SWAPO Intensifies The Struggle
Inside Zimbabwe Refugee Camp
Maputo Conference
Apartheid In Sport
CONTENTS

2 INSIDE NAMIBIA — SWAPO INTENSIFIES THE STRUGGLE

4 NO NEW BALL GAME — APARTHEID IN SPORT CONTINUES

7 SPECIAL REPORTS
   7 ZIMBABWE REFUGEE CAMP — AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
   9 MAPUTO CONFERENCE — NO U.S. TRIUMPH

10 SOUTH AFRICA
   10 ONE YEAR AFTER SOWETO: VORSTER INTRANSIGENT
   12 SQUATTERS FIGHT BACK

13 U.S.
   13 YOUNG — CALMING WHITE FEARS
   14 MONDALE AND VORSTER IN VIENNA
   19 U.S. SEeks ROLE AS PEACE-MAKER
   20 U.S. CORPORATIONS — IRON FIRST IN VELVET GLOVE

15 OVERVIEW

16 NEWS BRIEFS

18 UPDATE

21 MOZAMBIQUE
   21 EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE

24 ZAIRE
   24 A LONG STRUGGLE AHEAD

25 ANGOLA
   25 Factional Revolt Suppressed
   26 Fighting on Many Fronts

26 NAMIBIA
   26 Setlement Ploys Continue
   27 Terrorism Trials
   28 Foreign Corporations Exploit Uranium
   29 SWAPO NATIONAL CONFERENCE MEETS IN WINDHOEK

29 ZIMBABWE
   29 Rhodesian Settlement: One More Time
   30 Regime in Trouble

31 BOOK REVIEWS
   31 What Happened in Angola?

33 ACTION NEWS NOTES
INSIDE NAMIBIA -

SWAPO INTENSIFIES THE STRUGGLE

by Marilyn Biman

At a primary school in Katutura—the black "location" outside Windhoek—fifty children run towards one of the national executive members of the South West Africa People's Organization as he is snapping their picture. Some have their arms raised in the clenched fist salute, others are giving the V-sign for victory or have their thumbs up. Smiles, laughter, and excitement are all captured in the resulting photo.

It is a brief moment, and yet this moment makes the most striking statement about what is happening inside Namibia. Everywhere—in schools, in the factories, in the mines, on the reserves—the people know SWAPO and give it their visible support. That is the message conveyed by these children. As in Mozambique, so in Namibia, the children have become the Continuadores, the continuers of the Revolution.

Local political parties and organizations have ceased to maintain their independent status and have amalgamated with SWAPO in one fashion or another. The Rehoboth Volksparty disbanded last August and elected to join SWAPO. In November four important groups—together they represent 80% of the 37,000 people of southern Namaland—followed suit. So did the Namibia African People's Democratic Organization (NAPDO). Throughout the country one hears more and more people saying, "I'm not a Nama or an Ovambo. I'm a Namibian," and "One Namibia, one nation."

Namibian students joined their counterparts in South Africa in a sustained boycott of their end-of-year examinations in protest against the Bantu education system. Workers have also been mobilizing through educational campaigns in the work place and through the formation of broad-based unions. But increased repression and the increased intimidation of the Namibian people have inevitably accompanied these developments.

Resistance Symbols

Symbols of resistance are found underground in the mines, where "SWAPO" and "Power" are often sprayed on the walls with aerosol paint. Evidence is also found along the roads, where "SWAPO" is fingered in the dust that covers road signs. It is found in the discussion groups currently being formed throughout the country, groups that are serving as vehicles for local mobilization on a mass scale by educating people about the struggle for liberation.

SWAPO public meetings occur almost every week throughout the country. There is always a heavy BOSS (Bureau of State Security) presence at these meetings, complete with cameras and tape recorders to have a full record that may later be used in court. Consequently, if SWAPO publicly and directly supports the armed struggle now being waged in the northern sections of Namibia, its members will be tried under the Terrorism Act.

But the organization's message comes across clearly and succinctly, as can be seen in the words of Pastor Hendrik Witbooi, "captain" of one of the southern Nama groups that recently joined SWAPO: "The people in the south are like the venomous snake that lives there. If you leave it alone, it won't bother you. But if you bother it, then it strikes. And whose fault is it that the snake bites you?"
Repression

Many Namibians have been arrested and charged under the Terrorism Act or any of a number of other types of repressive legislation and in May South Africa carried out the execution of a SWAPO militant, accused of terrorism.

It was to escape such repression that some 300 students fled the country following the boycott of examinations that Namibian students launched last November. The action was initially intended in support of similar protests against Bantu education in Soweto, the South African township where African resistance broke out last June. But the boycott in Namibia rapidly became a protest against the entire apartheid system.

Within three weeks the boycott had spread throughout the territory, involving over 1,000 students. The regime responded harshly and quickly. While some fled into Botswana, Zambia, and Angola, many others were brought in for "questioning." One student is known to have died from the beatings he received from the police.

No Phony Independence

The increased resistance of the Namibian people is partly in response to South African Prime Minister John Vorster's attempts to implement his neocolonialist plans for Namibia through the Turnhalle constitutional talks. It is becoming increasingly clear to Namibians that the main concern of the ruling party is to usher in an "independence" that continues to protect its position of power and privilege at the expense of the majority of the population, and the population is determined to resist this ploy.

Accordingly, inside Namibia the South African regime has been mounting a massive propaganda campaign to promote Turnhalle. There is a frequent anti-SWAPO campaign that includes outright intimidation and terrorism as well as such tactics as pamphlets that show SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and SWAPO National Chairman Daniel Tjongarero with lion's heads, devouring little children.

But contrary to the image of Namibia reflected by the South African press and western media—an image of a racial holocaust with black killing white—one hears a different interpretation of the Namibians themselves. "We don't fight against black faces or white faces. We fight against a system," says a 17-year-old student from Khomasdal, the "coloured" location outside Windhoek. A worker from Consolidated Diamond Mines in southwest Namibia told me, "This country is for all Namibians—black and white. And we want all to live together peacefully. We are not fighting for the freedom to cast out all the whites. We want to make the white man aware of the inevitability of change and that if he wants to stay in the country, he must have a change of attitude."

SWAPO's Work

Two of the main components of SWAPO's activity inside Namibia are the mobilization of the masses and political education. Organizationally, SWAPO is tackling this through the SWAPO Youth League, the SWAPO Elders' Council, and the SWAPO Women's Council. Women I talked to saw their struggle as taking place on two levels: against the oppressive apartheid system that dominates both men and women, and against traditional ideas and training that maintain the idea that women cannot be leaders. In addition, many men and women say that the liberation of women must happen simultaneously with the national liberation of the country.

It is this mass mobilization and growing political consciousness that presents the regime with its biggest threat. It is clear that the occupying South African regime will not give up without a fight.

Hanging On

Namibia is an important strategic buffer zone for South Africa. Namibia is also an important source of natural resources, particularly base metals and, more recently, uranium. Labor is cheap. Namibia's 852,000 blacks (almost 90% of the total population) live on reserves or bantustans in the poorest third of the country and chronic food shortages resulting from an arid climate and sandy soils force Africans off the land and into employment in the white-owned and white-controlled farms and mines in the central and southern parts of the country. Namibia's 99,000 whites are in full control of two-thirds of the country, which includes all fertile farmland, mines, ports, urban areas, and transport facilities.

Mining is the foundation of the Namibian economy, and most foreign-owned corporations make their wealth in this sector. Work conditions at the mines are similar to work conditions everywhere in Namibia: low wages and inadequate food for the workers and high profits for the companies. As one mine worker commented: "If there's any apartheid in Namibia, it's on the mines. These firms are here only to steal. These firms are the ones that pay to keep apartheid here. These firms explain to us why countries like the United States use the veto. But we know what they are doing. They are the oppressors!"

Workers Organize

Even with oppressive living and working conditions, there has been a long history of resistance by Namibian workers, a resistance which culminated in the massive strike of 1971-1972, when
almost 20,000 contract laborers in mines, factories, and fisheries walked off their jobs and returned to their homes in the north. Such resistance is still in evidence today, in the study groups that have been forming at the work place and in a broad-based Namibian Workers Union that is just beginning to emerge.

While SWAPO is consolidating its support in the south, PLAN (the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, the armed wing of SWAPO) has been escalating the armed struggle in the north. Here, as in the south, SWAPO has the support of the majority of the population. The white-owned Windhoek Advertiser has reported that SWAPO's support in Ovamboland alone is as high as 70%, and it is clearly still growing.

There are presently 50,000 South African troops in the north. In the past year they have created a "free-fire" zone along the northern border between Namibia and Angola. Villages have been uprooted, crops burned, livestock confiscated and slaughtered, and Mexican Sisal, a poisonous plant that causes sores that never heal, has been planted in large areas. Yet despite this campaign of terror, SWAPO soldiers continue to expand their activities.

Guerrillas warfare depends for its success on the full support of the local population. One SWAPO member, when asked by a reporter how many soldiers SWAPO has, answered: "The Namibian people, we regard them as the soldiers of SWAPO." The Namibian people seem to agree with that view.

South Africa is now attempting to "win" the population through providing bread and cookies, and offering people rides in their military vehicles. But it is all too little and much too late. Even now, the regime locates its smaller bases mainly in the heavily populated areas, and then only near hospitals, schools, or churches because it knows SWAPO will not attack the people.

SWAPO now has semi-liberated areas in the north, where South African troops are reluctant to go without air cover. The struggle is not yet won in Namibia, but the courage and the militancy of its people is reflected in the names becoming common for newborn children—names such as Tukondgeni—Let Us Fight.

NO NEW BALL GAME - APARTHEID IN SPORT CONTINUES

by Trevor Richards

When the National Party came to power in South Africa in 1948 it set about rigidly enforcing apartheid in all spheres of life, including sport. Over the years, in an effort to roll back South Africa's increasing isolation in international sport, which developed as a form of protest against the regime's policy, the government's sports policy has undergone changes. These changes, however, have always proved to be more apparent than real.

Under apartheid, Africans must join African clubs. Coloureds join Coloured clubs and Asians, Asian clubs. These racial clubs each belong to their own "national" bodies. Thus, in South Africa there are often as many as four "national" bodies. Thus, in South Africa there are often as many as four "national" bodies for each sport—one for each of the government's major racial classifications.

Some Earlier Alterations

In 1971, government policy was altered to allow, "under special circumstances," African "national" teams to play white "national" teams. But although African teams could play white teams at a national level, people of different races could never play together on the same teams or in the same club. This new policy, of allowing teams from one racial group to play teams from another racial group, was called "multi-national sport."

As long ago as 1956, black sportsmen clearly rejected the apartheid multi-racial sport policies. Non-racial sports bodies were organized by blacks committed to the Olympic principles over the past two decades. Despite increasing government intimidation, harassment, and prosecution these non-racial bodies have continued to grow. At the present time there are non-racial sports bodies in every major sport.

They come together under the umbrella of the non-racial South African Council on Sport. These non-racial bodies are open to whites, although very few whites have had the courage to join them. As usual, in South Africa, those who defy apartheid are faced with a web of segregation-enforcing laws, and it is much more comfortable for whites to avoid such confrontations.

The New 'Changes'

Last September, in response to white South Africa's exclusion from international athletics and soccer bodies, the South African government announced new "changes" in its sports policy. Immediately there was an ocean of praise from politicians and sports administrators, both inside South Africa and in the West. "The race barriers came down in Sport" and "Now it's multi-racial sport in South Africa" were typical headline claims.

However, experience has taught that the fine print of these announcements completely changes the meaning conveyed by the sensational headlines.

In fact, South Africa's sports policy has not changed even though expensive and skilled public relations exercises by the Republic's then Minister of Sport, Dr. Piet Koornhof, and his government colleagues have tried to disguise this fact.

Dr. Koornhof's September 23, 1976, statement was composed of a series of specific points. The first clause states that taking into account the applicable (apartheid) regulations, "the interests of South Africa and all its peoples in respect of sport can best be served in terms of the sportsmen and women belonging to their own clubs and that each should control, arrange, and manage its own sporting fixtures." This is no more than a restatement of the government's belief in apartheid sport. The second clause states that "councils of the different race groups should consult together or have such contact as would advance the interests of the sport concerned." Again, this is a restatement of the status-quo. No mention is made here, or elsewhere, of the non-racial sports bodies, and their role in the scheme of things—all references are to the apartheid bodies.
The consultation the statement refers to is vague and non-explicit, and ensures that the present inter-group consultations will proceed on the same basis as in the past, i.e., when the white body feels that there is some benefit and advantage in such consultations taking place. In a number of sports, including rugby, cricket, soccer, tennis, athletics and golf, the black and coloured sports bodies have developed a subservient stooge relationship with the white body.

Still ‘Multi-Racial’

Clause three says that “inter-group competition in respect of individual types of sport be allowed at all levels, should the controlling bodies so decide.” Put simply, this means when all the apartheid sports bodies in each sport agree, sportsmen from the white body will be able to compete against sportsmen from the black and coloured bodies. This is not non-racial sport, but multinational sport. The first clause makes it clear that the separate race bodies must remain, so there will only be competition between the different groups when decided by all concerned, which basically means when the whites want it. “At club level” simply represents an extension of the multi-national policy.

The fourth clause is a further reinforcement of the first clause, and spells out very clearly that the basis of sport in South Africa continues to be apartheid sport. It states that “in respect of team sports, the councils or committees of each racial group should arrange their own leagues or programs within the racial group.” Within a week of making the announcement, Dr. Koornhof had removed the word “should”—some sports administrators mistakenly thought it meant should as opposed to must.

The fifth clause reads “where mutually agreed, councils or committees may, in consultation with the Minister of Sport, arrange leagues or matches enabling teams from different racial groups to compete.” There is nothing new in multi-national matches, and again, the Minister has the final say as to when, at what level, and how frequently they will be allowed.

Separate Arrangements

The sixth clause is again a restatement of past policy, and states that “each racial group should arrange its own sporting relationships with other countries or sports bodies in accordance with its own wishes and each should award its own colors and badges to participants.” Coloured and African teams have toured overseas in the past (e.g., the Proteas, the team of the coloureds only S.A. rugby federation, toured Britain a few years ago). There

This ad was placed in major US newspapers at the beginning of this year by the Committee for Fairness in Sport, a South African propaganda organization. The Committee was formed in 1973 and among its sponsors are Wilf Isaacs, a businessman, who owns a cricket team; Gert Wolmarans, Chairman of CFS and former sports editor of the pro-government paper Die Vaderland; and millionaire Louis Luyt. Mr. Luyt has financed such ads in Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the US.
is nothing new, or desirable, in the
awarding of separate colors and badges.

The seventh clause said "that if and
when invited or agreed, teams comprising
players from all racial groupings can
represent South Africa irrespective of
whether the type of sport is an Olympic
sport or not, and that such participants
can be awarded badges or colors which,
if so desired, can incorporate the Na
tional flag or the colors of the National
flag." Again, there is nothing new in
South Africa being represented by
"mixed" teams, although it certainly is a
rarity. A "mixed" gymnast team toured
West Germany in 1975. However, these
teams are not chosen by open merit
competition, but from within each
separate racial group. The non-racial
sports bodies have condemned all
aspects of these teams, and will not
allow any of their members to put
themselves forward for selection.

The eighth and final clause states
"that attendance at sporting fixtures be
arranged by the controlling bodies." Again, a repeat of the status-quo.

Non-racial sport is not mentioned
in the statement. Nowhere in the
statement is there even a suggestion
that multi-racial sport will be allowed.
The whole direction of the stated move
is away from multi-racial sport. The
statement reinforces and in several
areas extends the apartheid multi-
national sports policy of the South
African government. It should be
stressed and re-emphasized that the
announcement breaks no new ground in
terms of policy directions. If anything,
the statement signals an intensification
and reinforcement of apartheid in sport.
Since September 23, there has been no
further policy statement on sport. It is
the September statement that is the
operable sports policy of the Republic.

