INSIDE:

- Soweto Student Speaks Out
- Conference of The Organization of Mozambican Women
GUINEA-BISSAU
Population .... 525,000
President .... Luis Cabral
Ruling party .... PAIGC
(African Independence Party of Guinea & Cape Verde Islands)
Independence date .... September 24, 1973

ANGOLA
Population .... 6,761,000
President .... Agostinho Neto
Ruling party .... MPLA
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
Independence date .... November 11, 1975

NAMIBIA
Population .... 883,000
Percent African .... 88%
Ruled by .... South Africa
Liberation group .... SWAPO
(South West Africa People's Organization)

SOUTH AFRICA
Population .... 25,471,000
Percent Black .... 81%
Prime Minister .... John Vorster
Liberation groups .... ANC
(African National Congress)
.... PAC
(Pan African Congress)

ZIMBABWE
Population .... 6,310,000
Percent African .... 95%
Prime Minister .... Ian Smith
Liberation groups .... ANC
(African National Congress)
.... ZANU
(Zimbabwe African National Union)
.... ZAPU
(Zimbabwe African People's Union)
ZANU and ZAPU united in Patriotic Front linked to ZIPA
(Zimbabwe People's Army)

MOZAMBIQUE
Population .... 9,239,000
President .... Samora Machel
Ruling party .... FRELIMO
(Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
Independence date .... June 25, 1975

Based on 1975 UN population figures
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Cover photo: Students demonstrate in Soweto
FBI TRAILS ‘TERRORISTS’ TO SOUTHERN AFRICA COMMITTEE

A legal tug-of-war, pitting the Southern Africa Committee against the FBI and the Justice Department, has moved out of stalemate with the recent release of Bureau investigative files on SAC.

This concession of ground—grudging because not all the files have been made available—came early in January and supposedly ends a two-year FBI investigation of the Committee.

Not yet terminated, however, is a legal action which Committee attorneys filed last year in Federal District Court here, seeking disclosure under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

Not Full Disclosure

In the current legal proceedings, the Committee maintains that the 57 pages of documents handed over to date do not represent the full disclosure to which we are entitled under the Act.

Firstly, there are numerous deletions in the documents that have been released. An FBI affidavit detailing the grounds for these deletions is likely to be the focus of considerable argument in the litigation to come.

Secondly, SAC attorneys have now made a demand that the Justice Department, and not just the FBI, release its files on the Committee.

Finally, there is the matter of additional FBI files which antedate March 11, 1975, the day on which the Justice Department officially instructed the FBI to find out if the Committee was in violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. None of these files have been released.

The Committee’s position is that the original request under the Freedom of Information Act asked for all documents relating to SAC. The FBI cannot be permitted to limit its disclosures to only those files which relate to the period of the Foreign Agents investigation.

Because—and here’s the rub—it would appear the FBI in New York has been investigating SAC intermittently and clandestinely for as long as six years!

Not only do the documents in our hands cite allegations of unnamed informants dated March 29 and Sept. 26, 1973, there is this revealing snippet of Bureau prose:

Inasmuch as investigation of the SAC since 1971 has failed to uncover any act of violence or terror on the part of the SAC in the United States...

This word “terror” appears throughout the 57 pages. It is the central and overriding obsession of the FBI. For its part, the Justice Department was revealed to be obsessed with determining if the Committee “may be receiving financial support from African sources.”

The twin obsessions resulted in a curious matrix of paranoia out of which evolved an investigation the two agencies managed to drag on for almost two years.

“Not Guilty” Yet

It was a painfully bureaucratic and incredibly unenterprising bit of sleuthing, involving intermittent exchanges of mail and telex between New York and Washington, which ultimately came to this Reductio Ad Absurdum, dated 12/14/76, from the office of the Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division):

The investigation to date has failed to demonstrate that the SAC is financed, subsidized, directed or controlled by a foreign principal...

It is recommended, therefore, that no further investigation be conducted. Division, however, will be interested in receiving any additional information which may indicate that the subject organization has an obligation to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

In other words, the Attorney General is saying “not proven,” but that the dark suspicion of foreign money will persist in his mind as long as there is “terror” in Africa.

Pro-terrorist Positions

The FBI is likely to preserve its interest in SAC because of the thinking revealed in the entries in the file that we have seen.

Southern Africa, according to the FBI, takes a pro-terrorist position in such countries as the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and South-West Africa. Collective members have made occasional trips to Africa to meet with terrorist activists. Committee organizers are also related to such groups as the American Committee on Africa [NYC]... whose members are also reported to be in contact with so-called liberation movement workers.

...The SAC is comprised of approximately 40 members in the New York area who agitate in favor of black terrorists in Africa. The Committee has supported terrorism in Africa for over ten years and now has a strong relationship to ‘Guinea-Bissau,’ a member of the UN having been taken over by some of those ‘liberation’ outfits. Money could be coming from this state, as well as Cape Verde, Mozambique and perhaps other black countries... who seem to value their propaganda contributions to the terrorist cause. The Committee is one of a network of groups which provide much support, both propaganda and material, to the subversive forces and anti-white activities in and of Africa.

Res ipsa loquitur—or, for those of us who are not lawyers—“The thing speaks for itself!”
CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF MOZAMBICAN WOMEN: GUARANTEERING THE CONTINUITY OF THE REVOLUTION

Mimi Edmunds

In November last year, over 200 members of the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) came together in Maputo to decide on the goals and strategies of the Organization in a new situation.

It was the first OMM conference to be held inside a free Mozambique. The founding conference, during the war against Portuguese colonial rule, had been held in Tanzania.

Mobilizing women to play a full role in the liberation struggle had been a long and complex process because Mozambican women had been so severely oppressed, both by colonialism and the values of traditional society.

The Conference last year recognized that the next stage, securing the complete emancipation of women so that they could play an unrestricted role in helping build "People's Power," would be even more difficult. Thus much effort was devoted to examining in detail the problems that still confront women in Mozambique, and assessing the extent of progress achieved by OMM so far.

Birth of OMM

The Organization of Mozambican Women was born out of the struggle to oust the Portuguese. Its seed lay in the earlier women's group, the Women's Detachment of Frelimo, formed in 1966. Primarily a military organization, the Women's Detachment's main tasks were to mobilize the population and to serve in the Frelimo army. As it grew, its impact was felt throughout the liberated zones.

By the early 1970s, with the success and expansion of the struggle on all fronts, Frelimo recognized the need for a mass organization to bridge the gap between the women in the army and the hundreds of thousands of Mozambican women, peasants and workers, who had remained on the periphery or beyond the reach of the liberation struggle.

In March, 1972, Frelimo cadres from the Central Committee, women delegates from every liberated zone, and members of the Women's Detachment met to form the OMM as a broad-based organization, seeking to incorporate women into the reconstruction of society envisioned in a new Mozambique.

Second Conference Meets

Now, three years later, the organization was meeting again, to draw up a concrete plan of action for the new phase of the struggle. The participants did not come unprepared. For months before, there had been discussions at the local level. At the Conference itself, delegates were divided into commissions to deal with issues in three major areas: statutes and programs of OMM; program of action; and specific and general problems of Mozambican women.

Discussion among the delegates was open, critical, and frank. President Machel set the tone, in opening the Conference with a realistic appraisal of OMM's failure to respond to the new situation created by the defeat of colonialism.

With the Transitional Government, OMM was opened to a new dimension. For the first time, it began to reach the occupied zones, the plantations, aldeamentos, urban areas... creating a great hope among women conscious of their oppression. But this enthusiasm grew faint and became general demobilization... because OMM had not analyzed the new situation and was unable to give an organized and correct response...

Delegates criticized the Organization for not initiating a stronger offensive to counter men's concept that the emancipation of women is only secondary. They criticized the leadership for not mobilizing large numbers of women after the first OMM Conference in 1973 and linked this to the failure to set up structures which could engage worker and peasant women. A third criticism was the Organization's failure to integrate cadre from the Women's Detachment into OMM. Delegates saw this as reflecting a level of consciousness in OMM that viewed women's activities as secondary and support tasks.

Problems Analyzed

Considerable time was spent analyzing the general problems affecting all women in Mozambique and the specific problems of women in the countryside or in the cities.

The greatest emphasis was given to peasant women, since they are the majority and represent, in the words of President Machel:

"The most elevated degree of oppression, backwardness and exploitation in our society... Reduced to the role of..."
being an object of pleasure, producer of children and subsistence for the family, unpaid worker at the service of the ‘head’ of the household, the man, she possesses a great revolutionary potential that the Mozambican revolution cannot do without.

Mozambican women in the rural areas knew colonialism as a system of direct repression. It was also the “force that tore her husbands and her sons from her for the degradation and misery of forced labor... Her inferior status was even more rigidly entrenched by the ideological values of traditional society. An infinite variety of practices sanctioned her subservience to men, including the ‘lobolo’ (brideprice), initiation rites, forced marriages and polygamy.

Conservative Traditions
These traditions persisted in every province of Mozambique, repressing the creative capacity of women by not permitting them to take part in discussions or decision-making. Furthermore, the peasant woman was taught to think only in the constraining terms of tribalism and regionalism.

Theresa, a member of the Women’s Detachment, spoke of the difficulties of mobilizing against such traditions:
Where it is normal for a man to have 4 or 5 women and for the marriage to take place during childhood, how are we going to tell them their women must be treated as equals? What if they send away all but one? Where will the others go? Maybe they won’t even want to go.

Other problems that she cited were mothers who believed their daughters should marry at 12 or younger; and the reluctance to send girls to school, since they are needed in the fields.

Transforming the Economy
One of the forces maintaining this reluctance to send children to school is the condition of Mozambique itself, a country whose basic form of production is subsistence agriculture, work done by women. The aim of the government is to transform this subsistence economy into organized, planned and collective agriculture.

By participating in this process, Mozambican women will play a direct role in transforming both the society and their place in society. It will be a lengthy process. It will be born from the practice of socially oriented work and from political participation. And it will be from the working women that active militants will emerge forming the cadre of OMM and Frelimo, for only they will carry the values of revolutionary society.

Planning the Future
Having examined the problems facing women throughout Mozambique, Conference delegates turned to planning strategies for the future. Delegates stressed that OMM must not be allowed to make only “small reforms that make less hard or more attractive the situation of women as second class citizens.” Instead, the Organization will struggle against the sexual division of labor and discrimination in production opportunities and its benefits, and for a greater role for women in making decisions for the society as a whole.

Resolutions were passed to ensure that Mozambican women be given equal opportunities to learn new techniques and new theoretical knowledge, to have access to the use of all machines, and above all, to participate in political structures, management and administration.

Constant stress was placed on the necessity that the emancipation of women be integrated into the larger context of national reconstruction. The aim of OMM was therefore to “engage women in erecting the material and ideological base for the construction of a socialist society.”

The principle of liberation both for men and for women lies in full participation in social production. To implement this principle OMM dedicated itself to ensuring that conditions are created in Mozambique so that the vast majority of women, in the countryside as well as the city, can leave the tasks which they have had so far as servants of small family units, to become workers integrated into the life of the community.

A Firm Commitment
OMM sees itself entering a new phase, following its Second Conference. The commitment to incorporate women into political life and leadership will be a difficult and lengthy process. But it is believed that “the consciousness of women about their own dignity, which they must defend, is a class consciousness,” and, according to President Machel:

... It will be born from the practice of socially oriented work and from political participation. And it will be from the working women that active militants will emerge forming the cadre of OMM and Frelimo, for only they carry the values of revolutionary society.

Perhaps the best statement of the nature of the commitment inspired by this conference came from one of the delegates, a member of the Women’s Detachment, who saw the struggle not for herself, but for those who will follow:

It will be a lengthy process. It doesn't advance the struggle much to speak of equality between men and women, if the woman has no possibility of realizing this equality. But perhaps her children will have. We are doing our best here to ensure that they do.
Nkosazana Dlamini is the Vice President of SASO (South African Students Organization) and a member of the ANC underground inside South Africa.

She left the country last September after weeks spent evading a police search, by moving from room to room in the men's hostels of Natal University. She had one narrow escape: she was arrested for trespass, but gave a false name, was fined ten Rand, and released as one more routine "offender" caught in the relentless machine of repression.

Nkosazana, when she escaped, was the only member of SASO's executive not in detention. She was born in Pietermaritzburg, Natal, in 1949. She lived with her family in Glebelands location, Durban, and attended primary school there.

Her family was moved out when Glebelands was turned into a bachelors quarters, and they were taken to Umlazi—the "Soweto" of Durban. She went to high school at Amanzimtoti training college (formerly Adams College), and took her BSc in zoology at the University of Zululand. She was in her fifth year in medical school at Wentworth, becoming a doctor, when the uprising began.

The following are excerpts from an interview which will appear in the next issue of Sechaba, official organ of the ANC of South Africa, and is published here by special permission of Sechaba.

**SOWETO STUDENT SPEAKS OUT**

**INTERVIEW WITH NKOAZANA DLAMINI, VICE PRESIDENT OF SASO**

The ferment among young people reached a head just as exams were coming close. Did you not feel worried about getting politically active at this time, and upsetting your exams?

DLAMINI: Well, when the June incidents came I was already involved. In fact they broke in the middle of our half-yearly exams—but all the students decided they were not going to continue. I just found myself getting on with my political work. I knew that if it came to the crux I would have to leave the country. But there was no point in leaving what I had started just for a degree. Even if I passed the degree I would still suffer the same oppression. It was a feeling that to make something of education—or anything else—there must be a complete political change. We all felt that we should rather concentrate on getting the people mobilized and politicized to bring political change, before we can enjoy education.

The only thought I had was for my parents. You know how important it is for them, if they are putting you through medical school. But the police started harrassing them, even before I left the country, so fortunately there were with me. Thousands of parents came to feel the same way, that the struggle was the only alternative.

There is an argument, as expressed by Gatsha Buthelezi [Chief Minister of the Kwazulu bantustan, Ed.], that it is against your own interests to be militant against these institutions because they are helping you. What do you feel about that?

DLAMINI: I think that's totally wrong. The kind of education we get would not advance anybody. It is meant to create a reservoir of cheap labour, to exploit the people! The idea is to equip us to take instructions from our white rulers, and to cope with the economic demands of the country. It is not to advance us as a nation. The buildings burned were government buildings, symbols of oppression—and there were also bantustan buildings burned—which shows how the people really reject these "homelands."

