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by William Minter

On January 18, at Madjedje in Mozambique’s Niassa Province near the border with Tanzania, a small briefcase began a journey through the ten provinces and 110 districts of Mozambique, passed from hand to hand, to arrive in Maputo for the opening of the Third Congress of FRELIMO on February 3. It contained the documents of FRELIMO’s Second Congress, held at Madjedje in 1968; its journey symbolized the involvement of all of Mozambique in the Congress about to take place, the first since Mozambique’s independence in June 1975.

The Second Congress had taken place in the midst of struggle over many unresolved issues. Four years of war had disillusioned some who had expected a quick victory over the Portuguese. At the same time the victories won—the liberated areas established—had posed basic questions about the organization of a new society. Should there be collective organization of agricultural production? Should leadership be based on traditional structures of authority, or should new democratic structures be organized? Should the oppression of women be challenged, even when based on traditional practices?

The answers chosen by the Second Congress began to turn the national independence struggle into a revolution. It was this decision, commitment to transforming the basic nature of Mozambican society, that made it possible for FRELIMO to lead Mozambique to victory against Portuguese colonialism. The people, especially those in the liberated areas, saw the war as their own. They accepted sacrifices that made it possible to survive Portuguese counterinsurgency campaigns, spread the war and transform life in the areas already under FRELIMO control.

New Stage of Struggle

Winning the war against Portuguese colonialism was not the end of the struggle for the Mozambican people. Delegates gathered in Maputo for the Third Congress heard reports and debates which stressed that Mozambique’s problems had not ended with the coming of independence.

The new state has inherited fundamental problems from Portuguese colonialism, including a poor economy, with the majority of the people involved in subsistence farming that barely gives them enough to eat. The economy had been designed to produce goods, wealth and comfort for the few—now it has to be totally reorganized.

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There are other problems too. For years the Portuguese had kept education and skill to themselves. When they left, after independence, unable to adjust to ending their lives as colonialists, they took with them not only whatever physical wealth they could carry, but also much of the country’s pool of skill and knowledge. Production fell sharply with the mass exodus. Now workers are struggling to run factories with little technical training.

To add to its difficulties Mozambique is bounded on two sides by actively hostile regimes—Rhodesia and South Africa. It is still heavily dependent economically on South Africa, and vulnerable to Pretoria’s maneuvers.

In the face of these extremely difficult conditions, FRELIMO sought to clarify its longtime commitment to the construction of a socialist state in Mozambique. Seven theses, examining the conditions that exist in the country, and outlining the ideas and principles that FRELIMO proposed should carry the country forward to socialism, were presented to the population for discussion some months before the Congress.

Mozambicans participated very actively in debate on the theses. Meetings and study groups in town, village and countryside gave people the opportunity of participating very directly in shaping the future of their society.

At first, according to Mozambique press reports, many people said “Congress will solve our problems.” As discussion evolved, people came to understand that the Congress could not solve the problems. Its task was to set the strategy and the division of tasks for the people to organize to solve the problems.

Over 200 delegates (40% working class (classe operaria), 27% peasants and 33% workers in other sectors, such as health and education) came to Maputo to clarify the tasks ahead. In an exciting session that lasted more than
nine hours, they heard President Machel present the Central Committee report, which outlined FRELIMO's objective of building a society based on the principles of scientific socialism.

The report traced the history of the struggle led by FRELIMO, the meaning of the decisions of the Second Congress, the difficulties, lessons and victories of the war, of the transitional government, of the period since independence. It focused on the class struggle in independent Mozambique and the necessity of a clear class option for the workers and peasants if any embryonic petit-bourgeoisie anxious to replace the colonialists in the posts of privilege were to be prevented from gaining control.

Creating A Party

President Machel told the delegates "the struggle we have taken on is arduous and long." Socialism would not be built easily. The people, he warned, would find their interests opposed by imperialism and its allies, internal reactionaries and the remnants of the colonial bourgeoisie. The working masses would have to organize themselves to "impose their will over the internal exploiters" and to defend their revolution. Again and again the importance of "a people organized" was stressed—as was the importance of the alliance between workers and peasants.

As had been discussed in the Congress theses, the report spoke of transforming FRELIMO into a vanguard Marxist-Leninist political party. Building on the tradition of struggle during the war, and on the organization of "dynamizing groups" in the last two years, FRELIMO is to limit its membership to those with the greatest class consciousness, ideological firmness and revolutionary spirit. It will also intensify the study of revolutionary theory as a guide to action in the difficult process of creating the bases for building a socialist society. The systematic organization of the party will build on the structures already existing in the People's Forces, in the "liberated areas" and in the "dynamizing groups" in neighborhood and workplace.

Alongside the party organization, there will be mass organizations open to all Mozambicans: the Organization of Mozambican Women, organizations of workers and of peasants, especially those in communal villages or cooperatives, and other organizations.

To ensure the establishment of popular democracy President Machel announced that general elections to establish a Peoples' Assembly will be held in February 1978. The Assembly will be the highest legislative body of the state.

Economic Planning

The Report on Economic and Social Guidelines was presented by Mozambique's Economics and Planning Minister Marcelino dos Santos. It laid out Mozambique's economic plans for the next four years. 1980 has been set as the target year for regaining the levels of production which existed prior to the last years of the war and the crisis provoked by the exodus of technicians. Immediate priority was given to agricultural production aimed at the increased production of basic foodstuffs. Expanding industrial processing of agricultural goods and production of cloth, clothing and footwear for the people, is also an urgent priority.

The development of heavy industry was given long range emphasis as a "decisive phase in economic development which will create the conditions for real equality and liberate us from economic dependency . . ."

State enterprises, both farms and factories, are to play a central role. Stress was laid on the need for increased productivity and also the organization of more effective means of workers' control and participation in decision-making. Communal villages and cooperatives are to remain the primary focus of organization of the masses of the peasants, in the rural sector.

Mass Participation

FRELIMO is well aware that carrying out such plans is above all dependent on an active and mobilized people, who feel confident about FRELIMO leadership. Such a spirit obviously exists in Mozambique at the moment. In Mocimboa da Praia, in northern Cabo Delgado province, the population demonstrated their symbolic solidarity with FRELIMO and the Party Congress in a typically practical way—on the second day of the Congress 11,000 people cleared more than 1600 acres for planting bananas, pineapple and coconut trees.
FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT

ON THE WORKER-PEASANT ALLIANCE

It is at this stage that the power of the worker-peasant alliance consolidates its roots in society. In the process of sharpening the class struggle, the workers continually deepen their class consciousness. Working in the factories, organized by the party, this class acquires a high degree of organization and collectivization of work. Struggling for the social control of their own production, the working class sees the antagonistic contradiction which opposes it to private possession of the means of production. Thus it gradually acquires the conditions which make it the leading body in the process of liberation of society from all forms of exploitation. It is thus that the working class, assuming the long tradition of struggle of the Mozambican people, becomes the leading force in the construction of the socialist society.

The peasantry is the fundamental ally of the working class; they form the majority of our population. Brutally exploited by the colonial system, they played a decisive role in the armed national liberation struggle. The majority of the fighters, cadres and militants of FRELIMO are of peasant origin. It was the peasants who bore the greatest weight of the People's Revolutionary War, who were the permanent target of attacks, bombardments, crimes and massacres carried out by the colonialist forces. The production that fed the fighters, the transport of war materiel, the internal security of the liberated zones were guaranteed by the organized peasants. It was the peasants who, under the revolutionary leadership of FRELIMO, overthrew the feudal class and the new exploiters in the liberated zones. Their alliance with the working class was forged in the process of national liberation and bases itself on the common interest of workers and peasants in the liquidation of all forms of exploitation. Today, the peasantry, the principal force of the revolution, is involving itself enthusiastically in the communal village movement.

It should be noted that in spite of the inadequacies of the state apparatus and its incapacity to respond in time and correctly to the impetuous development of the communal villages, in spite of errors due to bureaucratic mentality, the peasant masses did not demobilize. Rather by their creative initiative and by arduous work they consolidated and made the communal villages an irresistible conquest of our revolution and the future image of our countryside.

According to recent visitors, in spite of the problems facing them, the people of Mozambique display strong support for FRELIMO, and a genuine sense of progress being made. The people can already point to government actions in nationalization and reorganization of health, education, housing and land usage that have meant concrete improvements for the average worker or peasant. Perhaps most important of all men and women have the experience of having participated in countless meetings where national and local problems were discussed, where decisions were taken about what needs to be done and where commitments were made to shoulder responsibility for the work involved.

As the Congress drew to a close, a new expanded Central Committee of 67 members and a nine person permanent political committee were elected to lead the party until the next Congress. Elected to the permanent political committee were veterans of the long years of struggle, all having demonstrated their ability to work with the people.

One of FRELIMO's continuing strengths has been its ability to involve the people very profoundly in every aspect of the process of social transformation. As the Congress worked to outline the strategy for the task ahead—the building of a socialist state—President Machel underscored the central importance of maintaining the commitment to mass participation, of ensuring that the actions taken represent the interests of the mass of the people.

It is not enough to proclaim the leading role of the party, it is necessary to win it in practice. There is only one way for FRELIMO to affirm itself with the masses as a leading force: continuous and persevering work in defending the interests of the masses, and struggle for meeting the material, intellectual and cultural needs of the workers, struggle for the just demands of the people.

ON BUILDING A PARTY

It was in the course of that struggle of classes in the midst of the front that the most conscious elements of the Mozambican working classes understood that in order to win the class battle against foreign and domestic reactionaries, the working classes had to be united, organized, conscious of the ultimate objectives of their struggle, and armed with its scientific ideology.

This situation made it possible to begin the long process leading to the creation of the party. In 1973, the People's Forces party committees were created. They grouped the most conscious, most dedicated, most disciplined militants, capable of being elements who could propagate our policy with the militants and the masses in general. In January of 1974 the party school began its work, to synthesize and theorize our experiences, to furnish a theoretical base to the cadres and militants.

The conquest of national independence, taking of political power at the national level by the working classes, made the need for a party stand out even more clearly and sharply.

The creation of the party emerges as a necessity of the development of the revolution.

Without a vanguard party that knows how to lead the working classes through all the phases of class struggle, there can be no socialist revolution. But the vanguard party does not win by itself.

It is the people, organized, who make the revolution, it is the broad working masses. The central task of the party consists precisely in unifying, organizing, educating and leading the masses so that they may make the revolution.

The force of our party lies in its intimate unity with the masses, in its capacity for organization and leadership of the masses. FRELIMO will always live rooted in the masses, educating them continuously in acquiring a revolutionary consciousness, engaging them in active struggle against exploiters.

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A SOUTH ATLANTIC PACT IN THE MAKING

by Robert A. Manning

LONDON—In the aftermath of the 1974 coup in Portugal, concern for the South Atlantic region has grown considerably in Western military and strategic circles. This is particularly so since the Popular Movement’s victory in Angola, which signalled the termination of Portuguese colonialism in the South Atlantic region.

Events now point to the unfolding of a new military alliance designed to maintain Western hegemony over the South Atlantic—bringing together forces on both sides of the ocean. What the West apparently envisions is a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO), which would probably be “independent,” but aligned with NATO, its northern neighbor.

Indeed, as Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento recently noted: “While trying to impose his own solution in southern Africa, former Secretary of State Kissinger created the conditions for a military pact in the South Atlantic which would include South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and the US. The goal of this pact is to concentrate ‘imperialist forces’ around southern Africa and Angola.”

Geo-Political Context

While the strategic role of the South Atlantic has not significantly changed—it is the sea route for the bulk of Mideast oil and for other commodities destined for NATO countries—the geopolitical context of the region has altered drastically in recent years. The South Atlantic is not a strategic vacuum suddenly being filled. Since the days of the Monroe Doctrine the US has played a leading role in exerting maritime control on its side of the South Atlantic. In 1956, for example, a Washington-inspired Inter-American Naval Committee was formed. It was made up of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay and conducted naval maneuvers jointly with the US between 1956-60.

This pact was primarily a training exercise; more elaborate co-ordinated commands were formed by these Latin nations after 1960. These coalesced under the US Navy’s South Atlantic Operational Command (COMSOLAT). But until the Lisbon coup, the South Atlantic remained in the backwaters of US strategic priorities as a relatively stable region—contained in a Brazil-Lisbon-Luanda axis—with Portuguese-controlled Azores and Cape Verde Islands in between.

South Africa Offers Bases

During this period, South Africa trumpeted its geopolitical virtues, its role in the economy of the West and its strategic location. South Africa was engaged in a conscious effort to secure a NATO commitment to its strategically attractive military bases and its military intelligence-communications facility at Silvermine. The huge computer complex at Silvermine monitors air and sea traffic from the coast of Venezuela to the Bay of Bengal, forwarding information to the warrooms of the Pentagon, London, and Brussels, and the US has long shared intelligence coming from this source.

By the early 1970s, South Africa had made some marginal inroads to NATO. These included NATO contingency plans for operations in southern Africa drawn up by the Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic (SACLANT) and NATO communications supplied to the Silvermine complex.

The mid-60s also saw Pretoria beginning to make inroads with many of the key South Atlantic nations—Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and others. In 1968-69 Brazil participated in naval exercises organized by Portugal and South Africa. In 1967 Argentina conducted joint naval maneuvers with South Africa.

Latin America Links

As early as 1965, Brazil’s trade with South Africa totalled $8.5-million. Since then, South Africa has aggressively pursued trade links with other key Latin nations like Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile—after the anti-Allende coup. Not surprisingly, all of these are governed by right-wing mili-
military dictatorships. Pretoria has established full diplomatic links with these nations and lower-level ties with at least half a dozen other ultra-conservative Latin and Central American regimes.

In the early 1970s, South African trade missions began to appear in full force at Latin American trade fairs. Although both trade and investment are still relatively small, the huge potential markets across the Atlantic could serve to export some of Pretoria’s contradictions. From a $57 million fertilizer plant in Paraguay, a cement factory in Uruguay, to a $20 million irrigation and construction project in Peru, South African efforts—aimed largely at bolstering its fledgling capital goods industry—began to pay off. Ironically, just a week before the April 1974 overthrow of fascism in Portugal, a development which dramatically altered the strategic balance in the South Atlantic, Pretoria scored a major diplomatic coup when Paraguayan President Gen. Alfredo Stroessner became the first Latin American head of state to visit South Africa.

**The Angolan Effect**

But it was the internationalization of the Angola conflict that began to hurry all these concerned parties in the South Atlantic together. NATO has for some time been readying plans for a joint naval task force in the South Atlantic. At the NATO summit in Ottawa, Canada, in October, 1974, a declaration was issued extending NATO operational bounds “wherever mutual interests arise.” In May 1975 a NATO defense ministers’ meeting heard US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger propose using Pretoria’s Simonstown base in the NATO framework.