Policy Rejected

The non-racial bodies have completely
rejected the September statement.
Norman Middleton, until recently Presi
dent of the non-racial South African
Council on Sport, said of the policy "It is
not acceptable. It is based on racialism.
Multi-national games—that is race
groups playing other race groups—has
been rejected by the non-racial sports
organizations, and the whole world.
South Africa continues to be out of
step ... My organization will continue
to press for complete isolation of South
Africa until all of us, irrespective of
color, or race, can have integrated sport
from club level upwards. We will not
compromise on this."

The South African government pays
attention to the non-racial bodies only
when it wants to harrass, persecute or
victimize them. This process was quick
ened when it was announced at the
beginning of the year that the non-racial
S.A. Council of Sport had been given
associate membership of the Supreme
Council for Sport in Africa, the continen
tal sports body representing all
member states of the O.A.U. Non-racial
sports administrator Morgan Naidoo
was arrested on a trumped-up charge of
breaking one of the provisions of his
banning order, and general harassment
increased.

Since the September announcement
the government and the whites-only
sports administrators have provided
ample evidence that nothing has
changed. It was reported, for example,
on October 9 by The Guardian that "The
South African government has made it
 crystal clear that its new sports policy
does not allow for mixed rugby clubs."
The newspaper quoted a Department of
Sport and Recreation spokesman as
saying that "it is against the government
policy to allow integrated teams."
The spokesman, Mr. E.J. Pienaar, said
the government's new sports policy was
nothing more than an extension of the
old policy down to club level.

No Compromise

Later in the month, eight white
rugby players, including Springboks
trials Cheeky Watson, played a game
with blacks from the Kwaru club. White
response was immediate and uncompro
mising. Dr. Craven, President of the
whites-only South African Rugby Board
stated that the players had "violated the
state and rugby laws." Dr. Koornhof
was no less forthcoming. He stated
flatly that the players had acted "in
defiance of both the government's
sports policy and the law."

Over the past six months, the non-
racial sports bodies have made dramatic
gains. The blacks-only South African
Rugby Board, which had been affiliated
on a subservient basis to the national
white body for a number of years,
announced that it will break its relation
ship with the whites and join the
non-racial South African Rugby Union.
Recently, several clubs from the col
coureds-only South African Rugby Fed
eration, another stooge body, have left
and joined S.A.R.U., making it the
second biggest rugby board in a country
where rugby is the national sport. In
soccer the non-racial body is the largest
and most powerful of all the soccer
groups.

Even amongst those blacks who still
belong to apartheid sports bodies in
increased opposition to the sports policies
of the whites is emerging. Last year
members of the blacks-only tennis union
refused to compete in the South African
Tennis Open because they regarded
their participation as a ploy of the
whites to convince the outside world
that changes were really coming to
South African sport. In athletics the
black- and coloured-only bodies are
weak, and only have any strength in the
townships where they are organized by
either the mining companies or mem
bers of the Bantu Affairs Department.

African opposition to apartheid ath
letics is such that 80% of the executives
of the African-only athletics union is
white—Africans refuse to administer
racent athletics. But the whites hang on
determinedly, knowing that they have
many friends overseas.

US Complicity

In the US, the Lawn Tennis Associa
tion firmly supports the International
Lawn Tennis Federation and refuses to
expel the whites-only South African
Lawn Tennis Union from membership.
The ILTF is one of the last major sports
bodies of which South Africa is still a
member. Being a member enables the
country to compete in both the Davis
Cup and the Federation Cup. The US in
fact was host to the Federation Cup last
year in Philadelphia. Anti-apartheid
demonstrators poured oil on the courts
and marched outside the gates at the
Davis Cup match in California in April.

The single most important contribu
tion the US could make to the interna
tional struggle against apartheid in
sport would be to actively push for the
expulsion of South Africa from the
ILTF. Until the US takes that stand, it
is viewed internationally and by South
Africa as a good friend of racism in
sport.
Mounting harassment by Rhodesian security forces has led thousands of Zimbabweans to flee to neighboring Botswana and Mozambique and both these countries have also been subjected to repeated raids by the Smith army. Botswana government officials report that 800 new refugees are arriving each week, while some 12,000 have already been airlifted to safer areas in Zambia.

In early June the Mozambique Department of Defense reported that in the previous 17 months Rhodesian troops had killed 1000 people and wounded more than 300 in 120 raids into Mozambique territory; the June raid on Mapai highlighted the continuing Rhodesian aggression, against both the Zimbabwe people and the countries that give them aid.

In late February, Carol Collins, a member of the Chicago Committee for African Liberation, visited two refugee camps in Mozambique: Nyazonia, a camp abandoned after a Rhodesian attack in August 1976 in which 640 people were killed, and Doiroi, currently home to about 11,000 refugees, including 2000 survivors of the Nyazonia massacre. The following is a report of her visit to Doiroi.

The first view of a refugee camp is always a shock—the incredible number of people in tattered clothing, the few resources, the overwhelming sense of vulnerability of people suddenly and catastrophically uprooted from the familiar—from their land, houses, few small possessions, from their villages and friends. At Doiroi, two other things were also striking, the determination with which many people had set about building new lives, and the deep scars that still marked many who had fled from the Smith regime's campaign of terror.

Among the first people I saw in the camp were several young women, who had what seemed like involuntary whooping hiccups. In some cases the hiccuping accelerated in intensity when the young women saw my strange face.

No one knew the origin of this phenomenon. It has occurred only in young women or older girls, particularly those who have recently escaped from Rhodesia, and in some of the survivors of the massacre of Nyazonia.

In the most severe cases it seems to be complicated by partial paralysis. There appears to be no physical origin of the symptoms, but speculation is that it may be a hysterical reaction to the horror its victims were subjected to before leaving their homes.

I visited a special ward which has been set apart for the most seriously affected cases, in which partial paralysis is involved or where the spastic, involuntary reaction to strange faces is especially severe. To stand in this ward and to experience the involuntary reactions of terror of these patients on seeing me is an experience I hope never to relive.

This was my introduction to Doiroi refugee camp, a small city of 11,000 set in a hollow near a river. The camp itself has little in the way of resources except what can be gleaned from the surrounding countryside. For housing, there are

In 1976, Smith's troops massacred over 600 people at the Nyazonia refugee camp in Mozambique.
crude huts made of branches and thatch. Young men and women sleep dormitory style, 200 to 400 crowded into each hut. Nearby are smaller huts for the few families that escaped together. With between 50 and 80 new refugees arriving weekly, even these rough accommodations cannot accommodate everyone: camp officials told me that about 4,000 people were sleeping outside on the ground without even a blanket to cover them as the winter months drew on.

**Little Food**

Food is a major problem. One is struck by the sight of long lines of quiet people waiting to receive their one meal for the day—hot porridge made of corn meal cooked in big metal drums. For an American, it is hard to realize what this means: no sugar, no vegetables, nothing but corn meal.

Even this sometimes runs dangerously low. As I was about to leave the camp a truck arrived with bags of corn meal. That morning, the camp had had only four bags of meal left. What food there is comes from the United Nations and from the Mozambique government. FRELIMO used to supply fresh fruits, but the massive floods of last February wiped out whole crops in the central-south region leaving one out of every 20 Mozambicans homeless, and the government can no longer afford to do this. The Zimbabweans did plant an extensive garden, but this was washed away in the floods, and only the maize fields still survived.

Yet as hard as conditions are in the camp, Zimbabweans keep coming, because what they leave behind is so much worse.

**Smith’s Terror Tactics**

Several people at the camp told me that in Rhodesian operational areas people were being driven into concentration camps where there was not enough food and no schools. They were forced to abandon their cattle, often their only economic resource or form of wealth. Refugees described the areas along the border as now totally deserted.

Students told me of returning from boarding schools to find their parents in concentration camps and their home villages burned to the ground. One told me how soldiers came to his home and beat three of his teenage brothers who, since they were not in school or in the army, were suspected of sympathizing with the guerrillas. Two were taken by the Rhodesian soldiers and not seen again. His parents were later taken to court. The student left soon afterward in fear of his life and doesn’t know what has become of them.

Another refugee described how the women in his village, coming home from the fields a few minutes after the curfew time of 6 p.m. set by the government, were met by security forces who fired on them, leaving many dead and most of the rest wounded.

Despite the immense hardships they have experienced and still face, the spirit among the refugees is good, and many are eager to join in the liberation struggle. The head of Doiroi camp told me how, returning from a trip, he had found his wife and mother dead and all the huts in the village burned. “At first you want to kill yourself,” he said. Instead, he decided to leave for Mozambique in the hope of joining the Zimbabwe People’s Army. As ZIPA was not operating from the refugee camps he had turned his energies to working where he was. I met several of the camp’s “responsavels” (people responsible for specific tasks), and they showed me the work that was being done.

**Building Schools**

Wadzani Tichiona, a young woman with a warm smile and serious manner was in charge of the elementary school program in the camp. Although the camp was barely 7 months old, classes had already been set up for 1,260 primary school children, who were being taught by 9 teachers. They had built classrooms, huts with rough wood benches and desks; schoolwork and charts hang from the rafters. Wadzani thought that if additional supplies became available they would be able to establish secondary school classes, because there were several teachers among the refugees, able and willing to teach.

I visited classes in mathematics, creative writing, science, history and geography. There are currently four streams of grade 1, one stream each for grades 2 through 4, and two streams in grades 5 and 6. English is the major language of instruction, though Shona is sometimes used, as in beginning math classes. Several classes were meeting under trees for lack of classroom space, the students eager in their responses, alert and attentive, although few had exercise books. The energy I sensed in this part of the camp was truly amazing; teachers dressed as poorly as their students, gently pushing them to speak out more.

**Poor Medical Facilities**

Of all the problems facing Doiroi, none was more affecting than the lack of adequate medical facilities. Currently these extend to only a few huts and a handful of drugs.

Illness is rampant. In addition to the hiccuping disease, there is another ailment at Doiroi which residents call the “hurricane” after a popular dance in Zimbabwe. Those struck with it walk with an erratic, springing/shaking gait in its early stages; later they often fall down paralyzed and moaning. There is speculation that the “hurricane” may be a result of contamination of food supplies by herbicides used by Rhodesian security forces in areas where guerrillas are suspected of operating. It seems to affect the nervous system and there is no known cure at this time.

People have a low resistance to disease as a result of their inadequate diet. 550 people had gangrenous infections. Few people had shoes, so feet are infested by hookworm; malaria, bilharzia, tuberculosis, diarrhoea, anaemia and a host of other diseases were common.

Medical supplies include very few antibiotics, which is why wounds or scratches have become such a problem. There was a shortage of even simply things like iodine, bandages and gauze, lactogen for new-born babies, vitamin supplements for the 38 pregnant women in the camp, and insecticides to keep conditions more hygienic and bearable.

The United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) and FRELIMO have both worked hard to provide what there is, and there is a close and strong working relationship between Zimbabweans and the FRELIMO representatives in the camp. But the Mozambican government itself has very few reserves, so that quantities of everything are limited, and transport problems have further complicated the task of supplying the camps.

Responding to my question about useful forms of assistance one camp official said: “We really could use about anything people can send us. We could use clothing and things like tennis shoes; we need blankets for the cool nights.” I was told of the need for textbooks, notebooks, chalk; the need for medical items like anti-biotics, bandages and vitamins was obvious.

What struck me most, over and over again in conversations, was the strong desire of the people in the camp to do things themselves. “If we could only have our own sewing machine and cloth, then we could be self-sufficient and make clothing for ourselves,” one man told me.

The camp had many problems, and needs many things, but I came away greatly impressed by the energy and commitment of the refugees and their ‘responsavels’, who have already done much with very little, and who are so seriously beginning to create a new life out of the destruction of the old.
MAPUTO CONFERENCE-
NO U.S. TRIUMPH

by Paul Irish

The UN sponsored conference, in support of Zimbabwean and Namibian liberation, held in Maputo May 16-21, was unique in UN annals. It was held in Mozambique, a country only recently liberated by armed struggle, and sessions met just sixty miles from the South African border. "Right under the nose of the enemy" was the way SWAPO President Sam Nujoma characterized it.

Also unusual was the strong US and western presence. These countries have traditionally shunned such events. This time the US, at any rate, seemed bent on using the Conference, and Ambassador Andrew Young, both in and out of the sessions, engaged in a type of personal diplomacy aimed at gaining support for the Carter policies.

Young's arrival in Maputo was part of a well-orchestrated US diplomatic maneuver, which began May 18 with a statement by President Carter that the US was prepared to take "all steps short of war" to achieve an acceptable solution in Namibia. The next day Vice President Walter Mondale met with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Vienna, while, simultaneously, Young delivered his first major speech on southern Africa before a UN forum.

Carter's statement created expectations among delegates that Young might announce concrete policies in support of African liberation, including acceptance of a mandatory arms embargo of South Africa. Instead Young urged the pursuit of a "silent, non-violent revolution." Both in private sessions with the leaders of SWAPO and the Patriotic Front, and in his public address, Young presented no discernible shift in established US policy.

A Sermon on Civil Rights

Laying aside his prepared text, Young delivered what amounted to a thirty-minute sermon, consisting largely of personalized anecdotes.

Weaving a tale around the civil rights and anti-war movements, Watergate and its aftermath, Young claimed a "revolution" in recent American history, with its culmination in the election of Jimmy Carter as President. Stories of his own meeting with the President of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane in 1961, and Carter's childhood association with a black AME bishop were given as evidence of the Administration's identification with African interests.

Young suggested that the Zimbabwean people use "economic weapons" and buy nothing but food and medicine for six months to force a settlement. He barely mentioned Namibia, and his only reference to US policy dismissed the effectiveness of economic or arms sanctions against South Africa, and appealed for trust in US efforts to achieve negotiated settlements with the white regimes.

Ignoring History

His speech was not well received. African delegates flatly rejected the analogies between the civil rights movement and the African liberation struggle. Leslie O. Harriman, Nigerian UN Ambassador and Chairman of the UN Committee Against Apartheid, said, "Ten years ago if I had heard the speech in Atlanta I would have found it interesting. Now I find it irritating. We are not talking about improving the lot of Africans. We are talking about liberation."

Zimbabwean leaders were particularly angered by the way in which Young's boycott proposal ignored Zimbabwean history. Robert Mugabe, a leader of the Patriotic Front, noted that Zimbabweans had "used strikes, sit-ins, and passive resistance. We tried these methods and our people got shot... we came to the conclusion that what remained to be tried was the armed struggle."

Sensing that his approach had flopped, but still defending his belief in the efficacy of western intervention, Young told reporters somewhat contemptuously that "the UN deals in word-power; the United States deals in real power."

Armed Struggle

Despite the presence of the western powers, the conference provided a strong display of the determination of the front-line states, backed by much of the world, to support the armed struggle. Mozambique President Samora Machel, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley and former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, all spoke on this theme.

Machel answered the western myths surrounding the struggles in Namibia and Zimbabwe with devastating simplicity:

We are told that in Namibia the main stumbling block to a negotiated solution is the existence of only one nationalist movement—SWAPO—and we are told that one movement alone cannot claim to represent the interests of all the people. Simultaneously, we are told that in Zimbabwe the lack of unity creates an obstacle to the discussions. The difficulty is the existence of many nationalist movements... The only obstacle to national independence is colonialism.

Machel rejected attempts by the white settlers and their puppets in Zimbabwe and Namibia to be involved in negotiations as "third parties." This violated the experience of all colonial countries which had proved that effective negotiations must take place only between the colonial power and the patriotic forces. Machel attacked the hypocrisy of countries which allow 'private' corporations to break sanctions and individual citizens to serve as mercenaries.

Robert Mugabe delivered a stirring rejection of direct US participation in any constitutional conference on Zimbabwe. He noted the experience of Vietnam, where the US, after participating with the French in the Geneva accords of 1955, then assumed the colonial war on its own.

