in Namibia; and is trying to arrange a South Africa-SWAPO meeting, possibly in Zurich. (Washington Post, Sep. 14, 1976).

The US government, fretting over any interruption of the “delicate negotiations” it has been pursuing outside the UN, sent Ambassador William W. Scranton to complain to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim about comments alleged to have been made by Commissioner Sean MacBride. “The American protest over Mr. MacBride’s statements appeared to be based on the contention that as an international official he should not interfere in matters pending before the Security Council”. (New York Times, Aug. 28, 1976).

MacBride has been a staunch proponent of the world body’s exercising its responsibility as the trust authority over the International Territory of Namibia, and stands ready to carry out his duties as Commissioner to support the UN’s supervision and control of Namibia-wide free elections, completely separate from any South African influence.
Zimbabwe

THE MILITARY FRONT

On August 11th, Umtali, the third largest city in Rhodesia, located close to the Mozambique border, was hit for one half hour by rocket and mortar fire. The attack is thought to be in retaliation for the Rhodesian invasion of a refugee camp inside Mozambique a few days earlier. (See section on Mozambique) Several people were injured, and government and civilian property were damaged. The Rhodesian government has accused Mozambique regular forces of carrying out this attack. Vila Salazar, a police post 250 miles south of Umtali, was hit by mortar fire at the same time. (New York Times, Aug. 12, 1976)

Guerrilla activity in Zimbabwe is increasing, particularly in the areas bounded by the Bulawayo—Victoria Falls road in the east, the Zambian border in the north, and the Botswana border in the west. (Star, Johannesburg, July 31, 1976) New developments include closing the main Bulawayo—Victoria Falls road from Lupane to Victoria Falls from 4 p.m. to 7 a.m. and mining tarred roads. Previously only dirt roads had been subjected to guerrilla laid land mines. (Star, Johannesburg, July 24, 1976 and Guardian, London, Aug. 2, 1976) Several automobile ambushes have also occurred recently on the Wankie-Bulawayo road.

The railroad line from Zimbabwe into Botswana has been the site of an increasing number of attacks and attempts at sabotage. The Rhodesian regime has sent officials across the Botswana border to question and harass the local population in an effort to gain information about the presence of Zimbabwe nationalist fighters. This violation of the Botswana border has been vigorously protested by the Botswana government. (New York Times, Aug. 13, 1976 and Star, Johannesburg, July 24, 1976)

REPRESSION INTENSIFIES

As support for the African nationalist forces inside Zimbabwe grows, the Smith government is stepping up its repressive actions against possible sympathizers. In July, 56 black farm workers were sentenced to 10 years in jail for failing to report the presence of “terrorists” in their area. (Star, Johannesburg, July 31, 1976) Eight officials of the African National Council have been sentenced to death after admitting they caused explosions in a black township beer hall and on railroad tracks near Salisbury as well as the grenade attacks on a restaurant and night club in Salisbury on July 20. (New York Times, Aug. 31, 1976) An Italian woman missionary doctor accused of treating a wounded guerrilla faces a possible death sentence if she is convicted. (New York Times, Aug. 18, 1976) A congregational church mission near Chipenga has been shut down for allegedly aiding guerrilla activity in the area.

Shortly after the mortar attack on Umtali, the Catholic Bishop of Umtali, Donal Lamont in an open letter to the Rhodesian regime blamed it for the current violence. He criticized the repressive and unjust rule of the white minority and called on the regime to drastically change its policies as the only way to bring peace to their country. “Conscience compels me” he wrote, “to state that y our administration by its clearly racist and oppressive policies and by its stubborn refusal to change, is largely responsible for the injustices which have provoked the present disorder and it must in that measure be considered guilty of whatever misery or bloodshed may follow.” A few days after this letter was made public, the Bishop was arrested for sympathizing with the outlawed nationalist struggle.

BUDGETARY CHANGES AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS

In mid-July the Rhodesian Finance Minister presented a new national budget to Parliament which drastically cut into the amount of money Rhodesians can take out of the country. Holiday allowances have been reduced from over $600 to less than $400 and people who leave the country for good can now only take $1600 with them where before they were allowed almost $8000. (Star, Johannesburg, July 24, 1976) No new taxes are envisioned for the coming year, although government spending is to increase by 22 per cent. One reason for this is that in April the sales tax increased from 5 to 10 percent on the dollar. (Guardian, London, July 16, 1976)

Prime Minister Ian Smith countered criticism of his decision to cut emigrant allowances and holiday spending, declaring the cutbacks were necessary to pay for war materials needed to fight the guerrillas. The budget calls for an increase in defence spending of 40 percent and for the police of 23 percent. (Guardian, London, July 15, 1976)

Limiting the amount of money Rhodesians can take out of the country will also help compensate for the loss of export earnings which have resulted from the closing of the Mozambique rail link with the coast last March. Serious bottlenecks are said to exist along the only rail route Rhodesia has to the outside world, through South Africa, contributing to a further loss of export revenue.
MERcenARies
In early August a US House of Representatives subcommittee of the International Relations Committee held hearings on the recruitment of mercenaries for Rhodesia. The Committee chairman reported that the campaign to get North Americans to sign up to fight with the Rhodesian army is highly organized. The US Federal Department of Justice is said to be investigating cases in this area. It is against US law for an American citizen to serve in the military forces of a foreign country.