Prime Minister Vorster’s visit to Paraguay and Uruguay in August of 1975 further boosted South Africa’s Latin American connection. But it was the specter of more than 10,000 Cuban troops in Angola in November, 1975—responding to South Africa’s blitzkrieg invasion of Angola—that triggered a flurry of high-level naval meetings between the US, Latin American military chiefs, and South African officials. The Cuban presence in Angola could be used to provide the ultra rightist military planners in Latin America with the “external threat” which would enable them to dramatically upgrade the level of military cooperation. The consistently non-aligned foreign policy of the OPA, the political constitution that prohibits any foreign naval bases in Angola were omitted in the anti-Cuba frenzy.

Cuba’s role in Angola was high on Henry Kissinger’s agenda during his last Latin American shuttle in February, 1976. That round of diplomacy resulted in new accords in the US’s “special relationship” with the key sub-imperial power, Brazil. Not long thereafter, as Kissinger was gearing up for his unprecedented shuttle to southern Africa, the US military organized a series of conferences in Buenos Aires. The Pentagon was putting the final touches on its strategy for the whole Southern Hemisphere. This strategy is aptly suggested by the recently built US naval base in the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia island.

**Strategy Conference for South Atlantic**

Among the naval officials present in Buenos Aires were George Ellis, outgoing Commander of US naval forces in the South Atlantic; his designated successor, James Sagerholm; Brazilian Naval Minister Azevedo Henning; and Argentine Naval Commander and member of the ruling junta, Emilio Massera. The official purpose of the meetings was the question of security in the South Atlantic, closer coordination of naval policies in the region among the two dominant naval powers, and preparation for the UNITAS (a codename) joint naval exercises. Ellis and Sagerholm presented an ambitious plan for creating an integrated naval strike force with a single strategic command, air power, and with its own bases.

Shortly after navy officials left Argentina, there was an unusual press campaign in both Argentina and Brazil, which voiced concern for the “menace” posed by the “Marxist governments of Angola and Mozambique.” These countries were said to be part of the alleged—but thoroughly undocumented—“Soviet naval presence” in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. The conservative Argentine daily, La Nación, editorialized: “Our relationship with South Africa must be reconsidered. South Africa is a bastion in the struggle against Communist infiltration already present in the South Atlantic.” At the end of April, a joint naval mission from Argentina and Brazil arrived at Simonstown. The goal of the visit was to arrange preliminary logistic contingencies for future naval cooperation in the South Atlantic.

**Naval Pact Alleged**

In August and September of last year, there was growing speculation that a new South Atlantic military pact was in the works. The Deputy Chief of US Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Shear, declared that the US would continue to hold UNITAS maneuvers “to preserve South Atlantic security.”

Speaking at the Eighth Interamerican Conference, Shear refused to comment at that time on stories charging that a study was presented at the Conference for creating an interamerican naval force. But as UNITAS exercises got underway shortly after the conference, the right-wing Brazilian daily, O Estado de Sao Paulo, claimed in a front page story that the creation of a permanent interamerican naval force to assure a permanent presence in the South Atlantic was under study by a number of Latin American countries.

In a move believed to have been inspired by the Argentine and Chilean navies, the Argentine daily Hoy and the Chilean weekly Que Pasa both published detailed versions of the naval pact allegedly being considered. Both charged that Britain and South Africa were involved in SATO plans and said that the pact could solve the Falkland Malvinas islands dispute between Britain and Argentina by turning the islands into a major strategic base for SATO. It is also worth noting that two days before the Interamerican Naval Conference, the British Arms and Weapons floated the idea that Brazil might soon join NATO. Such a move would not only be testimony to Brazil’s rise as a regional power but would also cover South Atlantic contingencies, without a new organization, although it would snub Argentina and South Africa.

The differing ideas being canvassed as to the form prospective Western military commitment in the South Atlantic may take, underscore some of the contradictory tendencies within the potential SATO community. The most obvious is the embarrassment that an open alliance with South Africa would bring. Although nations such as Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay are not paralyzed by this stigma, both the US and Brazil are in a different situation vis-a-vis South Africa.

For the US, an open alliance with Pretoria, before substantial reforms of Pretoria’s apartheid system occur, does not appear to be an easy option. Such a development would go against the grain of the new policy image of support for “majority rule” that is now being heavily promoted.

On the other hand, when Henry Kissinger went to meet Prime Minister Vorster in Switzerland last September, he also had a two-hour meeting with NATO Commander in Chief Alexander Haig, who came to Zurich for the occasion. The State Department denied that southern Africa was a topic of discussion, but the coincidence reinforced concern that the US continues to press for strategic linkages that include South Africa.

There are two possibilities to circumvent this obstacle. One is for the Carter Administration to apply severe pressure on the Vorster regime to implement “reform from above,” dismantling the naked apartheid apparatus and moving towards the federal structure advocated in some “liberal” Afrikaner circles and apparently also acceptable to Carter’s National Security chief—Zbig Brzezinski. But the steady rightward drift of the Vorster regime in recent months would appear to preclude this option in the immediate future.

The other option is to support without formally joining a military alliance of “middle powers”—South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. This would be in accord with the “Nixon Doctrine,” which calls for US support through arms and military training of regional allies. Such support is normally backed by US air and sea power with “quick strike” capability.

A third variant of these options would be to integrate South Africa gradually—as has been the pattern with NATO—anticipating eventual political changes in South Africa that would permit the lifting of a military quarantine on the official level.

Similarly, while elements within the Brazilian military have urged the creation of SATO, Brazil’s foreign policy, which includes the cultivation of closer ties with Black Africa, is at odds with an open military association with South Africa. Brazil’s commercial ties with Angola, for instance, have burgeoned in the months since Angolan independence.

But beyond these contradictions, South Atlantic politics are also complicated by rivalry and hostilities between the Brazilian and Argentine military establishments. There are also internal rivalries within the Argentine military—between the army which controls the junta, and the navy, which has strongly advocated SATO in an effort to gain prestige. Moreover, these nations have advanced conflicting claims in the Antarctic, where substantial amounts of oil, gas, manganese, and uranium deposits are believed to be recoverable.

Policy Contradictions

Some of these contradictions were embodied in developments last September, when Brazil’s foreign minister, Antonio Azevedo da Silveira, demanded that Pretoria governments and stated that “there is not the slightest possibility of a system of collective defense in the South Atlantic” if South Africa were involved. At the same time, Admiral James Johnston, chief of the South Africa navy, visited Argentina in mid-September. During Johnson’s visit, Argentine Admiral Cesar Guzzetti declared in an interview that a South Atlantic treaty involving South Africa would be an efficient means of guaranteeing the security of the Cape Route. Later that month US Assistant Secretary for Maritime Affairs Robert Blackwell visited Argentina. He deplored the growing Soviet merchant ship activities trading with Latin America and said “an offensive threat” in the South Atlantic could not be ruled out. He cited Angola as reflecting the “projection of Russian power great distances from their home waters.” Shortly after these developments, the Buenos Aires daily Clarín, noted for its good government contacts, said that the Argentine foreign ministry did not think another anti-Soviet Atlantic alliance was necessary, at least for the present.

Nonetheless, economic and technical ties between Pretoria and Argentina, as well as Brazil and Uruguay, continue to blossom. In late October, four separate groups of South African financiers and industrialists conducted exploratory missions to these countries with possible loans, credits, mining projects and ship and aeronautical deals in the works. Moreover, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile have discussed with South Africa the possibility of white emigration from South Africa and Rhodesia if such contingencies arise.

It should also be noted that Brazil, Argentina and South Africa are all close to obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities. Although the level of technical cooperation in this sphere is not fully known, the head of South Africa’s Atomic Energy Board visited Brazil and Argentina as far back as 1967 to discuss “nuclear energy matters of common concern.” It appears that there is growing cooperation—economic, technical, diplomatic, military—among Washington’s regional gendarmes. The question of South Africa’s role is the prime obstacle to reaching a full SATO pact.

US Southern Hemisphere Plans

If a formal SATO alliance is initiated it would bolster the weakest link in the Pentagon’s “Southern Hemisphere strategy.” Since 1972, the US Pacific Command (PACOM) has expanded its official area of responsibility to encompass the entire Indian Ocean. The US has been cultivating allies from South Africa at one end of the region, to Australia at the other, strung together by the strategic capabilities of the Diego Garcia base in the center of the Indian Ocean.

The Pentagon has constructed a strategic ring around the Indian Ocean—from bases in Guam, Tinian, the Philippines, Japan and Singapore to close ties with US-trained and -armed forces in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Closer to the Indian Ocean, the US maintains a base on the Omani island of Masirah. South Africa’s Simonstown naval base and its Silvermine communications center would fit neatly into this global design.

The last leg of the Cape sea route, through which 24,000 ships pass each year, would complete US hegemony over the sea lanes of the Southern Hemisphere. While the Pentagon has often complained of the growing “Soviet menace”—and it is true that, relatively speaking, Soviet naval capabilities are growing—the USSR has no full-time bases in the Indian Ocean with the possible exception of the disputed Soviet-built facility in Somalia. Where the US has 14 full aircraft carriers, the USSR has no comparable “forward attack” capability.

The US defeat in Vietnam led to the formation of the “Nixon Doctrine” and a focus on the Indian Ocean. Now events in southern Africa have brought the old notion of SATO front and center. With the conflict in southern Africa continuing to intensify, this trend will probably accelerate, placing a new Western military commitment on the agenda. This is clearly a notion that has increasingly gained currency in military circles. The key questions appear to revolve around the sensitive diplomatic and political issues involved.

As an article on SATO in the October 1976 issue of Seapower, the publication of the US Navy League, commented: “American strategic thinking in the region is undergoing a deserved overhaul.” In Seapower’s view, “recent signs indicate that the US hopes to maintain, with the aid of friendly governments, a cooperative, indirect influence in the region.

Robert Manning who writes regularly for London-based African Development, has travelled extensively in Africa.
Namibia: A Country at War

by Sean Gervasi

Namibia today is a country at war. South Africa continues to try to enforce its rule, and the Namibian people have rebelled. During the last two years, large numbers of Namibians have joined the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the military wing of the South West Africa People's Organization. PLAN has now carried the struggle in Namibia to an entirely new stage. It is carrying out military operations against the South African security forces in the whole northern part of the country almost continuously. Its forces have undertaken extensive political education among the people, and have secured mass support for the armed struggle. PLAN has established important bases in Namibian territory, and it is now fighting for the eastern Ovambo and western Kavango regions. As even the South African newspapers have indicated, support for SWAPO grows all the time.

The South African response to this has been savage. Tens of thousands of troops and police have been sent into the “operational area” in the north. Opponents of the bantustan “governments” are jailed and tortured. Police and the army have been given almost absolute powers for search and detention. A state of emergency has been declared in the three northern regions. A “free-fire zone” is being created on the border with Angola, replete with minefields, fences, “automated” artillery fire and helicopter patrols. “Search-and-destroy” missions are carried out frequently by South African security forces. Villages are burned and populations are “relocated.”

Most Western observers, however—and Americans in particular—refuse to acknowledge that anything of importance is happening in Namibia. They obdurately refuse to recognize that there is a war going on, even when the facts are placed in front of them. When asked recently what the Carter Administration proposed to do about South Africa’s troops in Namibia, a high US official replied that he had not given the matter much thought. This is, of course, the familiar bureaucratic blindness, which dismisses every perception that is inconsistent with the needs of policy or the assumptions upon which it is built. There are clearly some people in the new Administration, and in Europe, who realize that it is blindness.

“Peaceful Solution” Sought

Western governments are now in the process of elaborating a policy towards southern Africa that makes it almost impossible for them to deal with hard facts. These governments want to see a “peaceful evolution” towards majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe. The “state interests” of the western powers call for it. It is only by a “peaceful evolution,” they realize, that “moderate leaders” who will be sympathetic to
Western interests can come to power. In their view, the continuation of the armed struggle is likely to bring to power people who will not hesitate to carry out thorough and radical reforms, reforms which could unsettle the usual and profitable relations between these two countries and the industrial nations of the Western bloc. All efforts, therefore, are now bent towards ensuring a "peaceful evolution" to majority rule in southern Africa. One high US official recently described his job as being "to compete with the armed struggle."

Officials involved in working out this policy—and in organizing the means to ensure its success—evidently cannot ask themselves what will happen if their policy does not work. They are not willing to confront the fact that there are wars going on, that the people of Namibia, for instance, are waging an armed struggle that has mass support. If they did, they would see more readily that what they view as their state interests call for the imposition of a Western solution in southern Africa, a solution that Africans might choose, but one that they must also be free to reject. To stop the armed struggle in Namibia at this time is to defeat the Namibian people and to hand victory to the Republic of South Africa, a victory which some blandly call "stability." For the Namibian people, however, this would not be stability, but rather a continuation of apartheid, the exploitation of their resources, and the oppression of their country.

Inaction A Policy

Thus, although some see and understand what is happening in Namibia, those who make policy wish at this moment to avoid the subject, to "keep all the options open." In the present context, however, inaction is a policy. In an important sense, it places the initiative in South African hands. And to allow South Africa to carry out the policy that it is now elaborating in Namibia is to court disaster. South Africa thinks that it has a solution for Namibia that will meet its own needs and placate the international community, which might otherwise take action against it. What South Africa is actually proposing, however, is a formula that will lead to an escalating war in southwestern Africa. The major Western powers could well be dragged into this war if they fail to analyze the situation properly, and they will be dragged in on the South African side.

It is therefore absolutely essential at this stage to clarify what is happening in Namibia. People in the Western countries must be made to understand that there is a war going on in Namibia and that there is only one way to stop it—by withdrawing from South Africa the economic, financial, diplomatic, and military support that now make it possible for it to wage that war. Western governments must be made to see that even a tacit acceptance of South Africa's policy will be exceedingly dangerous and, in the long run, quite counter-productive.

Implications of South Africa's Policy

In recent weeks senior South African officials have made Pretoria's policy towards Namibia abundantly clear. In a series of private interviews they have described in detail the course they propose to pursue over the next two years. Their basic objective is to secure the northern border of the Republic from any potential threat. South Africa cannot afford to have a "SWAPO Marxist state" on its northern frontier for military and political reasons. Such a state could be expected to support the liberation struggle in South Africa itself. And that is regarded as intolerable. Even if it held the South African liberation movement in check, a government that proceeded to dismantle apartheid on South Africa's border would have a dangerous impact on the internal situation in the Republic.

