What Arms Embargo?
U.S. Press Smears Mozambique
Two South African Trials: An Observer's Report
Our Collective:

Southern Africa is published monthly, except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10010.

Subscriptions: Individual (domestic and foreign)/$8.00; Institutional/$18.00; Air mail: Africa, Asia, Europe/$20.50; South and Central America/$17.50.

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilm, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 68206, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index.

Cover photo: South African Armoured Car

Contents

2 WHAT ARMS EMBARGO?

6 U.S. PRESS SMEARS MOZAMBIQUE

9 U.S. AID EXAMINED: THE CAMBODIAN EXPERIENCE

12 ZAIRE: THE U.S.-BELGIAN-FRENCH CONNECTION

14 TWO SOUTH AFRICAN TRIALS: AN OBSERVER'S REPORT

16 SOUTH AFRICA
16 ONE YEAR LATER: STUDENT RESISTANCE CONTINUES
21 BLACK STUDENTS DENY MEETING WITH YOUNG

17 OVERVIEW

18 NEWS BRIEFS

20 UPDATE

22 NAMIBIA
22 DRIVE TOWARD SETTLEMENT

24 ZIMBABWE
24 SMITH LOOKS FOR A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE
24 FARMWORKERS JOIN GUERRILLAS

25 ANGOLA
25 LEADERS OF ATTEMPTED COUP ARRESTED

26 MOZAMBIQUE
26 ATTACK ON MAPAI

28 UNITED STATES
28 FORGING THE CARTER POLICY
29 CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATIVES SUPPORT MINORITY REGIMES

30 CONFERENCES
30 CONFERENCE AGAINST APARTHEID APARTHEID HELD IN LISBON
31 OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE STRESSES ARMED STRUGGLE
31 OAU BACKS PATRIOTIC FRONT
32 SECRET MEETINGS TO WIN THE WEST
33 COMMONWEALTH DEBATES AFRICAN LIBERATION

33 LETTERS

34 BOOK REVIEWS

35 RESOURCES

36 ACTION NEWS NOTES
What Arms Embargo?

South African Airforce Mirage Jets

by Sean Gervasi

The UN arms embargo against South Africa has in no way deterred Western countries, notably the US, Britain, Italy and France, from selling major weapons systems to South Africa. The following Special Report outlines the basis for this claim by providing Southern Africa readers with an edited version of Sean Gervasi's testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 14 July, 1977. Gervasi, an economist who has worked for the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia at the UN, called on Congress to investigate US arms sales to the apartheid regime, and received a particularly sympathetic hearing from Congressmen Diggs, Whalen and Bonker.

A telex from the Rand Daily Mail to a correspondent in Washington dated 14 July, 1977, relays a South African Defence Department request suggesting that South Africa is more than a little concerned about the information provided by Gervasi. The Department requested no publication of the report, noting that "...any publicity given to this testimony could result in embarrassment to countries friendly to South Africa and therefore affect South Africa's security."

Evidence has recently come to light which makes it clear that the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa, instituted through resolutions 181 and 182 of 1963, is in practical fact non-existent. An exhaustive examination of both governmental and confidential industry sources reveals that a thriving international trade in arms to the apartheid state has been underway for nearly a decade. As a result, South Africa has been able to build a powerful modern military machine based on foreign weapons—the very outcome the UN embargo was designed to prevent.

According to American journalist Jim Hoagland (Washington Post, 16 January, 1977) the South African government has in recent years been spending the equivalent of two-thirds of its annual defense budget on military imports. With a defense import bill of $450 millions and more than $800 millions in 1973 and 1975 respectively, South Africa's projected defense import bill for 1977 is, according to US Senate sources, in excess of $1,200 millions.

Prepared to Pay the Price

Almost all of this money has been spent, and is being spent, in Western countries, or in countries used for the trans-shipment of Western arms, who have been willing to sell South Africa almost anything it wants for a price. Prepared to pay that price, South Africa has been purchasing every kind of weapon and type of equipment, from tanks and radar to helicopters and self-propelled guns.

It was generally believed until now that France had supplied South Africa with most of its imported arms in recent years. However, this now seems doubtful. While figures on the value of the arms trade are not yet available, it appears that Great Britain, the United States and France have accounted for the bulk of sales to South Africa since 1963, with Italy as a fourth principal supplier. As the South Afri-
can defense import figures indicate, the volume of the arms trade with South Africa has been far larger than it was thought to be, with French sales accounting for only a part of that trade. It goes without saying that, for the most part, western arms sales to South Africa, in particular, those involving Britain, the US, and Italy, have been shrouded in secrecy.

A thorough analysis of this "invisible" trade must begin with an accurate description of the present South African arms inventory. The difficulty up to now has been that published figures on this inventory were inaccurate. Specifically, data generally regarded as authoritative published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and indicating the quantities of different kinds of military equipment held by most countries has provided a misleading view of South Africa's strength in two respects:

First, the IISS publication, The Military Balance, 1976-77, fails to list many major weapon systems currently in use in South Africa, including Centurion Mk 10, Patton, Walker Bulldog and AMX-13 tanks; Staghound and Shorland MK 3 armored cars; M-113A1, V-150 Commando, Piranha, Short SB 301, and M3A1 armored personnel carriers; and Sexton 88mm, M-7 Priest 105mm, and M-109 155mm self-propelled guns. Not listed among South Africa's combat aircraft and helicopters are Impala II jets, F-104G Starfighters, F-51D Cavalier COIN, and Iroquois and Gazelle helicopters.

Second, the IISS figures on weapons which it does list often underestimate the quantities actually in use. This is the case with regard to Centurion tanks, Ferret scout armored cars, Saracen and Ratel armored personnel carriers, Mirage II strike interceptors, and several types of helicopter.

Large Quantities Not Reported

From the evidence now available it is clear that suppliers have been selling far larger quantities of certain weapons to South Africa than is generally reported, and have been selling South Africa many items of equipment, not generally believed to be part of the South African inventory.

Table A provides some details on the sale of "extra quantities" of equipment to South Africa, and the sources of that equipment.

Table B indicates that many important arms deals have been kept entirely secret until now. It lists weapons systems now in the South African inventory which are not credited to South Africa by standard sources such as The Military Balance. With one exception, all of the arms listed have been delivered to South Africa since the arms embargo began, and many have been delivered within the last eight or nine years. Orders for some are still on the books in Great Britain, Portugal and Italy.

The data set out in these Tables show that France, the US, and Italy have failed altogether to heed the Security Council call for an arms embargo against South Africa. While there may be "arms export control" regulations of some kind on the books in various countries, they have not stopped the flow of Western arms to South Africa over the whole of the last decade.

The breakdown of the arms embargo has had very serious consequences. Perhaps the most serious is that South Africa has been able to build a modern military force on the African continent, a force which in the present circumstances gives it formidable power.

When the arms embargo began, South Africa had a relatively small military establishment, with less than 13,000 men in the Permanent Force and total military expenditures of approximately Rand 120 million. The Air Force had few modern aircraft and only a few helicopters. The Army had a collection of old British and American tanks, armored cars and artillery.

Lacking even a small mobile attack force, the apartheid regime had an essentially defensive capability.

Awesome Military Capability

Today the situation is completely different. South Africa now has an awesome military capability. The Air Force possesses more than 600 combat aircraft, including nearly 150 Mirage III and Mirage F-1 aircraft, as well as some 300 Aermacchi MB-326 strike-trainer and strike jets, 40 Lockheed F104G fighter-bombers and 50 North American F-51D Cavalier counter-insurgency strike aircraft. It also has more than 200 helicopters. There are well over one thousand aircraft in service with the South African Air Force.

The army possesses more than 500 tanks. A large number of these are Centurion Mk 10's, with a 105mm gun and better armor and engine than the
Mk 5 and Mk 7 models which South Africa is usually listed as having. The Patton tanks are an improved model fitted with a British 105mm gun.

The army also has nearly 200 Panhard armored cars fitted with 90mm guns. These are made in South Africa under French license. In addition, it possesses several hundred other armored cars and nearly 1,000 armored personnel carriers. Some of the latter are very recent American and British models. It has a large number of self-propelled guns—medium and heavy artillery, of 89mm, 105mm and 155mm, mounted on tank chassis.

Table C indicates the extent to which The Military Balance generally underestimates South African power, giving figures for each type of major weapon actually in service. Weapons systems now known to be in the South African inventory at the end of 1976 include four times the number of combat aircraft, twice the number of helicopters, three times as many tanks, as well as more armored cars and personnel carriers than the IISS lists, and self-propelled guns not listed at all.

Now A Dominant Influence

The new data on South African arms make it clear that in terms of real military capability, South Africa's strength, generally compared with that of Nigeria, Poland and Argentina, ought in fact to be compared with Iran, Brazil, Egypt and Japan, all significant military powers with a dominant influence in important regions of the world (see Table D).

Although it is true that South Africa has a relatively small standing force, its actual manpower pool, according to South African sources, contains some 450,000 trained personnel. More importantly, South Africa can mobilize large numbers at relatively short notice by calling up the Citizen Force reserves, units composed of men with military experience, who are retrained every year. At the present time, Citizen Force units are being rotated continuously though the standing forces, those on active duty, in order to maintain a high degree of readiness.

There is no question that South Africa has achieved overwhelming military power south of the Sahara even while it continues to lack the capacity to produce sophisticated modern arms economically. Thus as South Africa prepares for war it knows that it has a tremendous advantage over its weaker and poorer neighbors—an advantage achieved largely because Western countries have been willing to violate the arms embargo and sell it aircraft, tanks and other military equipment.

Acquired In Last Ten Years

Those who insist that the Western equipment in the South African inventory is largely old or shipped to South Africa before the arms embargo began are incorrect. Although some of the Western equipment still in service, such as the Walker Bulldog tank and the Staghound armored car, is quite old, much of it is still serviceable. More importantly, other equipment,
South Africa's firepower on the ground.

Although the US declared its intention to adhere strictly to the UN embargo from the very beginning, and has consistently maintained that it is doing so, it is now clear that a great deal of US military equipment has found its way into the South African Defense Forces. Major items about which we know at this time include the following:

- M-3A1 armored personnel carriers
- T-17 E1 Staghound armored cars
- M-47 Patton main battle tanks
- M-41 Walker Bulldog light tanks
- M-113A1 armored personnel carriers
- Commando V-150 personnel carriers
- M-7 105mm self-propelled guns
- M-109 155mm self-propelled guns
- Lockheed F-104G Starfighter jets
- North American F-51D counter-insurgency aircraft
- Agusta-Bell 205A Iroquois helicopters
- Lockheed Hercules C-130B transport aircraft

These weapons, made in the US or in other countries under US license are all in service with South Africa's regular forces or the Citizen Force. Most of the US weapons have been sold to South Africa since the arms embargo began. More importantly, deliveries of some items of US equipment were continuing in early 1977.

US corporations do not, so far as is known, sell directly to the apartheid regime. The preferred channel for getting US arms to South Africa at present appears to be licensed production—an arrangement by which US corporations agree to let a foreign manufacturer produce an American weapon under license. The foreign manufacturer then ships the item in question to South Africa.

In theory, this traffic should be controlled by the Office of Munitions Control in the Department of State. However, the OMC apparently does not control some foreign sales when production takes place under US license. For example, the Ford Motor Company has licensed Oto Melara, a major Italian arms manufacturer, to produce a version of the M-113A1 armored personnel carrier.

It is the Oto Melara models which have been recently sold to South

### TABLE D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total armed forces (000s)</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combat aircraft</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td>625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>helicopters</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tanks</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>350+</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armored cars</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armored personnel carriers</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-propelled guns</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>n.s.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


n.a. = not available
n.s. = not specified

1. Estimate by the author based on South African source material. South Africa can mobilize 200,000 men within 2 days in an emergency.

### TABLE E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>approx number in service</th>
<th>approx date of delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centurion Mk 10 tank</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1967-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard AML 245 H60 armored car</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>produced under license</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard AML 245 H90 armored car</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>produced under license</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daimler Ferret Mk 2 with Vigilant ATGW</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1968-1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saracen armored personnel carrier</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1962-1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commando V-150 armored personnel carrier</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>post-1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piranha armored personnel carrier</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>delivery beginning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-113A1 armored personnel carrier</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1973-1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexton 25 pdr self-propelled gun</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-109 155mm self-propelled gun</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1972-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shorland Mk 3 armored car</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-47 Patton tank</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Assigned to the Citizen Force, but major equipment.

Such as the Patton tank, has recently been re-conditioned and improved. And most of the major weapons now in service with the regular Air Force and the Regular Army have been delivered in the last ten years.

Table E shows that almost all the first-line armor of the regular South African army has been imported from Western countries within the last ten years, with important items such as the M-113A1 armored personnel carrier and the M-109 self-propelled gun imported very recently. Given this equipment, all of the frontline states combined could not hope to match...
Africa. Oto Melara is also producing, or refurbishing, the M-109 self-propelled gun under license and then selling it to South Africa. Meanwhile Bavia, a firm in Portugal, is producing the V-150 Commando personnel carrier under license from Cadillac Gage of Detroit. The Commandos, like other US weapons produced under license, were in the process of being delivered to South Africa earlier this year, and so far as is known, no attempt has been made to stop this traffic.

There is a great deal which is still unclear about the breakdown of the arms embargo. What is clear, however, is that the US, and other Western powers, have allowed vast quantities of arms to be sent to South Africa, and have, for all practical purposes, ignored the UN arms embargo against South Africa. In so doing, they have helped South Africa to impose apartheid and have encouraged a state whose policies they profess to abhor.

That is, these states, the US included, have taken the side of the apartheid regime and have, in fact, armed the white minority regime for the military confrontation which is now developing in southern Africa.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Data on arms deliveries to South Africa and weapons currently present in the South African weapon systems provided in the text and tables above have been derived from the following sources):

The prohibition carries far-reaching implications in that its stipulation of "indirectly" would also deprive Mozambique of much needed bilateral and multi-lateral assistance, primarily through the UN.

The political climate legitimating both the Rhodesian invasions, and the right-wing maneuvers here, has been prepared by the US media establishment, whose distortions about Mozambique are identical to the stereotypes propagated by the Smith regime.

Among the newspapers which have repeatedly depicted the Mozambican government as a totalitarian and racist regime slavishly tied to the Soviet Union are the People's Republic of Mozambique and weapons currently present in the South African weapon systems provided in the text and tables above have been derived from the following sources:

The most immediate threat comes from the illegal Rhodesian regime whose armed forces have launched more than 150 incursions across the border. A less direct, but nonetheless telling, blow has been struck from the US, where Congressional allies of Salisbury have pushed through legislation to cut off aid to Mozambique.

The House action—a voice vote on June 23 approving an amendment by right-wing Illinois Republican Philip Crane—prohibits any appropriated funds from going "directly or indirectly" to Marxist African states, including also Angola.