The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) has reported that as many as 80% of the new soldiers joining the Rhodesian army are coming from a well organized network for mercenary recruitment in the Western countries. (Daily News, Dar es Salaam, July 20, Aug. 2, 1976)

NEW PARTY FORMS
In mid August the formation of a new Black nationalist political party was announced in Salisbury, the capital of Rhodesia. The new group, called the Zimbabwe Reformed African National Council (ZRANC) claims to have elected Robert Mugabe, a Zimbabwean and one of the leaders of the “Third Force” operating out of Mozambique, as its President. Mugabe, however, has denied any connection with this new party. The “Third Force”, which has carried out the bulk of the fighting against the Smith regime in recent months, appears to have rejected any political strategy which includes reopening negotiations with the illegal Smith regime at this time. ZRANC, on the other hand, which seems to be a group of political unknowns, claims to be prepared to open talks with the Smith government if Mugabe is allowed safe passage back into the country to participate in them. (Africa News, Aug. 30, 1976 and New York Times, Aug. 24, 1976)

A Luta Continua

angola

president neto visits cuba

President Agostinho Neto received a tumultuous welcome in Havana on July 23rd when he arrived to participate in the July 26 celebrations celebrating the 23rd anniversary of the attack on the Moncada barracks by Cuban patriots, among them Fidel Castro. President Neto came to thank the Cuban people for their international support and solidarity in securing Angolan independence, and was given a hero's welcome. Neto was greeted at Havana's José Marti airport by Prime Minister Fidel Castro and his brother Raul Castro, Cuba's Armed Forces Minister, who had flown to Angola earlier in the year to make arrangements for Neto's visit. A million Cubans waving Angolan banners and posters of Neto lined the 17-mile route from the airport to the city of Havana. Some observers described the Neto arrival as the most massive welcome ever given to a foreign head of state. (Tanzania Daily News, July 24 and July 25, 1976)

The week-long visit of the large Angolan delegation headed by President Neto, included talks on plans for more technical assistance as well as joint Angolan-Cuban cooperative agreements.

The highlight of the visit was the sharing of the speakers' platform on July 26th by President Neto and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Neto addressed the Cuban people first in Portuguese with a Spanish translation following, and then Castro spoke. Considerable excerpts are reported here from the speeches of the two heads of state since both have received little attention in the U.S. press.

Neto began by extending fraternal greetings of the people of Angola to the Cuban people, expressing the "feelings of friendship, active solidarity and fraternity which have grown in the common struggle against the enemies of the people, imperialism and colonialism". Neto went on to point out that the imperialist camp "wants to divide us on the basis of race, nationality or spheres of influence—they wanted the Angolans to be Africans, the Cubans to be Americans and the Soviets to be Europeans. Meanwhile the very evolution of history shows that geography cannot limit contacts between peoples... and that a common ideology and common political vision unites us in solidarity. Cuba and Angola are free regions of
the world which will contribute increasingly effectively to freedom and progress of peoples."

Dr. Neto referred also to the "generous and fraternal help of the Soviet Union, a country whose internationalist practice has been firm and continuous since the beginning of the MPLA struggle for national liberation." Neto compared the support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with the aid that China effectively gave to the imperialist camp in its support of the western puppet groups, FNLA and UNITA and in its non-support of Angolan U.N. membership. "If the People's Republic of China practices socialism, as it claims, I must say this is a strange kind of socialism."

Finally amidst chants of "Long Live Cuban-Angolan Friendship" and "The Struggle Continues—Victory Is Certain!", President Neto affirmed the Angolan people's desire to build a true, permanent, and solid friendship between Cuba and Angola. (Radio Havana, Text of Neto Speech, July 26, 1976)

It was then Prime Minister Castro's turn to take the speaker's platform. Saluting Neto, Castro compared him to the great Cuban hero, José Marti, who was also a poet, an intellectual and a revolutionary nationalist. A major theme in his speech was the common battle against imperialism waged by Cuba and Angola.

"When we, the Moncada Barracks combatants, were imprisoned in the Portuguese colonialist jails of Angola. A few weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Neto was being imprisoned for the fourth and last time. In April 1961 we had not given Yankee imperialism its first defeat in America then in 1975 we should not have been able to lend our support to an invaded Angola."

Dr. Castro then turned to the subject of the historic ties between Angola and Cuba through the slave trade saying,

"... in our wars of independence in 1868 and 1895, African slaves and their descendants, who knows how many of them from Angola, fought for our fatherland. We are united by blood, and blood in the two senses of the word, the blood of our ancestors and the blood we shed together on the battlefield."

Prime Minister Castro concluded by stressing that Cuban aid to Angola is an international duty and a privilege. "Let no one believe that a people loses anything when it helps another. Our country gains. It gains a professional who becomes more conscientious, who becomes more revolutionary."