South African officials say the only "solution" at this stage is to seal the Namibian frontier with Angola and to establish a regime in Namibia that is responsive to South African interests—that is, to establish a "government" which is dependent upon, and controlled by, South Africa. Namibia must remain within the South African sphere of influence. The South African government, in short, is still proposing to follow through with the plan that has been elaborated at the Turnhalle "constitutional conference" in Windhoek. That plan calls for a new "multiracial" transition regime and "independence" at the end of 1978. In their recent interviews South African officials have been "clarifying" the fine print in the Turnhalle proposals. SWAPO is to be excluded from any settlement. The economy is to remain in the hands of the white community and the transnational corporations. South African troops and police are to remain in Namibia to back whatever arrangements are finally settled upon. In short, there is to be some kind of "multi-racial government." For the rest, things are to remain as they are.

Turnhalle's Lack of Credibility

South African officials freely admit that the Turnhalle conference has little credibility, and that the kind of interim government it is proposing would have little popular support. They sometimes acknowledge that SWAPO has extensive support and that a Turnhalle regime will be opposed. But they argue that their "solution" can be made to work. If an interim government can be established, South Africa will back it with money and troops. It expects support from the large transnational corporations. It is concerned about the attitude of the United Nations and some Western governments. It is hoping, however, that there will be no active international opposition to a Turnhalle solution. If a "multiracial" regime can be established, South African officials say, it will gain credibility and support "in time." At that point, they add seductively: "We might even make a deal with SWAPO. But only from a position of strength."

Thus the South African view is that the Namibian problem can be solved by moving the country "towards independence" while ensuring that a "moderate leadership" is installed. This is the classical neo-colonial solution. And it seems to articulate perfectly with the kind of solution proposed by Henry Kissinger for Namibia and Zimbabwe. It is the kind of solution that many Western governments say they want. The Common Market countries have, it is true, denounced Turnhalle. And US officials continue to be critical of the Turnhalle idea in public. This is no guarantee that they will actively oppose South Africa's efforts to impose such a solution. There have been too many indications that Western governments, and particularly the Carter administration, are prepared to let South Africa have its way. Henry Kissinger studiously avoided pressing South Africa on the question of Namibia. He was unable to deliver any South African concessions when he discussed Namibia with SWAPO in New York. There is no sign that anyone has more recently been willing or able to get South Africa to negotiate with SWAPO. And there seems little prospect that South Africa will adopt any line other than the one for which it is now actively seeking international support.

Control Threatened

What will happen if the major Western powers simply adopt a "hands off" policy on the Namibian question at this time? The answer can be found by looking briefly at the politico-military situation in Namibia today.

As indicated, there is now a major conflict raging in Namibia. With the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa in 1974 the strategic balance in southern Africa changed. South Africa was profoundly shaken and frightened by the events to the north. It became particularly alarmed at the situation on the Namibian border with Angola. And almost immediately it began to turn northern Namibia into a kind of for-
PROBABLE SADF BRIGADE AND BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
NORTHERN NAMIBIA, 1977

Northern Command
Grootfontein
HQ 16th Support Command
HQ 301 Air Component
SAAF Strike Command base

Ovambo Region
Ondangua
HQ armored brigade group
HQ infantry brigade group
parachute battalion

Ruacana Falls
mechanized battalion
infantry battalion

Onunu
infantry battalion

Oshakati
SA Police battalion

Oshikango
mechanized battalion

Eenhana
SA Police battalion

Nkongo
infantry battalion
(eastern Ovambo region) Ovambo-Kavango battalion

Kavango Region
Rundu
HQ infantry brigade

Kuringkuru
SA Police battalion
(central Kavango region) FNLA/UNITA battalion
FNLA/UNITA battalion

Caprivi Strip
Katima Mulilo
infantry battalion
SAAF Strike Command base (M'pacha)

Andara
infantry battalion

(central Caprivi) FNLA/UNITA battalion

ESTIMATED MINIMUM MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BORDER FORCES IN NAMIBIA, 1977

Low Intensity War
5 infantry battalions 3,500 men
3 South African Police “coin” battalions 2,100 men
1 Ovambo-Kavango battalion 700 men
3 FNLA/UNITA battalions 2,100 men
combat support units1 8,400 men

Reaction Force
1 armored battalion 500 men
2 mechanized battalions 1,000 men
1 infantry battalion 700 men
1 parachute battalion 700 men
combat support units1 2,900 men
TOTAL GROUND COMBAT FORCES 22,600 men

Ground Support Units2
16th Support Command, signals units, 22,600 men
engineer units, medical units, quartermaster
units, technical units, intelligence units, etc.

Air Force and Air Commandos
175-200 helicopters and light strike, transport 8,000 men
transport and liaison aircraft, 301 Air
Component and supporting units
TOTAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES 53,200 men

1. Field mechanized, AA, light artillery, signals, engineer and medical units.
2. Rear area infrastructure. This does not include local police.

The Ford Administration and the US military evidently shared South Africa's view of the developing “threat” against Namibia. That was one important reason, as a high Defense Dept. official explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year, for the authorization of a covert operation against the Popular Movement in Angola in early 1975. At that time President Ford authorized the "largest covert operation ever mounted outside Southeast Asia" to prevent the MPLA from assuming a dominant, or even a significant, role in Angola after the departure of the Portuguese. However, the US attempt to use the National Front and the National Union failed miserably. By the early summer of 1975 South Africa confronted a very uncertain and “frightening” situation. It could see that the MPLA would not be crushed easily. And it feared a militant and hostile Angolan government would take power in November of that year.

In the spring of 1975, from bases in Namibia, South Africa began to infiltrate men and equipment to UNITA and to mercenaries in southern Angola. In October panic set in. South Africa unleashed a major invasion of Angola, sending several armored columns deep into the north to seize Luanda, which was already under siege from FNLA and mercenary forces in the north. South Africa failed: FNLA and UNITA forces suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the MPLA and of Cuban units rushed to the country in the fall. South Africa withdrew from Angola in March of 1976, the United States, it is now clear, having played a major role behind the scenes in an effort to assist South Africa.

SWAPO Resistance Intensifies
In the past nine months South Africa has seen the military situation shift against it once more. Angola can be counted on, after an aggression which turned Africa upside down, to support SWAPO’s struggle. And SWAPO has intensified its efforts everywhere in the country. A state of emergency was declared. A new road network was hurried to completion. Airports and airfields were built everywhere. Troops and helicopters were rushed in. Nonetheless, in 1974 and 1975, SWAPO was able to extend and intensify its armed struggle in the northern part of the country. It scored many successes in the Caprivi and Kavango regions in the latter part of 1974 and the first half of 1975. South African officials began to talk about the buildup of PLAN forces. By mid-1975 they admitted the presence of at least 3,500 SWAPO guerrillas. They saw the situation as dangerously threatening.
northern Namibia. It poses a serious challenge to the tribal authorities in the Ovambo region. Large numbers of PLAN fighters have been able to infiltrate into the country from the north. By the summer of last year PLAN units had begun to infiltrate deep into the white areas. Engagements took place for the first time in the Police Zone. More recently PLAN forces in the north have become partially motorized. PLAN has periodically sent large units into action. SWAPO, in other words, has shown that it is developing real military strength in the north, a strength made possible to a significant extent by the support it receives from the local population.

South Africa has refused to recognize the meaning of these developments. It has not responded by entering into negotiations with SWAPO, but simply by trying to defeat it. It has sent increased numbers of troops into the northern areas. By the beginning of the year it was estimated that South Africa had sent some 50,000 men to the "operational area," the equivalent of several brigades and a good part of the standing army and the police forces. It is now fighting a low-intensity war across an area some 800 miles long and 150 miles wide, an area which it cannot possibly control and in which the population strongly opposes South African rule.

South Africa is thus caught in a trap in Namibia. It cannot possibly win the kind of war in which it is now engaged. It probably cannot even succeed in sealing the Angolan border in the Ovambo region. As it moves towards the establishment of an interim regime under Pretoria's tutelage, it therefore confronts the prospect of a continuously expanding war in the north, a war which is bound to extend itself eventually to the south and into the urban areas. There is no way that the South African government can avoid such a war if it proposes to continue on the present course. Indeed, SWAPO and the Organization of African Unity are bound to intensify their efforts to liberate the country as South Africa moves towards implementing the plans elaborated at Turnhalle.

Western Support for South Africa

The present moment is also an exceedingly dangerous one for the international community. South Africa could not possibly win the gamble it has undertaken in Namibia if it did not have the tacit support of the major Western powers. It does have such support. These governments persistently criticize South African policies in Namibia, but some of them have also blocked UN action in the Security Council. Through various but known channels, they are providing the weapons with which South Africa is fighting the war in Namibia. And they are providing a diplomatic screen for South Africa by pretending that nothing is happening in Namibia. They may well be hoping that South Africa succeeds.

If so, they are very much mistaken. The war will continue to expand unless South Africa ends its occupation of Namibia. And, as South Africa has neither the manpower nor the resources to conduct this war, escalation will bring more insistent requests for "assistance" of various kinds. And there will be many in the Western countries, especially those who exercise power in secret, who will demand that the West go to the aid of South Africa in order to prevent "another Angolan debacle." It is time to get the issues out into the open and to recognize exactly what kind of situation is developing. Not to do so—to continue to accept the bland pleadings of the policy makers for "patience"—would be the most extreme kind of folly.

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**U.S./South Africa**

**NEW ADMINISTRATION—NEW POLICY?**

The new Administration's first public move on southern Africa was to support the Congressional effort to end US mineral imports from Rhodesia—an issue clearly intended to differentiate Carter from his Republican predecessor and demonstrate his commitment to peaceful transition to majority rule.

**$135 Million Requested**

At the same time, however, the Government in presenting its foreign aid package to Congress quietly requested $135 million in Security Support Assistance for Africa, with $100 million specifically earmarked to aid the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe or Namibia. The administration said the Security Support Assistance, including a $100 million Southern Africa Special Requirements Fund, was needed to "promote economic stability" and "achieve peaceful political change." It would be administered by AID.

One of the main rationales advanced for the Fund was to "reinforce" the major US negotiating role on the future of Zimbabwe and Namibia "by economic actions to promote political stability and to demonstrate that the US can be counted on to co-operate in a constructive manner." The focus was largely on Zimbabwe, where a "multilateral Zimbabwe Development Fund is planned, and new bilateral programs will also be required."

**Zimbabwe and Namibia Excluded**

About ten days after the original request was presented to Congress, the State Department decided that any request for Zimbabwe and Namibia would be excluded from the $100 million Fund, probably because negotiations for a "transition to majority rule" had become stalled. According to the State Department these would be presented later so as to be "related more closely to the timing of the negotiations." Instead of the specific reference to the Zimbabwe Development Fund, the new rationale says, "the transitional and post-transitional periods will entail significant requirements for technical and economic assistance. Potential requirements and appropriate multilateral mechanisms are being studied..." With Namibia and Zimbabwe dropped from the list, five independent states with "serious economic difficulties" are now slated to get the full $135 million.

**Flexible Foreign Aid**

Security Support Assistance is a type of foreign economic aid the President...
can use "to support or promote economic or political stability." It allows the administration greater flexibility than other development assistance programs, and only twelve nations can receive it each year. Most of the Security Supporting Assistance Program originally went to countries in Indochina, and now it goes mostly to the Middle East. Assistance to southern Africa in this category has expanded in the last two years from $12 million to $135 million.

The revised explanation provided to Congress suggests that a large part of the emphasis will now be on Zaire, where US military aid and balance of payments support increased last year during the Angolan war and is on the increase again. AID says that the funds will be used for the following kinds of projects:
- balance of payments support for Zaire and Zambia;
- development of transportation routes for Botswana and Lesotho;
- acceleration of development projects in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland;
- education and training scholarships for children of the region;
- balance of payments support increased last year where US military aid and balance of payments support increased last year.

Their worries will not be completely alleviated by the new package since several have expressed opposition to large-scale assistance for Zaire, which is still scheduled to receive up to $50 million.

Military Millions
The administration, meanwhile, has also asked Congress to approve about $70 million in military aid for sub-Saharan African states and another $70 million for two north African regimes. Almost all the assistance is for arms sale credits, including $45 million for Morocco, $25 million for Tunisia, $30 million for Zaire, $15 million for Kenya, and $10 million for Ethiopia.

UPDATE:
By late March it seemed fairly certain that the $100 million could and quite probably would be used for Zimbabwe. Secretary Vance told the House International Relations Committee March 16 that part of the $100 million could be used for the Zimbabwe Development Fund, and that the Fund was meant as a "means to bring about a settlement," although "whether it can be used depends on whether we can get a settlement."

Clearly the Administration was trying to retain maximum flexibility on how and when it uses the $100 million.

The focus of the Special Requirements Fund could also be Zaire, especially since the Carter Administration has signaled its immediate supply of $1 million worth of equipment for Mobutu's defense against Katangese gendarmes that keeping Mobutu in power is as important a US policy goal as ever. W.H. North, acting director of the AID Africa Bureau, told Africa News that Zaire could get up to $60 million in security supporting assistance in fiscal year 1978.

CROSSON INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS DISCLOSED

William H. Crosson, who served as Zaire Peace Corps director until March 7, previously was one of the Army's top counterintelligence officers in Vietnam. Crosson, a West Point graduate described by the Pentagon as having served in numerous intelligence assignments, retired from the Army in June 1967 and was hired by the Peace Corps in March 1972.

Sam Brown, newly-appointed director of Action, parent group of the Peace Corps, says he was aware when he took office of Crosson's background, owing to published reports in California, and that he moved within a few days to recall Crosson two weeks ahead of his scheduled termination date.

"To the best of my knowledge, Crosson stood out as an exception," Brown says, adding that he hopes to establish a policy that "no one who has ever been involved in intelligence in any way should ever serve in any post at any time" in the Peace Corps.

CROSSON INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS DISCLOSED
Twelve US corporations with operations in South Africa announced on March 1 their support for six principles designed to "end segregation" and "promote fair employment practices" at their facilities.

The plan is the work of Rev. Leon Sullivan, a Black minister from Philadelphia, who serves on the board of directors of General Motors. The twelve corporations endorsing the employment principles include some of the largest US investors in South Africa: Mobil Oil, General Motors, Ford Motor Company, Union Carbide, I.B.M., Caltex, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, International Harvester, American Cyanamid, Burroughs, and Otis Elevator.

Plan Outlined
The six principles are:
- Nonsegregation of races at eating, comfort, and work facilities.
- Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
- Equal pay for equal or comparable work.
- Training programs to prepare Blacks for higher-level jobs.
- An increase in the number of Blacks in management and supervisory positions.
- Improvement in the quality of life for Blacks outside the workplace in areas such as housing, schooling, and health.

No Challenge to Apartheid
The clearest indication of how far the principles fall short of representing any challenge to apartheid is their endorsement by the South African government. Minister of Information Connie Mulder stated, "In expressing a desire to contribute to the well-being of the Black worker in South Africa, these American companies are to be commended. In fact, the authorities welcome their declared intent to give further impetus to existing extensive development programs in South Africa."