The implications of this propaganda campaign have not been lost on the Mozambican government. Last December, the Ministry of Information denounced these distortions which, it observed, were designed to persuade world public opinion that:

- the liberation struggle is not being carried out by the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa, and is reducible to rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union;
- the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique is an aggressive government, while the racist and imperialist forces that invade its borders do so in self-defense;
- a climate of instability and people's revolt exists in Mozambique such that "the imperialist lackeys who participate in the massacre and slaughter of our people" become representative of the will of the masses.

Lurid Tales

The dominant theme of most accounts of Mozambique in the US press is the widespread existence of "political repression." It is not uncommon to find detailed and often lurid tales purportedly illustrating the authoritarian regime imposed by FRELIMO. "Talk of human dignity in Mozambique will get you a rifle butt upside the head and an all expense paid vacation in that rather nasty Marxist nation's reeducation camps." (Philadelphia Inquirer, May 6, 1976). Dial Torgenson of the Los Angeles Times, who has extensively written about what he terms the breakdown of Mozambican law and the capricious nature of the new regime, reiterated this theme: "Technically, the legal system left over from the days of Portuguese rule still applies. But on
the street level, what applies is what
the Portuguese called Kalashnikov's
law—so named for the Russian-de-
dsigned weapons carried by soldiers
who man the roadblocks and make
arrests" (February 11, 1976).

Special attention has also been given
to the reeducation centers, dubbed
"concentration camps" by the Western
press. Unverified reports in a variety
of American publications claim that as
many as 75,000 have been incarcerated.
An article in the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor noted that "the refugees'
stories tell of the regime's increasing
ferocity, where summary arrests for
anything from being late to work to not
carrying the correct identification can
send a person to prison or to labor
camps" (May 7, 1976). This "Siberian"
image surfaced again in Newsweek,
which claimed that FRELIMO compen-
sated for its lack of leadership and
popular support by packing off "thou-
sands of Mozambicans to reeducation
centers where Machel's brand of
Marxism is taught with a heavy and
punishment that underlies and compounds
troubles and the economic deteriora-
tion that Mr. Machel introduced
shortly after taking office. Land was
promised to key Portuguese owners"
(July 25, 1976).

The reputed repression, racism and
economic turmoil has, predictably,
created a groundswell of opposition to
FRELIMO, according to the US
press. Periodic, but unconfirmed,
reports that Tanzanian and Somalian
troops were being used to put down
internal opposition in northern Mo-
zambique have appeared in the Ameri-
can press. As proof of internal dissen-
sion the New York Times repro-
duced extracts of a staged interview at
a Salisbury prison in which several
Mozambican dissidents claimed that
Rhodesian forces "are welcomed as
liberation from the rule of that coun-
try's Marxist government" (June 9,
1977).

Reverse Racism?

Linked to these unsubstantial
charges of massive political repression
are claims that it is Europeans who are
particularly vulnerable and arrested
in numbers grossly disproportionate
to their percentage in the population
While acknowledging that such a racist
policy is explicitly forbidden in the
Mozambican constitution and is in-
consistent with FRELIMO pronounce-
ments since independence, reporter
Torgenson nevertheless asserts that
President Machel "seeking support
from the African majority... now
attacks whites, Asians, and mixed-
blood Africans in his speeches and
allows them to be harassed and ar-
rrested seemingly at will" (Los Ange-
les Times, January 1, 1976). For those
who might be fooled by the presence of
Europeans at the highest levels of gov-
ernment, including three ministers,
reporter Tom Lambert alleges it is
common knowledge that "the white
ministers are ultra-leftists with no par-
ticular affection for their race" (Wash-
ington Post, September 24, 1975). The
ultimate result of this anti-white cam-
paign, it is asserted in all such ac-
counts, has been the mass exodus of
Portuguese from Mozambique.

The outflow of whites is also
advanced as the primary reason for Mo-
zambique's faltering economy. Rarely
do Western reports acknowledge that the
underlying causes of this poverty
are deeply rooted in 400 years of colo-
nial exploitation. Instead, reverse rac-
ism and socialism become the culprits.

In the latter vein, John Burns of the
New York Times noted: "Many of the
troubles and the economic deteriora-
tion that underlies and compounds
them can be traced to the doctrinaire
policies that Mr. Machel introduced
shortly after taking office. Land was
nationalized, and unwilling peasants
were coerced into collective farming.
The state took over key industries and
utilities, without the compensations

Purges Alleged

The alleged divisions within Mo-
zambique are also said to be reflected
within FRELIMO itself. Purges, in-
trigue and violent retribution against
those who are deemed disloyal pur-
portedly characterize the chaotic poli-
tical process. While it is true that there
have been some expulsions for corrup-
tion and abuse of power, these efforts
to make government more responsive
do not warrant the sensational charges
of influential columnist Robin Wright
that "almost daily new lists are re-
leased with the names of people ex-
pelled from FRELIMO" (Christian
Science Monitor, April 20, 1976). The
most startling assertion appeared in an
article written by John Burns for the
New York Times and International
Herald Tribune. He claimed that a
deep rift existed between President
Machel and Interior Minister Gu-
bueza, that the latter tried to assassi-
nate Machel, and that Gubueza was
badly wounded in the abortive coup.
These events were supposed to have
occurred at a Central Committee
meeting, on a day when the Central
Committee was not in session and
Gubueza was out of the country.

In addition to uncritically accepting
and popularizing these fabrications
about life in Mozambique, the press
continually depicts Mozambique as a
"pawn" of either the Soviet Union or
China. American journalists, employ-
ing the rhetoric of the Cold War era,
frequently speculate on which of the
super-powers will ultimately swallow the country whole.

The Soviet presence, according to one version, includes air and naval bases along the strategic Indian Ocean coastline (Washington Star, October 13, 1976), a fact disputed by Western diplomats who have visited the area. Reports of several thousand Cuban troops, in Mozambique as proxies for the Russians and backed by sophisticated weaponry, have also been discredited.

The country whole.

Super-powers will ultimately swallow the country whole.

Western reporters have written so indignantly? Writes the English journalist, David Martin:

At least 3,000 persons have been sent to political reeducation camps. They include drug addicts, pushers, prostitutes and pimps, petty thieves and fences. . . . Those who need it are given medical treatment. All are given the taste and habit of productive work including building their own camp and growing their own food. There is no discrimination about who is sent for reeducation. Some of the inmates are white and inevitably that has brought an outcry from the Portuguese and other whites who have remained here and are not used to being treated the same as blacks (Africa, February 1977).

A Swedish sociologist, one of the few foreigners to visit a reeducation camp, presented a similar picture. "Men without families, employment, aspiration, drop-outs for whom no cure is available in our own society, are here gradually brought back to social life through progressive methods of group work, shared responsibility, discussion, education and the collective improvement of their living conditions" (Washington Post, April 9, 1976).

I recall the sense of surprise and disbelief when colleagues and I inadvertently walked into a makeshift prison (which was also an historical monument in northern Mozambique last summer). None of the guards carried rifles. The prisoners were engaged in small group discussions, and the only weapon in sight was a hatchet being used by a prisoner to chop wood. These detainees, we subsequently heard, were former soldiers involved in an abortive coup. Perhaps we should not have been so surprised, since Mozambique is the first country in Africa to have abolished the death penalty. Certainly we would be hard pressed to find a similar scene in an American prison.

Irrational Panic

Rather than brutal repression, it was deep-rooted anxieties, reinforced by unfounded rumors of retribution, which primarily precipitated the large-scale migration of Portuguese. Noted David Martin: "Since FRELIMO nationalized rented buildings in February there have been whispers that Machel is about to nationalize children, wives and bank accounts. Incredibly, some of these rumors have
been printed and broadcast abroad, and panicked the white community here into exodus" (Washington Post, April 9, 1976).

Nicholas Ashford of The Times filed a similar account on October 5, 1976: Today many of these cement buildings are empty, abandoned by their Portuguese owners who fled to Lisbon or Brazil rather than face the future under the FRELIMO government. Some left for ideological reasons, some because they were harassed, many because they could not face being governed by people whom they considered inferior. But most departed because an irrational panic appeared to overcome the white community once the exodus began.

Anxieties of this sort were expressed to me last summer not only by Portuguese but by mulattoes and Africans who, after living in relative privilege during the colonial period, had become disenchanted because the socialist goals of FRELIMO jeopardized their social position.

Thus, two rather different pictures of contemporary Mozambique emerge—one based primarily on secondary accounts, rumors and Rhodesian and South African propaganda, and the other based primarily on personal observations. Sadly, it is the former which has carried the day. As in the case of Vietnam and Cuba, the American press—with such noticeable exceptions as the Washington Post which has published conflicting accounts—has selectively reproduced images of Mozambique that bear little relationship to reality.

Propaganda Campaign

Such gross distortions both conform to and complement the extensive propaganda campaign being waged in this country by the minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa and their right-wing American allies (such as the American Heritage Foundation).

The effect of this campaign is to redefine the legitimate struggle for majority rule and self-determination in Southern Africa in global Cold War terms. The white minority governments become defenders of Western interests against communist-backed terrorists, who use Mozambique, "pawn" of the Soviet Union, as their base of operations.

Thus, public opinion is manipulated to support American alliances, both covert and overt, with a dying colonialism and to resist efforts to improve relations with Mozambique, Angola and the future majority governments in Zimbabwe, and Namibia who, it is claimed, will pursue an anti-Western policy as Mozambique reportedly has. Herein lies the roots of yet another self-fulfilling prophecy, of which the Crane amendment is the earliest expression.

U.S. Aid Examined: The Cambodian Experience

Readers of Southern Africa may be surprised to find an article on US aid to Cambodia in our pages this month. We have broken the long-standing tradition of only writing about events in Africa, and in southern Africa in particular, because we think the issues raised in this article deserve serious attention. The questions dealt with will confront policy makers in Africa with increasing frequency in the coming period. As the conflict on that continent shifts from a war against open colonial rule to the far more complex struggle against neo-colonial domination, new imperial strategies will inevitably be brought into operation. One such strategy likely to be heavily used, is "capture by kindness"—or the use of aid.

This approach, while relatively new in Washington's armory, has been widely used by the US in Latin America and South East Asia. The recent US/British proposal to establish a Zimbabwe Development Fund provides a dramatic example of the extension of this technique to southern Africa. We believe it may be useful for those whose primary concern is Africa, to have access to the experience of others in similar circumstances.

It would be arrogant to suggest that no country should at any time take any aid from the US, Japan, or the industrialized countries of Western Europe. But recent history indicates that countries accepting such aid will need to examine the "gift" very carefully—a few sharp tugs may reveal the pelt of a wolf underneath the lambskin surface.

by George Hildebrand

Since the collapse of its wars in South East Asia, the United States has extended to developing countries has dropped its gun and now holds out offers of aid and assistance. Many countries seem tempted to grasp that hand firmly—hoping perhaps to "dance with Vance" into a rosy future paid for by US aid. How realistic is that hope?

A definitive answer may have to await an exhaustive analysis of the Carter administration and what it represents. Yet even a cursory examination of US aid policies in one Asian country, Cambodia, is sufficient to establish that in that particular case such assistance has been at best irrelevant and for the most part pernicious.

Nearly two and a quarter billion dollars was channeled to Cambodia between 1953 and 1975. Much of this staggering sum was consumed in the five-year war that killed 800,000 Cambodians (out of seven million) and wounded or crippled another 400,000. In that framework it might seem macabre to criticize US aid programs for failing to contribute to Cambodian development. But as approximately 40% of the money was ostensibly earmarked for economic assistance it is in fact relevant to examine the impact of the aid.

Aid to Sihanouk

During the Sihanouk era of the fifties and early sixties Cambodia had two overriding objectives: the preservation of national independence and the establishment of the foundations of economic development. The maintenance of independence required the
adoption of a genuinely neutral stand in the East/West Cold War. Economic development seemed to demand state initiatives and some national planning.

The Eisenhower Administration viewed both these Cambodian priorities with hostility. Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in Manila in 1954. This alliance included Cambodia's antagonistic neighbor, the Thai military dictatorship, and extended its protective "umbrella" over the developing reactionary Ngo Dinh Diem regime in Saigon. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles denounced neutralism as "immoral," and, with his brother, CIA-chief Allen Dulles, repeatedly attempted to cajole or coerce Sihanouk into subscribing to the Manila Pact.

Sihanouk resisted these pressures, accepting US aid but balancing it by a visit to the People's Republic of China. But by 1958 a full-scale crisis had arisen; Diem's forces seized territory on the Cambodian side of the frontier, and Thai soldiers occupied an area on the northern frontier, that was subse-

sequently adjudged Cambodian by the World Court.

In this crisis the US informed Sihanouk that US military aid could only be employed against "Communist aggressors," admonishing him not even to use US-provided trucks for troop transport. He was further warned that any recourse to the socialist bloc would result in the automatic termination of US aid. According to US Ambassador Carl Strom, such an aid cut-off was actively being studied in Washington. Its purpose was to incite right-wing elements to oust the Prince, exactly as the pro-US General Phoumi Nosavan had overthrown Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma a short time before in Laos, following the suspension of US aid. Thus, US military assistance not only failed to preserve Cambodian independence, but was in fact deliberately used as a means of threatening it.

Agriculture in Trouble

In the realm of economic development, Cambodia's primary problem was the extreme under-productivity of agriculture, by which most Cambodians lived. Rice yields still ran at a low one ton per hectare. Besides lacking fertilizer and modern implements, Cambodia's peasants relied almost exclusively on monsoon rains, and were, in terms of rice production, effectively idled nearly 250 days a year. (Chinese travelers at the end of the Thirteenth Century reported that the extensive irrigation works of the Angkor Empire permitted the production of three and four rice crops a year.)

US aid programs listed irrigation projects as a priority, and US funds restored the Baray Occidental, the enormous western reservoir at Angkor. Yet no great improvement in rice production ensued, largely, in the view of one IMF economist familiar with the region, because of the failure to develop programs which would provide the peasants with access to the improved water supply. Most peasants did not have the money necessary to build even the most simple irrigation works. Existing social relations had saddled the peasants with a crushing burden of debt; they were the victims of exorbitant landlords, moneylenders, etc. But no US support was allocated to break the structural barriers which prevented the peasant from increasing production.

Yet twenty-five or thirty millions—in 1950s dollars—poured into Cambodia each year. Where did it all go?

Building A Capitalist Sector

For political reasons the US refused to foster the state economic institutions designed to implement Prince Sihanouk's "Buddhist socialism." Much of the money was directed towards entrepreneurs from the small but growing capitalist sector in order to finance the importation of US-made goods. These goods were selected for their profitability in terms of elite consumption, without regard for the priorities of national development planning. Moreover, the US State Department at the same time held the Cambodian government liable for defaulting importers.

