John Saul on Zimbabwe Transformation
Basil Davidson on Processes of Reconstruction:
Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pressing on with the Politics of Liberation, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Mozambique by Basil Davidson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U. S. Scenes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FBI Harassment of Southern Africa Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyrus Vance, What Prospects for Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Mercenaries in Rhodesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Firms Tout Support for S.A. Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Abstains on Angolan Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberals Plan Congressional Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.I.D. Plans Strategy for Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Transforming the Struggle in Zimbabwe by John Saul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Report from the U.N. by Pat Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Angola Border Tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turnhall, Seeking an Alternative to SWAPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>ANGOLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Changes Announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More Fighting in the South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>NEW BRIEFS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XICONHOCAs Northwestern University Library Evanston, Ill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>ACTION NEWS AND NOTES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>UPDATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Southern Africa is published monthly, except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10011.

Subscriptions: Individual (Domestic and foreign)/$8.00; institutional/$18.00; Airmail: Africa, Asia, Europe/$20.50; South and Central America/$17.50

Application to mail at second-class postage rates is pending at New York, N.Y.
January 1977

Dear Readers:

Here is the first issue of our "new magazine", a double issue for January-February. We have worked hard on it, and hope you will feel that we are moving in the right direction.

Despite the long list of collective names, there are actually relatively few people who have the time to work on writing and editing, so some of us have burned a lot of midnight oil these last few weeks.

We are hoping to shift the whole technical production process away from New York. That will mean a major re-organization, so we will not have a separate February issue. The improved March issue will, we hope, more than make up for the delay.

We have been very encouraged by your response to our subscription mailing, and the support that has been expressed for our work. We particularly want to thank those subscribers who sent us donations in addition to their subscription.

Readers whose subscriptions lapsed at the end of December and who have not yet resubscribed will be receiving this issue, but not the March one. Hope you'll resubscribe in time.

A luta continua
The struggle continues

THE COLLECTIVE
Pressing on with the Politics of Liberation

ANGOLA, GUINEA BISSAU, CAPE VERDE AND MOZAMBIQUE AFTER INDEPENDENCE  

Basil Davidson

The Politics of Liberation

The wars of liberation in “Portuguese Africa” were won, as we all know, by the politics of liberation. What do we really mean by that? The question has been answered by the record of the three liberation movements, MPLA in Angola, PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and FRELIMO in Mozambique, and also by the careful explanations of each stage of the struggle given by the leaders of these movements.

A pioneering group of revolutionary nationalists, at first very small, begins to mobilize people, at first very few people, against the colonial system. They explain that misery, hunger and oppression are not sent by God, are not “natural in this world” and are not bound to go on for ever. They continue with their work of explanation and soon they meet with Portuguese repression. When it is clear that the Portuguese colonial system will make no concessions by peaceful means, the revolutionary nationalists prepare to fight for justice.

Slowly, painfully, they mobilize more support. But support is not enough. People have to liberate themselves. The revolutionary nationalists take the next step. They begin to transform support into active participation. This mass participation in the work of self-liberation becomes the key to everything done by the liberation movements. It stands at the heart of the politics of liberation. In every essential sense, it is the politics of liberation.

Everyone who travelled in the liberated zones of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique during the war years, bore witness to this. They saw villages governing themselves by elected committees under the leadership of the liberation movements. They found the beginnings of a new educational system, a new legal system, a new economic system. In all these ways, and in other and comparable ways, mass participation not only made it possible to fight and win the guerrilla wars against huge and often terrible odds. It also made it possible to lay the foundations of a new social order, of a new state, of a new kind of nationalism. New in two ways: new because it could overcome the constrictions and distortions of the colonial system; and new, secondly, because it could also overcome those pre-colonial African structures which, however valid in the distant past, have now become a drag on democratic progress.

This achievement is the main thing to bear in mind when looking at what has happened in these countries since independence. Unlike the nationalists of an earlier decade, these revolutionaries had no interest in merely taking over the structures of the colonial states evacuated by colonial power; their aim was to dismantle and replace them with new structures. The framework for the new structures was already in existence in the liberated zones. The central task was not to invent a new system of government, nor to simply “occupy” and prolong the colonial system. The task was to extend to the whole country the system of liberation which had been brought into being during the anti-colonial wars.

This is not easy, and it could not be done overnight. Large urban populations (and some rural populations) in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, had remained until the end within the zones of Portuguese control. In these areas the politics of liberation had functioned only in deep clandestinity, and therefore only in a very partial way. Large sections of these “unliberated populations” were far gone in doubt, disbelief and demoralization, or remained in a state of apathetic political and moral emptiness. Some individuals in these areas had served the Portuguese until the end, either in the army or administration. A whole horde of hangers-on had made money out of the war, in trade, prostitution, or the like. There were people, too, who thought that joining the liberation movement at the last moment, or after liberation, was simply a matter of climbing on to a bandwagon of privilege and graft.

All this meant that these “unliberated people” needed to go through a long and difficult process of learning the politics of liberation before they could take part in the work of reconstruction, could begin to liberate themselves from their own ignorance, idleness, or opportunism, could start to participate in the new state. This is probably the main work to which the victorious movements have applied their best militants and their round-the-clock energies. They have naturally met with a lot of difficulties and setbacks in this essential work of political and moral education; but the evidence shows that they have also made a lot of stubborn progress.

Mobilizing Reconstruction

The movements have set about this work
In Guinea-Bissau school students are responsible for the upkeep of their schools. Here students at a boarding school outside Bissau clean the grounds. (Urdang)

...in various ways, but on the same principles and with the same objectives. In full command of the state—Guinea first in time, then Mozambique and Cape Verde and Sao Tome, then Angola (held back by South African and other foreign invasions during 1975 and early 1976)—they have set going a tide of mass initiatives. In Mozambique this has been done partly by promoting the establishment of democratic committees of local self-government in newly-liberated areas, partly by the on-going action of tried and tested militants, partly by the creation of new groups of *dinamizadores* ("dynamizers") consisting of young men and women ready and able to carry political education to every corner of the country. The process has also been supported by administrative actions of the new government.

In Guinea-Bissau the task was somewhat easier. By 1974 the liberated zones covered some two-thirds of the country, comprising over half the population, and the building of the structures of mass participation in these zones had begun as early as 1964. The essential problem has been to absorb into the structure of national liberation the 400,000 people not influenced directly by PAIGC, in particular the 80,000 who were concentrated in the capital city of Bissau.

The work has gone well and now one finds that elective committees exist throughout Bissau as well as in other towns held by the Portuguese until the end of the war. Similar committees and social services have likewise developed in the Bissagos Islands and other rural areas liberated only in 1974.

The 250,000 people of the Cape Verde Islands had no such alternative government structures during the war years. The PAIGC could survive there only as a shadowy and secret presence. But the Cape Verde elections of June 1975, preceding independence in July of that year, proved that the PAIGC had overwhelming support in all of the nine populated islands. Since then the new PAIGC structures in the archipelago have worked to transform this mass support into mass participation in self-rule and self-administration. In September 1976, President Aristides Pereira could report, in a twenty-year review of the party's work, that "PAIGC committees of militants and active workers now exist in all save one or two remote areas. Many thousand Cape Verdians are now joining in decisions about how to crack their problems, and in action to carry out those decisions. None of this was even thinkable in colonial times. Here, as in the other former Portuguese territories, the masses of the people have launched their own history once again.

**People's Power**

The same work has occupied the MPLA in Angola since independence in November 1975, but above all since the throwing out of foreign invaders in March 1976. Here you find the same kinds of new organization, but the characteristic Angolan form consists in an extension of *Poder Popular* ("People's Power").

As in the other territories, here too the idea is that power begins at the base and goes up to the top, not the other way round. The aim is to produce a situation where each executive committee, at each level (city district, suburb or village, cluster of districts or villages, groups of regions), is elected and controlled by a corresponding and similarly elected assembly or council. Having got off the ground in Luanda, these comprehensive structures are being gradually extended to other cities and regions. There is still a long way to go after only a few months' work at this objective, but it remains central to the MPLA's program.

Among basic decisions taken at the first plenary session of the central committee held in Luanda during late October this year, was one "to perfect the installation of People's Power with a view to its extension throughout the country." The struggle against colonialism is now followed by the struggle for a real and meaningful democracy.

**Replacing Old Systems**

Many other important things belong to the politics of liberation. Colonial educational systems have to be scrapped and replaced by national systems. New schools must be opened, new teachers trained, new textbooks written, published and worked into use.

Colonial legal systems have to be displaced by national legal systems, and these, too, must take full account of local history and local needs. Democratizing the legal system, for instance, means taking account of African law, custom, tradition. In Guinea-Bissau at the moment—and perhaps it will be so for a long while ahead—there are no fewer than eight legal "codes" in application, because different ethnic groups have different conceptions of law. In all national questions, needless to say, the law of the new state is applied: but people's tribunals apply local law, modified from the practice of pre-colonial times, in the myriad local disputes of everyday life. Action in all these fields, and others of the same nature, is also "what is happening" in these countries after independence.

**Economic Re-organization**

Something needs to be said about another big subject, that of economic reorganization and reconstruction. Here again there are big differences in the circumstances of each of these countries, but their policies are framed in the same basic pattern. The aim is to promote mass participation in the building of new and democratic structures of economic life. What existed here in colonial times was an economic system which was no more than a powerless fragment of the Portuguese capitalist system, itself little more than a "neo-colonial" projection of the major capitalist economies of the West. One or two per cent of Africans could have some small entry into that system, though as second-class citizens, the remaining 98 or 99 per cent of Africans were its servants or virtual serfs.

The liberation movements have no intention of trying to build local capitalist systems. Even if that were possible, these systems could only be puppets or instruments of foreign controllers. They are determined to build economic systems of mass participation, non-capitalist systems, eventually (when circumstances make this possible) socialist systems. To that end they aim at extending People's Power into the field of economic life. What existed here in colonial times was an economic system which was no more than a powerless fragment of the Portuguese capitalist system, itself little more than a "neo-colonial" projection of the major capitalist economies of the West. One or two per cent of Africans could have some small entry into that system, though as second-class citizens, the remaining 98 or 99 per cent of Africans were its servants or virtual serfs.

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Meanwhile these new governments have broken the economic control of foreign companies, nationalized banking and finance and many enterprises, made new and better agreements with certain corporations, such as Gulf Oil, whose high-level technology is at present irreplaceable, and laid the ground for further progress in the future. That progress will depend on the training of technicians,
All this, too, is conditioned by the appalling state of ruin and abandonment in which the Portuguese left the economies of these countries. The Cape Verde Islands emerged at liberation from a seven-year drought. The Portuguese had done nothing to counter the consequences of this except hand out a little mindless charity. Most of the islands were in a state of destitution, with more and more emigration to distant lands as the only way out. This emigration will have to continue, but the Government of the PAIGC is taking steps to ensure that it shall continue as only one of the ways out of destitution. The other ways are concerned with the discovery and distribution of underground water resources, and the building (already begun) of a host of small dams, reservoirs; with the construction of a new ship-repairing harbour at the capital of Praia; with the launching of a number of small industries; with the reorganization of the land-holding and land-exploitation patterns in some of the larger islands; above all, with the participation of the masses of the Cape Verdian people in the daily improvement of their conditions of life.

Guinea-Bissau has never suffered from drought—rather the contrary! But here too the Portuguese system had done nothing save promote a primitive exploitation of certain export crops, notably peanuts. The country was left without a single modern enterprise save for a brewery designed to supply the Portuguese army—and finished in 1974. The port of Bissau hadn't so much as a heavy-weight crane. Since liberation the chief economic effort has gone into an extension of the Armazens do Povo (People's Shops) throughout the country; into planning for some immediate industrial establishments of an ancillary kind; and, beyond that, into laying long-term plans for the modernization of the whole economy.

There is no space here to enter into details about economic changes in Mozambique. Broadly, they have gone and are going in the directions mentioned above, with a strong emphasis on the maximization of food production by way of cooperatives and collectives, while looking forward to a time when the country's riches in minerals and hydro-electric power can be harnessed to a national plan.

Ravages of War

A few more words, though, should be said about Angola. The economic problems left by the colonial system have been enormous. With the flight of some 200,000 Portuguese in 1975 (panicked, for the most part, by their own reactionaries, and many now regretting that they left), such manufacturing and comparable enterprises as the country possessed were left without technicians, managers, and skilled personnel at the workbench level. Even six months after independence the general rate of production was little better than half of the colonial norm.

Much the same applied to the coffee plantations which had supplied a large proportion of Angola's exports. Ravaged by war, abandoned by their managers and technicians, these lay idle. The immediate job was to mobilise the workers so as to get them back into production, just as was the case with the industrial or semi-industrial enterprises. This has called for an immense effort of organization, for although there has been no lack of willing workers there has been a more or less complete absence of personnel with the necessary technical know-how. Over and beyond that, wage levels stood at a wretchedly low level, and yet it was practically impossible to improve them in the situation left by the departing colonial power.

The New Struggle Begins

This brief summary has had to skip a lot—about the liberation of the women of these countries, about the preparations for transforming the liberation movements into more effectively structured political parties, about the democratization of medicine and public health, and much else. But it may be useful in showing what kind of policies and principles are being applied, and what kind of basic problems they are being applied against. Amilcar Cabral used to say that: "When we are independent, that's when our struggle really begins." We are into some very exciting years.
There is a lot of headscratching going on these days at Southern Africa Committee offices, as committee members puzzle over the bizarre fact that we are still under investigation by minions of the FBI.

