As the Zimbabwean war of liberation has escalated in the last few months, so have Western press reports of "terrorist atrocities." Echoing South African and official Rhodesian press statements, US papers have carried prominent stories reporting the "terrorist" murder of priests and nuns and the mounting of a campaign of terror so severe that missionaries and nuns are being driven to flee the country.

Liberation movement denials of responsibility for these deaths, their accusations that the executions are in fact being carried out by Rhodesian government forces, have received much less prominence. So have statements issued by leading members of the Catholic Church in Rhodesia, expressing serious doubts about the veracity of the official allegations.

Yet despite intense Salisbury censorship and propaganda, evidence is beginning to mount outside Rhodesia that the regime's army is heavily implicated in the attacks on both church and general population.

In March The Sunday People, a British weekly, quoted a former soldier in the Rhodesian army as saying he had proof that a secret commando unit, the Selous Scouts, had killed missionaries in Rhodesia. The paper said the ex-soldier Gordon Thomas Wood, 37, a Briton, also admitted that they had killed unarmed, harmless civilians during curfew hours. Among them was a 16-year-old boy who was herding cattle. The Sunday People said Wood talked because he wanted the world to know of the "atrocities" he had seen in Rhodesia and wanted to give himself up in Britain to face a driving charge brought against him last year.

The Sunday People said Wood backs claims by black nationalists that troops were responsible for the massacre of the Zambesi River from helicopters. "They are fed to the crocodiles," he told the paper. He admitted having killed 18 Africans. "One soldier called me a murderer for shooting two men who turned out not to have weapons but they were out during curfew and you can't say, 'Excuse me, have you got a grenade or gun?'

The Sunday People said Wood backs claims by black nationalists that troops were responsible for the massacre of seven priests and nuns at St. Paul's mission in February. The paper said Wood told its reporter: "It was in the interest of the Rhodesians that missionaries should be stopped from helping the blacks."

On March 31 a black Anglican lay preacher was shot at a mission station 171 km east of Salisbury. Again security force spokesmen announced that "terrorists" were to blame for the killing. But the murdered man, Basil Nyabadza, was a close friend of Terence Ranger, the historian, and Ranger was able to break through the smoke screen surrounding the assassination. He reports for Southern Africa on the true circumstances surrounding the death of Basil Nyabadza.
THE DEATH OF BASIL NYABADZA

by Terence Ranger

On the night of Thursday, March 31, 1977, two men wearing camouflage uniforms entered the yard of St. Francis African Church, Rusape, in the Eastern district of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). They woke some of the African nuns and demanded to see the pastor, Basil Nyabadza. Basil Nyabadza came out. They shook hands with him. Then they walked over to the well standing by the cross between the house and the church. There they shot him. He died at once. The two men joined their fellow who were waiting by the gate. In the bright moonlight the murder was witnessed by Basil Nyabadza’s wife and one of the African nuns.

This killing was only one of thousands that have taken place in the rural areas of Rhodesia in the past months. Usually there is simply an announcement in the Rhodesian security forces bulletin—so many curfew breakers, so many “shot in the company” of guerrillas, and the dead are reduced to the anonymity of statistics.

But for me, Basil’s death was different. I had known Basil very well when I lived in Rhodesia from 1957 to 1963. I know his children, many of whom are now studying in Britain. I am getting to know some of his grandchildren. To me Basil’s death is tragic and remarkable and unacceptable—as all these anonymous deaths have been to people without the means to bring their loss to the notice of the world. In telling something about Basil it is possible to bring individuality and personality into the death statistics.

Basil’s father, Francis Nyabadza, was a man with great gifts of teaching, preaching, healing and prophesying. As a catechist in the Anglican Church he found little room allowed for the exercise of his vocation inside the church structure. Pressed by his followers, he set up his own community on the edge of the Makoni Reserve. When this community was denied the sacraments of Rhodesian society, Members of the congregation became active in the African National Congress, when it was revived in 1957. I remember driving with Basil, his wife Rosemary and some of the sisters across the country to a restriction camp in Matabeleland where a church member was detained after the roundup of Congress leaders in 1959. Among the families closely connected to the church was that of the Nyagumbo’s, and Maurice Nyagumbo emerged as one of the most fearless of African nationalist leaders during this period. He spent much of the time in prison, while his wife Victoria kept the family going.

Tigera, who was a member of the Nyagumbo family, said that Basil Nyabadza was the most fearless of the Nyagumbos. He was held in Umtali jail and rigorously interrogated, for a long period before being released on bail. Maurice Nyagumbo was sentenced to further two years in prison.

From that time on the community at St. Francis was under surveillance. Its members were讯 the brutal searches of passengers on the buses that passed by the church yard entrance. They had to regulate their lives according to the curfew—anyone outside after dark, even in the yard between the church and the houses, could be shot on sight by the security forces. Some time last year African members of the security forces, disguised as guerrillas, entered the area. They were given hospitality—the people who had given them hospitality were then arrested on the charge of not having reported the presence of guerrillas. Among those arrested were Victoria Nyagumbo and her daughters. Victoria was sent to prison for several months.

Meanwhile the “boys”—as the guerrillas are called by the people—did indeed enter the area. Customers came into Basil’s stores with stories and rumours of their activities. Gradually the people came to know what sort of people the “boys” were, what their aims were and what they wanted done. The “boys” told people who helped themselves to protect themselves by reporting the presence of guerrillas to the police. The community of St. Francis was certainly not frightened of the “boys.” But it was increasingly alarmed at government action. There was a threat to close all schools. There was constant searching and harassment. With Basil only out on bail, with Victoria Nyagumbo in prison, there was every reason to fear further action against them.

Then came the uniformed men, and Basil’s death. When the police arrived after the shooting and asked the sisters at St. Francis what uniform the killers had worn, they replied, “It was just like yours!” No one at St. Francis has any doubt that Basil was shot by members of the “security forces.”

No doubt the community at St. Francis will survive the death of their pastor, sustained by their own faith—though it is a terrible thing to them to be without a priest and leader for the first time. But I hope that a regime which can destroy a man like Basil cannot long survive. There is no pretense in Rhodesia any more that “hearts and minds” are to be won. Hearts and minds are to be coerced. The real offense of Basil—and of his father before him—was to possess a free heart and mind in an unfree society.

MAY 1977/SOUTHERN AFRICA 3
CASTRO IN AFRICA

In Tanzania the banners read “Karibu Ndugu” as Castro stepped off his plane. The words differed in the language of other places but the meaning was always the same: “Welcome, Comrade.”

This cry swelled up each day of the more than 30 days Fidel Castro spent in Africa. It came from thousands of ordinary citizens who turned out to catch a glimpse of the leader of a country whose actions have galvanized the entire Third World.

Castro’s tour occupied the whole month of March and took him to eight countries: Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola. In each of these nations, tumultuous crowds pressed around him wherever he went—in motorcades, on foot, at plazas, historical sites, places of work. In Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzanians lined the route from the airport to the capitol, holding aloft placards inscribed with greetings such as: “Ndugo Castro, your actions are a radiant hope for the oppressed masses;” and “Long Live Ndugo Castro, long live proletarian internationalism.”

The enthusiasm was genuine and often spontaneous. It was manifest in Mozambique (where Cuba and Frelimo signed a cooperative agreement in the fields of industry, fishing, education and culture) and surpassed only in Angola. There, animated crowds repeatedly interrupted the Cuban leader’s speeches with chants and applause.

Community of Interest

The people’s welcome everywhere indicates the extent of a continent’s appreciation of Cuba’s internationalist stance during the Angolan civil war. It springs too from an awareness of the profound community of interest between Africa in diaspora and the continent itself, both areas linked in a common struggle to throw off oppressive forms of social order.

On this essential point, the incomprehension of the Western press seems to devolve from a tendency to view world events solely in terms of Good Guys and Bad Guys, with all that is evil having its beginning and end in the Soviet Union.

Looking for Stooges

When the various facets of Castro’s African tour are reduced to simple functions of superpower politics, the Western press produces the following revision of recent history:

- the Cuban leader is a stooge, dutifully carrying out orders from his “pay-masters in Moscow;”
- his tour was an imposition upon the African leaders concerned;
- he had as a hidden agenda further to enmesh his hosts in the economic web of “Soviet imperialism,” and to prepare plans for delivering southern Africa into the jaws of the Russian bear.

Thus Castro is portrayed in the Western press as a slick advance man, simply greasing the way for a follow-up visit by Soviet Premier Podgorny.

Mesmerized by their own fantasy of heavy-handed plotters inside the Kremlin, such analysts overlook a crucial point:

While Castro’s visit generated mass excitement among the people, the Soviet leader received a more subdued, though friendly, welcome.

The difference exists because the exchange between Cuba and the African nations is perceived as one involving equals. The basis of the identification is a common Third World perspective, and a shared struggle against under-development.

It does not follow that this identification leads directly to a loss of national independence in a slavish relationship with the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the Western press smells a plot in which the Africans must be unsuspecting dupes, beguiled by the machinations of Soviet “imperialism.”

The intrigue discerned in all this is one aiming immediately to subvert Zaire (thus severing Africa at the middle by means of an uninterrupted chain, coast to coast, of pro-Moscow states), and ultimately to “terrorize” Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa so that they fall, like lambs, into the Kremlin fold.

Maintaining Independence

This sinister rendering of African reality, the result of Western ideological imperatives, denies Africans any independent ability to play determining roles in what transpires on their own continent.

In actual fact, Africans see themselves as rising up against colonial domination in a conscious exercise of free will. They achieve national liberation: they are not taken over by the Soviets.

The “front-line” states support the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa also in a conscious exercise of free will. They are not pliant pawns in a grand foreign design in which Castro becomes “Moscow’s shuttle diplomat” and Cuba the spearhead of Soviet hegemony in the whole of southern Africa.

Africa now is breaking up into two camps (one progressive, the other reactionary) because of the sharpening of its own internal contradictions. That imper- tus cannot be ascribed to Cuba, a tiny island of eight million inhabitants, located at the other end of the globe and acting as a proxy for Moscow.

Liberation Support

At a press conference just before leaving Dar-es-Salaam, Castro denied charges made by Mobutu and others implicating Cuba in the popular uprising in Zaire. He said:

“The struggle for independence is first and foremost a task for the people of that country. Each people, with the solidarity and support of all other progressive peoples, must carry forward the struggle for independence. That is, independence cannot be brough in from abroad. It is obtained from within the country with the support of progressive countries. That’s what happened in Angola. The people of Angola gained their independence. Direct foreign aid came about at the time of an attack from abroad.

National liberation there would mean, in their eyes, a weakening of global imperialism. Any weakening of imperialism is conversely a strengthening of...
the Socialist camp, of developing nations generally, in a world in which the primary confrontation remains that between Capitalism and Socialism.

In Zimbabwe, the Patriotic Front gets Socialists support precisely because it rejects the Kissinger plan, and its ploy of a "development fund" which would neatly locate a majority-rule economy in the hands of the US.

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma told reporters later that the Cuban leader had promised to continue to support SWAPO... with material assistance, and he did the same for other liberation movements in southern Africa.

An Open Agenda

The Socialist countries, then, would not appear to have a hidden agenda in

Socialist reply that proletarian internationalism is, in the end, the recognition of necessity. Cuba did not need to be coerced into assuming a leadership role among Third World nations. It assumed that role and engaged in the battle in Africa because it was one of the few Socialist nations in a position to counter the interventions of external forces of reaction, and thus prevent the strengthening of forces hostile to its own survival.

Any intervention of the Soviet Union or a Warsaw Pact nation directly into an African conflict could lead to its complete internationalization. Progressive African nations still have limited capacities to give assistance because of their own internal weakness, and the lack of unanimity in the Organization of African Unity.

But when the African nations choose the direction of Socialism, they too are moved by the recognition of necessity. "Times are changing," said Castro, recognizing the African position, in a speech in Luanda. "The progressive African countries long ago staked out their legitimate right to maintain relations with those countries they chose. But although this movement for complete independence began many years ago with Kwame Nkrumah, with Patrice Lumumba, with Amilcar Cabral, with President Marien Ngouabi, it is here in Angola that imperialism has met its strongest challenge so far. Angola means a strong rearguard enabling the frontline states to be utterly firm in their determination to support the liberation struggle in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe—with all this entails for capitalism's exploitation of the three countries' 30 million workers and the mineral resources. And Angola has had the courage to stand by Marxism-Leninism as the only road out of colonial exploitation to independence and a better life for all of its people... How can one expect a neocolonial regime to be able to answer the needs of the African people?"

Some countries in Africa have begun to shape their futures by recognizing that the answer to that question is "It is impossible."

That recognition lies at the heart of the struggle now being fought in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. While the minority regimes seek to entrench themselves through record defense budgets and western alliances, the people are organizing.

Castro spoke about what can mean for the future in a speech at the Stadium in Benadir, Somalia. "There is another sun which shines over us, the sun of revolution and socialism—a sun which is rising all over the world. There is a dawn for this sun but there will never be a dusk."
PODGORYNY VISIT:
A WARNING TO SOUTH AFRICA

Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, visiting three African "front line" states in a quick trip beginning March 23 and ending April 4, pledged continuing Soviet support for the liberation movements in southern Africa. The pledge was welcomed by the "front-line" leaders, who have expressed their impatience with Western delaying tactics and reluctance to take a stand in favor of the African liberation struggle.

Podgorny met with President Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, President Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and President Samora Machel in Mozambique. In Lusaka he also met with representatives of the South African ANC, Namibia's SWAPO, and the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe.

Consistent Support

All three countries have been privately critical of some Soviet actions in Africa, such as the sale of weapons to Uganda's Idi Amin. But even Zambian President Kaunda, at odds with the Soviet Union during the last two years over Angolan policies, made a strong statement favorably contrasting the Soviet role in southern Africa with that of the Western countries.

Speaking at a state dinner for the visiting Soviet President he said: "Since the dawn of the struggle for independence, the Soviet Union has been consistent in its historical role as a large ally of liberation movements. When we, as leaders of Zambia's independence movement, were frustrated by Western ambivalence we also turned to the traditional allies of freedom fighters, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries...

"The United Nations has no record of a Soviet veto on resolutions supporting genuine liberation movements... while other nations have clearly identified themselves with the oppressors through vetoes, abstentions and negative votes."

