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NOTE TO READERS: This is not a double issue, but we have had to shift production dates to meet newsstand requirements. Subscribers will receive the usual 11 issues in 1978, with a summer double issue.
American Publisher Peddles South Africa

by Steve Weissman

In our September 1977 issue, Southern Africa detailed aspects of Pretoria's campaign to win favor among Americans. The minority regime's effort involves hundreds of thousands of dollars spent through American public relations firms—all to put a pretty face on apartheid. South Africa's Ministry of Information also supports an expensive lobby in Washington, and has hosted numerous conservative congressmen on two-week jaunts to South Africa.

Last June, the South African government hosted a two-day US conference on investment in South Africa, for some 350 American businessmen.

In a recent Public Television interview, news commentator Robert MacNeil asked Prime Minister Vorster: "If you don't particularly care what—as you call it—uninformed opinion feels about you, why does your government finance such a large public relations campaign in this country, spending last year, I've seen the figure of two million dollars?"

Responded Vorster: "Because we owe it to our country to give the true facts to the world outside for those who care to want the true facts and to listen to the true facts. Same as you owe it to your country and each and every other man owes it to his own country."

Was he planning, as reports state, to step up that campaign and spend more money in the US?

"If it's necessary to do so," Vorster replied, "we will do so."

"Do you feel it is necessary?"

"From time to time it will be necessary, and perhaps now is such a time."

"Apart from Pretoria's effort to make friends among the upper reaches of US government and business, though, the current propaganda assault is also aimed at the US public. And in this it seems designed to benefit more than just the South African tourist trade; it is aimed at Washington as well. Acceptance of South Africa among Americans would serve to broaden the administration's policy options by reducing the likelihood of widespread outrage in the event open support for apartheid must replace the currently favored covert variety."

The sympathetic picture of South Africa presented by conservative US publisher John McGoff, in his string of local newspapers, fits neatly into this strategy. His dailies and weeklies are probably not read by many executives or congressmen, but they do reach hundreds of thousands of American readers, concentrated in the Midwest and the South. In the following article, Steve Weissman details McGoff's influence and his close ties to South Africa's leaders.

Weissman is a former editor at Ramparts and a current contributor to TV documentaries and magazines in Europe and the U.S. He lives in London.

A similar version of this article by Steve Weissman first appeared in the December issue of More magazine.

John McGoff owns more than 50 newspapers in the US, all of which are part of his Panax and Global newspaper chains.

Starting with some small broadcasting stations in central Michigan, McGoff began buying up community newspapers in the early 1960s and has turned his Panax Corporation into one of the nation's largest newspaper chains.

In addition to his position as a powerful publisher of domestic dailies and weeklies, the outspoken McGoff is co-chairman of the London-based UPI Television News and is that organization's majority stockholder. In addition, he was an unsuccessful bidder for the failing Washington Star in 1975.

At the time of his bid for the large Washington daily, McGoff told reporters that one reason he wanted the paper was to help sell South Africa. His two chains, which operate in Michigan, Illinois, Florida, California and in the Washington, D.C. area, as well as his TV news business, are already performing that function.

Telling South Africa's Story

"South Africa needs to tell its story, and through something like UPITN we can do it," McGoff told the South African newswEEKLY To The Point last year, when South Africa opened its first television network. "We at UPITN can provide you with instant news from all parts of the world. And you, in turn, can provide us with news of your country, which we can send to our customers in 66 countries."

Indeed, through his news media, McGoff seems to function as a kind of informal ambassador and advocate for the beleaguered Afrikaner regime. One of his regular newspaper contributors, the Rev. Lester Kinsolving, wrote several articles defending continued corporate investment in South Africa. Under attack, Kinsolving admitted that registered agents for the South African government—the law firm of Colier, Shannon, Rill and Edwards—paid him $2,500 in stock and expenses while he was doing his reporting. Kinsolving took the money from the South Africans to attend 13 corporation meetings in 1975 and 1976, where he opposed church-backed resolutions calling for withdrawal from South Africa. He has since lost his press accreditation at both the State Department and Congress.

Another of McGoff's writers, Panax Washington bureau chief Tom Ochiltree, made several trips to South Africa and returned to write glowing articles about the country. He also filed several pro-South Africa stories from Washington, and in August he teamed up with Ron Corday to do a four-part series for local papers entitled "Southern Africa In Crisis."

"The private enterprise system in southern Africa could be replaced by chaotic Marxism, as already has happened in much of black Africa," the two Panax writers warned. "And most serious of all, Soviet control of the strategic seaways around the Cape of Good Hope would give the Kremlin, in times of international stress, an opportunity to attempt cutting off vital Middle East oil supplies to the United States and Western Europe."

Such familiar arguments as these are the standard introductions to a view that essentially supports close economic and military cooperation with southern Africa's remaining minority regimes. They occurred regularly in the early 1970s, when then-National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger produced NSSM 39 for the Nixon Administration. Similar reasoning is
Dealing With Propaganda—Soweto Style

Mighty Man is dead, zapped in Soweto by the very people he claimed to defend.

The masked hero had been sent to the black township (by a group of Americans including McGoff), to wage a relentless war on the vicious perpetrators of evil—the muggers, purse-snatchers, dagga merchants, communists, and other enemy agents. But even as the law enforcing dynamo was engaging in his mind-bending adventures, the outside agitators stirred up the simple folk of Soweto to riot—WHAM! CRASH! THUD!

"They burned down the newstands," complains the strip's US creator, Richard Manville. "They threw the things on the ground, and we had to stop publishing them."

A New York marketing consultant with clients in South Africa, Manville thought of the comic strip back in 1975. "It was a deliberate copy of a highly successful format—namely Superman—which had been working for some 25 years." Only Mighty Man—with blue tights and scarlet cape—was a South African black, and Manville and his team of freelance cartoonists and balloon writers set the stories in a black township very like the now-famous Soweto.

Manville sold the idea to leading SA media man J. van Zyl Alberts, who also runs the pro-government newsweekly To The Point. Manville ran the creative end from New York. Alberts published the strips through a South African firm, Afri-Comics (Pty) Ltd. And John McGoff, head of the American Panax newspaper chain, printed the comics through his South African subsidiary XANAP, with a printing press in the Tswana bantustan near Pretoria.

The comics got off to a flying start. With full-color covers and press runs of 75,000. Predicted one of the Afri-Comics execs in an interview with a South African paper: "The blacks are going to lap this up."

Not everybody did. Some people looked past the brightly colored figures and found an ugly message. The new black comic strips preached something less than black power.

"There were certain guidelines," explains lead cartoonist Joe Orlando. "Like not screwing around with the government."

Better known for his drawings of the real Superman, Orlando wanted to create one-page heroes for the blacks to identify with. He suggested the slain leader of the anti-Portuguese liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau, Amilcar Cabral. The South Africans said no. They also vetoed a mention of slavery, even in a historical vein.

"Basically we were on the side of law and order, and kids should stay in school, and they should obey the law, and all the rest of that stuff, which is exactly the format Superman follows," said Manville. "I'd rather be for law and order than for anarchy and communism."

"Wasn't that pro-government?" we asked.

"Hell, no!" he replied. "Law and order is one thing, and being for the government something else."

A fine distinction, no doubt. But not one that the Soweto rebels recognized when they burned down the newstands and forced Mighty Man to his grave. —S.W.
In 1974, McGoff arranged for Mulder to meet the then-Vice President Gerald Ford, an old friend from Michigan. He also claims to have helped convince then-Secretary of State Kissinger to permit the controversial visit of South African Defense Chief, Admiral Hugo Biermann, shortly after the Lisbon coup of 1974.

As a publisher, McGoff joined with the Afrikaner fertilizer magnate Louis Luyt and right-wing German publisher Axel Springer late in 1975 in an unsuccessful effort to take over the English-language South African Associated Newspaper chain, which includes the usually anti-nationalist Rand Daily Mail. McGoff said at the time that he was making the takeover bid for "both business and political reasons."

Mr. Luyt has since put his money into a pro-government English-language daily, The Citizen, and is a reported member of the mysterious Club of Ten, which has published full-page pro-South African ads in British and American newspapers, among its other activities. Various British newspapers have also associated McGoff and UPITN President Clarence "Dusty" Rhodes with the Club of Ten.