Why these intrepid sleuths should be so keenly interested in the activities of a group such as ours—with its record of open work as the publisher of a monthly magazine on Southern Africa—quite escapes our modest powers of comprehension.

True, the magazine IS critical of US policy toward southern Africa. Nevertheless, we remain nonplussed. Congress may have cut off covert funding of pro-Western forces in Angola, but its attempt to ensure a more fruitful disbursement of taxpayers’ money seems not to have impressed the gumshoes of the FBI, or the legal beagles at the Justice Department.

The real question is not the why of the investigation, because the pattern extends to other organizations (the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, for example) which have in common their unequivocal opposition to oppressive minority regimes in southern Africa. The question is rather in the wherefor of it all. We are left with the inescapable conclusion that the wherefore is harassment, pure and simple.

The FBI began its investigation of SAC over one and a half years ago, during which time they have refused to hand over our file or any related piece of documentation, and have denied us our right to know why we are being investigated. Such divinity, they say, would “impede law enforcement procedures,” which is their quaint way of saying they reserve the option of instituting court proceedings against SAC.

Although we have not been officially informed, our suspicion has been confirmed that the investigation is tied to the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In July, 1976, two FBI agents arrived at our offices, illegally demanded our financial records, and told a member of the SAC collective that we are under investigation by the Justice Department to determine whether we should be required to register as an agent of a “foreign principal”.

Since then, in letters to members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who had expressed concern over harassment of the Committee, the Justice Department has conceded it is investigating the Committee under terms of the Act.

Recently, the Federal Court judge who is hearing a suit brought by SAC in New York demanding FBI disclosure of our file, called our lawyers and those of the FBI to court for pretrial arguments. The FBI stood fast on its refusal to turn over the documents.

Peter Weiss, one of the attorneys of the Center for Constitutional Rights, representing our committee, told the judge that we do not believe there is a genuine ‘investigation’, and that the chief reason for keeping it going is to excuse the FBI from making the disclosure which SAC demands.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Judge suggested that our lawyers discuss the case with the Deputy Attorney General, in an effort to secure voluntary disclosure by the Justice Department. Our lawyers agreed to this, and the case was postponed to mid-January.

The FBI’s protracted “investigation” and its continuing refusal to meet its obligations under the Freedom of Information Act are all in furtherance of its policy of harassment. To turn over its files on SAC would be tantamount to admitting there is no basis for a case against us.

To accuse us of being agents of a foreign principal is, frankly, ludicrous. As our readers know, our magazine covers the news of southern Africa, with analysis and background, and we no more put forward the ‘line’ or adhere to the ideology of any foreign principal than we act on the instructions of an overseas government. We are utterly baffled by who this “foreign principal” can possibly be.

We are concerned by the use of this legislation as a technique to control and diminish our work. If we were forced to register, all our activities would be closely monitored and everybody associated with our organization in any way—down to a dollar contributor—would be listed in the FBI files.

The provisions of the registration act state that all financial records must be turned over to the Department of Justice. So must all minutes of all our meetings. Every bit of correspondence, whether directly relating to our political activities for the so-called “foreign principal”, or simply a letter of encouragement, must be available for inspection. The name of every subscriber, contributor, worker for the committee—past and present—would have to be filed with the Department of Justice. In short, every conceivable aspect of our work for three years must either be filed with the government, or be readily accessible for inspection at any time. Whenever they choose, FBI agents would be able to walk into our office on the pretext of looking at these records, and would not need a warrant to do so.

It takes little imagination to realize the chilling effect this would have on our work, and how all but our closest friends would think twice about associating themselves with us.

We can have little doubt then that this must be the actual motive behind the investigation. We simply do not fit the description of a foreign agent and the FBI, after a year and a half of sneaking about, is well aware of this. So its last resort, the way of intimida
tion, is to continue to dangle over our heads the prospect of court-mandated registration, and the attendant restrictions.

We cannot help wondering, too, who precisely prompted this investigation. It would not surprise us if it were agents of the South African government, or groups in this country which are strongly pro-South Africa’s interests.

With the focus on southern Africa continuing to grow on the part of the American people, and, in a totally dissimilar way, on the part of the Government, this kind of harassment might be only the beginning.
David Halberstam, in his book "The Best and the Brightest," sketched John Kennedy's selection of Dean Rusk as his Secretary of State in terms which could as easily describe Jimmy Carter's choice of Cyrus Vance.

Halberstam wrote: "The Establishment peers sit around and ponder who its candidates should be. Slowly varying possibilities are checked off... finally the name that comes to the fore is Dean Rusk... Knows the military, knows strategy, plays the game... a Democrat, but not too much of one; a Southerner but not too much so; an intellectual, but not too much so... the acceptable man."

The parallels between Rusk and Vance are striking: Rusk from Georgia, Vance from West Virginia; Rusk president of the Rockefeller Foundation at the time of his selection, Vance the foundation's chairman; Rusk the one-time career Army officer who moved over to State, Vance the one-time Navy officer who later served as Secretary of the Army and then Deputy Secretary of Defense; both described by colleagues as low-key, team players.

Given the similarities between Rusk and Vance, as well as the essentially conservative natures of the two men who chose them, there is little reason to hope that African policies will undergo any more of a change now than they did in the 1960s.

To recall just one incident of that earlier period, G. Mennen Williams, Rusk's assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, said in a policy speech in 1962, "We welcome the apparent development in Africa of its own independent philosophy of government." A month later, Williams was defending US involvement in the Congo as necessary to prevent "chaos which would invite Communist intervention in the heart of Africa. This alternative the world cannot contemplate with equanimity." In 1964, with Moise Tshombe in control of the Congolese government, the US—which already had given tacit support to Tshombe's use of white mercenaries—engaged in a military action against leftist opponents of Tshombe which brought swift denunciations by Tanzania, Ghana, and other African countries. US support for Tshombe continued despite protests from various US black leaders including Malcolm X.

If anything, Vance is more firmly rooted in the Establishment than Rusk. A graduate of Kent, Yale and Yale Law School, he beat out William Buckley for a position on the university's governing board. He is a senior partner in the Wall St. firm of Simpson & Thacher, one of whose older senior partners, through a New Deal acquaintance with Lyndon Johnson, was instrumental in getting Vance his Kennedy administration post.

As an indication of his acceptability to the more liberal wing of the Establishment, a position he secured as an effective trouble shooter during the Detroit riots and as a negotiator of the Paris peace talks during the Vietnam War, Vance won strong praise upon his selection by Carter in the editorial columns of the New York Times. (Vance also serves on the board of The New York Times Co.)

The Wall St. Journal, while admitting it would have preferred someone other than a member of what it described as the North-eastern foreign policy establishment, added the approval of the conservative wing with the comment that, "If we had to pick one of them it would probably be Cyrus Vance."

For all his low-key reputation, Vance is not a man without ambition. Halberstam records that when a Kennedy talent scout asked Vance what position he'd like, he suggested Secretary of the Navy—but was given for starters only the post of general counsel to the Defense department. Paul Hoffman in his book about Wall St. law firms, "Lions in the Street," says that Vance turned down an opportunity to be president of the Bar of the City of New York in 1972 because he expected to be named Secretary of State by Edmund Muskie. (He is now Bar president.)

In that same book, Hoffman writes that "Louis Auchincloss, who professes no desire whatsoever to go into government, offers a six-word explanation for the periodic exoduses of the McCloys and Deans, Vances and Gilpatricks to government service: "They want to rule the world."

What all this adds up to in terms of Vance's likely attitudes toward Southern Africa can only be guessed at.

If, for example, he was truly an adviser to Carter during the campaign, then presumably Carter, with limited foreign policy knowledge, was echoing at least some of Vance's views in an interview published in the South Africa "Financial Mail."

In that interview, Carter was quoted as saying: "Once those solutions are achieved," Carter is quoted as saying, "then we can move to stabilize the Angolan situation and achieve a removal of the Cuban troops there."

On the subject of South Africa, Mr. Carter was quoted as saying that he favored increased US private lending and corporate activity while opposing sanctions. "I think our American businessman can be a constructive force achieving racial justice in South Africa," Carter is reported to have said.

Vance has given some indication of his feelings about business relations with South Africa by serving on the boards of Pan American World Airways, which services South Africa, and IBM, which is the chief supplier of computers to South Africa, with about half its sales to the South African government.
As chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation, Vance presided over a study of the foundation's support for higher education in developing countries which led to a decision to concentrate less on universities in general and more on "key persons with creative ideas"—in other words, the elite of the elite.

Vance indicated how he views the international economic scene as it relates to developing countries in a speech in September before the Economic Policy Council of the UN Association of the US.

Warning that if the US doesn't accept the reality of the increasingly diffused power situation in the world and the legitimacy of developing nations' concerns, it may antagonize the moderate developing countries, he noted, "In purely economic terms, the potential benefits from agreements assuring access to supplies of raw materials and guarantees of investments are significant."

Dear Sirs:

I've been appointed a Captain in the Rhodesian African Rifles. I haven't received a specific assignment yet I'm in the operational area for an orientation tour. There are several other American ex-officers with Vietnam experience serving in the Rhodesian Army. I haven't met any yet.

I'd like to give you the latest information on Americans obtaining commissions in the Rhodesian Army. They need officers and NCO's and welcome well qualified Americans, but this isn't any "mercenary" trip.

I had to pay my own way over. They gave me $340 Rhodesian ($1 Rhodesian equals $1.61 American dollars - eds.) and $300 R for uniforms. I was appointed a third year Captain and receive about $600 R per month. On that amount you can live very well in Rhodesia. They give most new foreign officers an initial three-year tour. My wife will also receive $340R when she arrives.

From my limited observation I can only state that the RAR, RLI, and Territorial Force units are all well trained and motivated.

Obviously this is a potential career for me or I would not have come.

Not all Rhodesians fit a standard mould. Most are conservative by U.S. standards, but there's a place here for an ex-Catholic-turned-Unitarian and his "hippie-wierdo San Francisco wife."

Captain A.G.
1 RAR, Methuen Barracks
Bulawayo, Rhodesia

... etc. could be continued as needed.

Young soldiers in training for the Rhodesian army. (UN/Davis)

"threatened African nation paying $1,600 million" in gun magazines and The Overseas Weekly, a soft-porno magazine distributed with the permission of the US Army on military bases in Europe. Persons responding to these ads since June 15 have received a standard "information only" letter about mercenary opportunities in Rhodesia, and a strange cover letter in which Frank Renzi "strongly advised" anyone "against becoming involved," adding, "I am under pressure from many fronts . . . I will furnish no additional information and all past information is obsolete."

No Prosecutions

Renzi's reply raises the question of whether any pressure against recruitment is coming from the US government. The Justice Department says it has been conducting a grand jury investigation on recruitment for five countries since November 1975, which has involved more than sixty individuals and organizations. But no prosecutions have resulted, and people like Brown laugh off the possibility of being prosecuted.

This attitude is not surprising, given the weakness of laws covering recruitment under the Neutrality Act. The State Department explained the position in a letter to Congressman Lee Hamilton in September: "US law prohibits the enlistment or recruitment in the United States of American citizens for service in a foreign army. US law does not otherwise prohibit the service of American citizens in a foreign army abroad."

Political pressure from the Administra-
tion has gone in the opposite direction, with efforts to discourage investigation of recruitment. Representative Hamilton's Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House International Relations Committee got little information from the Departments of Justice and State when they were requested to testify.

Justice refused to discuss any specific recruitment efforts on the ground that to do so would hamper the grand jury investigation. When the Subcommittee tried to organize a second hearing calling some recruiters to testify, the Administration put pressure on them to call it off.

Some public pressure to end recruitment is being organized. In San Antonio, the Texas Committee against Mercenary Recruitment and US Intervention in Foreign Countries was organized to counter a group called American Aid for Rhodesia which was recruiting people with a "military background" from across the state. The Texas Committee has initiated a petition campaign calling for an end to mercenary recruitment and the isolation of the Smith and Vorster regimes.

U.S. FIRMS TOUT SUPPORT FOR S.A. AGENTS

In line with South Africa's extensive propaganda efforts to promote its policies of bantustan and Namibian "independence," Blacks in South Africa and Namibia operating within the tribal apartheid structure have recently hired US firms to promote themselves and these policies.

Andrew Hatcher, a black American who has been working for the South African Department of Information since last spring, began work in August for a new client - Chief Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei. In addition to $365,000 direct from the South African Government, Hatcher's public relations firm, Sydney S. Baron and Co., collects a fee of $50,000 from Matanzima for its work. The firm's most visible job so far has been the orchestration of an expensive advertising campaign on the Transkei just prior to its so-called independence from South Africa on October 26. Ads appeared in publications from the Wall Street Journal to Ebony magazine stressing the Transkei's peaceful independence and attractive investment climate for US companies.

At the same time, individual Americans registered by South Africa were also promoting the Transkei. Albert Gerstein is drawing a $15,000 annual fee for, among other things, preparing the Transkei's application for membership in the International Monetary Fund. New York City Mayor Beame's son, Bernard Beame, has registered as an agent for the Southern African Freedom Foundation, and plans to produce a 30-minute documentary film on the Transkei.

Namibia Chief Clemens Kapuuo, with members of his Herero delegation at the Turnhalle talks.

Clemens Kapuuo, with members of his Herero delegation at the Turnhalle talks.
On November 22 the UN Security Council voted to admit the People’s Republic of Angola as the 146th member of the UN with one abstention—the United States.