US aid thus failed to contribute substantially to Cambodia's development, especially insofar as the great, rural-based, majority of the population was concerned. Secondly, US aid served to intensify the country's dependent relationship with the producing countries of the First World, without ever earning sufficient capital from the rice and rubber exports to finance a development program. As Khieu Samphan—today president of the State Council—analyzed it in his 1959 thesis, Cambodia became "part of a whole whose center is outside the country, rather than part of a homogeneous national whole." Thirdly, to cite Prince Sihanouk's sober reflections upon the matter in 1971, "within a couple of years the United States has created a powerful internal lobby in our country, a political fifth column working to
Within a couple of years the United States had created a powerful internal lobby in our country, a political fifth column...
receive between 1.3 and 2 lbs. of rice per day, as well as substantial meat rations, a significant improvement over pre-war consumption patterns. After a tour last November, Tanzania's ambassador declared "This is a great lesson for all of us in the developing countries. Food—I repeat, food—is the key to development."

These achievements have been won not through US AID-style "green revolutions," and imported pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and gasoline-consuming farm machinery, but by peasants in every village (village) improving conditions locally with the means at hand. Cambodia is not universally opposed to foreign assistance. It has accepted aid where it feels no adverse political strings are attached. But in the main it is Cambodia's peasants who are bringing about the country's development—building 500 ton ships entirely from abandoned US gasoline drums and constructing rice-hulling machines fuelled by rice-hulls, or devising fertilizers that utilize nutrient-rich ant-hill earth and natural insecticides derived from local poisonous plants.

Cambodia confronts many of the same conditions faced by African nations—little technology, low productivity, high illiteracy, endemic disease and poor rural health. The Cambodian example demonstrates that even a very small country can progress economically without US aid—in fact, in spite of two decades of its influence. Cambodia's progress, of course, rests on a political foundation, the mobilization of the people behind ideas that free popular energy to expand production. As Cambodia's United Nations delegation chief Thiounn Prasith remarked in the fall of 1975, "When a people is awakened by political consciousness, they can do anything."

Zaire: The U.S.-Belgian-French Connection

by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban

The rebellion by the Congolese National Liberation Front (FLNC) in Zaire's Shaba province has apparently been quelled, but not without posing a serious threat to the Mobutu dictatorship and establishing the FLNC as a major force to be reckoned with in Zairian politics.

The Zairian army, consisting of 65,000 soldiers, proved to be a weak, undisciplined force. Mass desertions from the Zaire army were reported during the fighting, and confirmed by western diplomats and journalists in Zaire. Estimates of the FLNC strength range from 1000 to 10,000. The discrepancy in these figures reflects a relative ignorance in the west about the FLNC, as well as the large number of recruits who joined the Front after sections of Shaba province were liberated. The FLNC was initially successful in beating back the Zairian army until considerable reinforcements were brought in from the outside to aid Mobutu.

'Rescue' Committee

The major powers behind the rescue were the US and France, with their political underlings, South Africa and Morocco, playing key roles. Egypt, Sudan and Uganda played minor roles. Although African and western diplomatic sources uniformly agreed that there was no evidence of outside support to the FLNC, Mobutu claimed that Cuban and Russian as well as Portuguese troops were fighting with the FLNC.

In March, as the military situation in Shaba province was deteriorating, Belgium called a secret meeting of Belgian, French and American officials. The Belgian government was alarmed that Mobutu's family had already fled to Switzerland and that Mobutu himself had reportedly "already packed his bags."

The first discussions centered on a replacement for Mobutu, a "moderate nationalist" in their terms. Salvaging the Mobutu government was next discussed, and the necessity of direct western intervention was favored by Belgium, France and West Germany. South African, Rhodesian and Israeli officials reportedly pleaded for a prompt military intervention to save Zaire. The smokescreen would be the allegation of a Soviet-Cuban-Angolan invasion of Zaire. At this juncture only the US hesitated to endorse the plan.

Instead of troops, the US responded with a total of $13 million in direct aid. In the past two years aid to Zaire has increased from $3.5 million to $32.5 million. There were also reports that the CIA covertly supported efforts to recruit several hundred mercenaries in the US and Britian to fight for Mobutu. David Bulkin, a notorious soldier of fortune and the CIA's key man in the recruitment of mercenaries for Angola, was reported to be in charge.

Hesitation and indecision on the part of the US gave way to approval when a plan to bolster the Zairian army with African troops was suggested. Gabon, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Cameroon, Morocco and Tunisia were suggested by France as possibilities, and Anglo-American neocolonies such as Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana were mentioned.

These nations were contacted, but many responded that they could send only a token force, since openly fighting in support of an unpopular African leader such as Mobutu could prove politically dangerous at home. King Hassan of Morocco, however, responded most strongly in the affirmative and offered up to 10,000 troops. The Shah of Iran also pledged military support if the Moroccan troops proved insufficient to the task.

Intervention

Part of the Brussels agreement seems to have been that France would
take on the most overt role in aiding the Zaire government. France provided the aircraft to ferry Moroccan equipment for the 1500 troops sent to Zaire. There were reports of French advisers with the troops and that other troops were brought in French planes. The Defense Minister in Paris admitted the presence of French military instructors, whom he said were there solely “to instruct the Zaire army in the use of equipment.” It is clear that the Moroccan troops and French military advisers were responsible for turning the tide for the Zaire government and Mobutu.

As soon as intervention had been decided upon, South Africa's BOSS (Bureau of State Security) officials were busy in Kinshasa negotiating emergency aid in fuel and support funds for Mobutu. Zaire normally buys food and medicine from South Africa with South African beef a speciality in Kinshasa market. Zaire is South Africa's strongest ally in central and southern Africa.

A New Strategy

In addition to direct intervention by the Western powers, other international support for Zaire points to a new imperialist strategy for “troubleshooting” in Africa. That strategy is to use neocolonial military assistance and troops to stop progressive movements from coming to power in Africa. The political cover story is that such intervention is necessary to halt Soviet-Cuban expansion on the continent.

Besides Morocco, other African neocolonies that responded to the call for help were Egypt, Sudan and Uganda. Egyptian President Sadat sent an estimated 200 Egyptian pilots and mechanics and one air force colonel. Sophisticated military hardware recently sold to the Sudan by the US was loaned to Zaire for the operations in Shaba. Nigeria also sent supplementary military personnel. President Idi Amin arrived in Kinshasa in April, and before returning home announced that he was ready to assist President Mobutu.

Financial Background

The US is the senior partner in the Euro-American imperialist alliance. While France and Belgium trade more with Zaire, US investments in Zaire are substantial. A conservative estimate of $1.25 billion in 1975 makes Zaire second only to South Africa as a site for US investment in Africa.

Heading the list of US monopolies in Zaire: Gulf Oil, General Motors, Texaco, Mobil Oil, Goodyear, Intercontinental Hotels, Continental Grain, IBM and Singer, along with US copper companies and Westinghouse, US Steel and Morrison-Knudsen. The latter two companies are jointly building 1,050 miles of electric power lines.

Today Zaire’s economy rests on a stack of loans amounting to $2.5 billion, and Zaire’s debt to private lenders stands at $500 million, nearly half of which is owed to US banks. In 1976 the US imported nearly $100 million worth of cobalt, industrial diamonds and other raw materials from Zaire. Exports to Zaire totaled close to $200 million. Since 1962 the US has poured nearly $500 million in economic and military aid into Zaire, making it one of the largest aid recipients in Africa.

A businessman with investments in Zaire was quoted in the New York Times April 4 as saying, “Tell me where else in the world I can write off my entire investment in just six months.” President Carter, in approving the emergency aid to Zaire, said, “Over a period of years President Mobutu has been a good friend of ours. We’ve enjoyed good relations with Zaire. We have substantial commercial investments in that country.”

Zaire is a major supplier of copper to western Europe and accounts for about 15% of copper production outside of the socialist nations, mainly from Shaba province. France has the largest trading concerns in Zaire of the European countries, while Belgium has longstanding colonial and economic ties.

Re-Colonization

The fighting in the copper-rich province of Shaba occurred in the middle of a reconciliation between Belgian business and President Mobutu. A single Belgian company, the Societe Generale de Belgique, is estimated to control 70% of all assets in Zaire that Belgium claims. These interests, once nationalized in 1969 under Mobutu’s “authenticity” or “Zairianization” program, are now being given back to their old owners on increasingly generous terms.

Zaire’s collapsing economy and Mobutu’s unabashed lack of interest in anything but his own personal wealth are responsible for what is essentially the recolonization of Zaire by Belgium, this time with US economic support. Belgians have been asked to run the countries industries, mines and plantations, as well as such key government-owned services as the road, rail and river transport systems—on which the export of copper depends—and the airports.

Conditions in the country are deteriorating, making this potentially rich nation one of the most backward, with one of the lowest standards of living for its people. In the old days Zaire exported palm oil and other agricultural crops, now it must import them. While Mobutu owns 11 palatial residences in the country, the people of Kinshasa can barely afford the price of a 10 lb. bag of flour. A 40-mile superhighway extends from Kinshasa to one of Mobutu’s palaces while the country’s antiquated railway system cannot accommodate the export of copper. As the Peace Corps/Zaire Evaluation Program, of 1976, put it, “Whatever Zaire has become today, both politically and economically, the US assumes a large share of the responsibility.”
Two South African Trials:

Introduction

The following personal report was written by Martin Garbus, an observer representing the International League for Human Rights at two of the current political trials: the Pretoria African National Congress trial and the trial of Breyten Breytenbach, the Afrikaans poet.

The twelve accused in the ANC trial, the most significant in many years, are charged under the Terrorism Act for various activities including secretly taking people out of the country, or recruiting people, for military training; smuggling arms into South Africa; trying to establish an underground organization with secret cells and arsenals; distributing propaganda material; undergoing military training in Russia and China; giving instructions in manufacturing explosives and the use of firearms; the throwing of a hand grenade at a police vehicle and injuring two policemen, and the blowing up of a section of railway line.

The accused are: Morima Sexwale (24), Naledi Tsiki (21), Lele Motuang (44), Simon Mohlanyaneng (23), Elias Masinga (24), Martin Ramokgadi (67), Joe Cqabi (48), Petrus Mchabaleng (50), Nelson Diale (41), Michael Nkubeni (42), Jacob Seathloho (47), and Pauline Mohale (26)

Throughout the trial, the accused were referred to by number rather than by name. Recent reports indicate that nine of the accused have been convicted; sentences were not published. It is not known who they are or what the fate of the other three is.

This is Breyten Breytenbach's second trial, in which the State alleged that he had tried to recruit a prison warder, who acted as the State's main witness, for Okhela (a white underground organization) and to help him escape from the maximum security section of the Pretoria Central Prison.

Breytenbach pleaded not guilty to the charges but admitted that 40 notes and letters which were handed in as exhibits were written by him. Some of these notes were in a code which the South Africans were unable to break. It was reported in the South African press that the coded messages were sent to the United States to be deciphered. Although the US was unsuccessful in its attempt to get to the level of cooperation between the two countries.

To the surprise of those following the trial, Breytenbach was acquitted on July 15. He now continues to serve his original nine year sentence, and has been released from solitary confinement.

Why he was suddenly acquitted when the State appeared to have had a weight of evidence against him is puzzling. It could be due to the fact that he is widely known as a poet and artist and hence had considerable international support. It could also be due to the fact that unlike other Afrikaners who rejected the politics of the South African government, he has not in addition rejected Afrikaner culture. Instead, he is a leading contributor to it. As such, he identifies both with Afrikaner culture and with the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Because of his success as an Afrikaans writer, he cannot easily be rejected as an Afrikaner. Therefore, the potential exists for those Afrikaners who respect his work to also be influenced by his politics. His acquittal helps to weaken him as a political figure and to defuse international pressure for his release.

Increase in Political Trials

There has been an increase in the number of "terrorism" trials, a reflection of the growing black unrest and escalating mobilization for armed resistance. Some of those which have taken place since the 1976 uprisings are:

- The "Pietermaritzburg 10" who are accused of running a "terrorist recruitment ring" to send recruits through Swaziland for guerrilla training. Two of the accused claim that they were kidnapped by Security Police agents from Swaziland. The judge ruled that that was irrelevant to their case. The State's key witness, Mr. Harold Nxasana, told the court that after he had been detained for 17 months, he no longer knew which part of his evidence was true and which part had been suggested to him by the Security Police.

- Sibussiso Ndebele and three others are on trial in Randburg, charged with arranging for people to travel to Swaziland for guerrilla training.

- Stanley Nkosi and Petrus Mothlanthe were convicted of ANC activity associated with publications and explosives and were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

- Two men and one woman were convicted of furthering the aims of the ANC by distributing ANC pamphlets.

- Steve Biko, honorary president of the Black People's Convention, has been charged with persuading school students to give false evidence in a sabotage case so as to secure the release of those charged with burning a secondary school.

- Walter Tshikili, Joseph Madyo and Penrose Mduwanda were sentenced in Grahamstown under the Terrorism Act to five years imprisonment for participating in Pan African Congress activities.

On July 19, a mass trial began of 143 school students who were involved in the school demonstrations around South Africa earlier this year.

The number of prisoners on Robben Island (a political prison near Cape Town) has increased by over 50%, from 253 to 383, since the beginning of 1976.
An Observer’s Report

by Martin Garbus

Two of the most important trials in Africa’s history were tried in June and July in Pretoria. One of Africa’s past, the other of its future. Each trial was very different yet they both told the same story: opposition by both whites and blacks to apartheid is brutally punished by the South African Government.

First, in the Palace of Justice, the trial of Breyten Breytenbach, 37, one of the leading Afrikaner poets, was the State’s attempt to finally crush whatever liberal white views still exist. Breytenbach, married to a Vietnamese woman, was not allowed to live with her in South Africa. This was Breytenbach’s second trial. Convicted in 1975 under the Terrorism Act and given a nine year sentence, Breytenbach would under the law be eligible for release after three years. Instead, the South African Government, vindictive because he was one of theirs, threw him into solitary confinement for two years, telling him he would have to serve the full nine years of his sentence and threatening him with serving it all in the most brutal kind of solitary imaginable.

The State was seeking the death sentence. Breytenbach, admitting the escape attempt, tried, in mitigation, to describe what drove him to it. Deliberately kept next to the death cell for the full two years, where each month a dozen black Africans wait to be hanged, he heard the prisoners singing as they walked to the gallows during his two years. The wardens made a point of telling how, even in their last moments, blacks were discriminated against. If a white man were hanged, he would get a new rope, but for the blacks, the same ropes were used over and over again, even though many of them were full of vomit and saliva from the hangings before. He saw the wardens wash their hands after each hanging as if it were a job well done and only Breytenbach, of all the prisoners in the jail, was ordered to wear the prison clothes of the men who just died.

The defense tried to show that Breytenbach was given a special vicious kind of treatment, previously reserved only for blacks. The South African Government had tried to break Robert Sobukwe, a black, by holding him nine years in solitary confinement—and they succeeded. Breytenbach was given the same treatment. No warden or policeman was permitted to talk to him—no reading materials furnished to him. He spent 23½ hours per day in his lightless cell and when he took his half hour exercise, he took it alone—away from all the other prisoners.