Before leaving Angola for Cuba, President Neto proclaimed July 26 a national day of homage to Cuba, a day on which special work was to be carried out. The announcement came on July 18 as President Neto, his wife, and members of the MPLA Central Committee went to Martires do Caxito farm to take part in the sugar harvest. (Radio Luanda, July 19, 1976) Neto returned to Angola via Yugoslavia where the Angolan delegation spent four days during which time joint communiques were issued stressing support of the struggles in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar Es Salaam, July 24th, 1976)

AFTERMATH OF MERCENARY TRIAL

In a recent interview with a would-be mercenary, former Staff Sergeant in Vietnam F. Lee Hutson indicated that the executions are already having the desired effect of acting as a deterrent to future mercenaries planning to go to Africa. Hutson attempted to organize a 50-man "Special Operations Cadre" to engage in counter-insurgency warfare. Hutson said that most of those who had signed up earlier this year through an ad in the notorious "Soldier of Fortune" magazine had lost interest after American and British mercenaries were executed in Angola. (Providence Evening Bulletin, Aug. 13, 1976)

ON THE MILITARY FRONT

Skirmishes between MPLA troops and FNLA, FLEC, and UNITA continue in isolated pockets of the country. In the far north, FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda) is still mining roads and ambushing government troops in Cabinda despite the peace accord which accompanied the recognition of Angola by Zaire. Ironically, Gulf Oil Co. has become dependent on the presence of Cuban forces in the Cabindan enclave to maintain security and "protect" their operations. Gulf officials have said that they would have to close down operations in the enclave if the Cubans were to leave! (Africa News, Aug. 2, 1976)

The People's Republic of Angola has charged that the U.S.-backed FNLA is massing troops along the Angolan-Zaire border, also in violation of agreements between Angola and Zaire. FNLA has claimed through communiques issued in Paris that its "commandos have captured the town and airport of Tuto..." and another report said that fighting was taking place in Caxito. If the FNLA communiques are correct, the fighting in Caxito would have been precisely at the same time that President Neto and government members were participating in the sugar harvest in Caxito with newsmen on hand to report the peaceful scene. (Tanjug News Report, Belgrade, July 26, 1976) It is interesting to note that FNLA reports which previously came out of Kinshasa are now coming out of Paris. No doubt FNLA still operates from Zaire but cannot do so openly.

UNITA, like FNLA and FLEC, has rejected the MPLA's call for political reconciliation and continues to carry out acts of sabotage in southeastern Angola. MPLA has intensified its political and economic programs in the area and government sources indicate that the military threat which UNITA poses is not a cause of major disruption.

It is significant that among the 157 enemy soldiers killed by SWAPO in guerrilla operations in northern Namibia between May 9 and July 10 of this year were UNITA soldiers along with South Africans and Portuguese mercenaries. (Tanzania Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Aug. 14, 1976) Meanwhile Zambia has denied assertions that UNITA forces were operating from Zambian soil and the Zambian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mwale, expressed Zambia's keen interest to work closely with the PRA. (Radio Lusaka, Aug. 6, 1976)

NETO INAUGURATES SUGAR HARVEST

The first sugar harvest of the First of May and the Fourth of February sugar mills in Benguela Province has been inaugurated by President Neto. This is Angola’s first harvest under the direction of the government after the nationalization of the sugar industry. (Radio Luanda, Aug. 10, 1976) In addition to Neto's participation in the Caxito sugar harvest other government ministers have been active in agricultural production. Defense Minister Iko Carreira took part in the coffee harvest in Cabinda.
ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT

Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kaduma, reported that Tanzania will open an embassy in the People's Republic of Angola. "Apart from our fraternal relations, Angola has now joined the front-line states in the liberation struggle of southern Africa" said Kaduma (Tanzania Daily News, Dar Es Salaam, July 17, 1976)

Mozambique

ZIMBABWE REFUGEES MASSACRED

A representative for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has confirmed that a large refugee camp in Mozambique was destroyed by Rhodesian soldiers on August 8. The Pungue refugee camp in Nhazonia, Mozambique, housed 8-10 thousand refugees from Zimbabwe. Hundreds of them died in the attack and hundreds more were injured.

When he visited several days after the attack, the UN visitor found the camp burned to the ground and rescue workers still gathering up the bodies to place them into ten large trenches serving as mass graves. 618 bodies had already been found. The total number of dead was expected to approach 1000 as more people were found in the surrounding bush where they had fled and died from their wounds. Most of the survivors had scattered when the onslaught began, and only a few hundred had trickled back to stay at the camp by the time the U.N. visitor came.

Rhodesian troops reportedly masqueraded as Mozambican soldiers, wearing FRELIMO-style uniforms, singing revolutionary songs, and shouting FRELIMO slogans when they met anyone as they drove the 20 miles on the Mozambican side of the border. The Zimbabweans in the camp were just awakening when the Rhodesian troops began the attack.

One of the survivors reported: "Those who were nearest fell. They died right there. Then they began to pursue those who were running away toward the river. They got out of the vehicles firing continuously. On the road the vehicles crushed the bodies and everything that was in their way. Many people died at the river, when they were trying to cross it to escape into the bush, above all, children, old people, women, those who didn't know how to swim."

After mowing down men, women, and children with gunfire, the Rhodesians ordered survivors to place the bodies of the dead women and children inside their huts. The Rhodesian troops then set fire to the huts. The intent was to destroy evidence which would prove that this was not a guerrilla base. More than 300 of the wounded were women and children.

Hundreds of wounded were treated at Chimoio, Tete, and Catandoica hospitals. Survivors escaped with only the clothes on their backs. The U.N. High Commission for refugees which had helped support this and two other similar camps in Mozambique is expected to help resettle the survivors.

The white minority Rhodesian government had triumphantly announced the raid to the world the day it happened, claiming to have killed 300 Zimbabwe guerrillas and some 30 others, mostly Mozambican soldiers.
The U.N. visitor, Hugo Idoyaga, a Uruguayan, had also visited the Pungue camp in May and reported at that time that there was no evidence of military activity at that location. Survivors lamented:

"I cannot understand why they came to attack us and did not attack the guerrillas. We are not military people... We are in an independent country. How come they come here to kill us?... Why are they persecuting us? We left our own country."