No Take-over

The three countries also reacted angrily to Western press reports which presented the Podgorny visit as a Soviet "take-over" bid and an attempt to promote violence in the subcontinent. Joint statements stressed the view that the source of tension in the area is the continued existence of the racist, white minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia and that the Soviet Union's general policy of "detente" did not imply compromise of support of the liberation struggles in southern Africa.

The Soviet President met with a particularly warm reception in Mozambique, and the visit was concluded with the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Soviet Union has similar treaties in effect with Angola and Somalia.

The treaty included a provision to "continue developing cooperation in the military sphere" and a pledge to "coordinate their positions... if situations should arise that threaten peace or break peace." Mozambique is particularly vulnerable to conventional military attacks from Rhodesia or South Africa.

The treaty is thus seen as a warning to those countries, and to the West, that African states would have recourse to powerful allies in the event of a South African invasion of their territory.

Just a few weeks before the Podgorny visit, Tanzanian President Nyerere answered a Time correspondent's question about possible Cuban involvement in Rhodesia by noting African states' rights to ask for support from anywhere. "The West is arming South Africa," he said, "and if the West is arming South Africa in order to prevent southern Africa becoming free then we shall also seek support from anywhere, from bigger powers than Cuba even."

Support
Southern Africa Magazine
In Style

Top quality white T-shirts displaying the magazine logo and a large map of Africa in brown are available in small, medium and large. Price $5.00 plus 50 cents postage. Order from: Southern Africa Magazine, 156 Fifth Ave., Room 707, New York, NY 10010.
MOBUTU IN TROUBLE

The fighting in Zaire's Shaba (formerly Katanga) province that has continued for almost two months now must appear curious to Americans not familiar with the history of that vast and strategic central African country. Press reports have it that several thousand soldiers "invaded" the copper-rich southern province and occupied almost half its territory within two weeks. The press deliberately avoided posing any questions about the obvious lack of resistance offered by the Zaire army. Yet by early April the safety of the Mobutu regime was so severely threatened that France decided to airlift troops from Morocco to aid Mobutu's army and the US although still unwilling to commit direct military aid of its own, moved to send up to $15 million of "non-lethal" supplies.

An emergency airlift of American aid to Zaire had begun in mid-March and was defended by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on the grounds that the invading forces from Angola posed a "dangerous situation" for Zaire's critically important copper industry.

According to the New York Times, Zaire was told by the State Department that it would not receive any Pentagon aid unless it could prove that Cubans were taking part in the fighting. Few were surprised then, when the Zaire news agency, AZAP, reported that the "invasion" was being led by people "from across the Atlantic, supported by a third country for ideological conquest." By the end of April, news reports reached the US that Zaire's president Mobutu Sese Seko had requested tanks and several hundred thousand cans of Coca-Cola to bolster his troops' sagging morale.

Establishing A Western Base

One result of these developments is clear. "Through all this, the West has been able to establish a center for military operations in an extremely strategic location in central southern Africa," pointed out one diplomatic source at the United Nations recently. "It's not only Zaire or Angola that they have access to now. It's Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe. Shaba is the linchpin in an extremely complex strategy for all of southern Africa."

Despite constant assumptions in Western reporting that the initial troop movements in western Shaba reflected an invasion from Angola, no hard evidence has yet contradicted Angola's official position that the fighting was the product of an internal conflict in Zaire.

An Angolan Foreign Minister Paulo Jorge called developments in Shaba an insurrection, a view echoed by Angola's representative at the United Nations, Ambassador de Figueiredo.

"We are committed to peace and we will stay out of the conflict as long as no one violates our territorial integrity," said de Figueiredo at a UN press conference April 19.

But the leaders of MPLA do not expect the future to be free of conflict. "Neither Zaire nor the US can accept the recent defeat that has been inflicted on the Zairean armed forces," Foreign Minister Jorge told a Paris press conference several days earlier. "Therefore we do not rule out the possibility of a new aggression against us."

Opposition to Mobutu

The rebels, some of whom had fled to north-eastern Angola after the abortive secession of Katanga from the newly independent Congo of the early sixties and many of whom appear to be more recent refugees from Mobutu's brutal rule, went through Shaba "like a knife through butter," according to one Western diplomat. By the end of March, most of the Americans and some of the 3,000 Europeans in the mining town of Kolwezi, the rebels apparent primary target, had been evacuated, and the Zaire army had moved its operations headquarters east to Lubumbashi.

Almost all Western reports said the local people had welcomed the Katangese "with open arms." Residents shun the government troops and had refused to provide food for the army. One Belgian radio reporter said that instead of fearing the rebels, Kolwezi's population was aiding them.

In the face of the rebel advance, indiscipline among Mobutu's troops spread. Desertions were frequent. In one instance, half a regiment that Mobutu sent south by rail disappeared within the first 100 miles of the journey.

Mobutu's regime itself gave some signs of falling apart. Several members
of his family fled the country and some of his own government officials had contacted foreign embassies for safe-conduct passes out, according to Afrique-Asie, a bi-weekly radical magazine published in Paris. Before the arrival of Moroccan troops, the magazine reported, Mobutu himself had packed his bags.

Help on the Way

Mobutu had hoped that the US would give him direct military aid, but he had to settle for assistance from France which began shuttling 1500 Moroccan troops, armed and trained primarily by the US, from Rabat to Kinshasa in 11 transport planes in early April. "Both France and Belgium have been superb in the crisis," Mobutu told Newsweek. "I must confess we are bitterly disappointed by America's attitude."

But in reality Mobutu may not be all that upset. In the wake of the Vietnam war, the constrictons on actual direct US military participation in foreign conflicts are severe. The use of surrogates has become the predominant Pentagon strategy.

"I think the French have considerably more leeway in some of these matters," commented Secretary of State Harold Brown while denying advance knowledge of the French-Moroccan decision, "Both in terms of the international reaction to what they do and in terms of their own domestic opinion." Still it is known that French and US military advisors under a NATO cover met secretly for a month prior to the French move, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing several days before the first flights began.

Morocco's Angola

Nor was the choice of Morocco accidental. Morocco had sent troops as part of the United Nations "peace-keeping" force during the Congolese crisis of the early sixties. Morocco is itself facing bitter resistance from the POLISARIO movement in that region of the Western Sahara which it annexed after the ending of Spanish colonial rule in 1975. By sending troops to Zaire—picted in the Western press as a country facing a secessionist movement—King Hassan may hope to gain support from other moderate Third World and African countries for this annexation. He would no doubt like the world press to link the "invaders" of Zaire with his Sahraoui dissidents to prepare world public opinion to accept a strategy of future "hot pursuit" across the Algerian border at Tindouf where POLISARIO guerrillas have a major operations base. Further Morocco is heavily dependent on US military aid for maintaining its military capability, and is thus a logical agent for implementing Washington aims.

Hassan has also received this tacit support of richer allies—Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, according to Afrique-Asie—to finance his new wars. Mobutu has been gathering other allies too. After visits to Washington and Paris, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt announced he would aid Mobutu as has President Numeiry of Sudan. Idi Amin visited Mobutu in late April and expressed willingness to send military aid. South Korea also announced it would provide $100,000 worth of military clothing and medical supplies.

Most importantly, the Washington Post has reported that South African would provide logistical aid for Mobutu's efforts in Shaba, but the Pretoria government quickly denied this. Thus, even without direct US military involvement, US investments in Zaire—only exceeded in Africa by those in South Africa—are sure to be protected for the present.

The Post's story on South African involvement has yet to be confirmed, but the South African Financial Mail did report that trade between Shaba and South Africa continues to be heavy. Zaire is South Africa's most important trading partner north of the Zambezi River, the paper said recently, and in spite of the present troubles in Shaba, the major trade routes, particularly the rail lines that carry the greater part of Zaire's copper to the South African port of East London, are still operating well.

CIA in Action

The French role does not rule out the possibility of covert US military opera-
NOTES ON ZAIRE

It is difficult to understand current developments in Zaire without some knowledge of the country's history, particularly that of the post independence period. Southern Africa therefore reprints extracts from a Zaire Dossier prepared by Africa News, in an effort to give our readers some useful background information.

CAPSULE CHRONOLOGY

1892: The Conference of Berlin ratifies the creation of the Congo Free State as the private possession of King Leopold of Belgium.

1908: The Belgian government takes over responsibility for the Congo, partly in response to international criticism of the unrestrained exploitation of the territory, which is thereafter called the Belgian Congo.

1960: June 30 - Belgium grants independence to the Congo Republic. July 12 - Moise Tshombe declares the province of Katanga (now Shaba) independent. July 17 - UN troops arrive in response to government appeals for help in dealing with Katangan secession, troop mutinies, and Belgian intervention. August 8 - South Kasai secedes. President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba clash.

1961: February 13 - Lumumba, handed over to the Katangese by the central government is killed by Katangan authorities; Lumumba's supporters, under Antoine Gizenga, remain in control of Stanleyville (now Kisangani).

1962: January - The Stanleyville government collapses.


1964: February - The Committee of National Liberation opens rebel front in eastern Congo and advances rapidly. July - President Kasavubu asks Tshombe to serve as Prime Minister. November 24 - US planes and Belgian paratroopers take Stanleyville, the CNL headquarters.

1965: November 25 - General Mobutu becomes head of state.

1966: June - Many Congo cities are renamed. Leopoldville becomes Kinshasa and Elisabethville Lubumbashi. July - Katangese troops stationed in Kisangani mutiny and hold out for two months. December - Congo nationalizes Union Miniere, a giant Belgian copper firm; the state company replaces it (now Gecamines) later signs management and marketing contracts with the Belgian owners of Union Miniere.

1967: May - Mobutu forms the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR). June - The Congo accepts a monetary reform plan traced out by the International Monetary Fund. Tshombe, trying to return to Congo, is hijacked to Algiers. July - Mercenaries in the Congo army mutiny.

1968: October - Mulele, returning to the Congo on a promise of amnesty, is executed.

1969: June - University students demonstrate in Kinshasa; over ten are reported killed by fire from government troops. Tshombe dies in prison at Algiers.

1970: King Baudoin of Belgium is received warmly on a visit to the Congo.

1971: October - Proclaiming the doctrine of “authenticity,” Mobutu renames the Congo Zaire.

1973: January - Mobutu visits Peking. October - Zaire breaks relations with Israel. November - Mobutu decrees the Zairization of the economy; the measure affects primarily small businesses (Belgian, Greek, Portuguese, and Asian), while American or other large firms are for the most part exempt.

1974: July - Mobutism becomes the official philosophy of Zaire. September - Mobutu meets secretly with General Spinola of Portugal to map out efforts to exclude the MPLA from power in Angola.

1975: January - Mobutu steps up support for the FNLA in Zaire; in the second half of the year Zaire troops move into Angola to bolster FNLA forces. May - People’s Revolutionary Party guerrillas in eastern Zaire kidnap three American students. June - Mobutu expels US Ambassador Dean
Hinton, charging the CIA with masterminding a plot against him by high military officers. October — Zaire’s inability to meet payments on its growing foreign debt becomes public knowledge.

### THE ANTI-MOBUTU FORCES

Reports from Zaire are unanimous in citing widespread discontent with the government of President Mobutu, but the make-up and objectives of the opposition forces have so far remained obscure.

Only two groups have been reported involved in fighting inside Zaire: the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) and the Congo National Liberation Front (FLNC). PRP guerrillas have maintained a small-scale insurgency in southern Kivu province near Lake Tanganyika since 1969. It is the FLNC, reportedly formed in late 1975, that claims responsibility for the fighting that is now threatening Mobutu’s control of the copper mining area of southern Shaba province.

The PRP is lead by Laurent Kabila and in part bases itself on the heritage of the 1964 eastern Congo revolts. The FLNC has been identified with elements of the so-called Katangese gendarmerie, a group formed to carry through Tshombe’s attempt at secession. Both groups deny having secessionist designs at present, however, calling instead for direct military action against Mobutu, several prominent exiled Zairois politicians are considered significant figures in the opposition movement. One of them is Antoine Gizenga, who directs FODELICO (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Kinshasa) from Geneva. FODELICO claims to include the PRP as well as other exile groups.

A second is Paris-based Cleophas Kamitatu, a former minister in the Adoula government. Kamitatu authored a book critical of Mobutu in 1971, and is associated with a group called Front Socialiste Africaine.

**The US Interest**

US direct investment in Zaire is estimated at about $250 million, including the American stake in the giant Tenke Fungurume copper mine. Falling copper prices and Zaire’s economic and political problems caused suspension of that venture early last year.

Zaire’s debts to American creditors are large—$410 million in outstanding Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees. $500 million owed to other US government agencies, and about $350 million to private American banks.

Mobutu’s financial woes, which surfaced in 1975 when copper prices plummeted, may have indirectly brought on his expulsion of the US ambassador, Deane Hinton, in mid-1975.

Most observers believe Mobutu wanted to shake off his pro-American image and shock Washington into paying him more attention. Secretary Kissinger dispatched a top aide on three quick trips to Kinshasa, and the Ford administration put together a new and beefed-up aid package.

The assistance has continued, but the new administration seems worried about the future. The State Department is writing a policy option paper, and some officials are urging President Carter to turn down additional aid pleas. But as yet, a decision to alter US policy in that way has not been made. And new emergency aid shipments are now being proposed.

### U.S. AID TO ZAIRE (in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Assistance</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>221.9</td>
<td>124.2</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>109.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>186.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credits</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other U.S. Government</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>175.2</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>NOT AVAILABLE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans and Grants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>169.8</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>238.8</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>236.2</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>116.8</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(e = \text{estimated} \quad p = \text{proposed}\)

**data source: U.S. State Dept.**

10 SOUTHERN AFRICA/MAY 1977
"GIVING ANDY A CHANCE"

The Security Council has convened a new series of debates on "the question of South Africa," and the occasion has brought a complicated set of diplomatic maneuvers between Western members of the Council and the UN’s African Group. The sessions, still to be concluded, were first convened on March 21, the 17th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa. US delegate Andrew Young presided over the opening sessions as Council president for the month of March.

The debates came at a time when the African policy of the US and its allies is under intense scrutiny here. In the past the “Big Three”—Britain, France, and the US which are permanent members of the Security Council—have consistently vetoed council resolutions calling for arms embargoes and economic sanctions against South Africa. But such vetoes have now become very expensive for the West, both diplomatically and politically. Some African delegations hoped that this might make it possible to move away from what has become an annual ritual of tough resolution and US veto.