Rev. Sullivan's employment principles do not confront apartheid because they treat it as primarily a problem of work-place racial discrimination ignoring the overall political context. The white government refuses to consider Africans as South Africans, treating them as transient migrant labor units with no political rights, whose only recognized homes are the fragmented 'tribal' bantustans. Without full political rights and power Blacks will always be subordinate to Whites, who control the economy to their own advantage. Thus, the issue of job reforms is illusory.

Vague Promises
The principles laid out are vague and subject to a wide range of interpretation. Training programs and placing Blacks in some supervisory positions are necessary now because of the shortage of skilled white labor. Black and white workers already work alongside one another on shop floors, but a black foreman cannot supervise a white worker, and the principles make no mention of challenging this policy. Some companies have already integrated canteens and recreation areas, but no Blacks sit around the table when the Board of Directors meets.

"Equal and fair employment practices" and "equal pay for equal work" are claims that many companies have already made for their South African operations. But job-fragmentation, juggling of job titles and the inherent assumptions of white domination have diluted these principles in practice. Because black workers have no political power and no union recognition, they are forced to accept white definitions of fairness.

Significantly, the employment principles make no mention of collective bargaining or recognition of Black trade unions—measures which would at least place real power in the hands of black workers and recognize their right to control over the conditions of work.

Programs to "improve the quality of life" can only be seen as tokenism when it is clear that there can only be real improvement for Blacks with the total elimination of apartheid, the cause of black poverty.

Black Response
The plan has elicited only new frustrations from black South Africans, according to Robin Wright of the Washington Post. "It looks good on paper, but in practice it means only minor, token changes," a prominent black employee at one of the 12 US companies explained. "It'll still be years before the steps bring significant results. That would have been fine a decade ago. Now
Black Lawyer to Join AID

Goler Butcher, a lawyer and advisor on Africa policy within the Democratic Party and the Congressional Black Caucus, is likely to be appointed AID Assistant Administrator of the Bureau of African Affairs in the Carter Administration. Ms. Butcher worked for three years as the consultant to the House Subcommittee on African Affairs under Congressman Diggs' chairmanship, after serving as a legal advisor at the State Department for eight years. Last fall, she contributed a paper to the AID southern Africa study project administered through the African American Scholars Council. This study prepared the groundwork for the $100 million Southern Africa Special Requirements Fund, which Ms. Butcher will oversee in her new position.

Companies Play Down Employment Manifesto

Since making their original declaration, the corporations are now playing down their gesture. According to an article in the Rand Daily Mail, corporation representatives have declined to say what changes—if any—their new employment principles will bring. Ralph Weller, chairman of the Otis Elevator Company, said that he would not amplify his company's position because he was not looking for a confrontation with "a bunch of rednecks."

Some whites have also criticized the American companies' announcement. The influential magazine Financial Mail commented: "There is a genuine question as to whether the recent anti-apartheid gesture by the US firms was aimed more at the White House and liberal American stokholder groups than at the Vorster government and its policies."

Carter Meets With Buthelezi

President Carter met with KwaZulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi for 15 minutes on March 5 in Washington. The Washington Post reported that the meeting was initiated by Carter, after Buthelezi had met with UN Ambassador Andrew Young and William Schaufele at the State Department. Buthelezi said after the meeting that Carter had "some good things to say" about some of the positions Buthelezi has taken.

No American President has ever met with a leader of a South African liberation movement. Buthelezi has been strongly criticized by fellow black South Africans for operating within the apartheid framework. Recently the Christian Science Monitor carried the following report: "A prominent white South African businessman in touch with government thinking told this reporter recently that the Nationalists plan eventually to bring blacks, specifically Chief Buthelezi, into the central government."

The deliberate honor accorded to such a "leader" casts further light on the probable direction of US policy.

Rhodesian Chrome Banned Again

On Friday, March 18, President Carter signed the bill which reinstated the US ban on imports from Rhodesia.

It's not enough. If that's the only kind of pressure American businesses are willing to make, then I can see we can't rely on them as a major force for change."

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Rev. Leon Sullivan, who has coordinated the move, and originally termed it a radical step, later said that it was only a beginning. He has also denied the suggestion that the principles were watered down at the urging of South African Ambassador Pik Botha, saying the corporations wanted to be "as cordial as possible" to the South African government.

Carter Policy

The Sullivan plan fits nearly in line with the South African policy proposals of President Jimmy Carter and UN Ambassador Andrew Young. Both have spoken of using corporate reforms to promote peaceful change in South Africa. The employment principles mesh with wider efforts to promote American sponsored solutions in southern Africa.

They have almost certainly also been designed and proposed by the corporations to counter some of the criticisms which US church agencies intend to make at a number of annual stockholder meetings this spring.

Stockholder Actions

This year, according to the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, which coordinates the work of Roman Catholic orders and Protestant denominations, the following corporations have received resolutions from the churches calling upon them to cease expansion and withdraw from South Africa: General Motors, Ford, General Electric, Goodyear, Texaco and Standard Oil of California (joint owners of Caltex in South Africa). Union Carbide, Kennecott and Phelps Dodge are being asked not to expand operations.

In addition the following banks have received resolutions requesting them to terminate loans to South Africa: Citicorp, Continental Illinois, First Chicago, Manufacturers Hanover Trust and Morgan Guaranty Trust.

continued on page 19
STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA ON THE SITUATION IN ZAIRE


International news agencies have authorized extensive reports concerning the present situation prevailing in the Republic of Zaire, particularly in the province of Shaba. According to these same agencies, the situation has allegedly intensified to the point of prompting certain Western countries such as the U.S.A., France and Belgium to respond favorably to the call for military assistance from the government of Kinshasa.

Accordingly, referring to statements made by a spokesman for the Carter administration, the United States of America has already sent war materials, fuel, diverse equipment, food and medicines while an air bridge between the Republic of Zaire and the United States is being planned. Certain foreign information agencies have similarly reported that two large C-130-type aircraft departed from Belgium last night loaded with arms and that the French government is preparing to send war materials, reportedly aircraft and parts of airplane and armor.

Concerning these reports, everything indicates that these countries are preparing to create the conditions that would lead to setting up of a new Vietnam in the Republic of Zaire directly in the heart of Africa.

No one is unaware of the catastrophic economic situation in which Zaire finds itself. Overlapping the economic chaos resulting from unmitigated capitalist exploitation by the large foreign monopolies, there is political instability evidenced by constant ministerial changes and the consequent misery of the population. In a country as extremely rich as Zaire, the per capita income is one of the lowest in the world. The lack of combativity shown by the Zairian army when confronted by the insurrectionaries is therefore not surprising.

Reports from the capital of Zaire refer to widespread demoralization in the core of the elite battalions deployed from Kinshasa, the consequence of the lack of morale in an army that is poorly fed and poorly paid.

The People’s Republic of Angola solemnly reaffirms that it has nothing to do with the present situation in the province of Shaba, which borders on our country, nor in other provinces in Zaire where there similarly exist focal points of resistance to the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko.

The reports spread by Zairian leaders alleging the presence of Cuban soldiers among the Zairian insurrectionary forces are nothing more than pure fabrications designed to provoke an escalation of the war and to allow the United States of America and other Western powers to intervene more directly in the repression of the population of Zaire which is opposed to the dictatorial power of Kinshasa.

The People’s Republic of Angola will not send arms nor troops. What is now occurring in the province of Shaba and in other provinces is a result of the general discontent of the population of the Republic of Zaire.

It is a matter of an internal rebellion bordering on the north-eastern frontier of Angola which the Kinshasa authorities are attempting by any means to build into an international incident in order to maintain the present regime.

The People’s Republic of Angola reaffirms its desire to see that the foreign powers which the Zairian government has called on for aid do not interfere in an affair that pertains only to the people of Zaire and hopes therefore that there will be sufficient good sense on the part of these powers, so the situation of the continent will not be altered as a result of the internal problems of a single African nation.
titionally look to local money markets and have been reluctant to become minority partners. (Chrysler announced in November that it was merging its South African operation, in which it had a $35 million investment, with Anglo-Americo Corp. to cut its equity position to just under 25%)

The South African government's effort to restrict foreign companies' local borrowings can be seen in part as a response to its own needs: military outlays in the fiscal year beginning April 1 are expected to rise to $2 billion from $1.6 billion and $860 million in the two previous years. Spending for military equipment helped to raise the country's balance-of-payment deficit to $1.72 billion in 1976.

The Journal also reports that interviews with US firms in South Africa, whose direct investment in South Africa was $1.58 billion at the end of 1975, reveal "a pattern of uneven efforts and sporadic accomplishments" in ending racial discrimination—along with considerable reluctance to discuss the subject.

New figures on South Africa's mineral resources recently published in South Africa reveal the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>% World Reserves</th>
<th>% Western Reserves</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>50</td>
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</tbody>
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But a recent report commissioned by the US government has found that the US metals industry could easily weather the coming to power of left governments in South Africa and Rhodesia, the Johannesburg Star reports. The report, prepared by Charles River Associates of Cambridge, Mass., says that if such power shifts should occur, short-term disruptions and higher prices would be followed by a resumption of supply flows and price stabilization.

De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. announced 1976 profits rose 40% to a record $354.8 million. De Beers, the world's largest diamond producer, also announced a 15% price hike covering about 85% of all the diamonds it produces.

The Minister of Justice has warned that any "international" hotel which knowingly allows men and women of different races to share the same bedroom would jeopardize its international status. The category "international" was created to allow special hotels to accept both white and black guests—this being illegal for ordinary hotels. He was commenting on a published report that such hotels have become 'havens of multiracialism'.

While the Liquor Amendment Act—the legislation which created the international hotel category—doesn't prevent giving accommodation to mixed couples, such couples are still liable to prosecution under the Immorality Act.

The leader of Transkei's opposition Democratic Party, Hector Nookazi, and two other party officials were freed in late February after having been detained since July for allegedly advocating reincorporation of the country into South Africa. Another party official has been detained for a second time.

Foreign firms operating in South Africa are reducing their rate of investment owing to the uncertain political climate and a deep recession attributed to the political situation.

The net inflow of foreign capital fell to $1.1 billion a year earlier, and the Wall Street Journal quotes a Johannesburg financial analyst as saying that during the past 18 months the percentage of profits remitted by South African subsidiaries to foreign parents has increased 20% to 30%.

Since 1960, companies which are more than 25% foreign owned have been allowed to borrow locally only 25% of their invested capital, and last July the government ruled that such companies' leases must also be considered as borrowings. This was an additional blow to US companies, which tradi-
The minority regime said recently that it plans to recruit 12,000 men aged 38 to 50 into the security forces and that the use of women "cannot be overlooked." The government said the intensification of guerrilla activities made the new recruitment necessary.

Botswana's President, Sir Seretse Khama, has placed his country on a war footing, saying that he has received "reliable information that a major attack on Botswana by the Smith regime is imminent."

A few days previous to the announcement a white Rhodesian policeman was killed about seven miles inside Botswana by a Botswana police patrol. The Observer quotes diplomatic sources as saying the number of young black Zimbabweans who have crossed the Botswana border since October could exceed 3,000. Some have been sent on to guerrilla training camps and others to school.

Refugees reaching Botswana from Zimbabwe are claiming that the Smith regime is forcing Africans in tribal trusts to join the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO), set up by two chiefs in the Smith Cabinet. The refugees say mass arrests have been made of those who refuse to join.

The continuing drain on Rhodesian white manpower resources was highlighted by a recent report on Bolivian Radio that the Bolivian Under-Secretary of Immigration had announced preparations for the settling, in the near future, of some 150,000 southern Africans of Dutch and German origin, in eastern Bolivia. The resettlement, according to the report, was to be financed by the Federal Republic of Germany. Smith is going to have increasing trouble finding soldiers for his army.

OPPONENTS OF THE MOZAMBIAN GOVERNMENT have intensified their Rhodesian-based broadcast propaganda campaign. Their nightly program, "Voice of Free Africa," claims that FRELIMO leaders "are lackeys of Russian-Cuban imperialism" and urges Mozambicans to refuse to fight against the Smith regime, which is depicted as a close ally of the Mozambican people.

The Tanzania Sunday News reports the campaign may be receiving CIA funds through the Swiss-based Organization of Free Africa.

Following a line similar to the "Voice of Free Africa" is the recently formed United Democratic Front of Mozambique (FUMO). Little is known about the organization, which attempts to make an ethnic appeal to the Macua and Makonde of northern Mozambique. To date the organization has made little headway. Its leader, Domingos Arouca, resides in Lisbon where he has been reported to have negotiated with French arms dealers who have sent weapons to his followers via Malawi and Rhodesia. FUMO soldiers participated in Rhodesian attacks on Mozambique in February.

ISRAEL AND AFRICA were linked in the most recent spate of disclosures regarding the Central Intelligence Agency's funding of strategic pro-Western heads of state. According to newspaper reports Africa has for years been the object of a rather complex, indirect funding operation designed to consolidate existing pro-Western alliances, and to create new ones where the agency deemed them necessary. One key to the CIA's African campaign was Israel.

"In the late 1960s, checks for several hundred thousand dollars each were frequently delivered by US government officials to the Israeli foreign ministry in Jerusalem," the Wall Street Journal noted. "The money was then to be channeled to the African recipients." The purpose of the operation was to secure alliances between African nations and the West. The funding was also "intended to bolster Israel's political standing on the African continent."

Among the recipients of the CIA money were Uganda and the Central African Republic. The CAR—recently renamed the Central African Empire—has been one of the most willing partners in South Africa's "detente" policy aimed at securing friendly relations in black Africa.

After the 1973 war, nearly all of the 27 nations in Africa with which Israel had developed relations broke their diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv.

TOP ANGOLAN LEADERS including President Agostinho Neto visited Nigeria in February. President Neto told the Angolan people the visit was part of an effort to strengthen existing ties of friendship. He said discussions were held on Nigerian and Angolan assistance to liberation movements elsewhere in Africa.

Nigeria strongly supported the MPLA following the entry of South African troops into Angolan territory during post-independence fighting, a move which a recent New York Times analysis perceives as marking a turn by Nigeria to a much more active role in the liberation struggles. The analysis notes that while Nigeria has ruled out sending troops to assist in liberation struggles except unto OAU auspices, it has funneled more than $50 million to liberation groups.

The Club of Ten, a group of close to 20 wealthy businessmen including at least one American, who have interests in South Africa, recently paid an estimated $100,000 for large advertisements in leading US and British newspapers which included reprints of an article tracing Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. The article, which first appeared in the right-wing Sunday Telegraph of London, suggested that the Soviets intend to cripple Western defenses by interfering with shipping lanes along the South African coast.