Mr. Idoyega said there were tens of thousands of Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique and they were now streaming in at the rate of about a thousand a month.

As they retreated to Rhodesia after the massacre, Rhodesian troops blew up a bridge over the Pungue River on the road between Tete and Chimio (formerly Vila Pery), in Mozambique. Despite the elaborate masquerade Rhodesia continues to claim the raid was one of "hot pursuit" and justifiable. Ten civilians were also killed on the road: three technicians who were on their way to the Cabara Bassa project; five civilians on their way to Chimio, a Spanish priest of the Burgos Fathers, and another civilian who was in his car.

The Mozambique government is expected to take the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations. A week before the raid Joachim Chissano, Mozambican Minister for Foreign Affairs, said in Dar-es-Salaam that the four African frontline states had to be prepared to take joint military action if necessary to repel Rhodesian or South African aggression against any of them. He spoke as he was returning from addressing the U.N. Security Council on a Zambian complaint of South African aggression in July against a Zambian border settlement.

(Sources: Noticias (Maputo); Daily News (Dar-es-Salaam); New York Times; Washington Post; Los Angeles Times; Guardian (London); BBC Africa Service; Africa News and others during the first half of August)

NEWS BRIEFS

On August 10, Samora Machel met in Pemba with Cabo Delgado government officials to discuss how to solve some of the problems of that province. After the meeting, the President took off for Chinga, the educational center of Muidumbe (also in Cabo Delgado) and the central base in the Mueda district. At Chinga, President Machel encouraged members of the women's unit there to carry on with their task of mobilizing the people in fulfillment of the guidelines of the Party and Government and in the struggle against the vestiges of the colonial regime and the old society.

The August 13 Tanzania Daily News reported on a circular issued in Maputo by Frelimo headquarters addressed to all dynamizing groups. It pointed out that in Mozambique it is understood that people who resort to crime do so as a result of being oppressed. "Instead of seeking solutions through ending the causes of their plight, they resort to satisfying their needs at the expense and humiliation of the people of the class to which they belong." As a solution, people's tribunals will be created under the auspices of the dynamizing groups. Everyone will be encouraged to participate in the tribunal.

By the end of next year, Dar es Salaam and Maputo will have direct telephone, telegraph, and telex services between the two cities. The ten million dollar exchange operation will provide a direct link with the outside world by using the Mount Langmot earth satellite station without going through Nairobi.

Other plans include the installations of an international auto telex exchange and a radio call worth twelve million dollars to serve ships. (Tanzania Daily News, July 22, 1976)

The Tanzania Daily News of August 3, reported that tenants of nationalized buildings in Maputo and the suburb of Matola will now be able to apply for a reduction in rent that they pay to the State. This new regulation applies to "cement" houses. The new rents will be determined by the condition of the applicant's house, the number of people occupying it, as well as the size of their incomes. The amount of the new rents will also be determined by what the present rate is and what kind of house it is. After the nationalization of rented buildings February 3, 1976, the Government divided rented houses into different categories of payment. The readjustment of the rent is another move to eliminate inequality in Mozambique. The readjustment of rents in other parts of the country for such houses will begin soon.

July 24 was declared Nationalization Day. Throughout the country Mozambicans led by Government and Party leaders took part in a general clean up of hospitals, schools, streets, and villages as part of the celebration festivities.

A circular was issued by the Frelimo National headquarters to all dynamizing groups throughout the country to explain that the nationalizations of all land, schools, hospitals, and funeral parlors on July 24, 1975, was done in order to eliminate vestiges of the old colonial regime and class exploitation.

Radio Mozambique devoted the whole day to broadcasting interviews with members of the cleaning teams. Revolutionary music was also played. Samora Machel sent a message of good will to Anwar Sadat to congratulate him on the 24th anniversary of the independence of Egypt. (Tanzania Daily News, July 25, 1976).

Guinea-Bissau

PEOPLE'S WAR, PEOPLE'S JUSTICE
by Stephanie Urdang

The trials against the collaborators with the Portuguese colonialists during the war were—at the time of my visit to Guinea-Bissau in June and July this year—coming to an end. I listened as one of the last trials took place in an old run down cinema left in a state of total disrepair by the Portuguese. This building was typical of Bolama, the capital of Guinea-Bissau until the early '40's, which was systematically destroyed during the war because of the high level of PAIGC activity and support in the area.

Sitting on the stage were the five judges, the prosecutor (the regional security responsible) and the court recorder. The judges were Francisca Pereira, President of the Bolama Region—one of the eight regions of the country, the regional justice responsible, the regional commander of FARP (the national army), a member of FARP, and an elected representative of the population. In front of the stage, at ground level, stood the accused, nerously clutching a microphone, which he held too close to his mouth, causing his words to be blurred by a loud hiss, as he insisted that he was innocent of stealing cattle during the war and selling them to the Portuguese army. His denials
Iphone. "Before we continue," she said, "I want to explain to you the meaning of your actions." Her voice was full of emotion, her articulation forceful. "Did you know who we were fighting against?" "Yes," the defendant answered, looking down. "Then you must understand that we were fighting for our liberation, for the liberation of all the people of Guinea-Bissau. It was a hard struggle, one in which many people were killed. We suffered very greatly during the war. And while we fought for freedom, you were supplying food to the Portuguese army so that they could increase their strength. While we were without food in the liberated zones, you were giving food to the Portuguese. Without food, they could not have continued the war. Do you understand what your support of the Portuguese meant for our people?" At the end, the defendant thanked the Tribunal for the political education he had received during the course of the trial. He was sentenced to two years. The one-and-a-half years he had spent in detention were taken into account. He had had six months more to serve.