Both men deny any connection whatever.

McGoff's Panax has a small investment in South Africa—a printing firm called Xanap—which has printed the pro-government newsweekly To The Point and the controversial AfriComics, which were owned by To The Point publisher J. Van Zyl Alberts (see side bar). McGoff also offered to help out with American distribution of the new To The Point International, which is published from Antwerp.

An arch-conservative himself, McGoff obviously feels at home with the South African world view. He exercises autocratic control over his own newspaper chain—editors must publish what he tells them to or work somewhere else.

When there was a minor rebellion in the ranks, Panax issued an official policy statement published in the June 29 Escanaba Daily Press:

"John P. McGoff not only has the privilege, but is accorded the right as principal stockholder, president, and chief executive officer of Panax Corporation to distribute whatever news copy he deems appropriate and to demand, if necessary, that such copy be printed."

PAIGGC Looks to Economic Independence

Basil Davidson attended the third PAIGC congress which was held between November 15 and 20 in Bissau. The following is a shortened version of two articles published in West Africa, reprinted with the author's permission.

Now governing the twin Republics of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, the PAIGC has continued to follow principles and practices worked out and laid down under the leadership of the late Amilcar Cabral, the much-loved and quite outstanding thinker and organizer who was murdered by agents of the Portuguese dictatorship in January, 1973. Among these was the habit of calling representative congresses of the PAIGC, so as to discuss and decide upon important matters whenever the movement passed from one major phase of development into another. And Cabral used to insist upon this no matter what the obstacles might be.

The first PAIGC congress was held in 1964 when the guerrilla war was only a year old. The second was held in 1973, when PAIGC had effectively won the war against Portuguese colonial rule.

And now, in an entirely new situation, it was seen that a third congress was required. After due preparation this was duly held between November 15 and 20; and the scene was a very different one. Together with many delegations and friends from abroad, as well as accredited ambassadors who included those of Britain and the US, 305 elected representatives of the PAIGC gathered in a handsome conference hall (completed, and with not one detail out of place) in the middle of Bissau. With Aristides Pereira, secretary-general of the PAIGC, and his deputy Luiz Cabral, in the chair (they are also, respectively, Presidents of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau), the proceedings fell into several parts.

Pereira's Report

Aristides Pereira began with an impressive six-hour report on all aspects of PAIGC work and development. There followed in closed session some very long debates (one continuing into the small hours, another until six o'clock the next morning), and much ground was covered, including the airing of critical issues such as the developing relation between town and country, sectoral priorities, and so on.

Decisions emerging from conference papers and these debates were then embodied in a range of policy resolutions (published in the PAIGC newspaper, No Pintcha, of November 24); and, finally, there were elections to the three delegate bodies which govern the PAIGC between congresses.

These are the Conselho Superior da Luta, which was enlarged from 85 to 90 members, and whose immediate task was to elect the executive committee of the PAIGC, also enlarged to 26 members, while the latter, in their turn, then elected the Permanent Commission which governs the PAIGC from day to day. This too was

Aristides Pereira

Basil Davidson, the British journalist and African historian is well-known to our readers. He visited the Portuguese colonies before and after independence and has written widely on the subject. Among his numerous books are Liberation of Guinea, In The Eye of the Storm (Angola) and recently Southern Africa, which he co-authored.
enlarged from four to eight members, partly in order to facilitate a more frequent liaison between the leaders of the PAIGC on the mainland and those on the islands. These are the structures which will operate until the next congress, scheduled in four years' time.

All this gave the opportunity of seeing this governing party of two Republics in full review of itself, and also of examining the state of play, thanks chiefly to the copious detail assembled in Pereira's massive report. I must say, too, that it was a very happy and moving occasion. Here one saw gathered together, along with many new faces, including a lot of new delegates from country districts, the heroic men and women who led the way through harsh years of anti-colonial warfare to an unconditional victory, while the loss and absence of Amílcar Cabral and others who feel that struggle was obviously and sorely felt by those who were present. "We have always been the Party of Cabral," said Pereira in his closing remarks, "and we remain the Party of Cabral. It was a pledge of characteristic sincerity.

Pereira's report is a document rich in its political thinking, and may long rank as, a crucial guide to the politics of liberation as evolved and practiced here. I can do no more than hint at its content. It traces the development of the PAIGC from its earliest days—when, in 1956, it began with only six members—and goes through the successive stages of enlargement of its work and constitution down to today. It defines the PAIGC as the party which brought the State—or rather, two States—into existence as the fruit of its program and its struggle. But it points out that while the party controls the state, the party is not and should not become the same as the state.

"This subordination of the state to the party," Pereira explains, "is enshrined in the constitutional texts of our two Republics. But this can in no way signify a confusion between the two entities of state and party, or the substitution of the first by the second. Each has different though complementary functions, as well as different approaches and methods. Any such confusion is prejudicial to party or to state. It would lead to inefficiency in the different tasks confided to each. It would create or enlarge bureaucratism..."

That being so, decisions called for a continued development of the network of people's assemblies and committees (tied from "the base" to district and region and a People's National Assembly in each country), and of mass organizations such as trade unions, all of which form the principal structures of the state alongside the administration. At the same time, other decisions called for a more tightly organized party than the PAIGC has been till now. Conditions for entry are to be stiffer; more is to be demanded from members. This denotes a logical development of the lines of organization worked out and applied in past years.

Unity With Cape Verde

There was also the question of union between the two Republics. Listening to discussions on this topic, it rapidly became clear that the PAIGC continues to see union as a central and unalterable aim of policy. But these two peoples have different circumstances, often different local cultures, to some extent different problems. A merely imposed union could never hold. What is required—and the resolutions were specific about this—is a period of coming together, of getting to know each other better, so that all may come to accept that coming together will be better than staying apart. Meanwhile, the PAIGC, which isn't a party to allow the grass to grow under its feet, has already begun to provide for "a process of complementary and convergent development" in the two countries. Partly this means the creation of common services, at first in transport and communications, and partly the application of common policies to basic issues of development.

The last 18 months have in fact seen the emergence of such institutions and policies, together with the forming of joint commissions to inspect and push their operation, and a Council of Unity to supervise the work of these commissions. Congress decisions carry this process further. But the PAIGC isn't in any particular hurry. The two countries will come together gradually, but when they have come together they will stay together. So why hurry?

Principles of Investment

Much of Pereira's report bears on the theory and practical options now required for long-term development. Committed all along to planning on a national scale, the PAIGC now saw that agreement on basic principles of investment must go together with agreement on actual investment programs. Otherwise the danger would remain, and probably grow, of wastage on one hand, or, worse still, of the overgrown capital of Bissau's collarig a far bigger share than could be consonant with the rural advancement to which the PAIGC was and remains pledged. As it is, for example, existing trends indicate that the gap in electric power availability between Bissau (the country's only large town) and the rural areas, already much to the capital's advantage, will grow still wider over the next few years. And a lot was said by rural delegates, during congress debates, about a fear that their areas were being left behind.

Enshrined in congress resolutions—with no fewer than twelve devoted to a programmatic development of food-producers' opportunities—Pereira's report stressed that the party's central aim—"liquidation of exploitation of man by man"—could be reached only by "the active participation (manifestacao) of the most deprived sectors of our population, and above all of our rural producers" because, "if progress were to benefit the few" at the expense of the many, "our economy might grow, but it would not develop.

"In this phase of our transition," Pereira continued, "when we are not yet able to complete a national plan—or, as explained, from lack of space and information, perhaps only "but when we are able to launch and carry out specific projects, we must proceed with an extreme prudence so as to ensure that whatever we build is built in funct of an independent economic development. Whether in Guinea-Bissau or in Cape Verde, we have to make very sure that we do not fall victims to a vicious circle that would direct production towards that external market at a rate faster than the expansion (manifestacao) of the internal market."

More exports were needed and would call for more investment to secure them, "but the movement of our economy must, above all, be activated by a dinamismo interno," arising from the activation of "our own resources" and not relying on a merely mechanical expansion through "a proliferation and spending foreign aid. Foreign aid must remain complementary to a dynamics dictated by the needs of an independent internal development," and could not be accepted as a substitute for that development.