Is the feeling against Gatsha Buthelezi and his group very strong among the people of Zululand and Natal?

DLAMINI: Yes—very strong. When he first came up some people were not quite
sure, because he had been known before as a militant politician. He himself said he was only taking up a position in the Bantustan framework to prove to the world that the Bantustans are a sham. So some thought: we cannot dismiss him.

Recently people have seen him for what he is. He has gone out of the country and canvassed for foreign investments for KwaZulu. His party Inkatha met with very strong criticism when it was called Inkatha KwaZulu. People felt it was very wrong to start a purely ethnic movement. They have come to realize that one of the main reasons for their defeat in the past was that they were fighting in small ethnic groups—Xhosa wars, Zulu wars and so on. So they suspect anyone who tries to put one tribal group against another.

When the present uprising started he said that the policy should deal with the students, and that he would organize vigilante groups to counteract the students.

All this has lost him the little support he had. In May there was a big demonstration against him at the University of Zululand when he accepted an honorary degree. Once in Soweto he could draw quite a crowd. Last July he could not even hold a meeting—there was nobody.

Why in your view was there this sudden rallying over the education issue in June, and then this sustained heroic militant action by the people everywhere? How do they remain so resilient?

DLAMINI: One reason why it has been sustained is that there has, in fact, been a great deal of political work going on before, which brought out the pre-conditions before the outbreak. The June incidents sparked off something among the people who were really prepared and determined to carry on the struggle. Lots of people who left the country did not do so to apply for asylum as refugees. They left determined to acquire the necessary skills to fight, and to help the people in their struggle.

To show that much of the work which has been done has come from the ANC—almost everybody who leaves the country looks for the ANC. They know where to go, they know who is going to give them the necessary skills to overthrive the regime.

As for the older people, they are staying and getting some education in the role they can play as workers in the struggle. Especially in South Africa, we don’t need everybody to be a fighter with a gun.

Even initially, during the peaceful demonstrations, parents supported the pupils. It was they who opposed the original introduction of Bantu Education, and the forced introduction of Afrikaans as a medium revived their original rejection of the system.

But what really thrust the parents into action was the brutal police killings. The police had always been ruthless with peaceful demonstrators, but nobody expected the cold-blooded murder of young children. So besides their solidarity with young people they were angered—and their hatred and rejection of the whole system came to the surface. They were completely with the students in their militancy. Even the workers’ strikes were very successful.

At one point the government tried to use Zulu migrant workers against the demonstrators. What was your view of what happened?

DLAMINI: The government and police were taking advantage for instance of Gatsha Buthelezi’s statement that he was going to organize vigilante groups against the demonstrators. There is evidence that the police went to the township hostels and agitated the inmates. There is also evidence that most people who took part in the “anti-riots” were not really hostel dwellers, but disguised policemen, transported to the scene in police ears.

White policemen were heard giving instructions like “don’t destroy the buildings, kill the people only.” Obviously they were trying to reduce the whole thing to look like a tribal faction fight.

Do organizations like SASO and PBC (Black People’s Convention) still have a role to play? What should that role be? How should they work?

DLAMINI: I think they still have a role. They should concentrate on trying to break the racial and tribal barriers between different oppressed groups.

How do they go about doing this?

DLAMINI: We have lots of community projects ranging from literacy training to home industries, legal aid and medical aid. When we carry out these programs we also explain to the people why it is they have to be taught basic reading at their age, why they always fall on the wrong side of the law, why their medical services are so poor in other words, how they are affected by the system.

We explain to Africans that Indians and Coloreds are paid more so that the oppressor will be able to divide different sectors of the oppressed people, so they will see their interests as different, and not fight against the oppressor in a group.

At our work camps we give talks too. We explain when we are with Colored people why the whites seem to be favoring them—it is not that the whites see them as better, but just part of the
whole process of divide and rule; in fact they are just as affected as the Africans.

As medical students we ran clinics among all three black groups. Indian, African and Colored students would go as a team into African, Colored and Indian ghettos to demonstrate that we can all work together to help each other, and we can fight the enemy together. So people begin to see each other as part of an exploited, oppressed group.

In the future, do you think the struggle will take a direction which shows that the people are understanding who the real enemy is?

DLAMINI: Yes—the whole theme of the last SASO conference was the socio-economic structure of the country. There were many commissions to discuss how to explain to the people that the problem lies in the socio-economic structure rather than in racial differences. We felt we could do this, because we now have solidarity. We have consciousness. If we had tried to explain to an apathetic man: the white man is not your problem as such, your problem is capitalism and imperialism—he wouldn't have known what we were talking about. Now that they are with us—the student body and the mass of people—it is easier to explain the fundamental problems of our struggle in South Africa.

There is lots of literature, some of which is being simplified to reach the ordinary person, with the facts. Some of it is coming from SASO, some through ANC underground.

In recent weeks you have been around Britain and in Europe. You have seen and addressed a number of support movements. If you had just five minutes to sum up the most important things for our Western supporters to realize, and to do, what would you say?

DLAMINI: They should understand, first and foremost, that our struggle is not really a racial struggle, that we are more concerned about the socio-economic structure.

They have to stop their governments and others from any form of contact or collaboration with South Africa.

They must understand that the ANC is the answer to our struggle. The people inside cannot alone bring about effective change. They need the leadership of the ANC for an armed struggle—which is the only answer.

How do you see the present uprising in the context of the struggle that has been going on over the last few generations?

DLAMINI: I think what is happening now is at quite an advanced stage. The people are fighting at a national level, responding nationally to something which originally affected a smaller group, in one place. Now, if you take the Bambata rebellion—those people were revolting against the poll tax, but the revolt never spread around the nation.

I would say also that people are more united: something which affects one section is taken up by others. Even white students demonstrated in solidarity. This was quite a step forward.

The way the resistance has been sustained shows that our people are more determined. Also, in the past, students have demonstrated alone and workers never joined them, while workers have struck and students never realized that the strike was part of the national struggle. Now, people have got together.

Also, many people have realized they have got to go out of the country to join the ANC so that they can train and return to fight.

Do you think the regime will buy over a small group who will seize the chance to make money out of the situation, and form the core of a bourgeoisie in the Bantustans?

DLAMINI: Well, it might happen, but the only people who would benefit are a few cabinet ministers and a few businessmen. They look towards the “homelands" because that is where they can develop their interests and make money. They are the only ones supporting the Bantustan policy. The rest of the people are not. Maponya, Soweto's only millionaire, went to stay in an international hotel in Johannesburg during the Soweto uprisings because he was afraid the people might harm him. He was quite aware that the people no longer identify their enemies by their skin.

I don't think the regime has time to build up a bourgeoisie, because the people are already determined to fight. Maybe if they had started much earlier . . .

Would you say that in South Africa in general, the people's strengthening resistance is really the white government's own fault—because through Bantu Education, they have tried to force an obviously inferior and oppressive form of education on the people—and it is bouncing back on them?

DLAMINI: If you look at the earlier generations—those who were educated under the more British type of system, you will see that they tended to be more on the passive side. They seemed to feel they could be assimilated into the British way of life. But Bantu Education spells everything out—and now it's coming back to hit the people who introduced it!

I think if we had been left with the British type of education, a middle class might have been created by now. But Bantu Education has made the lines of confrontation sharper.
POLICY REVIEW IN PROGRESS

Later this month, Andrew Young and the Carter administration will face their first major test at the United Nations. The new US ambassador will be chairing the Security Council, and the UN African Group is scheduled to introduce a series of resolutions aimed at further isolating the white South African regime.

Young and President Jimmy Carter are on record as strongly opposed to economic sanctions against South Africa. They have said they want US corporations to play a "constructive role" in eradicating the country's racial problems. But the administration is also trying to repair US relations with Africa and would like to avoid the vetoes Republican administrations have used when faced with sanctions proposals at the United Nations.

According to Young, his Africa trip last month was designed to let him hear what African leaders had to say about the US role on the continent, and in southern Africa in particular. Front line presidents Nyerere, Kaunda, and Neto told him that since Smith has refused to bargain at Geneva, the British should reopen talks with the Zimbabwe nationalists and work out a transfer of legal power to them.

Young heard similar suggestions from Nigerian head-of-state Obasanjo, during what turned out to be a surprisingly cordial chat—given tensions in US-Nigerian relations over the last two years. But Obasanjo warned Young that the new administration must act quickly and decisively to back up its pledges of support for majority rule in Rhodesia, or relations with Africa will once again deteriorate.

Crisis for Carter?

The gist of the message that Young brought back to Carter is that the escalating problems of southern Africa could easily erupt into a major foreign policy crisis for the US. But the complexities facing administration officials are substantial.

A major southern Africa policy review has been underway in Washington for weeks now. It parallels in importance the 1969 study prepared in response to Kissinger’s now famous National Security Study Memorandum 39. Major responsibility for drafting the Carter review fell to the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, whose new director, Tony Lake, is a former Kissinger aide who resigned to protest the Cambodian invasion. Since then, he has prepared a major report on US compliance with Rhodesian sanctions for the Carnegie Endowment (The “Tar Baby” Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia.)

Policy Options

There appear to be various options being discussed for each southern African territory. On Rhodesia, Young returned from Africa with a proposal aimed at getting the stalled Geneva talks going again through a consultation among Britain, the US and the front-line states, plus Nigeria and Zaire.

Also under discussion is a request from Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere that the US give at least tacit recognition to the Patriotic Front, the group which recently won front-line state recognition as the legitimate representatives of the Zimbabwe people.

Some planners are also looking at actions which might topple the Salisbury regime by, for example, pressuring American oil companies to cut off Rhodesia’s oil supply. The “oil option” would have to be implemented in concert with Britain and The Netherlands, whose corporations are also suppliers to Rhodesia. More modest ideas under review include tightening sanctions in several areas and closing the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington (which, since the French government shut down the Paris office in January, is...
Andrew Young (left) meets with President Julius Nyerere on his recent Africa trip

the only official Rhodesia agency in formal operation outside Rhodesia and South Africa. Other possibilities under discussion relating to South Africa include the appointment of a black ambassador to Pretoria, the curtailing of intelligence information exchanges and the reduction of the number of US military attaches posted to South Africa.

**SWAPO Recognition or Not?**

On Namibia, most of the discussion revolves around the US attitude towards SWAPO, the South West African People's Organization. In his meetings with the liberation movement, Young has indicated a readiness to give it full diplomatic backing—in contrast to Kissinger's designation of SWAPO as "one of the important political elements." But SWAPO leaders are still cautious about the US attitude.

Recognition of SWAPO would certainly displease South Africa Prime Minister John Vorster, who has flatly rejected direct negotiations with SWAPO. That conflict exemplifies the dilemma which the new administration has created for itself. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has thus far been careful to maintain the cooperative diplomatic effort with Pretoria worked out by Kissinger. Immediately after his appointment by Carter, Vance met with South African ambassador Botha and received him again soon after taking office. Now that Botha has been named minister John Vorster, who has flatly rejected direct negotiations with SWAPO, the US is likely to maintain the cooperative diplomatic effort with Pretoria, the curtailing of intelligence information exchanges and the reduction of the number of US military attaches posted to South Africa.

**US AT THE UN—A HORRIBLE RECORD**

The 31st General Assembly of the United Nations was a landmark session for southern Africa. There were more resolutions passed, dealing with its problems, than ever before, and each of the 37 resolutions passed received the approval of the overwhelming majority of the nations represented.

Not only the number, but the content of the resolutions indicated growing world concern regarding events in the area. There was a move towards more forceful and thorough condemnation of apartheid, the racist regimes and the countries maintaining co-operative relations with them. There was a stronger demand for mandatory sanctions against South Africa, and for fuller material and political support for the liberation movements.

Of the 37 resolutions affecting southern Africa, 12 passed without a roll-call vote. By the end of the 1976 session, the US had compiled a unique record: it was the only country that did not vote "yes" on a single one of the 25 resolutions put to a roll-call vote.

African countries gave particularly strong support to the resolutions, many, including Tanzania and Zaire, voting in favor of all 25. The US, on the other hand, abstained 13 times, voted against 10 times, didn't vote twice and never cast a vote in favor.

At one point in the session US Ambassador Scranton claimed that the US "has followed a consistent policy of support for African solutions to African problems . . . " Given the way the US voted this statement makes particularly strange reading.
Byrd Repeal More Likely

Congressman John Dent, one of the staunchest Congressional advocates of the Byrd Amendment, announced the first week of February that he has changed his position. Although Dent cited "recent technological innovations" in the stainless steel industry which actually occurred some three years ago as making Rhodesian chrome no longer indispensable, his real argument is that the US can now depend more heavily on imports of ferrochrome from South Africa, where a new Union Carbidie processing plant will go on stream this year.

The stainless steel industry may still put up a fight, and reversing the 1975 22-vote House defeat will probably require some lobbying by the Carter White House. So far, Vance and Young have made strong statements for repeal. But the test will come in mid-March when Carter must decide whether to use his "chips" in Congress on this issue in the midst of larger fights over his economic program and the new budget.

Diggs Regains Africa Chair

Congressman Charles Diggs of Michigan is once again chairman of the resurrected Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations Committee. This and other regional subcommittees have been upgraded from their predecessors of two years ago which had only oversight authority. This session, the regional subcommittees will get legislative jurisdiction over economic and military aid to their regions. This will give Diggs not only his traditional platform for holding hearings on southern Africa, but also give him first crack on issues such as economic aid to hard-pressed Zaire and possible arms sales to Kenya.

US Considering Aid To Angolan Refugees

The United States is considering making a major contribution to the Angolan relief project of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It appears likely that the US may supply about 25% of the total projected cost of $48 million, but questions of how the proposed relief program would be implemented are still under consideration.

AAI HOLDS CONFERENCE IN LESOTHO

The African-American Institute, the New York-based private organization that conceives itself with "African-American understanding and further African development," concluded its seventh African-American Conference recently. Co-chaired by Senator Dick Clark and Lesotho Foreign Minister Charles D. Molapo, the week-long series of open and closed sessions was held in late November and December in Maseru, Lesotho. This year's timely title was "1976 and 1977: New Directions in African-American Relations."

The series of sessions included four closed sessions—on Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zaire, and Angola. There were also several public sessions and "working groups" that followed the closed sessions. Despite handicaps engendered by the current pace of liberation struggles in the nations discussed, there was apparently a broad range of African opinion represented. But some sessions suffered. According to AAI officials, for example, SWAPO representatives were unable to attend the closed sessions on Namibia because of the danger of flying over South Africa to reach landlocked Maseru.