Accordingly, the latest Security Council debates on apartheid have been marked by gestures of compromise and conciliation, both on the part of the African Group and Western members of the Council. African nations produced four draft resolutions designed to avert Western vetoes by presenting a bare minimum of demands. The African strategy was apparently meant as a test of new Western initiatives in southern Africa and as a somewhat tentative vote of confidence in Mr. Young, some African delegations arguing quite strongly that it was important to "give Andy a chance."

"A mandatory arms embargo is not a violent approach," Ambassador Harri man of Nigeria said of the African resolutions in the opening debate. "Economic sanctions are not warfare. These are the minimum pressures required to bring about change in South Africa."

The African Group’s apparent willingness to compromise was met outside the council chambers by an unprecedented diplomatic initiative on the part of Western Council members. Joined by Canada and West Germany, the Big Three proposed the approval of a draft declaration in lieu of a formal—and more potent—Council resolution. This in itself was viewed by some UN observers as a big step down for the Africans, but the plan apparently won conditional acceptance from African delegates.

Western delegates presented a draft declaration as a consensus agreement—their idea of what could be commonly agreed upon. Africans found this portion of the Western proposal vague and inadequate, some noting that the US draft could be useful as a preamble to the more concrete demands contained in the African resolutions. The US-sponsored draft, entitled "Declaration on Southern Africa," is essentially a "warning" to South Africa to change its policy.

Accompanying the Western draft but not in it, however, the five Western nations also gave assurances that in exchange for agreement on the declaration they would send a mission to Pretoria demanding that South African Prime Minister John Vorster:

- take steps to withdraw South African troops from Namibian territory;
- cease economic and other support of Smith regime in Rhodesia.

Once met, these demands were to be followed by further actions to be taken in the dismantling of the apartheid system in South Africa itself.
The five-ambassador delegation, led by US Ambassador Bowdler, made its proposed visit to Prime Minister Vorster in early April, despite the fact that agreement had not been reached at the UN on the Declaration. It met with a cool reception, the Prime Minister giving no indication that he was interested in shifting his positions on Namibia or Zimbabwe.

The timing of these proposals—never before considered by the West—left many African delegates suspicious of US motivations. Western delegates have since argued that this was only a preliminary session with the South African leader, designed to open debates with South Africa on the questions of Namibia and Rhodesia. But African delegates have been left wondering why such initiatives had not been forthcoming at any one of the dozens of occasions when they could have been advanced in the past.

At the UN itself, no agreement has been reached on even the limited Declaration. The African nations drew up an alternative Declaration, with tougher language, but Western countries and the US showed themselves unwilling to really shift old positions.

In this context, some UN sources saw the Western initiative as designed to buy time at a point when Western policy is being put to a crucial test. The West is desperately seeking to avoid Security Council vetoes, but is not willing to take significantly stronger positions.

This view is supported by Western proposals that the debates be postponed until September, to give the Council the opportunity to see what progress has been made in southern Africa. But African delegates, citing the timing of South Africa's plan for an interim regime in Namibia, are asking for a June deadline on the Security Council floor.

**U.S./South Africa**

**POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS - NEW TONE, SAME SUBSTANCE**

The Carter Administration has made a quick rhetorical break from its predecessor on southern Africa policy, setting a more liberal tone. But the policy being proposed offers little new. This Administration too appears intent on pressing for moderate solutions in southern Africa, trying to capture leadership for the western nations rather than allowing the African liberation movements or, as it claims, the Soviet Union to take the lead.

But substantive policy for the area is just beginning to emerge and outlines are still vague. Carter’s Administration has just completed a Policy Review Memorandum (PRM) on southern Africa, which will become the successor to Kissinger’s now-famous “NSSM 39.” No details have yet been “leaked” or announced.

**The Human Rights Analogy**

Administration officials have said that they view the problems of southern Africa in terms of violations of human rights, so it may be useful to look at how Carter has handled his new human rights thrust. He has pursued a carefully-designed policy to gain praise for new rhetoric describing a policy that is actually little changed from Ford’s. For two years, Washington liberals have been setting the groundwork to cut US aid to repressive governments. Carter endorsed a concern for human rights only in vague terms in the campaign, but, once in office, redirected it toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. His initiative was applauded by the foreign policy establishment and the press, which failed to detect any contradiction when Carter requested continued aid to some of the worst violators of human rights. State officials have now suggested that the notion of tying human rights concerns to US aid is “negative” and rigid. It appears that Carter does not intend to press the human rights issue too hard in countries where US economic stakes are high.

**Competing With Armed Struggle**

So too, on southern Africa, Carter began by setting a new tone. He made a point of saying that he supports majority rule not only in Rhodesia and
Namibia, but also in South Africa itself. (Ford's spokesmen consistently refused to be pinned down on this point.) Ambassador Andrew Young caused a flap by taking this to its logical conclusion and talking about an illegal South African government, but State and the White House backed off supporting that! Carter asked Andy Young at the first National Security Council meeting to travel to Africa to demonstrate his strong interest in the region. To give these general statements credibility, Vance and Young pushed successfully to get Congress to repeal the five-year-old Byrd Amendment.

But the US still sees its interests threatened by any militant liberation struggle. Our role, said Andy Young, at the UN, is "to compete" with those who advocate armed struggle." This goal is probably uppermost in the minds of American policy-makers following the Podgorny and Castro trips to southern Africa. Opposition to armed struggle is still a main tenet of US policy, based on the belief that if radical Africans gain control on the battlefield (with arms from socialist countries), this will solidify Communist power and influence. For example, according to the Washington Post, US Embassy officials in Kinshasa fear that "Shaba's fall could give the Communist bloc the potential for a land bridge across Africa, extending from Angola through the Congo, southern Zaire and Mozambique."

**Zimbabwe Plans**

Based on this fear of African radicalization via guerrilla war, the Administration's first planning priority seems aimed at the establishment of a western-managed Zimbabwe under "majority rule."

Secretary of State Vance's rationale for concentration on Rhodesia was put this way to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

The Rhodesia situation is of great urgency . . . for the extent of armed conflict is broadest and the threat of escalation most immediate . . . . If the Rhodesian authorities . . . persist [in maintaining themselves in power] the inevitable outcome will be a bitter legacy for the future of all the inhabitants of the territory.

Intensified conflict in Rhodesia also entails serious adverse economic effects on countries in the region. Furthermore, the possibility of non-African forces interfering cannot be discounted.

**Getting Negotiations Going Again:**

**The British-American Plan**

Since the breakdown of the Geneva talks in December, Great Britain and the United States have been urgently seeking a way to revive them.

On February 23, US and British officials held talks in Washington with Ambassador "Pik" Botha, now the Foreign Minister of South Africa, to discuss Smith's position and South Africa's possible role in pushing him toward settlement. Rhodesia was on the agenda at the March 9 meeting between President Carter and Prime Minister Callaghan of Britain, as it was also on March 23 when Carter met with Botha.

The British/American plan involved symbolic gestures toward African sensibilities (repeal of the Byrd Amendment and appointment of the British Foreign Secretary rather than the UN Ambassador as chairman of renewed talks); new suggestions for how to manage the question of transition (eliminate the problem by proceeding to write a constitution), and a very large carrot intended to pacify white fears (the Zimbabwe Development Fund).

The Administration reasoned that until the Byrd Amendment was repealed neither Smith nor the nationalists would take the US position on majority rule seriously. Andrew Young argued forcefully that "Repeal of the Byrd Amendment is a kind of referendum on American racism. It is viewed that way by the heads of state of the black majority nations." Young obviously recognized that his own credibility and his ability to head off hardline proposals on southern Africa at the current session of the UN would be strengthened by repeal.

**The Zimbabwe Carrot**

In March, the Administration moved to strengthen its negotiating capacity by asking Congress to authorize $100 million of Security Supporting Assistance for the Zimbabwe Development Fund. The money was needed to help smooth the path for renewed negotiations.

Since June last year, news stories have circulated that Kissinger, Callaghan and Vorster were proposing a multi-national plan to assure the "stability" of an independent Zimbabwe. The proposals were reportedly designed to reassure the white Rhodesians, who fear economic disaster for themselves under majority rule. The details were kept fuzzy, but in September Smith explained the Fund as point 6 in the Kissinger proposal the text of which, he said, read:

6. Substantial economic support will be made available by the international community to provide assurance to Rhodesians about the economic future of the country. A trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia which will organize and finance a major international effort . . . . The fund will, inter alia, support the internal and external economic circumstances of the country and provide development assistance, guarantees and investment incentives to a wide variety of projects.

Smith described the Fund again on March 15. He said that its location outside Rhodesia was designed to remove white fears. He said the object of the Fund would include large-scale financing of the development of the country's resources. He reiterated that the Fund would underwrite guarantees of "pension rights, the investment of the individual in his own home and/or
farm, and the remittances overseas of an individual’s liquid resources within levels yet to be stipulated.”

Details Revealed

Talcott Seelye, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs gave the first detailed US account of the Fund to the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations Committee. He revealed that:

- 18 nations have been asked to contribute to the Fund over a five-year period. Great Britain has pledged 75 million pounds but other countries have not yet responded. The US share will be 40 percent of the total, or $520 million, out of a projected total of $1.15 billion.
- The Fund is to be administered by the World Bank, which would respond to requests for project funding by an independent Zimbabwean government, only after independence.
- If independence comes by military victory, rather than through negotiation, the Fund would become a “dead letter” and would not be made available to the new government.

Under questioning he hotly denied that the Fund represents a scheme to “compensate” or “buy out” whites. According to Seelye, such criticism was a misunderstanding of the true purpose of the Fund:

Our purpose is to encourage whites to stay, not to abandon their jobs or their homes. ... Where you have moderate and constructive leaders, we believe that whites will be more willing to stay.

It is essentially to assure the viability of the economy. ... The blacks are not skilled. If they are left on their own, it would all fall apart.

The reaction of the Subcommittee to these revelations ranged from outraged opposition to cautious skepticism. Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-Brooklyn) stormed, “I have never heard of a more half-baked, assinine scheme.” Chairman Diggs declared himself adamantly opposed to any fund which was designed to get whites to stay although he said he might consider a fund designed to help racist whites to leave.

Help In The Wrong Places

The Subcommittee was also dissatisfied with the inequalities involved in allocating so huge a sum of money to Rhodesia to solve a political problem created by white intransigence while allocating relatively little to black African states which have suffered the consequences of that intransigence. Botswana’s share of Security Supporting Assistance for 1978 has been reduced to $3 million from $10 million in 1977. Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique will receive nothing from these funds, although their economies have suffered a great deal from the effects of the Rhodesian struggle. By putting all its emphasis on the effort to persuade the whites to settle, the Administration seemed also to be punishing the front-line states for their united stand in favor of guerrilla war.

No African country has ever received in a comparable period any sum remotely close to the $520 million now being proposed for Zimbabwe as an allocation for the coming five years; $520 million represents 11 percent of the total of US economic aid for all African countries in the thirteen year period 1962-75.

Settlement Price Climbs

While the US clearly wants a quick settlement, it is still clinging to the hope that it will be able to buy one easily. But it is not obvious that such tactics will work. Smith remains intransigent, and the Zimbabwean movements are less and less likely to compromise, fighting now from a position of growing strength.

The visits of President Podgorny of the Soviet Union and of Premier Fidel Castro to the front-line states, are likely to lead to an increase in the supplies and training given to the Zimbabwean guerrilla forces. The warmth and cordiality with which the Zambian government greeted Podgorny is some indication of the seriousness with which Kaunda has turned away from the Western strategy of negotiation and toward support for the Nkomo wing of the Patriotic Front in its new emphasis on a rapid buildup of armed struggle.

Mozambique and ZIPA will unquestionably get defensive material such as anti-aircraft weapons that will enable them to protect the civilian population against Rhodesian air incursions.

Thus the United States is on the horns of a dilemma. If the guerrilla war proceeds, the leadership that will emerge from that struggle is likely to re-orient the country along socialist lines and give support to guerrilla warfare against South Africa. The South Africans and the Rhodesians tend to lump all the external nationalist leadership together as Communists, but the United States and Britain know that Nkomo and Mugabe are comparatively pragmatic as compared to the leadership that they fear will emerge from ZIPA under Mozambican tutelage.

On the other hand the chance of achieving a quick and effective negotiated peace are slight. The US is keenly aware that an “internal” settlement that does not include the Patriotic Front is a “non-starter.” It cannot work because it will not bring peace. On the contrary, it might well escalate the level of fratricidal bloodshed.

The only real path to a negotiated transfer of power lies in bringing down the Smith government, either by force of arms or by a real tightening of sanctions which includes sealing the South African leaks. The US has already rejected the first option—support for guerrilla war. The second option is theoretically possible, but there are few signs now that the US is prepared to move vigorously in that direction.

CIA’S MAN FOR ANGOLA RESIGNS

John Stockwell was recruited into the CIA in 1964 at the age of 27. At the beginning of April, after 12 years of service and filled with disillusionment, he resigned. He grew up in Zaire, and knew the country well. Most of the 12-year period was served in Africa, including Zaire, Burundi and Abidjan, as well as a tour of duty in Vietnam. His last assignment was chief, Angola task force.

He explained the reasons for his resignation in a detailed letter to Admiral Stanfield Turner, the new director of the agency, which was published in The Washington Post, April 10, 1977. Because of the light this throws on CIA activities in Africa in general, and Angola, in particular, we are printing lengthy extracts from the letter.

My disillusionment was progressive throughout four periods of my career. First, during three successive assignments in Africa from 1966 through 1977, I increasingly questioned the value and justification of the reporting and operations we worked so hard to generate.

In one post, Abidjan, there was no eastern bloc or Communist presence, no subversion, limited United States interests and a stable government. The
Dear Readers,

Southern Africa magazine is going to fold.
Southern Africa magazine is in dire financial straits. For the first time in its ten year history, its existence is threatened.
Yes, we have often appealed to our readers for donations. But now it is a question of survival. We must increase our subscription list by 4000 by the end of 1977 to cover our minimal budget.

With limited funds and limited office staff, we concentrated our efforts for the first month of the year on conceiving and producing a new magazine. Our readers have responded extremely enthusiastically. But now we must raise funds to keep Southern Africa magazine alive through the summer, as well as undertake a substantial promotional campaign.

Southern Africa magazine is going to fold unless you help now! We are asking all our readers to do at least one of the following:
* become a sustainer — if you believe as we do in the political necessity for the magazine, become a Southern Africa magazine sustainer for $25-50 this year
* encourage a friend to become a Southern Africa magazine sustainer
* send us a donation — however big or small
* find at least one more subscriber; get your local library to subscribe.