While the US decided not to block Angola’s entry into the UN and withdrawing its veto, it repeated its objections to Angola’s membership. US Ambassador to the UN, William Scranton, claimed that the MPLA-led government has “only tenuous control” over much of the country, and that Angola cannot be considered truly independent as long as Cuba maintains a military presence there. Scranton described reports of Cuban military activity in southern Angola as “disturbing.” These reports have been widely circulated in the western press as a result of a massive propaganda campaign against the Angolan government by South Africa. The South African Government has transported large numbers of journalists to northern Namibia to talk with Angolans in Namibia, a significant number of whom are refugees from UNITA attacks, and the general fighting, but also include Angolans who have relatives in Namibia and cross the border regularly.

The US reversal on Angola’s membership appeared politically motivated. The June veto had been explained by the Administration as a necessity during the Republican primary in which Ford faced a challenge from the more conservative candidate Ronald Reagan. After losing the election, Ford acceded to Angola’s membership “out of respect for the sentiments expressed by our African friends.” There is still no indication as to when the US will recognize the People’s Republic of Angola.

LIBERALS PLAN CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY

While Carter chooses his appointees for top foreign policy jobs in his Administration, Congressional liberals are considering what strategy to pursue on southern Africa this year.

A number of congresspeople have travelled to Africa influencing some of their thinking.

Congressman Charles Diggs led a seven-person delegation of the Congressional Black Caucus to Geneva (to talk about Rhodesia), to Bonn (to talk about Namibia) and to several southern Africa countries, including South Africa. They attended the annual African American Institute Conference in Lesotho. The conference was funded by the Carnegie and Ford Foundations and brought together some 35 African countries and liberation movements and over 50 US politicians, corporation leaders and state department officials.

At the conference Diggs said he supported Cuban troops in Angola. He also gave his support to another representative of the Black Caucus, Yvonne Burke, when she proposed tougher US policy aimed at isolating South Africa. At the conclusion of the conference, the Black Caucus representatives reiterated their stance that Congress should take action to discourage US investment in South Africa, and called for legislation “denying tax credits to companies investing in South Africa, imposition of sanctions against South Africa by the United Nations because of its occupation of Namibia, and restrictive granting of visas to South Africans.” They are also advocating economic aid to the front-line states.

On his return to the United States, Diggs said at a press conference on December 8, that he will re-introduce a bill denying federal contracts to firms which do not abide by fair employment practices in South Africa, urge larger black American representation in the US diplomatic mission in South Africa
and protest the quality of the US Information office in Soweto.

Senator Dick Clark, who chairs the Senate’s Sub-committee on Africa also travelled to Africa. He acted as co-Chairman of the AAI conference. Shortly before leaving for Africa in early November, he spoke at the African Studies Association meeting and outlined some of his strategy for 1977.

His first priority, he said, is to be given to a renewed Congressional effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment which allows US violation of sanctions against Rhodesia by permitting the import of chrome. He called also for a mandatory UN arms embargo against South Africa until it withdraws from Namibia, for increasing the training of southern African exiles, recognizing the People’s Republic of Angola and ensuring “fair recompense to whites in Zimbabwe whose property is confiscated.

Clark is less clear on the crucial issue of investment in South Africa. He told the Press Club of Cape Town on December 6 that his eight-day hearing on investments had not produced convincing evidence supporting the claim that the presence of US companies in South Africa will assist in bringing about meaningful change in their country.

He has announced that he is considering the possibility of legislation denying tax credit to US companies operating in Namibia but appears to be leaning towards finding alternatives to disengagement in South Africa. One of these is to recommend the calling of a conference of presidents of companies with investments in South Africa to develop a united policy among them on employment practices in that country.

A.I.O. PLANS STRATEGY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

While American efforts in the negotiations on Zimbabwe continue in Geneva, in Washington, the Agency for International Development is proceeding with plans to aid Zimbabwe and Namibia “during the transition” and after independence. AID has budgeted more than $1 million to prepare specific aid requests, by country, which will be presented in early February. These will probably include requests for additional aid to some countries surrounding Zimbabwe and Namibia. Programs for the latter two countries, however, are likely to be stalled while the new Administration continues Kissinger’s efforts to place “moderate” leaders in transitional structures there.

The most publicized study in connection with the aid programs relates to Namibia and Zimbabwe and was contracted out to the African American Scholars Council. It is due to be completed in January. (See Southern Africa, Nov. 1976) The project has come under increasing criticism form several sources, most recently in a confidential memorandum circulated at the United Nations and printed in Counterspy magazine. The memo criticizes the project’s basic economic assumption that “growth must be accelerated along the present lines of specialization of each economy.” Such a policy, it notes, would perpetuate South Africa’s economic dominance over Namibia and Zimbabwe. Dependence on export commodities rather than domestically oriented production would be sustained by, for instance, a heavy emphasis on mining; control of finance would remain in the hands of the white minority and western business interests.

A second criticism in the UN memo stresses that the AASC project “has definite undertones of counterinsurgency war” and that several of the participants in the study have links to the CIA.

AID has also initiated a broader study on Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Namibia. This study is being carried out by four management consultant firms which often do work for AID: American Technical Assistance Corporation, Edward Burger Associates, Checchi and Co., and Robert Nathan Associates.

If your group is planning a stockholder campaign, an educational meeting, a demonstration, or some other action involving a Southern Africa issue, tell us and we’ll pass the word through this monthly column.

If your group has just engaged in such an action, send us a report. Be as specific as possible: tell us how many people showed up, how many leaflets were handed out, or how much money was raised. Include ideas, tips, and samples of any materials you’ve developed.

The deadline is the 10th of every month before the month of publication, e.g. material for inclusion in the February issue must reach us by Jan. 10. Our address is: News and Notes, Southern Africa, 156 5th Ave., Room 707, N.Y., N.Y. 10010.
Supporting liberation struggles in Southern Africa used to be fairly simple. At issue was only the straightforward question of white minority domination. Support work merely required a strong opposition to white racism and the desire for some unspecified form of black majority rule. Only the most conservative could have real problems with that.

Today the situation is no longer so simple. It has been growing in complexity since the early 1970's brought growing military and political successes to movements like FRELIMO and the MPLA.

Political and military victories went hand in hand, linked in a dynamic process which also brought with it increasing radicalization of the movements and their aims. Thus today the issue to be faced is no longer simply “independence”, but what kind of independence.

It is John Saul’s contention in the article that follows that those who want to support the struggle for liberation now have to confront the necessity of “backing socialist and revolutionary solutions” to liberation struggles.

Having accepted that principle, he goes on, one must face another unpleasant task. Overcoming the reluctance to “make judgments”, it is necessary to begin to make choices between movements on the basis of their desire and ability to lead such socially transforming struggles.

It is within this framework that Saul examines the Zimbabwean liberation movements and outlines some of the choices he believes should be made.

THE EDITORS

In 1972, writing about the implications of FRELIMO’s growing military and political success in Mozambique, I underscored a problem which this situation was likely to present to people engaged in support work in the metropolitan centers. Events in Mozambique were making clear the extent to which a successful liberation struggle gives rise “to a social revolution and to an anti-imperialist” denouement.

It was already possible to anticipate some of the difficulties that many North Americans would have “facing squarely the necessity of backing socialist and revolutionary solutions to liberation struggles” and making the unavoidably “subtle discriminations” between diverse claimants to the nationalist mantle in Southern Africa. Our work would become much more difficult as the whole question of the kind of “independence” likely to follow liberation became as important as support work as the much more straightforward question of resisting white minority domination itself.

The Angolan experience proved the seriousness of the problem. Not surprisingly, many liberals embraced the media-sponsored image of Soviet aggressiveness in that country, sparing themselves the necessity of exploring MPLA’s long history of struggle and the indigenous roots of its revolutionary character. Unfortunately, many further to the left were similarly confused. Abandoning concrete analysis is for the a priori approach of pseudo-radicalism or for the dictate of some preferred center of revealed revolutionary truth, such people were, at best, reduced to calling irrelevantly for a strategy of “unity” in Angola. At worst, they moved to support such grotesque creatures of ethnic manipulation and U.S. and South African design as FNLA or UNITA. Either way, all those who refused to support MPLA’s revolutionary struggle found themselves acting in concert with State Department designs to facilitate a neo-colonial solution in Angola and acting against the interests of the Angolan people.

There are certainly grounds for questioning the Soviet Union’s global intentions. The point here is that MPLA cannot be seen as simply the puppet or pawn of these intentions.

Lessons of Angola

There are important lessons to be learned from the experience of Angola. Kissinger and Co. began to learn these lessons even more rapidly than those who oppose US imperial designs in Southern Africa. How else to explain Kissinger’s dramatic initiatives of this past autumn, as he sought to intervene in the situation in Zimbabwe and Namibia?

In Angola, the attempt to advance a neo-colonial replacement for Portuguese colonial overrule had been left too late. Despite the fact that FNLA and UNITA were willing to play the puppet’s role, their bids were viable only to the extent that South Africa was prepared to intervene militarily and the United States willing to be fairly open about participation on the counter-revolutionary side of the equation. Obviously, such a direct imperial role had its costs. It helped legitimate Soviet and Cuban assistance to the besieged MPLA. It also aroused the opposition of Congress, still smarting from the precedent of US defeat in Vietnam.

Kissinger obviously felt there had to be a better way. And in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe there was—at least in theory.

Zimbabwe Radicalization

There was opportunity—but also urgency. A process of radicalization had begun in Zimbabwe. The independence of Mozambique had opened a much longer and more accessible border to Zimbabweans eager to fight for their freedom. Equally important, FRELIMO was prepared to help Zimbabwean militants learn the lessons Mozambicans had already learned—the necessity to clarify
Kissinger read it. Left to run its course, the Zimbabwean struggle would produce not merely "independence" but a social revolution. Where, then, was Kissinger's opportunity? It lay in the fact that the process of radicalization had only just begun. Fortunately for the Secretary of State, there were still many of the old guard African leaders left from earlier phases of Zimbabwean politics. Personally, many had suffered severe hardship, imprisonment, exile and isolation. Politically, most had spent the years since Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, engaged primarily in demanding that Britain remove Smith, impose majority rule, bring about change in Zimbabwe. There had also been much jockeying for political advantage in "soon-to-be-liberated" Zimbabwe. They were much more reluctant to embrace the imperatives of guerrilla struggle.

These men, perhaps unknown to even themselves, were Kissinger's secret weapon. Still maintaining considerable credibility with the African population inside the territory, they might be brought to the bargaining table—and to formal political power. Moreover, a shrewd old political chess player like John Vorster of South Africa—holding land-locked Rhodesia's thin economic lifeline in his hands—could also be persuaded to see the elegance of such a gambit. Smith became a pawn to be sacrificed, with a "stable" black regime a consummation more devoutly to be wished.

As subsequent events have made clear, there were flaws in this Kissinger "game plan" and it seems to have been mounted rather carelessly. But however sloppily the execution, there can be no doubt about the intentions of the operation. It was designed to guarantee "false decolonization". Kissinger had spelled out the premises of this approach quite unequivocally, testifying in May 1976, "...we have a stake...in not having the whole continent become radical and move in a direction that is incompatible with Western interests. That is the issue."

It was left to Britain's Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, addressing the NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels during December's Geneva meetings between Ian Smith and the nationalist leaders, to make the application of this approach to Zimbabwe perfectly clear. Stating that "he had not abandoned hope of success for the [Geneva] conference" he went on to say that:

If the British Government gave up hope, there would be no doubt over who would eventually win on the battlefield. But if the issue were settled on the battlefield it would seriously lessen the chance of bringing about a moderate African regime in Rhodesia and would open the way for more radical solutions and external intervention on the part of others.

Note in particular, the order in which these dangers are presented. It is not the specter of Soviet aggrandizement which is first and foremost in the minds of such plotters. It is social revolution that they fear.

Zimbabwean Nationalism

The Kissinger/Crosland scenario raises several questions: how easily can Smith be cowed into cooperation? how far is Vorster really willing, and able, to go in applying pressure to Smith to so cooperate? and so on. It seems even more important to ask another question. If neo-colonialism is the name of the game, who, more specifically, are the prime Zimbabwean candidates for the role of "intermediary" (to borrow Frantz Fanon's pungent term)?

This is a crucial question. There is a second: where within the Zimbabwean struggle is the more genuinely revolutionary impulse to be found? A thumbnail sketch of the recent history of Zimbabwean nationalism may help to provide more precise answers to these crucial questions.

Zimbabwean nationalism crystallized organizationally in the 1950s when the previously rather tame African National Congress was taken over by more radically populist elements from such groups as the City Youth League and the trade unions. Joshua Nkomo was elected President of the new ANC in 1957. This basic thrust survived into the 1960s even though the form of its expression changed—from ANC to National Democratic Party (NDP) to Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)—as each preceding organization was banned, in turn, by the Rhodesian government. Even more serious for the future than such changes, however, was the split within ZAPU in 1963.

This split gave rise to a second, parallel, claimant to nationalist primacy, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). As the struggle between these two movements still scars the nationalist landscape of Zimbabwe, the story of this original split continues to be rewritten to service their latter-day jockeying for political advantage.