AAI has had a curious, semi-public history since it was founded in Washington 24 years ago. The main sources of AAI funding are the US government and major corporations. In 1975 AAI spent over $5 million on its various programs, more than $3 million coming from AID and the State Department. The list of former and current members of AAI's board of directors runs to executives of large US corporations, media organizations, university faculties, law firms, and fund raising organizations. This seventh conference was itself funded by the Ford and Carnegie foundations, both of which have representatives on AAI's board.

As one US delegate to the conference explained in a subsequent interview with Southern Africa, the organization also "suffers from the fact that some years back it had been identified as having had some connection with the CIA." For this reason, many US delegates to the conference approached their invitations to meet with African leaders "cautiously." And certainly the State Department view of current African-American relations and their direction was amply represented. Included on the list of prominent black and white Americans were several Congressmen, former Georgia Representative Andrew Young, the Carter Administration's new ambassador to the UN, and a number of State Department officials, the most prominent of whom was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William E. Schaufele.

AAI has worked hard to act as a bridge between "liberal" Americans and important African government and liberation movement leaders. Many Africans seem to view its annual African Conference as serving as dual purpose: functioning as a channel for African opinion and providing Africans with an opportunity to confront the main lines of US policy toward the continent. "There was not a variety of viewpoints represented," said Bob Brown, an attending American, Director of the Black Economic Research Center in New York. "You might say that the whole conference was characterized by the Africans chastising the Americans for having such a lousy policy in southern Africa, and the Americans responding, 'You're right.'" But such agreement by US officials apparently did not represent significant departures from US policy plans. Young, for example, tended to agree with the African assessment, but he did so in the context of his often-voiced opinion that US economic involvement should continue along its present course and become a force for "rational" change.
The exceptions to this pattern were the representatives from the State Department. Assistant Secretary Schaufele, for one, found himself in a heated defense of the extent of US covert operations in Angola last year. “At one of the sessions it had been stated that the US had had an aircraft carrier in southern African waters,” a US delegate said, in apparent reference to NATO contingency plans to launch a sea attack on Luanda last winter in coordination with the movements of South African groundtroops. That statement made Schaufele very unhappy.

“The other thing that aroused Schaufele and the State Department people,” this delegate continued, “was the issue of the AID contract to the African-American Scholars Council. That had been mentioned in the Johannesburg papers the day that we arrived in Lesotho, and one speaker brought it up as evidence of the US intention to conspire with the minority regimes in southern Africa. (The AID study appears designed to support existing economic relations in Namibia and Zimbabwe.) The State Department people got very upset at that.”

This year’s meeting may ultimately have served somewhat inadvertently to inject greater realism into African perceptions of US policy objectives under the administration of President Carter. Many moderate Africans responded to criticism of US policy by saying that “with Carter things will be different,” said Brown. And he added: “The American response to this tended to be one of caution, many Americans present saying ‘Don’t count it.’”

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Among corporate donors to AAI in 1975 were these major investors in South Africa:

- Bankers Trust Company
- Bethlehem Steel Corporation
- Caterpillar Tractor Company
- The Chase Manhattan Bank N.A.
- Chemical Bank
- Exxon Corporation
- Ford Motor Company Fund
- General Electric Company
- General Motors Corporation
- IBM World Trade Corporation
- Leon Tempelsman & Son, Inc.
- United States Steel Corporation

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South Africa

SOUTH AFRICA BRACES FOR GUERRILLA WAR

There is no doubt that the Republic can expect terror crossing from Mozambique and Botswana in the future. The police are aware of what is going on in those two countries and the situation is being closely watched.

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Jimmy Kruger
Minister of Police and Justice
December, 1976

The resistance by students has not abated. There are continuing strikes, examinations have been boycotted, and students are organizing support among the rest of the black population. And so the round of arrests, interrogations and torture continues as the South African government tries to put a stop to the protests.

Against this backdrop a new pattern is emerging. Guerrilla activity has begun. The South African government—the military in particular—is taking steps to try and counteract this new, and in the long run, most dangerous threat to the apartheid regime.

By printing reports in Afrikaans newspapers which describe African National Congress guerrilla training camps in Mozambique, the regime is trying to prepare the public for a new onslaught against resisters, a new level of oppression. The reports speak of hundreds of Africans already in the camps which, it is alleged, were set up after the Soviet Union put pressure on the Mozambique government. Whether the reports are true or simply propaganda is unclear as the ANC has neither confirmed nor denied them. What is clear is that weapons are now more readily available. Mfanafuthi Makatine, a member of the ANC executive, has stated that these are now available to the movement through the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity.

The military threat to the apartheid regime is no longer just potential. It is very real. In Namibia, SWAPO guerrilla activity is increasing, and the South African defense force has let it be known that it is expecting a hard time.

We have information that SWAPO is preparing to attack South West Africa on a scale unequaled before. They plan to strike deep into the territory and even penetrate white areas.

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Jannie de Wet
South Africa’s Commissioner for South West Africa

South Africa becoming militarily involved in Rhodesia, said evasively, “we will not take part in any operation in neighboring countries without Parliament first taking a decision on it.”

Bombs and Arson

In South African itself the government is facing major problems. A man was killed and five were injured when a house in Soweto blew up in early January. The house is believed to have been a bomb factory. The five injured men were detained and, according to Jimmy Kruger, Minister of Police and Justice, the incident led to the arrests of top leaders of the ANC underground.

On the same day a bomb planted on a railway line south of Johannesburg exploded after a worker who discovered it attempted to move it. A train was due to pass along the line shortly after the bomb was detonated. Police are encouraging the idea that the ANC is responsible.

And police have arrested 32 people in Langa, an African township outside Cape Town, and charged them with arson for attacks on six schools in which over $1700 worth of damage was done. They are all alleged members of the “Comrades Movement,” a new political movement in the Cape. Seventeen of those arrested were picked up in a church, where they had apparently been hiding for some time.

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That very night attacks were made against six more schools in Langa causing over $2300 worth of damage. Other incidents have been reported and according to Jimmy Kruger over 80 “trained terrorists” have been arrested in the last two months.

More Government Powers
To meet this new situation of insecure borders and urban guerrilla warfare, the government has moved in several ways. A bill has been introduced into parliament that empowers the Minister of Defense to direct members of the army, navy or airforce to “activate civil protection” in emergencies. Emergencies include riots, disasters, influx of refugees or sabotage. Up until now the military has not been used in suppressing the uprisings.

Another bill grants police immunity for their actions provided they acted in “good faith.” Since the bill is back dated to June 16, 1976, this effectively clears police of the killings during the uprising and will abort several civil prosecutions in which blacks have accused police of assault and damage to property.

More Troops Needed
The South African government has also moved to extend the military manpower available to it. The Minister of Defense P.W. Botha has called for volunteers for the South African army in preparation for “the contingency of mobilization.” Mr. Botha has warned that compulsory military service may be extended 18 months or two years. Under the current system all able-bodied white men must serve for a year, then three months a year for the next five years. After that all enter the National Reserves until age 65. Even now recruits doing their year service often end up on the Angola/Namibia border.

South Africa is also extending its military manpower by establishing its first squadron of women pilots. The Commando Squadron for Women consists of 20 pilots and five observers who will be used mainly for casualty evacuation and communications flights.

Further, the number of “coloured” recruits has increased by over 24 per cent in the last year. Also the government is strengthening its civil defense units. These units consist of both men and women in the white suburbs. They are setting up training courses, drawing upon their lists of those with guns. There is one gun for every four whites and gun sales have increased dramatically since June.

Weapons Sought
South Africa is also increasing its conventional weapons strength. South Africa has purchased from Israel six long-range gun boats equipped with surface-to-surface missels, which also contain US parts. Scheduled for delivery over the next few years, the total value of these items is $150 million. This comes close to the total worth of French arms sales to South Africa from 1965 to 1974, which totalled $224 million.

South Africa has become increasingly self-sufficient in arms production over the years. Most recently, the South African Air Force announced many of its aircraft will be equipped with a new missile developed in South Africa. It was not disclosed whether this new missile is air-to-air or air-to-surface.

This increased self-sufficiency is largely due to a technology transfer that has taken place with foreign investment. A recent example is a new electronics factory built jointly by the South African Calan group and Tadiran Israel Electronic Industries. Tadiran is the world’s largest manufacturer of tactical military communications equipment and is one of Israel’s fastest expanding industries.

Another example is the British electronics firm Racal, which sells to the South African military. Equipment manufactured by Racal was recently found on jeeps captured from Rhodesia in its recent attacks on Mozambique. Racal is also associated with the US company Milgo, operating as the joint company, Racal-Milgo, which also does business with South Africa.

Many countries such as France claim that the weapons they sell are purely “defensive” and can not be used to suppress domestic dissent. However, it is clear that these weapons can be used to attack those countries that border on South Africa, such as Mozambique and Angola.

There is an increasing lack of confidence in South Africa by foreign investors. The combination of economic problems and the uprisings have changed an average monthly capital inflow from $184 million in 1975 to a monthly outflow of $4.6 million in the third quarter of 1976. Yet despite economic problems, the government is expected to increase the defense budget this year from some $460 million to over $2 billion.

Despite South Africa’s strengths, its weaknesses are beginning to take their toll. And the real battle has yet to begin.
MORE BANTUSTANS, MORE MISERY

Bophuthatswana will become the second "independent" Bantustan on December 6, 1977, according to the South African government. Bophuthatswana, "homeland" of the Tswanas, consists of six small disconnected pieces of land.

With independence Bophuthatswana will get an "army" of about 250, trained by the South African army, to help keep the population in line.

In a foretaste of the policies that can be expected from a South African imposed black government, Bophuthatswana's Chief Minister, Lucas Mangope, has announced that the cost of rebuilding the schools that were burned down in the recent anti-apartheid protests will have to be born by students and teachers. Teachers will each be required to pay $5.75 and parents must contribute $23.00 before their children will be readmitted to school. Average monthly African household income in South Africa in 1975 was $85 and in the Bantustans it is considerably lower than that.

Parents are also being forced to sign a form agreeing to pay the cost of any future damage to schools or government buildings. Migrant workers have been refused the papers that would enable them to work in Johannesburg until they pay the $23 school levy.

The threat of denial of work papers is a major one. Of the 1.6 million "official population" of Bophuthatswana, over two thirds live on a permanent basis in the "white" areas. Even people who live in the Bantustan usually earn their living outside, working as migrant laborers or commuters to so-called border industries. Less than 10 per cent of the income earned by Bophuthatswana's "citizens" is earned inside the Bantustan.

Bantustan "independence" undercuts even the very limited rights that Africans now have when they are regarded as South Africans, the right to live or work in "white" areas.

THE POOR GET STILL POORER

The specter of poverty haunts South Africa, according to the South African Financial Mail of November 19, 1976. The magazine reports on the latest survey of living costs, called the Household Subsistence Level (HSL) — formerly the Poverty Datum Line, compiled by Professor Johann Potgieter of the University of Port Elizabeth.

The magazine contrasts the results of the survey of living costs with various government wage statistics in various fields and a 1975 survey by Market Research Africa on African household incomes. These surveys are summarized in the tables below. Only one employment field (banking) provides income above the Household Subsistence Level for African families. Only 11.1 percent of African households earned more than $172 per month, somewhat above the Household Subsistence Level. And strikingly, 22.5 percent of the African households, almost one quarter, earned less than $23 per month.

All figures are in dollars, at the conversion rate of 1 Rand = $1.15.

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Transkei Refugees

So great was African resistance to independence that over 40,000 people have fled the Transkei since October and are living in desperate conditions in the neighboring Ciskei Bantustan. Most refugees are from two districts, Glen Gray and Herschel, areas that were part of the Ciskei Bantustan until last year, when they were transferred to Transkeian jurisdiction.

The number of refugees is growing fast and most are crowded into a small area, Thornhill, once a farm owned by a single farmer. "It is a fair estimate to say that within the next four months there will be over 100,000 people in the area. And with 40,000 people already herded together, who is going to solve their predicament?" said Lennox Sebe, Chief Minister of the Ciskei. There is no water at the site, nor are there any sanitary facilities or houses for people to live in. Most critically, there is no food. People are starving and, therefore, are especially susceptible to the types of diseases that flourish in unsanitary conditions.

Many people have already died. In January Dr. H. J. Coldham, Ciskei Secretary of Health, told reporters he had counted only 69 graves. Reporters counted 111, even though their access was limited. Many children have died of gastro-enteritis.

Unemployment is a large problem and will continue to be for some time. When Glen Gray and Herschel became part of the Transkei, Africans were told that if they wanted to move they would be given land which the government would buy and release to the Ciskei. Thus, those who opted to move expected to survive as farmers.

However, it is clear that the South African government had no idea that so many people would rush to leave the "independent" Transkei. The South African government has frequently promised to buy land for Africans to increase, however slightly, the size of the Bantustans. But it has been slow to fulfill these promises.

Clearly South Africa is facing major problems in its Bantustan program. And most of the problems stem from the massive opposition of the black majority.

Zimbabwe

SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY RUNS OUT OF GAS

Ivor Richard's three-week safari across southern Africa ended in failure recently, when Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith announced, on Jan. 25, his rejection of the new British proposals for a transitional government in Rhodesia. Richard undertook his travels following a "recess" in the talks in Geneva. When the recess came, it was clear that the talks were stalemated. Richard's journeys were an attempt to break through this stalemate.

He went to the subcontinent armed with a series of new British "proposals" that were to replace those of former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Richard's scheme entailed a greater British involvement in the transition phase.

Britain announced its willingness to play a "direct role" in an interim government in Rhodesia immediately following meetings between Kissinger and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland. Crosland explained London's willingness in an address to the European Parliament in Luxembourg in January. If the Geneva talks break down, he said, the guerrilla war would intensify.

The Kissinger and Crosland objective was to arrive at a moderate solution before a far more radical solution imposes itself.

Council of Ministers

The new proposals were to substitute for the two-tier, white-dominated governing councils of the Kissinger plan, a 30-member Council of Ministers composed of five Rhodesian Front members, five other Rhodesian Whites, and 20 Blacks, appointed by the black delegations. Decisions would be made by a two-thirds majority.

A British Resident Commissioner would chair the council, and he would have a vote that could be used to block any decision taken by the council.