This rejection of "growth-without-development" policies called for a strong accent on decentralization from Bissau to rural areas. And no doubt hitting at any who might still prefer the easy option of allowing Bissau to continue to grow at the expense of the rest of the country—at present, for example, an overwhelming proportion of the country's administrative personnel is still concentrated in Bissau; Pereira laid down (and the congress agreed) that "Bissau must not be allowed to monopolize our action, but must function only as a motor of development, as a catalyzing element for the activities of the regions..."

The PAIGC is thus beginning to find its way out of the snags and snare...
the inherited situation; and the last three years have been evidently rich in lessons. It is now accepted that Bissau should still be the scene of some major infrastructural and industrial investment (such as the building of a refrigerating complex for a deepsea fishing industry). But it is likewise emphasized that any failure to put a close rein on the capital's growth would lead straight into a widening gap between the capital and the rural areas, would risk the outcrop of a privileged sector, and, in so doing, would undermine any hope of balanced development. Amilcar Cabral's guiding principle was that: "Never again do we want to see a group or class of persons exploiting or dominating the work of our people." The congress said a loud amen to that.

Progress in Guinea-Bissau: An Assessment

by Denis Goulet

Many problems faced the new government of Guinea-Bissau at independence in its pursuit of genuine development that would benefit all the people of its country.

Most of these could be traced to a colonial heritage: the imbalance of export and import relations with Portugal; the lack of cadres; the need to re-integrate the fifty percent of the population who were living in Portuguese-controlled areas during the war; the grave financial situation created by the need to import 90 percent of the food during the first year with no foreign exchange available.

The main focus of the new nation's development strategy has been a consistent emphasis on the rural areas. President Luis Cabral has said that "in this phase of transition to a modern economy, we are going to make quite sure that the big share of the gain goes to our rural areas, for the people there are the heart and core of our nation."

In looking at how PAIGC and the government is putting this goal into practice as a priority, a number of questions come to mind. Is the city of Bissau becoming a parasite on the nation? Will the high degree of dependence on foreign finance and technicians undermine self-reliance?

Bissau As Urban Parasite?

About ten per cent of the population lives in Bissau—80,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. The visitor to the city is immediately aware of the rural-style existence of its people, reflected in the housing, the practice of raising chickens and pigs in the adjacent yard, and the dependence on water wells located far from the house. Despite the density of Bissau, the country as a whole is 90 percent agricultural.

With independence, PAIGC inherited a capital city with little capacity for producing wealth, one whose history and economic habits tied it to artificial Portuguese subsidies, and one with a limited potential to generate new employment.

Bissau's problems are carried over from the colonial era. There are still very few factories and scant opportunities for productive employment outside the civil service. Also carried over was the way it constitutes a drain on the national economy. Nonetheless, the nation's leaders had little choice but to try and render the city somewhat more functional.

Their initial decision to make Madina do Boe, in a remote part of the east, the capital was soon abandoned. It was a decidedly impractical and uneconomic proposition.

Therefore, although Bissau is untypical of the national economy in its behavior and remains somewhat parasitical, this condition can only be overcome gradually by cumulative, multifaceted measures.

Among the steps already taken are vigorous efforts to increase production and productivity in rural areas; a policy of discouraging further migration to Bissau; the attempt to improve the port, the postal service and other infrastructures. Educational programs including city schools are being geared to bring new prestige to agricultural production. These are some of the
ways in which the government is living up to its promise of giving priority to agriculture.

Government officials point out further, that their largest infrastructure investments are in decentralized electrification of the country, roads to the agricultural areas, rural education, the dissemination of Peoples' Stores in remote sites, and even the establishment of factories in such diverse areas as Bolama, Balata and Gabu.

Does Foreign Aid Undermine Self-Reliance?

Although documentation of the total aid to Guinea-Bissau is incomplete, this is estimated in recent years to average $50 million per year. This adds up to a per capita figure of some $50 yearly, very high in relative terms, particularly for a country whose per capita GNP is $120.

Leading donors are SIDA (Sweden's development agency), the UN system, the European Community, the USSR and Cuba. Lesser contributors include Norway, Algeria, Holland, France, the United Kingdom, East Germany, West Germany and numerous non-government agencies. The US plays a very minor economic role in the country.

What effect does this high degree of dependence on outside aid have on the economic evolution of the country and its goal of self-reliance?

There are a number of considerations. First, most of this aid comes in the form of grants, not loans. Thus Guinea-Bissau is receiving substantial resources without incurring a burden-some debt. Another is the government's criterion that insists on diversification of sources and projects.

So we find the Chinese, Americans and West Germans engaged in rice projects. We find medical assistance from Cuba, China, Sweden, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Fishing projects are being undertaken by Algeria, the Soviet Union and Holland. In short, no single donor dominates a sector so totally as to curtail initiatives by the Guinean government.

Criteria Imposed

Underlying their open-door policy is the basic political decision to accept all available aid provided no unacceptable strings are attached. Government officials do not worry greatly that some portion of aid may be poorly used or fail to produce desired results. They judge that Guinea-Bissau's needs are so great and so urgent in all domains that anything good that ensues from aid efforts is a plus, and negative consequences can be written off.

According to Planning Commissioner [Minister] Vasco Cabral, Guinea-Bissau has no choice but to accept all aid offered loyally and frankly. To illustrate, one offer made by a Latin-American country to build schools and supply literacy teams was turned down for political reasons. For similar reasons, the US and West Germany have had to exercise great persuasion to win approval for certain projects they wished to fund.

The insistence on national self-reliance has guided all negotiations for aid. This has generally offset any dangers that might have resulted from such dependence.

One striking example of the way that the new nation's political strength was mobilized to overcome a situation of intolerable dependency, was the creation of the new currency, the Guinean peso in 1976.

When the Portuguese Banco Nacional Ultramarino was nationalized in February that year, Portugal and Guinea-Bissau were unable to agree over the national debt of "Portuguese Guinea." Guinea-Bissau broke the Gordian knot and issued its own currency, while repudiating the debt. In the process the PAIGC organized the exchange of all old bank notes for newly-issued ones. This was carried out within five days—a remarkable organizational feat indeed in a rural country notoriously poor in transportation and communication infrastructure. But the victory was won: monetary self-reliance was achieved and an autonomous national bank created.

At independence the national leaders were faced with three possible choices in the area of foreign assistance. They could refuse all aid and resign themselves to economic stagnation at a very low material level. They could select a preferred country to supply the bulk of the aid, with the possible price of lessened political autonomy. Or they could welcome aid from various quarters with as few preconditions as possible in order to 'buy time' until the country needed less.

This third alternative was chosen, and despite certain inefficiencies in the utilization of aid, Guinea-Bissau has reserved basic control over its economic decisions. The risk is that a sufficient degree of productive self-reliance will not be achieved before the ample streams of unconditional aid run dry.

Grounds For Hope

There exist several grounds for hope for the future of Guinea-Bissau.

The main source of strength is the PAIGC. The party possesses a politically mature and dedicated leadership in close touch with its people.

While resources are scarce, PAIGC leaders do not invoke this as an excuse for inaction. On the contrary they constantly urge themselves and their people on to more strenuous efforts precisely in order to overcome the scarcity.

Yet even the country's resources should not be underestimated. Guinea-Bissau is not lacking in valu-

Peoples' Stores have been built in remote areas, such as this one in a village in the south.
able natural resources. Many potential riches have simply never been properly exploited: agriculture, fishing, leather, forests, even minerals.

Bauxite reserves ranging from 250 to 500 million metric tons are now being prospected. Petroleum studies, interrupted by Exxon shortly before independence, have been resumed by the Italian firm, AGIP.

Successful agricultural diversification has proved feasible. Furthermore, Guinea's population is small, and its food/people balance is favorable.

A clear-headed, disciplined leadership working with the people is important. No less so is the existence of a strategy whose choices are dictated, not by imported models or rigid doctrines, but by the concrete realities encountered at the grass roots. Such a strategy has been adopted in Guinea-Bissau.