Southern Africa magazine is needed now more than ever. With your support we can pull through.

A Vitória é Certa!
The Southern Africa Collective

☐ I want to be a Sustainer

I enclose $_____

Name __________________________
Address _________________________

☐ I enclose a donation of $_____

Name __________________________
Address _________________________

☐ Send a gift subscription to:

Name __________________________
Address _________________________

__________________________ Zip ______

Gift subscription from:

Name __________________________
Address _________________________

__________________________ Zip ______

Name __________________________
Address _________________________

__________________________ Zip ______
South African coal continues to fuel US electric plants owned by Gulf Power Co. of Florida.

Under a ten-year contract between the Transvaal Coal Owners Association and Southern Co., parent of Gulf Power, the first of 7.7 million tons of coal was to begin arriving in Mobile, Ala., in April. From there it will be sent on barges to plants in Panama City and Pensacola, Fla.

The Southern Co. declined to disclose the cost of the coal, but based on known present prices, it can be estimated at well over $200 million.

Southern's new contract, which was signed last year, is not its first with South African coal producers. In 1973, despite widespread opposition, it signed a three year contract for 2.5 million tons of coal.

The Independent Press quotes a Southern Co. spokeswoman as saying, "We're assured no slaves work for Transvaal Coal Co. It's not a penal colony—they're regular workers and there are no slave labor conditions."

Barclays Bank is expected to speed up plans to sell its controlling interest in a South African subsidiary following a flap over the subsidiary's purchase of $10 million in South African defense bonds. Plans now call for the bonds to be sold.

The expected buyer is Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo-American mining empire which already owns 18% of the bank, Barclays National Bank of South Africa. A son of Oppenheimer was named recently to the bank's board.

The purchase of the defense bonds became known through a series of ads in the South African press proclaiming the purchases as evidence of Barclays' patriotism. Zambia and Nigeria, among others, are reported to have protested that the purchase was incompatible with Barclays' professed support of their countries. Following a visit to South Africa by Barclays chairman Anthony Tuke, a decision was made to sell the bonds.

Ford Co. is expected to be asked shortly to recognize the black United Auto, Rubber and Allied Workers of South Africa as bargaining agent following an announcement by Ford, General Motors and Volkswagen that they will recognize black unions if they represent 50% or more of black workers. Black unions are not recognized by the government, which has kept many workers from joining them out of fear of harassment.

The Israeli industrial conglomerate Koor Industries is acting as an intermediary enabling the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) to trade in the European Economic Community, according to Mr. Hillel Seidel of the Israeli right wing opposition. Israel is an associate member of the EEC and receives preferential trade tariffs from other members. South Africa has been denied membership.

Koor officials have refused to comment other than to say "Koor Industries denies it is representing South African steel in Europe." However, vast amounts of ISCOR steel are exported to Israel and a joint Iscor-Koor steel servicing center in Israel is scheduled to open later this year. South African semi-processed steel and iron will be rolled and cut to size at the servicing center and then exported.

ISCOR steel comprised over 40 percent of South Africa's exports to Israel during the fiscal year 1975/76. Trade between Israel and South Africa from January to December 1976 exceeded $92 million.

The government has introduced two bills which extend the already far-reaching prohibition against strikes. One, the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill, which applies to white workers, provides for the Minister of Labor to declare an industry an essential service. In an industry so designated, strikes are illegal and both sides must submit to binding arbitration.

The other, the Bantu Relations Regulation Amendment Bill, puts increased emphasis on a prohibition against strikes and lockouts involving black workers and regulates the settlement of labor disputes.

Britain's Ambassador to South Africa, Sir David Scott, recently told a Cape Town audience that Britain finds it increasingly difficult to defend itself against criticism that it is leaning over backwards to defend South African internal policies.

Scott told the group, "unless you can give us more ammunition we may not be able to go on doing so." He said he couldn't elaborate on his statement, adding, "I think the fields where this could be done are fairly well understood."

He noted that the only four occasions on which Britain has exercised its veto in the U.N. Security Council during the life of the present Labor government have been in support of South Africa. He said Britain has spoken up for South Africa because "we have so many interests in common with you, which we want if possible to maintain."

Two South African conscripts who have refused to participate in operations in Namibia are fighting a test case in Britain to establish whether they, and subsequent South African deserters, have a right to political asylum.

The two, Laurence Bartlett and Kevin Lane, are currently appealing an application for asylum which was initially rejected by British officials with the explanation that they were "not satisfied that your fear of persecution is well-founded."

Under the South African Defense Act the men could be sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Both Bartlett and Lane underwent basic training when they were 17 and have served further training periods since.

Bartlett left South Africa a year ago after being told to join his regiment for three months' "anti-terrorist" training at a base camp from which Namibian operations were launched. His call-up papers advised him to prepare a will before going.

Mr. Lane was recalled last year specifically for service in Namibia.
The two men said in a statement in London, “We see the struggles of the black people in southern Africa as a just one, and we refuse to fight anywhere for the white minority South African government. We are proud to be regarded as traitors to apartheid and deserters from racism.”

An increasing number of South African families are emigrating to Australia, according to a story in the Johannesburg Star.

The Star quotes Cecil Fredericks, a 28-year-old Coloured building company supervisor now living in Australia as saying, “Job opportunities here are based on your ability, not on your skin color... And coloured people in Australia can buy a home in any suburb they desire. There are no worries about whether it is a whites only suburb.”

A white immigrant, Gus de Brito, now a leading journalist, is quoted as saying, “I had a great life in South Africa. And I was better off financially than here in Australia. But I could not live with Apartheid, which to me is a form of slavery.”

TORTURE IN NAMIBIA is the focus of an Amnesty International report on South Africa’s occupation of the territory. The report charges South Africa with the use of widespread detention without trial to suppress political opposition and intimidate opponents of continued South African rule, the torture of political detainees, application of South African security laws, the use of the death penalty for certain political and criminal offences, and the imposition of emergency rule in northern Namibia.

The report is detailed and specific and itemizes torture “almost on a routine basis.” Deputy Commissioner of Police Lt. Gen. Michael Geldenhuys retorted: “The allegations are totally unfounded and ridiculous. There are very few political detainees in South West Africa.”

Barclays Bank decided in late March to separate its branches in Namibia from those in South Africa—with an eye to the Turnhalle-style independence in the works. The Standard Bank of South Africa was studying the same procedure. In early April a SWAPO delegation met in London with Barclays officials to demand that the bank recognize the jurisdiction of the UN Council for Namibia.

Word from Namibia is that the Rossing uranium mine is now in production—after many delays due to equipment trouble and labor unrest—and that initial small shipments of the precious ore are underway from the port of Walvis Bay bound for the United Kingdom. Rossing is estimated to comprise the largest field of low-grade uranium ore yet discovered. Rio Tinto Zinc, a British Company, has the controlling interest in the uranium mine. It has been severely attacked by British supporters of SWAPO for continuing to operate in Namibia, in defiance of UN resolutions.

MOZAMBIQUE’s port of Beira experienced a drop in cargo and revenue last year following the closing of the country’s border with Rhodesia. Beira previously had been the main exit point for Rhodesian goods as well as the main entry for imports into the country. The number of ships tying up at Beira dropped to 834 ships in 1976 compared with 914 in 1974. A Maputo radio report gave last year’s total tonnage figure as one million, compared with nearly three million in 1974. It gave no revenue figures.

Mozambique and Tanzania have agreed to pool their civil aviation and telecommunications resources for “mutual benefit.” The agreement follows the unilateral Kenyan takeover of East African Airways, which had been jointly owned by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Earlier this year Mozambique loaned Tanzania an aircraft for domestic flights.

LESOTHO-SOUTH AFRICAN relations have sharply deteriorated since Lesotho’s refusal to recognize the farce of Transkei independence. Numerous incidents of harassment have been reported at the border posts in the Transkei region between the two countries. South Africa has withdrawn a R2.6 million maize subsidy, formerly granted Lesotho.

Lesotho has applied to the UN and the Common Market for funds to overcome hardships related to the border dispute as well as for development projects designed to decrease overall dependence of this impoverished land-locked nation on South Africa.

RHODESIA has been receiving US manufactured military planes. Rockwell International and Lockheed Aircraft have been accused of supplying aircraft indirectly to Rhodesia in violation of the arms embargo. In a little-noted Los Angeles Times account, correspondent Jack Foisie reported from Rhodesia Feb. 28 that a US-manufactured military plane—the OV-10—is being used by the Rhodesian Air Force. The OV-10, a double-fuselage spotter plane that was used in Vietnam, is manufactured by Rockwell International in California. Foisie says that the planes were apparently purchased as “civilian aircraft” by Rhodesia’s white-minority regime “through roundabout channels.” A spokesperson for Rockwell said, “We could not sell these planes to Rhodesia without a US government permit,” adding that Rockwell records did not show any sales of the plane to Rhodesia. He declined to say how the planes might have got there. The Rockwell spokesperson described the OV-10 as a “counterinsurgency” observation plane, armed with machine guns, and said it had been sold to Indonesia, Thailand, Venezuela and West Germany.

A spokesperson for Rockwell said, “We could not sell these planes to Rhodesia without a US government permit,” adding that Rockwell records did not show any sales of the plane to Rhodesia. He declined to say how the planes might have got there. The Rockwell spokesperson described the OV-10 as a “counterinsurgency” observation plane, armed with machine guns, and said it had been sold to Indonesia, Thailand, Venezuela and West Germany.

An American pilot who flew to Zambia after deserting from the Rhodesian armed forces has been deported to the US. In Johannesburg, a white US mercenary serving in the Rhodesian army is being held without bail. He is wanted by Rhodesian authorities for alleged robbery and theft.

Rhodesia’s Great Trek continues. Over 1,400 Whites emigrated in January and a mere 448 (compared to 1,040 in January last year) entered the country according to official figures released in Salisbury in February.

Last year saw a net loss of 7,072 Whites, and it looks as if the trend will continue in 1977. Amongst the professions hard-hit in 1976 were accountants (net loss 100), engineers (98), teachers (85) and doctors (46), contributing towards an overall drain of 506 professional men.

These figures are actually low, since they do not include those who have left on temporary visas but who will never return. The illegal white minority regime will face increasing problems of manpower in the future, since it is losing many of its most skilled citizens. This exodus has taken place despite laws restricting removal of money. According to some reports youths are being taken off trains leaving the country to make sure that they will be available to fight.
Soweto Students Urge Rent Strike

Students in the sprawling Johannesburg township of Soweto took to the streets again in late April to protest against the board rent increases ranging from 30 to 80%.

Faced with police dogs and tear gas, the demonstrators dispersed but threatened to organize a rent strike if the increases are put into effect on May 1 as scheduled. A one month delay was announced following the protests.

Before the announced hikes, the average rent for Soweto was $14 per month according to the South Africa Institute of Race Relations, while the average monthly wage for Sowetons is $60 per month.

Just prior to the rent protests, South African Prime Minister Vorster promised new legislation to make homeownership possible for Africans in the township. His pledge came in a letter to the Associated Chambers of Commerce, which is pressing the government to institute reforms.

Enactment of home ownership measures, however, probably will not dissipate support for the student protests. Most township residents are simply too poor to purchase homes.

ZANU, ZAPU to Try Again On Join Fighting Force

The Zimbabwe nationalist movements, ZANU and ZAPU, which formed a political alliance as the Patriotic Front at the Geneva Conference last fall, are now taking steps to bring together a political alliance as the Patriotic Front.

Land Tenure Act were very inconsistent with party principle.

Rhodesian Front Sets Back Rightists

Rhodesia’s ruling white party, the Rhodesian Front, has expelled thirteen members who recently opposed legislation aimed to relaxing certain race laws. Those ousted include twelve members of parliament and the deputy chairman of the party.

The desegregation moves are part of Prime Minister Smith’s quest for an “internal settlement” with moderate African leaders. The Rhodesian Front’s now-discredited right wing, however, felt the proposed amendments to the Land Tenure Act were very inconsistent with party principle.

Mondale to Meet South African Premier

The White House has announced that Vice President Walter Mondale will travel to Austria and meet with South African Prime Minister John Vorster on May 14.

Mondale’s consultation with Vorster is part of the Carter administration’s diplomatic initiative on southern Africa, which aims to find peaceful settlements for Rhodesia and Namibia.

On the diplomatic front, the Zimbabwe movements have declared their opposition to an American role in the settlement effort, and have said they will not participate in a conference partially sponsored by the U.S.

Botswana Names First Army Commander

The Botswana government has appointed former Deputy Police Chief Mompati Merafhe as the first commander of its army and charged him with the task of organizing the country’s new fighting force.

Botswana’s decision to establish a standing army came in the wake of repeated incursions by Rhodesian Security Forces. In a formal complaint to the UN, Botswana said the Rhodesian attacks had taken the lives of its citizens and damaged property in border areas.

A special UN mission visited Botswana earlier this year and recommended that the country be given emergency assistance because of the war on its eastern border.

The USSR’s Ambassador in Zambia has offered Soviet military aid to Botswana, but Botswana has not responded officially to the offer, according to Agence France-Presse.

SWAPO Doubtful On Western Diplomacy

The South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) is taking a “wait and see” attitude towards the Western diplomatic campaign now underway in South Africa.

Theo Ben Gurirab, the movement's UN representative, says a just-completed SWAPO leadership meeting has worked out plans for intensifying the guerrilla war. “Our fighting capability has been greatly enhanced,” Gurirab told AFRICA NEWS. “We are now in a better position because we have Angola as our rear base. We are also in a position to receive sophisticated weapons from our friends.”

A SWAPO communique issued in Luanda in April claimed that South African forces had lost 25 vehicles, 3 helicopters, and more than 100 soldiers since January. The communiqué also reported clashes inside Namibia between SWAPO and the disaffected Angolan guerrilla groups, UNITA and FNLA.

Kellogg Rejects African Unions

Kellogg-South Africa, a subsidiary of the giant U.S. cereal manufacturer, is having labor troubles at its Springs plant.

Kellogg, like many other firms, is either unaware of the provision or chooses to ignore it. Says Kellogg’s Harrison: "A formal relationship between a company and a union representing native workers is not permitted within the law.”
three of us competed with State Department officers to report on President Houphouet-Boigny’s health and local politics.