The two other crucial interim bodies, also chaired by the Resident Commissioner, would be drawn from this council. The first would be a Constitutional Commission, given the task of drafting a constitution. The second continued on page 19
REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY

During the month in which International Women's Day is celebrated, we can look back to International Women's Year and see that it gave little impetus to the emancipation of women.

There are countries, however, where the liberation of women has made substantial progress. Despite the serious problems that the women of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau are confronting, this fight—which began with the mobilization for the armed struggle—continues to be taken seriously.

While March 8th will be celebrated with enthusiasm in these countries, the issue is not forgotten at the end of the day. That day is symbolic of an ideology which sees the liberation of women as fundamental to the revolution, and is implicit in the programs of FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC. "We cannot have a successful revolution without the full participation of women," are the words of Amilcar Cabral. This idea is spelled out even more forthrightly by President Samora Machel when he says "the liberation of women is a fundamental necessity for the revolution, a guarantee of its continuity and a pre-condition for its victory."

These statements are significant as they do not simply say that women are needed for the revolution. Rather they stress that the revolution itself would be meaningless, in fact could not happen unless women are liberated in the process. Women cannot be liberated in isolation.

The issue was not set aside to be taken up after independence. Neither is the view held that women will automatically be "free" once the society has become socialist.

Since the beginning of the armed struggle continuing efforts have been made to transform theory into practice. There have been some variations in this practice, but in general it has encompassed women fighting in the army, political education and organization aimed at changing attitudes of both men and women, laws passed to protect women, encouraging women to take on greater responsibility and become leaders at all levels of the party and state.

This has not ended with independence. The tasks ahead are enormous. No longer is there a visible, easily definable enemy in the form of Portuguese colonialism to provide a focal point for mobilization of the people. Except for Guinea-Bissau, the population in the liberated zones was considerably smaller than the population in the Portuguese-controlled areas. And so, in terms of the liberation of women, the struggle to create a new consciousness begins all over again—with one important difference. The experience gained and the progress made during the long years of the war will give tremendous impetus to the continuing fight.

It is important for women of the West to show strong solidarity with the women's struggle in these newly independent countries. At this point, there are still areas in which understanding needs to be deepened on both sides. In a recent speech, President Machel warns women in Mozambique against using the women's movement in the West as a model, for, he says, they regard men as the enemy. While this may be true of certain aspects of the women's movement in the United States, it is not true among anti-imperialist women.

At the same time there is much that women in this country can learn from the revolutionary struggles in the ex-Portuguese colonies, for they graphically demonstrate the interconnection between the women's struggle and the fight to transform the whole society.
A UNION BOYCOTT OF SOUTH AFRICA gained considerable support in some Western countries. The week-long action in mid-January called by the Geneva-based International Confederation of Free Trade Unions prompted affiliated unions in Italy to refuse to service aircraft bound for South Africa, and dockworkers in several countries refused to handle cargo to and from South Africa. Some postal workers in France declined to handle mail and telephone communications with South Africa, but a similar action planned by British postal workers was called off after a challenge by a citizens’ group brought an unfavorable court ruling.

The AFL-CIO refused to join the action but the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) on the West Coast did support the action calling on all its members to “make effective for the entire week of January 17 an official boycott on all cargoes to and from South Africa.

Most of South Africa’s white unions condemned the boycott, saying it would harm blacks, but several black unions expressed appreciation.

South Africa increased its borrowings in Europe by 32%, to $830 million, in 1976. Most of the money came in the form of medium-term floating-rate syndicated loans, since the long-term bond markets were all but closed to South Africa owing to the uncertain political climate... French investments in South Africa have doubled since 1970 to about $800 million.

Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, head of Inkatha, a rural-based African movement claiming 70,000 members, is reported to have been discussing a loose alliance with the white liberal opposition Progressive Reform Party. Buthelezi also recently traveled to Nigeria, at the Nigerian government’s expense, where he met with Oliver Tambo, exiled leader of the African National Congress.

Inkatha, whose price urban center is Durban and which has been expanding its membership among non-Zulus, has started putting out a newspaper for which it is seeking foreign financial assistance.

In addition to a growing number of directly political trials, between 4,250 and 5,000 people have been charged with offenses relating to the demonstrations and confrontations begun in June last year. Charges include arson, public disorder, sabotage and other offenses.

Some 1,400 cases were decided by the end of last year and more than half of the sentences involved corporal punishment. At least 528 defendants under 13 years old, including an eight-year old boy, received up to 10 cuts with a cane. Many convicted have had no legal representation.

Black U.S. diplomat Joseph M. Segars, a consular officer, was refused service at Chez Andre, a Johannesburg restaurant. There was no immediate decision as to whether the US would protest to the South African government.


Barclays of London owns 63 percent of the South African bank and has supported the bond purchase by its subsidiary.

Barclays National in South Africa said that the purchase was part of its "social responsibility" to South Africa and to its employees who have been "called up for military service on the borders." Barclays in London stated, "We abhor Apartheid, but the bank feels... that it could do more good in South Africa than by turning its back and walking away.

Southern African News Agency, an independent press service which was effectively shut down last year after reporting widely on black actions and opinions in South Africa, has been reorganized in Geneva. From there, it intends to continue to report on Southern African affairs, operating for the time being out of the offices of the International University Exchange Fund. Eric Abraham, who founded SANA in 1975 and was subsequently put under house arrest, escaped safely to England in January.

A UNION BOYCOTT OF SOUTH AFRICA of SOUTHERN AFRICA/MARCH 1977

EIGHT ZIMBABWE NATIONALISTS were hanged by the white regime on Jan. 17 after being found guilty of bombings of railway lines, a beer hall, and a restaurant for whites. Elsewhere on the war front, the white regime acknowledged for the first time that one of its planes had been shot down. Those responsible were Mozambican anti-aircraft gunners, who downed the plane near the border on Jan. 12.

A US firm, Travel Consultants International, is to disseminate information about tourism in Rhodesia to US travel agents, according to a January 19th radio broadcast from Salisbury. Such promotion would seem to constitute a violation of US sanctions against the Smith regime.

The firm will represent the Rhodesian United Touring Company by informing travel agents in the US about its tours and facilitating tour bookings. Travel Consultants International is based in Los Angeles and has offices in 12 major US cities.

Twenty African bus drivers were fined for staging a strike in protest over the size of their Christmas bonuses. The strike shut down public transportation in Salisbury for five days. Another 780 drivers and conductors face similar charges.

More than 43% of the country’s African workers engaged in other than
agricultural or domestic employment in 1975 received wages barely above the poverty level for a couple with no children, according to an updated study by a University of Natal economist. Yet more than half of all urban African families consist of seven or more persons.

GUINEA-BISSAU'S MINERAL RESOURCES are being surveyed, with experts expecting to find significant quantities of bauxite and petroleum. A chain of Peoples Stores which emerged in the liberated zones during the war is now handling much of the country's basic commerce. The nation expects to return soon to self-sufficiency in rice, which was an export crop prior to the war of national independence.

THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE and the United States have established full diplomatic relations. Cape Verde's Ambassador in Washington is Dr. Raul Varela; at the UN, Abilio Duarte. The US Ambassador to Cape Verde is Melissa Wells.

ANGOLA'S ELECTRIC POWER POTENTIAL is growing with the Gove dam in Cunene expected to be finished shortly and an installation at Ruacana scheduled for completion in March. Since September, work has been suspended by government order on an electric scheme at Calueque which had been intended to supply mines and other foreign-owned ventures in Namibia. The government says, however, that existing installations there are being kept in good condition for future use.

The new currency of Angola is the "kwanza," replacing the escudo, the currency of Portuguese colonialism. Angolan banks were closed for a week in the Angolan capital to complete work related to the currency change.

THE ZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT has ordered officials of UNITA to leave the country in compliance with the OAU charter which forbids member states from harboring groups fighting against the legitimate government of another member. In an "exclusive" interview taped recently for the South African Star (Jan. 15, 1977), Jonas Savimbi said that UNITA would continue to fight on in the bush against what he described as "Soviet imperialism" in southern Africa. At the same time Savimbi said that he welcomed aid from the western allies to help him contain communism in Africa. UNITA's operations in Angola since the end of the war have been mainly directed toward the disruption of traffic on the Benguela railroad. In December it was reported that dozens of people were hacked to death by UNITA guerrillas who stormed a train on the railroad.

MOZAMBIQUE'S FRELIMO CONGRESS, which was held early in February, was preceded by widespread discussions at the local level on major issues facing the country. (A report on the Congress will be carried next month.) All borders were closed to tourists and travelers without official business for a month before and during the conference.

The US has given Mozambique 28,000 tons of wheat to help overcome the effects of the closing of the border with white Rhodesia. Japan also assisted with emergency financial aid.

Administrative commissions have been appointed to run the Mozambique Tobacco Co., whose farms had been abandoned, and the Tivoli and Turismo hotels in Maputo, whose managements were suspended. Some 107 commercial and industrial enterprises are now run by such commissions.

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY'S Secretary-General, William Eteki Mboumoua, in a New Year's message, urged members to set up a deterrent force to discourage aggression by white regimes against African front-line states. He said that if such aggression occurred and was not countered, it would "create the pretext for extension toward other independent countries beyond the Equator."
Detentions, Deaths Continue in South Africa

South Africa's Minister of Justice and Police, Jimmy Kruger, has rejected calls for an investigation into the deaths of political detainees. Requests for the inquiry came after police announced in late February that two more persons had died while in police custody, raising the official total of deaths in detention to 18, since June of last year.

Kruger told reporters that police have already investigated sixteen of the cases. They found that six of the detainees had committed suicide, five had suffered fatal falls or been shot while trying to escape, and five others died of natural causes, such as heart attacks and strokes.

Among prominent Africans recently taken into custody by the South African authorities is Sally Motlana, vice president of the South African Council of Churches. Her husband says the police who took her from her home told her she was being held under Section Six of the Terrorism Act.

Journalism Awards Spotlight Cronkite, Magubane

CBS news anchorman Walter Cronkite presented an award for enterprising journalism to black South African photographer Peter Magubane during Cronkite's recent visit to South Africa.

The award, given by the Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery, is considered South Africa's highest journalism prize, and has never before been presented to a black.

Magubane, who spent a year and a half in detention and was released without being charged, won the award for his pictures of the Soweto uprising last year.

Cronkite was the featured speaker at the ceremonies.

Prelo, Catholic Church Reach Compromise

Catholic Church officials averted a possible showdown with the South African government in late February, by agreeing to freeze church school integration at present levels.

The South African Conference of Bishops had earlier decided to integrate all churches, schools, homes and convents under its control, and to accelerate the promotion of blacks to church leadership positions.

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Faced with a government threat to close down all Catholic schools that violated segregation laws, however, Church officials agreed to freeze enrollment of black and coloured pupils, estimated by some sources as low as 100, pending high-level consultations with government officials.

Pretoria has argued against school integration partly on grounds that it will spoil the separate cultural heritages of each of the country's ethnic groups.

Missionary Slayings Denied

Zimbabwe nationalist officials have denied responsibility for the slaying in mid-February of seven Catholic priests at the Musami mission, 37 miles from the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury.

Officials of the Smith government blamed the killings on ZANU guerrillas, who allegedly carried Soviet-made AK-47 rifles on the raid. According to one eyewitness to the slayings, a group of black men in guerrilla gear entered the mission and ordered the priests outside, where they were quickly lined up and gunned down.

Statements by the Patriotic Front leadership denounced the massacre, which they charged was carried out by special commandos of the Rhodesian army, such as the Selous Scouts.

Edward Kazembe, a recent deserter from the Scouts, added weight to that accusation when he told journalists that one of the unit's tasks was to "kill the local people" in order to discredit the guerrillas.

At the missionaries' funeral, a group of whites stormed out in anger when a black priest laid blame for his friends' death on government policies that had forced Africans to take up arms.

Rhodians Try For 'Internal Settlement'

The Rhodesian government is asking Parliament to approve a package of racial reforms as part of its effort to forge an "internal settlement" with what it calls "moderate Africans."

Prime Minister Smith is pressing for modifications of the Land Tenure Act that will make Africans eligible to purchase white-designated farmland or property in urban commercial and industrial districts that is presently reserved for whites. City residential districts are expected to remain segregated, while private hotels, restaurants and hospitals will be integrated.

The reform package has won the enthusiastic endorsement of the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO), which called the legislation "the most important move yet by the government." ZUPO, a right-wing African party led by tribal chief and Rhodesian Senator Jeremiah Chirau, has already begun a series of private consultations with the government.

The white regime in Salisbury is hoping that the racial reforms will also induce Bishop Muzorewa to participate in negotiations toward an internal settlement. The main nationalist movements, however, have dismissed the legislation as yet another attempt to buy time and international sympathy for the Smith government.

"Africans no longer want to be ruled well by whites," said a spokesman for the Nkomo ANC in Salisbury, "they now want to rule themselves."

Zimbabwe Refugees Flee to Botswana

The Botswana government says refugees, many of them schoolchildren, are leaving Rhodesia in record numbers and settling in camps in Botswana. Those wishing to join the guerrilla army, says Botswana, are being sent on to Zambia for training.

Rhodesian troops, meanwhile, have kept up their cross-the-border raids into Botswana. Authorities in Salisbury publicly admitted that "hot pursuit" missions into Botswana were being carried out in late February. They said that the raids were designed to recover kidnapped schoolchildren, and kill or capture guerrillas operating from Botswana territory.

Botswana, which maintains there are no guerrilla camps in its territory, has asked the United Nations for some $29 million in compensation for damages from the Rhodesian attacks. Botswana is also bolstering its small Mobile Police Force in an attempt to meet the Rhodesian threat.

Vance Discusses South African Investment

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met twice late last month with a small group of corporate executives to discuss U.S. investment practices in South Africa.

Sources say Leon Sullivan, who heads the Philadelphia-based Opportunities Industrialization Center, organized the meeting to consider ways of improving the image of American corporations involved in the white-ruled nation.

Sullivan has made several trips to South Africa since he became the first black member of General Motors' Board of Directors.
would be a National Security Council, comprised of the heads of the four black delegations invited to the Geneva conference, or their nominees, and the heads of the Rhodesian Army, Air Force and police.

Richard was vague as to who these last three would be. But he was clear in asserting that they would not come from the current heads of the Army, Air Force, and police.