Recently, for example, some ZANU-inspired accounts have presented the founders of ZANU as distinguished by their articulation, in those early days, of a strategy of armed resistance to white minority rule far in advance of the conventional nationalist approach of Joshua Nkomo and his ZAPU colleagues. Yet the analysis presented some years ago by the political scientist, Giovanni Arrighi, seems closer to the mark. Employing a class analysis, he gives ZAPU the better of the argument. He sees the split as a confrontation between a faction of educated, middle-class, rather elitist elements, who had joined the nationalist movement in the early sixties (these men now becoming the core of ZAPU under Ndabaningi Sithole) and populists from the mid-50s (such as Nyandoro and Chikerema) who had much firmer roots among the migrant workers and the peasantry itself.

But even if there is some truth in the latter emphasis, what seems more obvious, in retrospect, is that neither group readily found the key to mobilizing and focussing popular energies in ways which could be effective. Symbolic actions and mass protests worked politically in situations where Britain was eager, after initial African assertions, to strike a neo-colonial bargain. In Rhodesia such actions merely pushed the dominant settler caste further to the right, on a course which led ultimately to the unilateral declaration of independence.

ZAPU had begun to take some steps toward launching a more effective (and necessarily violent) form of resistance even before the 1963 split and both movements were to undertake military and quasi-military actions in subsequent years. Yet in both cases the political clarity necessary to undertake effective guerrilla struggle was appar-
ently lacking. At the same time the absence of that meaningful revolutionary practice which effective guerrilla struggle provides forestalled much real political growth for Zimbabwean nationalism! The dynamic of ZAPU's internal squabbling, the bold strikes, launched jointly between Shona and Ndebele, or among Shona subgroups, have been heightened, instead of ended, in the years of nationalist infighting.

In independent Africa such a pattern of petty-bourgeois politics serves to pre-empt the kind of radical politics which might eventually lead to development strategies genuinely designed to meet popular needs. In Zimbabwe it has served to forestall the day when Smith might be put under significant pressure by the force of African nationalism!

Internal Conflicts

Such, then, has been the politics of charge and counter-charge between ZAPU and ZANU over the years. Such was the politics of ZAPU's desperate collapse into internecine squabbling in 1969-70, one upshot of which was the addition of yet a third, though marginal movement to the kaleidoscope of Zimbabwean petty-bourgeois politics. ZAPU and ZANU dissidents sought a new unity in the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe—FROLIZI. Unfortunately this infighting came hard on the heels of ZAPU's most dramatic military undertakings, the bold strikes, launched jointly with South Africa's ANC, into the Zambezi Valley at Wankie, Kariba and Victoria Falls between 1968 and 1970.

These actions, despite their boldness, had revealed profound weaknesses in ZAPU's whole approach to liberation, especially in the movement's relative disregard for those methods of political work which might have served to provide the popular basis for effective guerrilla struggle. Yet the movement's further internal difficulties dictated that there was little opportunity for the lessons of Wankie to be learned or for ZAPU to then develop a more revolutionary practice.

Rather more militarily promising, and duly celebrated in recent literature on Zimbabwe, was the ZANU-sponsored guerrilla activity mounted in the north-east of the country from December, 1972. Taken together with the fact that ZANU enjoyed Chinese backing during much of this period, this has given rise, in some circles on the left, to the view that ZANU has emerged as the cutting-edge of the Zimbabwean revolution. This interpretation demands careful scrutiny particularly since any such judgment has important implications for the evaluation of the current balance of forces in Zimbabwe.

The "Chinese factor" can be more or less discounted. China's dismal record in Angola would, in and of itself, suggest this. The fact is, however, that Angola provides merely the most extreme example of a generally disturbing pattern. Whatever China's distinctive merits on other grounds, its policy in Southern Africa has been quite appalling, reduced to the backing of almost any movement which did not already enjoy Soviet support—without regard to the objective merits of the various movements involved. But if the fact of Chinese backing is no ready index of revolutionary merit, what of ZANU's guerrilla activities themselves?

These have been impressive in many ways—particularly relative to previous Zimbabwean military undertakings—but they have still shown serious limitations. ZANU's incursions from 1972 on were facilitated by FRELIMO who had by this point, liberated enough of Tete Province to permit passage of the guerrillas into Zimbabwe. FRELIMO has been well placed, therefore, to witness and evaluate the progress being made. When I visited Tete in late-1972 at a time when the ground-work for ZANU activity was being laid, it seemed to me that FRELIMO entertained few illusions that ZANU had yet defined a political line capable of sustaining a genuinely transformative process of popular struggle. I was to get the same impression three years later, in June 1975—in discussing Zimbabwean developments with officials of the new Mozambican government in Maputo. In FRELIMO's view the fighting of 1972-75 in the north-east of Zimbabwe, while of obvious importance, had remained too exclusively militarist in its orientation. ZANU's methods of work being still far removed from those which characterize a people's war. In fact, FRELIMO was not willing to differentiate between ZANU and ZAPU in terms of their military or political capabilities, at that point seeming generally discouraged by the performance of both movements.

It is significant that it was towards the end of this period that ZANU came apart at the seams, much as had ZAPU several years previously—the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, ZANU's Acting Chairman, being the most dramatic outcome of such a pattern of development. Some attempt has been made to portray these events as reflecting a contest between right-wing opportunists on the one hand and all those inside the organization who were prepared to move with the radicalizing logic of protracted struggle on the other. Supporters of this view draw an analogy with the Simango crisis which had signalled a critical turning-point in the progressive transformation of FRELIMO in the late 1960s. On such an interpretation, the process of the emergence of a genuinely revolutionary nationalism in Zimbabwe is seen as playing itself out within ZANU. That movement then has a claim to priority with respect to support from all those who wish the Zimbabwean struggle well.

This is not a parallel which FRELIMO has found illuminating. A much stronger case can be made for the view that such internal problems as ZANU experienced in 1974-75 smacked more of the old wasting kind of petty-bourgeois political infighting—centered upon personalities, intrigues and the mobilization of constituencies around ethnic identifications in this case, various Shona subgroups. In mid-1975 FRELIMO officials with whom I talked saw the military and political struggle in Zimbabwe at this time as more or less starting from scratch. Mozambique stated, at this juncture, that it would not cut the vital Beira rail link to Rhodesia, nor act to reinforce sanctions until Zimbabweans were ready to take advantage of such moves and present a real challenge to

Abel Mazurewa (left), Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Knomo (right)
the Smith regime. Significantly Mozambique did not act until nine months later, in March, 1976. Explaining Mozambique's actions that month, President Machel said:

in Zimbabwe, it will be a people's struggle and it will be protracted. It will allow Zimbabweans to transform the present nationalist struggle into a revolutionary struggle that implies profound changes in the society. . . . So we would like the struggle to be a long one in order to liberate the mentality of Zimbabweans.

 ZIPA: The Key
Thus neither ZANU nor ZAPU could be said to hold the key. No more did the African National Council. The ANC had sprung into life to give focus to African rejection of the 1971 compromise constitutional proposals put forward by Britain. The British sent the Pearson Commission to Rhodesia to test African feeling. The answer, often expressed through the ANC was a resounding NO. The Commission went home to England, but the ANC continued to exist, adding another quasi-movement to Zimbabwe's nationalist sweepstakes. The ANC birth also added Bishop Abel Muzorewa to the corps of senior political notables who have become well known to the Zimbabwean populace. In 1974-1975 the ANC was the umbrella organization under which the heads of the front-line states encouraged the old leaders (Muzorewa, Nkomo and Sithole in particular) to establish a common front and to begin negotiations with Smith and Vorster. Very soon this new umbrella ANC simply reflected old politics with the revival of intense fragmentation among the old guard leadership and the old-line organizations.

FRELIMO—mindful of its own experience—chose to give its support to the new military-cum-political leadership which it felt could emerge from the camps within Mozambique and Tanzania as the guerrilla struggle gathered new impetus along the extended frontier provided by a free Mozambique. It seems that FRELIMO's assessment has proved correct. The Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) which has now emerged has drawn on the energies and dedication which exists below the top leadership level, in the military wings of both ZANU (ZANLA) and ZAPU (ZIPRA).

Dzinasehe Machingura, ZIPA's Deputy Political Commissar, recently outlined the founding of ZIPA as follows: . . . "after the fighters had realized the incompetence of the ANC leadership they took it upon themselves to reconstitute themselves into an army that would fight for the independence of the Zimbabwe people. The combatants from both former ZANU and former ZAPU agreed to form a joint military command that would lead the armed struggle. . . . the joint military command was formed on the understanding that the liberation of Zimbabwe could only be realized through an arduous armed struggle; secondly, on the understanding that the traditional political leadership of Zimbabwe had divided the people of Zimbabwe.

Such were the origins of ZIPA. The interview from which these statements are taken (see Southern Africa, November 1976) also has a great deal to say about the conceptions currently guiding ZIPA's practice:

ZIPA is an army in the traditional sense of the word. But ZIPA is a unique and revolutionary army in the sense that it has a strategic role in transforming itself into a political movement. The ZIPA structure accommodates the shouldering of both the military and the political tasks of the revolution. We have, within the ZIPA structure, a political department exclusively charged with the responsibility of shouldering the political tasks that are normally shouldered by a revolutionary political organization. . . . we have to establish a formal political structure in order to give better direction to the armed body that is now fighting inside Zimbabwe. And moves to do this are already underway, moves to transform this organization into a revolutionary vanguard for the people's struggle.

This formulation, and others like it form ZIPA's cadre of guerrilla leaders, represents something fresh and promising within Zimbabwean nationalism. Certainly these are not the formulations of ZANU and ZAPU.

The actual practice of ZIPA has also differed from that of the old movements. There has been a distinctive measure of military success, which has been linked to other signs that, within ZIPA, Zimbabweans have at last begun to break out of the vicious circle alluded to earlier. New methods of political work in the field are one such sign; another is the beginnings of a capacity to transcend earlier organizational loyalties and sub-national identifications.

In this and other areas we must guard against overstatement. As Samora Machel's observation, cited above, might warn us, it is still early days in the transition to revolutionary nationalism in Zimbabwe. There seems little doubt that ZANU/ZAPU infighting, and even ethnic tensions, have continued to make themselves felt from time to time within this "Third Force". Some "ZAPU commanders" of ZIPA are said to have withdrawn their cooperation in recent months and relocated their activity inside ZAPU and within Zambia.

Even if this is the case, it would still be a mistake to see the ZIPA initiative as having collapsed to the point were it is really ZANU/ZANLA operating under another name. Yet this is the interpretation which much of the press, both left and right, has tended to present. Thus, in the context of the Geneva talks, Robert Mugabe, a longtime ZANU activist who has replaced Sithole as the dominant figure among those claiming the mantle of ZANU leadership, is being packaged by the media as spokesman for both ZANU and ZIPA.

In fact Mugabe's recent base of political operations—in Quelimane on the Mozambican coast—has been well away from the centers of guerrilla activity and his position on the Geneva talks has not been the same as that of the public pronouncements of the ZIPA leadership. ZIPA spokesmen have shown themselves quite loathe to identify themselves politically with Mugabe in any straightforward manner. It seems clear, that the distinctive process which has been shaping the promise of ZIPA's future development has not been Mugabe's, or ZANU's, handiwork; nor has it been the handiwork of any other of the old guard leadership sitting across from Smith in Geneva.

The Future

Will Kissinger's adventures, and the Geneva charade serve to forestall the radicalizing process which we have been discussing? An important query to be sure, but with it we enter more deeply into the realm of journalistic scenario-building than this article can or should hope to venture. Suffice to say here that Geneva has, for the moment, brought the old guard back more firmly into the game—this being precisely the intention of the western strategists. Obviously this creates the danger that the revolutionary process will be short-circuited by the old guard (by virtue of their striking a neo-colonial bargain). It also increases the possibility that renewed jockeying for position among these leaders will encourage old-style fragmentation along party, ethnic and other lines, even the Zimbabwean revolutionary camp itself.

At the same time, there are also hints that an alternative, more revolutionary, kind of logic may now be at work. It is difficult, for example, to escape the conclusion that part of the reason the old guard (Nkomo and Mugabe in particular) have been as united as they have been at Geneva in (the "Patriotic Front"), and so little prone to compromise away the essence of African demands, is because they realize that they are no longer exclusive arbiters of the nature of Zimbabwean nationalism. It is, of course, also true that Smith's outrageous demands and calculated intransigence have left little ground for such compromise.

It is possible that the revolutionary process which ZIPA represents has gone far enough to that the guerrillas, with their promise to the Zimbabwean people of a more meaningful independence than that which neo-colonialism can offer, have become crucial participants in the negotiations almost in spite of themselves. They thus force the entire spectrum of Zimbabwean nationalism further to the left. And, meanwhile, in Zimbabwe itself the guerrilla struggle is continuing, with further radicalizing implications.

Which tendency within Zimbabwean nationalism will prevail? There are too many
US policy and strategy in southern Africa have now emerged as crucial factors in determining the immediate outcome of the subcontinent's two most heated liberation struggles—in Namibia (South-West Africa) and in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). As the details of Washington's newly activist role in southern Africa emerge, it appears increasingly likely that the armed struggles in progress in these two nations will escalate drastically in coming months, with the US directly or indirectly supporting the reigning minority regimes, or, in the case of Rhodesia, encouraging South Africa to do so.

With great reluctance, the US has been forced to reveal its aims in southern Africa on several occasions since Kissinger's April 27 Lusaka speech. And nowhere has the substance of US policy been so graphically demonstrated as in the United Nations . . .