I attempted to rationalize that my responsibility was to contribute and not to evaluate the importance of my contribution, which should be done by supergrades in Washington. However, this was increasingly difficult as I looked up through a chain of command which included, step-by-step: (A) the branch chief, who had never served in Africa and was suspiciously ignorant of Black Africa . . . (B) the chief of operations, who was a senior officer although he had never served an operational overseas tour and was correspondingly naive about field operations, and . . . (C) the division chief, who was a political dilettante who had never served an operational tour in Africa . . . Their leadership continuously reflected their inexperience and ignorance.

In Burundi we won a round in the game of dirty tricks against the Soviets. Shortly after my arrival we mounted an operation to exploit the Soviets’ vulnerabilities of having a disproportionately large embassy staff and a fumbling, obnoxious old ambassador, and discredit them in the eyes of the Barundi. We were apparently successful, as the Barundi requested that the ambassador not return when he went on leave, and they ordered the Soviets to reduce their staff by 50 per cent.

We were proud of the operation, but a few months later the Soviets assigned a competent career diplomat to the post, and he arrived to receive a cordial welcome from the Barundi, who were more than a little nervous at their brashness, and eager to make amends. For the rest of my tour relations were remarkably better between the two countries than before our operation. The operation nevertheless won us some accolades. However, it left me with profound reservations about the real value of the operational games we play in the field.

After Vietnam I received the assignment of chief, Angola task force. This was despite the fact that I and many other officers in the CIA and State Department thought the intervention irresponsible and ill-conceived, both in terms of the advancement of United States interests, and the moral question of contributing substantially to the escalation of an already bloody civil war, which there was no possibility that we would make a full commitment and ensure the victory of our allies.

From a chess player’s point of view the intervention was a blunder. In July, 1975, the MPLA was clearly winning, already controlling 12 of the 15 provinces, and was thought by several responsible American officials and senators to be the best qualified to run Angola—not was it hostile to the United States. The CIA committed $31 million to opposing the MPLA victory, but six months later it had nevertheless decisively won, and 15,000 Cuban regular army troops were entrenched in Angola with the full sympathy of much of the Third World, and the support of several influential African chiefs of state who previously had been critical of any extra-continental intervention in African affairs.

At the same time the United States was solidly discredited, having been exposed for covert military intervention in African affairs, having managed to ally itself with South Africa and having lost. This is not Monday-morning quarterbacking. Various people foresaw all this and also predicted that the covert intervention would ultimately be exposed and curtailed by the United States Senate. I myself warned the interagency working group in October, 1975, that the Zairian invasion of Northern Angola would be answered by the introduction of large numbers of Cuban troops—10,000-15,000. I said—and would invite an eventual retaliatory invasion of Zaire from Angola.

Is anyone surprised that a year later the Angolan government has permitted freshly armed Zairian exiles to invade the Shaba province of Zaire? Is the CIA a good friend? Having encouraged Mobutu to tease the Angolan lion, will it help him repel its retaliatory charge? Can one not argue that our Angolan program provoked the present invasion of Zaire, which may well lead to its loss of Zaire’s rich copper mines.

Yes, I know you are attempting to generate token support to help Zaire meet its crisis—that you are seeking out the same French mercenaries the CIA sent into Angola in early 1976. These are the men who took the CIA money but fled the first time they encountered heavy shelling.

Some of us in the Angola program were continuously frustrated and disappointed with headquarters’ weak leadership of the field, especially its inability to control the Kinshasa station as it purchased ice plants and ships for local friends, and on one occasion tried to get the CIA to pay Mobutu $2 million for an airplane which was worth only $600,000. All of this, and much more, is documented in the cable traffic, if it hasn’t been destroyed.

I came away from the Angolan program in the spring of 1976 determined to reassess the CIA and my potential for remaining with it.

While I was still serving as the central branch chief in Africa division last fall, a young officer in my branch was delegated away from my supervision to write a series of memos discussing with the Justice Department the possibilities for prosecution of an American mercenary named David Bufkin.

Bufkin had been involved in the Angola conflict, apparently receiving monies from Holden Roberto, quite possibly from funds he received from the CIA. In anticipation of the possibility that during a trial of Bufkin the defense might demand to see his CIA file under the Freedom of Information Act, it was carefully purged.

Certain documents containing information about him were placed in other files where they could easily be retrieved but would not be exposed if he demanded and gained access to his own file. I heard of this and remonstrated, but was told by the young officer that in his previous agency assignment he had served on a staff which was responding to senate investigations, and that such tactics were common—“We did it all the time”—as the agency attempted to protect incriminating information from investigators.

---

**DOING A MAILING?**

Whether you are doing a mailing of 50 or 5000, you can help build Southern Africa by including our brochures. Contact us and let us know how many you need. Write Southern Africa magazine, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 707, New York, NY 10010. We need your support.

**HAVING A CONFERENCE ON SOUTHERN AFRICA?**

Sell Southern Africa magazine. We will send them to you for 60¢ each. Also distribute our brochure. We need your support. Contact Southern Africa magazine, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 707, New York, NY 10010.
If the Transkei is meant to be the model for bantustan independence, then recent developments show the oppressive nature of such apartheid schemes. Less than one year after South Africa granted “independence” to the Transkei as part of its bantustan policy the Transkei “government” has drastically increased taxes, passed strict security legislation and is repressing political opponents.

2,500 Per Cent Tax Increase

Under new tax laws the yearly tax of most peasants in the Transkei will go up at least 2,500 per cent. One of the most burdensome taxes, the hut tax, has been increased 1000%, rising from R1 ($1.15) to R10 ($11.50).

In addition a new tax on livestock has been introduced. Cattle and donkeys will be taxed R5 ($5.75) per head, R2.50 ($2.88) for each horse or mule and R1 for every sheep and goat. Thus a peasant family with four huts, 10 head of cattle and some small livestock will pay about R100 ($115.00) as compared to R4 ($4.60). The effect may be to force the sale of livestock, thus further impoverishing the population.

Transkei “Finance Minister” Tsepo Letlaka defended the higher taxes saying that the “Transkeian peasantry’s virtual tax holiday is at an end... Those whose assets are mainly on the hoof, and who disclose cash incomes generally too low to attract general tax, have for too long been contributing too little to the exchequer.”

Migrant Poverty

In fact there is already rampant poverty in the Transkei, which the taxes will simply intensify. In 1970 Transkei had a de jure (official) black population of 2,978,240. Of these 44%, over 1¼ million, live and work temporarily or permanently in “white” areas of South Africa. 65% of males ages 15-64 are temporarily or continuously absent from Transkei, which has no jobs for them.

The de jure population refers to the official population associated with the Transkei. This includes those actually living there and those classified as of Xhosa origin, who live and work in “white” areas. These people are officially classified as temporary or permanent migrants, but, in fact, “permanent migrants” are actually permanent urban residents who may never have migrated in their lives and who have no ties with the Transkei.

The income from migrant workers in 1973 comprised 69.6% of the total gross national income of Transkei. For 1973 the per capita income of the black population actually living in Transkei was R55 ($63.25) a year, R4.38 ($5.26) a month. The total monthly income of a family of 7 would, therefore, be R32.06 ($38.81) but the household subsistence level (the officially estimated poverty line) for Umtata, the capital, was R97.15 ($111.72)/a month in October 1975.

The new taxes have already sparked protests. The outcry was so strong that the proposed tax on livestock was cut in half. (Originally taxes were scheduled to increase some 5,000 per cent.) It is still likely that there will be a virtual revolt when the tax collectors come around.

Five On Trial

Opposition to the Matanzima regime has also shown itself in other ways. Thus five people are currently on trial in the Transkei on charges under the Suppression of Communism Act, one of South Africa’s security laws. Under the Transkei constitution criminal proceedings begun before independence shall continue “in all respects” as if the Transkei had not become independent. The five, who were originally arrested under Proclamation 400 (a law allowing for indefinite detention, without trial), are accused of having set up Marxist...
The Transkei constitution states that South African security laws will remain in effect until such time as they are removed by the bantustan government. South African security laws still on the books include the Suppression of Communist Act, the Terrorism Act and Proclamation 400. According to Transkei “Minister of Justice” Chief George Matanzima these laws will soon be replaced. “They will be replaced by Transkei security laws. No country in the world is without security laws.”

New Security Legislation

The bantustan government has announced in advance that the new security legislation which has yet to be announced in advance that the new legislation will be passed... making it an offense to do so,” said Transkei “President” Chief Botha Sigcau, announcing the legislation.

Another factor involved may be the bad relations currently existing between Lesotho and South Africa. Lesotho, which has a common border with Transkei, has refused to recognize the bantustan’s independence. There is a Basotho secessionist movement in the Transkei that wants to integrate much of the Transkei into Lesotho.

All That Blusters Is Not Bold

Until recently Lesotho had not encouraged the secessionist movement. But days before the security legislation was announced Chief Jonathan, Lesotho’s Prime Minister, made a speech in which he said that Transkei was “fraudulently” taken from Lesotho and then acknowledged efforts being made by the Basotho to regain control of the Transkei territories” towards re-integrating the Transkei into Lesotho. This apparently tough stance vis-a-vis South Africa is, perhaps, an attempt to gain the support of his own people. His basic position, however, is one of total alliance with South Africa, which he needs to help control his population.

In a similar search for an improved image Transkei “Prime Minister” Kaiser Matanzima has claimed large tracts of land in southern Natal and eastern Cape provinces. He backed up his land claim by saying that if the land was not “returned” peacefully the only option was “armed struggle” against South Africa! The South African government has rejected the land claims.

Since South Africa trains and supplies the Transkei “army” it is impossible for it to take any independent action. Further, Matanzima has no popular support and will need his army for police work in the Transkei.

If the first six months of Transkei “independence” shows anything, it is that sham independence will only bring more repression and greater poverty for the large majority of those who live in the bantustans. Bantustan “independence” is not the solution, it is part of the problem.

US Image Building

While it intensifies repression at home the Transkei government has signed a contract with Jay Parker Associates, Inc., a Washington, D.C. public relations firm, involving a yearly retainer of $120,000 and “out of pocket” expenses of $5000 a month.

BOSS IN LONDON

At least three or four times a year, opponents of apartheid in London are faced with a mystery to solve.

The British Anti-Apartheid Movement recently circulated a petition calling for an end to British military collaboration with South Africa. It was soon discovered that there was not only one petition in circulation but two: one genuine and one a forgery. There were slight, almost indiscernible, but pointed differences. For example, where the genuine petition read, “Civilized opinion throughout the world called for an end to the supply of arms to South Africa,” the forged version read, “Following Sharpeville, Moscow called for an end to the supply of arms.” The purpose of the altered wording of the petition seems to be an attempt to link the A.A.M. with Soviet communism thereby discrediting the movement in the eyes of Western moderate opinion.

This effort appears to be part of South Africa’s propaganda campaign against any move to enact a United Nations arms embargo. The Club of Ten, which operates as a clandestine pro-South African group in London, has recently been placing extensive anti-arms embargo ads in major Western newspapers. These events coincided with the current session of the UN where attempts to pass an arms embargo against South Africa are being made. Speculation has it that this is yet another BOSS brainchild.

BOSS (the South African Bureau for State Security) is an intelligence agency whose task it is to gather information on “all matters affecting the security of the state.” In practice, it clearly works hand-in-glove with the security police. In addition to its internal activities, BOSS handles matters of external security and has overseas espionage networks set up which it is able to maintain through South African diplomatic, tourist, trade and press agencies in foreign countries.

BOSS seems to operate on two fronts in London: the harassment of apartheid’s opponents and attempts to discredit Labour Party leaders. (The British Labour Party is not as favorably disposed towards South Africa as the Conservative Party.)

Harassment

Recent years have seen at least a dozen burglaries of the homes or hotel rooms of black South African leaders in London. In almost every case, premises were ransacked, files and papers disturbed, confidential documents stolen while cash and valuables were left untouched. Not one arrest has been made in connection with these burglaries. Stolen documents and photographs, taken from his London flat, were submitted as evidence in the 1972 terrorism trial in South Africa of Moumbars. A photograph taken in Ireland was submitted as evidence in
the terrorism trial of the Dean of Johannesburg—who was later acquitted. In 1971, files relating to sponsored visits to Britain by South African church members were stolen from the Society of Friends' London headquarters.

Labour Party

In 1976, an elaborate attempt was made to pin a London bank robbery, involving about $860, on Peter Hain. Someone had exercised considerable ingenuity in establishing false evidence. Hain was president of the Young Liberals and had previously organized a campaign to stop a tour of South Africa's cricket and rugby team. He was acquitted, but only after a considerable fight.

In March 1976, Prime Minister Wilson accused South African business interests of financing a massive smear campaign against Jeremy Thorpe, leader of the Liberal Party. Thorpe is an eloquent apostate opponent. The smear campaign involved the claim of a male model that he had had a homosexual affair with Thorpe 15 years ago.

In May 1976, it was reported in the Guardian that an official of the South African embassy in London, Mr. Roussouw, had tried to obtain a copy of a "blue movie" reputed to involve a British politician. He claimed to be interested in the movie from a purely "personal point of view." Mr. Roussouw was recalled.

Since BOSS' operations are covered by a cloud of secrecy, it is not possible to positively verify that they are in fact responsible for these events. However, given that these mysteries so consistently and with such tailor-made precision serve South African interests, it is hardly possible to arrive at any other conclusion.

In 1961, the South African government granted "honorary white" status to the Japanese. Since then, a steady parade of Japanese businessmen, armed with contract forms and a willingness to overlook occasional lapses in racial etiquette, has been beating a track south.

In 1975, trade between the two countries rose to nearly $1 billion, up from about $17 million in 1968, making Japan South Africa's fourth largest trading partner. At last count the number of Japanese firms represented in South Africa had risen to 66 (about 50 South African firms are represented in Tokyo) and the Japanese community in South Africa had grown to 600.

Indications are that expanding trade relations are ahead. Last year, the representative in South Africa of Japan's government-subsidized external trade organization (JETRO) was quoted in the Johannesburg Star as saying he was convinced "that there is potential to more than double in the next five years the current volume of Japan-South African trade."

The Star noted that JETRO, which previously had been keeping a relatively low profile, was now planning extensive new contacts in the country.

Both South Africa's ruling white minority and Japan stand to gain more than additional dollars from any further trade growth.

Seeking-Sufficiency

The South African government has been engaged since the early 1970s in a massive "industrialization" program aimed at making the country self-sufficient in an increasingly hostile world. Several major rail and harbor projects undertaken in connection with this goal, owe their existence to huge long-term mineral contracts with Japanese firms. The most important of these is the Sishen-Saldanha project, which will involve close to $1 billion worth of looking coal.