Little is known about the group, only one of whose members, Lampris Nichos, a Greek, has identified himself. Their spokesman, Donald Bodie of London, describes them as "fervent South African patriots" who are "very concerned indeed about the preservation of the right way of life in South Africa."

IN THE UNITED STATES the New York State Court of Appeals has ruled 5 to 2 that newspapers may publish advertisements of employment opportunities in South Africa as long as the ads don't contain any references to discrimination.

The decision came in a case against the New York Times, brought by New York City's Commission on Human Rights after receiving complaints from the American Committee on Africa, the African Studies Association, One Hundred Black Men, and Judge William H. Booth.

The two dissenting judges found that the ads were discriminatory, while three judges in the majority found that the commission was attempting to make foreign policy in the form of a boycott against the Vorster regime.

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South Africa Woos US Conservatives

Roelof Botha's final effort as South Africa's ambassador to the United States and the UN focused on consolidating conservative American support for his government's cause. At a small reception he hosted in late March in New York, the Foreign Minister designate promised a group of sympathetic Americans that the white regime will not take US criticism of its racial policies lying down.

A few days prior to the New York gathering, Botha spent an hour with President Carter, Secretary of State Vance and National Security advisor Brzezinski. One highly-placed American official says Botha heard the same message "word for word" that he got from UN Ambassador Andrew Young: namely, that the U.S. expects significant concessions from South Africa and will press hard for them.

The South Africans leaked their version of the encounter with Young to columnists Evans and Novak, a move that sources say damaged their standing with the administration. Subsequently, the South Africans decided to rally support from the right wing.

SWAPO Death Sentences Reversed

Katutura township, outside the Namibian capital of Windhoek, erupted into wild celebrations last month when SWAPO members Aaron Mushimba and Hendrik Shikongo returned home after ten months in prison.

Mushimba and Shikongo were released after an appeals court in Bloemfontein, South Africa, overturned their convictions and death sentences. The court said their rights were violated because Security Police obtained documents from two informers who worked for defense lawyers.

The two may be retried on the same charge: complicity in the murder of a government-appointed tribal leader, Ovambo Chief Minister Filemon Elifas.

GM Halts South African Expansion

General Motors, one of the largest US corporations in South Africa, has decided to freeze all investment there, until that country's problems are resolved "on a basis which is just and equitable to all."

A statement released in late March says "severe civil disturbances" and a resulting "economic recession" have cut the demand for vehicles. "Consequently, the Corporation has no present need for, and has no intention of, further expanding its productive capacity."

The decision, the first of its kind by a US firm in South Africa, came in response to a looming shareholder fight. A coalition of church groups was pressing for complete withdrawal from South Africa by GM and five other corporations—a campaign that has now been suspended in the case of GM.

With $125 million invested in South Africa, GM recently completed its only significant expansion in three decades, spending $20 to $25 million to expand the proportion of the manufacturing process done locally.

Mozambique Aids Flood Victims

The Mozambican government is aiding flood victims to plan and develop 17 new communal villages on higher ground in the Limpopo valley. The villages, with cooperative agricultural production, will supplement state farms and the remaining private producers in taking up the slack resulting from the Portuguese settler exodus at independence in 1975.

Flooding is an annual event in southern Mozambique, but a mid-February hurricane made this year's flooding the worst in 22 years. Some 100,000 families were left homeless and 50 persons died. Xai Xai, the capital of Gaza Province, was under five feet of water, and banks and stores in the city center, usually untouched, were heavily damaged by the rising waters.

Flood damage from the three rivers in the region—the Limpopo, the Umzeluzi, and the Incomati—will mean substantial food shortages this year, with the loss of livestock, food crops and the export citrus crop.

Podgorny, Castro Tour Africa

Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro received a warm welcome on his tour of seven African countries last month.

Castro visited Libya, Algeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola, and went to South Yemen as well. In a major speech in Tanzania, Castro said there were no plans for sending Cuban troops to fight elsewhere in Africa, unless South Africa's troops directly intervened in the Zimbabwe conflict or attacked a front-line country.

In the wake of the Castro tour, Soviet President Nicolai Podgorny traveled to Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia.

Increased arms aid for the Zimbabwe liberation struggle was reportedly the top item on the Tanzanians' agenda for the meeting with Podgorny. President Nyerere also criticized the Soviet Union at a state dinner for Podgorny, complaining that Soviet aid to independent African countries had been minimal.

Rhodesians Split Over Reforms

Twelve Rhodesian Front MPs, including former Defense Minister Reg Cowper and prominent party legislator Ted Sutton-Pryce, have refused to go along with Prime Minister Smith's proposals for racial reform.

The dissident group nearly succeeded in blocking passage of amendments to the Land Tenure Act that would give Africans the right to purchase property in previously all-white rural and urban areas. The legislation passed only when African opposition MPs rallied to the Smith side.

Prime Minister Smith has demanded the resignation of the twelve Rhodesian Front rebels, and called for new elections in their districts. They have refused, saying it is they who remain faithful to party principles.

Rhodesian Bishop Deported

Roman Catholic Bishop Donal Lamont was deported from Rhodesia last month after being stripped of his Rhodesian citizenship and declared an "undesirable inhabitant."

Lamont had been convicted of failing to report guerrillas in his Umtali diocese and of inciting others to do the same. A prison sentence was cut short, however, because the Smith government did not want the Bishop serving as a martyr figure and hero for its opponents.

British Foreign Secretary To Visit Southern Africa

David Owen, the new British Foreign Secretary, is scheduled to visit southern Africa in April, to acquaint himself with the situation that defied solution by any of his predecessors.

Owen will not travel to Rhodesia, according to plans announced in London.

South Africa's official radio denounced the Owen trip as a "circuitsous diplomatic mission" because it excluded a Rhodesian stop. The South African commentary urged Owen to put Peking on his itinerary, since the Chinese government "discerns accurately what is at stake in southern Africa," namely Soviet imperialism.
Other corporations receiving resolutions include The Southern Company, which is being asked to disclose details of its renewed contract to import South African coal; Mobil Oil, which is being asked to ensure that its South African subsidiary does not supply Rhodesia with oil; and Newport Mining, which is being asked for new details about its Tsumeb mines in Namibia.

**Questioning Business As Usual?**

It is noteworthy that Rev. Sullivan was only able to line up support for his very moderate principles from twelve of the 350 US corporations operating in South Africa. Most US investors still seem content to continue business as usual.

Not all US corporations operating in SA are so complacent, however. A recent survey of 100 such corporations revealed that fifteen per cent are considering withdrawing because of political and social unrest. The survey was conducted in October, 1976 by Professor Meyer Feldberg of the Graduate School of Business of Cape Town University.

There is little doubt that southern Africa as a region is now perceived with a degree of apprehension by US corporations. "Professor Feldberg noted.

The student uprisings have apparently made some dent in corporate awareness. In a 1974 survey only two percent were opposed to "separate development" (i.e. apartheid), while in the new survey 27 percent opposed it. And whereas concern about corporate image because of stockholder campaigns in the US against South African investments was the main worry in the earlier survey, local unrest is now seen as the main problem.

There are other indicators of a growing mood of caution among business interests which used to see SA as a haven of profitability.

**Less Capital, Falling Profits**

There was a steady overall outflow of private short-term capital amounting to $912 million in 1976, a flow which accelerated sharply after mid-year, despite some large loans from international banks.

No doubt this was closely linked to growing political unrest. But it may also have something to do with the fact that investing in South Africa has become less profitable.

According to US Department of Commerce figures South Africa has forfeited its place near the top of the world profitability ladder. A comparison of rates of return on US direct investment in SA and the rest of the world shows that the Republic's position has deteriorated relatively and absolutely since 1973. There was a very sharp drop in profitability in 1975. For the first time this decade SA has lost its lead over Australia and has again been surpassed by Brazil.

According to the figures released, average US corporation profits on SA investment were 16.0% in 1970, rose to 18.4% in 1973 and had fallen to 8.7% in 1975.

**ADMIRALS AND AIRCRAFT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA**

US cooperation with the minority white regimes in Southern Africa continues to expand in near lockstep with the burgeoning threat posed by the liberation movements.

This cozy reciprocity, never officially acknowledged by any of the parties involved, has been a fact for years, although US stated policy appears to be in compliance with UN resolutions isolating the Rhodesian and South African renegades.

An indication of Washington's true intentions with regard to the African continent can be discerned from new revelations concerning breaches of the international arms embargo of South Africa.

In its February bulletin, the Washington-based Transnational Institute disclosed that certain well-known American firms are attempting to circumvent US law by selling military hardware to South Africa through the intermediary of an "Italian connection."

The South African Air Force, the Institute says, has acquired the following aircraft from Italy: 20 Aermacchi AL-60 light transports; 40 Aermacchi/Aeritalia AM.3C utility planes; and 20 Piaggio P.166S maritime patrol planes.

These planes are either manufactured under licence from Lockheed Corp., or based on Lockheed designs, and all are powered by engines produced under licensing agreements with the Avco-Lycoming Division of the Avco Corp.

Reportedly, most or all of the SAAF’s AL-60’s have been turned over to the Rhodesian Air Force, which uses them to supply outlying anti-guerrilla army units.

Meanwhile, on the Zimbabwe front, a retired US military official has been popping in and out of that country with almost tedious regularity. General William Yarborough, former Commanding General of the US Army Special Forces, and of the Psychological Warfare Unit (latter head of US Army Intelligence), completed his fourth visit last April, conferring with Ian Smith and Rhodesian Gen. Peter Walls.

The US military man then dispatched best-selling American author Robin Moore to tour Zimbabwe operational areas and conjure up pro-settler propaganda by means of a book and 45 rpm record, both to be released in June of this year.

This development is an eerie echo of the Vietnam War era, when the same Mr. Moore churned out the book The Green Berets, the release of which was heralded on the hit parade by the Ballad of The Green Berets, also a Moore creation.

The activities of Gen. Yarborough and his apologistscribe are part of a pattern of trans-oceanic exchanges, always characterized as unofficial or as involving "private" visits by "retired" officials. Though it dates back several years, this phenomenon has been stepped up markedly since the Portuguese coup and the national liberation of Lisbon’s African colonies.

Only last month, retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, US Chief of Naval Operations from 1970-74, arrived in Namibia for a 16-day visit that would also take him to South Africa.

The admiral, who, on stepping down, levelled a broadside at Washington’s civilian rulers for allowing the Soviets “to deny us the world’s sea lanes,” used his stay in Windhoek to meet with delegates to the Turnhalle conference.

Later, he told reporters that Southern Africa, because of its wealth and location, is "strategically significant" and a "prize which the Soviet Union covets." Zumwalt went on to describe the Pretoria-instigated constitutional conference on Namibia as a “fascinating process,” but admitted he had met no parties in opposition to the Turnhalle.

The admiral said he planned to promote the South African solution to the future of Namibia when he returned to the US.

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Namibia

NEW COMMISSIONER: TIME IS RUNNING OUT

Martti Ahtisaari has recently assumed office as the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia. Created in 1967, the Office of the Commissioner has had legal authority over the administration of Namibia, based on the UN's condemnation of the South African occupation of the territory.

Ahtisaari is a former Finnish civil servant and most recently, Finnish ambassador to Tanzania and Mozambique. He was overwhelmingly endorsed by the UN African group after he had been proposed by SWAPO.

As Commissioner he succeeds Sean McBride, who decided not to seek another term of office due to a great deal of covert pressure from the US State Department as a result of his strong support for the South West Africa People's Organization and the cause of independence and self-determination in Namibia.

Southern Africa's Richard Knight interviewed Ahtisaari shortly after he took office.

Southern Africa: What is the present role of the United Nations in Namibia?
Commissioner Ahtisaari: After the presence of the South African government was declared illegal by the World Court in 1966, the United Nations General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate, assumed responsibility for the territory, and established the Council for Namibia. The Council has the special role of administering matters relating to the territory within the UN and representing Namibia in all the organs and forums where Namibia is discussed. The role of Commissioner is to administer and implement the decisions of the Council.

Southern Africa: Your predecessor, Sean McBride, was often viewed as a man of action. Are you planning any particular or concrete steps?
Commissioner Ahtisaari: My work is partly directed by the actions of the Council. There are, however, certain tasks that I will undertake in the next few months. One of the most urgent is to fundraise for the UN Institute for Namibia [a training institute for Namibians] which was established in Lusaka at the end of August last year.

Southern Africa: How do the Council and the Office of the Commissioner relate to SWAPO in the process of their work?
Commissioner Ahtisaari: SWAPO was recognized by the General Assembly last year as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, with permanent observer status at the UN. Of course, all our actions are carried out in close cooperation with SWAPO. For instance, SWAPO is represented on the senate of the Institute, a SWAPO observer attends all Council meetings and we have regular and on-going informal consultations. In addition, extremely close cooperation between SWAPO and the organs of the UN which relate to the Namibia question has developed as a result of the strong resolutions passed by the 1978 General Assembly.

Southern Africa: What is South Africa's role of the United States and Western European countries will be regarding a South African solution?
Commissioner Ahtisaari: I have been in office such a short time that I have had no time to discuss these issues more deeply with all the representatives of their hands. To publicize this as some kind of democratic undertaking is, to my mind, extremely strange. I think anyone studying the contents of the discussions more closely will certainly agree that a democratic solution is in the offing. It is a camouflage for a continued South African presence. I do not believe that any lasting political solution can be reached by these talks. It is encouraging to see many of the delegations to the talks beginning to come to the same conclusion. I hope that even those participating in the talks could block the attempt to find such a solution.

The most probable outcome is an unacceptable independence which will internationalize the situation and so create even more problems. [Independ-ent’ Namibia would call on South Africa and other countries for military assistance to defeat SWAPO.]

Southern Africa: What are your thoughts on the role of the United Nations in Namibia?
Commissioner Ahtisaari: I think South Africa's strategy, and what effect do you think a constitution resulting from South Africa's puppet constitutional conference in the Turnhalle in Windhoek would have?
Commissioner Ahtisaari: I think South Africa's intention is to create a political solution that would keep Namibia in

United Nations
Commissioner Martti Ahtisaari

TIME IS RUNNING OUT
these countries. I think it is encouraging that the European Economic Community has stated very clearly that a solution based on Turnhalle would not be accepted. As I understand it, the American attitude is also negative towards the possible outcome of the Turnhalle talks.

**Southern Africa: Do you have anything to add for our readers?**

**Commissioner Ahtisaari:** I hope that concrete solidarity will be shown by giving assistance to the institute so that the training program, which in itself is a rather unique undertaking for the UN, can be fulfilled and implemented in the way it is planned.

I would especially like to add that I hope all parties concerned realize that time is running out. I don't agree with the idea that we still have time. We do not have time.