ANGOLA

Party Congress Charts Course Ahead

The racist Rhodesian regime which is becoming more desperate with each succeeding month, perpetrated yet more massacres inside the territory of neighboring Mozambique in the final weeks of 1977.

Rhodesian troops brutally killed 85 people, almost all women and children, in an attack November 23 on a refugee transit camp near the Mozambican town of Chimoio, 60 miles from the Rhodesian border with Tete province. Hundreds more were wounded.

Only three days later, Rhodesian troops attacked the transit camps near Tembwe, also in Tete province and more than 120 miles from the Rhodesian border, killing 246. The Rhodesians used four Mirage fighter-bombers, eight helicopters, and dozens of paratroops to bomb, strafe and burn the camps' villages. About 2000 refugees lived in the camps before the attack.

Even before the Chimoio attack ended, the Salisbury propaganda machine was ready with its version of events. It claims:  
* Starting November 23, Rhodesian troops, supported by planes and helicopters, had attacked and destroyed two camps of Zimbabwean guerrillas, located in the Mozambican provinces of Manica and Tete.  
* During the eight-day campaign, based on Salisbury's "pre-emptive strike" and "hot pursuit" policies, some 1200 guerrillas were killed, and tons of materiel destroyed.

Civilians Attacked

The people's Republic of Mozambique, in a protest note to the United Nations, painted a different picture of the events, detailing what it termed atrocities carried out by Rhodesian troops at a refugee transit center near Chimoio. Mozambique refuted assertions that the Chimoio camp harbored guerrillas of the Zimbabwean People's Army, pointing out that very few men had been found among the dead and the wounded.

"This center, in which there are exclusively civilians, is meant for receiving Zimbabwean refugees before they are distributed to the various camps, the Maputo government stated in its UN report. The enemy had as its fundamental objective the deliberate massacre of defenseless civilians. There were found victims placed in groups of three inside petrol drums and machine-gunned.

"The corpses were mined. Groups of persons tied up and killed with bayonets were found."

The Mozambican version of what happened in Chimoio on November 23 is supported by the film material of a BBC News crew, which was visiting the area on the day of the attack, and by the accounts of foreign journalists who later toured the site.

'We Saw Everything'

The shaken BBC television team told reporters "We saw everything." They filmed the planes dropping bombs, they filmed the helicopters, and later they filmed the results of the attack.

Reporters counted 70 bodies on the camp grounds, actually located some 18 miles from Chimoio. A doctor at the
town hospital told journalists that an additional 15 persons had died there.

Of the 85 fatalities, 55 were children; 21 were women. Eight persons were reported still missing, while the number of wounded was put at 534, of which 234 remain hospitalized. The majority of injured still under treatment are women and children.

Mozambican Defense Ministry officials said the attack on the refugee camp was carried out by paratroops carried by helicopter gunships. They were supported by Mirage fighter-bombers and Hawker-Hunter and Canberra attack and transport planes.

The Mirages, supplied by South Africa, which manufactures them locally under French license, dropped napalm and fragmentation bombs, not sparing even the camp hospital. In the debris, searchers, later found the charred remains of several war amputees.

Mercenaries Involved

The bombers preceded about a dozen helicopter gunships, which strafed the camp grounds and riddled all the buildings with cannon fire, before landing paratroops. The troops were said to consist of Rhodesian regulars and assorted white mercenaries.

The Mozambican magazine Tempo, the December edition of which carried pages of photos depicting corpses of Zimbabwean children lying in mass graves on the camp site, charged Israel with involvement in the affair.

Quoting "sources in diplomatic circles," Tempo said Israeli military advisers have shown up recently in Rhodesia, and that the attack on Chimoio brings to mind the tactics Israel employed in its raids on Arab towns suspected of harboring Palestinian guerrillas.

The November Rhodesian campaign inside Mozambique follows reports of a significant buildup of troops along the border, and admissions by a captured spy to the effect that the Smith regime was plotting a full-scale invasion, along with the physical elimination of FRELIMO leaders and senior guerrilla commanders. (Southern Africa, November 1977)

In its December note of protest against the UN, Mozambique places the Chimoio massacre in the wider context of a continuing Rhodesian campaign of border violations that has already brought worldwide condemnation.

Last June the UN Security Council had unanimously condemned "the illicit racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia for its recent acts of aggression."

At that time Mozambique had documented some 120 border violations and the deaths of about 1,400 persons, including 600 Zimbabweans at the Nyazonia refugee camp, at the hands of the invading troops.

These figures applied to a one-year period beginning in March, 1976, when recently independent Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in compliance with international sanctions that had been previously disregarded by the Portuguese colonial administration.

Desperate Response

Since the June UN debates the Smith regime has responded to increased pressure—both internal and external—for majority rule by stepping up its assault on Mozambican sovereignty.

Between May and October, according to Mozambique, the three border provinces of Tete, Manica and Gaza were subjected to 105 incursions, resulting in 85 persons killed and 48 wounded, 507 houses destroyed or burned, 7 shops, 2 schools and 2 hospitals razed to the ground, and 3,000 sacks of maize burned.

Reminding the international community of its June 1977 commitment to render "material" assistance, to increase the defensive capability of the People's Republic, Mozambique's December protest note also states:

"By launching constant aggressions against Mozambique, Ian Smith is not only challenging the international community but is demonstrating his systematic refusal to accept a negotiated solution of the Rhodesian problem. Moreover, by violating the territory of a sovereign state, where his troops have barbarically massacred defenseless civilians, mostly children and women, Ian Smith intends to internationalize the conflict between his regime and the people of Zimbabwe."

Meanwhile, a Patriotic Front spokesman, interviewed by Tempo following the Chimoio massacre, assessed the different moods of the Rhodesian racists and the Zimbabwean patriots by recounting an anecdote:

"When I was a child in my country, they told me something I have never forgotten. That is, when we kill a bull, when it is about to die, should we get near, it will kick out at us with all its strength, in a way we'll never forget. These [attacks] are like the thrashings of a dying animal, and they are powerful. But we are not afraid; we are undaunted.”

Holes in the Arms Embargo

Three weeks after the US voted in the UN November 4 to uphold a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, the State Department authorized the sale of six Cessna light aircraft to private distributors in South Africa. The State Department did not make its decision public until December 14, when a spokesman, John Trattner, told reporters that the Cessnas, valued at $500,000, were to be used for crop dusting, and that Cessna planned to sell an additional 44 planes to South Africa valued at $3 million. According to a spokesman for Cessna, the planes were sold to South Africa Distributors, Inc., Cessna has already sold 55 aircraft to South Africa in 1977, the spokesman said. Reliable sources indicate that the planes now being sold are Cessna Model 172, which are known to be used elsewhere in the world for military training, and which are included in the Air Force arsenals of Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru.

At the time of the UN vote in early November, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated that "aircraft and spare parts prohibited for sale to South Africa are those destined directly or indirectly for the South African military or police." Despite the State Department's assurances that the recent sales are civilian in nature, ample evidence exists that South Africa has been using Cessna light aircraft for years in military or police operations.

Military Use

There are two ways these and similar planes are put to military use in South Africa.
The South African Air Force already owns 22 Cessna 185 light aircraft, according to Air Force Magazine's year end roundup of world-wide military capacities. They have been used for a variety of support functions including liaison, reconnaissance, and light transport duties. These aircraft are not combat planes, but they have played an important role in guarding the South African border against black liberation fighters. "These small aircraft keep the 1,000-mile border under constant surveillance," according to a recent issue of the South African military journal, Paratus. "Cessnas can be used to control ground fire onto specific targets and to report subsequent enemy movement."

The DMS Market Intelligence Report indicates that some of these planes were sold to South Africa after the unilateral US arms embargo against South Africa was implemented in 1963. Thus planes sold now, even to private purchasers, could also find their way into the South African Air Force.

"Private" Use

Second, privately-owned civilian aircraft make up the all-white Air Commando units—"flying militia"—in which volunteers fly their own planes. This explains why sales of civilian aircraft to private purchasers, like the current transactions, have been criticized as a major loophole in the US arms embargo. In spite of ample data on the military implications of such sales, the Carter Administration has apparently decided to leave this loophole wide open.