No Policy Shift

With National Security Study Memorandum #39 looming closely in the background—a document that has recently been published in book form—Kissinger's new policy was suspect from the first. Rather than a policy shift, as Washington claimed it was, the Kissinger diplomacy appeared to be a new strategy mounted on the shoulders of NSSM #39. That document, researched and written under National Security Advisor Kissinger in 1969 and implemented in the first months of 1970, called for essentially covert support for the Smith regime in Rhodesia, for the Portuguese regimes in Angola and Mozambique, and, in particular, for the John B. Vorster regime in South Africa and the South African occupation of Namibia.

For the US, the stakes were high at the time NSSM #39 was issued, and US interests in southern Africa have increased dramatically since that time. Strategically, the southern rim of Africa is viewed in Washington as an integral part of US global defense policy—as recent speculation on the possibility of a US naval installation in Trinquart indicates. The loss of southern Africa to progressive governments would be a severe setback to Kissinger's brand of balance-of-power politics. Indeed, one of the stated aims of the Kissinger mission was to deter the "radicalization" of southern Africa.

South Africa is also viewed as an important trading partner by the West, and Kissinger has cooperated closely with leaders of the Western financial community in devising economic supports for Pretoria and Salisbury. The proposed $2 billion "safety net" of "guarantees" for Rhodesian whites is only the most visible of these numerous plans. South Africa is still thought to be a stable target for investment: According to figures recently published by Reed Kramer in The Nation, "major US financial institutions have moved in with more than $700 million to shore up the hard-pressed Pretoria regime. The biggest US banks have organized and participated in a number of multimillion-dollar loans to the South African Government, state-owned corporations, and private projects." South Africa has also been singled out as an important source of minerals, a source, writes Kramer, that is viewed as "the hub of a strategic, mineral-rich subcontinental economy . . . where more than $5 billion in Western capital is committed."

Forced to Reveal Aims

With great reluctance, the US has been forced to reveal its aims in southern Africa on several occasions since Kissinger's April 27 Lusaka speech. And nowhere has the substance of US policy been so graphically demonstrated as in the United Nations, where several decisions within the Security Council and the General Assembly have forced the US to side openly with South Africa on issues in which Kissinger has professed to support progressive African opinion—on apartheid, on South Africa's continuing occupation of Namibia, and on military aggression by South Africa in the territory of another country.

The most significant of these decisions occurred in mid-October, when US delegate William Scranton vetoed resolutions on the Namibian question proposed here by African nations and their supporters. South Africa's continuing military occupation of Namibia—declared illegal by the UN in 1966 and by the International Court of Justice in 1971—was one of the prime targets of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy. The US Secretary of State had promised to try to bring Vorster
and leaders of SWAPO into negotiations on terminating South Africa's control over the territory, an effort designed to mollify increasing international objections to that control and exploitation. It was already clear that SWAPO was readying for a major increase in its guerrilla activity against occupation forces in the northern regions of the territory, and if US contact with and support for Pretoria were to continue and increase, South Africa would have to stop fighting Namibia's internationally recognized and strongly supported liberation front.

Zambia Vote

A little-noticed vote in the Security Council last summer presaged the US position on Namibia. In mid-July, Zambia's Mission to the UN filed a formal request for Security Council consideration of an incident that clearly indicated the aggressive nature of South Africa's determination to hold onto Namibia. Zambia charged that a full platoon of South African troops had invaded Zambian territory July 11 in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas. With air support, the troops struck a Zambian village that was thought to be a transit station for SWAPO cadres, some 30 km inside Zambian territory near the Caprivi Strip. The raid resulted in 16 Zambian casualties and 45 injured. South Africa officially denied knowledge of the incident.

"The US delegation was silent throughout the debates... But when sanctions against South Africa were introduced in the form of resolutions, Scranton vetoed."}

In the final vote on resolutions condemning the act, the US abstained. "There are currently efforts of a very serious nature being made to make progress toward solutions in southern Africa which this council has long advocated," the US representative stated. "We believe that it would be appropriate for a resolution addressed to any incident beyond the immediate incident concerned to have welcomed these efforts..."

US Veto

The US veto that followed in the Security Council Oct. 18 was extraordinary for its timing. There had been earlier consultations between Kissinger and SWAPO President Sam Nujoma in New York at Kissinger's request. But it was clear that South Africa would not meet SWAPO's preconditions to negotiations— the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, the release of all Namibian political prisoners, and commitments to territorial integrity and to UN-supervised national elections. The US delegation was silent throughout the debates, during which African delegations called for arms embargoes and economic sanctions against South Africa for its failure to meet UN demands for an end to its 36-year occupation. But when sanctions against South Africa were introduced in the form of reso-

lutions, Scranton vetoed, this time citing "the delicate fabric of negotiations" taking place between Kissinger and Vorster on the Namibian question, and the "significant progress" that had already been made. Not surprisingly the US was joined in its veto by France and Britain. On the morning of the triple veto, however, the New York Times published an interview with Vorster in Johannesburg in which the South African Prime Minister said he "had nothing at all to say to SWAPO."

The Vorster interview was quoted in the Security Council on the morning of the veto. "We have been warned that the Western powers are going to veto," Theo-Ben Gurirab, head of SWAPO's political bureau and the organization's chief representative in the US said during the debates. "But it is important from the political point of view that we force them to veto, so that their intentions in the region are exposed. On the one hand, there is a lot of talk about the commitment of the Western countries to support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa, support for majority rule, and for independence. On the other hand, we see that the minority governments in southern Africa, be it that of Ian Smith or Vorster, have not in any way made significant moves toward these things. There is a lot of talk, but there is very little action. But vetoes have never stopped us before. A veto in the Security Council now will help us expose this duplicity."

Undermining SWAPO

While the debates were still in session, details of that duplicity—of a comprehensive US effort to undermine SWAPO and its struggle for genuine independence—began to emerge here. It was learned that Kissinger's diplomatic efforts were only the visible portion of a well-organized policy to provide support for the South African regime by winning credibility for the client regime that Pretoria is constructing through its constitutional talks at Turnhalle, in Windhoek, Namibia's capital city.

Politically, the likely head of such a South African sponsored government, Chief Clemens Kapuuo, current head of the Herero delegation at Turnhalle has been provided with a great deal of exposure to US government figures in the administration and in Congress; to leaders of powerful US media organizations; and to prominent members of the US and British business communities. A US law firm is advising him and a New York public relations firm has been sponsoring his own version of "shuttle diplomacy" between Windhoek, New York, and London. According to a report released here, and to interviews with UN consultants, there is reason to view Kapuuo's financial support and his publicity-conscious exposure in the West as an orchestrated effort to win credibility for his as "the leader of modern Namibia," as a confidential UN memo recently noted.

In the UN itself, a campaign has been launched to discredit SWAPO's principal diplomatic lobby, the office of the Commissioner for Namibia. This has chiefly taken the form of what is apparently a strongly backed propaganda campaign against Commissioner Sean MacBride, who has acted as a staunch ally of Namibian independence. A consultant in MacBride's office has said that

"It is too simplistic to condemn in blanket fashion economic relations with South Africa... US delegate at UN

what was being sought was the elimination of MacBride and his replacement by a pro-western Commissioner, or the complete abolition of the office.

It was also learned that the US has been attempting to create the necessary supports to sustain the existing economic infrastructure in Namibia once South Africa's version of "independence" has been effected through the Turnhalle talks. There are now at least two major studies, one conducted by the Agency for International Development in Washington and one authorized by AID to be carried out by a group of professional scholars, in which ways are being sought to maintain the exploitative economic relations that currently prevail in Namibia's white-controlled economy.

Promises to Vorster

Disclosures at the UN reflected the content of the diplomacy that Kissinger was carrying on with Vorster, and, by extension, with Ian Smith in Rhodesia. In reports released here and published both here and in Britain, it was learned that Kissinger had made significant promises to Vorster on their second round of negotiations in Zurich last fall, promises that would make it possible for South Africa to withdraw its own troops from Namibia without losing its
military control of the territory. "A new black Namibian armed force would then be created," a report published in the Dublin Sunday Press noted Sept. 19, trained by the US and financed by the US for at least a decade. What the limit would be on the number of United States military advisers is not known. It is intended that a large proportion of the American soldiers and other personnel working in Namibia should be black."

Such disclosures supported evidence then being advanced in the Security Council that the US effort to promote "majority rule" in southern Africa did not mean a commitment to fundamental change in the white-minority states. In the case of Namibia, this meant a covert rejection of the territory's leading liberation movement, in favor of a neocolonial enterprise that would install pro-Westem blacks that could then be said to represent the African majority.

The preservation of the white minority in South Africa itself, of course, is one of the principal aims of this policy. Kissinger was very careful to test the water among American blacks before plunging into his most recent round of shuttle diplomacy. State Dept. officials were sent off on wide-ranging studies of public opinion, particularly among blacks, around the country prior to Kissinger's departure in September for Pretoria. Kissinger himself made attempts to gather black support by speaking to selected black audiences in Philadelphia and Boston. It was in Philadelphia August 31 that he made his most explicit denunciation of apartheid. One crucial question after that speech was whether Kissinger would denounce apartheid once he was in South Africa, and whether he would meet with leaders of South Africa's blacks, or with figures chosen by the white regime to represent the black community. He chose the latter, of course; and not a word on apartheid was spoken during his visit.

No Blanket Condemnation.

For many, this supported the theory that Kissinger had already drawn the line for his new African policy at South Africa's borders. And this was further demonstrated in the General Assembly here shortly after the decision on Namibia was taken. On Nov. 9, the US delegation here refused the opportunity to support General Assembly resolutions denouncing apartheid.

The resolutions, approved after an extended debate on apartheid, were the most comprehensive attack the world body had thus far mounted on South Africa's racist policies.

The 10 resolutions were approved by wide margins, although many Western and South American countries abstained.

The resolutions supported efforts by South Africa's black majority to seize power "by all possible means." They called for a complete economic boycott, a mandatory arms embargo and the expulsion of South Africa from all international sports. In addition collaboration between Israel and South Africa was specifically condemned.

By not supporting the resolutions the US again refused to commit itself to any strong action against the apartheid regime.

In many homes in Soweto last month there was no Christmas. The Soweto Student Representative Council had called for Christmas to be ignored. No Christmas shopping, no Christmas cards, no Christmas presents, no Christmas parties, no drinking or buying of liquor.

What was there to celebrate, they asked, after six months of killings, police brutality, arrests, tortures and intimidation? The Christmas boycott was part of a general period of resistance and mourning which has been given wide support by the residents of Soweto and other townships in South Africa. Part of the successful campaign has seen the closing of shebeens (illegal drinking places), the total boycott of final school exams and the curtailment of sports activities. Sports teams have gone to the Representative Council to seek permission to play, reflecting the authority that has become vested in the Council. The success of this call indicates the strength of the new power structures centered around the students that are developing in the townships. Reflecting a new level in the people's struggle, these alternative structures are beginning to challenge directly the authority of the South African government.

Six months after the first demonstration that sparked off the police massacre in Soweto, the protests continue. The largest of these in recent weeks was a three-day demonstration in Guguletu, a township outside Cape Town. At least two protestors were killed by police bullets. Two schools, five vehicles and 19 houses of black policemen and suspected police informers were burned. The police cordoned off the whole township, allowing no-one to leave or enter, and systematically went from house to house, making their arrests. The press reported that over 200 people were detained.

However, throughout the past six months, police statements have been false, making it difficult to estimate accurately the number of people actually killed, wounded or detained. In an effort to give a more realistic assessment of the total number of people arrested, the South African Institute of Race Relations has estimated that at least 4,200 arrests had been made by October 31. The institute had found records of 1,281 people having been tried and found guilty, including 492 youth under 18. 528 youths are being held without trial are known. The Commissioner of Police, General Botha in blanket fashion economic relations with South Africa."

Justifying his vote the US delegate said "We cannot accept the thesis of this resolution that economic relations with South Africa work to the disadvantage of the population or necessarily result in their exploitation," the US delegate argued. "On the contrary, some United States corporations have been among the leading forces for equal rights and enlightened employment practices in South Africa. It is too simplistic to condemn in blanket fashion economic relations with South Africa."
arms to depots for use later.”

In another incident, a bomb was set off in a prominent white restaurant in Johannesburg during lunch hour. None of the diners was seriously injured. Isaac Sigho, who set off the device, was hurt in the explosion and hospitalized. The police then arrested Wellington Tshazibane and Johnnes Mofokeng as suspected accomplices. According to a police report, Tshazibane was found hanged in his cell a few hours after his arrest, on December 13.

Tshazibane who was 30, was employed in the research laboratory of South Africa’s major gold and diamond mining company, Anglo-American Corporation. He had been a student at Fort Hare, a college for Africans, until 1968 when he was expelled for political activities. He had continued his studies in England, on a scholarship from Anglo-American, and had received a degree at Oxford University.

Sigho, who was 27, had been dismissed in October from his job in the electronics section of an Anglo-American affiliate, the De Beers Consolidated Mines, where Mofokeng, a 24-year-old Soweto soccer star, had also worked, as a laborer, until his arrest.

The announcement of Tshazibane’s “suicide” was immediately challenged by his friends and relatives, who demanded that an independent pathologist attend the autopsy. The report issued by this pathologist simply stated that his injuries were consistent with death by hanging; it did not comment on whether the hanging was self-inflicted.

Two days later the police announced the suicide of another detainee, George Botha, a 30-year-old teacher who had been imprisoned in Port Elizabeth. They claimed that he had fallen six floors down the stairwell of the security police headquarters. He is the eleventh person known to have died in detention in 1976.