The system of justice inherited from the Portuguese administration was a disaster and had to be totally restructured. Justice was available for those who could pay, and before the process could even begin, a preliminary fee of 5,000 escudos had to be paid. This was equivalent to about $165.00, while the average income was about $100.00 per year. A backlog of 5,000 civil and criminal cases was found, many had been outstanding for as long as seven or eight years. There were cases of people who had been in prison for this period of time without being charged. The laws themselves fitted admirably with fascist Portugal but had little to do with the revolution in Guinea-Bissau. The work to change this has been intensive and has had to be done with a critical shortage of trained people. Two commissioners were set up immediately. One to handle the backlog of cases, the other to deal with ongoing criminal and civil cases. Because access to justice is now free, these soared in number. The process of electing people's tribunals in all the districts throughout the country had to begin and has not yet been completed. The trials for the collaborators were carefully documented and this required a lot of research in all areas of the country. All the laws of the country had to be studied. It was decided that at first those Portuguese laws that were not oppressive or directly against the principles of PAIGC would be left in operation for the time being and only those that were unacceptable would be changed. Nonetheless, many new laws had to be promulgated in keeping with the new society being developed. These include laws on marriage and divorce and relationships within the family, laws concerning workers, as well as those regulating the administration of the different regions. Then there is the day to day work that confronts any justice depart-

The recently elected members of the Peoples Court in Cacine, a small town of less than 1000 people in the south, with the responsibilities for the security of the area (left) and the court recorder (second from right). Cacine was a fortified town during the war surrounded by a liberated zone.
ment, but in Guinea-Bissau takes on a flavor of its own. Take the case of the Grande Hotel for instance. The Grande Hotel, during the colonial administration was the only hotel in the country. Some other establishments called themselves hotels but were closer to boarding house or the ‘European-style pensions’. (Since then two hotels have been converted from army officer quarters and a third, five story hotel has just been completed.) The owner of the Grande, like many of his compatriots, left Guinea-Bissau in 1974 as he could not stomach the idea of independence for the colony. He continued to own the hotel and developed an ingenious way of increasing his profits and getting them out of the country. He made an arrangement with the Portuguese Airlines whereby the hotel provided the food for their twice-weekly flights and payment was made in Lisbon. When this was discovered, the hotel was taken over by the Justice Department and was essentially nationalized. The Commissioner of Justice met with the workers of the hotel who elected a committee of three to run it. Now the person who has overall responsibility for it is the cook.

Stephanie Urdang recently spent 2 months in Guinea-Bissau.

**Neighbors**

![Kenneth Kaunda](image)

**ZAMBIA**

**KAUNDA WAXES MILITANT AS BORDER INCIDENTS CONTINUE**

Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda, whom many observers began to characterize as moderate and pro-Western for his stance during the Angolan civil war and his participation in the southern African “detente” exercise, has recently taken a more militant approach—publicly at least—with regard to remaining liberation struggles in southern Africa.

Kaunda recently told a reporter for the South African paper *Rand Daily Mail* that he would never consider meeting with South African premier John Vorster again. Kaunda and Vorster had met in the widely-publicized but fruitless Victoria Falls conference on Rhodesia in September 1975. “We know only too well that it is South Africa which is propping up the rebel regime in Zimbabwe-to-be,” said Kaunda in explaining his position. “And it is South Africa which has the power to decide whether there should be peace in Namibia. One must be specific: It is Vorster who is to blame. If he wanted it tomorrow, the rebels in Rhodesia would be on their knees and there would be majority rule. But Vorster has continued to prop up the rebel regime."

Zambia accused South Africa of bombing a Zambian border village in July, killing more than 20 persons. The accusation was taken up by the UN Security Council, which voted unanimously, save for a US abstention, to condemn the white regime. Two incidents were reported involving South African troops in early August, near the towns of Mambova, and Kazungula in which at least one Zambian soldier was killed. Zambia has also accused South Africa of training saboteurs who are creating havoc in Zambia’s Northwest Province.

Kaunda continues to urge a coalition government on the MPLA leadership in Angola but has recently made conciliatory gestures in that direction and extended formal diplomatic recognition.

In late August Kaunda was host to two American
assistant secretaries of state, who were in Lusaka pursuing Henry Kissinger's new initiatives in southern Africa. The next day, Kaunda accused unnamed Western powers of "unprincipled double-dealing" in southern Africa. He said

peace efforts had failed and warned, "now we fight." (WP, 8/27/76 & 8/24/76, Guardian, July 17, 1976, 7/27/76; T.D.N., 8/16/76)

International Organizations

UNITED NATIONS REJECTS NAMIBIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS

The proposals of the so-called "Constitutional Conference" set up by South Africa in an attempt to deceive world opinion and to retain ultimate control over Namibia, were firmly rejected by the United Nations. In a statement issued on Namibia Day, August 26, the Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim declared that the proposals "fall far short of the essential conditions stipulated by the United Nations. They do not therefore constitute an adequate response to the needs of the situation. South Africa must abandon its unilateral approach and recognize that co-operation with the United Nations is indispensable for resolving this matter to the satisfaction of the people of Namibia and the international community."