Namibia has been on the agenda of the UN for a long time, and I think it would be in the interests of everyone that it be brought to an acceptable solution. By saying this, I hope everyone realizes that in this kind of situation we have the oppressors and the oppressed people. All decisions that governments make place them either on the side of the oppressors or on the side of the oppressed. I hope this will be kept in mind and that all those who can help the United Nations bring real independence to Namibia will assist the United Nations to do so.

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**FIVE MINUTES TO HIGH NOON**

**SWAPO — A Strong Stand**

Sam Nujoma, president of the South West Africa People’s Organization of Namibia, has offered to meet South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster “man to man anywhere at any time and any place if that would solve the Namibian crisis.”

Speaking in Maputo, capital of Mozambique, in early February, the liberation leader reiterated that SWAPO was committed to armed struggle “whatever the price might be and however long it might take.” He added that if Vorster is sincere and wants a peaceful solution he should immediately send a delegation to an international conference in Geneva.

Nujoma laid down three conditions for the conference:

- all political prisoners at present held illegally on Robben Island and elsewhere must be released unconditionally, in particular Herman Toivo Toivo. We want to include some of them in our delegation should a conference materialize;
- a statement prior to the conference by the South African government committing itself to withdraw all its armed forces—its land and air forces, its Navy, Police, Security Forces, and BOSS (the South African Bureau for State Security);
- the parties to the talks must consist of the Namibian delegation and a South African delegation, with the UN convening the conference and providing the chairman.

Nujoma reaffirmed that black Namibian church leaders would be part of the Namibian delegation. “They are true patriots. Although they are waging the struggle from a different angle, they are not opportunists.”

The SWAPO president declared that his organization would continue armed struggle “regardless of the conference and will only stop when South Africa withdraws and our forces take over.” He added: “We may obtain military supplies from other countries, but we will do the fighting ourselves inside the territory even if it takes 10 to 15 years.”

Nujoma rejected the South African-sponsored “constitutional conference” which has been meeting since September at the Turnhalle in Windhoek, saying the Turnhalle delegates were ‘stooges and did not share the same political aspirations’ as SWAPO. He did say, however, that Turnhalle delegates could participate in the proposed Geneva conference as part of the South African delegation.

**Turnhalle Talks Continue**

In Windhoek, the talks are nearing the stage of declaring a so-called ‘interim government.’ The infighting between black delegates and the all-white National Party contingent has been protracted. But the overall controlling hand of Pretoria and its local representatives in Namibia is evident. An editorial in the Windhoek Advertiser points out “the heart of the National Party’s plan lies in ethnicity, there is one thing which has never altered, and that is ethnicity.”

Ethnicity—a euphemism for apartheid—may yet be the rock on which Turnhalle will founder. The National Party of South West Africa is proceeding with its plans to hold a referendum of the white electorate to determine if the ninety thousand populace of European origin will accept the draft constitution.

If the whites reject this document, and they well might oppose this minimal advantage, Vorster will have to carry out his November threat to impose the scheme. His other alternative is to begin again and try out another plan acceptable to the whites. This is unlikely at a time when internal pressures are mounting. SWAPO’s armed struggle is intensifying and the United Nations is passing tougher resolutions.

Protest from South African whites can also be expected. They are unlikely to be happy about the imposition of even such muted “black majority” rule on their blood brothers in the Territory. Vorster has little choice, however, if he wants a solution in Namibia that is advantageous to his government’s interests.

As a result, efforts to present the Turnhalle constitution as the perfect and only solution in Namibia are becoming more frenetic. The pro-government South African magazine To The Point hails Turnhalle as ‘one of the most impressive examples of democratic invention to be evolved for as long as anyone can remember.’ Apparently oblivious to the contradiction, the article states that the South African government will retain executive and legislative powers for defense, foreign affairs, finance, internal security, transport and communications over the proposed ‘interim government.’
MORE POLITICAL TRIALS

Four young men have been accused of "terror activities in South West Africa," Benjamin Chrispus Uulenga, R. Ruben Itengula, Michael Shikongo and Lazarus Carl Guiteb were charged in Supreme Court in Windhoek and returned to detention pending trial in April and May.

Six students of Augustinium College, Windhoek, are on trial accused of committing arson or conspiring to commit arson. Bernardus Petrus, Frederick Isaacs, Samuel Munjanda, Andreas Himaswa, Johannes Munjunda and Wilfred Emulka were arrested last November during a period of student protest against foreign rule and the imposition of South Africa's Bantu education system in Namibia.

Four SWAPO members were convicted in May 1976 under South Africa's Terrorism Act by a South African court sitting in the Namibian town of Swakopmund. Mr. Hendrik Shikongo and Mr. Aaron Mushimba were sentenced to death, Ms. Rauna Nambinga given seven years in prison and Ms. Anna Nqinhonjiva five years. It was discovered shortly thereafter that a partner and an employee of the defense attorney's firm had been regularly providing the South African security police with confidential defense documents. An appeal was launched and taken to the top level of the South African court structure, the Appellate Division. On February 16, three members of the high bench completed the hearing and announced that judgment had been reserved.

Angola

‘OPERATION COBRA’ POISED FOR ATTACK

Vigilance remains the watchword in Angola. President Agostinho Neto announced over national radio and television February 24, that Western powers backed by the US were planning a major military operation against Angola—code named Operation Cobra 77—for September and October of this year. The same day Neto summoned Luanda's diplomatic corps to hear him denounce the "intolerable provocations on an almost daily basis" along Angola's northern and southern borders.

Within hours of his speech, over 40 Angolan civilians were killed in an attack across the northern Zaire border. An additional 25 were severely wounded.

Leaders of MPLA have continually warned in speeches all across the vast country of continued provocations. In ceremonies commemorating the beginning of armed struggle against the Portuguese on February 4, President Neto said (in reference to UNITA and FNLA incursions): "We know that the reactionary troops of the puppet organizations are located all along our northern border near Cabinda and Zaire province." Neto said the bases were inside neighboring Zaire. "Although Zaire's Chief of State," Neto continued, "says every day that we don't have anything to fear from his politics, and that he wants to be friends with Angola, we can't rest while these military bases remain near our borders.

Describing Operation Cobra 77, Neto said that the MPLA had received reliable information that it involved the Zaire army and several US military officers and personnel along with troops of the defeated FNLA and FLEC (the so-called Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda). Forces from the right-wing "Portuguese Liberation Army"—ELP—were also included in the plans. Neto said the operation called for the use of air and sea power as well as armored cars to launch an initial attack on Cabinda province. Once a base was established there, further attacks would be made on the rest of the country.

US Officers

The Angolan President revealed the names of several officers he said were behind Operation Cobra. He identified the chief of the operation as Mutumo Pierre, a Zairean colonel trained at the St. Cyr Military Academy, France's West Point, and at Fort Bragg, N.C. Neto also named US Colonel Mike Brown, already in command of a 30-soldier mercenary band and a Colonel Johnson, "a former US army major and commander of Green Beret operations in Bolivia in 1966 and '67," and Colonel William Thompson, formerly of the US 82nd Marine Airborne Division and now in command of a special unit of 1,200 men preparing for the invasion.

Monstro Imortal, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Angolan Army, listed 17 bases the Zaire army was maintaining near the Angolan border from which the operation and continuing provocations could be launched. Neto said that the major part of the Zaire army itself is stationed along the Angolan border.

Neto also pointed out that the northern border hasn't been the only area of military attacks. "Each day there are more troop movements along the Namibian border," Neto said. "The day is rare when there aren't penetrations from reconnaissance aircraft, helicopters and troop-carrying trucks."

Angolans could not live in peace, Neto said, while the racist South African regime remains in power, and he added, "No African country should consider itself at peace as long as we face such a powerful and aggressive enemy, so constant in its hostile actions against other peoples."

Burned to Death

The most recent incursion from Zaire that cost 43 Angolan lives involved over 200 armed Angolans and Zaireans led by three men described as "European mercenaries," who swooped down across the Zaire River 20 miles inside
Angola to Pangala, a cluster of peasant villages. Pangala is located not far from Soyo (formerly called Sao Antonio do Zaire). The invaders used guns, knives and machetes. They set houses on fire, burning some villagers to death. The killings were described by survivors as brutal.

"The massacre occurred precisely one day after 'Operation Cobra' was denounced," stated a communique of the Ministry of Defense in Luanda. The Angolan army FAPLA "warns all the armed bands, all mercenaries and all those who are helping and protecting them that such acts perpetrated from neighboring countries cannot go unpunished any longer."

**Invasion of Zaire**

Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko denied that his government had anything to do with the massacre and promptly charged that "mercenaries" had invaded the Zaire province of Shaba, formerly Katanga. The Zaire daily paper *Salongo* reported on March 11 that the "invasion," which allegedly had held seven US missionaries in three villages captive, was ordered by Neto's "masters." Neto and "his clique," the paper said, had "received power from their masters thanks to systematical and shameful pillage by mercenaries."

Almost immediately after the first announcement of the invasion, Mobutu began claiming that the operation was being conducted by Cuban-led former Katangese mercenaries who previously assisted MPLA forces in Angola. The State Department admitted it had no "hard evidence" on the presence of Cubans, while the Angolan government denied any role in the fighting, saying the disorder was an internal affair in Zaire.

Despite the apparent confusion as to who was doing the fighting, one thing was soon very clear. President Mobutu’s security was being threatened and the US was determined to give him all possible assistance. The US administration didn’t even wait to consult with Congress before deciding on an emergency airlift March 15 in response to a call for aid from Mobutu the day before. Within a few days $2 million worth of spare parts for Zaire’s military aircraft, parachutes and communications equipment was on its way to Mobutu—although the US denied any military involvement.

The US had funnelled large sums through Zaire during the Angolan war to assist anti-MPLA forces, and continues to give heavy military aid to the country. Some $32.5 million is being budgeted for the fiscal year beginning Oct. 1, compared with $3.5 million in fiscal 1975 and $30.2 million in the current year.

Private US interests are also heavily involved, with an estimated US investment of $1 billion in mining activities in Shaba, whose exports provide Zaire's main economic support. US banks have also made substantial loans to Zaire, with the US having assisted in rescheduling repayments when the country was unable to meet its commitments in 1975.
"The new currency is an instrument of political combat," declared Angola's Finance Minister Saydi Mingas after a surprise announcement January 7 that Angola would, over the following three days, replace the old currency—the Angolan escudo—with a new one. Four days later, he and the governor of the National Bank of Angola declared "Operation Money Change" a complete success after all escudos had been removed from circulation throughout the country.

The currency is called the kwanza, named after a major Angolan river which traverses the country and was the line of demarcation between the area held by MPLA guerrillas and that held by the Portuguese army during the war in the 1960s.

Demonstrations in support of the money change were held in many cities in January. President Agostinho Neto said the government and the MPLA had been working on the exchange for months without word leaking out. "In this land of rumors," Neto said, "there wasn't a single rumor about the circulation of the new money.'

By Angolan accounts, over five billion escudos (more than $160 million) are presently held by residents of Portugal, most of the property of retornados—settlers who fled Angola during the war. A leftist daily in Lisbon, Pagina Um, quoting reliable sources, places the figure at closer to $10 billion escudos ($320 million). All such money is now worthless.

The Portuguese press was taken completely by surprise by the move. Angola closed its borders for the three days and not even the Portuguese flights from Lisbon, Angola's main contact with Europe, were permitted to land. "It's an extraordinarily delicate business," the Portuguese Minister of Finances said diplomatically, "which will certainly require a great deal of thought."

Only the Portuguese right had strong words. The CDS, one of the major right-wing parties, released a statement protesting the move, which it said "gravely prejudiced the interests of Portugal, and the Portuguese and Angolans who were obliged to flee during the civil war."

In late January, the major Lisbon daily devoted a full page of analysis to the money change, revealing that "in the last months, Swiss banks had shown themselves to be very interested in the purchase of the old currency."

"Speculators and adventurers, who had acquired large sums of Angolan money at liquidation prices, were returning with it to the PRA," the paper said, "normally through Zaire to buy diamonds on the black market, or they were related directly at times with financial networks for FNLA or UNITA."

From the Angolan point of view, then, the change in currency was an important step in fighting any further attempts to subvert MPLA's power. "The escudo was linked extremely closely to the Portuguese bank," said President Neto, whose portrait appears on the new notes. "Now we aren't linked in any way to the Portuguese bank or to any other. Our currency is independent, a currency that corresponds to our desire to be truly independent."

In Huambo, former center of UNITA activity, Lucio Lara, Secretary of the MPLA Political Bureau, outlined the consequences of the change in late January. "The millions and millions of escudos that were stolen from the national treasury now are only paper to burn," he said. "And with this paper, plans for the subversion and liquidation of our economy can't be covered." Lara commented that because of this, Angolans could expect more attempts on the part of "bandits" to steal kwanzas to finance subversive activity.
Do they or don’t they? That is the question. Does South Africa have an atomic bomb in its military arsenal or not? The South African government has not claimed to have the bomb. It has not tested an atomic bomb. But recently, an article by Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post drew attention to a statement by a senior US government source which claimed that South Africa could manufacture an atom bomb in a matter of months if they concentrated funds and manpower in a crash version of their present program.

Southern Africa asked a physicist who has followed these developments closely to give us his assessment of South Africa’s nuclear potential.

Without access to South African atomic secrets, no certain answer can be given to the question, but there is enough public information to assess the situation and render the question somewhat academic.

There are two vital aspects in the construction of an atom bomb: first, the technical information for constructing one; and second, the necessary ingredients.

Since World War II, South African nuclear physicists have been trained in the United States and Britain. From 1964, the South Africans have operated a US-supplied research reactor, Safari I, at Pelindaba, their nuclear research establishment. This experience with the fission process will have given a number of South African scientists and engineers the necessary background to design an atomic bomb.

The information required to make a bomb is no longer in classified or secret documents. A Princeton University student recently achieved some national prominence by designing a bomb as his term project, using only public information. Clearly, if at all motivated, the South Africans could have easily acquired the know-how to make such a bomb.

An atom bomb may be made using one of two metals, either uranium or plutonium, as the explosive substance. The use of uranium is not straightforward. Less than 1% of normal uranium is suitable for use in a weapon. The desired form, uranium 235, needs to be separated from the rest and the fraction of uranium 235 has to be “enriched” until it forms about 90% of the material. This is a very expensive process, and until recently only the US, USSR, Britain, France and China had the facilities for doing it.

Fuel No Problem

South Africa has now joined this elite group and has a pilot plant in operation at Valindaba, near Pretoria, that can enrich uranium to the weapons grade level.

In addition, a spokesman for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, G. Wayne Kerr, has stated that the United States has supplied South Africa with about 104 kilograms (230 lbs.) of such weapons grade uranium for use in the Safari I reactor. This is enough material for more than 10 bombs. If US controls are stringent, diversion of some of this uranium for other uses would be difficult and embarrassing, but it would not be impossible.