After extensive discussions, in which western delegates sought to further soften the relatively moderate language proposed, a Maputo Declaration and Program of Action were adopted by consensus. But the US, France, West Germany, Britain and Canada disassociated themselves from the call for a mandatory arms embargo of South Africa and a cut-off of all postal and tele-communications links with Rhodesia.

At the end of the Conference, FRELIMO invited the delegates to a rally held in a sports arena filled with thousands of Mozambicans. Symbolically, the rally brought the message of the conference to Mozambique. Joaquim Chissano, the Foreign Minister, spoke and led his people in songs and chants. Representatives from around the world witnessed a moving display of the deep bonds of solidarity that exist between the Mozambique people and the men and women continuing the struggle to liberate all of southern Africa.
ONE YEAR AFTER SOWETO: VORSTER INTRANSIGENT

Under Apartheid this is the best housing most blacks can hope for.

It has been a year since the uprising of South African blacks began in Soweto and other townships near the centers of white-controlled industry and government in South Africa. In the interim, South Africa's 4 million whites have engaged in heated debate on the country's economic, political, defense, and foreign affairs policies. The outcome of this debate could well have significant impact on the future strategies of South Africa's minority rule regime.

Pressure for the reforms thought to be sufficient to "win over" the country's 19 million blacks has increased considerably in the past year. But the leaders of this important pressure group—South Africa's industrialists, its liberal politicians, its government-appointed black officials—have been confronted with a regime that has pressed inexorably toward the further development of the apartheid system. According to Prime Minister Vorster the current crisis is the result of too little, not too much, apartheid.

What is required, his Nationalist Party argues, is the swift implementation of the apartheid system to its fullest extent, via the rapid extension of bantustan structures. Thus, despite appeals from various white groups, he has refused to make concessions on issues such as black trade-union rights, job reservations, permanent rights of residence for urban Africans, or the pass laws—one of the most constantly provocative of the regime's laws.

The Alternatives

Broadly, South Africa's reform-minded whites view the future of the country in terms of two options. They see the conciliation of black resistance as the only alternative to armed revolution. They are convinced that if the ruling Nationalist Party continues inflexibly on its present course, violent confrontation with the oppressed majority of South Africans is inevitable. Unemployment has been reaching staggering levels among Africans—up to 20% according to some estimates, as compared with 1% among whites. There are chronic problems of hunger facing blacks—along with critical issues relating to citizenship, housing, rising rents, education, transport, taxes, influx control, and pass laws. And resistance among Africans, although less reported than a year ago, has continued.

To South Africa's most influential industrialists, these are signs that time is, indeed, "growing short." "Basically," George Palmer, former editor of South Africa's Financial Mail says of the Afrikaner business community, "it's a feeling that their investments are at risk." It is to protect such investments that South African capital has launched its drive for appeasement. Industrialists are instituting reforms in the economic sector independent of governmental policy. And they are joining liberal whites in the arena of minority-rule politics in pressing for the reform—or even the abolition of formal aspects of the apartheid system. To compound the urgency, the South African economy has continued to decline to its lowest point since the world depression of the 1930s. This, too, is in great measure due to the problems arising from mass resistance to minority rule.
African 'Middle Class'

For South Africa's verwigte (enlightened, outward-turning) industrialists and politicians, the crisis took on its current urgency only when black resistance, that surfaced so visibly after June 16, started to take its toll in economic terms. The South African economy is closely connected to the industrial economies of Europe and the US, and suffers the same cycles of growth and slump, though lagging slightly behind its larger partners. Thus even before June 16, the economy continued to suffer the effects of the mid-1970s crisis in Western economies. And some South African executives had already recognized that the foreign investment that is vital to the economy's well-being would be easier to attract if the face of apartheid were somehow to be lifted.

But the uprisings in Soweto and elsewhere have proven to be a turning point in their outlook. According to a recent report in London's Financial Times, "the inflow of long-term private capital [for South Africa last year] was roughly matched by a net outflow of short-term private capital; and the figure for the total net inflow of capital would only have been a fraction of what it was but for the large official drawings on the IMF and foreign banks, deliberately made to bolster foreign reserves. Clearly there are limits to such drawings, and sooner or later they must be paid back." Thus businessmen were confronted by the urgent need to develop policies that would restart the flow of funds quickly.

Equally clear last year was the causal relationship between the faltering economy and the resistance of South African blacks to the political and economic conditions that have traditionally made the country an attractive investment. It is now reported that South Africa may be approaching the "risk" category in the Western investment classification used to rate potential capital investments and loans.

The country's verwigte politicians and businessmen see the solution to this crisis in the cultivation of an African "middle class" that would cut across racial lines and serve to give limited, controlled power to a small section of the African population. These blacks would then have a vested interest in the survival of the white-controlled capitalist economy. And as early concessions to Soweto's "mayor," T.J. Makhaya, and the Soweto Urban Bantu Council have demonstrated these officials would function much as did black leaders in the indirect rule structure once employed in the British colonies. This is now a major part of white, non-governmental strategy.

Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of South Africa's biggest corporation, Anglo American, seeking to save his millions.

Deflecting Resistance

A spate of such concessions were proposed in the aftermath of Soweto, ranging from the provision of electricity in Soweto to the right to buy houses—on a restricted basis, in ghetto areas—to even more radical proposals such as the lifting of some pass law controls.

And through various chambers of commerce and other organizations, South African industrialists began to develop tactics designed to deflect further African resistance. Such long-time advocates of these measures as Harry F. Oppenheimer of the Anglo-American Corp. of South Africa have been joined recently by increasing numbers of vocal Afrikaner industrialists. In mid-November of last year Oppenheimer convened such a group to launch a multimillion dollar fund to improve the living conditions of urban blacks.

Oppenheimer's project is typical of the many now under consideration in the white business community. Perhaps not surprisingly, a spokesman for the group said at the time that the plan was being worked out "in a spirit of assistance to the Government and not as a confrontation with it." Moreover, very few of the plans being proposed make mention of recognizing black trade unions or any other form of organization for African industrial workers. These efforts have, rather, a very specific aim in mind, as the following quotation from the August 27, 1976 Financial Mail suggests:

The starting point of the Transvaal Chamber of Industries' eminently sensible proposals is that the black 'middle class' must be won over to the side of the whites in order to contain on a long-term basis the irresponsible economic and political ambitions of those blacks who are influenced against their own real interests from within our own borders."

Widespread black unemployment has provoked other proposals from the alarmed business community. There have been reports of starvation in both urban and African areas. In Pietermaritzburg starving Africans recently broke into a white home in search of food. Such developments have led to widespread calls for a major overhaul in the national unemployment insurance program—for which most unemployed blacks do not qualify. But the government has shown no sign of reforming the system.

Political Opposition

South African business interests have also entered into minority-rule politics in force. There have been attempts at political alliances between Afrikaners and English-speaking liberals among the country's parliamentary whites, based primarily on the various factions' common opposition to apartheid. The aim seems to be either to "redesign" apartheid through reforms or to "replace it" with a system under a different name altogether. One such proposal calls for the creation of semi-autonomous cantons, as in Switzerland, and could include some role for blacks living outside tribal areas.

The proposal, put forth in the form of a suggestion by South African Education Minister Pieter G. Koornhof, is the result of a year's discussion by a cabinet committee. It calls for "plural democracies" in which whites, Indians, and Coloured would be substantially self-governing, with equal representation in "an over-arching institution" that would control national affairs. Blacks in the nine homelands would be in a separate category.

Koornhof, taking care not to commit the government to the plan, noted in a speech in Capetown that there is some feeling in the country that blacks permanently living outside the homelands should also be given a direct role in the new structure. "Politics, especially in these times are unpredictable, and only time will prove whether this line of thought is feasible or not," Koornhof said.

Supporters of the canton proposal apparently see in the plan the advantage of government under the accepted rubric of the Swiss cantonal system. But the federalist proposal keeps a place for the black bantustans that are the end result of apartheid. Now they would be called by some other name and apartheid, to the relief of the verwigte, would be gone—if only in name.

At the same time, the Progressive Reform Party, to which a great number
of liberal whites adhere, has been attempting to form an alliance with "moderate" black leaders who hold government-appointed positions. This touchy exercise has apparently been responsible for the failure to date of a political alliance between the PRP and the Afrikaners, but building bridges to moderate blacks is seen as priority number one by the more sophisticated of the whites. "Credibility with the blacks," the Financial Mail has noted in this regard, "is the one thing the PRP cannot afford to jeopardize at this critical point in South Africa's political history." However, a recent visitor from South Africa has told Southern Africa informally that there is a real possibility of "an alliance among the Afrikaners, the PRP, and some black leaders."

Vorster — We Will Not Be Moved
But so far these efforts have met with little positive response from the Vorster government. The recent appointment of former Washington and UN ambassador Pik Botha as Foreign Minister-designate has been taken in liberal circles as an encouraging sign of a shift in Pretoria's policy. Botha, like Vorster in the earlier years of his administration, has advocated mild reform of the apartheid system and detente with black Africa on the foreign policy front.

But Botha's appointment is a rare positive sign, for South Africa's verligte camp, among many negative indications of the direction the Vorster government is taking. Increasingly, Vorster is having to defend his right flank against the criticism of the verkrampte (conservative) farmers and white workers that make up the majority of his constituents. The South African position on Rhodesia is a good illustration of this. Officials in Pretoria clearly see much to

be gained internationally by conforming to the West's drift toward the abandonment of the Smith regime in Salisbury in favor of a Western-installed and supported black government. But "kith-and-kin" sentiment within the Nationalist constituency has prevented any such deviation from Pretoria's current stance — to disregard international sanctions against Rhodesia and to remain the Smith regime's economic lifeline.

This same pattern is clearly in evidence in South Africa's domestic matters, as well. The administration in Pretoria has shown no signs of compromising over the intensification of apartheid — even though to do so would, as liberal politicians have argued, make Western support of the minority more feasible. Rather than reform, Pretoria has apparently chosen the stand-fast option that liberals have been desperate to avoid.

SQUATTERS FIGHT BACK

"The reason why people are squatting is not only a result of the government's apartheid laws. It is also because the bosses are only interested in their profits and because the authorities act in the interests of the rich and do not answer the people," —from an editorial in Forward/Voorwaarts/Phambili (a squatter newspaper), November 1976

There have been squatters in the Cape Town area of South Africa for over 100 years. Today homeless people in greater Cape Town number at least 400,000, many of them Africans who are in the area illegally, having come to the town to seek work, although their passes do not allow them to be there officially.

No Right To Be Anywhere
Squatters are homeless South Africans, coloured and African, often without legal permission to be anywhere at all in their country. They live in haphazard collections of makeshift dwellings constructed of wood, corrugated iron sheeting, cardboard, and other scrap building material, poor shelter from the fierce storms and extremes of temperature that are part of the Cape's none-too-gentle climate. Usually sanitation facilities are confined to the those the very poor inhabitants of these communities can provide for themselves. Electricity, streets, water taps, refuse collection, schools, health centers, shops, and other basic amenities are rarely available. A 1974 government survey estimated 200,000 coloured squatters in the greater Cape Town area. The number is higher now, and African squatters are thought to exceed coloured.

Contradictions between the apartheid system and the profit-oriented capitalist economy have produced this large body of people whose labor is essential to Cape production yet who must provide their own minimal housing under difficult and illegal conditions. The waiting period for city council housing is now seven years and most Africans would not be eligible for such housing anyway, as they are either classified as migratory laborers — who are supposed to live in "single" men or women hostels, or are working in the area illegally.

In addition to the laws which only allow most Africans into Cape urban areas as migratory workers, people are also drawn to squatting by a number of other circumstances, the most common of which include:

- eviction from council housing because of inability to continue to pay rent due to unemployment (African unemployment is now estimated at 2 million) and the steeply rising cost of living, estimated at 100% annually for the lowest income families, according to the Garment Worker, a South African union newspaper, in July 1976.
- eviction from areas reserved under the Group Areas Act for occupancy by a different ethnic group.
- marriage or other reasons for establishment of a new household before council housing is available (from the seven year list).
- migration from desperately poor rural areas to urban areas with jobs but no available housing, particularly for people wishing to live together as families rather than with the adult(s) in "single" person barracks and the children in the reserves.

Squatters Unify to Win
Concessions on Housing
Shifting the guilt to the victims, Minister of Community Development Marais Steyn in an Assembly debate on an appropriations bill in February 1977 emphasized that as "people who are law breaking," his government felt no need to consult with the squatters over resolving their housing problem. The thought of "consulting" with African or coloured squatters would probably never have entered the discussion except for the important developments taking place within squatter communities around the country. The squatters are organizing themselves.

Many squatter communities now have committees whose purposes are to organize the communities to meet community needs for sanitation, education, and order, and to defend the settlements from government attack. The organizing tasks are made particularly difficult by the extremely precarious economic situation of squatters and the legal vulnerability of both settlements and residents. Nonetheless some victories have been won.

Bulldozing School An Official Mistake
In the squatter community of Crossroads the people had gotten together to
build and staff a two-room school for 250 children of the settlement. The Bantu Administration came in and bulldozed it on the grounds that it was an illegal building and had to be demolished. As the squatters paper Forward (January 1977) explained: "Now when the men came home they became very angry. They said 'there is a limit to what people can take.'" The authorities realized they were pushing the people too far. The people were angry and stood together. The authorities feared this.

Just five days later the government apologized for having mistakenly bulldozed the school and rebuilt it on the same site. This was June 9, 1976, seven days before the Soweto uprising 1000 miles away which set off months of popular rebellion. Press accounts of the post-Soweto rebellion occasionally refer to participation by squatters in the anti-government protests which touched all of South Africa's urban areas.

In early February 1977 the South African Ministry of Community Development served notice on the residents of the Modderdam Squatters Camp, home to some 10,000 people, that it intended to bulldoze their homes in a week. Modderdam squatters, many veterans of earlier bulldozings, decided to fight the decision. Large meetings took place in the settlement. Appeals to other camps were made to see that the attack on Modderdam was a threat to all squatters. Two busloads of residents went to try to meet with the State President and the Prime Minister at their church one Sunday. There were appeals to the press and to liberal community leaders and politicians. A controversy raged in the white press along the traditional lines of hardliners versus those who would make some concessions to save the system. At the end of February, the squatters at Modderdam were still occupying their dwellings.

How enduring and widespread these victories will be in a system as profoundly anti-human as that of South Africa depends of course on many factors. Squatters organizing to defend their interests is one which now must be taken into account.

UN Ambassador Andrew Young carried the new Carter policies to both the UN-sponsored conference in Maputo, May 16-21 [see Special Reports] and to South Africa on May 21 and 22.

In Johannesburg he addressed a group of South African businessmen at the invitation of Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of the giant Anglo-American Corporation. Speaking to the businessmen he ardently proclaimed the reforming powers of capitalism, asserting that "capitalism has the power to tame white fears of one man one vote." He said that if Blacks were given a bigger economic stake it would not be long before enough Blacks would vote to retain the system. And he suggested that some African Marxist states would turn to capitalism "because it works best."

In commenting on these remarks the Rand Daily Mail noted that Young was even more optimistic about the future of South Africa than most of the businessmen.

Young met with the current president of the Soweto Students Representative Council, Sechaba Montsitsi, and another member of the council at the home of Harry Oppenheimer. He said he was moved by the meeting and that the Council was pursuing change "in a non-violent, religious context . . . I can
Also at Oppenheimer’s house he met with students and faculty from the University of Witswatersrand. He urged white students to stay in the country to work for change (noting a recent survey that found that 65% of the white students wanted to leave South Africa). He said he “respected Afrikaner stubbornness... which includes a certain respect for Blacks.”

On May 22 he met with a group of some 250 Blacks and Whites from all over the country, invited by the US embassy, at the office of the US Information Service in Johannesburg. The only Bantustan leader invited was Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, currently trying to establish his credibility as sufficiently militant for the black community and sufficiently moderate for the whites. As he embraced Young at the meeting he shouted out “Amandla” (Power).