The other area that was left vague was the crucial issue of who would be in charge of the ministries of Defense and Law & Order.

White Control

Kissinger had proposed that these ministries be controlled by whites. Such an idea was rejected by the African delegations. Robert Mugabe, head of the ZANU delegation and a member of the Patriotic Front, explained their reasoning before leaving Geneva. “It would be ridiculous for the settlers who were murdering the Zimbabweans to be entrusted with the latter’s security during the crucial transition period.”

The new British proposals included several alternative resolutions to the problem of the two security ministries:

- that the Resident Commissioner be in charge of them;
- that they be the collective responsibility of the National Security Council;
- that one ministry be left in white hands, and the other in African hands.

Shuttle Itinerary

Richard’s shuttle took him to South Africa, Rhodesia, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania and back to each again. He emerged from each of his initial meetings—even his meeting with Smith, which he described as “fairly grim”—still maintaining a posture of “guarded optimism.” And, despite his statement that he found talks with Vorster “useful, helpful, and constructive,” the South African prime minister apparently refused to make any commitments to Richard. It was reported that Vorster was far less interested in the new British proposals than he was in the assurances and concessions Richard intended to extract from African nationalist leaders and the front-line presidents.

The Smith regime had not been secretive in laying out its position. Smith and other members of the illegal white government had spent much of the interlude since Geneva denouncing the Geneva events, commenting extensively on British “pandering” to the “most extravagant demands put forward by the nationalists.”

They publicly rejected the new proposals long before the final encounter between Richard and Smith, asserting that agreement had already been reached on the Kissinger plan. Said Smith’s foreign minister, Piet van der Byl, on Jan. 10: “The [new British] proposals depart so radically from the undertakings which we accepted at the Pretoria meeting that we are not prepared to entertain them.”

To nobody’s surprise—except, perhaps, Richard’s—Smith rejected the proposals, declaring that the plan was “so far removed from reality that it would lead to chaos.”

Role for Muzorewa?

There was speculation that Smith, in his plan to implement unilaterally the Kissinger proposals, might seek legitimacy by bringing the Abel Muzorewa-led faction of the ANC into the negotiations.

The bait, according to reports in the London Observer, was to be the repeal of racially discriminatory legislation—in the face of opposition from various elements within the Rhodesian Front Party—and, perhaps, some test of black opinion to demonstrate support for the Africans negotiating.

In his pronouncement rejecting the Richard proposals, Smith announced that such legislation would be repealed, but was not specific about which laws would be involved. The most optimistic aim of this strategy was to have it accepted by the West, in particular the

Smith’s Alternative Plan

At the same time, he made good his often-stated intention to unilaterally enact the Kissinger proposals, announcing that his government intended to begin to negotiate a “transition to majority rule” along the lines set forth in those proposals. He announced that he had “issued invitations to black leaders to join me” in these negotiations.

Conveniently for Smith, a new group, the Zimbabwe United Peoples’ Organization (ZUPO), emerged in Salisbury after Geneva recessed, and requested to be included in all future negotiations. ZUPO later had a meeting with Richard in Salisbury, after which they called him a “perfect gentleman,” and said they had agreed to consider their request.

ZUPO was formed by two of the four chiefs who had formerly been the black faces in Smith’s cabinet. They long ago proved their “reasonableness.” In 1964 these two chiefs supported Smith’s drive for independence. Along with the other chiefs, they later unanimously approved the 1965 unilateral declaration of independence, the 1969 introduction of the constitution that entrenched white rule and, more recently, the Kissinger proposals. They also support the regime’s war against the liberation forces.

Harold Wilson, former British prime minister, long ago labeled the chiefs “paid stooges.” Only Smith and his cohorts recognize them as spokesmen for the African population.

Zimbabwean nationalists denounced the creation of ZUPO. A spokesman for Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU) dismissed the new “political party” as the creation of the white minority regime. “It won’t cut any ice with the people of Zimbabwe.” he said. “It is white initiated and will be white run from behind the scenes.”

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US, as sufficient to merit the lifting of sanctions and the renewal of overt support for the regime.

The Smith regime's strategy and goals were made clear in a statement by Foreign Minister Van der Byl: "We have made an irrevocable commitment to majority rule within two years and we are also irrevocably committed to elimination of the remaining forms of discrimination. If discrimination is done away with, and majority rule comes along, and we make an agreement on that basis within the terms of the Kissinger plan with the representatives of the 6 million Africans in Rhodesia, what else could anybody want?"

Failing this—and, according to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, US approval will be denied—it is believed that the moves will be sufficient at least to satisfy Rhodesia's most immediate and most needed ally, South Africa.

South African Role
South Africa is the key to Smith's ability to maintain his position. While there has been no public statement since Geneva, white Rhodesians, according to the Johannesburg Star, are encouraged by a "new realism" they sense in South Africa's attitude. Vorster has publicly supported Smith's insistence on making no concessions beyond the Kissinger proposals, most recently in his New Year's message.

Moreover, South African supplies of ammunition and petroleum to sustain the Rhodesian war effort have been fully resumed, and there are rumors of aircraft and other equipment having been supplied secretly during the height of the Kissinger shuttle. The vast amount of publicity given to the Rhodesian regime's claims concerning the massacre of 27 people on a tea plantation in the Hondo valley seemed intended to boost public support among white South Africans for the Smith regime.

Bishop Muzorewa's position is unclear. He has publicly and repeatedly stated his rejection of the Kissinger plan, which would make it difficult for him to enter into negotiations with Smith that would be based on this plan.

At the same time, he is increasingly isolated. The front-line presidents emerged on Jan. 9 from a two-day summit meeting in Lusaka to announce their total support for the Patriotic Front, headed by Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU in order that the Patriotic Front would realize the objectives of the struggle in Zimbabwe. According to Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's statement announcing the decision, it had been taken because both wings of the Front were backed by the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA).

STUDENTS 'KIDNAPPED' TO FREEDOM

In late January 384 primary and high school students from Zimbabwe crossed the border into Botswana, apparently for military training to fight the Smith regime.

The Rhodesian Security Forces issued a press release, picked up widely by the US media, describing the action as a "kidnapping" by armed Zimbabwean nationalists.

However, interviews with each of the students by the Botswana Government and foreign press reporters revealed no evidence of any kidnapping. Even the Johannesburg Star, not known for its sympathy with African liberation movements admitted there was nothing to the story.

"Nobody forced us to flee and free ourselves from terror in Rhodesia," said one 13-year-old girl in the group. "We were willing and determined, and the arrangements were entirely ours," added the secretary of the Youth League, the student organization which had planned the move. His main reason for leaving Rhodesia was "freedom."

In their statement to Botswana officials, the students said the trek had been planned for months. To back up their claim, they cited the fact they had not paid their school fees for the term.

Cross marks area of school from which students fled.

Botswana Response to the Refugees
Since the resurgence of the Zimbabwean armed struggle in 1975, thousands of students and young people have fled Rhodesia for both Botswana and Mozambique. Current estimates place the number of refugee students crossing out of Rhodesia at 500 a month.

In addition to housing and feeding the refugees, Botswana must try to protect them from the constant threat of raids from Rhodesian security forces. Thou explained. Without an army, this was not easy. Several refugees, Botswana civilians and police had already been killed, and others kidnapped by the Rhodesians.

Eric Abraham, a South African journalist, head of the banned South African News Agency (SANA), and a recent refugee himself, reports that 150 to 300 refugees arrive in Botswana every day from South Africa and Rhodesia. Botswana, according to Abraham, just does not have the capacity to house, feed, or protect these people. South African agents, he said, regularly enter Botswana and kidnap refugees.

In a February 3 press release, Botswana announced it had invited the International Red Cross to interview the students who had supposedly been kidnapped. It urged Rhodesia in turn to allow the Red Cross access to four Botswana citizens abducted by Rhodesian Security Forces from inside Botswana and held in a Rhodesian jail since November 1978.

Rhodesian Harrassment of Students
The student refugees spoke of increasing pressure on them in Rhodesia. Besides being denied adequate educational and employment opportunities, they faced constant harassment. Rhodesian forces come regularly to their schools to urge them to fight against the nationalists. The last such visit had been in January, the month they decided to leave the country.

Another form of pressure is the special registration certificate, which all students are required to carry. Virtually a pass, this certificate has the student's personal data, as well as his/her father's name and that of the village headman. "If you are not in possession of the certificate, you are expected of being a freedom fighter and shot dead," said one of the student refugees.
RHODESIAN FORCES STRETCHED THIN

Evidence of spreading war is obvious throughout Rhodesia. As of December, the regime’s military forces were involved in four operational areas: the original Operation Hurricane in the northeast; Thrasher in the west; Repulse in the southeast; and Operation Tangent, the most recent theater taking in Matabeleland from Beitbridge to the Victoria Falls.

With the opening by Zimbabwean guerrillas of a new front around Kariba on the Zambian border, it is estimated that all but 138 miles of Rhodesia’s 1,842-mile border are now penetrated, stretching security forces very thin.

Selous Scouts

The Rhodesian regime has developed a series of anti-guerrilla units to meet the threat. First among these are the Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian equivalent of the Green Berets. It is the Selous Scouts who are believed to have spearheaded Rhodesian raids into Mozambique. ZIPA and the heads of the Patriotic Front have blamed these marauders for the December killings of 27 African workers on a tea plantation in the Honde Valley.

The Selous Scouts’ track record already includes the massacre of 600 people in a Zimbabwean refugee camp last summer. The Rhodesians have attempted to maximize publicity throughout the world’s press for their version of the tea plantation killings, which is, of course, that it was Zimbabwean guerrillas who executed the raid. Rhodesian government officials responded to Joshua Nkomo’s call for an international investigation by stating: “We need no investigation; we know who did it.”

The second counter-insurgency group is the “Police Anti-Terrorist Unit.” Operating in “sticks” of five men, to maximize maneuverability and speed, their role is officially designated as “search and destroy.” They are equipped with either Israeli Uzi machine pistols, or standard Belgian FN rifles. Most prefer the high velocity FN, because, as one policeman put it, “If a terrorist is behind a tree, and I have an FN, I can shoot right through the tree.”

The “Grey Scouts,” a mounted infantry unit, operates in rougher country. And finally, there is a Special Unit Force, within the Salisbury police, currently training to deal with urban guerrilla warfare. According to its commander, the 30 man force has been called on six times in three months.

These units are being supplemented by vigilante groups, such as the recently formed “Hell’s Angels,” a motorbike commando unit formed by farmers in Manicaland.

Manpower Shortage

The regime is faced with tremendous problems as it seeks to find manpower to carry on the extended war. There are only 270,000 whites to draw on, and a maximum force level of about 50,000 to 60,000 men. (Military service is compulsory for whites and coloreds, and voluntary for blacks.) The army is now 10,000 strong—with three black soldiers for every two white soldiers. Reserve units push army numbers up to about 20,000. Another 1,700 men are in the airforce, and there is a large regular police force.

Finding more manpower means squeezing available sources even harder. This was done directly following Smith’s rejection of Ivor Richard’s new proposals for a transition government. Defense Minister Reg Cowper announced, on January 2nd, that all able bodied men between the ages of 38 and 50 will now be called up, most likely for active reserve duty, while deferments and exemptions for men under 38 will be canceled.

“We are playing for high stakes,” Cowper explained. He asserted that Rhodesia will have the strength to meet the guerrilla threat with these new measures.

Mercenaries

That this is not true is shown by the ever increasing presence in Salisbury of what white Rhodesians call “boomers”—anyone, that is, who is attracted to the boom boom of weapons! While Rhodesian government officials contended that “no mercenary force exists in Rhodesia,” it was reported in December that some 400 US ex-G.I.s, all with Vietnam experience, are at present fighting with the Rhodesian army. In all there are at least 1000 mercenaries, recruited from as far afield as Greece and Canada. According to one report, coming from an American mercenary, Lawrence K. Meyers, who went AWOL from the Rhodesian army and escaped to Botswana, some 30% of the Rhodesian forces are made up of Britons, South Africans, and Portuguese. The Rhodesian ministry of Defense dismissed Meyers’ assertions as “grossly misleading and vindictive.”

The recruiting done in the US is carried on by the same people who took charge of recruiting for Angola. It goes on despite its illegality, and thus far has not been challenged by the Justice Department.

The numbers of mercenaries will probably grow in the months to come. Even with this assistance, there are clear limits to the Rhodesian regime’s fighting power. Paradoxically, these limits explain the major raids into Mozambique undertaken by Rhodesia. In Dar es Salaam, President Nyerere interpreted the incursions as a desperate attempt to internationalize the struggle.

The constant reports in Rhodesia and South Africa of the supposed presence of foreign troops in Mozambique, preparing to fight against Rhodesia, form part of a propaganda campaign aimed at creating the climate for such internationalization.
JASON ZIYAPAPA MOYO 1927-1977

On January 22nd, Jason Moyo, Second Vice President and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of ZAPU [the Zimbabwe African People’s Union], was killed by a parcel bomb, in the office of the organization in Lusaka.

The Salisbury regime, author of this murder, had long feared Jason Moyo, fighter for Zimbabwean freedom, and an architect of the unity now being forged between the movements, which promised the final swift destruction of white minority rule in Rhodesia.

Southern Africa asked Callistus Ndlovu, permanent representative of ZAPU in the United States, and long time comrade and friend of Jason Moyo, to review briefly the role he played in the fight for Zimbabwe’s freedom.

Jason Moyo, a quiet and unassuming fighter, was born in 1927 in the Kezi area of the Sengwe District in Southern Matabeleland Province, and attended the Mzingwane Government Industrial School where he earned a certificate in building.

On leaving school, Jason Moyo went to work as a brick layer in Bulawayo where he became a member of the African Artisans’ Union. He was later to lead the Union as its Secretary General and President, before he rose to the Vice-Presidency of the African Trade Union Congress to which the Artisans’ Union was affiliated. At the same time, Comrade Moyo served as Chairman of the African Advisory Board of the Bulawayo City Council representing Makhokhoba Township, the area where he lived all his life until he went underground to participate in the revolution against Rhodesia. Residents of this Bulawayo slum relied on Jason Moyo’s leadership, virtually regarding him as its mayor—this recognition later winning him the nickname “Makhokhoba” in the revolution. Jason Moyo continued to live in Makhokhoba Township, when most of his old associates moved to better townships, demonstrating his proletarian simplicity, and earning the respect and affection of the cadres of the People’s Union. These cadres regarded Moyo as by far the most revolutionary Zimbabwean under whose leadership they had worked underground. He combined the honesty of his peasant background, the simplicity of a worker, and the dynamism of a revolutionary.