ANC Trial

In the second trial, the government also sought the maximum penalty. Twelve blacks, members of the African National Congress and, according to the government, some of them trained in Russia and China, were charged with terrorism. Held two blocks away from Breytenbach’s trial, heavily armed police and army surrounded the building and sat in the courtroom during the trial.

The State’s first witness, Ian Deway Rwaxa—the key witness—after testifying for four days on direct—linking each of the defendants to Russia, China, telling of bombing and killing, recanted. He said his testimony was false and beaten out of him.

Mr. Rwaxa, in his dramatic turn-about in open court, described what happened to him. After testifying for four days in his native Xhosa, he asked if he could address the court in English. He described the lot of potential black witnesses in South African jails—three months in total solitary—away from his family, friends and even police—then taken to see his son, given money by the police to give to the child and told, that if he cooperated, he would get more money for his son. He understood if he did not cooperate, he would never see the child again. The next three months he saw the police every day. But they kept asking him for more and more facts. Beaten on a daily basis, he was strangled, suffocated, tortured and kept naked in the cold cell.

After Rwaxa recanted, the judge advised, as the law required, that because Rwaxa changed his testimony, he could be charged with perjury. I asked one of the lawyers whether that was likely. He smiled softly and said “No, I don’t think he will be charged. I don’t think he’ll ever see a courtroom again. I don’t think we’ll ever see him alive. Remember, he remains with the police and he now can be charged as an accomplice but that won’t happen either. It took enormous courage for him to do what he did. He knows he may never be seen again.” And the trial moved on.

Comparisons

Perhaps the most significant fact concerning these trials was not the testimony but the way it pointed out the distance between the black and white communities. In two weeks, there was not one black spectator at the Breytenbach trial. There was only one white spectator amongst the 200 black spectators at the ANC trial. White liberals and radicals told me what I could see—there was no longer any contact between them and blacks of any political stripe.

Other comparisons. The Breytenbach courtroom, populated by some white students and some of Breytenbach’s friends, had a funereal air. A good portion of the audience were probably police. Very few university faculty. The sparse attendance was understandable. Every courtroom visitor was photographed and some day when he applies for a job or passport, he may be confronted with this traffic. Each day, the audience filed in quietly, sat quietly and heard the testimony.

The ANC trial was another matter. It reminded me of trials in the American south in the ‘60s. The spectators hung on each word—reacted to each

Martin Garbus is a New York attorney who has been active in the civil rights and civil liberties movement in the United States. He has previously been an observer of political trials abroad in Spain, Chile, India and Bangladesh.
answer. At lunch and at the end of each day's court session, the defendants, lifting their hands in black power salutes, shouted "amandla" (power). The audience answered "awetu" (to us). It often became noisy to the point of provocation.

Breytenbach left court each day unobserved in a van. At the end of each court day, the ANC prisoners were removed in a van that—as it drove through the street—became surrounded by hundreds of black spectators. Each day, the blacks sang freedom songs and cheered the defendants.

Guards with machine guns and a dozen Alsatian dogs trained only to attack blacks, kept pushing the crowd back hoping to provoke an incident. The hatred of the white community, seen not only in the eyes of the police but also the shopkeepers across the street, was palpable.

As the prisoners drove off in the van, they poked their hands through the holes giving the black power salute. At that point, on two separate days, the dogs were allowed to bite at the nearest black.

The Breytenbach and ANC trials are "show" trials. Commencing on the first anniversary of the Soweto riots of last year, they are designed to show the government’s continued firmness. More arrests and trials will follow.

Students demonstrating at memorial for those slain in last year's uprising

Students taking to the streets in South Africa's Black townships is almost a commonplace event now. But this has been accompanied by a significant solidification of the student resistance movement in the year since the brutal police response to the first peaceful protests in Soweto triggered the student uprising.

Large contingents of militant Black students held protests in white downtown areas of Johannesburg and Pretoria in June. Students have taken up community-related issues such as the township rent increases the government proposed in June.

The ideological acceptability of “moderate” Black political figures has been undermined by the students' well-planned and courageous acts of defiance. Furthermore, politically motivated, small-scale armed actions and incidents of sabotage, many claimed by Umkhonto We Sizwe, the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC), indicate the re-emergence of an armed underground as a factor in South African political life.

As the prisoners drove off in the van, they poked their hands through the holes giving the black power salute. At that point, on two separate days, the dogs were allowed to bite at the nearest black.

The Breytenbach and ANC trials are "show" trials. Commencing on the first anniversary of the Soweto riots of last year, they are designed to show the government’s continued firmness. More arrests and trials will follow. 

Student Power in Soweto

A campaign to end Bantu education, "education for slavery" as the students characterize it, remains an immediate focus for the South African student movement. Another objective is the release of hundreds of students detained in the government campaign to repress student militancy.

The Soweto Student Representatives Council (SSRC) established during last year's uprisings, has emerged as a significant force in Soweto's political life. The most recent examples of their authority within the Soweto community were the issue of Soweto's Urban Bantu Council (UBC) and the activities called to commemorate those who died in last year's June 16 massacre.

Campaign Against UBC

The Soweto UBC, like those in other Black townships, was comprised of government-appointed officials and other Black figures acceptable to the South African government. In the 1974 elections for the UBC, only 14% of the eligible voters went to the polls. Known in the townships as the Useless Boys' Clubs, the Soweto Council generally held its meetings without a quorum present. A fourth of its membership had already resigned since last June.

Although the UBC exercised little real power, it became a target of the SSRC because they had the false appearance of being a representative body, and furthermore encouraged the coalescing of a conservative Black political grouping potentially capable of challenging radical, popular-based leadership in the townships.

Following the government's announcement of its intention to raise rents 40-80 percent for the inadequate government-supplied housing of the township, the students marched on the UBC offices. They charged it with complicity with the government and demanded their resignation. The township population solidly opposed the proposed increase and the UBC was forced to present this position to continued on page 21
SOUTHERN AFRICA magazine still needs your support

The May issue of Southern Africa carried a plea to our readers. The magazine had hit a low point in its finances, and we were unsure of its continued existence. With the help of a few grants and donations from our readers, we have been able—unfortunately temporarily—to delay the crisis.

However, the threat to our existence has not been averted. We continue to need support. If you believe, like we do that the magazine is now more vital than ever to get out information about southern Africa and the US involvement in that area, LET US HEAR FROM YOU! Become a year’s sustainer for $25 to $50.

The response from our readers to the appeal has been heartening. All who responded, did so generously. Some of our readers showed imagination in providing support where direct funds have not been possible. THANK YOU!

A Vitória é Certa!

☐ I want to be a Sustainer
   I enclose $______

☐ I enclose a donation of $______

☐ Send a gift subscription to:

Name __________________________
Address __________________________
_________________________ Zip ______

Gift subscription from:
Name __________________________
Address __________________________
_________________________ Zip ______

Name __________________________
Address __________________________
_________________________ Zip ______

Name __________________________
Address __________________________
_________________________ Zip ______

Name __________________________
Address __________________________
_________________________ Zip ______

Name __________________________
Address __________________________
_________________________ Zip ______

Name __________________________
Address __________________________
_________________________ Zip ______

AUGUST 1977/SOUTHERN AFRICA 17
SOUTH AFRICA's balance of payments for the first five months of 1977 showed a surplus in the current account for the first time in four years. The figures, which do not include exports of gold or imports of oil and military equipment, show that the total value of exports for January to May was R2.21 billion while that of imports was R2.10 billion. Restrictions on luxury imports and increased mineral exports owing to new harbor facilities at Richards Bay and Saldanha Bay were cited as major factors in the turnaround.

A South African research agency calculated that between 1973 and 1975, white per capita monthly income rose 19% to R182. For the same period, Indian income rose 67% to R50; coloured income 52% to R35; and African income 32% to R12.50. While Africans enjoyed a higher percentage rise, the gap between white and African earnings continued to grow, reaching R169.50 in 1975 compared with R143.50 in 1973. [note: $1.00 US = R1.15]

National income was divided as follows: whites, 67%; Africans, 23%; coloureds, 7% and Indians, 3%. Government figures show that whites currently make up 13% of the population, Africans 72%, coloureds 9% and Indians 3%.

The vast majority of black families, however, remain substantially below the poverty line.

By way of comparison, in UK the wealthiest 15% of the population (comparable to South Africa's whites) receive about 35% of total income. In France, the top 15% receive 47% of total income.

In other economic news . . .

- The South African Commerce Department reported that between 1966-1976, exports to other parts of Africa rose more than 130% to R453 million, while imports from the rest of Africa rose 141% to R312.
- The South African Reserve Bank concluded a "gold swap" in May which involved three million ounces (almost a quarter of its total holdings). Neither the price nor the identity of the other participating party was revealed, but according to the Financial Mail, it's likely it was a group of Swiss banks which participated in a similar transaction last year involving five million ounces.
- The swaps are actually mortgages intended to cover deficits in South Africa's balance of payments.
- The government has proposed making "economic sabotage" a crime against state security. A government spokesman on security matters suggested that not only communists but "liberals" should be regarded as a threat to state security.
- ITT announced it would sell its South African subsidiary in an exchange of shares which would give ITT a minority position in Allied Technologies, a South African-owned firm. The action follows a similar move by Chrysler a few months ago involving Anglo-American Corp.

Best Western of America, another US corporation, announced it has formed a South African subsidiary of its motel chain.

Twenty-one more US companies operating in South Africa have endorsed a statement of Six Principles they describe as aimed at ending segregation and promoting fair employment in South Africa. The firms include Pfizer Inc., Eastman Kodak, Gillette, and CPC International. Twelve major firms originally endorsed the Six Principles last March. At the time the American Committee on Africa attacked the statement as essentially meaningless and noted that the firms' action had been lauded by the white minority regime.

Ten major black groups representing teachers, students, trade unionists and other activists announced that they have agreed to mobilize all black people in Azania to demonstrate in no uncertain terms their rejection of Bantustan independence." The announcement followed a July 16 meeting held near Pretoria.

In a related action, police broke up a crowd of young blacks demonstrating in the town of Ikaheng against Chief Lucas Mangope, Prime Minister of Bophuthatswana, which is scheduled to become "independent" on December 6.

The first small firearm to be fully manufactured in South Africa, a semi-automatic stainless steel pistol called the Mamba, is expected to be on sale about August 1. It was designed by two Rhodesians.

Some 8,578 people left South Africa in the first four months of this year, the highest figure for any quarter since record-keeping started in 1924. Immigration has been halved and emigration has more than doubled in the 12 months since the Soweto uprisings. Britain draws the most emigrants, followed by the US, Canada and Australia.

A new white political party, which bills itself as a 'centrist force,' has been formed from the old United Party and the Democratic Party, which together won 31% of the vote in 1974. The UP, by far the larger of the two, lost power to the National Party in 1948. The other major white political group is the liberal Progressive Reform Party.

South Africa has been voted off the governing council of the International Atomic Energy Agency and will be replaced by Egypt. Third World countries voted for the expulsion, Western countries against, and Japan abstained at a June meeting in Vienna.
As of March 25, 471 persons were believed to be held in detention. Among them, 107 have been identified as students, 23 as teachers, 16 as associated with the South African Students Organization or the Black People's Convention, five as churchmen and five as journalists. Between January 1, 1976 and March 25, 1977, 366 persons were released from detention without charges having been brought against them after serving a total of 30,314 days. Also during that period, at least 12 detainees are known to have died.

An estimated 50,000 persons who fled from Transkei following independence are living in refugee camps in Ciskei described as appalling. Camp officials say an average of ten children a week are dying.

A number of Transkei students opposed to independence are reported to have fled to Botswana.

THE RHODESIAN FRONT of Ian Smith is in disarray following the breakaway of a right-wing group led by former party chairman Des Frost to form the Rhodesian Action Party. A third white group at present is the Rhodesian Action Movement, comprised of an estimated 3,000 servicemen who proclaim themselves disillusioned with politicians.

The threat Smith faces from his white opponents (which includes the possibility of action by the military) may have been what prompted Smith to agree to the return home of Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, who had been allowed previously to leave the country after being jailed for six years in 1969. A commentary in the London Observer suggests that Smith may be hoping to find in Sithole a black leader willing to aid him in forming an alliance with moderate blacks.

Rhodesia's Gross Domestic Product fell 3.4% in real terms in 1976, following 1.1% decline in 1975, according to an official survey quoted in the Financial Mail. The current year is expected to produce no real growth.

However, a bright spot for the Smith regime was the fact that the country enjoyed a trade surplus of $176 million in 1976, up from $47.6 million in 1975. Exports rose 6% in volume and 10% in value, accompanied by sharp cutbacks in imports.

Despite a sharp drop in foreign capital investment and significant increases in net outflows involving investment income and foreign travel, the country had an overall current and capital accounts surplus of $43.4 million, compared with a deficit of $16.3 million in 1975.

Black unemployment fell to 926,000 in 1976, down from 933,000 a year earlier, the first such fall since 1966. African wages increased an average of 11.2% to $517 a year, but declined fractionally in real terms.

The country's white population fell by 5,000 to 273,000, owing to emigration.

Zimbabwean freedom fighters enjoy widespread support according to Dr. Selwyn Spray, a United Church of Christ missionary doctor who was expelled by white authorities for having given medical advice and supplies to guerrillas. Dr. Spray said in a New York Times interview upon his return in June that during nearly three years in a district near the Mozambique border, "I never found anyone who spoke against the guerrillas." Dr. Spray also said that security forces confiscated a work he was preparing on torture, covering 10 cases he had personally encountered.

A BOTSWANA court found a black member of the Rhodesian security force's Selous Scouts guilty of kidnapping four Botswanans into Rhodesia. The four were subsequently detained.

Justice is hardly blind in Rhodesia. Recently one 21-year-old Zimbabwean was given a mandatory nine-year sentence for stealing an ox while two other men were given like sentences for stealing a heifer.

The cases recall one earlier this year in Salisbury in which an employer who pleaded guilty in the death of a 65-year-old employee was fined $300. The magistrate said he did not regard the assault which resulted in the employee's death as serious.

An American mercenary was reported killed in a clash with Zimbabwean guerrilla forces on July 17. He was the second US fatality among an estimated 400 recruits.

Transportation Consultants International, based in Los Angeles, has been named to represent Rhodesia's United Touring Company in North America.

A CUBA's Foreign Minister said in a speech in Lusaka that his country will, if asked, give military help to frontline states and liberation movements. He said such aid could include military personnel, teachers, and economists.

AUGUST 1977/SOUTHERN AFRICA
France and South Africa Set Uranium Deal

France, which has already contracted to sell nuclear reactors to South Africa, now says it has agreed to purchase 1,000 tons of natural uranium from the Johannesburg-based Randfontein Gold Mining Company.

Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires, a subsidiary of the French atomic energy agency, is the signor to the accord. It has agreed to pay a base price of $29 a pound, with an escalating clause covering wide price fluctuations.