"The licensing of so-called civilian aircraft to South Africa is little more than a polite legal fiction," Jennifer Davis, Research Director for the activist American Committee on Africa, said in reaction to the approval. "Any aircraft can easily be converted for military use, and in South Africa the existence of a paramilitary group such as the Air Commandos makes it possible for the military to use civilian aircraft while maintaining the legal fiction."

The Air Commandos are not members of the regular military forces but are paid by the government during regular periods of training every year and also when they fly in times of emergency or war.

Many of the Commandos fly light planes. Even if the licensing procedures were adhered to technically and no planes were sold to the military, such planes would become available to the military, forming part of the "security planning" of the government.

Polaroid Ends SA Sales

The Polaroid Corporation, the Cambridge, Massachusetts, producer of instant photographic equipment, has become the first US company to sever its direct links with South Africa because of the regime's apartheid policies.

Polaroid's decision to end all sales to South Africa came only after several years of pressure by a number of forces, including its own black workers in Boston, church, community and activist groups.

The recent action followed revelations that Polaroid has continued sales to the South African government. According to Indrus Naidoo, a former employee of Polaroid's South African distributor, Frank and Hirsch, and now in exile in Europe, Frank and Hirsch had been selling film to the government, for the military and for use in its passbook system, in violation of a 1971 understanding. That understanding stipulated that the distributor must refrain from selling any Polaroid products to the South African government.

Naidoo's information was first conveyed to the American Committee on Africa. A Boston Globe correspondent Robert Lenzner picked up the story, and gave it considerable publicity in late November. Soon thereafter, Polaroid moved swiftly to announce the termination of its dealings with Frank and Hirsch. It was obviously eager to avoid a repetition of the 1970 furor that focused national attention on its policies, when black workers at its Cambridge plant formed the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement to protest the company's complicity with apartheid.

The Polaroid Experiment

At that time Polaroid purchased full-page advertisements in a series of major US newspapers to announce an
"experiment" in South Africa. The company dispatched a team of company personnel to South Africa to fashion a program to respond to black workers' demands that the company pull out of South Africa. "We abhor apartheid," the company's advertisement said, but instead of withdrawing from South Africa, Polaroid said it would increase wages and contribute some funds toward African education. It also agreed to end all government contracts.

Polaroid set a precedent with its 1971 "experiment," outlining what was to become the standard defense of US companies that were challenged for their continued operation in South Africa. Instead of withdrawing, Polaroid pictured itself as a force for reform. The State Department issued a pamphlet recommending the Polaroid approach to the more than 350 US corporations in South Africa. Last March, 12 major multi-nationals signed a "statement of principles" sponsored by the Reverend Leon Sullivan that was also modeled after the experiment.

The Experiment That Failed

Faced with a new challenge in 1977, Polaroid clearly felt that it was no longer possible to defend its "experiment." It responded to the allegations of continuing sales to the military and to the pass-law agency by sending a team of investigators to South Africa. They confirmed that Frank and Hirsch had indeed established an elaborate scheme to hide its sales to the government. Bills were sent to the government through a "middleman" drugstore in Johannesburg, but the products were supplied directly to the government agencies in unmarked cartons and vehicles.

The investigators arrived at a critical time in South Africa, shortly after the death of Steve Biko and the banning of even the most moderate black organizations such as the Association for the Education and Cultural Advancement of the African People of South Africa, the group through which Polaroid had been providing its much vaunted assistance to African education.

It is not surprising that a Polaroid executive was finally forced to admit, albeit unofficially, that "the Polaroid experiment is dead."

Polaroid sales in South Africa are relatively small (less than $5 million a year) but the political significance of the company's decision was not lost in South Africa. The East Province Herald said that "an important link has been severed in the chain of trade between this country and the Anglo-Saxon business world." The Natal Mercury charged that "vociferous anti-apartheid lobbies in America... have long been agitating for the company to pull out of South Africa—and this time the boardroom seems to have capitulated." Die Transvaler, an Afrikaans paper, commented that "...an important Western company has bowed to political pressure in which the hand of South Africa's enemies is clearly visible.

It is possible that Polaroid products will still reach South Africa; Polaroid has not instructed its distributors in other countries not to sell to that country. But an important first victory has been won.

Polaroid's about-face is a particular embarrassment for those who apologize for and plead the "constructive" role of US corporations in bringing about changes within South Africa. The Carter administration and Ambassador Andrew Young no longer have the Polaroid example to hold up in defense of US economic interests in South Africa.

Transafrica Announces Stance

Transafrica, a new Black American lobby closely associated with the Congressional Black Caucus, has called for a more "progressive" US policy toward Africa. Its President, Mayor Richard Hatcher, urged the Carter Administration in a December press conference to:

1) support a mandatory UN oil embargo against South Africa;
2) increase US aid to Africa and the Caribbean; and
3) negotiate fair commodity agreements with African and Caribbean countries.

Transafrica also expressed "deep concern" about the resurgence of anti-Cuban feeling within the Administration and said that Cuba's role in Africa should not affect normalizing US-Cuban relations.

The new lobby has scheduled fundraising events hosted by major Black politicians in Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York over the next four months. Transafrica hopes to open a Washington office before May.

US Gives Food to Mozambique

Over $6 million worth of surplus food commodities will be sent soon to Mozambique for use in the regions hit by floods earlier this year and for Zimbabwean refugees. The 30,000 tons of food, mostly wheat, supplemented by dry skim milk, vegetable oil and rice for the Zimbabwean refugees, was authorized under the PL 480 "Food for Peace" program. This agricultural program was not affected by the recent Congressional ban on aid to Mozambique and Angola because it was not included in the main foreign aid appropriations bill.
It is now clear that the Western initiative on Namibia has failed. In the fourth and crucial series of negotiations with South Africa in December, Western diplomats were unable to obtain South African agreement to any internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem. The deadlock between SWAPO and South Africa remains. South Africa is entirely unwilling to make further concessions; indeed, according to those present at the talks in December, South Africa drew back from previous concessions. It is likely now to go ahead with the “independence” exercise which it had already proposed for 1978. It will probably conduct fraudulent elections sometime this year and establish a Constituent Assembly composed of the flunkies of the Turnhalle Alliance.

The arrest of several leaders of the internal wing of SWAPO—notably the Vice-Chairman Daniel Tjongarero and the internal affairs Secretary Lucia Mantenya—set the stage for the collapse of the talks in Pretoria. The arrests put SWAPO in an impossible situation. They were a clear message that South Africa has no intention of holding open elections. Indeed, they were the clearest possible expression of South Africa’s view that the negotiations are nothing but a game designed to buy time in which Vorster may better prepare his defenses and continue the process of “softening” the front-line states which support SWAPO.

The latest round of talks took the “contact group,” headed by US representative McHenry, to several countries in southern Africa. The group met with leaders of the “front-line” states, SWAPO and South Africa.

The “contact group” held two separate meetings in Lusaka with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and came away convinced that SWAPO would hold firm to the line that it has insisted upon all the time: that no solution was possible without the complete withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia. That is SWAPO’s condition for participation in any future Namibian elections. For it considers free elections impossible in a situation such as the present one, with South African troops and police in control of the main towns and free to impose their particular brand of “law and order” on the people of Namibia.

SA Army in Control

There are at present in excess of 40,000 troops and police in Namibia. The South African position in the most recent round of talks was that a “residual force” of at least 4,000 troops should remain in the country after a ceasefire and through the elections. No mention has been made of the large number of South African special police in the Territory in most discussions of the security issue.

President Nyerere is believed to have sought the creation of a United Nations peace-keeping force large enough to neutralize the South African troops which might remain. South African officials, however, have insisted in the most recent talks that their troops should outnumber UN peace-keeping forces by a ratio of three to one. The front-line states consider this unacceptable. South African negotiators demanded, in addition, that their troops be given observer status with the UN if the UN stationed observers with South African forces. South Africa also continues to insist on maintaining what it calls “platoon-sized units” at eight forward posts along the Angolan border.