The Secretary-General reaffirmed the stand of the United Nations, as contained in numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, on the issue of Namibia:

1. South Africa's presence in Namibia being illegal, it must withdraw its administration and put an end to the occupation of the Territory.
2. The United Nations will neither accept nor recognize any action by South Africa which would compromise in any manner the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, either through the establishment of homelands or by any other political device. 
3. The necessary political conditions must be created under which the people of Namibia may be able to exercise their right to self-determination and national independence free of any constraint. This requires the abrogation of all repressive and discriminatory laws, the release of all political prisoners and detainees, and the right of return of all political exiles as well as their right to participate fully in the political life of the Territory.
4. No constitutional arrangements for the Territory can have any validity unless they are based on the genuine and freely expressed wishes of the people of Namibia, including, of course, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and unless they are formulated within the framework of a single and undivided State.
5. Any constitutional arrangements for the Territory, including the holding of elections, must be conducted under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

The constitutional proposals were also immediately condemned by the Council for Namibia, the organ set up by the United Nations as the supervisory authority for the Territory. The Council for Namibia called on the Security Council to take appropriate measures under the United Nations Charter to enforce its decisions.

On August 31, the deadline set by the Security Council last January for compliance by South Africa with the United Nations resolutions, the Council met again to review the issue. In a strong speech, Henri Rasolondraibe (Madagascar), current chairman of the African Group at the United Nations, called on the Council to impose mandatory sanctions against South Africa. At the same time, however, the Africa Group requested the Security Council to postpone debate on the issue until September 22 in order to allow full participation by the African Foreign Ministers coming to New York to attend the General Assembly session (which is scheduled to open on September 21). Observers, however, indicated that the reason for the postponement was to allow for further diplomatic maneuvering and particularly for the outcome of Kissinger's meeting with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa on September 4. (UN press releases No. NAM/240, SC/3794; New York Times, September 1, 1976).

ASSISTANCE TO ANGOLA

The United Nations Secretary-General has designated Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as co-ordinator for humanitarian assistance which will focus primarily on the settlement of approximately one million refugees and displaced persons in Angola.

An inter-agency mission composed of representatives of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UNHCR, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Food Programme (WFP) visited Angola last July. Its findings indicate that the most immediate requirement over the next 12 months is 48,000 tons of food. Other requirements to be met include domestic needs such as blankets and clothing in cold areas, transport, health supplies and services, tools and seeds for agriculture, and some assistance towards primary education. (UN press release REF/743)

NON-ALIGNED GROUP SUPPORTS SOUTHERN AFRICAN STRUGGLE

The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries meeting in Colombo (Sri Lanka) in August, 1976 adopted a political declaration and several resolutions expressing strong support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa. The decisions are of particular importance in that the Non-Aligned Group numbers over 100 countries, primarily from the Third World, and can determine the political line in the United Nations and other world organizations.

The Conference declared its "firm commitment to the complete elimination of colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa." It reaffirmed its support for an intensification of the armed struggle in southern Africa, and urged all member countries to assume their full responsibility towards the liberation movements, granting them "decisive practical assistance—material and financial—... in order to accelerate the liquidation of colonialism and apartheid in Southern
Africa. The Conference also called on member countries to provide practical assistance for the front-line and enclave states, namely Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

On Zimbabwe, the Conference reaffirmed the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule, and that any settlement relating to the future of the territory must be worked out with the full participation of the African National Council. It called for the consolidation of the unity of the people of Zimbabwe under the leadership of the African National Council. It also called upon all non-aligned countries and other peace- and freedom-loving countries to give political, moral, material and diplomatic assistance to the people of Zimbabwe in order to enable them to achieve self-determination and independence. Emphasizing the need for scrupulous enforcement of the mandatory UN sanctions, the Conference called for the expansion of sanctions to cover such areas as communications, and called on the international community to provide all assistance to Mozambique to meet the economic needs arising out of its closure of the border with Rhodesia.

On Namibia, the Conference strongly condemned the racist regime of South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw from the Territory and for its attempts to consolidate its illegal occupation through the policy of "bantustans." It strongly condemned "the so-called Windhoek constitutional talks as calculated to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people, defy the international community and perpetuate South Africa's domination of the territory." The Conference stated that if the South African regime was really interested in a just solution in Namibia, it should meet immediately, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements for the transfer of power. Alternatively, South Africa should comply with the demands of the Security Council calling for immediate independence and UN-supervised elections. The Conference called on all States to refrain from according recognition to any puppet regime created by South Africa in an attempt to grant a spurious independence to the territory.

On South Africa, the Conference stated that "the total eradication of apartheid and the exercise by all the people of South Africa of their inalienable right of self-determination is an urgent and imperative need at the present time." The Conference called on all countries to strengthen the boycott against South Africa, and in particular raged the termination of all nuclear collaboration with the racist regime. It called on the Security Council of the United Nations to impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. It also called for sanctions, including an oil embargo, against France and Israel for persistently violating United Nations resolutions against the supply of arms to South Africa. The Conference condemned the "bogus independence" of the Transkei, scheduled for October 26, and called upon all non-aligned states not to recognize the puppet state, and to "intensify their vigilance against these nefarious maneuvers aimed at consolidating the obnoxious system of apartheid." Finally, the Conference emphasized the necessity that "at this critical period in the struggle of the oppressed people in South Africa, all efforts be made to effectively support the liberation struggle there." (Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, doc. NAC/CONF.5/FM/12/Add.3)

U.S. and Southern Africa

KISSINGER ACTIVE ON SOUTHERN FRONT

On August 30, radio newscasts reported that US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would meet with South African Prime Minister John Vorster, for the second time in less than three months. The meeting will take place in Zurich, Switzerland September 4th through 6th.