The deal is also believed to include a French agreement to extend a major interest-free loan to Randfontein. All sales contracts negotiated by South Africa's Nuclear Fuels Corporation on behalf of mining firms include the loan provision.

Randfontein, which is owned by the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Group, extracts uranium as a byproduct of its gold production. But uranium's importance to the gold firms has increased as the price has risen from about $6 per pound four years ago to $40 per pound today.

South African Project Attracts Citibank

Citibank of New York, the nation's second largest financial institution, has agreed to loan $60 million to a new copper - lead - zinc - silver project in South Africa's Cape Province.

The loan is destined for Gold Fields of South Africa, and is apparently guaranteed by the South African firm's London parent, Consolidated Gold Fields.

Phelps Dodge, a large US copper firm, already has about $35 million invested in the mining property, which it has owned since 1970. In May, however, Phelps sold 51% interest to Gold Fields, a move largely designed to avoid investing additional capital according to a company spokesperson.

The latest Citibank loan comes at a time when US banks and other investors are growing hesitant to put more money into the country because of its serious economic and political problems.

Citibank's willingness to advance the latest loan was reportedly contingent on the guarantee from London-based Consolidated.

South Africans Challenge White Authority

Residents of Johannesburg's sprawling Soweto township last month unanimously accepted a plan to establish their own local government in defiance of apartheid policies.

The proposal was drafted by the "Committee of Ten," a group representing a variety of black organizations, including the Students' Representative Council and the Black People's Convention.

The draft establishes a five-year plan to improve black living conditions by: 1) assuming the power to levy taxes; 2) establishing departments to control education, housing, public works and health; 3) taking control of police functions; and 4) seeking financial aid from the Organization of African Unity, the International Monetary Fund, and other governments and institutions.

The self-government proposal contravenes government policy, which gives Africans no political power except in rural reserves.

Churches Rebuffed In Namibia Mediation

Representatives of Namibia's three largest Protestant denominations last month offered a new set of proposals for a peaceful settlement in South Africa-controlled Namibia.

The church leaders, convinced that the plan put forth by Western powers was doomed to failure, suggested a phased withdrawal of South African troops from the disputed territory, along with the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force and the sharing of administrative authority between South African and UN representatives.

South African officials refused to meet with the church leaders. Western diplomats withheld comment on the new proposals.

A major obstacle to the plan negotiated by Pretoria and the five Western powers is the SWAPO liberation movement's objection to continued South African military presence in the territory. SWAPO maintains that the free elections called for in the settlement scheme will be impossible as long as the country is under the control of the South African military and police.

U.S. Leaves Hands Off Rhodesian Office

Congressional pressure has forced the Carter administration to postpone closure of the Rhodesian Information Office in Washington.

Although the US delegation endorsed a UN Security Council resolution in May which in effect called for closure of all Rhodesian outposts, no action has yet been taken in the United States. Says Kenneth Towsey, director of the Rhodesian office, "We are continuing to fill our information function, and have heard nothing whatsoever from the US administration.

In June, the Senate adopted by voice vote a resolution that declared the "sense of Congress that any foreign country should be allowed to maintain an information office in the United States." In addition, 44 members of the House, including Chairman Ed Derwinski of the International Relations Committee, wrote Secretary of State Cyrus Vance calling closure of the office an "unnecessary measure."

In his reply, Vance defended "our planned implementation of the [UN] resolution," and officials say the office will be shut down.

U.S. Wants Distance From South African Intelligence

US officials are considering a sharp response to the report from Johannesburg that South African agents are working and training in this country. Under study is a public move "to put some distance," in the words of one State Department official, between US intelligence bodies and South Africa's Bureau for State Security (BOSS).

In a banner-headlined article late last month, the Johannesburg Sunday Times reported that "BOSS has admitted for the first time it has undercover agents working in Britain, America, and other countries." The paper also quoted BOSS director Alexander Van Wyck saying the agents were trained in both the US and West Germany.

A month earlier, the paper reported the involvement of American police in trying to crack a code used by a South African political prisoner, poet Breyten Breytenbach.

UPDATE is written by Africa News Service, which also publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for $25 per year. Address correspondence to P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.
continued from page 16
the South African authorities. The government "postponed" the increase.

Community Councils Proposed by Government

The government passed legislation providing for the establishment of Community Councils, which would replace the UBCs. In terms of the act, the administrative responsibilities of the Councils for community authority, mainly for dispensing the meager resources allocated to the townships, would be increased. They would also control the new "community guards," seen as little more than black vigilante groups. These councils would be little more than revised UBCs still operating as puppet councils.

The students continued to press for their resignation, and on May 30, the remainder of the Soweto Council resigned. The government refused to accept their resignation, questioning the legality of the form on which the resignations were submitted.

David Thebeha-li, chairman of the UBC and outspoken proponent of cooperation with the white government claimed that he went along with resignation in an effort to spare council members and the people of Soweto further violence. Black "moderates" have consistently opposed militant actions against the white supremacist system with the argument that "those who die are always the black people." To this the students reply, "We will die if we must."

Following the resignation, the students called upon the residents of Soweto to choose their own form of representation. Sechaba Montsitsi, chairman of the SSRC (since detained), explained that the SSRC "cannot suggest the alternative. The people should be responsible for the establishment of a meaningful and powerful body which might come into being," and once again stated: "We condemn the government-instituted bodies because they capture the minds of unsuspecting blacks and obscure the truth by creating a false impression."

A committee of ten community leaders representing a wide range of Soweto organizations was formed as a preliminary step towards a popularly based council. Predictably the government refused to recognize it on the grounds that no law exists providing for such an organization to operate.

The government-sponsored West Rand Administrative Board tried to revive the UBC and after announcing in the press that the Soweto Council "is alive and well," called a meeting for the end of June. Some of the resigned council members attended but it was a short-lived victory for the Board as the meeting turned down the Community Council proposal presented for ratification. It is clearly becoming increasingly difficult for moderate black political figures to continue to press for compromises with apartheid.

SSRC Takes Initiative For Anniversary Activities

The SSRC called a week of commemorative activities in June for the victims of the first Soweto uprising. Deferring to the students' announcement, the All-Race Football Council for South Africa postponed a major soccer match between Rhodesian and South African teams to have been held in Salisbury. A scheduled religious commemoration was cancelled so as not to conflict with student plans which were regarded as the "official" activities of the period.

Soweto's shops, schools, and beer halls remained closed on June 16 and 17. Most significant of all was the breadth of support for the three-day general strike, or "stay away," which depended for its success on the support of Soweto's 320,000 commuting workers. South African authorities stated commuter traffic was 10% of normal on June 16.

Black Students Deny Meeting With Young

In the June/July issue of Southern Africa it was reported that UN Ambassador Andrew Young had met with Sechaba Montsitsi, chairman of the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC) and other black students during his trip to South Africa in May.

Subsequently, however, the Rand Daily Mail (May 24) reported that Sechaba Montsitsi denied that he or other SSRC members had met with Young, though the meeting had reportedly been mentioned by Young himself. The student leader said, "The SSRC categorically rejects reports that its members met and spoke to Mr. Young."

"It was put very well by all black consciousness movements and organizations who have links with students that if Mr. Young is not going to meet the true leaders of the people then there is no reason why he should be met at all."

"We do not regret it if he has been sold a dummy by meeting false SSRC members but we object to our name being dragged in the mud."

Montsitsi added that had a meeting taken place he would have asked Young to work for an end to US investments in South Africa and an arms embargo against the Apartheid regime.

On June 12 the entire leadership of the SSRC including Sechaba Montsitsi was detained and held without trial by the South African police. They remain in detention.

US Mission to the UN aide Tom Offenburger told Southern Africa that Young had met with Black students (at the home of Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation) but insisted that "no names of individuals or organizations were disclosed at the time nor could he now." It is known that great efforts were made during Young's trip to arrange to meet Black student and Black consciousness (the Black Peoples Convention) leaders and that Black consciousness groups refused to meet him. They said he should meet the true leaders, those like Nelson Mandela, held in prison.

Asked to comment on the detention of the Soweto student leaders following Young's visit Offenburger stated that "It would not be useful to comment on that specifically. We are opposed to the South African government's policies and their rounding up of opponents of Apartheid."

It is ironic that US policy, which Ambassador Young has helped focus on human rights and the goal of peaceful change in South Africa (to head off the radical fight for liberation) remains immobilized in the face of continuing repression of those who have struggled openly and non-violently for freedom.
The concentrated effort to achieve a ‘settlement’ on the International Territory of Namibia by the United States, Canada and the west European members of the United Nations Security Council has reached fever pitch.

A second round of talks between the five Security Council members and high officials of the South African regime was completed in Cape Town in early June. The full extent of these discussions have not been publicly revealed.

The five—the US, Britain, France, West Germany and Canada—strenuously deny they are engaged in negotiations, and there are no known documents or written agreements. Representatives of the five have made a series of reports to the African Group at the United Nations, the UN Secretary General, the UN Council for Namibia, officers of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia and to groups inside Namibia.

On June 10, at the end of three days of talks, the South African government announced that it would abandon plans to set up the Turnhalle interim regime in Windhoek at the request of the members of the Pretoria-created body. Instead, South Africa would install an “administrator general” for Namibia with virtually absolute powers over the territory, including the preparations for elections.

The Johannesburg Star reported, however, that Don McHenry, head of the Western delegation and number three man at the US Mission to the UN, stated “although the Turnhalle group gave the impression they originated the idea of an administrator general for Namibia, this was only one of a number of possibilities aired in our

April talks with the South African Government.”

SWAPO Rejects Appointment

Legislation was rushed through the South African Parliament by June 15 without opposition. The Southwest Africa Constitution Amendment Act provides for South Africa’s state president to appoint the administrator general. On June 6 Pretoria announced that South African Supreme Court Justice Martinus T. Steyn would assume the post as Namibia’s administrator general.

The students’ militancy has synthesized the South African people’s deep feelings of anger and frustration, swept aside many years of compromise with the racist regime and opened the way towards a revolutionary solution in South Africa.

Namibia

Drive Toward Settlement
posed in talks with the Western envoys, but to date negotiations are still continuing, and the proposal of administrator general was not ratified by the ‘interested parties’... Only the South African Government and the Turnhalle support the proposed administrator general.”

The writer continues: "Should the West be in agreement with Mr. Vorster and the Turnhalle, then they will have failed in gauging the opinion of the ‘interested parties’ in this regard and will furthermore have failed to maintain any objectivity in the matter.

There has been no indication that the five Western nations have recognized the new conprosul in Windhoek. In fact, the Windhoek Advertiser of June 15 relates South African Prime Minister Vorster’s presentation in Parliament during discussion of the new South-West Africa Constitution Amendment bill. "The West had been fully informed of what had been intended by the legislation and agreed that both the Bill and the appointment of an administrator general were consistent with their discussions aimed at reaching an internationally acceptable solution to the South West Africa problem,” the daily reported.

Hard Realities

Among the many facts that stand between any deal that the five powers and Pretoria hope to work out, two are paramount: the presence in Namibia of the South African Defense Force, police, security branch, Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the entire bureaucracy built up by Pretoria over the decades of occupation; and the role of the lawful authority over Namibia, the United Nations.

Pretoria has up to 50,000 members of its armed forces in the Territory engaged in war with SWAPO’s Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia not only along Namibia’s border with Angola but also deep into the country. This occupation army, together with South African police and both police and developing military battalions belonging to the puppet bantustans, are responsible for a constant reign of terror against the Black inhabitants of the territory. Not only SWAPO leaders but also representatives of other Namibian entities, including the churches, strongly assert that any progress toward independence is impossible in the presence of all these elements of South Africa’s rule.

The scheme devised by the group and Pretoria appears only to call for some kind of "phased withdrawal" of South African forces, not to be completed until after nationwide elections and the selection of a government for the territory. Far from withdrawing, there are renewed reports of further expansion of Pretoria’s giant army and air force base at Grootfontein in north-central Namibia.

Mention of the role of the UN during the transition scheme is limited to vague talk of a UN presence in the territory. The group persists in saying they intend to honor and fulfill the terms of Security Council Resolutions 385 of January 1976, which calls specifically for UN “supervision and control” of the entire election process in Namibia. Yet “control” is as persistently lost in all the talk. US government spokesmen say that a UN supervision team can spot any intimidation, harassment or election fraud.

The firmest and most vocal defender of the UN’s right and role has been SWAPO. The movement’s Information Secretary, Peter Katjavivi, writing in the July 1977 issue of New African Development, repeats the point that “SWAPO insists on UN control, which does not mean, as suggested, that a special UN representative should observe the proceedings while the South African army and police force are still in occupation.” He continues: “It is impossible for one UN representative or a host of international jurists to oversee the activities of 50,000 troops, let alone the police and BOSS. The world knows from past experience how South Africa has been able to intimidate voters in past ‘Bantustan’ elections, and through its control of the state apparatus, to determine election results.

Internal Maneuvers

In the wake of Pretoria’s abandonment of the Turnhalle scheme, there has been a jostling for position by political groups preparing to enter the lists of a national election. Formation of a political party by some or perhaps all the 11 Turnhalle ethnic groups is under way. A Turnhalle Election Fund has collected over 100,000 Rand ($1.00=R1.15). The all-white Federal Party and the black Namibia National Front are discussing a possible merger in preparation to contest seats in a constituent assembly.

Turnhalle white leader Dirk Mudge is recorded in an article in the Christian Science Monitor of July 11 as saying Turnhalle’s role is far from over. The dispatch is cast under a rubric that does not mean, as suggested, that a special UN representative should observe the proceedings while the South African army and police force are still in occupation.” He continues: “It is impossible for one UN representative or a host of international jurists to oversee the activities of 50,000 troops, let alone the police and BOSS. The world knows from past experience how South Africa has been able to intimidate voters in past ‘Bantustan’ elections, and through its control of the state apparatus, to determine election results.

The firmest and most vocal defender of the UN’s right and role has been SWAPO. The movement’s Information Secretary, Peter Katjavivi, writing in the July 1977 issue of New African Development, repeats the point that “SWAPO insists on UN control, which does not mean, as suggested, that a special UN representative should observe the proceedings while the South African army and police force are still in occupation.” He continues: “It is impossible for one UN representative or a host of international jurists to oversee the activities of 50,000 troops, let alone the police and BOSS. The world knows from past experience how South Africa has been able to intimidate voters in past ‘Bantustan’ elections, and through its control of the state apparatus, to determine election results.

Internal Maneuvers

In the wake of Pretoria’s abandonment of the Turnhalle scheme, there has been a jostling for position by political groups preparing to enter the lists of a national election. Formation of a political party by some or perhaps all the 11 Turnhalle ethnic groups is under way. A Turnhalle Election Fund has collected over 100,000 Rand ($1.00=R1.15). The all-white Federal Party and the black Namibia National Front are discussing a possible merger in preparation to contest seats in a constituent assembly.