At the meeting Young urged black South Africans to use economic boycotts to press for change. Like his prescription for Zimbabwe, this ignores the fifty years of non-violent black struggle and protest before the Sharpeville massacre. Young did admit that “It would be quite hypocritical if the US, which had to take up arms to get its freedom from Britain, was to go around advising people against it.” But the theme he continually pushed was non-violent boycott. He said that in the civil rights movement they used to say that whites would only listen to “votes and dollars. Since we didn’t have the votes, we used dollars.”

The American embassy made two attempts to persuade representatives of the Black Peoples Convention (BPC) to attend the meeting, but was rebuffed. The BPC issued a statement prior to Young’s visit saying that they would not meet with Young until he met with South Africa’s “true Black leaders... Our leaders are all either in jail, banned, or outside South Africa—people like Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki and Sobukwe. If Black leaders are to be consulted, then it must be these people.”

A footnote to Young’s southern Africa trip, dedicated to promoting a “new” US policy, is the refusal in April of Steve Biko, banned honorary president of the BPC, to accept a State Department offer to visit the US because, according to BPC leaders, although the US claimed to have changed its attitude to South Africa, it had not yet demonstrated this change.

The International Monetary Fund has recently granted an $85 million credit loan to Zaire to help stabilize its ailing economy. Currently that nation owes $5 billion in foreign debts, including $500 million in commercial bank loans.

In November, 1976, Zaire was bailed out of international bankruptcy by the world’s principal commercial banks, with Citibank acting as head of a consortium to reschedule Zaire’s debt by raising $250 million more in international money markets.

The World Bank is scheduled to convene a summer meeting of potential donor nations to solicit new development funds for Zaire.

In return for the IMF loan, Zaire has promised to institute austerity measures that will cut down the high rate of inflation. But these measures may also cut social services and deepen the desperate situation of the rural and urban working population.

**MONDALE AND VORSTER IN VIENNA**

Vice President Walter Mondale suggested that the US removed a moral blemish as the result of his two-day meeting with South African Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna on May 19 and 20. Mondale, stressing the link between the US experience with its civil rights movement and its current southern Africa policy, informed Vorster that the Carter administration would press for reforms in South Africa. This provided some contrast to the Kissinger policy of refraining from criticizing apartheid while seeking settlements in Namibia and Zimbabwe with South African assistance.

However, the new morally “clean” policy is not being backed by any measures that would put pressure on the South African regime. A State Department official said prior to the meeting that, “We have a policy but we have no program.”

While southern Africa clearly has high priority for Carter, the approach favored is still one of reform by the white rulers at the top, assisted by selected Blacks, in opposition to the radical programs of the African liberation movements.
Perhaps because the struggle for liberation is so difficult, people at all levels are constantly turning away from that struggle, seeking easy solutions, hoping to avoid the cost and pain of fundamental confrontation with the rulers of society and their henchmen.

Much of the current optimism about the Carter Administration's "new" Africa policy seems to flow from such a desire to avoid confrontation with what are, after all, very powerful and threatening forces. It is far more pleasant to accept a job on the inside, or to dream about reaching the ear of an old friend now in power, than to continue the role of "outsider," challenging the very basis of the society.

But even the most optimistic of Africa policy watchers should, by now, if they have any honesty, find the rosy glow growing dim. We have been promised something new, but all that has changed is the rhetoric in Washington—in Africa everything is still the same—except where victories have been won by the determined struggle of the people.

A glance through the pages of this month's magazine makes the point clearly. The western press heralds a "victory" against Vorster in the Namibian settlement, masterminded by what some irreverent wit has termed the gang of five (Britain, France, West Germany, the US and Canada). Yet the agreement with Vorster leaves unanswered many fundamental SWAPO demands, such as full UN control of elections, and the withdrawal of South African troops before such elections. In fact the settlement seems deliberately designed to undermine SWAPO, at home and internationally, making it look "unreasonable" and intransigent in the face of what are constantly described as major concessions by the South Africans.

Similarly, there has been no progress in the implementing of the US commitment to support majority rule in Zimbabwe. Those who argued late in 1976 that Smith was only going to Geneva, had only agreed to Kissinger's plan, as a stalling device which would enable him to strengthen his army, seem unfortunately to have been proven correct. Rhodesia's vicious onslaughts on Mozambique indicate no willingness on its part to surrender power.

In South Africa, one year after Soweto, the white regime has made it perfectly clear that it has no intention of sharing political power on the basis of one person one vote, with black men and women. Despite continuing US investment, so long proclaimed the lever whereby the US would induce change in South Africa, repression escalates daily. Even economically blacks find themselves worse off every day, as unemployment mounts, driving the weakest, those without trade unions and bargaining rights, out of their tenuously held jobs.

It is time to abandon the optimism and the good guys theory of history. Much hope has been placed in the honesty and sincerity of the Administration's Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young. He may well be a sincere man, who hates racism and wants to see the end of black humiliation in South Africa. But his vision is shaped by his belief in his own society. How else could he have been appointed Ambassador of his country?

Young said some remarkable things when he went to South Africa—remarkable because of the openness with which he identified himself with the dominant powers in the US. Addressing white businessmen in Johannesburg he said "change can come through the market place. And it can be non-violent, productive, and humane. . . . When blacks became a part of the free market system in the South (of the US), not only did the system not explode, but blacks had very much at stake in it. And when you've got a stake in a society you don't vote to change it, outlaw it, or overthrow it."

He stressed that it was in areas of the world where there was a "free market system" that most was being done to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, heal the sick, and "where there's very little said about revolution and where there's no ideology at all of change. And yet, in fact, in those free market countries more social change, more revolution is in fact taking place." Young held out the hope to the Johannesburg businessmen that they had as a potential market not just the 16 million black citizens in South Africa, but "you're talking essentially about the southern half of the continent that is a potential market for a system which could relate to it as brothers."

Surely there could be no clearer explanation of the considerations that still dominate Washington's policy in Africa. At stake are US $$$ not African freedom on independence. So long as that is true there should be no more talk about a "new" US policy for Africa.
RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA is mounting, as is government repression. In an effort to prevent widespread protests commemorating the Soweto uprising in June 1976, the police have sought out known student and other leaders, and detained them. In late May Winnie Mandela, political activist in her own right, and wife of imprisoned African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela, was banished from Johannesburg, to an isolated township outside a town called Brandfort, in the Orange Free State—the most conservative of the four provinces in South Africa. In addition to being banished Ms. Mandela is also banned—which means that nothing she says may be published, and that she may never attend a gathering—which, by South African definition means any collection of more than two people. Immediately after her banning Ms. Mandela was arrested for breaking her ban. Her crime? Being visited at the same time by two of her sisters.

Two prominent members of the Black Peoples Convention (BPC) were recently banned, one of them was also banned to a remote rural settlement. Mxolisi Mvovo, who had taken on the role of Acting President of BPC while President Hlaku Rachidi was in detention under the Terrorism Act has himself been banned. Dr. Mamphele Ramphele, Executive Director of the BPC in the Eastern Cape, and head of a community clinic near Kingwilliamstown has been banished. She had attended the post mortem of student leader Mapetla Mohapi, who died while in security police custody in 1976, and was then detained herself. Eventually released she has now been banished.

The arrests are endless; many people have just disappeared—law in South Africa does not require that a detained person be allowed to contact either a lawyer or any family member; thus no accurate list of political arrests exists.

The State also continues to harass political prisoners, even while they are in jail. Nelson Mandela was recently charged with insubordination, and white South African poet Breyten Breytenbach, convicted of terrorism last year, is now being charged with threatening state security and attempted escape.

South Africa is the subject of a draft of a book by a former British colonial officer which was among papers stolen from the country home of former Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The book, by Gerald Sparrow, is known to name five millionaires as the anonymous promoters of the Club of Ten, the South African propaganda organization. Mr. Sparrow was once the club’s campaign manager. He is thought to have given the names of the club’s bankers to the Foreign Office.

The manuscript had been sent to Wilson in light of the former official’s expressed concern over South African interference in British politics. A year ago Wilson said that South Africa was involved in attempts to discredit the Liberal Party and its then leader, Jeremy Thorpe.

The number of women to be trained at the Army College in George is to be doubled, to about 300, beginning next year. The women will be posted to units made up of national service conscripts. Besides the women, the Army College will train 45 officers, about 30 candidate officers, about 160 commandos and about 150 permanent force members.

"Terrorism in Commerce and Industry" was the subject of six recent conferences held in South Africa. For the fee of $40 delegates hear experts on such subjects as riots, strikes, intimidation, violence, sabotage, psychological terrorism and fire precautions. The conferences were organized by the National Development and Management Foundation, and were held in Johannes- burg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, Bloemfontein and Pretoria.

"Concerned" businessmen have formed the Urban Foundation to "improve the quality of life in the urban areas." The initial fund raising goal of the Foundation is $28,750,000. The Foundation has already received large contributions from Anglo-American Corporation, De Beers, and the Oppenheimer family, who have given a combined total of $5,750,000. Mobil Oil is also reported to have made a large grant.

The Bolivan government is seeking to attract up to 150,000 white farmers from Southern Africa and Europe to settle in that country. According to some reports West Germany has offered to provide $150 million to help settle white farmers in Latin America. Bolivia has also reportedly approached the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and several private organizations for financial aid for the scheme. According to the plan, at least 30,000 whites from Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa would settle in Bolivia. Only 15 per cent of Bolivia’s population of 5.9 million is white, but they dominate the government and economy.

In an analysis of South Africa’s current financial situation, the Financial Mail predicts that new rail tariffs and increased excise and sales taxes are likely to increase unemployment and accelerate the slide in private sector spending. Noting that such levies represent the opposite of the stimulation usually prescribed for an ailing economy, the analysis points out that in this case, the government has no choice: while government spending rose by 8% last year (compared with a 2% rise in the private sector) and while R1 of goods and services must be imported for every R4 spent in the country, foreign earnings and investment have been running at rates far lower than expected—owing in large measure to
the country’s political problems. Thus, there is nowhere to turn except internally to meet financial needs.

The analysis suggests that one positive step the government could take would be to cut back on its own spending, which has included massive capital outlays for projects intended to make the country invulnerable to international economic pressures, and increasing outlays for defense and internal security.

A farm labor wage survey has found that monthly farm wages last year ranged from about $20 a month cash to about $60 cash depending on the area. Taking into account payments in the form of food and other items, total wages may have reached a high of between $69 and $104 a month.

The Bantu Laws Amendment Bill recently presented to Parliament doubles to $170 the fine for pass offenses, leaving intact the provision for a three month jail sentence. The bill comes at a time when the government-sponsored Viljoen commission has strongly urged that the pass laws be depenalized.

Bantu Administration Minister M.C. Botha says an average of 160 Africans a day were arrested in the Witwatersrand area alone last year for offenses under the pass laws.

There were 71 public and 1,171 private telephones in Soweto at the end of 1976. The waiting list for private phones included 2,338—the population of Soweto exceeds one million.

New figures serve to further demonstrate the severity of South Africa’s unemployment problem. A Pretoria University study estimates that unemployment reached 1.5 million in 1976, with more than one million Africans among that number. The government says that depending on which figures are used, estimates range from 10.2% to 18.6% of the workforce.

The Pretoria University study notes that in 1974, when the economy was running at near full capacity, unemployment was running at 9%, suggesting that the problem is structural, rather than than the result of the recession.

The Financial Mail says that unemployment in Soweto has become so serious that numerous robberies have been reported by men describing themselves as unemployed heads of families.

In Maritzburg, fewer than one-third of the African workforce is estimated to be employed.

Johan Adler, South Africa’s Deputy Consul General in New York, recently said in a letter to Time magazine that “compulsory education for Black primary school children has already been introduced.” The South African Financial Mail was prompted to comment that “South Africans haven’t yet been told about this notable move away from race discrimination.”

Bantu Administration Minister M.C. Botha says an average of 160 Africans a day were arrested in the Witwatersrand area alone last year for offenses under the pass laws.

New flooding was reported in the Limpopo valley as torrential rains raised rivers to dangerous levels. Evacuation of residents and an airlift of supplies were under consideration.

The Financial Mail reports that the $37,000 given by the US to assist Mozambique flood relief efforts contained a proviso that at least part of the sum be used to buy maize from South Africa. FM quotes a US official in Pretoria as saying that at most only about one-fourth of the money will go for South African grain.

**THE PEOPLE OF MOZAMBIQUE** have donated more than $100,000 to assist in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. The funds came from voluntary donations made to the Bank of Solidarity, set up last year.

**THE RED CROSS** has revised the 1949 Geneva War Conventions to provide that captured guerrilla fighters must be treated as prisoners of war and not as terrorists. The organization ruled the guerrillas will be required to “distinguish themselves from the civilian population” and to “carry their arms openly” in combat, military maneuvers preceding an attack, or while being watched by the enemy.

**ZAMBIA** says it is holding an American deserter from the Rhodesian army. The government says the deserter flew into Zambia illegally in a Piper plane.

**HENRY KISSINGER**, former US Secretary of State, has been named vice-chairman of the international advisory committee of Chase Manhattan Bank. The committee meets twice a year to advise the bank on economic and political matters.
New Clashes On Soweto Anniversary

Pre-emptive detentions of student leaders, rubber bullets, and other new crowd control techniques failed to stop new violence during the recent commemoration of last June’s Soweto uprising.

Over a dozen Africans were shot and killed by police in townships surrounding Johannesburg and Uitenhage, where scores were wounded and hundreds arrested.

In Soweto itself, the June 16 commemorative rallies were accompanied by calls for a strike, and Johannesburg employers reported 15 to 50% absenteeism among black workers. Student demonstrations continued sporadically throughout the week, culminating in a massive action on Thursday, June 23, in which roadblocks were mounted and students sparred with police all day. Three black youths were killed in the protest.

Large-scale demonstrations were also held in Uitenhage, located in the eastern Cape. Township residents there set fire to government-owned liquor stores and schools, and threw rocks at police. The Uitenhage demonstrations saw 6 blacks fatally shot and 33 wounded.

While South Africans were shaken even before the Soweto anniversary when three black youths carrying automatic weapons skirmished with police in downtown Johannesburg and gunned down two white auto mechanics before two of them were captured. Police said the South African-born youths had been trained in Luanda, Angola, and had re-entered the country from Mozambique.

ITT Sells South African Holding

The U.S.-based International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation has decided to sell its South African holding, Standard Telephone and Cables.

The firm cites financial rather than political considerations for the move, which involves a merger with Allied Technologies of South Africa. ITT is selling Standard Telephone for a 36.3% interest in Allied Technologies plus $287,500 in cash.

Coming at a time when South Africa’s political and economic difficulties are mounting, however, the ITT deal has government and business circles worried about declining American confidence in the country’s future.

To counter such a trend, two South African organizations hosted a seminar for more than 300 US executives at an exclusive Rye, New York hotel last month. In an opening address, South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha assured the guests that his government plans reforms to ease black tempers but will not agree to one man—one vote.

Angola Hard Hit By Coup Attempt

The failed May 27 coup attempt in Angola inflicted serious leadership losses on the MPLA.

In the wake of the fighting at least six senior MPLA members were found dead. These included Finance Minister Saydi Mingas.

The late May attempt, mounted by supporters of Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem, also involved economic sabotage such as the hoarding of already tight food supplies to be distributed after the ouster of Neto’s regime.

Angolan officials claim to have unearthed foreign backing for the plot, but they have not specified which countries were involved. Some Portuguese citizens are among the arrested suspects, according to authorities in Lisbon.

SWAPO Reviews Namibia Compromise

The five Western nations which have been pressing South Africa to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal from neighboring Namibia are awaiting a response from SWAPO, the Namibian independence movement.

U.S. officials believe SWAPO will go along with a plan worked out in mid-June by British, French, West German, Canadian and American envoys during a Cape Town meeting with South African Prime Minister John Vorster.