The announcement underscored the dramatically increasing priority which Kissinger and the US have assigned to southern Africa, and the great amounts of diplomatic energy which have gone into the pursuit of US goals in that region in recent months. In the wake of the Angolan war, widely regarded as a disaster for US policymakers, the State Department has been carefully cultivating leaders and diplomats of both white and black Africa. The start of the "new Africa policy" was marked by Kissinger's extensive tour of black African nations in April. There followed a meeting with Vorster in Germany in June, and now this second session with the South African Premier. Meanwhile, other officials in the State Department have been travelling through Africa, attempting to sound out leaders and drum up support for the US initiatives. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa William Schaufele and Under Secretary for Economic Affairs William Rogers were, in fact, in Africa at the time of the latest Kissinger-Vorster announcement.

Officials on all sides have been extremely tight-lipped on the substance of these talks, but some patterns and details have emerged. Kissinger's avowed intent is to prevent "any more Angolas," in other words, the emergence of radical states—especially if they have Soviet or Cuban backing—in the wake of receding colonial and white power in southern Africa. In this view, the white regimes of Rhodesia and Namibia—but not South Africa—are seen as hopeless anachronisms; black majority rule is inevitable, and the goal is to find and back moderate, as opposed to radical, black leadership. Hence the emphasis on "peaceful settlements": the feeling is that if protracted military struggles take place in these territories, the chances are much greater that radicals will predominate in the end, and quite possibly may invite assistance from Communist powers.

At first, it appeared that Rhodesia would be the focus of Kissinger's diplomacy, in light of the upsurge in guerilla activity there in recent months, which has severely taxed the Smith regime's capacity to carry on.

More recently, the attention on the southern African scene has shifted to Namibia and to South Africa itself, and Kissinger's proposed second meeting with Vorster may focus on these countries as much as on Rhodesia. The UN Security Council last year set August 31, 1976, as the deadline for South Africa to show substantial progress in moving Namibia to independence. In anticipation of this deadline, South Africa announced on August 24 that
independence would be granted "with reasonable certainty" on December 31, 1978, and that a multiracial government would lead the country, with South African supervision, in the interim. The US responded that the proposals were "a step in the right direction" but decried the failure to set elections in the territory and to include "all interested parties" in constitutional discussions a reference to SWAPO, which has refused to participate in the so-called Turnhalle talks now going on in Windhoek. But, as the New York Times noted, the "tone of the State Department comment . . . was moderate, and an effort was made to praise South Africa for the steps it has taken toward independence for South-West Africa, even while criticizing the shortcomings." Meanwhile, sources at the Department comment toward independence for South-West Africa, even while it was made to praise South Africa for the steps it has taken on December 31, 1978, the so-called Turnhalle talks now going on in Windhoek. "all the failure to set elections in the territory and to include proposals were "a step in the right direction" but decried government would lead the country, with South African stability in southern Africa. And no longer can Kissinger claim that South Africa is still a bastion of racism and repression in South Africa, choosing to concentrate on Rhodesia and Namibia. This is especially true in light of what might be seen as Kissinger's new "domestic strategy": as Thomas Johnson of the Times put it, Kissinger "is attempting to build the widest possible constituency for his new Africa policy and has begun seeking support from influential black Americans." The Secretary chose to deliver his major American address on his new policy to the annual meeting of the Urban League, an established and powerful vehicle for black civil-rights and anti-poverty activism, on August 2. Shortly thereafter Kissinger met with several black American leaders, including Jessie Jackson, Percy Sutton (Manhattan Borough President), and William Booth of the American Committee on Africa. On August 31 Kissinger gave another major African speech to the Rev. Leon Sullivan's Philadelphia-based Opportunities Industrialization Centers.

By such moves Kissinger hopes to head off black opposition to his policies and thus emasculate liberal white opposition as well. But black leaders cannot and have not ignored the continuing violence against Blacks in South Africa, and it is likely that Kissinger will have to wring some concessions from Vorster at home, or put up a great show of trying, in order to gain appreciable black support for his policies here in the United States. (New York Times, August 1, 1976, August 25, 1976; Washington Post, August 24, 1976)

resources

PUBLICATIONS

South Africa News Agency Bulletin. SANA is a loose association of free-lance journalists within Southern Africa which aims at providing an in-depth information service for the international press. The SANA Bulletin was originally distributed from South Africa, but has now been declared an "undesirable publication" in terms of the Publication Control Act of 1974. The Bulletin is therefore now available from the International University Exchange Fund (postbox 348, 1211 Geneva 11, Switzerland). Acknowledgement and nominal payment/donation are appreciated for material used.

Third World Forum. Magazine published six times/year. The January through April, 1976 issue contains articles on Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Available from Third World Forum (Box 685--Station C, Montreal, Quebec, Canada). Price for subscription: $6 for individuals; $8 airmail (outside of US and Canada); $15 for institutions; free to prisoners.

SASO Newsletter. Publication of the South African Students' Organisation. Distributed by the International University Exchange Fund (P.O. Box 348, 1211 Geneva 11, Switzerland). Price: 30¢ each.

Publications available from The Africa Fund (Associated with the American Committee on Africa) (305 E. 46th St., New York, New York 10017):


No One Can Stop the Rain--Angola and the MPLA: From War to Liberation, by George M. Houser and Herb Shore; 55 pp. Price: $1.50; $1.00 for orders over 10.