“Is There Room For Christ This Christmas”?
The arrests and detentions have not only been aimed at radical leaders, but also at moderate critics of the government. In a raid on the offices of the liberal Christian Institute and the South African Council of Churches in late November, the security police seized posters which had a photograph of a Soweto youth carrying a child who had been shot. The picture, which had been circulated internationally by the press, bore the caption “Is there room for Christ this Christmas?”

Detained without charge at the same time was Cedric Mayson, white editor of the Christian Institute’s publication Pro Veritate. Also detained were Leonard Mosala and his wife, Bernadetta Mosala, a former member of Soweto’s Urban Bantu Council. Mr. Mosala had been criticized by many Blacks for his participation in this paragovernmental body. The Mosalas were held for 13 days before being released.

Barney Ngakane, who has spent 12 of the past 15 years under banning orders, was also arrested. Detained earlier was Nat Serache who gave up his job at the Rand Daily Mail to become president of the Black People’s Convention.

In an attack on black labor organizing, twenty-three labor leaders were “banned” by the government at the end of November and early in December. A typical banning order forbids communication with other banned persons, prohibits participation in union activity and prevents the person from preparing anything for publication or from being quoted anywhere, in print or verbally.

Eight of those banned are associated with the Trade Union Advisory Committee, an umbrella organization of black trade unions in the Durban-Pietermaritzburg area. Five of those banned were associated with Johannesburg area unions including the Metal and Allied Workers’ Union and the Urban Training Project. The remaining ten are associated with unions in Cape Town. In addition to those recently banned, at least seven other union members have been detained in recent months.

In the wake of all the repression by the government hundreds of people, mostly youths and children, have fled their homes, many going to Botswana. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated the number in the middle of November to be about 700. By the beginning of December many estimates put the number at over 1000.

Businessmen call for “Change”

While the government attempts to crush the black movement by force at its base, divisions among white South African officials and business leaders over government policy are increasing. The Association of Chambers of Commerce (Assocom), at its annual conference in late October gave unanimous backing to a resolution which called for: 1) Permission to own property for all racial groups in their own parts of the urban zone 2) Relaxation of restrictions on black businessmen in their own areas 3) Designation of areas in which all races may trade freely 4) Relaxation of all racial restrictions on jobs in white owned areas 5) Establishment of restaurants for all races in the white central business districts.

The plan does not do away with apartheid, and gives no real political power to Blacks. Such plans for abolishing “petty-apartheid” have been proposed before, but have never received as much backing. The apparent purpose is the creation of a black middle class to act as a buffer between the black majority and the white rulers. "It is both unsound and dangerous for Blacks to be moulded into a single strata of their own without a real middle class,” said Mr. J.J. Conradie, a representative from Durban at the Assocom conference, as he called for quick reforms.
Tension in the Namibia-Angola border region is increasing rapidly leading many observers to fear another South African invasion of the newly independent People's Republic of Angola.

United Nations Commissioner for Namibia Sean Mac Bride, speaking in Lusaka, Zambia in early December, told reporters that South Africa had positioned 50,000 heavily armed troops in the border area in readiness for an attack. Mac Bride said that attack could come as early as January, and added that Rhodesia was building three military airstrips for use in the invasion.

Mac Bride had been speaking in response to ominous remarks made recently by high South African government officials. South African Minister of Defense Pieter W. Botha told journalists during a November inspection trip to northern Namibia that "South Africa would strike a mighty military blow against any plans to invade South West Africa from across the Angolan border." In the same breath Botha denied that his government was training or equipping guerrillas of UNITA which was defeated in the war in Angola last year. UNITA has continued to carry out guerrilla attacks in various parts of southern Angola. Luanda radio broadcasts quoted President Agostinho Neto as saying his country faced a threat from "imperialist bases in Namibia" as reports filtered slowly to the West of South Africa's shelling military camps in southern Angola.

South Africa's Commissioner General for indigenous peoples in Namibia, Jannie de Wet, issued a warning in early December, stating that troops "may apply hot pursuit tactics to wipe out" the Angolan guerrilla bases of the South West Africa People's Organization Liberation Army. "We have information that SWAPO is preparing to attack Southwest Africa on a scale unequalled before," Commissioner Jannie de Wet claimed. "They plan to strike deep into the territory and even penetrate white areas."

"War Psychosis"

De Wet was quoted by South African journalist Stanley Uys whose dispatch to the Manchester Guardian in early December continued, "The war psychosis that has been generated in South Africa and Namibia reflects South Africa's determination not to come to terms with SWAPO. Defense Minister P.W. Botha has appealed for volunteers for the South African army in preparation for what he calls 'the contingency of mobilization.' If sufficient volunteers do not enroll, the period of compulsory military service may be extended from one year to 18 months or even two years."

A South African move to install a black government in Namibia, UN Commissioner Mac Bride has asserted, would leave Pretoria free to step in and support the government if called on. "South Africa wants to turn the guerrilla war into a struggle in which the new black government is pitted against SWAPO," he is reported to have said.

The Commissioner said that if South Africa proceeds with its war plans, SWAPO is likely to call on outside support from the Organization of African Unity, but added...
that he doubts that Cuban troops now stationed in Angola would enter the territory.

The Windhoek Advertiser reported in mid-November that Nigeria would deploy 50,75,000 of its own troops into Angola in early 1977 to join in the war against South African occupation troops in Namibia. The report was filed by a South African journalist who, the paper said, had travelled throughout Africa.

SWAPO, in a November 22 war communiqué issued by its permanent mission in Angola, detailed a number of military actions against South African occupation forces over the previous two months. SWAPO denounced South Africa's propaganda campaign as a cover-up of Pretoria's activities in Namibia. News reports from South Africa have claimed that SWAPO soldiers have been engaged in massacres of the civilian population in southern Angola.

SWAPO representative at the UN, Theoben Gurirab, addressing the world organization's Fourth Committee on November 22, spoke to South Africa's use of UNITA elements both in Angola and Namibia 'to frustrate the efforts at national reconstruction of the People's Republic of Angola' and 'to contain the military activities of SWAPO'. Mr. Gurirab charged UNITA units 'are today being trained, financed, armed and sent back into Angola to create havoc and terror among the civilian population ... South Africa also uses these UNITA elements inside Namibia to terrorise Namibians, masquerading them as SWAPO guerrillas. The enemy hopes to alienate the Angolan government from its people in Southern Angola and also SWAPO from the people of Namibia.'

Turnhalle—Seeking an Alternative to SWAPO

This 16-month-long 'constitutional conference'—composed of 11 'ethnic groups' and put in place by the South African regime, operating through its South West African administration—recessed in early December without reaching a conclusion on setting up an 'interim government' for the Territory of Namibia. Turnhalle is due to reconvene early in January, 1977, under pressure to declare its intent so that the Namibian population would peacefully accept such a client government. But if fighting were to continue after independence, it would be a black government that called for South African aid, thus giving the apartheid regime's soldiers apparent legitimacy when they intervened.

It is of course unlikely that SWAPO or the Namibian population would peacefully accept such a client government. But if fighting were to continue after independence, it would be a black government that called for South African aid, thus giving the apartheid regime's soldiers apparent legitimacy when they intervened.

But in fact Turnhalle is moving very slowly. Wrangling between black and white delegates, mostly over the shape of a legislative set-up for Namibia, has delayed any conclusions, much to the annoyance of South Africa. Late in November members of the constitutional committee flew to Pretoria for a meeting with South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster. Shaking a big stick, Vorster warned them that South Africa would impose a constitution on the territory if the Turnhalle conference delays continued.

Word from the Pretoria meeting was that South Africa would not join any conference on the future of Namibia that included SWAPO, thus clearly rejecting Kissinger's recent negotiating ploy.

A SWAPO reaction to a Turnhalle/Vorster interim government came from the movement's Secretary for Information, Peter Katjivui. 'If they impose an interim government on the people of Namibia, we reserve the right to call in military support from friendly countries.'

ANGOLA

MAJOR CHANGES ANNOUNCED

"We still are not completely independent," declared Angola's President Agostinho Neto only days before Angola celebrated its first year of independence November 11. Neto was addressing a crowd of thousands who had come to hear him speak of the decisions taken by the Central Committee of the MPLA in its important meeting the last week of October.

"We have political independence, yes," Neto continued. "But Angolans do not control our oil; Angolans do not control our diamonds; Angolans do not control our iron. We are not completely independent—we lack one essential element in our independence: economic independence."

Still, Neto was not pessimistic. The Central Committee had just finished its work—a major rehauling of the structures of the Angolan state and of MPLA itself—establishing clearer priorities and strategies for work in the future. Neto told the crowd that
Angola would work patiently, but "with strength" to reach economic independence "on new bases."

"We are going to collectivize production, in the countryside and the cities. And we are going to organize the alliance between the city and the countryside. We are going to construct a socialist society."

The resolutions of the meeting made public in early November echo the themes of confidence and patience as expressed in the presidential address. Emphasizing Angola's choice of socialism, the documents set down more precisely than has been done previously, MPLA's strategy for national development.

The "Program of Action" states:

"Only after the principal tasks of reconstruction have been completed, will we have created the conditions giving us the possibility of beginning the phase of socialist construction."

The Committee stressed that this brand of socialism stands unequivocally for the liquidation of human exploitation, and is not to be confused with "the so-called 'African socialism.'"

The Committee first set down as its most immediate goals, "the healing of the wounds of war," repair of paralyzed sectors of the economy, ending of illiteracy, and initiation of a vast plan to develop skilled technicians in key areas of the economy. The MPLA leaders see a need, according to their resolutions, to submit the private sector of the economy to rigorous control through centralized planning of the national economy, including the close regulation of wages and prices. To that end, a National Planning Commission would be established.

The Central Committee also recommended major changes in the structures of both the state apparatus and the MPLA itself.

In the first year of independence the new government had functioned within structures essentially inherited from the Portuguese, and which, the Committee now concludes, can never provide the basis to build a new society. A politics of "functionalism" was dismissed as "an expression of the colonial politics of encouraging the development of a well-paid elite loyal only to its own interests." Not only would such "functionalism" have to be ended but the upper structures of government submitted to a progressive "debureaucratization."

Specifically, the Central Committee recommended that the Ministries of Information and Internal Administration be disbanded, and that their functions be assumed directly by MPLA. The President would take direct control of the administration of the government, acquiring the role of Prime Minister. (These recommendations were approved in late November by Angola's Council of the Revolution, the functioning law-making body of the government.)

Additionally, the Central Committee called for the organizing of MPLA into a "vanguard party" of the working class. "The working class," the Committee declared, "is the legitimate depository of the doctrine of scientific socialism; the working class and its natural ally, the peasantry, are the moving forces of the Angolan revolution. All the peasantry, which constitutes the immense majority of our people is the principal force, and the working class is the leading class."

A vast plan for the political education of the people was recommended, which would include the opening of schools of "political formation," and greater dissemination of information throughout the country, with emphasis on the use of television, a resource now functioning only in Luanda, the capital.

Finally, the Central Committee called for the convention of the First Congress of MPLA late in the coming year to continue and consolidate the work it had begun.

More Fighting in the South

For the past two months, reports, chiefly originating in South Africa about a UNITA "offensive" in southern and eastern Angola have spread throughout the west. They allege that a Cuban force with some Angolan support is conducting operations using scorched earth tactics, destroying crops and livestock, and that Africans fleeing these attacks are streaming across the Namibian border to seek "refuge" from such "MPLA reprisals."

All of the reports cite only South African government or military officials as their source.

Reports that UNITA remnants have been attacking and massacring civilians in areas where UNITA previously claimed strong support have been given little coverage. Agence France Presse reported on December 9 that "dozens of people were hacked to death when guerrillas stormed a train on the Benguela Railway in Central Angola" several days earlier. The AFP report cited "fragmentary but tallying reports" from sources in Luanda.

AFP also referred to the massacre of nearly 300 civilians, slain by machete, in a village in Huambo Province in October. Although it received wide coverage in the Angolan press, this attack was not reported in the west. The village called Canhala is located near Huambo, the capital of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA-FNLA "government" in the last year's war. Canhala had supported MPLA strongly. MPLA authorities felt Canhala had been signed out for reprisals by UNITA guerrillas because of this support.

The Angolan Minister of Defense Iko Carreira announced this autumn that FAPLA, the Angolan Armed Forces, had captured a regular South African soldier in fighting in the country's southernmost provinces. Carreira also stated that South Africa was maintaining a base in Namibia's Caprivi Strip strictly for the training and equipping of UNITA guerrillas to infiltrate back into southern Angola. South Africa quickly denied the charges.

But scattered information has surfaced that UNITA "Foreign Minister" Jorge Sambundo (a frequent visitor to the US in the days before Angolan independence) arrived in Johannesburg on November 10 where he was met at the airport by an official greeting group. Press reports issued on his arrival said he was in South Africa to obtain greater assistance for UNITA.

Holden Roberto, president of the now defunct FNLA, has turned up in Brussels. According to reports in two Lisbon dailies (Jornal de Notícias and Diario Popular) Roberto is in Belgium to contact arms traders and mercenaries.

Women members of FAPLA, the Angolan armed forces. About to pick up arms against South Africa again? (LSM)
SOUTH AFRICA’S BANTUSTANS are drawing investors. Chief L. J. Sebe of Ciskei said after a recent tour of the U.S. that he had lined up $22 million in investments. He said most of that amount is to come from Mobil Oil, Union Carbide, John Deere, Caterpillar, and General Motors, and that proposed developments include irrigation projects and a pineapple plantation.