Sources close to SWAPO say the group is almost certain to reject the proposals, despite some concessions by South Africa, which reportedly include:

• Abandonment of South Africa’s plan to hand power to a tribally-based administration of government-sanctioned leaders, in favor of a temporary administrator to govern until a constituent assembly is elected.
• Agreement to UN participation in the elections, in the form of a team appointed by UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.
• A promise to release political prisoners identified by a group of international jurists.

A point at which SWAPO is likely to balk is South Africa’s evident refusal to withdraw its officials and armed forces from the territory prior to an election.

OAU Foreign Ministers, meanwhile, meeting in Libreville, Gabon, have voted to encourage Western efforts towards a Namibia settlement, and have also called for increased material aid to SWAPO.

Guerrillas Hit Rhodesian Railway, Power Station

Zimbabwe People’s Army guerrillas last month blew up a railroad bridge on the line connecting Salisbury with Bulawayo, the first such sabotage on that stretch of the vital rail link with South Africa.

The damage was repaired the following day, but the attack served as a reminder that guerrilla forces have the capability to strike major targets within 100 miles of the capital.

Guerrillas also launched a two-pronged attack in northeastern Rhodesia. Troops operating from Zambia shelled the Rhodesian border resort town of Kariba, wounding one civilian and damaging property in the shopping district. A raiding party, meanwhile, cut the power lines connecting the Kariba hydroelectric plant with Salisbury, blacking out residential areas for several hours.

The Rhodesian government has accused Zambia of a “criminal act of aggression” in sanctioning the rocket attack on Kariba. A Rhodesian military spokesman said the government was reconsidering its policy of limited response to attacks from Zambia, and will “retaliate vigorously to further provocations.”

UN Considers Rhodesian Raids

The UN Security Council is considering Mozambican requests for reconstruction assistance as well as aid to bolster its defensive capabilities against future Rhodesian attacks.

Mozambique presented evidence of Rhodesian aggression against its territory to a special session of the Security Council. The meeting came in the wake of Rhodesia’s occupation of Mapai, in southwestern Mozambique. Botswana and Zambia also put forth charges of border violations by Rhodesian troops.
A Warning

Mondale did warn Vorster of diplomatic measures that the US could apply if changes are not made but these were not specified. He noted that the US favors “full political participation by all people” in South Africa whereby “every citizen should have the right to vote and every vote should be equally weighted.”

He also stated that the South African government now knows “that we believe their perpetuating an unjust system that we are sure contributes to increased Soviet influence and even racial war—but quite apart from that is unjustified on its own grounds.”

Mondale and Vorster held separate press conferences at the conclusion of the talks which reflected their differing positions. Mondale told reporters: “We hope that South Africans will not rely on any illusions that the US will intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is pursuing, for we will not do so.”

At his news conference Vorster reaffirmed his commitment to apartheid saying, “In the final analysis, I’m prepared to hang for what I am, but I’ll be damned if I’ll hang for what I am not.”

Some agreement was reportedly reached at the meeting on approaches to Zimbabwe and Namibia. Vorster agreed to support the new British and US effort to promote an agreement on Zimbabwe, not subject to approval by the Smith regime, which would lead to majority rule by the end of 1978. But Vorster insisted and Mondale agreed that “every effort should be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence” in Zimbabwe. The liberation movements have opposed this type of language as an effort to remove their military pressure against the Smith regime.

On Namibia, Mondale asserted that Vorster had agreed to free, nationwide elections for a constitution-writing assembly. But South Africa has offered such elections previously on an ethnically-based system and excluding the political purposes intended. The House International Relations Committee therefore re-programmed the $100 million intended for the Zimbabwe fund to meet the security needs of black-rulled southern African countries (excluding Malawi and Zaire). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed suit by allotting the $100 million to Zaire, Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola were conspicuously absent, indicating the Committee’s basic reluctance to cross swords with right-wing Senators on southern Africa.

To serve the Administration’s purpose of encouraging negotiations, both foreign relations committees endorsed the idea of an international development fund by adopting “sense of Congress” language. The House version announced its intention to back a special fund for “economic justice and development” after a firm agreement for majority rule has been reached. The Senate version, on the other hand, declared the Senate’s intention to authorize $100 million for the Zimbabwe Development Fund when “progress” toward a settlement permits establishment of the Fund.

On May 24, the full House approved a $3.2 billion military assistance authorization bill containing the $100 million for Southern African countries after narrowly turning back an attempt to delete the special funds and to remove an expression of support by Congress for administration efforts to bring about a peacefully negotiated transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe.

In the debate preceding the 208-204 vote on the deletion amendment, critics charged that the funds would be used to subsidize the extension of Communism in Southern Africa. The House did add an amendment barring aid to Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, but the effect was weakened considerably by the addition of wording which permits such aid if the President specifically waives the restriction and reports to Congress how the funds will be used.

In other words, the bill would cut in half the administration’s request for $30 million in aid to Zaire and prohibit the use of the funds for military or paramilitary operations.

The House measure was then sent to the Senate, where debate on the Senate version was expected to begin shortly.

While Congress was mildly rebuffing the Administration, the Zimbabwean nationalists were forcefully rejecting US co-sponsorship of any “settlement” conference. On April 19, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo totally rejected the idea as big power involvement, and again on May 6, after meeting with Vance and Owen in London, Nkomo...
ruled out US co-sponsorship. But neither Britain nor the United States has given up on an idea that clearly pleases Vorster and Smith.

Meanwhile, President Carter had appointed Vice President Mondale to oversee the development of Africa policy because Carter was too busy with the Middle East to "master something as complex as Africa." Mondale told reporters that the felt a conference should go ahead even if Smith or one of the black nationalist factions does not want to participate. He thus confirmed a Bernard Nossiter story from London in the Washington Post of April 22 that the Anglo-Americans were prepared "to shave off an extreme at either end."

By mid-May, however, it had become clear that a conference should be put off until more spadework had been done "behind the scenes." In a joint announcement on May 12 Vance and Owen declared that the British and US would set up a special mission to make contact with the parties to visit the area, including Salisbury. At the same time the outlines of a new Owen plan were emerging: the British would establish a "presence" and a British parliamentary system in Rhodesia during the transition. The white minority regime would resign and one-man, one-vote elections would then be held. Independence would come in late 1978 and only thereafter would there be a constitutional conference.

But neither the Smith government nor the nationalist movements professed to see much new in these frenetic efforts to spare Zimbabweans and Rhodesians from the escalating trial of their armed strength.

Although the Zimbabwe Development Fund and the US co-sponsorship are intended to offer whites reassurance that the US will guarantee further sustained economic growth built on the foundations of existing structures, the Patriotic Front does not seem inclined to make commitments that would bind future generations to a western plan to foster foreign investment, create a larger black middle class by job training and make only modest increases in African land holdings.

U.S. CORPORATIONS - IRON FIST IN VELVET GLOVE

While US corporations maintain publicly that they are a force for change in South Africa, their actions continue to speak louder than words.

US Company Fires Union Organizers

Two African workers were fired recently in a South African scrap metals plant which is 50% owned by Heckett Metals, a subsidiary of Harsco Corp. of Pennsylvania, which operates the plant in partnership with the Pretoria regime's state-owned Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR). The workers were dismissed in what appeared to be retaliation for union activities. A third worker quit rather than comply with a company request for information about the activities of the unregistered Metal and Allied Workers Union, which claims the allegiance of about three-fourths of the plant's 80 African workers.

South Africa's repressive laws do not give trade unions with African members any legal status, and such black trade unions are deprived of all recognition in bargaining processes. Strikes by African workers are all but outlawed, but the unions themselves are not illegal. As general militancy has risen in the community, more and more Africans have been organizing "unofficial" trade unions, and attempting to achieve a position where employers have to recognize their existence, even if the law does not. The Metal and Allied Workers Union has been one of the most active of these unions, and it has met with consistent hostility from most employers, South African, American or British.

Questioned about the situation by a Johannesburg business journal, the Financial Mail, one official of Heckett SA declined to discuss the fired workers except by number, and another insisted that Piet Pheko, one of the activists, was sacked because he refused to obey orders.

The official was unable, however, to cite the orders in question.

In the US, Heckett's parent company told the Financial Mail that it formally recognizes the union and that its South African subsidiary "is one of the most compelling and moving forces for change" in labor relations in South Africa. Later, Heckett admitted that in fact it does not recognize the union and that labor policies in the South African operation are decided by ISCOR.

"We are happy with our operations in South Africa," Heckett said. "Our only labor problems in South Africa are due to our inability to find and keep skilled labor in sufficient quantities."

Control Data Promises Trouble

In a related incident, Control Data Corp. effectively thwarted an effort by the Minnesota Committee on Southern Africa to launch a protest in St. Paul against the company's South African involvement. Control Data sells computers to several key South African industries, and to the SA government, for a variety of uses, including military, nuclear and other applications. The Minnesota Committee selected Control Data in part because of the company's repeated statements of commitment to socially responsible corporate action and in part because the company employs only 19 Africans in South Africa, precluding the possibility that its withdrawal would raise the issue of job opportunities for Africans.

The committee planned a picket April 2 at Control Data's Selby-Dale plant, located in a black community. The picket was organized as part of day long activities in a nearby center which were to culminate with a rally where Khotso Seatloho, a South African student leader, was scheduled to speak.

Prior to the planned event, the committee met with black leaders, several of whom agreed to address the rally. At Control Data's request, committee representatives also met with company officials. These officials, after failing to convince the representatives to halt the demonstration, threatened that they would take measures to counter the committee's activities.

The day before the planned action, the committee was warned by a Control Data official that reports from the plant indicated that workers were upset and that violence was likely. Also at the last minute, all but two black speakers withdrew from the rally. It was reported privately to the committee that company spokesmen had met with some of its workers, and with black leaders to express disapproval of the planned protest, and had pointed out that Control Data provided many jobs to local residents which might be lost if foreign sales were curtailed. Fearing a serious confrontation, the Committee canceled the picket.

The committee says it was not discouraged from further action by the company's activities. Members picketed the company's annual meeting on May 4 and the group is discussing additional moves.
EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE

by Carol Collins

Carol Collins was in Mozambique in March, when President Machel met with 6000 students, teachers and other educational workers, and outlined to them important new educational policy decisions. These decisions were the outcome of long discussions within Mozambique’s political party FRELIMO, within the Ministry of Education, and with Mozambicans at all levels. Here she reports for Southern Africa on that meeting.

A speech by Samora, as everyone calls the President, is a big event, and as we waited outside the sports stadium for the speech to begin, an electric current of excitement ran among the elementary and secondary school students, many without shoes, all neatly waiting in double rows. Student “responsavels,” rather than teachers, kept classes in order. Only we of the university contingent were so disorderly as to require the police to gently place us in lines so that cars and trucks could get by.

The stadium was packed when we entered, with bright banners posted everywhere saluting the president, FRELIMO and the alliance of workers and peasants which FRELIMO is working to consolidate. When the President entered the stadium, the response of the students and others was immediate, deafening and overwhelmingly warm. There is a closeness which Samora has with Mozambicans which strikes one immediately. His eyes sparkle with the response, and for the next four hours, as he outlined FRELIMO’s analysis of its educational experiences, obstacles, strategies for overcoming these problems and invited educational workers to participate fully in this new phase of struggle on the educational front, his energy, humor and warmth never flagged.

Two sets of issues had to be confronted. First there was the fundamental question of what role education can and should play in building a socialist society. Secondly, choices had to be made about designing policies that would best deal with the legacy of underdevelopment and illiteracy inherited from Portuguese colonialism.

President Machel interspersed his careful analysis with incisive caricatures of individualistic, elitist and exploitative attitudes and behavior among students, parents and teachers. His vivid illustrations of such vestiges of colonial mentality remained with many of us for days afterwards, as often, to our embarrassment, we identified such behavior in ourselves.

Informing the People

In a country where most people are still illiterate, as a result of colonialism, such an analysis cannot be conveyed to the majority of people by writing. FRELIMO is committed to the task of explaining its policies fully to all Mozambicans so that they understand the basis for each policy decision and will support them on an informed basis.

Thus Samora’s outline of policy was not only for bureaucrats, educated people or other policy-makers, but for students and teachers, for parents of students, for workers and peasants listening to the speech on radio at their places of work. FRELIMO is committed to these people being and becoming the policy-makers.

The Colonial Heritage

The meeting, as Minister of Education Grace Simbine noted in opening, represented the first time since independence that FRELIMO, the Ministry of Education and educational workers could exchange experiences and analyze ways of improving educational work in order to create the “new mentality” and the “new person” that would be capable of transforming Mozambican economic and social realities.

In reviewing FRELIMO’s educational experiences during the war of liberation, Samora recalled the colonial policy of
maintaining the majority of Mozambicans in profound ignorance and superstition by excluding them from schools on racial grounds and failing to train Mozambican teachers. By 1950, after 400 years of Portuguese colonialism, not one black Mozambican was studying at a secondary school in Mozambique. Elitism and racism permeated the practice and functioning of the few schools there were, restricting black Mozambicans to educational and work opportunities related to manual labor, which was socially looked down on.

Samora described how colonial education took Mozambicans out of their own realities and taught them to ridicule their own people and culture, to become "depersonalized" and to strive towards becoming "assimilated" to Portuguese culture. The Catholic church sought to teach resignation and submission to foreign oppression and exploitation, not values that stressed people's abilities to control and change the conditions of their own lives for their own benefit.

Schools were essentially undemocratic institutions whose function was to limit teachers, students and workers to individual objectives, to prevent their working for common objectives. Mission schools also became centers for the economic exploitation of students, who, over the years were obligated to pick millions of tons of nuts and rice which they never got to taste, but which went to the church missions.

Liberation and Education

During the war years FRELIMO defined education as decisive in liberating Mozambicans politically and scientifically. As Samora said, "...years ago we had the same questions...we need to organize education, but what kind of education? Education for whom? In service to whom? What does going to school mean?" FRELIMO came to support the concept and reality of education which was at the service of the whole Mozambican people and which didn't just serve to educate a special few to achieve individual objectives. As part of that commitment bush schools and literacy classes were set up wherever FRELIMO went, using those with a few years education to teach those with less.

Education reinforced common unity among the people as it stressed "It's not what you want. It's not what I want. It's what we want, the people want, which is important." Describing how Mozambicans often had to write their lessons in the dirt with sticks, go to school under bombardment and not eat for 2-3 days at a time, Samora said "this is our tradition of education." By the end of the war in 1974, 30,000 Mozambicans were in FRELIMO primary schools and 500 in secondary schools, while 70 Mozambicans were studying in foreign universities.

The Struggle Against Elitist Attitudes

These accomplishments did not come easily. Many Mozambican students, steeped in colonial and capitalist values, saw education as an opportunity for individual advancement at the expense of others. They defined the elitist notion that educated people were special and deserved special privileges, special opportunities; that they should not be asked to risk their lives in the struggle as they would be indispensable after independence. These students, a few directly in service to the Portuguese military, tried to create indiscipline and confusion in FRELIMO schools until they were firmly dealt with. As Samora noted, they didn't want what the people wanted and had sacrificed so much for.

They thought only of what they as individuals wanted. Samora also recalled, with a smile, how some of these same students, remembering that some of their schoolmates were officers in the Portuguese army, wanted FRELIMO to create such ranks in its army, and train them as officers, and thus guarantee them a privileged position in the army.

Even now, Samora noted, a few Mozambicans still have such colonial attitudes. Although the Portuguese lost on the battlefield, he said, they are trying to make our heads their new base of operations, a much more difficult enemy to fight and face, since we still have inferiority complexes in relation to foreign culture.

New Plans for Students

A central problem facing the new government has been the shortage of trained teachers. In the two years since FRELIMO came to power, the school
population of Mozambique has doubled. 800 new teachers completed training in 1976 and another 1500 are expected to do so in 1977.