United States Policy and Southern Africa, by George M. Houser. 36 pp. Price $1.00; 75¢ for orders over 5.

Evidence produced in mid-September supports Angolan claims that South Africa is still militarily involved in southern Angola. A South African soldier, Eugene de Lange, age 18, was presented at a press conference in Luanda. South African Defense Forces reported him missing at the end of August when he did not return from a mission in which they said he was the lead driver in a truck convoy “picking up refugees” inside Namibia.

Angolan officials say the soldier was captured some 25 miles inside Angola near Mucusso. De Lange told the press conference he had crossed into Angola four or five times from a base in Namibia. Angola charges that South Africa is training and assisting dissident Angolans in infiltration and subversion in southern Angola. They say FNLA-UNITA units are trained at a base in the Caprivi Strip, 50 miles southeast of Mucusso, with South African and Portuguese as military trainers, advisors, and sometimes field commanders.

A South African national serviceman confirmed these charges to a reporter in Capetown. He said UNITA troops were being trained in Ovamboland and he recalled three soldiers from his own company who had gone inside Angola to fight with the FNLA.

More important, the soldier told of the existence of elite units known as “recce” troops. He said they were neither South African citizens nor permanent force personnel, but serve three-year contracts in the emergency area of northern Namibia. They have been acting as military advisors to UNITA and FNLA units in southern Angola and, according to the soldier’s account, “actually fight with them, disguised as guerrillas using black greasepaint and South African manufactured AK47 machine guns.” He said they also took part in the attack at Sialola in Zambia which was the subject of United Nations Security Council debate on July 30.

The “green book” lost in Europe last year by Leo Cherne, Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, may contain material related to U.S. recruitment of mercenaries for Angola, according to AFRICA NEWS.

The loss was revealed in mid-September in the Washington Post. Michael Casey, a mysterious figure who turned up with the classified notebook, and who has ties with mercenary recruitment circles in California, claims he was robbed in Washington of a tape recording in which Cherne threatened him with death if he “spilled the beans.”

In September, South African government officials began the removal of 45,000 Africans from their homes in a rural area near Lichtenburg, South Africa, 120 miles west of Johannesburg. Police cordoned off the area and brought one hundred trucks to transport the Africans to a new location fifty miles away. The group being resettled this time is the Bakalobeng, a subgroup of the Tswana tribe. They are being moved to an area near Deelpan, in the Bophuthatswana African reserve, to which they are assigned.

Chief Kelly Molete has protested the move on behalf of his people, citing over one hundred years of residence in what has now been ruled a “white” area. He also charges that the new area is swampy and desolate.

The forced removal emphasized the government’s determination not to let continuing protest divert it from what it considers “normal activity” and continuation of its long-standing program to consolidate African areas as part of the “separate development” plan.

Five South African high school students have arrived in Dar-es Salaam, after escaping from South Africa through what one of them called “friendly African countries.” They say they fled because their lives were in danger, and police were searching for them at their homes. They expect more people to escape in the coming weeks, most of them by walking long hazardous overland routes through Botswana, Swaziland, or Mozambique. The students reported in to the Tanzanian office of the African National Congress. ANC officials say they will see that the five students will get to continue their education.

The United Church Board for World Ministries has filed a shareholder resolution calling upon Mobil Oil to stop the flow of petroleum products to Rhodesia. The action follows a Mobil statement on its investigation into alleged oil shipments to Rhodesia in violation of U.N. sanctions. Mobil told the Church that its investigation had faltered because South Africa refused to cooperate.

On September 22, the Washington Post reported that the Chrysler Corporation is negotiating the sale of most of its holdings in South Africa as part of a move by the corporation to divest itself worldwide of losing situations. The South African economy is in economic recession after 15 years of growth. A company source claimed the decision to sell South African holdings was not related to recent unrest there. But unrest has been one of the factors in the current state of the South African economy. In June, about 1000 black workers at the Chrysler plant near Mamelodi, outside Pretoria, went on strike. Chrysler has a total South African work force of near 2000 and holds a 5.6% share of the South African car market and 2.1% share of the truck market.

As of mid-September, David Martin, writing in the London Observer, described the leadership situation among Zimbabwe nationalists as follows: The ANC has disintegrated and ZAPU and ZANU again exist. Bishop Abol Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and James Chikerema, three of the four leaders who signed the unity agreements forming the expanded ANC in December of 1974, are isolated and without large constituencies. Joshua Nkomo, the fourth signatory, remains the effective leader of ZAPU. Robert Mugabe now describes himself as ZANU’s leader and his leadership is endorsed by ZANU members of the 18-member guerrilla high command set up last December and by ZANU Central Committee members, although Sithole still claims to be President. Although Mugabe leads, and is recognized, Josiah Tongogara, now in Zambian prison awaiting trial charged with the murder of Herbert Chitepo, also has considerable influence in ZANU. Last November when the military high command was being formed, representatives of both Nkomo and Mugabe’s ZANU consulted him in prison and he named some of the high command’s members.

In September ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas were no longer in joint camps but Martin reported expectations that the Mugabe and Nkomo movements would soon begin negotiations to try to form some kind of alliance or coordinating body and that the guerrilla high command involving both ZANU and ZAPU would again function.

On September 22, Joshua Nkomo traveled from Mozambique to Salisbury, in the midst of the Kissinger initiative to try to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. Nkomo said there were serious faults in the Kissinger proposal but gave no details.
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