The Transkei will be the recipient of a $12 million development loan approved by Dow Bank of the U.S., a subsidiary of Fuji Bank Ltd. of Japan, and Hill Samuel Ltd. of Britain. The funds from the two banks will go to the Xhosa Development Corp., the government agency through which all private investment funds currently are channeled.

The agency says that to date R40m ($46 million) has been loaned by overseas financial institutions.

Five white South Africans, four of them members of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), were found not guilty, on December 2nd, in a political trial that had gone on for 7 months. They were accused under the Suppression of Communism Act and the Unlawful Organizations Act, of promoting the aims of two banned groups, the Communist Party and the African National Congress. All five, Cedrid de Beer, 23 years old, Glen Moss, 24, Charles Nupen, 26, Karel Tip, 31 and Edward Webster, 33, have spoke out strongly in their testimony at the trial against South African racial laws and attempts to suppress opposition.

Gun dealers in Johannesburg and Cape Town report soaring sales to white South Africans. Even before the present surge of interest, it was estimated that two out of three white men owned a gun. Now, the Washington Post reports, burglar alarm installations in white areas have risen sharply and newspaper ads suggest that what every woman needs is an umbrella that—at the press of a button—produces a 6,000-volt charge.

REPRESSION IN ZIMBABWE is intensifying under the Smith regime. A report recently issued by the International Defense and Aid Fund cities a minimum of 1,750 and possibly more than 3,000 Zimbabweans as being detained for political offenses under abominable conditions. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia declared in a bulletin that members of the Rhodesian security forces have now reached a stage where they regard the slightest suspicion that Africans have some connection to the liberation forces as constituting a license to kill. The Commission cited the example of Charuma kraal in the Mt. Darwin area, where eleven Africans, including an old, almost blind woman and a 1½-year-old child, were shot dead for “assisting terrorists.”

At eight o’clock every night thousands of people throughout Zimbabwe tune in to “The Voice of Zimbabwe” on Radio Mozambique for up-to-the-minute news and comment on the liberation struggle. Originally produced by Mozambique as an act of solidarity, the program is now produced by the Mozambique People’s Army (ZIPA), using the facilities of Radio Mozambique. Despite the Rhodesian regime’s attempts to jam the program and the fact that some employers have forbidden their workers to listen, audiences have been growing since the program began last March 3, the day the People’s Republic of Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia.

ANGOLA’S AID FROM CUBA may be reduced, according to The Observer. It cites Cuba’s own need for skilled manpower and the collapse of world prices of sugar, Cuba’s major export. It says the future of the Cuban presence in Angola is expected to be the main subject discussed during an announced but as yet unscheduled visit to Havana by Angolan Prime Minister Lopo de Nascimento.

MOZAMBIQUE FORBADE THE EXPORT of personal belongings previously imported and paid for out of the country’s foreign currency reserves. The government said the measure was in response to attempts by persons preparing to leave the country permanently to get around the limit on the amount of hard currency they could take out by purchasing consumer goods. It said such practices had led to a shortage of radios, auto parts, cameras and other items that were draining foreign reserves. Commercial exports aren’t affected by the decree, which was enacted Oct. 14.

The Third Congress of FRELIMO is to be held Feb. 3-7, 1977. It is expected to revise FRELIMO’s programs and statutes to correspond with the new phase of consolidating people’s power. It will set priorities and tactics for economic and social development. The Congress, to be held in Maputo, will also elect the Party’s leadership.

A THREE-DAY EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE in solidarity with the People of South Africa was held from 30 October to 1 November in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.
XICONHOCA—An Enemy Who Teaches

Mozambicans call him “Xiconhoca” (shee-kohn-yoh'-kah). His cartoon presence is everywhere—in national newspapers and magazines, on bulletin boards, on posters. You will see him in rural stores or in urban centers.

Xiconhoca is the enemy, “o inimigo.” Xiconhoca has all the bad habits, vices and wrongheaded ideas that people must overcome to build a new nonexploitative society in Mozambique.

He is a parasite, “e’ um parasita,” who refuses to work and does not cooperate in production, “recusa a trabalho nao colabora na producao.” He strolls carefree, a bottle of wine under his arm, and lectures his heavily burdened wife on the evils of OMM, the Organization of Mozambican Women, which works to end the exploitation of women.

The humor of the cartoons—developed by the FRELIMO Department of Information and Propaganda—brings a wince along with the chuckle as Mozambicans recognize their own shortcomings and the difficulties of learning new ways. Although they evoke laughter, the essential seriousness of the cartoons’ message is not lost on the Mozambican citizen: that they, the people, “o povo,” must recognize the enemy, the Xiconhocas who endanger their new nation.

Xiconhoca is a bureaucrat, complicating the life of the people with endless forms to fill out. The sign on his desk says, “long live wastefulness.” He is a middle-class bourgeois who despises the people.

Xiconhoca means snake, and, in Mozambique where most snakes are poisonous, people are learning to understand the danger of those who, like Xiconhoca, are the enemy. The pimp is the enemy; and the murderous driver is the enemy; but most menacing of all is the Xiconhoca who helps the foreign invaders of Mozambique. He is an enemy agent, a guide for the invaders who collaborates in aggression and in the massacres of the people.

Xiconhoca shows a face of evil, but he is helping teach Mozambicans to build a strong, new, and just society.
THE ECONOMIC SCENE:

Adjusting the Style of One’s Swimming Pool

While nothing may be clear in Geneva, no time is being wasted elsewhere in the world in preparing for the day when sanctions will be lifted and Rhodesia will again be a nice place to do business openly.

At the request of Ian Smith, Chris Scofield, a Rhodesian businessman, flew to the US to sound out investment prospects. His appointments were arranged by the Washington law firm of Collier, Shannon Rill and Edwards, the firm which, in 1971, took a leading role in lobbying for the Byrd Amendment, which permits the import of Rhodesian chrome. US companies gearing up for re-entry have been joined by their Japanese colleagues. Japanese trading firms are reported to have begun intensifying contacts with shippers and mine operators getting ready for the time when imports of Rhodesian raw materials—principally chrome and ferrochrome—can be resumed to Japan.

In Britain, opposition leaders hurriedly attempted to block the renewal of sanctions against Rhodesia. While they failed, several examples of sanctions violations have surfaced recently, the most serious involving the use by government troops of ten new Cessna light reconnaissance and transport planes. These are said to have been brought from Rheims, France, where they are made under license from the American company.

The white Rhodesian business community is optimistic about prospects ahead. 1000 responsible people (including directors and leaders of banks and financial institutions, commerce and industry, mining and agriculture) sent a message to Smith urging and supporting his acceptance of the Kissinger plan. While Associated Chamber of Commerce President Mike Duffy warned that “settlement will not solve all the problems overnight,” he added, “there is a golden opportunity to create a prosperous and truly multiracial state.”

Besides the two billion dollar investment pool promised by Kissinger, immediate benefits of any settlement are expected to accrue to the tourist industry: estimates predict a 50% increase in tourist traffic. Rhodesian businessmen further expect to export minerals to the developed West, and a host of manufactured and agricultural products to other parts of Africa.

The end of sanctions will mean imports too. Cartoons in Rhodesia’s Sunday Mail following Smith’s September announcement illustrated “happiness is” white Rhodesian style: driving a huge American car into a garage and asking for a full tank; hearing the patter of feet from an approaching army of foreign businessmen; a child shouting to its mother, “Come quickly, Dad is drinking a strange new drink called whiskey.”

Not all whites feel so secure, and white emigration continues. In September, for instance, 1,240 people left the country permanently, and only 524 whites settled, making a net loss of 706. This figure brings the total number of emigrants to 11,666 whites for the first nine months of 1976.

Where to go? The major newspaper of Paraguay, another outpost of Christian civilization, urged its government to begin a campaign to attract white Rhodesians to settle in that country. “Europe does not want them, there is no point in mentioning Africa and Asia has few attractions,” explained the newspaper. The Premier of Western Australia has promised support for a plan to settle 1000 white Rhodesians in his state, and an Alabama realtor placed an advertisement in the Rhodesia Herald offering to sell land to Rhodesians “in an area where the white people think as you do.”

The war is having a greater and greater effect on the lifestyle of those whites who stay behind. As one farmer’s wife who lives in the southeast border area wrote in a Johannesburg newspaper: “Mrs. Petro Murray, another farmer’s wife and a keen gardener, is concentrating on designing her garden to fit in with the new security fence that is being erected. Another farmer’s wife is busy making her security lights fit in artistically to light up her polo. “My garden,” she asserts, “has never looked so attractive.”

Not all reactions are as light-hearted. Big farms are seeking Malawians to work as agricultural laborers in areas of intense guerrilla activity. When asked why Malawians were specified, one tea company official replied, “why do California grape growers hire Mexicans?” However, considering that the rate of pay offered was twice that of the rate of pay generally paid African agricultural laborers, and that there is currently a high rate of unemployment among blacks, it is fair to assume that there is another motivation—fear of the local black population. A fear that is unlikely to subside as the guerrilla war escalates.

The Geneva Conference dribbles to a halt

Seven weeks after its much heralded opening, the Geneva Conference recessed for a month on December 14th. Almost nothing had been achieved. Surprised perhaps that the delegates had even stayed at the conference table, Ivor Richard, British Chairman of the conference, pronounced the outcome thus far “a modest success.” He called a break until January 17th, the interim time to be used for bilateral discussions with the various parties concerned.

Seeking an Independence Date

The major issue discussed so far has been the setting of a date for the granting of independence. The British apparently chose this as the first topic for the conference because they thought that it would be an easy point upon which to get agreement. Discussion eventually lasted more than three weeks, and the conclusion reached is itself somewhat inconclusive, involving as it does a series of dates dependent on the completion of certain requirements.

The African delegations were united in calling for a date not later than 12 months after the close of the conference. The Smith regime stuck to the two years given it in the Kissinger plan, and the British put forward a “compromise” 15 month date.

According to legal experts on each of the delegations—including that of Ian Smith—everything that needed to be done in preparation for independence could easily be accomplished within nine months. The publication of a confidential Smith regime document, which revealed plans to use the interim period for the building up of white controlled military and economic capacity, in preparation for a second UDI, threw some light on the reasons for Smith’s insistence on the 23 months. It also gave point to the African delegations’ demands for the shortest possible time interval before independence.

Agreement with the African delegations was reached when Chairman Richard added to Britain’s proposed March 1978 independence date a proviso that independence could come as early as December 1977 if the necessary constitutional processes were completed in time.

The Smith delegation, no doubt believing that they could use the “necessary constitutional processes completed” proviso as an escape clause, enabled them to obtain an extended or even open-ended interim period, and confident of their ability to provide constant delays, declared that they found “nothing objectionable in Richard’s statement.” However, Smith’s Foreign Minister, Van Der Byl announced that he believed “the necessary preparation for independence would still take longer than Mr. Richard had envisaged...”

Britain’s Role

Having agreed on some dates, little further progress was made. The conference drifted towards reces amidst speculation that Britain would offer proposals for a settlement in Zimbabwe involving a more active role for itself. The reports followed on meetings held in London, during the first week in December, between British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, Ivor Richard and Henry Kissinger. No new proposals were formally placed before the conference, but there was considerable coverage in the press of at least some of the new ideas.

The meetings had been aimed at finding some way around the rejection by each of the African delegations of the Kissinger plan as little more than a blue-print for neo-colonialism. Reports indicate that unlike the Kissinger plan, which allowed Smith’s forces...
to keep their hands on critical power levels during the transition period, the new proposals will substitute some form of British authority during this key period. Elements in the proposals include the appointment of a British resident High Commissioner, who would become the effective Head of State during the transition period, and might also act as Commander in Chief of the Army. This executive officer would substitute for the Council of State chaired by a white Rhodesian, proposed in the original Kissinger plan, and rejected by all the African delegations and the front-line states.

Still unclear in mid-December were several areas of concern, related particularly to the direct exercise of power in any interim government. The extent of the resident Commissioner's authority remained vague. The vexed question as to who would control the ministries of defence and police, Smith's preserves under the original Kissinger plan, had not been answered. How the army would function, and under what controls, had still to be clarified.

The British-American meetings had apparently discussed several related proposals in attempts to deal with these issues.

Controlling the Army

Some consideration was given to the idea that the British, either through the resident Commissioner or directly, take on responsibility for these ministries. Linked to this was a plan to have a British military task force substitute for the present commanders of the Rhodesian army. The British officers would be in charge of phasing out the Rhodesian army, while ZIPA guerrillas were being phased in under their own commanders as the country's future defence force.

It seems unlikely that the British would accept a role of such solitary responsibility. Indeed Ivor Richard returned to Geneva from the London talks saying that the idea that British troops might be sent to Rhodesia was a "possibility so far at the extreme of implausibility that one ought to rule it out."

A second, more plausible plan appears to revolve around the appointment of white and black Commonwealth officers in charge of Rhodesia's military and police. The commanders and their supporting staff would come largely from Canada, Nigeria and India.

Richard to Africa

Richard hopes to test the idea on all the principals during a southern Africa trip after Christmas. He expects to consult with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, and also with the leaders of the liberation movement delegations represented in Geneva. He plans also to go to Salisbury to see Smith, and to hold discussions with Vorster.

Officials emphasized that the plan was still in embryonic form, and would not be presented to any of the parties as a finished proposal. Richard, they said, would simply be "sounding out" reactions.