But education, like most other sectors of Mozambican social and economic development structures, continues to face a shortage of trained personnel. When contracts signed by Portuguese nationals at independence expire this June, the situation will be critical. To meet this situation, the government has decided to suspend the last two years of secondary school and utilize the 600 affected students in a variety of essential tasks. Samora said, "Cadre are in school. The more advanced classes should teach the less advanced classes. The less advanced classes should go teach the illiterate. It is that way that we grow. We will advance in successive waves, like ants."

Some of these 10th and 11th year students will go into the armed forces or the factories. Some will shift to training courses for specific tasks. The Preparatory Course for University Entrance will take some quickly toward university level courses. Others will work in the planning sections of ministries and will be trained for work in agricultural development. Many will train as teachers to fill both secondary and primary school needs.

Need to Connect Schools and Communities

Samora’s speech also assessed other problems FRELIMO and the government had encountered in education, apart from the continuing elitism of some teachers and students who still sought personal advancement rather than advancement of the people as a whole. Educational institutions have at times confused administrative and political responsibilities, responding to political problems with bureaucratic measures. They have failed to develop sufficient links between schools and the people, the communities of which schools are a part. Thus, people still didn’t think of the schools as their own. Yet the people in FRELIMO’s view are essential to carrying out the revolutionary task of creating a new and non-exploitative society, and parents have to actively participate in the functioning of the schools.

To find solutions for these problems, Samora announced several major policy directives.

From now on, private employers cannot go directly to the schools to recruit. All students will be placed in jobs through governmental structures. Thus available people will be sent to fill priority needs in accord with national planning rather than just going to the best paying job they can find.

Secondly, all schools will now work to establish close working relationships with an active production unit, whether factory or collective farm or a state enterprise. The students will work within the factories or farms both in production and in such tasks as teaching literacy or primary school classes for workers. The workers will teach the students skills in carpentry, animal husbandry, etc.

Samora anticipated attempts by Portuguese colonialists and others to discredit the Mozambican revolution by claiming that the FRELIMO government allows “no liberty or choice” in Mozambique. In a long analysis of the concept of freedom, he stressed that liberty is never absolute, that protecting the rights of a minority has often served to justify continuing the exploitation by a few of the many.

An Appeal to Students

In one of the most moving and tough parts of the speech, Samora asked the audience, "Think what you’d be like if you were born in Chile. How would you feel if you were born just a few kilometers from here, in Bulawayo, where everyday youth are being assassinated, killed. The youth of Soweto, students of Chile, of Zimbabwe—why do they struggle? They struggle, even though their leaders are assassinated, because they want schools. What kind of schools? Their own schools! . . . They are imprisoned, killed, because they want schools that help the people, schools like ours. At our schools, bourgeois tendencies continue . . . it is against these tendencies that the students of Bulawayo and Chile are fighting. But here, we want to maintain bourgeois tendencies. Students come to study solely as a means of self-dignity, social distance, to be isolated. They want diplomas as a certificate for exploiting the people. Some, if they could, would walk around with it on their chest, saying ‘this is how much I’m worth.’ People with diplomas often think everyone is below them. This committee [pointing to members of the Political Committee sitting to either side]—there’s no such price on them!"

In concluding the speech, Samora appealed to teachers, students and parents to understand the meaning and the need for transforming Mozambican society, and to actively support the policies developed by the government. Noting that schools were the fruit of the blood of the Mozambican people, he urged all to become actively engaged in the struggle to change educational institutions into genuine centers of education for all the Mozambican people that would work to create a society free of exploitation.
Zaire

A LONG STRUGGLE AHEAD

By mid-May, President Mobutu Sese Seko was proudly proclaiming that, with Moroccan and Egyptian military aid, his army was mopping up the last of the "Katangese invaders" that have been challenging his authority since early March. Western news reports dutifully monitored Kinshasa radio and press briefings which portrayed the fighting in Shaba province (ex-Katanga) as practically over.

But a few reports have punctured this portrait of Mobutu's uniformly successful strength. Although Agence France Presse was hard put for information to counter Mobutu's press releases, it did report that when Mobutu visited the "retaken" town of Kasaji in mid-May, only 26 lepers, who had been unable to flee into the countryside, remained in the town. Zairois Armed Forces Commander-In-Chief Eluki said that the presence of pro-government troops in Kasaji, not far east of the border town of Dilolo, proved that the two-month-old war in the copper-rich province was "virtually over." But the absence of the bulk of the population in the towns being occupied by joint Moroccan-Zairois forces could presage a more protracted guerrilla-type war in the Shaba countryside.

European Missionaries Speak

As the Zairois troops pushed toward Shaba's western border with Angola, several groups of European missionaries, who spent several weeks living in Shaba towns under rebel control, fled to Angola. By early May they had made their way to the Angolan capital and had given their first accounts of the situation.

Augusta Conchiglia of the Paris-based bi-weekly, Afrique Asie, interviewed three missionaries in Luanda before their return to Europe. All agreed that no Cuban or other foreign troops had accompanied the rebels and that the fighting force was essentially native to the province. Sister Camilla Carzaniga, a Franciscan nun from Milan, Italy, who had lived for three years in Mutshatsha, Zaire, one of the towns recently occupied by the rebels, said that "the population received them very well. Many among them had parents or cousins in Mutshatsha." When they entered the town on March 25 "they sang," she added. "It was a festival."

Mobutu Bombs Civilians

Sister Camilla lived peacefully with the Congolese, as the rebels referred to themselves, until April 8. During that time there was no ground fighting, but the Monday after Easter, the Zairois air force began bombing the town regularly. By April 12, the bombing had become so intense that most of the town's residents had fled to the countryside. The sick in the hospital where Sister Camilla worked also had to be evacuated. "They dropped their bombs on the camp where the railroad workers lived," she said. "We were very frightened." Although Radio Kinshasa had announced the retaking of Mutshatsha in mid-April, she said that it hadn't yet been taken. By then she had decided to leave for Angola.

Sister Camilla said the rebels, members of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo, knew the area well. She said that soldiers of Mobutu's "elite" Zairois regiment, known as the Kamanyola, pillaged many of the houses in the towns they occupied. She had encountered one Zairois soldier who fled from fighting at Malonga between Dilolo and Mutshatsha. "They [the rebels] are very strong," the soldier told Sister Camilla. "We hardly had the time to put cartridges in our rifles and they already had shot several times."

Mobutu's soldiers had become seriously demoralized, the missionary reported.

Political Education Begun

She said that the rebels had distributed railroad car-loads of fresh food to the town's population and that they held numerous meetings with the town's people to explain their objectives. "Some of the nurses at the hospital asked an officer of the Front if they could continue to go to church," Sister Camilla said. "He told them that they were there for enough other reasons than to eliminate religion. 'Each is free,' he had said."

Jorge Raymond, a British missionary and chief of a Protestant mission in Kasaji corroborated Sister Camilla's report. He said that since his mission had been established in Kasaji in 1956, the economic situation in Kasaji had worsened continually. When the rebels entered Kasaji, Raymond said, they told him, "we have come to liberate our country."

"They spoke a great deal about socialism," Raymond said. "Everyone must be equal, they said." Raymond also reported that there were no foreign troops among them. "The first Cuban that I saw was at Luso in Moxico province in Angola," he remarked. □
FACTIONAL REVOLT SUPPRESSED

by Mike Shuster

The May 27 attempted coup in Angola that sought to overthrow the government of Agostinho Neto is known to have claimed the lives of at least a half dozen of MPLA’s top leaders before it was suppressed. It was the result of a division within MPLA that had widened since the end of the Angolan war in early 1976, and had involved conflict between Nito Alves, leader of the group involved in the coup attempt and other MPLA leaders.

During my stay in Angola from April to September 1976, the politics of Nito Alves, then Minister for Internal Administration was a constant topic of discussion and debate within many Luanda homes and workplaces as well as throughout the countryside. Even then, divisions were beginning to appear between the “Netoistas” and the “Nitoistas.” The struggle that eventually brought the MPLA government dangerously close to chaos is one of the most complex and important in Angola today.

A guerrilla commander who is only 28 or 29 years old, Alves had fought in MPLA’s First Military Region during the war against the Portuguese. That was the dense, swampy Dembows Forest area, northeast of Luanda, which had been totally cut off from other MPLA units for several years in the 1960s. Many legends of the heroic struggles of the guerrillas who continued fighting there grew throughout the country.

After the Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974, Alves emerged as one of the more legendary guerrilla fighters. When the movement in support of Poder Popular—People’s Power—developed in the shantytowns of Luanda, Alves was one of its earliest backers, eventually becoming identified with the movement for the formation of “Comissões Populares de Barrios,” the local Neighborhood Committees that are designed to become the backbone of MPLA’s Poder Popular government. He was made Minister of Internal Administration, with special charge of overseeing the formation of these CPBs.

It appears now that Alves was using his position as Minister to create a base for the expansion of his own personal power. Throughout last summer, as he felt his power base grow, he was openly critical of the policies of Neto and Lucio Lara, the secretary of the Political Bureau of MPLA and a man generally credited with its organization.

The first move to diminish Alves’ growing strength came at the end of October when MPLA’s Central Committee abolished his Ministry. A week before the coup attempt, MPLA removed Alves from its ranks altogether, the move that led directly to the coup. Sources in Luanda told me that Alves did have support within the military. Although Luanda is reported calm, there have been unconfirmed reports of fighting in other areas of the country.

For an outsider, Alves’ brand of criticism was hard to untangle. His rhetoric in support of “class struggle” had gained favor with Lisbon leftists who, uneasy with the presence of Cuban troops, saw him representing the “left-wing of MPLA.”

Yet within the concrete Angolan context—a country badly divided by war, and an economy paralyzed and virtually abandoned by its skilled labor force—I came to feel that his views represented a real threat to MPLA’s still precarious power. His advocacy of “class struggle” against the “petit bourgeois element” translated into the elimination of skilled whites and mulattos from prominent and responsible positions. It challenged the position of Neto and Lara who have continued to argue for national unity—a politics of anti-racism, anti-tribalism, and anti-regionalism. When Alves supporters took over the national radio station on May 27 they appealed to “you who have always felt humiliated because of the simple color of your skin” to demonstrate against the government.

Privately, sources in Luanda who spoke frankly with me about the Neto-Nito split, expressed anxiety about Alves’ personal ambitions. They felt he wanted to overthrow Neto and establish an all-black government, not necessarily progressive, with himself at the top. These same sources, who were close to several Cuban commanders who had fought during the war, told me the Cubans were aware of the impending split and opposed Alves.

Press dispatches about the recent coup attempt have speculated on whether it was supported by external forces. Several reports say that Alves accused the MPLA government of being “anti-Soviet.” When Alves supporters took over the Angolan radio station they were also said to have exhorted people to demonstrate in downtown Luanda to “bar the road to the alliance of right-wing and Maoist forces conspiring again the revolution’s victories.”

After the attempt had been crushed, Neto reiterated on national radio that Angola remained committed to non-alignment and its own independence. No one, including the Soviet Union and Cuba, would dictate the country’s policies, he said.

MPLA communiques have hinted at the possibility of Western support for the coup, but so far have not revealed any specifics. I do know for certain that the US State Department was interested in Alves as early as last spring. Other journalists who traveled to Angola while I was there and who had visited the State Department reported that information on Alves was one of its primary interests. Some reports stated that supporters of Alves who had attacked Luanda’s Sao Paulo prison to free him and another coup leader, Jose van Dunen, also sought to free British and American mercenaries held there since their trial last summer. If true, this could mean that those who organized the attempt may have agreed to free the mercenaries in exchange for support for their efforts.

What has happened to Alves is uncertain. Some reports say he has fled the country, others that he was killed, still others that his fate is unknown. It is known that at least six high ranking members of MPLA including Saydi Mingas, the Finance Minister, several commanders of the army, and other government members, were killed. Several dozen more are missing.
"We cannot fail to call attention at every moment to the necessity of giving importance to the defense of country," said Lucio Lara, secretary of the political bureau of MPLA in late April. His sentiments have been echoed throughout Angola in the past two months, in response to the increasingly tense situation in the neighboring Shaba province of Zaire. The Angolans were particularly disturbed by the French airlift of Moroccan troops to Zaire, in early April.

**French Role**

Speaking to a wide spectrum of Angolans, ranging from workers at the Port of Luanda to young people attending a seminar for members of MPLA's youth movement, Lara constantly reiterated the theme of vigilance and defense. He took considerable pains to expose France's motives in their African ventures. "We shouldn't forget," he told the port workers, "that it was France that was one of the countries that most worked to destroy MPLA on the eve of independence, always with its eyes on Cabinda's oil." Lara also gave some indication of the perspective in which MPLA viewed France's quick recognition of the MPLA government at the point when the outcome of the Angolan war had become clear. "We mustn't forget as well that, at the moment we came to power, and to the shock of its partners in the European Common Market, France immediately and opportunistically was the first of these 'nine' to recognize Angola," he said.

Lara charged that while France was flying troops to Shaba on the pretext of Cuban, Soviet and Angolan involvement there, it was also initiating discussions aimed at establishing an "African army of intervention," at the meeting of Francophone African states in Dakar, Senegal. "Intervention against whom?" Lara asked. "They speak of communism, they speak of a new NATO. What would a new NATO do in Africa? It would intervene against revolutionary African countries."

When France began its airlift, Angolan President Agostinho Neto sent telegrams of protest to the OAU, King Hassan of Morocco, President Sadat of Egypt, and to Mobutu in Kinshasa.

**Zaire Attacks Continue**

On April 13, in a communiqué which received no coverage in the western press, the Angolan Defense Ministry revealed that Zaire had fired on an Angolan merchant marine ship in Angolan coastal waters near the mouth of the Congo River. The boat, the communiqué stated, was returning to Luanda on April 10 when it was attacked about 20 kilometers west of Zaire's port of Matadi by a 30-man artillery. No one was killed, but several were injured and property was damaged. "New provocations against any type of national ship," the Ministry warned, "will not be tolerated."

Several days later the Defense Ministry announced that a group of 50 armed invaders from Zaire had attacked three Cabinda villages north of the town of Landana. The group carried North American and European weapons and tried to convince the villagers that its members were part of the Angolan army. "The undefended peasants were shot," the Ministry stated. Thirty-one were killed and several more wounded.

The Ministry also announced in late April that three Zaire airplanes violated Angolan air space, bombarding three villages in the eastern province of Menindo, directly southwest of the area of Shaba province where fighting continues. "The desire of the Kinshasa government to internationalize the conflict," the Ministry stated, "is notorious. With these provocations, it is seeking to draw the People's Republic of Angola into the conflict in order to find a pretext for new aggressions and to gain new military aid to repress the people who have revolted against an invalid regime." Further bombing raids were reported in eastern Menindo in early May.

**Health Campaign Begins**

While Angola is girding itself against the possibility of attack from the outside it is also moving to protect itself from another serious internal enemy—disease. On April 7, the Ministry of Health launched a massive campaign to vaccinate children against polio, the particular day coinciding with World Health Day. By all reports the initial stages of the campaign have been a great success.

According to Angolan sources, over 1.5 million children under the age of ten received the first dose of anti-polio vaccine on the first three days of the campaign. Over 40,000 volunteers participated in the organization of the program.

Angola hopes to extend the vaccination campaign against smallpox, measles, tetanus, diphtheria, whooping cough and yellow fever by the end of the year.

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**Namibia**

**SETTLEMENT PLOYS CONTINUE**

Meetings between representatives of five major Western powers and South African government officials have stirred a rash of reports and rumors regarding a breakthrough in settling the issue of Namibian independence.

None of the governments is saying very much, although there have been numerous leaks, mainly from sources close to the South African sponsored Turnhalle conference in Windhoek, Namibia's capital city. The thrust of Western press accounts is that South African Prime Minister Vorster has yielded to pressure from the US, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada—all members of the United Nations Security Council—and that a number of concessions either have been made or are close to being made by the South African regime now illegally occupying the International Territory of Namibia.