Turnhalle white leader Dirk Mudge is recorded in an article in the Christian Science Monitor of July 11 as saying Turnhalle’s role is far from over. The dispatch is cast under a rubric that describes faithfully Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith’s long-proven delaying procedures in Zimbabwe: “How to appear to be moving while actually digging in one’s heels.”

Notwithstanding all these maneuvers, there can be no resolution of the
issue of independence for Namibia without SWAPO. The US and Western Europe cannot avoid the admonition of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who writes in the July 1977 issue of Foreign Affairs: "America cannot control these events. But it could use its considerable influence to avert the dangers of a serious war of liberation in Namibia. In order to do this, America would first have to accept that SWAPO is the only Namibian nationalist organization, and that no settlement is possible without its agreement."

---

**Zimbabwe**

**Smith Looks for a Vote of Confidence**

Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia has dissolved Parliament and scheduled new elections for August 31, an effort to secure a vote of confidence from the predominantly white electorate before moving ahead with his plans for an "internal settlement."

In a special late-July broadcast on Rhodesian television, Smith told his constituency that he was aiming for a settlement that would empower "moderate" blacks by the end of the year. The scheme envisioned would apparently revolve around a qualified franchise—something of short one man, one vote—and would aim to secure the support of either Bishop Muzorewa or Ndabaningi Sithole, both of whom are currently living in Rhodesia.

Smith called the new election largely because he lacked sufficient support in Parliament to carry through the plan. A two-thirds majority is required to approve changes in the political system, and with twelve ultra-rightist white MPs in active rebellion against Smith his chances looked dim. The fifteen black MPs are thought unlikely to go along with any internal settlement based on qualified franchise.

Some observers, in fact, predict that the new right-wing grouping, the Rhodesian Action Party, may make a good showing in the upcoming ballot. Nearly a third of Rhodesia's 85,000 registered voters are civil servants—a group that would fear for their jobs at the very least under a black government.

Of the country's 6.1 million black residents, only 7,500 will be permitted to vote. The rest are excluded by property and educational requirements.

Even if Smith's Rhodesian Front party does succeed in consolidating its hold on the white electorate, its plans for an internal settlement have been completely rejected by the Patriotic Front guerrilla leaders and are regarded as unrealistic by the US and Britain.

Rhodesian officials accused the Anglo-American negotiating team that recently toured southern Africa of letting the Patriotic Front "call the tune," and the Western initiative was brusquely dismissed by Prime Minister Smith as a "non-starter."

The guerrilla war, meanwhile, is at an all-time high, with government forces stretched thin all over the country fighting an estimated 2,500 guerrillas. Another eight thousand guerrilla recruits are believed to be undergoing training at camps in Tanzania and Zambia, but already many rural locales in the Tribal Trust Lands are designated "no-go" areas.

In addition, economic sanctions are beginning to bite more deeply, and last month a major ferrochrome plant owned by the British Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation closed down operations. And a record loss of 1,339 whites in May, as revealed by official statistics, is widely regarded as a low estimate, since many whites leave on "vacation" without expressing the intention to emigrate.

As a result the government has ordered its Reserve Bank to slow the tax clearance documents of whites seeking to leave, according to the Christian Science Monitor.

---

**Farmworkers Join Guerrillas**

African farm laborers have been deserting en mass from white-owned farms along Rhodesia's border with Mozambique, leaving an increasingly difficult security problem for the beleaguered Smith regime.

Some settlers, reporting that 100 per cent of their labor force has crossed the border to join the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), have chosen to abandon their farms, although it was clear the land would automatically come under guerrilla control.

Meanwhile, says a report in the Tanzanian press, Rhodesian security forces and representatives of the National Farmer's Union are attempting various ploys to keep the farms occupied, and the border secure.

Several African businessmen have been approached by the hitherto whites-only Agricultural Finance Corporation to take long-term loans to buy farms in the war zone. But the offers have been refused because they are perceived as a desperate attempt by the enfeebled minority regime to bolster its sagging position.

In some of the liberated areas, landless Africans have occupied farms abandoned by white settlers.

Because wives of farmers on call-up duties are left alone, the security forces are offering them the protection of the so-called "bright lights"—vigilante bands of armed soldiers who, with the help of bright light outside farm houses, help guard against guerrilla attacks.

Many of the border families have been heartened by this development, but one farmer told reporters: "No, it's too late. It's just shutting the stable door now the horse is gone. Let the young 'bright lights' get into the army and fight."

Another measure of the deteriorating military situation in the desertion-plagued Umtali district has been the call by farmers for exemption from the draft. To bolster security, they are demanding a curfew and the designation of their area as an official no-go zone, whereby any African stranger could be shot on sight.
Leaders of Attempted Coup Arrested

Two months after the attempted coup d'état in Angola, life is gradually returning to normal. *Southern Africa* learned that Nito Alves, the central figure in the coup attempt, has been arrested by the MPLA in Angola. No additional information about his arrest could be obtained, but the Angolan ambassador to the UN indicated that in all several hundred had been arrested.

Angolan President Agostinho Neto said in a speech before a large crowd in Luanda in mid-June, that the conspirators—called 'factionalists' in Angola—were spread through MPLA organizations and agencies of the government, in Luanda and other provinces. Among those arrested were members of the general headquarters of the army, the state security police, the provincial commissions, the military and civil police, the MPLA Central Committee itself, of schools, unions, and nationalized and private enterprises.

A first hand inquiry by *Afrique Asie*, Paris, has substantially supplemented recently released information from Luanda. The report indicates that the coup leaders—Alves, Jose Van Dunen and several others—began to plan the coup in late October 1976, but their expulsion from MPLA forced them to act earlier. The report also reveals that the MPLA had already thwarted one coup plot before the actual May 27 attempt.

Alves, Van Dunen, and a white Angolan woman born in Cabinda, Cita Vales, had begun the systematic recruiting of militants and cadres in opposition to Neto, and the Political Bureau of MPLA. Joining with them were some foreigners, primarily Portuguese who had come to Luanda after the April 25, 1974 revolution in Portugal. They infiltrated diverse structures of the MPLA, the government and the army, in Luanda and in other provinces.

Cita Vales was an important figure in the MPLA’s Department for the Organization of the Masses (DOM) which had the responsibility for overseeing the political mobilization of Angolans, through the Angolan Women’s Organization, MPLA Youth, and its Action committees. Vales used her previous experience as a clandestine member of the Young Portuguese Communists to create a structure—a sort of secretariat—to challenge the state and spread distrust of the decisions of the MPLA leadership.

Alves Removed from Office

At a Central Committee meeting in late October these activities were denounced and the problem of factionalism heatedly debated. Nito Alves was removed from his position as Minister of Internal Administration, although he remained a member of the Central Committee, and Vales was expelled from her office.

Deviations within the political commission of the army were rebuked, the Central Committee completely reorganized DOM and restricted to Angolan citizens exclusively the right to ideological debate within MPLA, thus automatically eliminating a number of important Portuguese citizens who had been active in Angolan politics before that.

In addition, the Committee decided to shut down the afternoon daily paper, *Diario de Luanda*, which had become a forum for Alves’ speeches and declarations. This left a single morning paper in Luanda, the *Journal de Angola*, whose white editor, but long-time MPLA militant Fernando de Costa Andrade, would later become a prime target of criticism by the factionalists.

After these serious blows to their prestige and power, the conspirators began an intensive campaign to sabotage all the sectors of life in Angola and to reinforce their own clandestine organization. According to the *Afrique Asie* report, they organized a veritable parallel movement next to MPLA, a sort of anti-party, counter government which aimed at seizing power. They sought the destabilization of the country and the total discredit of the government and the leadership of MPLA. MPLA’s Political Bureau indicated that the conspirators had contacts with some foreign embassies, while not identifying them.

Recruitment was also heavy among the military. Some commanders were encouraged to travel regularly to Luanda for meetings and debate, leaving certain areas of the country more susceptible to infiltration from the outside. Sympathizing officers withheld pay from their soldiers to promote discontent. The bank account of a commander of the Military Police was found to contain the salaries of at least forty soldiers.

Sabotage within the Ministry of Commerce was undertaken by the Minister himself, David Aires Machado, who exacerbated congestion in the crowded ports by refusing to unload ships which were carrying important food products—claiming that local markets couldn’t absorb them, while food shortages in Luanda and other towns increased. Edmond Vales, head of the commission for restructuring of heavy industry and brother of Cita Vales, opposed the purchase of spare parts from western markets despite the western origin of the machinery—under the pretext that it would be trading with the imperialists.

In some neighborhoods, Alves had ordered the local committees or state stores which stocked immense quantities of food of all sorts to refuse to distribute them. “Take your complaints to the mulattos and whites who rule this government,” the people were then told.

Central Committee Expels Factionalists

The Central Committee met on May 20, amid this explosive atmosphere, and most of its members demanded immediate disciplinary measures against the factionalists. Fifteen minutes before the meeting was due to convene, Neto changed the site from downtown Luanda’s Museum of the Revolution to a location 15 miles south of Luanda closer to his home.

Apparently the Political Bureau had learned that a demonstration against the government had been organized to take place outside the Museum. Mem-
Mozambique

Attack on Mapai

Following is an excerpt from a report in Mozambique’s weekly Tempo from Mapai, the village in western Mozambique that was raided and occupied by Rhodesian security forces on May 29. The raid, one of dozens that have taken place in the year since Mozambique closed its border to Rhodesia, prompted Security Council sessions that took place at the end of June.

Mapai is completely destroyed. We had hardly entered the town when we smelled the characteristic odor of rotting flesh, coming from the corraes where more than 100 head of cattle lay dead. When Rhodesian troops occupied the town they machine-gunned all the cattle they found. They also pillaged the people’s store and then dynamitated it, as well as a granary that held several tons of corn.

Almost all of the houses of the town were dynamitated. Nothing remained of the Ngala transport company. The company’s garage and about twenty vehicles were completely destroyed, also by dynamite.

Altogether, damage must be more than 44 million. The people in the surrounding rural area have lost all the services rendered by the town. And the Ngala company was practically the only one carrying passengers in the region.

The attack began on the morning of May 29, when about 1,000 Rhodesian soldiers entered Mozambique in the Chitanga zone and advanced along the road linking Mapai to Vila Eduardo Mondlane (formerly Malvernia). In spite of being heavily armed and protected by aircraft, the Rhodesians did not escape some ambushes by People’s Forces patrols stationed in Vila Eduardo Mondlane. Meanwhile, the Chicaulacu command notified Mapai, and in the two parts of Mapai the People’s Forces and the militia organized the retreat of the people to the bush.

After some hours of resistance in Mapai, the railway town was occupied by the Rhodesians, who lost four soldiers by a confirmed count. While some 200 Rhodesian troops stayed in Mapai station to destroy the railway line, the bulk of the column, preceded by three jet bombers and one Mirage, advanced toward Mapai River with heavy artillery. On May 29 the first two 500 kg bombs fell near the airfield on the bank of the Limpopo River.

On May 30 the Rhodesians reached the second airfield, about 7 km from Mapai. There, the People’s Forces ambushed the enemy, killing three of them. Mapai was occupied on May 31 amid constant aerial bombardment and heavy artillery fire. Also on May 31 a Rhodesian transport aircraft landed on the runway at Mapai. Among the trees on the side of the field were three members of the People’s Forces who waited until the aircraft loaded up. When the plane was taking off, one of the three fired his bazooka at the airplane, totally destroying it. The soldiers still at the field fled. The three People’s Forces soldiers fired mortar shells at them, but were unable to tell if there were any casualties.
Altogether, three members of the People's Forces were killed in the fighting.

The United Nations Security Council met late in June to take action on the continuing raids into Mozambique by military forces of the Ian Smith regime. On June 30 the council unanimously condemned "the illicit racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia for its recent acts of aggression." More important, the council's final resolution called on all nations to give "immediate and substantial material assistance" to aid Mozambique's defense.

The immediate cause for the sessions was Rhodesia's May 29 seizure of Mapai, a Mozambican village some 50 miles from the border between the two countries. Termed the largest of many so-called "hot pursuit" efforts since combat with Zimbabwean nationalists was stepped up four years ago, the raid included the use of 500 kg fragmentation bombs, napalm, and—apparently for the first time—French-made Mirage jets. The Mirages were part of a group of six fighter jets Rhodesia has received from South Africa.

But throughout the three days of debates, which were attended by numerous high African officials, speakers in the Security Council drew repeated attention to the continuing pattern of Rhodesian incursions into Mozambican territory in pursuit of Zimbabwean nationalists. Such attacks have apparently increased drastically since March 1976, when the government of
ment both on and off the Security Council floor regarding the wording of an acceptable document. Western officials, claiming their reluctance to support a resolution that could be construed as an acceptance of direct foreign military involvement, sought to weaken considerably the draft advanced by members of participating African delegations. "Material," therefore, became the key word describing the support called for. And the resulting ambiguity was reportedly intentional.

For Western officials, such wording was considerably more restrictive than the original call for "practical" aid—which could include direct military involvement. And US representative Andrew Young said outside the council that along with other Western council members he interpreted the resolution to be limited to a call for economic aid. But as one Western official was quoted as saying, the resolution's final language was widely taken to include "money, schoolbooks, tanks—anything but troops." And this was apparently a compromise with Western officials won by African delegations.

U.S.

Forging the Carter Policy


On January 21, the first full day in office for the Carter administration, a little State Department ritual which Secretary Kissinger had carried on for the previous six months was enacted in the office of the department head.

Secretary Cyrus Vance, joined by Undersecretary Phillip Habib, Assistant Secretary for Africa William Schaufele, and several other officials and aides gathered to discuss the day's developments in Africa. These sessions of the 'Africa working group,' the structure Kissinger used to conduct his southern Africa initiative, met for only three days in Vance's office. Then they were moved down the hall, and Habib assumed the chairmanship.

"The striking difference," says one participant who survived the transition from Ford to the Carter administration, "was in the style of operation." Kissinger's method, he says, was "vertical": Outside the working group no one in the State Department had input; no one even knew what was going on. But under Vance procedures were "more horizontal, more democratic."

Even if they were more participatory, however, the sessions in Habib's suite were not always harmonious. The incoming administration has several high-ranking appointees especially interested or experienced in African affairs, and a conflict quickly developed between them and former Kissinger insiders.

Most prominent among the new arrivals, of course, was Andrew Young, the black Georgia Congressman Carter picked as Ambassador to the United Nations. Others in this category included Tony Lake, the new director of Policy Planning, and William Maynes, the new Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

While the old guard, such as Assistant Secretary William Schaufele, insisted that the British/American plan for peacefully ending white rule in Rhodesia deserved more time, Carter appointees tended to think Kissinger had been on the wrong course. They asserted that he had relied too heavily on highly-publicized diplomatic shuttles in his quest for moderate solutions and had overlooked the possible cooperation of European allies.

Southern Africa Review

President Carter agreed to continue US backing for the Rhodesian negotiations, but he also ordered a full-scale policy review on southern Africa. Within ten days of the inauguration, in fact, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had set in motion an interagency task force to work on the project. Policy Review Memorandum 4.