Jason Moyo’s political life spanned the whole history of organized political resistance to settler rule in Zimbabwe. He was elected to the National Executive of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1957 when it was recognized with the merger of the Bulawayo based old ANC and the Youth League of Salisbury. After that, he served in the National Executives of all Zimbabwean Nationalist parties that were formed under the leadership of Joshua M. Nkomo: The National Democratic Party (NDP), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), and the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC). When the PCC was banned by the Smith regime in 1964, Moyo joined the External Mission of ZAPU which set up its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, under the leadership of the then Vice-President of ZAPU, James Robert Chikerema. Moyo was then National Treasurer of ZAPU. In 1970, after a rift in the leadership which resulted in the formation of FROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe) by James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, and their expulsion from ZAPU, Jason Moyo was appointed head of the External Mission of ZAPU and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

Having assumed the leadership of the External Mission of ZAPU, Moyo negotiated with the late Herbert Chitepo of ZANU the formation of a Joint Military Command which was established by the Moshi Declaration.

Although this did not materialize as a working unity, largely because of mutual distrust between ZAPU and ZANU, the attempt to unify ZAPU and ZANU established the fact that Moyo could in the future become an important link between the two organizations.

Thus when ZANU cadres rejected Ndabaningi Sithole’s leadership in 1975, they turned to Comrade J. Z. (as he was also known) to negotiate a new attempt at military cooperation between ZAPU and ZANU. This led to the formation of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) when ZAPU’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and ZANU’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) came under one command.

Before the Geneva talks on Zimbabwe convened, Jason Moyo was once more at the center of efforts to unite the liberation forces of Zimbabwe, when he negotiated with Robert Mugabe the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, the success of which brought together Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. Jason Moyo believed that all the fighting forces of Zimbabwe must be united, but he did not subscribe to what he liked to call a “mixed grill” type of unity, in which groups which did not share the same beliefs worked together. He believed that such unity was counter-productive and meaningless. When he was killed by the parcel bomb which was mailed to him he had just returned from Maputo, Mozambique, where he had been discussing the complete merger of the guerrilla armies of ZAPU and ZANU.

His death is a great blow to the revolution, although he has left a legacy that must inspire all those that are working for creative unity. His spirit lives amongst all the true revolutionaries of Zimbabwe. The struggle continues!
ballooning labor costs, discouraging investments, and hampering exports.

The extent of the slump is nowhere more immediately obvious than in the tourist industry. For 1976, for example, hotel managers reported a 40% drop in visitors.

Production Drops

Another indicator of the extent of the economic slump is the 34% drop in steel tonnage imported in the period beginning April 1976. Says a young executive at British Rhodesian Steel Co., the country's biggest steel distributor: "The downward curve has become more acute. It's apparent it hasn't hit bottom yet. We're a very good pointer to how things are going generally. Whatever you build, you need steel."

There is, in fact, almost no construction underway in Salisbury, partly due to spending cutbacks and partly due to white uncertainty about the future. One business executive related to a Wall Street Journal reporter how an employee "wanted to know if we should bother" to repair a damaged roadway and parking lot at an industrial plant.

Only defense and police expenditures are mushrooming, taking an ever increasing share of foreign exchange reserves. This leaves an ever-smaller amount available for the purchase of non-military imports, such as spare parts, or finished goods.

Military call-ups are creating serious shortages of skilled manpower. Under the age extensions on military service announced during January, white men to age 50 are being called up, many for more than 100 days per year. This means soaring labor costs—costs that are exacerbated by the government policy that the difference between military pay and a man's regular pay must be provided by his employer.

The crucial mining industry also is suffering the direct effects of the war. Despite a 41% increase in output reported for the first five months of 1976, the war is taking its toll here too. Small mines in contested areas have closed, and new exploration has stopped. In this situation, and despite government regulations that forbid emigrants to take more than $1,600 out of the country, emigration is escalating. In 1976, for the first time since UDI, emigration totals exceeded the numbers of people coming to settle in the country—the net loss was 6,000. Places such as Argentina and Uruguay have begun to prepare for an influx of white Rhodesians. An Argentine business periodical reported last month that the government is readying thousands of acres of farmland for the expected settlers.

The various expressions of support for the Front, as politically and militarily the most effective movement, are aimed at blocking any exploitation by South Africa and Western countries of the kind of divisions which precipitated the Angolan war.

The five front-line states (Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and Botswana) gave the lead in backing the Front early in January. However, the OAU committee, unlike the front-line states, did not withdraw recognition of either the African National Council, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, or the ZANU faction of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. The Lusaka resolution stated that, "the door should remain open to all groups of Zimbabwean nationalists fighting for majority rule in their country to join the Patriotic Front."

LIBERATION COMMITTEE BACKS PATRIOTIC FRONT

The Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity agreed to give full support to the Patriotic Front in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.

In a statement released following its Jan. 31-Feb. 4 meeting in Lusaka, the 22-nation committee endorsed the decision of the front-line states "to give full political, material and diplomatic support to the Patriotic Front." It also committed the OAU to "give assistance and support to all fighting cadres of Zimbabwe inside and outside" through the agency of the Front."

The Patriotic Front, the alliance formed last fall between ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe of ZANU, is linked with the forces of the Zimbabwe People's Liberation Army (ZIPA).

Namibia

TIME RUNNING OUT FOR TURNHALLE

The South African-instigated 'constitutional conference' in Namibia's capital city of Windhoek is inching toward formation of an 'interim government.' But time is running out.

Carefully selected representatives from Pretoria's designated 11 'ethnic groups' have been meeting in plenary and by committee over a period of a year and a half. Nevertheless, legal advisers, most of them South African lawyers assigned to the black delegations, returned in mid-January from yet another meeting with South African officials in Pretoria, without a draft constitution.

Pressures from inside Namibia and from the international community, and the rapid movement of events elsewhere in Southern Africa demand that the assemblage and its manipulators come up quickly with a constitution to pave the way for passage of legislation by the South African Parliament enabling the creation of a provisional government.

The longer the process drags on, the more likely it is that the internal contradictions of the conference will become so polarized as to be irreconcilable. The South Africans fear that the major beneficiary from such a turn of events would be the South West Africa People's Organization of Namibia.

On January 18, an 11-person working committee began its latest session at Windhoek's Turnhalle building, against a background of dissatisfaction within conference ranks, widespread public distrust and a protest march by members of SWAPO calling for United Nations' supervised and controlled elections in the International Territory.
Vorster’s Proposed Constitution

On the same day the Windhoek Advertiser revealed ‘confidential papers which came from Pretoria,’ consisting of proposals emanating from the all-white National Party. A three-tier governmental structure—national, regional, and municipal—is a central feature. A national assembly would be appointed by the second-tier (regional) governments from which a council of ministers will be chosen. That council would select one of its members as state president on a one-year rotation basis.

A recurrent theme is “minority rights,” with particular attention paid to property rights in “traditional areas,” a device which would prohibit black ownership in the towns and rural areas held by the whites, which cover much of the country.

Another document divulged confidential minutes of the Pretoria meeting. The preparations for this move, which requires enactment of South African legislation. Walvis Bay is Namibia’s only deep water port, and Pretoria’s maneuver is obvious: to place a stranglehold on the country.

By early February, a series of press conferences had cheerily reported on the closed Turnhalle meetings, announcing progress on the constitution: the three-tier government, and a bill of rights assuring freedom of speech, religion and political activity. There was one exception: ‘Marxist Leninist’ parties are forbidden. The meaning is clear. Dirk Mudge, National Party stalwart and chairman of the working committee, declared: “The conference will never break down, there is too much at stake. . . . We must discuss now how we will live with our differences. SWAPO is communist; if you were a member of SWAPO you would not be a friend of mine.”

Advertiser comments: “The sum total of all the developments is that the Turnhalle finds itself exactly where it was all the time—nowhere.”

“Nowhere” may be an understatement. National Party boss A. H. du Plessis said on February 2 that whites in the Territory would take part in a referendum on the Turnhalle decisions in March. This proposal indicates that the ruling class in Namibia still cannot abide losing control, and indeed, the entire machinery so elaborately concocted by Pretoria may founder on its own inconsistencies before the interim government can be presented to the world.

Vorster—A Heavy Hand

The heavy, unyielding hand of Pretoria shows up at its crudest in Prime Minister Vorster’s plan to transfer Walvis Bay from the Territory to South Africa. A special committee has been set up by Vorster to make the necessary preparations for this move, which members have been denied passports to leave the country for study.

Student resistance has not been confined to South Africa; many Namibian students are fleeing the Territory in a steadily growing stream. They come from high schools which had to close down last year because of student unrest.

As the mobilization of workers is strengthened, a new wave of strikes can be expected. Already, SWAPO is building the first African union in the Territory, with a view toward organizing a nation-wide strike. Rossing Uranium, a prize future money-maker, will be the primary target. The company got its first taste of popular discontent only last November, when 700 mine-workers went on strike.

White Reaction

Turnhalle delegates, responding nervously to this situation, are restive, leading one of their more outspoken members, A. J. Kloppers, to predict further movement of Namibians to join SWAPO. The Turnhalle stage managers, attempting to stem this leakage, have brought back a few exiles—air fares paid—including renegade SWAPO members, and are offering them positions connected with the conference or in business enterprises.

A January memo from SWAPO’s Department of Information assesses the frantic situation. It points out the fear of elections, quoting Dirk Mudge: “There can be no elections now, as such elections would mean choosing between SWAPO and South Africa.”

The ‘interim government,’ once set in place, would call on South Africa’s military and police to remain in Namibia. The Turnhalle defense committee is to work with Pretoria’s defense ministry to recruit and train what Namibians it can to fight alongside the South African army—against SWAPO’s Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia.

Armed Conflict

The imminence of increased armed conflict in northern Namibia and the likelihood that it will soon reach deeper and deeper into the interior of the Territory is daily becoming more apparent. News stories of air-lifted military supplies to SWAPO bases in southern Angola are regular. UN Commissioner Sean MacBride—stepping down from his post after a three-year period—once again warned of the inevitability of war if South Africa goes ahead with its ‘interim government’ plans.

In London, SWAPO information minister Peter Katjavivi said at a press conference in early February: “The nature of the political situation in southern Africa is such that an escalation of military struggle is inevitable.”

SWAPO Proposes Constitution

SWAPO, Namibia’s only internationally recognized, nationwide mass political organization, recently issued a discussion paper on a draft constitution for an independent Namibia, reinforcing a similar document it circulated before the Turnhalle conclave started on September 1, 1975.

The paper proposes a single-chamber, popularly elected legislature of 100 members from numerically equal constituencies. A president would be directly elected by the people, and cabinet ministers drawn from the legislature. A bill of rights would follow the UN Covenants on Human Rights. SWAPO suggests a cabinet minister for human rights. There would be an independent judiciary, and a constitutional court appointed by the president which would interpret the constitution and the bill of rights.

The Advertiser carried the SWAPO proposal in some detail, allowing the million strong black population—already well-informed and aware of the charade being played at Turnhalle—to read the constitution for themselves.

Increasing Resistance

Political awareness continues to be channeled into increasing resistance to the white regime. SWAPO is being hounded, with its members constantly arrested and questioned. Several
During the past year there has been a dramatic increase in Rhodesian attacks against Mozambique. The massacre of 600 Zimbabwean refugees at Nyazonia in August 1976 and the five-pronged invasion of Tete district in November were only the most widely publicized cases of continuing Rhodesian aggression. The Mozambican government has reported more than fifty attacks, a figure that attests to the Smith regime’s desperate attempt to demoralize the Zimbabwean Peoples’ Army (ZIPA) and its Mozambican allies and to internationalize the widening conflict in southern Africa.

Rhodesian incursions were initially limited to short raids along the Mozambican border. Small groups of Rhodesian commandos, often supported by foreign mercenaries, including some Americans, attacked frontier villages alleged to be staging areas for ZIPA. Increasing ZIPA successes and Mozambique’s March closing of its border with Rhodesia, in compliance with UN-sponsored sanctions, brought escalating military aggression.

Mapai Attacked
On June 25 a large Rhodesian force, supported by helicopters and armored vehicles, attacked in and around the town of Mapai, an important transportation center in Mozambique’s Gaza province. The invaders, dressed in FRELIMO uniforms and singing FRELIMO songs, caught the residents by surprise, killing civilians and FRELIMO soldiers and virtually destroying the town. The incursion was meant to warn the Mozambican government that unless they curtailed support of ZIPA, other population centers would be vulnerable, including Maputo, the capital, less than 250 miles from Mapai.

Nyazonia Massacre
Both Mozambique and the Zimbabwe forces refused to be intimidated, and the Smith regime intensified its offensive. In August, Rhodesian troops, again dressed in FRELIMO uniforms, attacked Nyazonia, a refugee camp for 10,000 Zimbabweans who had fled from Rhodesia. According to the testimony of survivors, subsequently corroborated by a UN commission, members of the camp were rounded up and shot, attempts being made to burn the bodies of women and children, to reinforce the story that this was a guerrilla camp.

The massacre lasted for more than two hours. Six hundred people were killed, and many more wounded. Predictably, Smith and his ministers hailed the action against “terrorists” as a great victory for “Western civilization.”

In the subsequent two months, the Rhodesians had little cause for cheer. Zimbabwean freedom fighters penetrated deep into the Rhodesian state, disrupting the transportation system, attacking Rhodesian army posts and European plantations. These actions intensified anxiety in the minority community.

Retaliating, the Salisbury government launched its most sustained offensive against Mozambique. On Oct. 31, more than 800 ground troops and paratroopers, including mercenaries from Western countries, supported by helicopters, armored cars, heavy artillery and jets, simultaneously assaulted five Mozambican military bases in Tete district. At the same time, a smaller Rhodesian expedition moved south into Gaza province and again attacked Mapai. The invaders bombarded civilian and military positions for 48 hours, leaving a large number of victims behind when they were eventually driven out by the Mozambican troops.

Late in 1976, Rhodesia intensified its air raids against Mozambican territory, and during the past three months Hunter fighters and Canberra light bombers have repeatedly bombed locations in Tete, Manica, and Gaza province. According to Mozambique reports, 10 Rhodesian airplanes have been shot down.