Whatever the African reaction, Rhodesian acceptance seems doubtful. The Rhodesian regime has not, thus far, taken a conciliatory stance either in Geneva or in Africa where it has escalated its attacks on Mozambique. Early on Van der Byl announced, "We made all our concessions before we came to Geneva... We didn't come here to give further ground." His immediate reaction to the idea that the British might assume authority for the military and police was a terse, "The Rhodesian Army would certainly not take orders from some man sent out from Whitehall whom they have never seen before and probably hope they never see again."

The Rhodesian regime's strategy throughout the talks has been to demand rigid adherence to the Rhodesian version of the Kissinger plan, but not to walk out. "If the conference fails" Smith announced, "it will not be because of us." Salisbury hopes that divisions among the African delegations will terminate the conference. Even if this does not happen the conference can be used as a stalling operation, but Smith wants to avoid annoying the Western powers by appearing intransigent.

He indicated some of his thinking when he declared in Salisbury that if the talks broke down, he might consider implementing the Kissinger plan unilaterally, by finding some black faces, "moderates," in his terminology, willing to go along with his scheme. In his view this could be presented to the world as proof of good faith and compliance with western demands, and would justify international suspension of sanctions.

Smith has made it clear that in his view the Kissinger plan and references to majority rule do not necessarily mean black majority rule. "You will not find anything about African majority rule in the five principles" he said in November. Majority rule, he said, must be "responsible majority rule" which means restrictions on the franchise so that voting power remains in white hands!

Ultimately, the way Smith reacts to the current British proposals or any new proposals will depend, in large measure, on South Africa. The US has shown no intention of shifting from the strategy it employed to get Smith to Geneva, namely pressure through Vorster. The major question then is how much pressure Vorster will be willing to apply to the Smith regime.

According to reports circulating in Geneva, all that Vorster has required of Smith thus far is that he not walk out on the Geneva conference. The reports cite an agreement between Smith and Vorster guaranteeing South African aid if the talks fail through no fault of Smith's. Indeed, Vorster announced in an interview on US television in early November that he "would not boycott" the Smith regime. South Africa seems willing to accept unilateral implementation of the Kissinger plan proposed by Smith as sufficient compliance with that plan if the Geneva talks break down.

The African reaction to the rumored British proposals, both in and outside Zimbabwe, will hinge on the concrete nature of these proposals. The front line presidents have repeatedly and consistently called for a stronger British role in the Zimbabwe settlement. President Nyerere of Tanzania underlined this in early November when he urged Britain to assume its proper task as the responsible colonial power, by appointing a resident commissioner and assuming the two key ministries of defense and external affairs in the interim government. Tanzania has long indicated support for some form of interim "Commonwealth" peace-keeping force being sent to Rhodesia to assist in an orderly transfer of power.

The Zimbabwean delegations did not all respond immediately to the reports of a second round of proposals. Nyerere's November statement had been endorsed by Joshua Nkomo, one of his spokesmen declaring, "We have always argued that Britain must take up her full responsibility to decolonize Rhodesia if the conference is to be a success. . . ." A Patriotic Front spokesman commenting on the reports of new proposals said that the Front would reject "any British role during the interim period that exceeds the minimum participation of the British government required to set in motion the process of decolonization," a statement open to several interpretations.

Kissinger and US Aims

Kissinger has continued to maintain a "low profile", a position, cynics say, which makes it possible to avoid blame for failure but take credit for success. He was, he said, still "cautiously optimistic", as he continued working through Britain and South Africa.

Kissinger's goal in calling the conference was to prevent the implementation of a radical solution in Zimbabwe by the swift achievement of majority rule government in moderate hands. His tactics, as revealed by the New York Times, were very much in his traditional style.

Essentially, he presented Smith with a fait accompli, already carefully coordinated with South Africa and Great Britain. "Mr. Kissinger coldly presented (Smith) with intelligence estimates that predicted military and economic disaster in a year."

He then "handed Mr. Smith the five point plan and said he had to accept it or else face total isolation in his guerrilla war. "Smith's plea for "sweeteners" to the plan then led to a series of ambiguous messages concerning African agreement to the idea of white control of crucial offices in the interim government, messages which were deliberately left vague in order to ensure the next stage of his plan, a conference at Geneva.

The stumbling block to the Kissinger strategy is the difficulty of finding African...
Gifts for a “Whites Only” Christmas . . . Abraham & Straus, a Brooklyn, N.Y., department store, agreed to stop advertising its Krugerrand coin jewelry (price tag: $195-$250) and to halt further inventory buildup following a Dec. 4 leafleting action outside the store organized by an ad hoc committee including the American Committee on Africa and the International Socialists. While the leaflet asked shoppers only to protest the store’s sale of the jewelry, about 200 people changed their minds about going inside. Among the demonstrators was Sikose Mji, an African National Congress member from Soweto.

Footnotes: WLDB, a N.Y. radio station with a heavily black listenership, temporarily lost its approximately $500-a-week advertising contract with A & S after repeated airings of an interview with a committee spokesman critical of the A & S sales. The station says such sales have sparked strong opposition in the black community. The ad withdrawal, it speculates, was the work of an eager beaver later overridden by higher-ups who didn’t want to lose an important vehicle for reaching customers.

The committee’s subsequent plan to picket NBC, which had been airing Krugerrand commercials, was at least temporarily halted when NBC gave assurances that the Krugerrand contract had run out and that it would consult the committee before accepting any further ads.

In Denver, the City Council passed a resolution urging citizens not to buy Krugerrands.

High Finance . . . About 60 people attended a Nov. 10 conference on US bank loans to South African which was sponsored by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility in New York. Loans to the financially pressed South African government and to government-controlled corporations are approaching the $1 billion mark for the year. Among recent loans was one for $110 million led by Citibank which is specifically intended to assist in overcoming balance of payment problems.

About 50 people protested Citibank’s involvement by demonstrating in front of a Harlem branch on Dec. 1. The National Anti-Imperialist Movement in Solidarity with Southern Africa, which organized the protest, plans similar actions elsewhere. Church executives have met with four major leaders who fit the necessary requirements of both accommodation to the West and a certain degree of legitimacy at home. In this situation he apparently believes that the best way to brake the escalating military situation is to reinstitute British colonialism for the time being. Dealing directly with the British presents far fewer problems than attempting to deal with Smith. The question remains as to why the British, who seemed so unwilling to go back into Rhodesia have now apparently acceded to a far more active role. The new British proposals followed London discussions between Crosland and Kissinger. The fact that Kissinger, despite his terminal status as Secretary of State, could still exercise pressure on Crosland may indicate that he had the solid backing of Jimmy Carter—yet another signal that the Kissinger strategy for southern Africa is likely to be adopted, substantively unchanged, by the Carter administration.

ACTION NEWS AND NOTES

The Great Turkey . . . About 200 people opposed to the jailing and torture of South African dissidents held a vigil outside the White House on Thanksgiving, then marched to the South African embassy for more prayers and protests. Dick Gregory, leader of the group, described South Africa as being “to the world what Mississippi once was to America” and recalled that “Dr. King spoke of injustice anywhere being a threat to justice everywhere.” Gregory was arrested for defying a D.C. ban on actions within 500 feet of an embassy. He was released the next day and charges were dropped.

Upcoming . . . Tsietsi Mashinini, one of the leaders of the June 16 Soweto student protests, recently visited this country at the invitation of the National Student Coalition Against Racism and will return in February for a national tour. Mashinini had to flee South Africa when the government put a price on his head.

The Coalition has called for a weekend of demonstrations against South Africa on March 25 and 26, the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre.

- The “Golden Harvest,” which sailed from England Oct. 27 with a cargo of “banned” books, is expected to arrive in Namibia in March or April after stops in West Africa to add to its supplies. Among sponsoring groups are the American Friends Service and the Movement for a New Society in Philadelphia.

- A member of the LSM Bay Area Unit is scheduled to depart for Europe in January to buy equipment for the SWAPO printshop. She’ll then continue on to Luanda to help set up the operation. About $10,000 of the $30,000 needed for the printshop has been collected.

- The Bay Area LSM is selling T-shirts to raise funds for the printshop: one version is a picture of Che with the words “Each nation is a step toward victory”; the other shows a woman with the words “MPLA Angola People’s Power.” The shirts are available in yellow, blue, beige and orange in sizes small, medium, large, and extra large. The price is $5.50. Make checks payable to SWAPO Printshop Project, Box 736, Berkeley, CA. 94701.

Angolan Delegation Goes to Harlem . . . Five members of the Angolan delegation, in New York for the UN vote on Angolan admission, were guests at a reception attended by about 150 in Harlem. The reception was organized on short notice by the South African Freedom Day Coalition at the request of members of the delegation who wanted to meet and talk with members of the black community.

Hitting the Pavement . . . About 75 people turned out Nov. 22 at Mobil headquarters in New York to protest Mobil’s role as chief oil supplier to Zimbabwe. Church leaders have also met with Mobil . . . About 200 demonstrators protesting both Democratic and Republican party positions on Southern Africa showed up at the first Presidential debate in Philadelphia; another 1,200 did the same at the second debate in San Francisco . . . About 60 people passed out leaflets in front of the South African consulate in San Francisco on Oct. 28 in a protest against Transkei independence organized by a coalition including the Bay Area Namibia Action Group. The group remains active in the Del Monte coalition which, among other things, is fighting the company’s importation of fish from Namibia.

Briefs . . . The Madison, Wisc. City Council passed an ordinance requiring the city to seek future contracts with corporations that don’t have ties in South Africa . . . New York and Chicago events to celebrate the first anniversary of Angolan independence each drew about 100 people. The highlight of the New York program was the premier of a slide-tape show, “A Vitoria e Certa”. . . . The National Lawyers Guild and the National Conference of Black Lawyers co-sponsored a program on liberation struggles and international law at New York University Law School on Dec. 2.
South African Government Releases Some Detainees

Shortly before the New Year holiday the South African government released 32 of the men and women being held in detention. All those released had been held under the Internal Security Act, some for as long as five months. As far as is known there are several hundred people still being held in detention, without charge, under various other of South Africa's security law. Among those released were several writers including reporter Peter Magubane and playwright Gibson Kente. Winnie Mandela, Nelson Mandela's wife, and Rashid Meer, son of noted sociologist Fatim Meer (also released) were among those immediately placed under arrest. Others have been placed under banning orders.

SASO Nine Found Guilty.

Nine members of the South Africa Students' Organization and the Black People's Convention were found guilty, December 15th, under the Terrorism Act, and were then sentenced on December 21st to prison terms ranging from five to ten years.

Judge Boshoff sentenced six of the nine to ten year terms for endangering public order with their advocacy of black rule, and for participating in banned rallies. The three others, convicted only of attending such rallies, were each given five years.

The trial lasted for 17 months but the nine had been in jail for even longer, having been arrested and held in detention in September and October 1974, after their participation in rallies celebrating FRELIMO's victory in Mozambique.

Charges went beyond the rallies, centering on the defendants' demands for the total liberation of black people in South Africa.

While the "liberal" press has hailed the "leniency" of the judgment, because the judge dismissed some prosecution charges, including one that the nine had conspired to bring about revolutionary change by violent means, it seems more relevant to note that ten years is a savage sentence, reflecting the South African regime's attempt to terrorize all opponents into silence. The trial amounted to a test of the limits of free speech, since the main thrust of the state's case against the accused rested on speeches and documents, not on actions.

United Nations Backs Armed Struggle in Namibia

By a 107-6 vote, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on December 20th, endorsing armed struggle by the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO. This is the first time the Assembly has explicity supported armed struggle, although it has in the past used such language as "by all means necessary". The US, Britain and France were among the few countries opposing the resolution.

ZIPA Comments on Geneva Conference.

Guardian reporter Wilfred Burchett interviewed Dzinase Machungura, ZIPA Deputy Political Commissar, as he was preparing to leave Geneva after the adjournment of the Geneva Conference. Machungura made it clear that he did not believe the future of the Zimbabwean people would be shaped in Geneva.

"The Geneva conference came about as a direct result of our armed struggle," he said. "We have to intensify that struggle. We are not just fighting for majority rule but for real national independence and the transfer of power to the Zimbabwean people. From the beginning of this year we stepped up our military activities, firstly by infiltrating small armed units equipped with only rifles and submachineguns. But as the fighting progressed we employed bigger units, platoon and then company-sized units, with better weapons.

"We have the total support of the mass of our people ... we are now preparing to go over to the strategic offensive, thanks to great support of the broad masses. We have reached the point where we no longer speak of 'support from the masses' but of their participation in the armed struggle.

"We have not yet created conditions to force the enemy to unconditional surrender, but we have paralyzed his supply lines and destroyed some of his strongholds in the countryside.... We are getting to the stage where we catch the enemy in the contradiction of whether to disperse his forces to hold territory or to concentrate them to prepare offensives against us. Smith is now forced to use tactical air support and use planes and helicopters to supply his dispersed garrison. Without air support Smith would already be lost, but we are starting to take a toll of his planes and helicopters...."

Concerning the future of the Patriotic Front, Machungura said, "It was a coincidence that this emerged just before the Geneva conference. Many [people] thought that this was only a tactical move. In fact we would like to develop a wider front—into a National United Front. ZANU and ZAPU are the two main national liberation groups. Now they have joined together from a political viewpoint, they have formed the nucleus of the future United Front. The Patriotic Front worked well during the Geneva conference and this is a good omen for future development."

No Solidarity with South African Workers form AFL-CIO

The AFL-CIO has refused to join an international trade union boycott against South Africa and Rhodesia. The Interna-
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