Much of the groundwork for this review had been carried out during the transition period. Don McHenry, a former foreign service officer who did extensive research on US corporations...
in South Africa while at Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment, collaborated with Lake on Africa policy ideas.

Using the papers they wrote, with input from State, Defense, the CIA and other agencies, Policy Planning officer, Donald Petterson, a career diplomat, began drafting PRM 4 in early February. The initial versions, heavily influenced by Schaufele and others in the Africa Bureau at State, emphasized the need to find settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia.

But Young, McHenry (by then a Young appointee at the UN), and Lake argued that the problem of South Africa must be faced head-on, and not put off until solutions were found in the other two territories. They carried their case to Vance and ultimately to Carter, and the Presidential Directive (PD) on southern Africa, which Carter signed in early March, endorses this view.

In sum, the Directive
- attaches great urgency to southern Africa's problems;
- reaffirms the US commitment to peaceful solutions, saying that escalating guerrilla warfare allows the Soviets to gain influence they otherwise won't have in the region;
- declares the necessity of working with European allies and African states to find solutions;
- states that a continued American failure to speak out against white rule in South Africa will jeopardize relations with the rest of Africa and much of the Third World;
- determines that the administration will have to take "visible steps" to downgrade relations with South Africa, unless the whites begin to move towards power sharing with the black majority.

Private Consultation, Public Diplomacy

Even before PRM 4 was completed, policy planners were hammering out a review of US relations in the Horn of Africa. This memo, PRM 21, gave most attention to Ethiopia and won Presidential approval on a proposal to reduce the American presence there.

**Congressional Conservatives Support Minority Regimes**

Conservative southern Congressmen and other hard-line rightists on Capital Hill have in recent months, consistently mounted well-planned attacks on legislation providing aid to southern African nations opposed to the continent's remaining minority regimes. And they have argued in favor of a continued US presence for such lobbying instruments as the Rhodesian Information Office. Together with the powerful South African presence in Washington, this office is one of the lobbies most actively engaged in influencing the positions taken by these Congressmen.

Namibia and Zimbabwe are, of course, the focal points for many provisions in recently proposed aid and assistance bills. On each issue, Congressmen such as Richard H. Ichord (D-Missouri) and Phillip M. Crane (R-Illinois) have attempted to block aid that would benefit enemies of the Smith regime or the South African administration in Namibia.

On NAMIBIA, House Republicans have attacked US funding for the Luwaka-based Institute, which trains future Namibian administrators, journalists, diplomats, and other personnel necessary for a fully independent nation. Through an amendment to an aid bill introduced by Trent Lott (R-Mississippi), the US would withhold its share of funding for the Institute, as well as for the UN Education and Training Program for Southern Africans. And it would cut $10 million from its share of funding for the UN Development Fund. The Lott amendment has thus far not succeeded, however, suffering a 232-182 defeat in the House earlier this year.

ZIMBABWE has been the center of most of the action on Capital Hill. Ichord and other House and Senate conservatives have argued that no aid should be given to any of the frontline states because of the so-called Anglo-American initiatives for a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian issue.

"I know for a fact that the Smith government is sensitive to the need for representative government and has made considerable strides in that direction," Ichord argued in House hearings. Crane added to this: "The political conflict in the region is the direct result not of white minority government in Rhodesia but is in fact the result of the aggressive actions taken by the so-called front-line countries, which we are contemplating rewarding under the provisions of this bill."

Two proposals were at issue in these arguments. One was a deletion of $100 million from the Southern Africa Special Requirements Fund. The fund is a reprogramming of the Zimbabwe Development Fund, and it is designed to aid refugees and address other problems of the region caused by economic dislocation resulting from regional conflicts. The Senate has subsequently agreed to cut $20 million from the fund.

Also at issue is bilateral US aid to African states working in opposition to the Smith regime. Crane and his allies proposed a specific prohibition of aid to Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and Zambia. Crane has recently attempted to soften the prohibition amendment by eliminating Tanzania and Western-tilted Zambia from it, concentrating instead on any aid, direct or indirect, to Angola or Mozambique. This amendment covers all bilateral aid programs, Export-Import Bank credits, all international financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF, for instance), and UN agencies. If passed, it would prohibit even such popular children-oriented programs as UNICEF grants for Mozambique.

But without debate or recorded vote, the Senate agreed to the House amendment to the security assistance authorization bill prohibiting aid to all four nations except by Presidential waiver. The waiver provision had been earlier proposed by House liberal Charles Diggs (D-Michigan) in order to blunt Ichord's original proposal.
Specifically, the administration decided to wind down military training programs and close the Kagnew communications base. But before these measures could be taken the Ethiopian government expelled a large part of the American contingent, and broke off military links that had existed between the two countries for thirty years.

While the deliberations on policy remained secret, many aspects of the Carter administration’s activities regarding Africa grabbed public attention. First came Young’s early February trip to Africa, during which he succeeded in winning the confidence of the Nigerian regime, which had developed a deep mistrust of Kissinger.

In March, President Carter stepped into the spotlight. He addressed the United Nations just after Congress had modified the Byrd Amendment so that US firms could not longer legally violate UN sanctions against Rhodesia, and promised support for “fundamental transformation” in southern Africa.

Carter also tapped Vice President Mondale as coordinator of African policy—a move intended to meet British requests for clear American cooperation in the difficult Rhodesia settlement negotiations. Mondale was also expected to “ride herd” in the administration, which was still beset with infighting over Africa policy. With Vance occupied on other pressing matters, Mondale was the logical choice.

Carter announced the Mondale selection on April 15, just one day after Young had been quoted as saying “yes” when asked if the South African government was illegitimate. Carter’s move was interpreted as a rebuff to Young, and given the President’s political acumen the timing may have been calculated. But an African expert from the UN mission staff had been working with Mondale aides for several weeks by then, and Mondale himself had begun to prepare for his meeting with South African Prime Minister John Vorster.

Facing Off With Vorster

May was perhaps the busiest month to date on the administration’s Africa calendar. Schaufele, Young and other officials from Washington met in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, with all US ambassadors in sub-Saharan Africa. Young went on to visit several west African nations before flying to Mozambique to attend a special United Nations conference on Rhodesia and Namibia. Then he made his controversial private visit to South Africa.

Mondale, meanwhile, met Vorster in Vienna on May 19 and 20, on the eve of the Maputo conference, and the unprecedented high-level talks between the two governments produced more dissonance than harmony. Vorster was apparently shaken and angered by the sharp words Mondale had for South Africa’s racial policies. Upon his return to Pretoria, Vorster told his cabinet that the American demands were unreasonable.

Spearheading the South African response to the Vienna talks, Foreign Minister Roelof Botha has accused Washington of asking the whites to commit suicide by demanding “one man, one vote.”

Actually, Mondale avoided that phrase, which carries considerable emotional weight with white South Africans, asserting instead that firm US-South African relations depend on progress towards “full political participation” by all citizens of South Africa. But the final questioner at his Vienna news conference asked if the “full participation” phrase was a compromise replacing one man, one vote, and Mondale replied, “No, no, it’s the same thing.”

Shuffling Personnel

Mondale’s role in Africa policy has been much reduced since then. He has expressed a desire to spend more time on other foreign and domestic policy matters, and his aides say he is anxious not to become identified as “the person” responsible for African affairs in Washington. “He knows it will take at least ten years to resolve things down there,” one aide says frankly, “and his political career will pass through some crucial periods in that time.”

With Africa policy more or less set in motion, Carter and Vance have moved to resolve remaining personnel problems. In April, Petterson was transferred from Policy Planning to the important Office of Southern African Affairs in the Africa Bureau, replacing Frank Wisner, another Kissinger holdover who had joined Schaufele in opposing some of the new strategies.

Richard Moose was sworn in last week as Schaufele’s replacement, and for several weeks has been functioning in the assistant secretary’s post. The Africa group meetings still take place daily, now in Moose’s suite, drawing together officials from Policy Planning, International Organization Affairs, Young’s State Department office, one or more deputy assistant secretaries from the Africa Bureau, and Habib aid George Moose.

Conferences

Conference Against Apartheid Held in Lisbon

The following report was written by Mimi Edmunds, a member of our collective who represented the magazine at the conference.

Commemorating the first anniversary of the Soweto uprising, over 400 delegates from 75 countries and 38 international organizations attended the World Conference Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Lisbon, June 16-19.

Major organizations backing the Conference included the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, the World Peace Council, and a number of other organizations including the OAU and UN committees.

The broad international spectrum of the conference was evidenced by delegations from socialist and non-socialist countries throughout the world, as well as the PLO and the Polisario Front of Western Sahara. The 22-member US delegation represented a wide range of opinion and political activity, including Black groups, anti-imperialist and liberation movement support groups, trade unions, a city councillor from Florida and a State Senator from Massachusetts.

The highlight of the conference was the attendance of the leaders of southern Africa’s liberation movements,
OAU Liberation Committee Stresses Armed Struggle

The 21 member states and two observer delegations participating in the meeting of the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity in Luanda, Angola, June 14-19, stressed the need to support the intensification of armed struggle as the key to liberation in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

Angola's President Agostinho Neto setting the tone in the opening address said: "Armed struggle should not be neglected in any area still occupied by the enemy. Only through armed struggle is it possible to defeat the oppressive forces in the world."

In reference to the attempt by western powers to negotiate for peaceful settlement, he warned: "It is not through negotiations, through conferences or councils that people will determine their own future, because there is a struggle of interests, a struggle between classes developed through imperialism and through the desire of just one social group to dominate all others." The conference also condemned maneuvers by Western powers and the racist regimes to destabilize frontline states' support for the liberation forces.

Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano noted that on May 27 Angola had to put down an imperialist-inspired coup attempt, while on the same day Mozambique was attacked on an unprecedented scale by Rhodesian and South African forces.

"We cannot allow this," he said, "And we cannot allow the enemy to go on gaining time via a so-called peaceful solution."

SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, speaking for the southern African liberation movements, urged increased aid for the armed struggle.

The Liberation Committee strongly recommended to the upcoming meeting of the OAU to recognize the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people.

OAU Backs Patriotic Front

The Organization of African Unity gave total backing to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, led by Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU, as the representative of the political and military struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe against the Smith regime.

The OAU met July 2-5 in Libreville, Gabon with 48 nations represented, including 23 by heads of state. While not specifically withdrawing recognition from Bishop Abel Muzorewa's

African National Council and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's wing of ZANU, the OAU called on all Zimbabweans "devoted to the liberation of the country [to] fight for liberation within the framework of the Patriotic Front." Nkomo assured the body that the Front would be open to all Zimbabweans wanting to take up the struggle.

It also called on OAU members to refrain from supporting individuals, thus running the risk of creating more than one army for the liberation and drafted resolutions on South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia stressing material and political support.

A general Declaration was passed supporting the objectives of the conference and condemning apartheid and all states which supported it, notably the US, West Germany, Britain, France and Israel.

A plan of action passed by the assembly called for governments and non-governmental groups throughout the world to "strongly condemn the policy of apartheid pursued by the minority regime of South Africa . . . , the illegal occupation of Namibia . . . ; and the regime of racism and terror in Zimbabwe," and to "strongly mobilize the public opinion against these policies."

Areas of action and solidarity were specified in terms of assistance to the liberation movements, boycotts of the Vorster and Smith regimes, dissemination of information, and establishment of anti-apartheid and solidarity movements in all countries where they do not yet exist.

One of the highlights of the conference was the six-hour public rally held Sunday afternoon for the Portuguese people, where support and highly emotional solidarity was expressed by the Portuguese people for the liberation movements in southern Africa, and the independent governments of the former Portuguese colonies.

The conference demonstrated the potential and strength of an international movement that is growing and taking shape. At the same time its goals will be realized not only in the movements themselves as the struggles accelerate, but in the countries and organizations represented at this conference where a movement to destroy apartheid, racism, and colonialism is also growing at an accelerated pace.

AUGUST 1977/SOUTHERN AFRICA 31
defense of an independent Zimbabwe."

The decision was a blow to Mzorewa and Sithole, who have been allowed by the Smith regime to operate inside Zimbabwe and to travel outside to seek support from African states and Western countries.

The resolution backing the Patriotic Front was introduced by Zambian President Kaunda representing the five frontline states. He proclaimed that Zimbabweans could gain their freedom only from "the barrel of a gun," an unusually strong statement from a leader who is considered to be pro-West and to abhor violence.

**Chinese Quote Raises Problems**

An ideological controversy resulted from a statement attributed to Robert Mugabe by Hsinhua, the Chinese News Agency and the *Peking Review,* that "the people of Zimbabwe are facing a menace from both Western imperialism and social imperialism and the menace from social imperialism, in particular, is more insidious and dangerous."

The purported statement was released while Mugabe was enroute to Gabon from China, where he had led a Zimbabwe friendship delegation. On arrival, he denounced the report as false. "Such fabrications are aimed at undermining the Patriotic Front," he said. "It is absurd to come out against the Soviet Union which makes a tangible contribution to the cause of liberation of southern Africa from the yoke of racism. We highly appreciate the Soviet Union's effective and unselfish assistance."

While the Soviet role was an issue in the ZANU/ZAPU split in the '60s, unity is now based around the central goal of defeating the Smith regime. Any differing views on Soviet policy or other issues between the two groups in the Front have clearly been subordinated to the main task.

**Other OAU Actions**

SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma spoke on behalf of the liberation movements of southern Africa urging greater support for their struggles. He stressed the need for greater isolation of the South African regime through an embargo on ship and aircraft links.

On Namibia, Nujoma called for elections to be organized by the UN Council for Namibia, and not, as the five Western powers are suggesting, in cooperation with South Africa, reducing the UN role to a token.

The OAU denounced interference by outside powers in African affairs and describing mercenary activity as international piracy. Also approved was a resolution calling for increased military, economic, and diplomatic aid to Mozambique in the face of attacks from the Rhodesian regime.

---

**Secret Meetings to Win the West**

A hush-hush, high-powered seminar of US businessmen and South African trade, financial, business, labor, bantustan and government representatives met at a posh suburban hotel outside New York City on June 20/21.

The tightly guarded meeting was sponsored by two South African outfits, the South African Trade Organization (SAFTO) and an up and coming Afrikaner financial entity, Senbank. A New York public relations firm, Sidney Baron, Inc., promoted the event, and E.F. Andrews, a vice president of the American corporation Allegheny Ludlum Industries, was a speaker; his subject: "Why Is South Africa So Important?"

American business people swarmed to the meeting. The *South African Financial Mail* reported 1000 invitations were mailed out to Americans. Over 300 of them attended and many had to be turned away because there wasn't room for more.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was to have been the principal guest speaker, but he pleaded prior commitments. Instead, his former cabinet mate, ex-Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, now a consultant to a Wall Street brokerage firm, plumped for the right of American corporations to invest wherever they want.