Military Strength

The series of attacks raises three important questions. Why has it been so difficult for Mozambique to prevent these incursions? What does Smith hope to gain through this policy of military escalation? And to what extent has the Rhodesian government achieved its military and political goals?

The heavily forested and rugged terrain along the 800-mile border between Mozambique and Rhodesia makes it particularly difficult to prevent Rhodesian attacks. Conversely, ZIPA forces enjoy a tactical advantage when they penetrate the Rhodesian frontier. As the attacks escalated, reports from FRELIMO field commanders indicated...
that Mozambican border forces lacked sufficient heavy artillery and antiaircraft equipment to turn back the intensive frontal assault immediately.

The recent wave of air attacks further demonstrates that without a functioning air force Mozambique will remain vulnerable, a situation unlikely to improve for another two years—until the first group of Mozambican jet pilots completes its training.

Escalating Rhodesian aggression against Mozambique was motivated by the Smith regime's deteriorating internal position. The emigration of substantial numbers of settlers and the outflow of capital reflected widespread demoralization. Smith's announcement of impending negotiations in Geneva reinforced the sense of despair. The attacks were designed to demonstrate the continued prowess of the Rhodesian military and to appease the right wing of the Rhodesian Front, which has vehemently opposed negotiations. The regime also hoped to drive home a message to Africans living in Rhodesia, reassuring the collaborators that the government was not about to collapse and demonstrating to opponents that they would be vulnerable even if they fled into neighboring Mozambique.

**70,000**

The figure refers to readers, but, unfortunately, they're not ours. What they read instead is Soldier of Fortune, a glossy magazine for "professional adventurers" which has carried material seeking recruits for the Rhodesian Army. Soldier of Fortune has published just five issues to date. There are now 400 US mercenaries fighting against Zimbabwe liberation.

In this context, the small circulation of Southern Africa, now in its 10th year, should move us to redouble our efforts to increase circulation.

Help us help the people of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia in their fight for independence and majority rule. Don't just read Southern Africa, show it to your friends. Doing a mailing? Include brochures on Southern Africa magazine. Having a meeting? Get copies of the magazine to sell. If you order ten or more copies, we will send them to you for 60¢ each. Brochures are free. Let us know how you can help!

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**Translation:** Notice says "There is nothing," while he whispers "For you a civilized person... come back later. I can arrange 50 kilos of rice, 50 kilos of potatoes, 50 kilos of sugar, 200 cakes of soap, 50 liters of wine... do you need anything else?"

**Strategic Objectives**

The military campaign also had immediate strategic objectives. The Rhodesian High Command believed that a preemptive invasion of Tete would enable the Rhodesian army to capture much military equipment and inflict substantial losses on ZIPA and FRELIMO troops. These setbacks were intended to thwart a ZIPA offensive planned for November, the beginning of the rainy season.

The Rhodesians also hoped that the casualties inflicted would induce the Mozambican civilian population to oppose continued sanctuary and support for ZIPA and perhaps even to turn against FRELIMO. To speed this process, Salisbury initiated a radio propaganda campaign, the Voice of Free Africa, which denounced FRELIMO's "irresponsibility and tyranny." It has also provided funds for a Mozambican opposition party in exile, known as FUMO.

The long-term Rhodesian goal is to internationalize the conflict in order to draw the Western countries in as its allies. This strategy assumed greater urgency after Western intelligence reports confirmed that ZIPA was seriously jeopardizing the government's military position. When Kissinger and Vorster began pressuring Smith to negotiate a transition to majority rule, he developed new strategies to involve them in a military defense of his regime.

**Cold War Language**

At the heart of his plan are efforts to redefine the conflict with ZIPA in "Cold War" terms rather than acknowledging it as a struggle for self-determination and majority rule. A victory for ZIPA, Salisbury contends, would increase the influence of the Soviet Union, which Salisbury portrays as already the beneficiary of the war in Angola.

Aside from immediate strategic advantages, escalating attacks on Mozambique are designed to force it to seek military assistance from socialist countries, especially Cuba. This would enhance Smith's claim of communist aggression, and justify South African or Western intervention, which would rescue the tottering regime and provide it with international legitimacy.

**Ineffective Policy**

On balance, Smith's policy has proven ineffective. The raids into Mozambique provided only momentary relief for the besieged minority community. They have not instilled great confidence among whites who continue to leave at the rate of 550 per month.

The invasion of Tete failed to disrupt ZIPA's military activity. Guerrilla attacks have expanded, and a new front was recently opened in northwestern Rhodesia. The flow of new recruits to join ZIPA indicates Smith's failure to intimidate his oppressed subjects, while the Mozambican people have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to the struggle in Zimbabwe and to the policies of FRELIMO. Workers and peasants have given hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Bank of Solidarity, which provides assistance to Zimbabwean freedom fighters, the refugees and Mozambican victims of Rhodesian attacks. After the June attack on Mapai, more than $150,000 was collected to help reconstruct Mapai, and $200,000 was sent to ZIPA.

**Seeking Internationalization**

It is more difficult to gauge the effects of Smith's efforts to internationalize the conflict. The Mozambican government has exhibited restraint in responding to the attacks on its territory, being reluctant to give South Africa or any other foreign powers a pretext for intervention.

The Western decision to promote the cause of a moderate black government in an effort to forestall the "radicalization" of the region has also frustrated Smith's efforts at internationalization. But South Africa continues to give considerable support to the Smith regime. There are ominous signs that if the West fails to find a suitable black leader, one willing to accept a compromise settlement with Smith, South Africa may intervene directly, supported either openly or in secret by the US and other Western powers.
CHRONOLOGY OF AGGRESSION

* October 31 — Rhodesian troops crossed the border in two main areas, from north-eastern Rhodesia into Tete province, and from the south-east, close to the South African border into Gaza province. Attacks began in the early morning using tanks, mortars, cannons, fighter bombers, infantry and mounted infantry. At least seven towns or centers are reported to have been attacked, at Chitanga and Chiqualaquala (formerly Malvernia) in Gaza province, and at Gentu, Nura, Chicombizi, Chioco and Changara in Tete. Railway and other communications were cut in an advance from Chiqualaquala to Mapai, 80 km inside the country. The Rhodesian forces included black and white troops from the Selous Scouts, the Special Air Service and the Rhodesian Light Infantry, penetrated altogether about 100 km, and “violent fighting” was reported to be still continuing November 1.

* November 2 — Rhodesian troops, arriving at Mapai, attacked the village and railway station, where four railway coaches with passengers were waiting. About 150 soldiers attacked, raking the railway coaches and houses in the village with machine-gun and bazooka fire, killing 28 people and wounding 30. The only resistance came from seven railroad workers who were carrying arms as members of the Mozambique People’s Militia. Two were killed. The invaders, most of whom were said to be black, with a white Rhodesian commanding officer, sabotaged the railway line in 9 places and ripped up more than 3 km of track.

* November 3 — Two attacks mounted by Rhodesian forces in the early evening on the border village of Machipanda, opposite Umtali in Manica province.

* November 7 — Maputo radio announced that Mozambican forces had now gained control over all three provinces attacked. Fighting ceased in Gaza on November 2 but continued in Tete. The total of civilians wounded was put at several hundred.

* November 11 — A mounted patrol of white Rhodesian soldiers crossed the border in the early morning 3 miles north of Chiqualaquala, and attempted to blow up a passenger train by laying landmines. They were spotted by villagers and apprehended by a Mozambique patrol. A second attack, using heavy weapons and armored cars, was launched on the same day about 20 km south of Chiqualaquala.

* November 11-15 — Rhodesian jets bombed 4 positions in the Mavue area of Gaza province. Paratroops and helicopter troops, supported by heavy artillery and infantry sent in over the border, attacked and occupied a military base at Mavue. Seven out of a total of 20 Rhodesian aircraft, were allegedly shot down over a 4 day period.

* November 18-19 — Rhodesian troops, supported by heavy artillery, armored cars, paratroops, helicopters and bombers, attacked Pafuri in Gaza province in the early hours of November 18. After an 8 hour battle, the Rhodesians retreated, and reinforcements were sent in over the border for a second attack launched early on November 19. The fighting spread towards Chiqualaquala and involved 600 Frelimo troops and 400 Rhodesians.

* November 23-24 — Rhodesian bomber planes, combat vehicles and infantry combined in an attack on the Chirara area, Vila Manica district.

* December 2 — Rhodesian attack lasting several hours in the Chiqualaquala area. Bombing from the air was

Compiled from information supplied by FOCUS, published by Defence and Aid, London.
supported by ground attacks using infantry and armored cars.

- December 10-16 — A Rhodesian attack was launched late on the night of December 10 in Manica. Fighting continued until December 16, apparently with the aim of cutting the Beira-Tete road link. An attack on the Pafuri region using aircraft and heavy equipment on the morning of December 11 was repulsed the following day. In the course of this series of attacks all telephone and telex links between Maputo and the rest of Mozambique were cut off.

- December 13-14 — Rhodesian air attack on Caponda, in Tete province.

- December 16-17 — Two attacks on the Chitanga area of Gaza province. In an attack in the early morning of December 17 on the Chirara area of Manica province, using two jets, a bomber, two helicopters, heavy artillery and infantry.

- December 25 — Rhodesian troops with air support invaded Gaza province and attacked the Chitanga area. The Rhodesians are alleged to have used napalm bombs.

The Colombian author, Gabriel Garcia Marquez has written a series of articles which add considerable drama and detail to the picture of Cuban support of the MPLA during the critical period between November 1975 and March 1976, when South Africa was invading Angola.

Marquez, a long time friend of the Cuban Revolution, based his articles on interviews with actual participants in the Cuban campaign of solidarity. The series was originally published in the journal Proceso in Mexico City and was later released by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban News agency. Exclusive rights in English were given to the Washington Post and major excerpts were published on January 10, 11 and 12, 1977.

Marquez makes it clear, in contrast to the view taken by the Western press, that the Soviet Union did not "order" Cuba to send troops to Angola. He indicates that Cuba and the MPLA informed the Soviet Union of their decision after they had reached it. Marquez calls the decision one of "irreversible consequences, too large and complex to be resolved in 24 hours," yet when the MPLA officially requested that Cuba send troops, the leadership of Cuba’s Communist Party made the decision in just that short a time “in a large, calm meeting” on November 5 [1975]."

Operation Carlota

The first contingent of 82 soldiers left Cuba November 7, two weeks after the South African invasion of southern Angola began, and at a time when South African troops were advancing on Luanda at the rate of 40 miles a day, while Holden Roberto’s FNLA troops had come dangerously close to the capital from the north. The immediate role of the first men participating in Operation Carlota—named for a black Cuban woman who had led a slave rebellion in 1843—was to hold back the offensive being mounted against Luanda so that the capital would not fall into enemy hands before the Portuguese left, and then to keep up the resistance until reinforcements could arrive by sea.

650 men were flown to Angola in the initial 13 days of the operation; just as the first two planes arrived in Luanda, three ships left Cuba carrying an artillery regiment and a mechanized battalion; but they only arrived in Angola on November 27th.

US Obstruction

The flights to Luanda were themselves a saga of courage and daring. Obsolete Britannia planes carried oversize loads: pilots flew up to 200 hours a 75 hours a month, flew up to 200 hours a month. The pilots flew the unfamiliar course between Havana and Luanda without knowledge of weather or landing conditions and flew at unusual altitudes to conserve fuel.

The US was aware of the flights and of the limitations of the Britannias, which cannot go for long distances without refueling. The US forced Barbados to bar refueling stops and finally also

continued on page 29
South Africa did not claim it had used the Cuban military presence in Angola as a pretext for its invasion, and one account of the press conference said that South Africa didn’t receive signs of a Cuban presence until November 4, 1975, almost two weeks after the initial invasion.

South African Admissions

The South Africans admitted sending an officer to Silva Porto (now Bie) in central southern Angola to advise Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, at least one month before its column invaded Angola October 23, 1975. The account said that the officers purpose was to advise UNITA and to hold Nova Lisboa (now Huambo) “at all costs.” The South Africans admitted sending 18 more “instructors” with anti-tank weapons and machine guns soon thereafter.

The South African account only admitted to having committed 2,000 white troops to the Angolan invasion, a figure that contradicts other accounts, including that of South African Defense Minister Piet Botha, who told the Washington Post in February, 1976, when Angola was still at war and the South Africans occupied a portion of southern Angola, that it had committed 4,000-5,000 white troops. Sources in Luanda estimated that between 3,000 and 5,000 white South African troops were involved.

Oddly differing accounts of information divulged in the press conference have emerged in the Western press. Although the Washington Post’s story was headlined “S. Africa Says Its Angolan Allies Prevented Total Victory” and went on to attribute the loss to the MPLA to the unwillingness of UNITA and FNLA to pursue victory in the “whole of Angola,” the version reported by Agence France Presse said that six top South African army officers, who remained unidentified at the press conference, charged that the United States’ political will had failed in the conflict, leaving South Africa alone to do battle for the West. South Africa “could have conquered the whole of Angola if they had been instructed to do so,” a South African spokesman said, according to the AFP version.

US Role

The Washington Post account reported the press conference quite differently. “There was no indication from the account,” wrote David Otta-way, “that the unnamed senior military officer briefing local journalists had blamed by name or inference the United
States for failing to back the South African venture."

In an interview with Newsweek shortly after the end of the war last year, South African Prime Minister John Vorster stated that the US had encouraged South Africa to invade and later refused to provide aid because of Congressional opposition. Vorster later denied the statement.

But the recently revealed South African account also conflicts with an account by Observer correspondent David Martin of the chronology of the decision to withdraw from Angola taken by the South Africans during Christmas, 1975. Martin's report stated that the South Africans decided to withdraw from Angola after the vote by the US Senate prohibiting military aid to Angola in mid-December, 1975. He reported that Jonas Savimbi had requested that Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia and at that time an ally of UNITA, arrange a meeting with Vorster in order that Savimbi could make one last plea for increased South African involvement. Kaunda eventually arranged the meeting and Savimbi flew to South Africa. But Vorster's mind was not to be changed.