Japan, for its part, is not only gaining needed agricultural products and raw materials—it is South Africa's top mineral customer—but is also finding welcome new markets.

In 1975, South Africa was Japan's fourth largest car and truck customer, and at the end of last year it appeared that South Africa was about to jump to second place. South Africa's Orange River electricity project, the largest ever undertaken in the country, is being supplied with power generators from Japan, and South African sugar exports to Japan—the largest single item of trade—travel mainly in Japanese-made ships.

Further enhancing prospects is the fact that trade totals between the two countries have remained nearly in balance, an issue of particular interest to South Africa because of its chronic balance-of-payments problems.

Balancing Act

The Japanese government, caught between its own needs and the criticisms of Third World countries, has been trying to maintain a balancing act in its attitude toward the South African minority regime. Adding to the delicacy of the task is the fact that many of the Third World countries—to whom it would like to appear as a leader—also have resources Japan wants and needs. Among these are oil from Nigeria and Angola, iron ore from Swaziland, Angola, and Mozambique, copper from Zambia, and niobium (used in the production of alloys) from Nigeria and Mozambique.

In 1968 the Japanese government banned direct investment in South Africa, and a spokesman says there are no plans for a change in this policy. In 1974 Japan took the further step of banning financing of South African trade by its export-import bank. In that same year it stopped granting visas for sporting events and it ordered the Japan-International Bank to cease lending to South African borrowers. At the same time, Japan has increased its foreign aid to Africa—the percentage rose to 3.1% of the total $1 billion in 1975 from 1.8% in the previous year—and it has opened its first African aid office in Nairobi.

Japanese concern, however, appears to be more cosmetic than real. The South African Financial Mail, in a recent special report, said that Ex-Im financing is known still to be available to Japanese firms in South Africa.

It also said that a considerable amount of Japanese capital is believed
to be finding its way into South Africa through the “back door” of third-country subsidiaries, and, indirectly, through the large-scale sale of patents, franchises, and expertise.

The report commented, “It seems clear that many Japanese companies have succeeded—perhaps with the tacit approval of their government—in circumventing the spirit, if not the letter, of official Japanese policy.”

That policy, as outlined by Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka in December, calls for a continued hands-off attitude.

“Japan is basically opposed to South Africa’s apartheid policy,” Mr. Kosaka said. “Therefore we have banned direct investment in the Republic. But when it comes to trade there are many ramifications. Our basic position is to let private business concern make its own decision.”

At the United Nations

Japan’s voting record in the United Nations has reflected its desire to stay out of world controversy over South Africa as much as possible while practicing this laissez-faire approach.

Last year, Japan abstained or failed to vote on most key issues involving South Africa, while voting in favor of motions which did not directly affect its South African interests. Among these latter were resolutions condemning countries which violate the ban on trade with South Africa, while voting in favor of motions which did not directly affect its South African interests. Among these latter were resolutions condemning countries which violate the ban on trade with South Africa.

But Japan’s role has not gone unnoticed in the world body. In 1974 the UN sent a mission to Tokyo to express concern over Japan’s increased trade with South Africa, and last year a motion was passed naming Japan, among others, as guilty of assisting the minority regime.

That motion condemned “the collaboration of all states, particularly France, the Federal Republic of (West) Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Israel and Japan... with the racist regimes of Southern Africa, especially in the economic, military and nuclear fields,” and described such countries as “accomplices” in the practices of racial discrimination, apartheid, and colonialism.

Dodging Apartheid

For the Japanese living in South Africa, their own lives have not been completely free of the indignities racial discrimination fosters, despite their honorary white status.

Shigeru Nakamura, general manager in South Africa of the Nissho-Iwai trading firm, told the Financial Mail that “the days of quibbling over park benches certainly seems to have disappeared from South Africa’s major cities as far as Japanese are concerned.”

But unpleasant things still occasionally happen, Mr. Nakamura added, recalling an incident which occurred while he was attempting to get his drivers’ license endorsed for South Africa.

“I was told by a woman to move round to the blacks-only counter,” Mr. Nakamura said. “A male official soon put things straight but the woman did not apologize.”

Yet their own problems haven’t blinded the Japanese to the economic advantages that come with the apartheid regime.

Border Industries

A number of South African firms with Japanese connections have set up operations in the so-called “border industrial areas” where they can take advantage of cheap labor on the bantustans. One such firm is Toyota, which according to a report prepared for several church groups and published by the UN unit on apartheid, moved in 1971 from Durban to a border area. The report notes that Toyota’s black workers struck the plant in 1974, demanding an increase in their minimum wage. An accompanying table shows that in 1974 Toyota paid a minimum hourly wage of 38 cents to its black workers, better than Datsun-Nissan’s 25 cents but considerably below Ford and General Motors’ 56 cents and Citroen’s 47 cents... all of which give black workers pay packets too lean to even meet bare subsistence needs.

Strengthening Economic Base

The most important of the current industrialization-linked projects include a port at Richards Bay, opened a year ago, which is the largest such facility on the east coast of the continent, a railway to Richards Bay, and west coast development in the form of a railway from the Sishen iron ore and coal mines to Saldanha, the expansion of the Saldanha port, and the construction at Saldanha of a semi-processed steel plant.

The Japanese have been reluctant to expose their participation in these projects, but the Financial Mail commented, “It is an open secret that the Japanese are the mysterious unidentified partner in the semis plant at Saldanha” and described the total package of improvements as “the first major South African projects to owe their existence to the Japanese trading connection.”

Nuclear Connection

Looking to the future, the most worrisome Japanese involvement in
A 1975 UN report noted that "apart from its potential significance for the production of weapons-grade uranium (a possibility which the South African government claims it eschews at this point) the enrichment plant is of major importance to South Africa for economic as well as political and strategic reasons." These, the report says, include greater energy self-sufficiency to lessen the impact of any potential international boycott of petroleum supplies.

The report adds, "it is clear that the South African regime hopes to take advantage of its position as a major producer of uranium, and eventually of enriched uranium, to involve the major industrialized countries more closely in the apartheid economy and thereby to strengthen their vested interest in support of the status quo in South Africa."

So far, there's been no indication that Japan finds the prospect unsettling. □

**Namibia**

**SHUFFLING TOWARDS "INDEPENDENCE"**

The South Africa government and its minions have long insisted that SWAPO has influence only among a small section of the Namibian people, the Ovambo, in the north. Hiding behind these blinders, members of the puppet Turnhalle delegations have been touring the country, touting support. The hostility with which they were met underscores the widespread support that is actually accorded SWAPO throughout Namibia.

In the small town of Gibeon, in the north, the speaker from one of the Turnhalle contingents unwisely declared, "SWAPO has not been able to bring freedom to Namibia as it promised. Through the constitutional talks we will do it, and do it peacefully."

The meeting broke into an uproar. The audience was additionally infuriated by the presence of Emil Appolus, a SWAPO renegade who has cast his lot with Turnhalle, and they gave vent to their anger with energy, denouncing him as "an agent of the CIA and the South African government."

As the jeers and fury mounted, the security police made vain attempts to bring the meeting back under control. At a loss, they were forced to ask local SWAPO leaders to calm the crowd. The SWAPO officials responded by leading the people en masse out of the hall.

Popular antagonism towards the Turnhalle talks in Namibia was recently confirmed by two American Lutheran Church leaders, on their return from a visit to Namibia. They said in New York April 7 that the majority of "the black Namibian population does not accept the conference participants as true representatives" of their country.

Dr. Robert Marshall, president of the Lutheran Church in America and Dr. David Preus, president of the American Lutheran Church, talked as well about South African domination of the territory. Dr. Marshall went on to say, "for the black population . . . the government is a police state, with all the evils that go with that."

**Phony Interim Government Planned**

At the Turnhalle itself—the name of the hall in which the meetings are taking place—the South Africa-sponsored conference which has dragged on for one and a half years so far has reached the end of the first stage of its work. It has produced what it calls the "final concept" for an "interim government" for an "independent South West Africa."

The Ministers Council of South West Africa, the governing body, will be composed of one representative for each population group. In other words, there will be a representative for each of the 11 ethnic groups singled out according to the officially prevailing race and ethnic distinctions designated by the apartheid regime. Its president will be appointed by the South African State President, "in consultation with" the Ministers' Council.

The interim government is based on a three-tier structure—federal, regional or tribal, and local or municipal—which has been under discussion throughout the duration of the conference.

**International Campaign**

Turnhalle's campaign to win support has recently reached the US. Last August, a group of Namibian business and professional men, black and white, formed an organization named the Prosouth Africa Foundation, modeled on the South Africa Foundation, which has propagandaized for the Pretoria regime for years. PROSWA has now become PROSWA/Namibia, or just the Namibia Foundation in the US, with an eye to possible future acceptance of Namibia as the name of the country.

The promotion outfit has surfaced in the US with a message from its director of information and communication, Professor Mbumbu Kerina, extolling the Turnhalle solution. Kerina, another SWAPO defector, lived in the US for many years and recently returned to Namibia to join the Turnhalle team. He is, according to the Windhoek Adver-
View of Damaraland, one of the areas designated for representation in the government.

tiser, "deeply detested" by most Namibian political groupings that have not associated with Turnhalle. Kerina's message is being distributed by Jay Parker & Associates, Inc., a Washington, D.C., based management and public relations consulting firm, which also handles all the public relations activities for the Transkei.

On the Defensive

Whatever the outcome of the Turnhalle talks—and even if there is nominal independence—South Africa is obviously not planning to abandon its military capability in Namibia. The ability to operate militarily, whether directly or at the "invitation" of a puppet independent government, is crucial to the South African regime's forward planning. It is determined to maintain its capacity to deal both with SWAPO and, most important of all, with any future South African liberation movement attacks.

A recent government defense memorandum presented to the South African Parliament focused heavily on Namibia, where much of the South African army is stationed. Pretoria claims the three northern Namibian bantustans have requested defense force protection. The memorandum states that the number of Ovamboland and Kavango battalions is being increased and that an infantry battalion for East Caprivi is being considered.

In the same month South African Defense Minister P.W. Botha, accompanied by the Chief of the Defense Force, General Magnus Malan, visited Turnhalle to consult with that body's Defense Committee.

South Africa's determination to keep the defense responsibility under its control was corroborated in a statement made by Brigadier Ben de Wet Roos, former military commander in the territory. The Windhoek Advertiser of March 29 reported that he "believed the local inhabitants still wanted the army in the territory." He added that he "would prefer to continue fighting for the Republic in South West Africa, than in South Africa itself, but it was for his political masters to decide whether or not to withdraw from the territory."

At the same time, the army has intensified its "counter-insurgency" training.

The manual for senior officers covers more specific techniques to enable them to "retain or regain" African support. This "Guide to Psychological Action" suggests "the display of deceased insurgent leaders' bodies to the population, among whom they have built a reputation for invincibility. "Care should be taken, however, not to create martyrs." Psychological action officers have been assigned to each battalion of the South African occupation force in northern Namibia.

Despite these intensified tactics, it is highly unlikely that they will be successful in wooing support away from SWAPO. SWAPO has proved that it has mass support and the Turnhalle is being shown up for what it is—totally unrepresentative of the people.

**Zimbabwe**

**SMITH MARCHES ON**

While British and US diplomats worked furiously behind the scenes to produce a new formula for a Rhodesian settlement, Smith, apparently unmoved by all the furor, seems still to be seeking an internal solution which will avoid even token forms of majority rule.

The Prime Minister's strategy, designed, it appears, to win co-operation from Bishop Muzorewa, involves removing the image of an apartheid society, but the concessions made are still so minimal that they seem unlikely to achieve his aim.

Central to his scheme were revisions in the rights Africans have to land usage. The amendment to the Land Tenure Act which Smith rammed through Parliament, supposedly frees the 50% of the land formerly in the control of whites, to be purchased by whites or blacks. But Smith emphasized that his government would not permit existing farms in the white areas to be subdivided, a development which he said, would reduce productivity and encourage "squatters." In effect this restriction places the vast part of the land well beyond the financial means of even the most well off black farmers.

With regard to land and homes in urban areas, Smith gave assurances that changes would be "gradual and unhurried." Local authorities were to be asked to consider the matter and advise the Government on "what areas they believe should be multi-racial." Strict racial segregation would continue in white suburban areas; special areas would be set aside for "multiracial living" in future development schemes. Racial separation in hotels, restaurants and bars is to be abolished, but owners retain the right to refuse admission. Smith's "changes" do not touch Rhodesia's racially segregated schools.

Smith's "reforms" were universally condemned by the liberation move-
ments, and Smith's black puppet leader of ZUPO (the Zimbabwe United People's Organization), was moved to say that the reforms "did not go far enough."

Yet despite their clear limitations, opposition to Smith's proposals within his own Rhodesian Front party was so strong that Smith literally had to bring two Rhodesian Front MP's straight from their hospital sick beds to muster up the two-thirds vote he needed to get his amendments passed.

Dialogue Begun
The dialogue on "internal solution" has already publicly begun between Smith and ZUPO, the black party which Salisbury hopes to use to assert African support in the tribal trust lands for an "internal solution."

Branded as Smith's tool, ZUPO has been unable to gain any kind of base among the people. Refugees reaching Francistown, Botswana, say that the Smith regime is now forcing Africans in tribal trust lands to join ZUPO; refugees have told of "mass arrests" of those who refused to join ZUPO.

Muzorewa Reaction
Muzorewa's reaction to the Smith initiatives appeared unambiguous. In an official statement, Muzorewa's United African National Council declared that it would not "be party to any internal settlement talks where Britain is not in the chair. ... Britain and Britain alone must give us our independence. The only settlement we will accept from Mr. Smith is a total handover of power."

But despite that statement the regime seems to believe there are grounds for reconciliation with the Bishop. Two of the ANC's top men, secretary general Gordon Chavunduka and publicity secretary Max Chigwida, have appeared on discussion programs on Rhodesian TV in recent weeks. Up until now, as the Star Johannesburg points out, "having a black nationalist air his views on Rhodesian TV has been about as likely as snow on Christmas Day in Johannesburg. Today," as the Star observes, "it almost appears as if the hard-line, pro-Government TV service is trying to accustom white Rhodesians to the faces and the views of the bishop's men, to the exclusion of any other black nationalists."