The seminar was to have been conducted in the greatest secrecy but alert anti-apartheid forces spread the word. Many newspapermen made inquiries and turned up only to be told that the meeting was private and not open to the press.

The desperate Pretoria regime had brought over a top level team. Leslie Lulofs, chairman of SAFTO, opened the conference. Dr. Gerhard de Kock, a senior deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, was a panelist with the moderator Dr. Chris van Wyk, general manager of Senbank. The theme: "Financial Policies."


Africans who have cast their lot with Pretoria were incensed. Ciskei bantustan leader Lennox Sebe addressed the gathering on 'What A Black South African Wants For His People And Country.' The moderator was a Soweto businessman Richard Maponya, once deputy leader of the now defunct Urban Bantu Council in South Africa's largest city. *Time* magazine of June 27 describes Maponya's encounter with the 'Children of Soweto'; he was told his shop would be boycotted because of his collaboration.

The most endearing topic was handled by L. E. S. de Villiers, deputy secretary of the South African Department of Information: 'Strategies for Enduring Investment.' Donald de Kieffer, a Washington attorney whose firm has been retained to lobby in the capital by the Pretoria regime, acted as moderator.

The high point of the seminar was the keynote speech by Pretoria's Foreign Minister, Roelof F. (Pik) Botha, whose passionate message was that South Africa was politically stable and still a top place to invest in.

After a final cocktail party thrown by South African Airways, the South African team split up. Many to visit various parts of the USA. Some went to Washington to reach lawmakers, others went as far as the West Coast with stops in between.

Pretoria's investment and financial worries match its international and domestic social and political straits. The *Financial Mail* says that "even with a booming economy SA would be a relatively poor credit risk." The Namibian *Windhoek Advertiser* reports a Capetown business consultant as saying "The World Bank regards South Africa to be as great a loan risk as Angola."
Dear Friends:

In response to your appeal in the May issue of Southern Africa, I am sending a gift subscription to everybody I know who would appreciate it. Attached are the addresses and enclosed is a check for $104.00. You may hear more from me because I am trying to get interested local newspapers to carry Southern Africa and I'm also trying to get organizations with which I am affiliated to stuff your brochures in their mailings. I will also give you a plug whenever I speak. Your magazine is one of my most cherished treasures. Do tell me if there is anything else I can do to help it.

Sincerely,
BCH
Washington, DC

Comrades, we realize the need for adequate information and prompt delivery of that information. We will do all we can to keep Southern Africa magazine from folding. Please send us more application forms (about 200) and we will get them out to potential subscribers. Please accept these posters as a contribution toward the liberation struggles that are ongoing in Southern Africa. Your work is much needed. Sell them at a price that is just. Thanking you in advance.

Respectfully yours,
Ray Eglin
Veneta, Oregon 97487

Dear Sirs:

As a moderate opposed to racism and strongly supportive of majority rule in Southern Africa, but not the imposition of a communist dictatorship (or any other dictatorship), I find it increasingly difficult to support your magazine.

Your drift towards a blind loyalty to marxist regimes and the failure to recognize excesses of the left as well as the right has destroyed your credibility. When marxism becomes a code word for "progressive" and all else is defined as reactionary, then you force me to part company with your magazine and its financial problems.

I have no appetite for oppression under whatever banner—fascism, communism, capitalism, proletarian internationalism, etc. If you choose to wear blinkers that is your business, of course, but it makes the eternal struggle for freedom that much more difficult.

Dr. Thomas Nyquist
State University
New Paltz, New York

Support Southern Africa Magazine In Style

White T-shirts displaying the magazine logo and a large map of Africa in brown are available in small, medium and large. Price $5.00 plus 50 cents postage. Order from: Southern Africa Magazine, 156 Fifth Avenue, Room 707, New York, NY 10010.
book reviews


by Mohamed A. EI-Khawas

The collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and the victory of FREP-LIMO has encouraged renewed attention to the legacy of African resistance throughout Mozambique's history. In the past, African history was interpreted largely from a colonialist perspective. Historians concentrated their analyses on Portugal's colonial administration and paid little attention to the responses of the African population. Only recently has the trend been reversed. Allen F. Isaacman's writing offers testimony of such a trend. His latest book, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique: Anti-Colonial Activity in the Zambezi Valley, 1850-1921*, is a pioneering and important study. It focuses directly on the history of the exploited Africans rather than on the Portuguese and it chronicles the record of resistance rather than collaboration with the colonial regime. His book, providing valuable information on a period in the history of Mozambique that has long been obscure, makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of how Africans responded to European colonialism.

This is an impressive study. It carefully documents growing African opposition to Portuguese encroachment in the Zambezi Valley. It is unique because it has not limited itself to the mass protest movements (a normal pattern for the study of resistance) but instead has examined resistance from the broadest perspective by emphasizing its regional character and long historical development (p. 197). Consequently, it has paid attention to such long-ignored forms of opposition as peasant revolts, social banditry, work slowdowns and modes of passive resistance. These acts of defiance, which occurred from the early years of Portuguese contact and throughout the colonial period, form an important chapter in the story of African opposition to colonial rule. Isaacman gives examples of acts of daily resistance or of groups fleeing into neighboring countries; such defiance occurred frequently and appears to have increased as the colonial period progressed. In contrast, the more visible forms of opposition—including peasant revolts and social banditry—took place mainly during the first decades of colonialism.

His analysis suggests that Portugal's eventual success in colonizing the Zambezi Valley was due to the support Lisbon received from African groups as much as to the technological advantages of its own weaponry. Throughout the book, Isaacman identifies social, economic and ethnic groups that supported Portuguese colonialism and attempts to explain their actions. In his view, the history of the Zambezi Valley has been largely influenced by ethnic particularism, cultural diversity and political fragmentation. Time and time again he shows that internal political instability and tribal rivalries enabled Portuguese "to establish its hegemony through a combination of threats, co-optation and armed confrontation" (p. 22).

Isaacman provides a valuable account of African responses to the increasing Portuguese pressures. His analysis documents the trend by which the Zambesian peoples gradually realized the need to bury their differences and to organize broader alliances against the Portuguese. Some alliances were formed in the 1880s, including several chieftaincies and kingdoms, to fight for their independence. Although these coalitions did not accomplish their objectives, they did "represent the first indications of an incipient Zambesian consciousness which transcended ethnic affinity and racial origins" (p. 39). A far reaching multi-ethnic coalition was organized by the Barue nation, the only major state outside the Portuguese sphere, in the 1890s because its leaders became convinced that its survival was "inextricably linked to that of the surrounding African polities, including those in neighboring Rhodesia" (p. 58). This alliance successfully challenged Portuguese control over the Zambezi Valley and provided logistic and material assistance to the rebels of Cambumba, Luis and the Shona in their attempts to repel foreign intrusion into their territories. The Barue were finally defeated when Portugal recruited a large African force from "the Nguni of Inhambane, the Chopo of Lourenco Marques, the Macua of northern Mozambique and a mix of Angolan peoples" (p. 65).

Isaacman devotes an entire chapter to the forms of localized African opposition to Portuguese colonialism that occurred between 1880-1917. His analysis shows that African resistance was widespread throughout the region and that anti-colonial sentiment manifested itself in many forms with "different recruitment patterns, tactics and levels of political consciousness... Each form of protest, moreover, represented an attempt to modify the existing social order, or to escape it altogether" (p. 97).

Chapters six and seven examine in some detail six rebellions that attempted to overthrow the Portuguese colonial system. They all represented both a high level of political awareness and an intensified expression of discontent. Isaacman details the preparations of these rebellions, particularly the Barue rebellion (1917) which necessitated the use of both diplomacy and pressure to broaden the base of the anti-Portuguese coalition. The rebel leaders attempted to form "an alliance of groups residing on both banks of the
Zambesi, regardless of their past loyalties, ethnic affiliation and racial composition” (p. 161). They even solicited British support, without success, in their effort to isolate the Portuguese.

The account reveals that the Bareleadership was sophisticated and aware of the necessary steps in staging a successful insurrection. They put together what came very close to a pan-Zambesian movement for independence. Moreover, the Portuguese were unable to defeat them without assistance from African mercenaries and/or collaborators.

Isaacman believes that the African resistance failed because of several factors. First, “rivalries among Zambesian peoples undermined efforts at coordinated anti-colonial activities and provided the Portuguese with vital assistance in pacification.” Second, “internal rivalries also included segments of the ruling elite to ally with the Europeans” (p. 189). Third, “economic considerations provided an additional incentive to cooperate with the Europeans” (p. 190). Fourth, some African groups like the Manica refused to assist the rebels despite their common ancestry and grievances. Fifth, they were outgunned and outnumbered by Africans who willingly or unwillingly fought on the Portuguese side. Following their defeat, some rebels tried to launch guerrillas warfare to liberate their lands. These efforts failed, however, because “they were unable to grow to a size necessary to offset Portugal’s technological advantage” (p. 148).

All in all, Isaacman’s book is a major additional to the literature on Mozambique. He has successfully demonstrated the considerable extent of African resistance to Portuguese colonialism and has analyzed the reasons for its failure. A basic theme that emerges is that “Portuguese policy rested upon a set of culturally arrogant and racist values” (p. 75). The analysis reveals the fallacy of Portugal’s claim of racial egalitarianism and the claim of a civilizing mission which was frequently used to justify its colonization of Africa.
**BANK CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED...**
The Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, whose members include the American Committee on Africa, Clergy and Laity Concerned, and the American Friends Service Committee, officially kicked off a campaign to end US bank loans to South Africa on June 24. At a New York press conference, the committee called on individuals and groups to withdraw money from banks with South African ties.

A representative of the Furriers Joint Council announced that the union would withdraw in excess of $11 million in pension and savings funds from one such bank. A representative of the New York Conference of the United Methodist Church reported that a resolution had been adopted directing the conference to withdraw funds; it has in several banks participating in South African loans.

At noon the same day, about 125 people protested in front of Citibank's main office in Manhattan.

A research arm of the Committee has prepared a guide on how to investigate a bank's possible involvement in South African loans. It will also publish by mid-August an essay describing the process through which international bank loans are made.

The guide, along with a flier outlining the bank campaign, the essay, and additional information are available through Prexy Nesbitt, ACOA executive associate, 306 E. 46th St., New York, NY 10017, and through the following regional bank campaign centers: Boston—Boston Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa, P.O. Box 101, Boston, MA 02123; Chicago—Chicago Coalition on Southern Africa, 8th Day Center, 22 E. Van Buren, Chicago, IL 60605; Northern California—ICCR, 870 Market St. #770, San Francisco, CA 94112; Southern California—c/o Thompson, 5925 Canterbury, Apt. 101, Culver City, CA.

**ART AGAINST APARTHEID...** An anti-apartheid poster campaign sponsored by the American Committee on Africa brought 375 entries from around the country. Cash awards made possible by a $1,300 grant from the Africa Office of the National Council of Churches went to five winners, including top winner Bob Ziering of New York. The posters have been displayed at the UN and other locations in the New York metropolitan area and will go on tour starting in the fall.

Interested groups can apply for a showing of 10 or more posters by contacting Raphael Gould, ACOA director of special projects, 306 E. 46th St., New York, NY 10017. Groups must pay all transportation costs (about $25 for 10 to 20 posters) and are asked to make a donation, depending on ability to pay, to help defray expenses.

Orders are also being taken for a 12-poster 1978 calendar. The price is $4 each, with funds going to support liberation projects.

**UNION ACTS...** Members of United Steelworkers Local 1011, representing 8500 workers at Youngstown Sheet and Tube (YST), in East Chicago, have put forward a local bargaining demand that, "YST not use or purchase products produced under non-union conditions in South Africa, including but not limited to chrome from Rhodesia and coal and coke from the Republic of South Africa. Union further demands that a monitoring system be provided to assure the Union of Company compliance."

The YST workers discovered some two years ago that the company was using coke, a coal by-product that is basic to the manufacture of steel, which was imported from South Africa.

Local 1011 President Norman Purtle said in a statement, "The Union position against South African products is based both on the defense of our members' jobs, which are threatened by the use of the 'Slave Labor Coke,' and also as a move in solidarity with the demand of Black African workers for union representation and majority rule. Liberation forces in South Africa have called for a ban on goods from the white-rulled regime."

**TALLYING THE VOTE...** The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility says churches are expected to intensify their efforts to end US business involvement in South Africa following a season of stockholder resolutions which met with modest success.

Resolutions put to stockholders of Texaco, Union Carbide and Manufactu...
Helping Education in Mozambique

A fund to support education in Mozambique has been started by Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman. The idea for the fund developed out of talks they had last year with representatives of the Ministry of Education in Maputo.

From the outset FRELIMO has placed the highest priority on education, with the result that school attendance increased from 700,000 in 1973 to over 2 million by 1976. These gains have been made despite the acute shortage of books, maps and other educational materials.

In a letter from Graça Simbine, Minister of Education and Culture, to the Fund, she said:

"... The end of the exploitation, the formation of a new mentality, new relations between man, and the creation of a just economic infrastructure, do not happen over night ..."

Although one of our guiding principles has always been and will continue to be, the necessity for self-reliance, "depender das nossas próprias forças" nevertheless we always welcome outside support for our efforts, when based on genuine internationalist principles of solidarity between peoples.

For this reason we welcome the enterprising initiative taken in establishing the Mozambique Education Fund and wish you success in your venture.

Tax exempt donations can be sent to:
Mozambique Education Fund
Main Post Office
P.O. Box 83
Minneapolis, Minn. 55440

Donation will be used to purchase books primarily in Portugal and Brazil, and to arrange for their shipment to Mozambique.

In Washington, D.C., the city council declared June 16 South Africa Solidarity Day and a rally attracted several hundred people to hear speakers including Rev. Ben Chavis of the Wilmington 10.

In New York about 250 people marched from Herald Square to South African Airways on Fifth Avenue and held a spirited demonstration. One of the marchers was arrested when he stepped off the sidewalk. Speakers in front of SAA included a South African, a representative of SWAPO and representatives of black solidarity groups.

Other demonstrations took place in other cities, including Atlanta, Boston and Philadelphia.

BOOKS NEEDED ... Acting on a UN request, the American Committee on Africa is seeking to supply the Mozambican Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a basic library for diplomatic training. ACOA welcomes contributions of books which it will forward to Mozambique. Please send any books in the following categories ONLY to ACOA, 306 E. 46th St., New York, NY 10017: International Organizations; Diplomacy; Political Economy; Dialectic Materialism and Historical Materialism; Liberation Movements; International Problems of interest at present (example: Indian Ocean, Disarmament, Law of the Sea, New Economic Order, etc.); Public and Private International Law; Civil Law; Trade Law.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES:

- **Individuals (Domestic and Foreign)**: $8.00 per year
- **Institutions (Domestic and Foreign)**: $18.00 per year
- **Introductory 7 month offer**: $4.00

**Airmail:**
- Africa, Asia, Europe: $20.50
- South & Central America: $17.50
- 3 month trial: $1.00

Enclose payment with order. Orders subject to change without notice.