**Western Diplomacy**

Nothing has yet been made final. There have been two meetings in Cape Town—one in early April and another at the end of the month. The Western representatives also held "informal" talks with Turnhalle delegates in Windhoek, although they had originally refused to meet with them in order to avoid giving the conference a Western stamp of approval.

US Vice-President Walter Mondale, who has taken charge of the Carter administration's Africa policy, met with Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna on
May 19. Namibia was one of the topics of discussion. According to Mondale, Vorster agreed to free nationwide elections in Namibia to establish a constitution-writing assembly, not a new concession. But there had been serious differences on who should administer the territory during transition.

According to Mondale, Vorster was still insisting that the transitional government should be drawn from "political ethnic groups relatively friendly to him."

As reported by David Martin of the London Observer, writing from Maputo, the "understanding" on Namibia between the Western powers and South Africa appears to include the acceptance of the principle of some United Nations involvement in nationwide elections in Namibia "held under universal suffrage without literacy qualifications."

Election Conditions

United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 of January 1976 demands "United Nations supervision and control" of elections, a position the U.S. government and the others have claimed to support. But Vorster has resisted UN control of elections, and it appears that the West is now acceding to a modified UN presence in Namibia, a far cry from the original concept, which envisioned the UN as involved in the construction of an electoral system and the close supervision of voting to ensure a fair and honest result. South Africa apparently is insisting that the UN presence be restricted to an observer, rather than a supervisory role. And the Rand Daily Mail said recently: "It may be that the Western powers themselves will offer to exercise supervisory functions on the UN's behalf."

"Control" is the key word. Carefully and deliberately introduced by the UN as the lawful authority of the International Territory of Namibia, in fact the demand for UN control has been obdurately ignored by Western governments, although Resolution 385 was passed with their formal concurrence.

Prime Minister Vorster (rear) with head of the U.S. delegation, Don McHenry (right front) and West German Ambassador Eick at opening of first round of talks on Namibia in April.

David Martin also reported in the Observer that South Africa apparently intends to establish a central administrative authority to govern Namibia before independence.

According to the Rand Daily Mail, the composition of such a caretaker administration has not been determined, but it may include a multiracial advisory council that may, in turn, include Turnhalle delegates. "South Africa would withdraw from Namibia in stages," Martin noted, "in consultation with those mainly involved." It was also reported in the South Africa press that the West was willing to adopt "a softer line on the UN demand for an immediate South African withdrawal from the territory." The Sunday Times reported, "The West's position amounts to a request to South Africa that it continue its mandate until elections are held."

Free Elections Impossible

Although South Africa has maintained that "all people and parties would be free to participate in the elections." Free elections in Namibia would be virtually impossible under the understanding apparently reached with Western diplomats.

South Africa has a history of harassment, deception, and outright repression in earlier tribal "elections." Pretoria's police, military, intelligence, and the all-pervading administration in Windhoek are intact. The Western powers, who have a potential three-nation veto, are likely to use their power to dilute the degree of control accorded to the U.N. in any future Namibian election.

In preparation for the election, South Africa also has promised to release Namibian political prisoners and detainees. But Pretoria repeatedly has stated that it holds neither political prisoners nor detainees. All incarcerated South Africans and Namibians, the administration claims, are "criminals," so it is unclear what action the commitment entails.

The elections so assiduously promoted would apparently be for a constituent assembly empowered to draft a constitution. The South West Africa People's Organization is not mentioned in the "understanding." However, SWAPO's information secretary declared that his organization would not participate under the envisioned caretaker administration. The SWAPO mission to the UN issued a statement on May 6 reaffirming the organization's pledge to accept elections, but also...
restated the conditions under which it would participate in such elections. "We know we will win," the May 6 statement said. SWAPO also underscored the fundamental issues in Namibia. "South Africa has no legal or moral right to dictate her own conditions to the international community regarding elections in Namibia," the statement said. "It is the duty and responsibility of the United Nations to decide on the modalities and timetable for the electoral process." The SWAPO statement concluded: "In the meantime, the struggle continues. We expect the Security Council to meet in the near future to take up the question of Namibia. We are also consulting about the convocation of a Special Session of the General Assembly to review the critical situation in Namibia."

South African soldiers guard the mission school from which 126 pupils recently fled to join SWAPO. The school is in the Ovambo Bantustan.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS EXPLOIT URANIUM

Namibia is one of the world's major sources of uranium ore. The Rossing uranium mine, not far from the coastal town of Swakopmund, is now in production. It is said to be the largest open-pit uranium mine in the world. The mining prospects in Namibia are enormous. The entire west-central region of Namibia, where the Rossing project is located on the edge of the Namib desert, appears to be carpeted with the strategic ore. Multi-national corporations, many of them South African, are proceeding with large-scale exploration projects. They are being lured into Namibia by the five-fold rise in the price of uranium over the past four years, by the global trend toward nuclear power and weapons, and by the international business community's estimation that Namibia's political future will be held securely within the Western capitalist fold.

Johannesburg's Financial Mail has reported that at least four areas in Namibia contain large deposits of uranium. A South African company, General Mining, is scheduled to begin developing the territory's second mine. Another potential uranium source lies within the Damara 'homeland.' The pressures for quick containment of the Namibian people's thrust for complete independence are thus accentuated by the vast wealth of the country, and the real extent of Namibia's rich natural resources is becoming clearer by the day.

South Africa's exploitative aims in Namibia are becoming equally clear. Water for the Rossing project, for example, is being brought to the mine from an underground lake in such quantities—necessary for Rossing's operation—that conservationists fear that Namibia's valuable water reserves may disappear within a few years. And there is the added danger of radioactive wastes. The concept of a balanced agricultural and industrial society, which is supported by the South West Africa People's Organization, is thus doubly imperiled.

Plans are underway to bring water down to the uranium-producing areas from the Cunene River dam complex, on the border with Angola, through the use of a series of canals. But as the London Spectator noted recently, these canals would "virtually wipe out one of the three finest game reserves in Africa [the Etosha Pan]." The irrigation of African farmlands in the north from the Cunene scheme has been one of the boasts of Pretoria's South West Africa administration. But the WindhoekAdvertiser has reported that the South African Minister of Water Affairs has said that there would be no such irrigation, because of prohibitive costs.

SWAPO NATIONAL CONFERENCE MEETS IN WINDHOEK

The recent SWAPO national conference demonstrated once again that the liberation movement is Namibia's chief and most rapidly growing political organization. Held in Katutura township outside Windhoek in late March, the conference enlarged the national executive committee to include representatives from political groups that have recently joined SWAPO. Six such organizations, all located in the central and southern areas of the territory, have joined forces with SWAPO within the past five months. They are the Witboois, the Hoachanas, the Vaalgras, the Democratic Organization of Namibia, the Namibian African Peoples Democratic Organization and the Rehoboth Volksparty.

Shortly after the Katutura congress, yet another group announced its affiliation with SWAPO. The 17,000-member Association for the Preservation of the Tjamuaha/Maherero Royal House held a press conference, at which SWAPO Vice-Chairman Daniel Tjongarero said that similar statements of allegiance could be expected in the future. The Tjamuaha/Maherero group represents a large portion of the Herero tribe, and it stands in opposition to Turnhalle "ethnic" delegate, Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the man widely expected to be the first president of South West Africa/Namibia under the South African-nurtured scheme.

The SWAPO congress also widened the scope of its executive by creating new executive posts and by strengthening regional councils to decentralize the party and build authority and responsibility throughout-the country. The internal section of SWAPO also reaffirmed the overall leadership of President Sam Nujoma and other officers in exile, stating once again the integral nature of the party within and outside the boundaries of Namibia.

SWAPO spent considerable time on its new political program, a chief element of which is aimed at changing Namibia's "two economies": one wealthy and white-owned and based on the exploitative extraction of the country's natural resources, and the other a poor, black subsistence economy in which the African people were forced to live in bantustans" and made to seek jobs in the white-controlled mines and ranches and in fishing and other industries.
Zimbabwe

RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT: ONE MORE TIME...

The latest round in the Western search for a Rhodesia settlement involved yet another safari through southern Africa. The new British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, embarked on a Kissinger-like 8-nation shuttle, in an attempt to gain acceptance for, or at least interest in, yet another set of Anglo-American proposals for Rhodesia.

The new plan is still vague, but appears to combine a greater British involvement with some juggling and reordering of the old Kissinger proposals. Since the parties could not agree on an interim government to draw up a constitution at Geneva, the new idea is that perhaps they could agree on a constitution which would give rise to an interim government. As a first step, the British are tentatively planning to open a liaison office in Salisbury. From this base they will be able to begin a round of consultations about a constitutional conference.

The Conference itself, to be held in June or July, would shape a constitution guaranteeing a transfer of power to the black majority in 1978 as well as assurances of financial aid to the white population. Owen himself would chair the conference.

At the end of his trip, Dr. Owen had to acknowledge that there had been no commitment to a new conference from any of the parties concerned. Undaunted, one of his aides predicted: "I think we are going to make it. I think we shall get a conference. But there could be a number of hiccups." Cool Reception

Among the "hiccups" are the responses of the front line nations, and the Zimbabwean nationalist groups to the Owen initiative. The Patriotic Front made its position on the Owen initiative clear at a press conference in Dar es Salaam: it cited four conditions which had to be agreed upon before the Front would join in any new negotiations:

- that the Geneva Conference was now a dead issue, and that a fresh start had to be made in resolving the Zimbabwean constitutional problem;
- that it is only the forces presently engaged in armed struggle, that is only representatives of the Patriotic Front, who should be involved in talks with the British. (Owen specifically rejected the demand at the conclusion of his South African safari);
- that a settlement be reached which definitely and unequivocally transfers power to the people of Zimbabwe;
- that Britain guarantee the implementation of whatever agreement is reached at a Constitutional conference.

Patriotic Front leader Robert Mugabe clarified the Front's position in an interview with Reuters: "We cannot set about drawing up a constitution unless Britain maintains the stand that they are going to grant independence immediately... We are not going to engage ourselves in a useless exercise."

A Friendly Smith

On the other hand, Ian Smith seems to have swallowed the Owen initiative without a cough, much less a hiccup. Smith and Dr. Owen appear to have gotten on swimmingly in South Africa. Dr. Owen enthused over Smith's "friendly and intelligent" approach to the problem and, as a result of their chat, Owen added Salisbury to his itinerary.

The scenario for Dr. Owen's trip, and particularly his meeting with Smith in South Africa, under the watchful gaze of Vorster, makes clear once more the central role which the South African regime plays in the Rhodesian drama. Smith has described Vorster as the "honest Broker"; one might quibble with the words, but not with the fact that much of the orchestration is indeed in Vorster's hands. President Kaunda's recent statement that Vorster had discouraged Smith from resigning, on several occasions, appears to indicate that Pretoria has privately continued to give the Rhodesians significant support, despite diplomatic gestures of disapproval, aimed at placating the international community.

Directly following Owen's visit, Smith's Rhodesian Front gave him "carte blanche" to agree to any settlement plan he sees fit to push. The endorsement came in the course of a special party congress which had been called following the rebellion of 12 Rhodesian Front congress members who refused to accept the principle of any modifications to a Rhodesian apartheid. Smith clearly has things back under control as evidenced by the two resolutions which more than two-thirds of the 800 delegates backed. The first gives Smith the authorization to "negotiate a settlement in the best interests of Rhodesia" and urges him, in these negotiations, to "strive" to abide by the principles and policies of the party. The second resolution assured the party's acceptance of "the need for a settlement," calling on Smith to "insure that the rights of all communities are meaningfully guaranteed."

'Internal Solution' Not Dead Yet

Smith meanwhile, continued to press forward with his "internal solution based on the old Kissinger plan," arguing that "there was no certainty that the Owen proposals would succeed."

There are indications that the next step in the internal solution charade will be a "referendum" to choose an appropriate black leader to negotiate with Smith. Smith seems to think that the winner in such a referendum would be Bishop Muzorewa. The Bishop seemed not unwilling to play the role designed
for him by Smith. At a news conference
he asserted that if it brought majority
rule to his country, he was "prepared to
talk to anybody, including the devil." 
More substantively, he has continued
ever more rigorously to call for a
referendum!

Muzezwra Stance

While Smith and the Bishop are thus
in agreement over the need and desira-
bility of a referendum, there continue to
be disparities in their concept of the
nature of this referendum. Smith sees
the referendum as a means for choosing
a black negotiating partner, who would
be invested by the referendum with an
adequate amount of legitimacy. Muze-
zwra sees the referendum as an elec-
tion, a means for deciding on a leader
for Zimbabwe, to whom the white
minority regime would hand over
power. The election would be super-
vised by the British. This notion was
included in the five point list of
demands he presented to Owen during a
swing through Western Europe and the
US, a swing which included talks with
Cyrus Vance as well as Owen. Dr.
Owen stated, during his southern Africa
tour, that he was "more attracted to an
election than a referendum."

The Patriotic Front reacted strongly
against Muzezwra's referendum election
idea, and the idea of a referendum was
dismissed by Nkomo as little more than
a joke.

Front Line States

Among the front line presidents,
there appeared to be some wavering in
the unity with which they have sup-
ported the Patriotic Front. Kenneth
Kaunda of Zambia rejected Muzezwra's
proposals outright but Botswana Minis-
ter Archie Mogwe, in a speech to his
country's National Assembly in early
April, asserted that no nationalist group
was "irrelevant" to the struggle. Dis-
cussions at the Maputo conference in
May indicate, however, that in general
the Patriotic Front has consolidated its
support internationally.

**RENOVE IN TROUBLE**

Evidence of the continuing erosion of
the Rhodesian economy came in the
form of reports of a serious manpower
shortage, and a decline in capital invest-
ment. 1976 was the first year since 1965
that there was a net outflow of Euro-
peans from Rhodesia, despite the impos-
ition, in mid-1976, of severe restric-
tions on the amount of money would-be
emigrants could take out of the country.
And indications for 1977 boded no
better; in January 1977, only 440 Euro-
peans entered the country, compared
with 1,040 in January 1976.

This emigration has hit the skilled
labor pool particularly hard. Last year,
Rhodesian Nickel, the country's major
nickel producer, admitted that it was
more concerned about the shortage of
skilled manpower than any other dif-
culty. In his annual report, the com-
pany's chairman said it was unlikely
that the group would succeed in recruit-
ing qualified and experienced men to fill
senior technical vacancies until the
country could once again offer a secure
future.

Capital Shortage

Further, reports from South Africa
document a drop in capital inflow, the
result, among South African investors,
of uncertainty about Rhodesia's future.
Manufacturing production fell 9% in the
first half of 1976. The uncertainty of the
political situation has also affected one
of the regimes major exports: tobacco.

Buyers, no longer confident in the
Regime's ability to guarantee delivery,
have canceled orders in such numbers
that the government was forced to grant
tobacco farmers a subsidy amounting to $20
million. Acute transport problems, brought on by the
closure of routes through Mozambique, has
cased severe losses for key exporters.

The country's largest fruit growing
company, Hippo Valley Estates, was
forced to dump its 16,000 ton citrus
export crop because rail transport could
not be assured.

Capital inflow was further reduced by
a drastic drop in the number of arriving
tourists. The total for this year is
expected to be the lowest since before
1965.

But one area of the economy had
adjusted well: the car rental business.
A Salisbury car rental firm has just
become the first agency to add a
mine-proof Land Rover to its fleet of
autos for hire!

**REWARDS**

Governments will pay substantial rewards to anyone who volunteers
secret information which leads to the death or capture of terrorists or
their supporters and the capture of their weapons.

(The names of anyone giving information will remain secret.

The amount of the rewards offered by Government are:

Five thousand dollars for a senior terrorist leader.
Two thousand five hundred dollars for a terrorist group leader.
One thousand dollars for a terrorist, for information which
leads to the death or capture of terrorists or their supporters and
the capture of their weapons.