**Decision to Withdraw**

The most recent South African version stated that it was the regionalism of both Savimbi and FNLA's Holden Roberto that eventually convinced South Africa to discontinue its involvement based on their seeming unwillingness to pursue the fight against MPLA throughout the whole of the country. "Our instructions," the South Africans now say, "were not to take Luanda but to safeguard Dr. Savimbi's traditional area." Although it would appear from this statement that the South Africans were taking orders from Savimbi and other non-South African individuals, the same South African account states that the "Zulu Battle Group" which led an offensive against MPLA, which was trying to retake Huambo in early October, 1975, before the mass of South Africans invaded later that month, consisted of 500 UNITA and FNLA troops commanded by six South African officers and seven non-commissioned officers. The South Africans credit this group with taking five major cities from MPLA in the south between October 19 and 28. It lost one South African soldier, and four FNLA troops, while MPLA losses were put at 210 killed.

Observers speculate that the South Africans decided to release this version of their invasion after a semi-official Cuban version of the war written by Colombian writer Gabriel Garcia Marquez appeared in the Communist press and in some Western newspapers.

**CUBAN AID**

continued from page 28

corrupted Guaiana into halting Cuban refusing ships. This was accomplished only by the US Ambassador in Guaiana threatening to have the Georgetown airport bombed. Often flying without radar and without the security of back-up airports, the Cubans had made 101 flights by the end of the war. The sea route was less hazardous, but the Cuban troopships were also harassed by American destroyers which followed them for days and by US warplanes which buzzed and photographed them.

The Cubans, were keenly aware of the US responses and seriously considered the possibility that their action might bring on direct intervention from the US.

But, according to Marquez, they reasoned that the US had "just freed itself from the morass of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. It had a President no one had elected. The CIA was under fire in Congress and low-rated by public opinion." Finally Cuba felt that the US must recognize the danger to itself "not only in the eyes of African countries but especially in the eyes of American blacks" in allying with South Africa. The Cubans concluded that Washington would at least think twice about direct intervention.

**History of Solidarity**

Cuba's act of solidarity was not an impulsive act, but the end result of a continuous policy of international solidarity with African liberation movements. According to Marquez, contacts between the MPLA and Cuba dated back to 1965 when Che Guevara fought alongside the guerrillas in the Congo. The following year Agostinho Neto went to Cuba, accompanied by Endo, the MPLA military commander who was later killed.

In May 1975, as the Portuguese were getting ready to leave Angola, Cuban Commandant Flavio Bravo met Neto in Brazzaville, and Neto requested help with arms and other specific needs. Three months later a Cuban delegation visited Luanda, and was asked by Neto to provide instructors to open and run four military training camps.

Marquez points out that at the point when these requests were made, the Portuguese were still in control of Angola. Cuba had requested Colonel Otelo Carvalho, member of the left-wing Lisbon junta, to arrange Portuguese permission for Cuban aid to Angola, but when the three Cuban troopships, carrying instructors arrived in Angola in early October, 1975, permission had not yet been received...they docked without anyone's permission—but also without anyone's opposition.

The Cuban instructors immediately set up four training centers, one in Delatando (Salazar), 180 miles east of Luanda; the second in Benguela, the Atlantic sea-port; the third in Saurimo (Enrique de Carvalho), in the eastern province of Lunda, and the fourth in Cabinda. Within a very short time the Cuban instructors and their MPLA trainees were embroiled in the war against invading armies from South Africa and Zaire.

**Many Volunteers**

The story of Cuban volunteers to the Angolan campaign also reveals the deep feelings of solidarity the Cuban people had towards the Angolan struggle. For security reasons the Cuban press did not publish any account of the Angolan campaign until Castro himself spoke of the Cuban role at the Communist Party Congress in mid-December, 1975. But the operation was, in Marquez' words "a secret carefully kept by 8 million persons." Both men and women were eager to join in helping the Angolan struggle. There were cases of volunteers attempting to circumvent the careful selection process that was operating. An engineer tried to pass as a truck driver; a government official pretended to be a mechanic; a youth who joined without his father's permission met his father in Angola, because his father had also gone without telling his family.

The multi-racial nature of the Cubans who came to help undermined the political posture of the MPLA—neither friends nor enemies are determined by the color of their skin. The South Africans on the other hand, threw up smoke screens behind which they collected their white dead; black soldiers fighting with them were left on the battlefield for the vultures.

Marquez describes in some detail the dark days, when the South Africans seemed to sweep all before them; he also describes the eventual triumph of the MPLA forces, the South African retreat, after mid-March and the April 1 talks between the South African governor of Namibia and a Cuban commander of MPLA troops, Commandant Cintras Frias, which ended the phase of full-scale warfare.

What emerges from Marquez' report is the sense that Cuban involvement in the Angolan war was an act of continuing solidarity, which had the whole-hearted support of the Cuban people.

In contrast, it is clear from various accounts that the Pretoria regime's intervention in Angola, long kept a secret from the population, evoked anger among blacks, fear, resentment and deep divisions inside the ruling class in South Africa.
Despite the amount of detail provided, Rogers has not simply produced a survey or descriptive listing of American investments. She examines critically and rebuts the arguments presented by the corporations to justify their investments, and the result is a strong indictment of their role. Regular readers of Southern Africa will find a good deal of the material in White Wealth and Black Poverty, but will find it a convenient resource for information on the hard facts behind the daily headlines.

Some writers, such as sociologist Heribert Adam, have suggested that foreign investments have not been vital to South Africa’s development. But Rogers, building on the work of others such as Ruth First, shows clearly how infusions of foreign capital and technology spurred gold mining in the 19th century and the emergence of the modern industrial economy in the post-war era. Foreign investors now cooperate with the white regime in such strategic state-controlled programs as armaments production. However, the financial arrangements, atomic energy development, coal gasification and the search for oil.

Paradoxically, what can be seen as an asset in White Wealth and Black Poverty also reveals a weakness in the study. Rogers has marshalled her facts and arguments with the sharpness of a debater. Her moral and legal condemnations of the corporations are followed by observations that suggest that for reasons of pure self-interest the corporations may consider withdrawing from southern Africa because of the growing instability of the white regimes.

This argument ignores, however, the political economy of southern Africa and the way this relates to the strategic interests of the US. Rather than disengaging from southern Africa out of a new sense of moral responsibility and fiscal prudence, US corporations have been involved in new strategies, in coordination with US foreign policy, to preserve and extend their interests.

Henry Kissinger had been seeking the installation of black, pro-Western governments in Zimbabwe and Namibia, to be bolstered by billion-dollar development funds, which would stimulate increased corporate investment. The thinking behind this strategy was expressed by E.F. Andrews of Allegheny Ludlum, Inc., following a meeting of twenty corporations in November to coordinate investment strategy with US policy on Zimbabwe. He said, “The question is what can the private sector do with an eye to keeping Rhodesia and the other African nations in the Western sphere as opposed to the Soviet and Cuban spheres?”

The Carter administration seems eager to use US investment as a lever for controlled social change in South Africa. President Carter said in an interview in the South African Financial Mail in November 1976, that the “value the South Africans place on access to American capital and technology” gives the US strong influence in South Africa. Continuing the argument, he said: “Economic development, investment commitment and the use of economic leverage against what is, after all, a government system of repression within South Africa, seems to me the only way to achieve racial justice there.”

This position has been echoed by new UN Ambassador Andrew Young, who stated recently that he hoped to “exact some sense of social responsibility from our businessmen involved in South Africa,” because, “people who have billions of dollars at stake are likely to become forces for peaceful change.”

Like Kissinger, the Carter team is aiming to stem the spread in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and ultimately South Africa, of the kind of revolutionary politics represented by FRELIMO, PAIGC, and MPLA. Unlike Kissinger, however, the Carter team recognizes that efforts to put more pressure on the white regimes on one hand and to court the liberation movements on the other. Clearly, then, corporate investors will continue to have a major role in these plans.

White Wealth and Black Poverty does not discuss this key area, the articulation between corporate investments and US foreign policy strategy, essentially because of the author’s determination to pursue an analysis that is apolitical—avoiding ideological approaches to the issue. Thus, while the strongest possible case is constructed for corporate withdrawal, the pressures and rationales encouraging increased investments and involvement are not fully explained. It is important to remember that the continuing campaign for corporate withdrawal is vital on political grounds, representing support for real liberation in southern Africa as against the neo-colonial strategies being pursued in Washington.

—Richard Leonard

BOOKS RECEIVED


February 3, 1977

Dear Friends,

Let me take this opportunity to say congratulations on your new format and the content of the January/February 1977 issue.

As for the issue itself it was, in a word exciting! Basil Davidson, as competent as he is—gave the reader an extremely comprehensive piece of literature, and information in the space of three pages—that takes our academic friends many more pages to get across: and he was able to do it in such a way that none of the content was missed with fancy phrasemongering.

Good wishes to you for the new year, and keep up the very valuable contribution to the liberation struggle that your magazine makes.

Sincerely,

Earl Smith
University of Connecticut

"Apartheid: Its Economic Base. New Zealand's Economic Collaboration with Apartheid," The National Anti-Apartheid Committee, P.O. Box 9154, Courtenay Place, Wellington, New Zealand. 20c (New Zealand) or 25c (USA).

Africa Revolutionary Music, 60 minute cassette, ZANU Support Committee, 1220 W. Grace St., Chicago, Ill. 60613. $5. 20% discount on orders of 10 or more.

Bank Loans to South Africa, a packet, Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, Room 506, 475 Riverside Drive, N.Y., N.Y. 10027. $1.

INFOSA: Information South Africa, African National Congress—South Africa-Toronto Committee, Box 123, Station E, Toronto, Ontario. M6H 4E1

"Millions Against Millions: The People Against Apartheid," Free Southern Africa Committee, P.O. Box 422, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. $1 with 15% discount for orders of 10 or more.


"South Africa: The Crisis in Britain and the Apartheid Economy," Anti-Apartheid Movement, 89 Charlotte St., London W1P 2DQ England. 50p or 85c (USA).

"South Africa—a Police State?" Interchurch Aid Department of Generale Diakonale Raad der NHK, P.O. Box 14100, Utrecht, the Netherlands, account #69.92.12.219. $3.


"Transkei Independence: Report of the Transkei Study Project," International University Exchange Fund, P.O. Box 348, 1211 Geneva 11 Switzerland. SFr 10 per copy or $4.00.


ZIPA interview with the Mozambique Information Agency, Liberation Support Movement, P.O. Box 94338, Richmond, B.C., Canada V6Y 2A8. 35c.

The Rulers of Africa, a comprehensive wall map of Africa, surrounded by photographs of all ruling heads of state, flags of each country and a table with some primary information on each country, including population, economy, etc. The speed of change in Africa threatens any such resource with obsolescence, before its ink has dried. Thus even the current, updated map contains no reference to the People's Republic of Angola. Nevertheless it is a useful resource, especially for the classroom. Published by Baskai International Marketing Corporation. Copies obtainable from Afram Associates, 68 East 131st St., New York, N.Y. 10037.

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Black South Africa Explodes, a comprehensive account of events in South Africa since the uprising in Soweto, produced by Counter Information Services (CIS) in London, an Institute of Policy Studies Affliate. This report gives a daily chronology of the last six months in the main areas of confrontation, using original source material and a large number of photographs. The account also deals with the white regime's dependence on European and US finance. Single copies $1.75, special rates for bulk orders. Write or call: The Transnational Institute Institute for Policy Studies
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ALONG THE GREAT WHITE WAY... A highly successful boycott of the South African musical, Ipi Tombi, organized by a coalition of solidarity groups, ended with the premature closing of the show some five weeks after it opened. About 500 demonstrators turned out in New York Jan. 12 to protest the Broadway opening of the show, whose presentation of life in the African homelands as a happy fantasy world drew artistic as well as political pans. In the weeks following, 25 to 50 demonstrators continued to picket the show at each performance. The coalition reported during the second week of February that only 200 to 300 people a night were entering the 1,270 seat theater—and that many of these had been given free tickets at places including city methadone centers.

The coalition, which has received letters of support from the OAU and the major South African and Namibian liberation organizations, believes it highly likely that the Vorster regime played a behind-the-scenes role in the show’s tour; it notes South African press reports that the show extended its original run at the government’s request to help draw tourists.

YOU GOTTA HAVE HEART... The Boston Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa called a Valentine’s Day demonstration in front of the Merrill Lynch office to protest the firm’s sale of Krugerrands. Detroit churches sponsored an ad urging people not to buy Krugerrands which ran in the Detroit Free Press, while the National Council of Churches issued a letter to a number of dealers opposing the coins’ sale.

A boycott of the Bank of New Orleans was initiated to protest the sale of Krugerrands there; picketing continued at New York’s Republic National Bank, one of the main distributors of the Krugerrand; Chicago’s black-owned Seaway National Bank stopped Krugerrand sales after bank officials were informed of the assistance given by such sales to the preservation of apartheid. Robert Chrisman, publisher of the scholarly magazine Black Journal, told a Bay Area press conference that payments for Krugerrands are “blood money.”

From the American Committee on Africa comes word that the new phase of the $4 million campaign to sell Krugerrands is intended to focus on the coins as jewelry. The theme: “An ounce of pure love.”

A MOTION FROM THE FLOOR... The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility has arranged the introduction of stockholder resolutions at five bank annual meetings, seeking an end to loans to South Africa until apartheid is abandoned. The action is supported by 15 Protestant and Catholic church groups whose stocks in the five banks involved have a combined worth of nearly $10 million. The five are Citibank, Continental Illinois, First Chicago, Manufacturers Hanover, and Morgan Guarantee.

AMRO, a major Dutch bank, has decided not to make any further loans to South Africa following a campaign by Dutch groups and the World Council of Churches, according to reports reaching New York. AMRO is a major power in the European-American Banking Corp., a consortium of European banks which has syndicated many South African loans in the US.

AIDING RECONSTRUCTION... Showings of O Povo Organizado, Robert von Lierop’s film about independent Mozambique, have raised nearly $40,000—the amount needed to build a medical clinic. The Africa Fund has contributed another $25,000 for medical needs in the form of a foundation grant it sought for that purpose.

BRIEFS... Business Week magazine of Feb. 14 devoted its entire issue to business in Southern Africa... Some 3,200 signatures were obtained on a petition circulated in Boston condemning the South African regime’s brutality toward blacks... The American Committee on Africa sent an open letter to President Carter pointing out that his comments in an interview with the Financial Mail before he took office suggested that he intended to actively encourage further US investment—a step backward from the government’s current policy of assuming a neutral stance. “Increased investments from overseas have not made any change in the basic structure of apartheid,” the letter noted.
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- [ ] Renewal
Change of Address ___________________________

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**SUBSCRIPTION RATES:**

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