Valindaba: site of uranium enrichment plant

Plutonium, the other metal that can be used to make an atomic bomb, does not occur naturally but must be manufactured from uranium in a nuclear reactor. India successfully acquired the explosive material for its bomb by this method. In the 1980s South Africa will operate two large French-manufactured nuclear power generating reactors at Koeberg, near Cape Town. Each of these reactors will produce enough plutonium for several bombs a year. The initial uranium fuel for the reactors, from which the plutonium would have to be extracted, will be supplied by the United States.

So it can be concluded that South Africa has both the know-how and the materials necessary for the manufacture of an atom bomb. They have the scientific and engineering personnel; they have some of the largest deposits of uranium in the world; they have weapons grade uranium from the United States; and they will be able to produce plutonium with their French reactors. The U.S. government source is correct. If the South Africans do not now have a bomb, they could have one in a matter of months.
A CRACK IN THE SCHOOL WALL?

Education is a recurring theme in South African political life, because of the regime's absolute determination to educate Whites to rule and Blacks to serve. The much heralded most recent development on the educational scene, the admission by the Catholic Church of a few black students to its previously all-white schools, must be assessed within that context.

While any opposition to the police-state is to be welcomed, there is, unmistakably, a large element of tokenism in this particular gesture of defiance.

So far the few students admitted have come from the small black middle class. Catholic schools are private schools, so that fees must be paid to enter them. Even if black children are given scholarships only a few hundred children, at best, could benefit from the current action. The rest will still be condemned to attending the segregated schools.

Most African students in South Africa go to schools run by the government under the Bantu Education Act of 1953. The purpose of the Act was to consolidate control of all black education under the central government. White education, on the other hand, is the responsibility of each province (the equivalent of a US state), and the system allows for both free state-run and private schooling—hence the various Catholic, Protestant and other non-public schools. But only about 5% of all white students attend church schools, the rest are in the free public schools, while African children have to pay about $50 a year for their inferior Bantu education.

The goals of the special black schooling were clearly stated by former Minister of Native Affairs and Prime Minister Verwoerd: "The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above certain forms of labor. . . . Until now he has been subjected to a school system which

Nursery school for whites . . .

DIFFERENCE IS OBVIOUS

. . . nursery school for blacks
drew him away from his own community and misled him by showing him the green pastures of European society in which he is not allowed to graze.”

The gulf between white privilege and black exploitation is very obvious in education. The authorities spend $513 a year on every white child's schooling; for every sixty black children, for whites the ratio was one to twenty; only 2% of African school teachers had managed to acquire a university degree, 20% had not finished primary school.

Both Church and Government have proceeded rather cautiously on the current desegregation effort—each side seeking to avoid open confrontation. A dozen African, Asian and Coloured children were enrolled in three schools in March 1976, after the South African bishops of the Roman Catholic Church had held intensive talks with the Government. The Government warned that this was “contrary to established policy” but took no action.

In November, about 50 more black students were admitted, into six schools. At this point officials in the Transvaal and Cape provinces threatened to close the schools and prosecute parents. An agreement was reached between the Church and the authorities not to admit any more children while the matter was being negotiated.

The South African Government’s attempt to avoid confrontation is in stark contrast to the action it took against students in Soweto, when they protested the use of Afrikaans as a symbol of their rejection of the whole Bantu Education and apartheid system. The regime’s attempt to negotiate quietly may reflect some understanding of the difference in dimension between the Church gesture and the student action, which marked a watershed in South African political life.

RIOT POLICE OR POLICE RIOTS?

During the months that followed the Soweto risings in June last year, resistance kept growing with strikes and demonstrations spreading throughout South Africa. The Riot Police, or Riot Squad, were called in—not, however, to put an end to riots, but to instigate them.

Reports in the South African and international press after the so-called riots in African townships outside of Cape Town over the Christmas weekend, spoke of clashes between migrant laborers living in the townships and permanent township residents. The migrants were portrayed as attacking residents because they were being stopped from going to work and hence were acting in self-defense. This was not the case.

Deeply concerned with the situation, and realizing the impossibility of bringing charges against the police, a group of African Church Ministers of three townships wrote a report focusing on Nyanga and exposing the actions of the riot police.

The document, published by the United Nations Centre Against Apartheid in February, is based on interviews with many witnesses and victims of the police burnings and killings.

The report concludes that not only did the riot police encourage and instigate migrants to attack and kill Nyanga residents, but they themselves took part in the attacks, shooting at residents and preventing them from protecting their families and property.

They deceived migrants into believing that they would be prevented from going to work and that they should arm themselves to counter attacks by residents—when no attacks were planned or intended. Migrants were trained in the making and use of petrol bombs which were used in the attacks.

The seven of numerous anonymous eyewitnesses quoted testify to the active and brutal role that the riot police played. One Nyanga woman said that she was in her backyard on the afternoon of December 28 when five vans transporting riot police drove into her street. A policeman, straddled across the hood of one of the vehicles, fired on an elderly, unarmed man who was walking down the road past her home.

“I saw the riot policeman beckon with his arm, and a large group of migrants came running. The riot policeman pointed them to Mr. M on the ground and then left, as the migrants came and killed him with their weapons.”

Another resident, referred to as “Mr. S.T.”, said that the riot squad let the migrants come to his area and shoot at the residents. The police told the residents to return to their homes lest the migrants think they were being attacked. They co-operated and then “the police let the migrants come and attack us, and actually helped them by shooting at us.”

“When the cry went up that we were being attacked,” he said, “we came up the road towards the Post Office and shops, to defend our area. We were in time to see Mr. D. trying to flee from a group of migrants. As we came to save him, the Riot Squad accompanying the migrants shot at us, and we were halted—they held us back with guns pointing at us. Mr. D. was dragged from the fence he was trying to climb and hacked about the head.

I spoke to the Riot Squad in shock and amazement, asking why they let the man be killed like this. They never answered; instead one said ‘Laat horn vrek./Let him die like a dog.’”

“Mrs. B.” told how the police had knocked on her door, and when her husband opened it, they stood by while migrants beat him to death. Another resident told how he was shot and wounded by police fire when he tried to go to the aid of an elderly man. “Mrs. G.” told how she had been shot and taken to the hospital while her house burnt down. “I later heard that my husband had been killed in our own front yard...”

The report, itself a brave act by the African churchmen, helps confirm the fact that the risings in South Africa were not riots, but unarmed demonstrations and strikes. These protests against oppression were turned into deliberate massacres of hundreds of blacks—many of whom were not even participants in the events in the first place. Despite this brutality, the resistance continues.
The critical manpower shortages which Rhodesia’s white minority government faces in its efforts to retain power were highlighted in February by the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Reginald Cowper, against the wishes of Ian Smith. Cowper is the third Defense Minister in as many years. Cowper resigned after businessmen criticized his plan to recruit more soldiers by cancelling deferments for white Rhodesians aged 25 to 38. In addition these measures called for reservists to serve in the field for at least three of the next six months, and for increased active duty for the age group 35 to 50.

The Association of Rhodesian Industries stated that it could not accept the extended military call-up measures as they would seriously dislocate industry, much of which is already directly involved in the war effort. The chairman of the Small Industries Advisory Service further asserted that in small industrial companies with up to 500 employees (companies which represent 25% of all industrial firms in Rhodesia) the measures would result in “a progressive rundown through loss of orders, deterioration of quality and failure to produce.”

After Cowper’s resignation Smith back-stepped a little. He moved to ease the stringent new military call-up measures by appointing a non-governmental National Manpower Board to review appeals against the cancellation of almost all deferments. At the same time he created a new Ministry of Manpower, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs in an attempt to rationalize the use of dwindling white labor supplies. But he made no moves to withdraw the bulk of the measures announced by Cowper. For instance, there was no change in the plan to extend active field duty to three months.

The ever worsening military situation, combined with the absolute limits on the numbers of whites available to fight, would make any such withdrawal impossible.

Growing Guerrilla Struggle

While the white minority regime is faced with growing, and seemingly unresolvable manpower shortages, reports of relatively massive waves of recruits into the liberation force ranks were prominent.

At the same time, the Rhodesian administration is facing mounting opposition from the Catholic Church and its just exiled Bishop Desmond Lamont for having aided the Zimbabwean guerrilla forces.

It is this action that most calls into question the allegations lodged against the liberation forces of responsibility for the recent murders of Catholic missionaries. If the Zimbabwean forces have no conceivable reason for attacking the Catholic Church, some other agency must have committed the outrage for its own political purposes.

In South Africa, security police were reported to be investigating reports that Zimbabweans were using work migration into South Africa as a means to escape Rhodesia to join the guerrilla forces, as well as reports that ZIPA agents were actively recruiting in migrant communities within South Africa. There are officially some 9,000 Zimbabweans legally employed in South Africa, but an official of the Rhodesian government estimated the number illegally employed to be somewhere around 100,000.

According to an agreement between Rhodesia and South Africa, at least one third of the wages of registered Rhodesian workers is deferred until the worker returns home. Thus the money is paid over to the Rhodesian government to pay out later. As one Zimbabwean joining ZAPU forces declared, “I want to join because they took R15 from my wages at the pass office in Johannesburg to support Mr. Ian Smith.”

The war in Zimbabwe continues to grow. In February, the regime announced the creation of the first military restricted area on Rhodesia’s southern border with Botswana, a 19-mile strip of the Shashi tribal trust lands. Such “no-go” areas have long been a feature along the Mozambique border. Within these strips of land, any “unauthorized” person is immediately presumed to be a “terrorist” and liable to be shot. The new “no-go” zone reflects the significant increase in activities in the south, involving both extended guerrilla activity, and frequent violations of Botswana borders by Rhodesian forces.

NEGOTIATIONS: SMITH LOOKING FOR STOOGES

Ian Smith, Rhodesian Prime Minister, after rejecting Ivor Richard’s January proposals for a Rhodesian settlement, is attempting to create some sort of partnership with moderate blacks under the guise of adhering to the original Kissinger plan.

This “internal solution” involves a two-pronged strategy. Firstly, Smith has to find sufficiently amenable Blacks with whom a transition to his version of “majority rule” can be negotiated.

Secondly, it is necessary to modify certain aspects of Rhodesian apartheid to allow for the appearance of the “end” of racially discriminatory practices.

Smith appears to be seeking ‘amenable’ Africans from among two groups: the Zimbabwe United People’s Organization, or ZUPO, and African National Council elements. ZUPO was conveniently organized by two chiefs, Jeremiah Chirau and Kayisa Ndiweni, in time to negotiate with Smith. Its formation, as the Rhodesian Herald acknowledged, was a “godsend,” although even local press observers seem to regard it as little more than a joke.

Faithful Smith-Supporters

Both Chirau and Ndiweni have been faithful Smith supporters since the unilateral declaration of independence. Both served as cabinet ministers when Smith decided to add a slight touch of color to that body, receiving a hefty $35,000 for their efforts. And both continue to echo the policies and claims of Smith’s government. Thus ZUPO was quick to denounce the supposed abduction of 400 mission school pupils as “inhuman,” telegramming the Botswana government to request their immediate return.

ZUPO’s political program calls for such items of prime interest to the white community as the “protection of private property,” and the right of Blacks to buy homes in previously
all-white areas on the condition that "customary standards" are maintained.

Smith hopes to portray ZUPO as the legitimate representative of the rural African population. And ZUPO, refraining from any modesty, claims the allegiance of 100 percent of the five million rural Blacks in the tribal areas.

Potentially even more serious are Smith's renewed attempts to find elements in Bishop Muzorewa's African National Council with whom to negotiate. The regime's Foreign minister, Van der Byl, has in fact stated that he believes Muzorewa to have the greatest following: Smith's efforts to push through revisions of racially discriminatory laws seem designed to make such negotiations more palatable, and more politically feasible to Muzorewa. Thus far, however, the Bishop has not biten.

Legislation Squeaks Through

The second part of Smith's strategy is to moderate racist appearances in Rhodesia, being enacted in the legislature.

However, Smith barely managed to push through a limited land reform bill and risked the toppling of his government.

The new law allows Blacks to purchase farm and commercial urban property originally reserved for Whites. The ruling Rhodesian Front could muster only 38 out of 66 seats, six votes short of the needed two-thirds majority. They were ironically saved by African members of parliament who favored the reforms, for the administration would have had to resign if they had lost the vote. This is required under the parliamentary system, when the administration loses an important vote.

Twelve parliamentary members of Smith's Rhodesian Front Party energetically opposed the reform measures. One of the 12 was defense minister Reginald Cowper.

Smith called on all 12 defectors to resign from Parliament saying they should face new elections in their districts. They have refused, saying it is they who remain faithful to party principles.

International Reaction Unfavorable

The immediate reaction in Britain and the US to Smith's "internal solution" has been generally unfavorable. A State Department spokesman said that "negotiations which exclude leaders of nationalist movements will not produce a settlement." Andrew Young, in his recent junket across Africa, stated that the Patriotic Front Alliance "has to be supported too because they are the only people who can stop the fighting. Any realistic settlement has to involve them."

But the US is obviously eager to persuade the liberation movement leaders to "be more reasonable" and to re-open Geneva-type negotiations. US "intelligence estimates," which last summer were predicting an early end for the white minority regime are now suggesting that Rhodesia will be able to prolong its existence for some years.

The new estimates were put forth in early March by Undersecretary of State Philip Habib and Assistant Secretary of State Schaufele in hearings before the Africa Subcommittee on International Relations.

In the face of obvious surprise expressed by the Congresspeople present, Schaufele conceded that the "initial assessment" was that the Salisbury regime could survive only a few months. Now, Schaufele claims, "the people who are experts in this field have stretched out the estimates." Both men declined to reveal what new information had entered into the revised assessment.

By publicly expressing confidence in the stability of the Salisbury regime, the US hopes to pressure the black representatives in the negotiations to make concessions to the minority regime and to weaken the appearance of success on the part of the guerrillas. The US is still insisting that negotiations in Geneva will resume soon—although Patriotic Front leaders Mugabe and Nkomo have both said there is no point to such negotiations unless Smith changes his position radically.

Nkomo, speaking at the FRELIMO Party Congress in Maputo, stated that Britain had taken the Patriotic Front for a ride in persuading it to join the Geneva talks. Both Nkomo and Mugabe declared to the Congress that guerrilla war in Zimbabwe must be the principal means of overthrowing white rule.

South African Support

Smith's future obviously rests heavily on South Africa. Soon after his declaration rejecting the Richard proposals, Smith flew off to Cape Town for meetings with Vorster and other high level South African officials. His strategy appears to have won South Africa acceptance. Soon after Smith's visit, Vorster, in a BBC interview, declared that it would be "deplorable" for outsiders to say they will not recognize an internal solution between the majority of Rhodesians, Black and White. He added that there was no stalemate in the settlement plans, since "Mr. Smith is honestly and sincerely trying to find a peaceful solution."