Three hundred dollars for each terrorist.
Three hundred dollars for each terrorist vehicle mine.
Three hundred dollars for each terrorist heavy weapons.
Three hundred dollars for each terrorist machine gun.
Three hundred dollars for each terrorist light personal weapon.
Three hundred dollars for each full box of terrorist ammunition.
Three hundred dollars for each full box of terrorist grenades.
Three hundred dollars for each full box of terrorist anti-personnel mines.

The winner is awarded first prize of a
pencil and a notebook. The essay writ-
ing is followed by a lecture on the evils
of "terrorism" complete with photos of
leftists riddled with bullets, dead guer-
illas with their names and places of
origin. Lately, given the wholesale
exodus of students, emphasis has been
placed on working among school chil-
dren. A truckload of government
soldiers, fully and frighteningly armed,
drives into a school and supervises an
essay competition on the "terrorists." The
winner is awarded first prize of a
cello and a notebook. The essay writ-
ing is followed by a lecture on the evils
of "terrorism" complete with photos of
badly mutilated, dead guerrillas, and
photos of dead cattle, allegedly shot by
the guerrillas as a punishment for lack
of cooperation.
WHAT HAPPENED IN ANGOLA?


by Daniel Schechter

This small book is the combined product of a distinguished specialist in the Africanist Establishment, and a well trained researcher of the intelligence agency school of political analysis. In 85 tightly detailed pages, it gives us two essays by Mr. Legum, the noted correspondent for the London Observer, who sets out to untangle the complex web of foreign intervention in the Angola war. He is joined in this exercise by the lesser known Mr. Hodges. The book is a monograph-offshoot of the expensive publication Africa Contemporary Record which keeps tabs on the continent for those institutions, corporations, and government agencies that can afford the service.

By self-admission this slim volume is a "preliminary study" which seeks to offer an "objective description." Its purpose is not detached analysis but an activist commitment; its stated goal is to influence western decision makers. And it is important to understand at the outset that Legum is completely committed to the survival of fundamental Western interests. In short what we have here is a brief intended for Mr. Vance and his ilk rather than an intellectual project aimed at clarifying the past.

Selective in its sources, skewed in its argumentation and biased in its conclusions, Legum's book combines a subtle anti-communism with a pseudo scientific tone. It seeks to avoid ideological issues, and deflects our attention away from the culpability and criminality of Western policy. Its one original idea is its provocative thesis that: "The main purpose of the Russian and Cuban intervention was to undermine China's influence in Africa rather than to help the MPLA win for its own sake, or even to weaken western influence." While Peking and a handful of western Marxist-Leninist sects might rally to this argument the evidence to support it is thin, speculative, and specious.

The study of revolutionary movements should be framed in both the national and international contexts simultaneously. Their origins have to be discussed in the framework of the problems and hopes that inspire them. Revolutions are not export or import items. They cannot be stage-managed from afar nor can they be entirely self-sufficient in an age of advanced weapons, Great Powers, and imperialist domination. It is unusual to find a revolutionary crisis without some foreign intervention, but it is also unusual when the foreign intervention by itself completely explains the dynamics of the situation.

The Western press treated Angola entirely as an extension of global rivalries. The war was like a sports event without a life of its own; each team wore the uniforms of its sponsors and nothing more. One rarely found the MPLA mentioned without the prefix, "Soviets-backed." Likewise their adversaries, whether Holden Roberto's FNLA or Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, were always identified as "pro-Western." There was never a parity of ideological identifiers however. The MPLA was labelled "marxist" but the others were never "pro-capitalist" or "imperialist-backed." Journalists seldom attempted to penetrate the meaning of these labels in the day-to-day affairs of ordinary Angolans. Rarely were the people themselves interviewed or the extent of their popular participation gauged. The quantity of military clashes were reported regularly; the quality of political struggles hardly at all.

Colin Legum's work comes to us in this spirit; an ostensibly 'objective' work which does not recognize its own anti-revolutionary bias; which takes seriously the dangers of superpower intervention. i.e., Soviet domination; but ignores the effects of imperialist penetration; which treats all the Angolan movements with a surface neutrality but is prepared to believe and repeat the worst about the MPLA. It is a book that makes careful political distinctions to support its thesis but ignores compelling evidence that contradicts it. Finally, its own narrative is internally inconsistent, implying more than it proves.

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Was the initial phase of Soviet and Cuban intervention (between March-October 1975) a reaction to American intervention in Angola; or was the Russian-Cubans' massive intervention only a response to SA's military intervention as they claim; or were the Russians primarily responsible for starting the 'war of intervention,' as the Chinese have insisted; or was it mainly due to the Sino-Soviet conflict in the Third World; or was Angola another stage in Russia's strategy to thrust into southern Africa, as has been claimed by Kissinger and Vorderst? When, in fact did SA military forces first become actively engaged in Angola?

A second group of questions is raised by the issue of who the 'legal government' was in the country after the Portuguese left. Was it the People's Republic of Angola, proclaimed by Dr. Agostinho Neto's MPLA? Or the Social Democratic Republic of Holden and Savimbi? If there was a legitimate authority, can one properly speak of a civil war, which the Russians dispute? Or was it a war of intervention?

Legum deals with these questions by individually discussing the role of each foreign power along with the barest outlines of the situation in the country as independence neared. There are two problems with this approach. First, it makes no serious attempt to integrate the levels of analysis. This creates a certain difficulty in remembering what the Americans were doing when the Russian arms were arriving, or where the Cubans were when the first South Africans crossed the border. The lack of a clear chronology leads to an unevenness in the narrative.

Secondly, the text jumps too quickly over the political struggles underway in Angola in the period from the Portuguese coup on April 24, 1974 through the break up of the transitional government in mid-1975.

So who intervened first? Colin Legum argues that the Russians and the Cubans intervened to undercut Chinese influence. The Chinese withdrew at the request of the OAU, while the Russians and Cubans torpedoed the prospects for peace, eventually winning the war. They could do that only because the United States did not act like a superpower. Meanwhile South Africa's intervention was a military failure indicating recklessness on its part and the inadequacy of the nationalist movement it was trying to support. Legum does not find evidence of US-South African collusion significant.

If you are having trouble digesting this theory, it may be because some of it is simply indigestible. Let's back up and look at these points in slow motion.
1. "The Russians and Cubans intervened to undercut Chinese influence." But how influential were the Chinese, and what political threat did they pose? Before the war, despite their rhetoric of even handedness and neutrality, they were supplying military advisors to the Zaire and FNLA armies, a relationship unlikely to win them many friends among progressives in Africa who are aware of both Mobuto and Roberto's CIA tinged past.

If the Russians were to counter the Chinese as their primary goal we would have expected them to pump arms into Angola even earlier. Tony Hodges tells us that the FNLA received 450 tons of Chinese arms in 1974. Yet it wasn't until March 1975, according to Legum, that the first big Russian arms shipments arrived for the MPLA. The American Angolan expert John Marcum says of those arms in an article in the April 1976 Foreign Affairs: that they were not an "unreasonable response" to Roberto's own "escalation" (with both Chinese and American weapons). Marcum also reports that the Soviets had actually cut their aid to the MPLA to the same extent as they had FNLA and UNITA.

2. Legum relies on "western intelligence guestimates" for his estimate on the costs of Soviet involvement. He uncritically accepts Henry Kissinger's claim of $200 million as the amount the Soviets spent. And all this, Legum insists, was to discredit the Chinese!

3. Why were the Russians and Cubans involved? The most direct and least fashionable answer is that the MPLA asked for their help. Both countries had been backing Agostinho Neto's movement since its formation although the extent of their aid varied over time. (In the same period, the US aligned itself with Portugal.) The Soviets certainly had a long-standing policy to justify their involvement.

As for the Cubans, Legum is way off base again. He implies that it was the Soviets who enlisted the voluntary cooperation of the Cubans, although he is not sure when this happened. He totally ignores Cuba's long standing policy of support for guerrilla struggles throughout the world, its activist anti-imperialist orientation, and its close relationship with the MPLA.

There is considerable evidence that the Cubans "enlisted" Soviet support for their autonomously developed policy. On February 4, 1975, the New York Times reported that Henry Kissinger indicated that he believed that the Cubans acted on their own initiative in Angola, but that the United States publicly held the Soviets responsible because "The United States had virtually no leverage with respect to Cuba..." The Times also quoted two Soviet sources to debunk the Administration inspired theory. "We did not twist their arms, we didn't even have to twist their arms, the Cubans wanted to go in," said one Soviet official. Another—who had been to Cuba—said simply: "They are more radical than we are."

4. The Americans and South Africans. Legum is critical of the American intervention, but largely it seems because it failed. He has no sense of the way United States policy helped create the crisis in the first place—and that is because he has no analysis of American imperialism and its strategy of neocolonialism. "The fact is that the United States has been intervening in Angola and Zaire since 1960," writes Africanist Immanuel Wallerstein, "continuously, flagrantly, and never on the side of the progressive forces. Angola might have been independent ten years ago, and under an MPLA government were it not for US support of the Portuguese, of Holden Roberto, of Mobutu, and anyone who threatened the structures of dominance in Southern Africa."

Legum is equally mild in his disapproval of the South African invasion which he brands as reckless and counter-productive. He finds it hard to accept that the United States government, in John Marcum's words "convinced of the South African intervention and sought to cooperate with it," despite clear implication in various statements by John Vorster that the two countries were in collusion from the very beginning.

As for the date of the South African invasion, all analysts are agreed that it began in full strength on October 23, 1975. But a South African build up past that point is real. With the help of its allies, it is reasonable to assume that MPLA's intelligence sources were good, and that they knew that the South Africans were coming. Is it any wonder that they prepared for it? So much for Legum's big discovery that there were some Cubans engaged in battle a few weeks before Pretoria launched its blitzkrieg. It is still uncontestable that the major Cuban assistance followed rather than preceded the South African invasion.

Legum's second set of questions deals with the legitimacy of the MPLA. This question is somewhat moot today since the People's Republic of Angola has been universally recognized as the country's only government. But the historical issue of who was responsible for the breakdown of the transitional government remains a point of considerable controversy in certain circles. That government was an uneasy coalition of unequal forces. They were forces that differed fundamentally on political ideology. The FNLA and the UNITA behaved as if they were contesting for power; the MPLA as if it was conducting a revolution. Even Tony Hodge's truncated account shows how the violence which eventually led to war is triggered by the FNLA's attacks on MPLA political programs in Luanda. As he reports, the very first serious clash began when the MPLA organized organs of grassroots and democratically controlled "popular power" and proclaimed a week of activities. The FNLA condemned these because "popular power should only be exercised by the liberation movements" and because "independence does not mean anarchy." The FNLA soon moved its CIA-backed and Chinese equipped army into Luanda and a series of violent clashes began.

It is only by not overlooking and submerging the ideological differences between the movements that one can recognize that the internal conflict within Angola mirrored the line-up of external forces. The MPLA's victory was not just a function of military success or external support, but a vindication of a political outlook and popular mobilization. In the final analysis, it was the passions, sacrifices and consciousness of the Angolans themselves that shaped their own history. Unfortunately writers who explain revolutions as the interplay of interventions and elites cannot understand that.

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**OF SPECIAL NOTE . . .**

Robert Van Lierop reports that the Mozambique Film Project, which aimed to raise $40,000 for a new hospital in Mozambique through showing of the film O Povo Organizado had raised $39,109 by May 5. Project participants hope to be able to hand over the full amount to Carlos Lobo, Ambassador of the People's Republic of Mozambique to the U.N., on June 25, the second anniversary of Mozambique's independence and the 15th anniversary of the founding of FRELIMO.

Please contact the Project if you can help—either by making a donation or by setting up a showing of the film. Tax exempt donations may be made to CAHD—Episcopal Church, 815 2nd Ave., New York, NY 10007. Make checks payable to Mozambique Health Project. For information regarding film showings, write to Mozambique Film Project, 240 East 23rd St., New York, NY 10010. Telephone: (212) 867-8400, ext. 341.
PROTESTING HYPOCRISY . . . A decision by Stanford University trustees to abstain on a shareholder resolution calling on Ford Motor Co. to withdraw from South Africa prompted a takeover of a university building which ended May 9 with the arrest of 294 persons. The action was repeated the following day, but participants voted 170 to 130 to withdraw rather than to face additional arrests. A spokesman for the Stanford Committee for Responsible Investment Policy, which organized the protest, cited the majority’s feeling that it would be more useful to engage in other forms of action rather than to continue the confrontation. The trustees maintained that they hold “a deep aversion to the practice of apartheid.”

A smaller protest at the University of California at Berkeley, whose trustees have voted consistently in favor of corporate management positions, also produced some arrests. About 300 persons, including the chancellor, attended a rally called to oppose South African investments.

At McAllister College in Minnesota, trustees agreed to vote the school’s share in favor of anti-apartheid resolutions.

Other schools where the issue has been raised this year include Harvard, Bryn Mawr, and the University of Massachusetts.

COLLEGE SELLS STOCK . . . Trustees of Hampshire College in Massachusetts have sold $215,000 worth of stock directly controlled by the college following a demand by students that the school divest itself of any holdings in companies doing business in South Africa.

The trustees’ action came after an extensive campaign by students which culminated in a four-day takeover of the college’s administrative center. About two-thirds of the college’s staff and faculty signed a petition supporting the students’ position on the stock sale.

BANK CAMPAIGN IN PROGRESS . . . A nationwide campaign to end US bank loans to South Africa is underway. Sponsored by a number of organizations including trade unions, church and community groups, and the American Committee on Africa, a call has been issued urging individuals and organizations to withdraw funds from banks known to have South African connections.

It recently has come to light that the First National Bank of Atlanta, not previously known as a lender to South Africa, is a partner in a $2 million loan.

MAY DAY PROTEST . . . More than 1,000 people participated in a May Day march in Boston to protest apartheid and US involvement in South Africa. One theme of the day was “Jobs at Home, not Wars Abroad,” and one target was the First National Bank of Boston, which is a partner in a major loan to South Africa. Organizers included Youth Against War and Fascism and the African National Congress, and sponsors included several state representatives and labor officials.

BRIEFS . . . A Congressional briefing on Zaire, sponsored by the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy and the Washington Office on Africa, was held April 29. . . . A demonstration by several hundred people on April 10 helped convince most longshoremen on the San Francisco waterfront not to unload a ship carrying South African asbestos. The demonstration was called by the Boycott South African Cargo Committee, a coalition of 20 Bay area groups. . . . The Detroit Solidarity Committee Against Apartheid, organized by the Revolutionary Socialist League, staged an April 30 picket of Manufacturers National Bank, which sells Krugerrands. The group has called on bank customers to protest the policy and to boycott the bank until it is changed. . . . Groups around the country planned to mark African Liberation Day with demonstrations and other events. Among the scheduled actions was a march and rally May 28 in New York, sponsored by Blacks in Solidarity with South African Liberation. The theme was to be “South Africa and black America: same struggle, same fight.” . . . Christian Concern in Southern Africa, a British church research group, has published a report alleging that ICI’s South African subsidiaries are providing tear gas for security forces, relying heavily on African migrant labor, and refusing to give adequate information about wages and conditions to black employees.

CANADIAN CONVENTION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA . . . The Southern Africa Action Coalition held a conference in Vancouver May 13-15 to discuss recent events and develop a coordinated plan of activities. Among the speakers were liberation movement representatives and John Gaetsewe, exiled secretary general of the banned South African Congress of Trade Unions.

TANZANIA COMMEMORATES SHARPEVILLE MASSACRE . . . Several hundred Tanzanians joined with representatives of the South African liberation movements and Soweto students to recall the Sharpeville massacre and to express solidarity with liberation efforts. Ndugu Nungu, a member of Tanzania’s CCM Central Committee, called on South Africans to abandon their differences and to form a common front in the liberation struggle. “The people who can fight are there. And the supply of arms is not a problem at the moment. What is mostly needed now is your determination which cannot come without yourselves being united.”
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