The transition period, furthermore, cannot begin, according to the South Africans, until SWAPO has agreed to a ceasefire, ceased all military activities, laid down its weapons and dismantled all mines in operational areas. South Africa will not allow any UN observers into the Territory until these conditions have been met. These conditions are, of course, absurdly restrictive in the circumstances. And Western negotiators were left with the impression that South Africa is most unlikely to accept the presence of a large UN force in Namibia.

Political Prisoners

The other principal obstacle which surfaced in the talks was the question of political detainees. SWAPO insists that all political prisoners must be freed prior to elections. South Africa insists that these prisoners are merely “criminals.” In an SABC radio interview on December 11, Foreign Minister Botha said he would agree to set up a four-man judicial panel to review all cases. This is not a new idea and can be regarded as a more elaborate version of dragging through talks as long as possible.

Despite this bleak outcome the “contact group” continues to exude optimism, although a little more cautiously than before. They are now talking about publishing a set of proposals which might become the basis of a settlement. They evidently hope that, at least neither of the two sides will flatly reject their proposals and that talks can continue. They apparently hope to enlist the support of some African leaders and, in particular, the Nigerian Head of State, General Obasanjo. Thus, if the Western plan works, talks will go on and on, and South Africa will have been granted some more precious time.
There will be more “settlement” talks on Namibia in January. The South African government has informed the western contact group that it intends to hold elections in Namibia on July 17, whether or not an internationally acceptable agreement has been reached by then, but it has also announced acceptance of the invitation to meet the five western members of the Security Council for talks in New York in mid-January.

SWAPO will not attend those talks according to reliable reports. SWAPO would be willing to talk to Vorster, but he refuses to include the organization in the negotiations. SWAPO leaders will meet with the contact group later in the month.

There are ominous signs that the talks will produce increasing pressure on SWAPO to make a compromise settlement, which would allow for a continued South African military presence in Namibia. So far SWAPO has insisted on the complete withdrawal of all South African troops as a prerequisite for elections and the transfer of power. Members of the US delegation in the contact group have been heard unofficially complaining that SWAPO is being unreasonable on this issue.

The contact group is asking SWAPO to accept a proposal that 1,500 South African troops be allowed to stay, in one area, under UN supervision. The South Africans have not so far indicated acceptance of that proposal; they have stated that they intend to continue stationing at least 3000 troops in Namibia, some of them on the northern border of Owambo.

Observers familiar with Namibia point out that it is often difficult to distinguish between the different elements in South Africa’s machinery of control. Men can easily change uniform and no-one is talking about the removal of the police-force, so that even if the soldiers left, there would be serious questions about the degree of continuing South African presence.

Resolution 385, the 1976 Security Council resolution which set out the attitude of the international body to the process of achieving independence in Namibia, specifically called for the withdrawal of the illegal South African administration, including its troops, before the commencement of elections, which were to be held under UN supervision.

Thus it is not SWAPO that is trying to change the internationally accepted terms of negotiation but rather the western group.

This is of course not the way the US press is presenting developments. In late December the Washington Post, in a vicious and dishonest editorial, attacked, as a display of “anti-colonial innocence,” the UN designation of SWAPO as sole representative of the Namibian people. It then accused SWAPO of being the “chief obstacle standing between Namibians and a freely chosen government of their own.” It referred to SWAPO as having a power base in northern Namibia “in the Ovambo tribe,” describing it also as an “externally based” organization, thus totally ignoring the fact, now widely acknowledged, that SWAPO has broad-based national support throughout Namibia. It went on to indicate that justice demanded that if Pretoria were forced to withdraw its troops or let them be neutralized by a UN presence then SWAPO should make “similar concessions—and SWAPO isn’t bending.”

The editorial went on to say “The South Africans are offering externally-based SWAPO forces the opportunity to participate peaceably in the political process.” On that basis it urged the United Nations to encourage SWAPO to “test that offer,” brushing aside, without comment the fundamental SWAPO argument that there cannot be any free peaceable political process under the barrel of South African guns.

It is tempting to ignore the Washington Post editorial as an unfortunate display of ignorance. Unfortunately it seems to represent more than that, reflecting somewhat crudely an attitude that is no less hostile to Namibian liberation because it is more elegantly expressed in the language of diplomats. SWAPO will need to watch its back when it comes to talk to the Western contact group in New York about Namibian independence.
SOUTH AFRICAN Economic Affairs Minister, Chris Heunis, reestablished measures, suspended since 1970, which give the regime the right to force foreign firms there to produce strategic materials. The supplier will be compensated, but the regime has the right to enter any premie and to seize any goods if a supplier refuses to deliver them.

Security police arrested about 30 African journalists on November 30. They were marching to protest recent bannings and detentions. Three police cars and a van intercepted the marchers, tore the placards from their hands and shoved them into the vehicles. A white photographer taking pictures was also arrested.

An 18-year-old student, Bonaventura Sipho, adds yet another name to the growing list of those who have died in detention.

More than 700 people are detained without trial in South Africa, according to latest figures from the Institute of Race Relations. Another 160 are restricted by "banning orders" which effectively silence the victims.

The evening newspaper The Star recently published a list of people known to be detained or banned. The list included 714 detained persons and there were probably at least another 50 whose names had not been disclosed.

US businessmen in South Africa set up an American Chamber of Commerce to boost trade. So far the Chamber has attracted 177 members—estimated to be half the American-controlled companies in South Africa.

More US businessmen are being wooed by Finansbank, which pays a golf pro, Gary Player, a large fee for helping to arrange tours and for playing golf with American visitors. The bank wants to promote South Africa's image abroad and to gain more business through establishing connections with prominent businessmen.

A new arms trading partnership, whose members are South Africa, Israel, and Taiwan, is gradually surfacing. Israel's arms sales to Taiwan and South Africa are well known, but recent activities have set the international community buzzing with rumors of a possible buying-and-selling link between the two political outcasts: Taiwan, which has been expelled from the UN, and South Africa, which has been placed under a mandatory arms embargo.

One of the first signs was a recent advertisement in the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce bulletin calling for weapons for two frigates now under construction in Taiwan, including naval guns in the 100mm and 75mm range, anti-aircraft guns in the 40mm range, land-attack missiles, torpedo tubes and torpedos. Armscor—the Armament Corporation of South Africa—could bid on this requirement.

Last March, the commander-in-chief of the South Africa Army spent nine days in Taiwan touring military installations. One topic that reportedly came up for discussion was the possibility of cooperation between the two nations.

Taiwan is highly concerned about American reluctance to sell its F-16 fighter planes and surface-to-surface missiles, and has turned to Israel for its home-made Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles. Israel has said it will stick by the arms embargo against South Africa, but there is nothing to prevent it from selling weapons via Taiwan.

Meanwhile, South African Minister of Defense, P.W. Botha, told a meeting in Port Elizabeth that South Africa is now in a position to export arms.

He said this was a development which held great prospects for South Africa's private industry. Arms production is such that exports could be made to other responsible countries.

South African-made mini-helicopters will soon be assembled in Israel and exported commercially to the Common Market countries, according to George Taussig, a South African business man engaged in this endeavor. Regarding the Common Market's boycott of South African products, Taussig says he hopes the Israeli factor in production will "lessen the concern" of the Europeans.

Longtime African National Congress leader Govan Mbeki, 67, currently serving a life sentence on Robben Island for his political activities, was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Amsterdam on January 9, the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Faculty for Social Science of the University.

THE RHODESIAN regime has sentenced at least nine men to die since the latest British settlement proposals were made public in September.

According to an International Defence and Aid (London) report, two others had their earlier appeals against their death sentences rejected, and have almost certainly already been hanged. They are Lucas Tlou, who was convicted on charges of recruiting guerrillas, and Mahlatini Sambulo Ndhlovu.

Of the nine known to be sentenced more recently, five were convicted of recruiting guerrillas; two of murder and possessing arms; one of being a member of a guerrilla group. The ninth conviction was not specified. At least five are executive members of branch officials of Muzorewa's African National Council. Evidence reaching London also suggests that the regime has mounted a new wave of detentions, also directed at officials of the ANC.

Wealthy American author Robin Moore has named himself "US Ambassador to Rhodesia." Unrecognized by President Carter's administration, the author of the Vietnam best-seller, The Green Berets, has opened an unofficial embassy in Salisbury and sponsored a club-like meeting place for US citizens fighting in the Rhodesian army.