Indeed, observers in South Africa have noticed an apparent orchestration of moves in Cape Town and Salisbury to boost Bishop Muzorewa as the real leader of the African people. Pronouncements to this effect by Smith and his foreign minister, Van der Byl, have been paralleled in South Africa by reports that "official circles" were increasingly in favor of the idea of a referendum to test African opinion, a move which, like Smith and Van der Byl, believe would provide evidence of the popular backing enjoyed by the Bishop.

At the same time that South Africa has apparently given its blessing to Smith's efforts to achieve his "internal solution," it is still clearly interested in achieving a resolution to the Rhodesian situation that would have the more solid backing of Britain and, in particular, the US.

New Conference Rumors

Rumors of a new initiative by these powers originated in South Africa, in a pronouncement by South Africa's Foreign Minister, Hildegard Muller, of "great expectations" for a new attempt to break through the Rhodesian stalemate which, he said, would soon be undertaken jointly by South Africa, Britain and the US. A State Department spokesman said only that it would be "premature to speak of new initiatives."
DOCUMENTING THE STRUGGLE IN MOZAMBIQUE: PROFILE OF A FILMMAKER

Since September 1976 several thousand people in the US and Canada have seen the film O Povo Organizado (The People Organized) which documents the victory of independence and the current efforts of national reconstruction in the young People's Republic of Mozambique.

Filmed in Mozambique in 1975 by Robert Van Lierop, a black American film maker, O Povo is a sequel to Van Lierop's earlier and widely-distributed film A Luta Continua which documented the period of armed struggle and life in the liberated zones of Mozambique. This second film, O Povo, captures the devastating human and physical destruction caused by the war, and the conditions of a country vastly underdeveloped by Portuguese colonialism. It focuses on the Mozambican people's determination to rebuild their country and construct the kind of society for which so many fought and died.

Starkly revealed in O Povo is the urgent need for basic health services, particularly in the countryside. Responding to this need, Van Lierop's film serves a dual purpose, both as a political and social documentary, informing North Americans about the nature of the continuing struggle in Mozambique and as a tool for raising funds for a rural health center and maternity clinic.

The goal is $40,000, and by March of this year, the goal had almost been reached. In a nationally organized campaign called the Mozambique Film Project, Van Lierop introduced the film in premiere showings in major cities throughout the US and Canada including New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Toronto, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Boston, and Jackson, Mississippi. In addition, it has been shown on television, at schools and to small groups.

Mozambique's Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquim Chissano was at the highly successful New York premiere which was held on September 25, FRELIMO's 11th anniversary of the launching of armed struggle.

Van Lierop, who was trained as a lawyer, first travelled to Africa in 1967, where he had the opportunity to meet and talk with Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first president. This meeting had a deep affect on Van Lierop and he returned to the US determined to contribute in some way to the struggle in southern Africa. It would be four years before that determination bore its first fruit.

In February 1969, Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated by Portuguese agents. This, along with the acceleration of events in Africa, convinced Van Lierop that the documentation of the struggle in southern Africa could wait no longer.

In 1971, Van Lierop, with no prior filming experience, decided to take on the project of making a film himself. "I couldn't get any film maker I knew to take on the project, and I knew it was something that had to be done." He quit his law practice, and with savings and contributions raised from former clients and church organizations, he and a cameraman, Robert Fletcher, went to Mozambique.

They spent six weeks in the liberated areas of Mozambique with FRELIMO guerrillas filming A Luta Continua, now considered a documentary film classic. It gave thousands of people in North America and Europe a firsthand glimpse of the nature of the war and national reconstruction in the Portuguese colonies.

Four years later in April 1975 Van Lierop returned to Mozambique to make his second film, O Povo Organizado, on the independence of Mozambique. Van Lierop admits that O Povo was the more difficult film to make. The Mozambique struggle is no longer against Portuguese colonialism but must now combat a poor economy, high rates of illiteracy and infant mortality—all elusive subjects for the camera.

Van Lierop does not view the story as over, and is already in the planning stage of a third and final film on Mozambique within the next few years. He understands that the process of revolution continues long after the end of the war. Through the Mozambique Film Project he hopes to make the total process of revolution in Mozambique a reality to others and at the same time provide a way for us to contribute to Mozambique's reconstruction.

—Roberta Washington
mentioned. And there is no hint in the book that the sort of policy the US has followed on Rhodesia could lead to confrontations with the Soviet Union as occurred around Angola.

Further, the book is not really a study of the "tar baby" option of the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) - in spite of the book's title. The option, based on the assumption that whites were there to stay in southern Africa and that the Africans could not oust the white regimes by force, led to an overall US policy of "communication" with the regimes. Lake only looks at this option in a limited sense, as it applies to the Rhodesian issue.

The value of the book is its analysis and description of the various forces on the US scene lined up to defend or defeat UN sanctions against Rhodesia. The Byrd Amendment was passed in 1971 as an amendment to the Military Procurement Bill. The measure's proponents have always put the issue in a cold war context. Thus the Byrd Amendment makes no mention of Rhodesia, the UN or sanctions; it says only that any "strategic or critical" material may be imported into the US if it comes from a non-communist country. This opened the door to imports of chrome, nickel, and ferrochrome from Rhodesia in violation of the UN sanctions (which the US continues to support at the UN).

The efforts of proponents of the bill are discussed in detail and the divisions within the executive branch are also dealt with. The White House itself dodged the issue and did not lift a finger (or a telephone) at critical points to press for repeal of the amendment.

Lake also analyses the non-governmental groups on both sides of the issue and is generally correct in his evaluation that organizations opposed to the Amendment were late in organizing campaigns to defeat it. He specifically mentions the American Committee on Africa as having limited effect in the legislative campaign. Two points must be made in this regard. One is that efforts to repeal the Byrd Amendment spurred ACFA to set up the Washington Office on Africa, which has done a good job of promoting legislative efforts in Washington since 1972. Second, Lake gives no attention to non-legislative efforts to organize support for sanctions. The ACFA, with other groups, was able to mobilize wide public actions at the docks where Rhodesian chrome and nickel were arriving. The imports were not stopped, but were delayed and public consciousness was raised about the issue, which aided the legislative work.

Lake does make the point that the Byrd Amendment did not achieve its stated aim of lessening US dependence on chrome imports from the USSR. Ironically, the imports of processed ferrochrome from Rhodesia drove at least two US companies out of business because they could not match low Rhodesian prices.

The question of US southern Africa policy, Lake makes the assumption throughout the book that the NSSM 39 option 2 (the "tar baby" option) ushered in a new policy. This is incorrect in my judgement. According to Lake, the "tar baby" option was adopted by Nixon in early 1970. In reality the Nixon administration was perpetuating a policy which had been in existence for perhaps twenty years. US policy had always been oriented toward the white colonial regimes, from support of the French against the Algerians to support of the Portuguese against the Angolans, Mozambicans and Guineans. While verbally endorsing self-determination and equality in Africa, concrete US policies consistently maintained European alliances. There were only nuances of difference between administrations. Thus it is by no means certain that a different administration would have been more active than Nixon's in attempting to defeat the Byrd Amendment.

Within the terms of reference which Lake has set out, The "Tar Baby" Option is a useful study, pulling together the details in the controversy over the Byrd Amendment. But it is a failing that it did not go on to draw some lessons from the experience. The key lesson is that unless there is a drastic change in US policy toward southern Africa, our government will continue to act in opposition to the forces which are molding the future there—the African liberation movements.

—George Houser

NOTE: Shortly before we went to press, but after this review had been written, both the Senate and the House renewed the ban on Rhodesian imports.


None of us will forget the image that flashed across the nation's television screens in 1976 of a small dead boy being carried away from panicked crowds by a denin-clad Soweto schoolmate. Along with burning crosses, bodies being dragged from Mississippi rivers, and Vietnamese officers shooting handcuffed prisoners at point blank range, Soweto too, is soldered into history.

The death of Hector Peterson, aged thirteen, shot in the back by a white South African policeman's bullet, was the immediate spark for the student-led mass uprising currently going on throughout South Africa. But much more lies behind the events in South Africa in 1976.

The tragedy, scale, and significance of the June 16th South African uprisings has now been simply but poignantly described in Black South Africa Explodes. The booklet challenges the "official" death toll, admitted by the Pretoria regime, carefully documenting a more real estimate of over 1,000 killed by South African police. Black South Africa Explodes also indicates that over half of those killed were shot in the back. Most important of all, we learn from the booklet about some of the organizational aspects of the uprising, its relationship to the migrant workers, and the defenses adopted against white vigilante groups.

Another feature of this new booklet is that it exposes the scant, inadequate, and uncritical US press coverage of the intense uprisings which began in South Africa one year ago, continuing a long tradition of African resistance to South African tyranny and exploitation. In many cases the US press simply repeated the interpretation of the so-called liberal South African press and, at worst, the South African government. Thus, when white officers ordered black policemen to pose with empty pistols in a firing position so that the world's press would convey an impression of black policemen shooting blacks, the photo appeared all over the US.

This powerful booklet has only one gap for US readers. Geared for a British readership, it carefully documents UK relationships, economic, political, and military, with South Africa, but deals only in passing with the US role in underpinning the South African police state. However, this information is available from other sources and the Transnational Institute itself added a most valuable insert to the booklet entitled, "US Arms Deliveries to South Africa: The Italian Connection" by Michael Klare.

—Prexy Nesbitt

Available from:
The Transnational Institute for Policy Studies
Attn: Carol Kurtz
1901 Q St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
IPI-TOMBI FOLDS... After 42 days of performances and picketing, the South African musical with a message that happiness reigns in the Bantustans closed its Broadway run on Feb. 13.

Twelve of the 25 cast members decided to stay in the US. Ten of them are trying to put together a show which would more accurately portray Black life in South Africa, with the encouragement of the Patrice Lumumba Coalition, which organized the picketing. The group is currently wrestling with financial and immigration problems.

AN EDGY GOLIATH... More than 150 people led by a contingent of South African exiles protested IBM’s involvement in South Africa at the corporation’s Milwaukee office in February. Three days before the demonstration, organizers from PAC-Azania and Youth Against War and Fascism were told they would have to raise at least $5,000 in security in order to use the local YWCA as planned. The YWCA lawyer later admitted that he and the Y had received calls from an IBM representative claiming that violence was planned at the meeting.

FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY... A campaign to force the U. of Maryland to divest itself of an estimated $1.5 million in investments in firms doing business in South Africa continues despite internal discord.

Seven members of the Revolutionary Student Brigade barricaded themselves inside the office of the chancellor for an hour on Feb. 24. They were censured that night by an ad hoc coalition working to end the investments and withdrew from the coalition. The black faculty and staff association also withdrew calling for an end to “organizational bickering.”

MEMORIES OF INJUSTICE... The anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre on March 21 prompted demonstrations around the country. The American Committee on Africa focused its attention on protests against Krugerrand sales. Protests were planned in Texas, California, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.

The National Student Coalition Against Racism called for actions on March 25-26 to demand an end to all US involvement in Southern Africa.

MOVING MOUNTAINS... The church-sponsored campaign of stockholder resolutions relating to southern Africa issues led off March 16 at the annual meeting of Morgan Guarantee Trust Co. The resolution presented at the Morgan meeting asked the bank to terminate loans to South Africa.

Catholic and Protestant churches participating in the campaign, coordinated by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, have filed resolutions similar to that presented to Morgan with four additional banks: Citicorp, Continental Illinois, First Chicago, and Manufacturers Hanover Trust.

Corporations receiving resolutions from the churches calling on them to cease expansion and withdraw from South Africa are: General Motors, Ford, General Electric, Goodyear, Texaco and Standard Oil of California (joint owners of Caltex in South Africa). Asked not to expand operations are: Union Carbide, Kennecott, and Phelps Dodge.

Other corporations receiving resolutions include: The Southern Co., asked to disclose details of its renewed contract to import South African coal; Mobil Oil, asked to ensure that its South African subsidiary doesn’t supply Rhodesia with oil; and Newmont Mining, asked for new details about its Tsumeb mines in Namibia.

For more information on upcoming meetings contact the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10027.

ON THE HOT SEAT... The Radical Academic Union at Duke University in North Carolina has called for a boycott of Hostess products, manufactured by a subsidiary of ITT, following the refusal of Duke president Terry Sanford to resign from the ITT board. The RAU had called for Sanford’s resignation in a petition signed by more than 300 people which notes ITT’s heavy involvement in South Africa as well as its activities in Chile.

ITT reported recently that it holds a special reserve to cover what the company described as possible losses of investments in operations in Rhodesia.

Acting as a clearinghouse and information center for anti-ITT actions is the IT&T Boycott Coalition, Box 123, D.V. Station, Dayton, Ohio 45406.

COMING EVENTS... A People’s Congress Against Racism and Apartheid, sponsored by groups including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the World Peace Council, will be held at Howard University in Washington on April 23-24. The emphasis will be on planning national actions around southern Africa issues and participation in a World Conference Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa to be held in Lisbon, June 16-19. For further information contact the Chile Solidarity Committee, 155 Fifth Avenue, Room 232, New York, NY 10014.

The role of transnational corporations in southern Africa will be the focus of a conference at the University of Chicago, Center for Continuing Education, April 15-17 ($10 fee), sponsored by the American Friends Service Committee, Midwest Region, 407 S. Dearborn, Chicago, IL 60605.

Banning Del Monte... The Southern Africa Support Committee of Pasadena, CA is preparing to launch a boycott of Del Monte Corp. and invites other groups to form a coalition. Del Monte sells sardines obtained off the coast of Namibia and processed by a South African firm, despite UN passage of an act in 1974 that made it illegal to use any material resource from Namibia without the permission of the UN Council for Namibia.

The sporting scene... Demonstrators plan to picket the Davis Cup matches at Newport Beach, CA on April 15-17 to protest the appearance of South African athletes.

BRIEFS... The ZANU Support Committee of Norfolk, VA has sent 12 hospital beds and eight tons of clothing to Mozambique.

Amnesty International has protested to the South African Justice Minister the death in detention on Feb. 15 of Matthew Mabelane, the 18th political detainee known to have died in security police custody since March 1976.

A New York State conference of 80 Protestant and Roman Catholic church leaders—25 of them from southern Africa—called for an immediate transfer of power to the black majority in Rhodesia. The group also called for repeal of the Byrd amendment.

Among West Coast Longshoremen, the only US union members to support the recent international trade union boycott of South Africa, San Francisco’s Local 10 has further demonstrated its support of Southern African struggles by sending two truck vans of clothing to Mozambique.
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