The South African Rand Daily Mail reported a clandestine trip to South Africa made by Gordon Chavunduka for talks with members of the South African regime, seeking that regime's support.

Sithole Alliance Rumored
Reports have also begun to circulate of an impending formal political alliance between Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndaganiingi Sithole, the two nationalist outrasts at the Geneva conference. Such an alliance, aimed at politically outflanking the Patriotic Front, would give added legitimacy to Muzorewa's forces and makes negotiating an "internal solution" with Muzorewa all the more attractive.

Smith's agenda also calls for a "test" of black opinion. No clear framework has been announced for such a move, but Smith appears to be leaning toward holding a referendum under some form of international supervision, to "establish black leadership" in the country. Smith's apparent acceptance of a referendum under international supervision is probably based upon his assessment that Bishop Muzorewa would emerge as the winner of such a referendum.

Muzorewa's proposals at the Geneva Conference also included holding a referendum, but there are differences in the two parties' conceptions concerning the referendum. The Smith regime sees a referendum as a test of opinion, designed only to give legitimacy to the plan of dealing solely with Muzorewa, and not with the Patriotic Front. According to Muzorewa's Geneva proposals the referendum would function to actually set up the interim government.

The Patriotic Front has denounced the idea of a referendum. "We cannot have a referendum whilst the racists are in power, while the racist state machinery is intact. ... We will have one man, one vote, yes—but in a free, independent Zimbabwe."

Smith clearly sees a settlement with the Bishop not in terms of ending the guerrilla war, but in terms of making it easier to fight the war. The rationale would be that in a war against a Muzorewa-rulled Zimbabwe it would be easier for the West to help with arms and supplies.

South Africa—Support for Smith
Indications of solid South African support for Smith's position and intentions continues to mount.

Prime Minister Vorster speaking to the South African Senate, declared that it was not correct to say that he supported majority rule for Rhodesia; he had never advocated this, either in public or in private. Vorster added that all he has ever said is that he is "in favor of a settlement in Rhodesia, a settlement between black and white Rhodesians."

ON THE BATTLEFRONT

Too Few Troops for Smith
White Rhodesia's military manpower crisis, caused by the escalating demands of the war and a manpower source absolutely limited in terms of numbers, continues unabated. With a rather understated air, the regime's new Minister of Manpower and Social Affairs, Rowan Cronje, declared that the crisis "had no easy solution."

The most immediate phase of the crisis was brought about by the phasing out of indefinite call-up of the Territorial Force, and the stepping up of the war. In May of 1976, the Territorial and reserve battalions were put on indefinite call up, which meant that during 1976 many men in the 22 to 30 age group spent up to eight months in the army. This has since been lifted. Under the new arrangements, men in these units will serve 44 days, followed by 40 days of freedom from service. Cronje further revealed that there were about 12,000 men in the 35-50 age group who had no military commitment. "It is the intention that most of those found to be suitable should be required to join the police reserve"—the "bright lights" in White Rhodesian jargon—normally
used to guard farmsteads and convoys. An executive at the institute of Personnel Management commented that the men drawn from this age group are not likely to take kindly to their military roles, and predicted that the 38-50 year old call up "will certainly have a disruptive effect on the economy and could well be a contributing factor to any upsurge in emigration figures among this group next year."

There are increasing signs of demoralization within the Rhodesian army ranks. Reports from Bulawayo spoke of problems of excessive drinking causing slackness and undiscipline in the Rhodesian army ranks. Soldiers have been warned that under the country's Defense Act they would be given the death penalty for "loose talk"—a clear indication that such "loose talk" has been a problem. And there are constant reports of disillusioned mercenaries—the white Rhodesia calls them "boom-booms"—defecting.

**Liberation Forces Grow**

In an interview in Maputo, Robert Mugabe, made it known that ZANU and ZAPU are to meet to consider the question of bringing their armies together. Mugabe stated that a coordinating committee had been established just before the Rhodesian assassination of Jason Moyo, to explore the question of harmonizing relations between ZAPU and ZANU. Mugabe further revealed that the guerrilla forces along the Rhodesian border would soon acquire modern anti-aircraft weapons to stop raids by the Smith regime's airforce.

As the struggle intensifies, hundreds of young Zimbabweans are leaving the country, many of them seeking to join the guerrillas. According to the Rhodesian Herald, some 25,000 black students are missing from schools in Manicaland, and particularly in the Tribal Trust Lands around Umtali, on the Mozambican border, where about 15,000 students have failed to enroll. The Rhodesian regime has retaliated first by dropping some 10,000 leaflets on selected areas in the eastern border tribal trust lands, calling on parents to enroll their children, and then, by closing most of the schools in the region.

In addition, small specialized teams headed by men trained in psychological warfare have begun visiting hundreds of schools throughout the tribal trust lands. Said one team member, "We can't expect to achieve miracles. There are many problems, some of which we are unlikely to overcome. But something must be done to curtail the abduction rate."

**BOTSWANA HARRIED BY SMITH**

A UN mission to Botswana reported on March 31 that Botswana will require $43 million in aid to meet urgent security and refugee needs over the next two to three years. These needs arise because of the country's location in the middle of turbulent southern Africa and are currently being met from Botswana's limited development funds.

The outside aid would be channelled into several projects. First would be the expansion of the Botswana Mobile Police Unit, the para-military force which, in the absence of an army, is bearing the brunt of Rhodesian border aggressions. Second, there are the needs of the growing number of refugees passing through, an estimated 12,000 Zimbabweans, Namibians, and South Africans since January 1975 (UN figures). Third, there is the need to safeguard landlocked Botswana against a sudden punitive curtailment of trade and transport/communications with its neighbors.

The Rhodesian security forces have a record of ignoring Botswana national sovereignty whenever it gets in the way of their capturing or killing an individual they particularly want.

In March three Botswana citizens and one Zimbabwean refugee resident in Botswana, who had been abducted from inside Botswana by Rhodesian security forces in late 1976, were actually charged, on allegations of conspiracy, in a Bulawayo court.

There have been 53 well documented incidents of various border incursions since Botswana's independence in 1966, 33 of them occurring in 1976 alone. But the bombing, burning and strafing of homes and villages in the frontier areas in Botswana as well as in Rhodesia indicates a conscious Rhodesian policy of creating a free-fire zone inhospitable to liberation fighters straddling the common border. Increasing Botswana's military capability is intended to enable Botswana to better protect its citizens and those who come from other states seeking a haven in Botswana.
Guinea Bissau

PEOPLE'S ELECTIONS

by Basil Davidson

The following article is reprinted, in shortened form, from People's Power in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, Number 6, January-February 1977, London.

Since 1964, from the second year of its armed struggle, the PAIGC has worked to build a new state, a new social order, a democracy, through the promotion in liberated areas of representative committees “at the base” and through the increasing control which these committees can and do exercise in every field of everyday life.

In 1974 the new social, political, and economic structures of the liberated zones were extended to those parts of the country which had remained under colonialist control until then. An intensive campaign of politicization was at once begun in these newly liberated areas, and above all in the city of Bissau with its 80,000 inhabitants, among whom were many thousands who had served the Portuguese, or made money out of the war, or refused to help the struggle for independence.

In December 1976 PAIGC took another big step forward. Building on the political work of the previous two years, the people of Bissau were called on to elect their representatives to the local government of Bissau, so that they too could be brought more fully within the democratic process of participation in the discussion and control of their own affairs. At the same time, between 19 and 21 December, similar elections to regional councils were held in every other part of the country.

Participation

But this was not done simply by setting up a list of candidates and asking people to vote for them. That would no doubt have shown an electoral success for the PAIGC, but it would not have achieved the party's central purpose. This was to bring about elections in which voters should actively participate in the whole process of selection of candidates, discussion of problems, and eventual choice of candidates. The purpose, in short, was once again to widen the practice of mass participation.

An electoral commission was formed for each of the rural districts, and another for the city of Bissau; and these were brought under the supervision of a national electoral commission. The representative committees of each region were asked to discuss the names of possible candidates, judging these by their moral and political qualifications, no matter whether or not they had been fighters in the war of liberation. Out of these discussions a list of approved candidates was then drawn up, while at the same time, all leading militants at every level were spending days and nights in electoral meetings with the public.

Voting

All persons over the age of 18 were eligible to vote with the exception of the mentally disabled, while candidates had to be over 21, engaged in some useful work, and known not to have served the PIDE (Portuguese Political Police) during the war or to have belonged to one or other of the Portuguese dictatorship's fascist organizations.

Voting was by secret ballot, and by the use of one of two cards, one stating Yes and the other stating No, in favor of or against the local list of candidates. About 90% of the people of Guinea-Bissau are illiterate so voting procedures had to be simple and carefully explained. It is perhaps necessary to say that women in Guinea-Bissau have the same civic rights as men.

All organs of party and state were used in emphasizing the meaning and the importance of this general election, and the eve of the election was marked by a solemn message to the nation from its president, Luiz Cabral.

A large fraction of the electorate was voting for the first time in their lives, and without the slightest experience even of the most superficial forms of electoral democracy. Even that proportion of the electorate which had voted in 1972 [for the People's National Assembly in the liberated zones] was voting only for the second time, since no elections had ever taken place under the Portuguese except within the managed circuit of fascist "corporativism," and even this excluded some 99 percent of the population of Guinea-Bissau.

Some expected setback duly came about. In the two main regions of the north where hereditary chiefs in Portuguese pay (mainly Fula) had always opposed the movement of national liberation as a threat to their own privi...
leges, and who had retained some credit because they are chiefs sanctioned by a long tradition, the PAIGC list could manage to secure only 50.4 per cent of votes (Bafata) and 56 per cent (Gabu).

Given the background of confusion and corruption in those particular areas during the colonial period, and above all during the liberation war, these proportions in fact denote a considerable success. A majority of preferences—even a narrow one—still went in favor of PAIGC candidates.

Most regions gave a very different answer, such as the 98 per cent of Cacheu and of Buba and the 96 per cent of Bissau region, while the 95 per cent of Bolama-Bijagos was particularly heartwarming since the populations of this region could be liberated, for the most part, only in 1974.

Another region where the liberation war had to be fought with great courage and persistence, that of Oio, returned a favorable proportion of 84.5 per cent. But the most striking success was the 84 per cent of favorable votes cast in Bissau city, a striking tribute to the effective work of party militants there.

From The Base

These elections had a dual institutional function. One of these functions was to establish new regional councils which, hitherto, had existed only in the liberated areas. The other was to elect a renewed National Assembly of members chosen from within the regional councils. Of course it would have been possible to proceed to a direct election for the sovereign National Assembly but the PAIGC has preferred this two-stage electoral method for solid reasons.

To begin with, the PAIGC has never displayed any interest in elections "for the sake of elections": democracy is much more than a voting machine. The PAIGC, on the contrary, has always seen the electoral process as a method of democratic control, but a method which can be effective only if it emerges from the base, level by level, and is dynamized by a genuine participation at the base and upwards from the base.

Hence the chief task of the party in building a system of democratic control is seen as that of promoting an everwidening consciousness of gains and obligations. To that end the two-stage method of election from the base to regional councils, and from the regional councils to the National Assembly has been judged manifestly preferable.

Democracy in this perspective, is a process of deepening the active participation of the masses in the direction and control of their own lives, and progressively, again through a democratic structure, of the life of the whole nation. December's elections in Guinea-Bissau have signalled another vital step in the building of this structure.

Angola

ON BUILDING A PARTY

This is an excerpt from an interview with Lucio Lara, Secretary-General of MPLA by Elisabeth Hedborg and Hillevi Nilsson which was published in Sweden. We are reprinting it because it raises very important questions about building a party. We plan to have further material on this subject relating to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau in the future.

Q: Lately there have been discussions whether the MPLA will form a party. What was the result of those discussions?

Lara: At the meeting of the Central Committee in the beginning of November this year it was decided that a congress is to be held in 1977, at which the question of forming a party will be studied. There are various opinions about what such a party should be like and what place it should fill, and for that reason a congress has to decide this. Earlier on the dominant opinion in the Central Committee was that the MPLA should be transformed into a party. But now more and more members seem to think that the MPLA should continue to exist as a movement, and at the same time a completely new party should be formed. In that case it will be a Marxist-Leninist cadre party. We feel that it would be politically unwise to abolish the MPLA, which has such a good reputation among the population of this country, in order to turn it into a party. Our people are not used to political parties, and it would be very difficult to explain to them that "now the MPLA is going to disappear, and a party is to be formed, but you are not allowed to be a member of it." It would be easier to change the MPLA into a mass party.
Q: Then why don't you do that?
Lara: The struggle between the classes in Angola has not as yet reached its most intensive phase. A movement like the MPLA, where all classes are represented, can not solve class conflicts and build up socialism. In such a case we would have conflicts between ourselves, and that would prevent us from realizing our political aims. Already we must think of creating a party that can become an instrument for the working classes and with the help of which we can build up socialism. The MPLA could never be such an instrument, even if it has filled—and during many years to come will fill—a very important place as a front organization. But in order to build up a socialist Angola it is necessary to have a party that is clearly defined in terms of classes.
Q: But what do you do if others want for form parties as well?
Lara: That we will not allow.
Q: Isn't there a risk that this party will become a party for an elite, while the masses remain in the MPLA?
Lara: That risk does exist, of course, but it can be avoided by means of the criteria laid down for party membership. Party members will be only those who are self-sacrificing and devoted, persons who humbly accept to carry out the difficult tasks we have in front of us.
Q: What important changes has the MPLA gone through from the days when it was a liberation movement up to now when it is an organization with government responsibility?
Lara: The problems, thus, are the same. They have only got other dimensions, and at the same time the MPLA has become much bigger. When the MPLA became legal, a large number of new members joined, but their political conviction rarely was as strong as we could have wished. They often had opportunistic or emotional motives. We have not yet managed to do very much about this opportunism. We have called for watchfulness, and we have made a certain selection among the applications for membership, but the methods have not been very effective so far. From now on we will be much stricter when accepting new members. (Within the

"We will create a party as an instrument for the working classes and build up Socialism." (fragments from an interview with Lucio Lara, by Elisabeth Hedborg and Hillevi Nilsson)
-Kommentar (Sweden), no. 1, 1977

MPLA there are three kinds of membership: simpatizantes, aderentes, and militantes. The kind of membership we have translated with "member" in the interview is the militante group. Being a militante means that already during at least one year you have been working for the MPLA, displaying "a consequent revolutionary practice." A simpatizante can every Angolan become who accepts the program and covenant of the MPLA. The requirements for activity are much more modest here. —Note of Kommentar.) We will even purge within the movement. It is not enough for an MPLA member to have a membership card that can give him certain advantages. A real MPLA member is only the person that takes part in the everyday political work, that is the person that belongs to an action group and takes part in its discussions, studies and work. Those who do not meet these demands will be expelled as members, and then we will consider if they may remain in the organization as sympathizers.
Q: How do the action groups function?
Lara: There are action groups in nearly every place of work and they function well. The groups in the residential areas function less well. There the work has not got properly started. We now attach less importance to the number of members and stress quality instead. This is part of the plans on the eve of the MPLA congress of 1977, so that gradually we shall be able to form a party. During the guerrilla stage people joined the MPLA almost instinctively, and there was no selection worth mentioning—now we build up the movement more systematically and on a scientific basis.
Q: But haven't you met with resistance from certain social strata?
Lara: . . . There is also resistance from the Catholic Church, not from the Catholics in general but from the leaders. It is quite clear that they are very worried by our policy, and that they oppose us directly in certain fields. They think that there is a conflict between the Marxist ideology and Christianity. But it is not necessarily so. The bishop of the Methodist Church, Emilio de Carvalho, recently pointed out in a very convincing way that there is no antagonistic conflict between Marxism and Christian teaching. To us it was important that a Christian Angolan leader in this way agreed with the idea that the most important common task is to build up the country. 