THE NAMIBIAN whites-only Republican Party of Dirk Mudge has aligned itself with the recently formed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), whose president is Clemens Kapuuo, handpicked by the South African government to lead an "independent" Namibia. The DTA constitution retains the provisions of the Turnhalle constitution for representation by ethnic group.
**MOZAMBIQUE and CUBA** have signed a series of aid and cooperation agreements marking the end of a five-day official visit by President Samora Machel. He was greeted on his arrival in Havana by an exceptionally warm welcome from thousands of Cubans who turned out to cheer him. A two-day tour of the countryside was followed by formal talks with President Fidel Castro and a signing ceremony.

The agreements include a general friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid pact, a cultural accord, and a direct cooperation agreement between the Cuban Communist Party and Frelimo. It also covered Cuban aid for education, health and the economy.

In a speech during President Samora's visit, President Castro said Cuba was stepping up aid in all these fields and would soon increase the number of its technicians there from 300 to 400, including doctors, nurses, construction workers, and specialists in the sugar industry.

President Castro, also announced that Cuba is setting aside six of its special schools built in the countryside for the education of children from Mozambique and Angola. 1,200 children made up the first group of students from Mozambique.

The Mozambican Finance Ministry announced that the government took control of all foreign exchange operations and payments abroad. The step was taken because of "constant sabotage in the financial sector by internal and external reaction," which had caused a flight of foreign exchange abroad.

**ZAMBIA and ZAIRE** have signed an agreement that will allow a Zairean company to build a bridge over the Luapula River in the Zambian copperbelt. Negotiations are also in progress between Zambia, Botswana and international financing agencies to construct a bridge over the Zambezi River at Kazungula, the point where Rhodesia, Botswana, Zambia and the tip of the Caprivi Strip of Namibia meet. The road between Kazungula and Livingstone in Zambia has already been tarred, and Botswana is making arrangements to do the same to the road to Francistown on its side of the crossing point.

**BOTSWANA'S decision to create a national standing army is imposing considerable strain on its economic resources.** President Seretse Khama has not favored such an army in the past, and until recently the country has made do with a small paramilitary police unit. But increasing tensions in southern Africa, the escalating border war in Rhodesia, and the possibility of a strike against refugee camps in Botswana by Rhodesian security forces, have forced Khama to reconsider his stand. He is recruiting 2,000 men to form the basis of a new army.

Khama is determined that the country will pay for its own hardware and training programs and avoid becoming dependent on any one power, but the cost of refusing overseas assistance will be high. About a third of the budget for its own hardware and training programs and avoid becoming dependent on any one power, but the cost of refusing overseas assistance will be high. About a third of the budget for his new army.

**THE UNITED NATIONS** Security Council voted unanimously December 9 to establish a committee, composed of all members of the Council, to supervise the implementation of the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the Council against South Africa a month earlier.

The new committee will examine the report submitted by the Secretary-General on the progress of the implementation of the embargo, and study ways of making it more effective. It will also seek further information from all nations concerning the actions they have taken to carry out the embargo.

Observers have noted that this committee is closely modeled on the committee set up by the Security Council to monitor sanctions imposed on Rhodesia, and have pointed out that the latter was in fact not able to prevent gross and continuing violations of these sanctions.

**ALASKA'S Lt. Gov. Lowell Thomas, Jr., created a stir among that state's 9,000 blacks when he stated on his return from a visit to South Africa that blacks there were "not ready" for the vote.** When he went before the state's Black Caucus to clarify his statement, he said his remarks, including a statement that the South African economy would "go to hell in a handbasket" if blacks were allowed to vote, were not intended to have any political or social significance or any bearing on affairs in Alaska. Standing by his earlier comments, Thomas added that he did not know "when the appropriate time would be" for blacks in South Africa to vote.

Thomas also said that he is "not in favor of segregation, but I am against mixed marriage. I suppose that's a form of segregation." Mixed marriage "goes against nature," he said. "It goes against my nature."

Lt. Gov. Thomas has announced plans to seek re-election in 1978.

**INTERNATIONAL actions** protesting the South African regime include France's stopping delivery on four warships under construction for South Africa in response to the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the United Nations.

Maritime unions in Sydney are considering placing a total ban on all South African shipping because of the jail death of Steve Biko.

The Caribbean island state of Antigua has banned ships with South African connections from using port facilities. The ban comes in response to an accusation that Antigua has been used as a staging point for the shipment of arms from Canada to South Africa. The government denied the charges but instituted the ban given what it said was "the possibility of the government being deceived."

The government of West Germany announced outlaws in credit guarantees for exports to South Africa. Although this step is seen as an indication of a tougher political line on South Africa, there is some question as to how seriously this decision will affect trade.

Action against Dutch nationals in South Africa who are considered to be supporting apartheid is contemplated by the Dutch government as part of rethinking its relations with South Africa.
Muzorewa, Sithole Give
Ground in Rhodesia Talks

Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith has managed to keep his 'internal settlement' talks going with Bishop Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau.

In mid-January both sides agreed that a future independent Zimbabwe should have a 100-seat parliament with 28 white members. Smith has been insisting that these white representatives should be elected by a whites-only voters roll—a point on which his African negotiating partners have taken varying positions.

The agreement on parliamentary composition came relatively quickly and met with some opposition from within even the ranks of the moderate camp. Sithole was criticized by his Central Committee for the accord.

The Patriotic Front has responded to the Salisbury talks by stepping up its military activities. Recent targets include the Grand Reef army and air base and a Salisbury suburb.

New press restrictions in Rhodesia have further curtailed the flow of news, with foreign correspondents now limited to reporting the contents of official communiques and court and parliamentary proceedings. References to declining white morale and the details of guerrilla attacks are among the themes deleted by government censors.

South African Murder
No Surprise

Rick Turner, a 35-year-old university professor and influential white leftist, was shot and killed by unknown assailants at his Durban home on January 8.

Turner was officially banned by the South African government five years ago but remained politically active, doing research for the defense in a number of political trials and writing for publication under various pseudonyms. His banning order was due to expire in February.

Several government critics have said they regard Turner's death as the beginning of an ominous period of heightened extra-legal repression. South African officials have faced mounting world protests over banning, detentions without trial, and deaths in detention. "It's certainly more convenient for the government if effective opponents are murdered by unknown persons," said one friend of Turner's in the wake of the shooting.

Buthelezi Attempts
New Alliance

A new political alliance formed in January by African, Asian and Coloured politicians in South Africa has evoked mixed reviews.

The grouping joins Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement with the Coloured Labour Party, headed by Sonny Leon, and an Indian organization, the Reform Party, led by Y.S. Chinsamy.

They have met for several hours and then announced their intention to call for a nonracial national convention to consider a new constitution for South Africa.

Buthelezi is chief minister of KwaZulu, the government-designated area for the country's largest ethnic group. But he is also a critic of the plan to divide South Africa into separate ethnic states.

South African Officials Sued

Attorney Shun Chetty has delivered letters to the South African Police Minister, James Kruger, and the Minister of Health, Schalk Van der Merwe, demanding compensation of $205,000 for the family of Steve Biko. If the officials do not pay up, the matter could go to court, reopening the public debate over Biko's death in police custody on September 12.

Family lawyers argue that police and doctors under Kruger's and Van der Merwe's authority were negligent in the Biko case.


Buthelezi has been criticized himself for keeping a distance from the influential Black Consciousness Movement and for ineffectively opposing the government.

Reaction to the new alliance from activists has ranged from skepticism to hostility.

New Phase for Mozambique

Mozambique is launching its economic and social program for 1978 with a general offensive in the field of planning.

"We direct the state farms, we support the cooperative sector, and we control the private sector," says Mozambique's Minister for Planning and Development, Marcelino dos Santos. Responsibility for planning and organizing production in most areas of the economy is assigned to provincial structures or to various national ministries.

But ten strategic enterprises, including all hydroelectric projects, coal mines, and several key factories, are under the direct control of the Council of Ministers, the country's highest administrative body.