Members of the Young Pioneers, an organization of MPLA in Luanda.

In contrast to the many academic studies published about the history, economy, international legal status or operative political forces of Namibia, Namibia by Bishop Winter illustrates how these factors, in application, affect the lives of its people on a day-to-day basis. Namibia leaves its reader with a personal taste of and feeling for Namibia and its people.

Written in an autobiographical style, Bishop Winter takes the reader into Namibia to experience with him the various people, issues and conflicts he met with during his thirteen years there. The reader will arrive at an intimate knowledge of the country—from the harshness of the terrain and climate, the searing oppression of the Blacks, the abstract indifference of the whites to the courage and determination of the people to achieve independence.

Throughout the book, Winter quotes from documents, correspondence, speeches, interviews and conversations in relating the development of a particular political event. Through this means, he often allows Namibians to speak through the book for themselves and gives the reader a first-hand experience of a cross-section of some of the Namibian people.

Colin Winter is the Bishop-in-Exile of the Anglican Diocese of Damaraland which, for the Church, encompasses the entire territory of Namibia. He was deported, like his two predecessors, from Namibia by the South African government in 1972. He was elected by the Diocesan synod to remain the bishop while in exile in 1972 and was re-elected to retain that position in 1975.

Namibia is portrayed from the perspective of a bishop and the theme throughout the book is the role of the church in general and in particular, Winter’s personal role within the church. In sharp contrast to the role that church has played in other colonial and occupied countries in the region of southern Africa, the church in Namibia has repeatedly been an active political force in the country siding with and supporting the struggle for national liberation. This is probably true because, while even the most wealthy and reactionary whites participate in the life of the church, they do not maintain a stranglehold on its purse-strings as is the case, for instance, in South Africa.

The Anglican church of Namibia receives the greater part of its funding from foreign sources and its survival is consequently not dependent on the occurrence of its white members with its policies. This factor, in combination with the fact that the overwhelming majority of church membership is Black and the fact that so far, the leadership of the church has been in sympathetic hands, accounts for the progressive role the church has played in Namibia.

Winter outlines the Anglican church’s broad range of involvement in socio-political activities through people who came to work in Namibia—some for short periods and others for many years. The church ran a school and hospital in Ovamboland in the north and, in the south, it ran a night school for students to aid in their studies, an occupational therapy program in the tuberculosis hospital, feeding schemes, self-help programs, youth work and established a small construction company to function as a ‘model’ company—equalized wages, sharing of profits and regular discussions between all the workers to make decisions and discuss problems. Winter describes the personalities of these workers, their encounters with some of the people and their encounters with the authorities.

Winter characterizes the three main sectors of Namibia’s population and their roles in Namibian society with perceptive insight: the confident, superior and often indifferent attitudes and lifestyles of the whites; the poverty, suffering, determination and humor of the Blacks; and the isolation, rootlessness and schizophrenic existence of the Coloureds resulting from their government-created social and political status of being in between and separated from both Blacks and Whites.

The book covers major international and local political events over the past three decades, including the long standing battle of the legality of South Africa’s mandate and the visit of United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. He does more than describe the events by giving the reader a sense of the hopes, expectations and disappointments experienced by the Namibian people.

The debate over whether or not multinational corporations should withdraw from Namibia has continued for many years. Namibia is a testimony to both the inhume working conditions and living quarters provided for the workers by the corporations and the categorical desire of the workers that the corporations withdraw from Namibia as a means of bringing South Africa’s rule of Namibia to an end. Winter discusses the contract labor system, which is forced in practice although not in law. He explains the disintegration of family life, the appalling living conditions, the frustration and the total lack of choice which go hand-in-hand with this system.

Winter then goes on to tell the amazing story of the 1971 labor strike when 15,000 workers throughout the territory downed their tools in a united protest. He reveals how the strike was organized despite the overwhelming power of the state and reveals the glaring contradictions between official statements regarding the contentment of the workers and the reality of the feelings of the workers. Winter describes the harassment, intimidation, panic, tightened police control, as well as improved working conditions, which resulted from the strike. Innocent people were shot, some were victimized and terrorized and others were imprisoned and mercilessly tortured by the police during the ensuing reign of terror. A trial of 12 persons followed, ranging in age from 20 to 69, accused of organizing the strike. All were acquitted. Winter gives an account of the trial quoting the defense, prosecution, judge, witnesses and newspaper reports of the trial.

Winter describes how South Africa, in attempting to apply the Bantustan system to Namibia, appointed chiefs to certain areas, and the puppet role they play on behalf of the South African government. He also explains how others in the black community are bribed or terrorized into acting as informers for the Security Police and provides evidence of the degree to which they are despised and socially ostracized.

Winter discusses the question of violence/non-violence in Namibia and the role and political significance of SWAPO, the national liberation movement. Although a self-proclaimed pacifist himself, Winter gives his reasons for fully supporting and understanding the necessity for armed struggle in Namibia. He illustrates the wide support that SWAPO has among the Namibian people and describes the formation, development and program of SWAPO, through an interview with a SWAPO representative giving the reader a deep appreciation of the courage, sacrifice and human torment in-
32

Dear Southern Africa Committee,

On April 6, about 50 people demonstrated in front of the Merrill Lynch office in Westwood [against sale of Krugerrand—Ed.]. We carried a cross of gold and our slogan was "you shall not crucify our brothers and sisters on a cross of gold!" When we reached Merrill Lynch, we placed a young black girl in a coffin and dropped gold coins on her.

Our local CBS outlet and another station carried the demonstration and gave us good coverage on the evening news.

A Luta Continua!
Stephen Commins

The Parish Church of St. Augustine by the Sea,
Santa Monica, California

In conclusion, he describes his experience of exile—a state in which thousands of Namibians and South Africans presently live as a direct result of South Africa's policies, and the resulting feelings of frustration, dislocation, longings and alienation.

In reading Namibia, an inexplicit attitude of the writer is perceived from time to time. He places somewhat obvious importance on his own empathetic leadership role as a bishop and whether intentionally or not, this attitude, at times, comes across as being egotistical. This same attitude extends itself into a patronizing presentation of some of his co-workers and their participation in various projects. One is left with the impression of Winter as the central figure around whom the other workers play a supportive and supplementary role. This is perhaps most true in his references to women. Some degree of sexism is discernible in a fairly subtle form. Certain descriptions and comments suggest an acceptance on his part of the existing role of women in society. His failure to address this issue directly, leaves a gap in his overall portrait of Namibia.

Nonetheless, Namibia is well worth reading. It is an excellent introduction to Namibia for those who are unfamiliar with the Namibian situation and is an invaluable supplement to those who are aware of the facts in Namibia but who have never personally experienced life there. It is an easily readable book and its style and content are both deeply moving and captivating.


"In Hock to the US Banks," by Reed Kramer, The Africa Fund, 305 E. 46th St., New York, N.Y. 10017, 5c each.


VOW: Voice of Women, a quarterly magazine of the ANC (sa) Women's Section. P.O. Box 1791, Lusaka, Zambia.

"The Zimbabwe Review," bimonthly publication of the international organ of the ANC, Box 1657, Lusaka, Zambia.

"Who are the Real Terrorists!", a document on the SASO/BPC trial. Available from the International University Exchange Fund, P.O. Box 348, 1211 Geneva 11, Switzerland, S Fr 10 per copy or $4.

Campaign Against Racial Discrimination has been formed by a small group of South Africans to analyze and comment on racial issues. The group has already produced papers on the Separate Amenities Bill and on training centers for Coloured cadets. In the works are papers on the "rioting" in Cape Town and squatter problems in the Cape Town area. For further information contact CARD, P.O. Box 169, Rondebosch, Cape Town, or c/o J. Bloch, 2 Crowland Rd., London N. 15.


Poster "Victory to the South African Revolution," 23" x 28", black and white lettering on a yellow, red, and orange background. $2.50 each. 5 or more $1.80 each. Also available as gummed stickers—$1.00 for 50. Sun Distribution, 14131 Woodward Ave., Highland Park, Mich. 48203.

Address Correction: The Rulers of Africa wall map reported in the March issue can be ordered from Baskai. 243 West End Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10023.

HELP KEEP US IN THE PRISONS!

For years it has been our policy to send the magazine free to prisoners. We do not want to stop or even restrict this practice. We urge you to send us gift subscriptions for prisoners. If you are able to do this, please send us your contribution as soon as possible and mark it clearly as a prisoner gift subscription.

I enclose $_______ for a gift subscription for ____ prisoners. ($5 per subscription)

Name____________________________________
Address___________________________________

__________________________________________ Zip_____

32 SOUTHERN AFRICA/MAY 1977
DAVIS CUP DEMO . . . More than 400 demonstrators chanting "South Africa go home" marched outside the Newport Beach, Ca., Tennis Club on the last day of the Davis Cup matches. The US beat South Africa 3-0 in the finals.

Two men not associated with the ad hoc Committee to Stop the United States-South Africa Davis Cup Match were arrested after one of them poured oil on the court where the match was being played. The two, Rev. Alvin Dortch and Stanley Alexander, face possible maximum sentences of six months on charges stemming from the incident.

The demonstrators said they had three goals: to protest having a team which officially represents the US compete against one selected by racial considerations; to support an international movement to isolate South Africa in sports; and to generate support for a US vote to expel South Africa from the International Tennis Federation when it meets in England in June.

They also raised the issue that by playing South Africa, the US may be subjecting all its athletes to a retaliatory African boycott. Last year African athletes refused to take part in any competition with New Zealand after a New Zealand soccer team had played South Africa.

The position of the ad hoc coalition had the support of many California officials including Lieutenant Governor Mervyn Dymally and Senator Alan Cranston.

In recent years, Mexico and India have defaulted rather than face South Africa in Davis Cup play.

SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS . . .
Church groups have withdrawn a shareholders resolution calling on General Motors Corp. to halt expansion in South Africa following a GM statement that it has no current expansion plans there. The company said its decision was based on a lack of demand caused by South Africa's civil disturbances and political uncertainties and by a recession tied to the internal disorders.

GM added, "The single most important factor in the creation of a more promising climate in South Africa is a positive resolution of the country's pressing social problems, which have their origin in the apartheid system."

The church groups note that while they are pleased by the GM action, they would like to see GM withdraw completely from South Africa until major progress is made in ending the current system.

Elsewhere in stockholder actions, demonstrators outside the annual meeting of Chicago's First National Bank called on the bank to end loans to South Africa.

Mobil Oil Corp. responded to a shareholder resolution asking that it ensure that its South African subsidiary doesn't supply Rhodesia with oil with a novel bit of Catch-22 logic.

The company said in its proxy statement which urged stockholders not to approve the resolution, that while its policy is not to supply Rhodesia, any binding resale restrictions on its customers "would constitute a clear violation of the laws of South Africa. These laws reflect the official government policy of South Africa which is opposed to any embargo on trade with Rhodesia."

UNQUIET CAMPUSES . . .
Students at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and nearby Hampshire College are putting pressure on trustees to dispose of investments in corporations which do business in South Africa.

At UMass, trustees have been meeting with representatives of the Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, a coalition of campus groups, to discuss the school's $540,500 investment in 16 corporations with South African connections. The Committee obtained several thousand signatures on a petition and held a teach-in April 4 and a demonstration April 5, which drew about 200 participants, to press its demands.

At Hampshire, trustees initially turned down a demand that the college dispose of about $38,000 in investments, sparking further mobilization efforts.

At Amherst College, students are conducting research on investments as a preliminary to a call for divestiture there.

BRIEFS . . . South African Dennis Brutus read from the works of some of his countrymen at a benefit March 5 in Chicago for imprisoned South African poets. The event was sponsored by the Matthews/Makay Benefit Fund committee . . . . The Madison, Wis. city council, which recently passed a resolution to seek out firms for city contracts which don't do business with South Africa, is now trying to get Dane County to do the same . . . . Some 550 academics signed a petition which was presented to the State Department several weeks ago. It called on the US to support a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, and to support groups working toward majority rule . . . . About 300 people attended a conference in Washington sponsored by the National Black Assembly. Among the speakers were Stokely Carmichael and representatives of all major liberation groups in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

On April 7 the City Council of Minneapolis unanimously endorsed a resolution condemning racial oppression in South Africa and urged the United States government to pursue a vigorous policy which would facilitate majority rule. The resolution was introduced by the Minnesota Committee on Southern Africa and was sponsored by a number of labor unions, churches, groups, community organizations, student groups, and feminist organizations. A similar resolution is expected to be introduced in May before the St. Paul City Council.

CORRECTION
In reporting the New York Times case in the April issue, one of the organizations cited as having complained to the New York City's Commission on Human Rights, was incorrectly listed as the "African Studies Association" instead of the "African Heritage Studies Association." We apologize for this error.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES:

Individuals (Domestic and Foreign)  $8.00 per year
Institutions (Domestic and Foreign) $18.00 per year
Introductory 7 month offer  $4.00
Airmail:
  Africa, Asia, Europe  $20.50
  South & Central America  $17.50
  3 month trial  $1.00