Merrill Lynch
Dumps Krugerrands

Merrill Lynch, the nation's largest stockbroker, has refused comment on its decision to stop selling gold coins, including the controversial South African Krugerrand. But AFRICA NEWS has learned that the firm cites financial reasons for its move in a letter sent to sales managers in late December.

Merrill Lynch officials, however, have also asked Philadelphia attorney Richard Ash whether or not his client Jo V. Siebert will withdraw her shareholder resolution calling on the firm to cease Krugerrand sales.

Ottawa Reduces
South African Ties

The Canadian government is bringing home its trade commissioners and ending government-backed insurance and loans for companies trading with South Africa. The move is intended to bring pressure on the white government to end its racial policies.

School Year Opens in Soweto

Primary schools in the embattled black Johannesburg township of Soweto began registration on January 17 and officials reported a meager 40% turnout.

Secondary schools are scheduled to resume in early February. Students have yet to say whether they plan to continue last year's school boycott.

UPDATE is written by Africa News Service, which also publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for $28 per year. Address correspondence to P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.
Prospects For Sanctions

Following the November 1977 Security Council ban on all arms supplies to South Africa, Nigeria's Ambassador Harriman, Chairman of the Security Council through January, announced early in the month that his government had instructed him to press for an oil embargo against South Africa. While initially intended to plug the leakage of oil through South Africa to Rhodesia, such oil sanctions would clearly have very serious implications for South Africa itself, signaling another stage in the international community's attempts to force an end to the reign of the apartheid regime.

The imposition of a mandatory arms embargo had been achieved only on the insistence of the African group at the United Nations, in the face of considerable resistance from Western countries. The murder of Steve Biko and the wave of political repression that swept most of apartheid's opposition leaders into jail in October had so aroused world opinion that even South Africa's traditional backers could not afford to support it openly. But even in this situation, African attempts to take stronger measures against South Africa by imposing an oil embargo and general economic sanctions were vetoed by the US and its Western allies.

Arms Embargo Too Late?

"I am afraid we are closing the stable door after the horse has bolted," said one leading French arms manufacturer, commenting on the impact the embargo was likely to have on South Africa.

South Africa has been expecting and preparing for some form of international arms sanction for several years. Its annual defense budget doubled and redoubled, reaching some $2 billion, as it stockpiled arms and spare parts, often obtaining these openly, or under the thinnest of disguises, from France, the United Kingdom, the US, Israel and West Germany.

Most important of all, the South Africans have worked hard at building their own arms manufacturing capability—with the help of those same friends.

Thus, for instance, according to French Defense Minister Bourges, South Africa is producing, under French license, Mirage F-1 fighter-bombers, Panhard armored cars—of which it now has probably 1600—and Crotale anti-aircraft missiles.

"South Africa has acquired the license and has all the blue-prints," said the Minister.

Delays Open Loopholes

These effects of the long delay in imposing a mandatory arms embargo highlight the dangers in allowing another long period to drag by before the imposition of stringent economic sanctions. The "tighten the screw step-by-step" model being proposed by the Western powers is supposed to warn South Africa of the possibility of worse to come in the future, and thus persuade it to make significant policy changes internally. In fact the gradual approach simply allows South Africa to build up its resistance to the effects of sanctions in advance. Said Prime Minister Vorster, commenting on the sanctions moves in November, "We have made provisions so that they cannot kill us.

Oil Sanctions

Oil provides a good example of the need for swift action if South Africa is not to be allowed again to escape the full effect of the imposition of sanctions.

South Africa does not have domestic supplies of oil. The country covers 75% of its energy needs by using coal, a resource in which it is very rich. But oil and petroleum are essential in any modern economy, and South Africa remains almost entirely dependent on imported crude for the 25% of its energy supplied by petroleum.

Most of South Africa's oil comes from Iran. According to UN estimates, South Africa in 1975 imported 12.7 million tons of crude oil from Iran, 1.8 million from Qatar, 0.4 million tons from Brunei, and 0.1 million tons from the United Arab Emirates.

The South African oil industry is heavily dominated by five major international oil companies, which have

MARKET SHARES IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Market Share</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caltex</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobil</td>
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<tr>
<td>BP</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>11.8%</td>
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<td>Four smaller companies</td>
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Sasol's first oil-from-coal plant: the next will be much bigger
South Africa's Oil Refineries

Mobil Refining Company Southern Africa (Pty.) Limited, owns and operates a refinery at Durban with a capacity of 3.0 million tons per year. This company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mobil Oil Corporation, a US company.

Shell and BP South African Petroleum Refineries (Pty.) Limited, owns and operates a 10.0 million tons per year refinery, also at Durban. The company is owned 50 percent by Royal Dutch/Shell (a Dutch-British Company), and 50 percent by BP (British Petroleum) (a British company, 51 percent owned by the British government).

Caltex Oil (S.A.) (Pty.) Limited, owns and operates a 3.25 million tons per year refinery at Cape Town. The company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Caltex Petroleum Corporation, a US company itself jointly owned by Texaco and the Standard Oil Company of California.

NATREF — National Petroleum Refiners of South Africa (Pty.) Limited, owns and operates a 3.6 million tons per year refinery at Sasolburg, near Johannesburg. The company's equity is owned 52.5 percent by SASOL (itself owned by the South African government), 30 percent by Total Refining South Africa (Pty.) Limited (itself owned 66 percent by the French state-controlled CFP (Compagnie Francaise des Petroles), and 34 percent by South African. Interest of 3 percent by NIOC (the National Iranian Oil Company) itself owned by the Iranian government.

Caltex, with $100 million already invested, has announced plans for an additional $134 million. Shell had even faster schemes for expansion.

The oil companies already have a large vested interest in keeping oil flowing to South Africa. The longer they stay, and the bigger they grow, the greater that interest becomes, and the more developed and extensive the refining and other technical capabilities made available to the South African government.

To date a high return on investment has stimulated foreign corporations like these oil corporations to produce whatever goods were in demand in South Africa; but the government also has legislation on its books that empowers it to force the cooperation of all companies operating inside the country that should become necessary. It has the authority to compel all companies to produce any strategic materials it requires.

Planning for Oil Sanctions

The South African government has long assumed that it might one day have to face oil sanctions. It has made long-range plans on that assumption, has stockpiled oil in old mine shafts for many years, and increased its purchases of oil significantly in the third quarter of 1977.

Official figures are classified, but the SA Minister of Planning recently claimed that were oil imports cut off, supplies could last to 1981. British oil researcher Bernard Rivers, who has done much to expose the way in which Rhodesian oil sanctions are being violated by US and other Western oil companies operating via South Africa, thinks that the apartheid regime has deliberately exaggerated the figures to conceal its vulnerability. He estimates that the supply might last 6-9 months.

South Africa seems to be hoping that it can stall off oil sanctions until it is close to ready to bringing its first major oil-from-coal plant on stream. That is expected to happen in 1981, and at that point the South Africans claim they will be able to provide about 30 percent of their oil needs internally.

South Africa has abundant coal, and plenty of S$3 a day black miners to dig it. It is currently getting a great deal of help from US corporations as it hurries to complete the $3.5 billion project, called SASOL II (a smaller pilot plant, SASOL I, also built with US help, is already in operation). Minister of Mines S. P. Botha recently announced that the government would build a third SASOL plant if that became necessary to counteract oil embargoes.

Several American companies are involved in designing and building the plant for the government-controlled project. Principal managing contractor is the giant Los Angeles-based Fluor Corporation, which in 1976 approached the US Export Import Bank to provide nearly $500 million in credit for the operation. Ex-Im refused. A subsidiary of Raytheon Corporation, the Badger Company, a Cambridge, Massachusetts international engineering firm, is a key sub-contractor.

Thus while the African countries are beginning to sharpen up their arguments in favor of imposing oil sanctions on South Africa, that country is hurrying to provide itself with a secure supply of the strategic material, and major US corporations are helping it to achieve its goal.

Biko’s Murderers Freed

Inside the courtroom, the white South African magistrate wasted few words in announcing his expected decision. Mathinus J. Prins needed less than three minutes to dispose of the evidence presented during a three-week inquest and to rule that the South African security police were not responsible for the death of Steve Biko.

On the street outside the courthouse, an opposite verdict was pronounced by Black demonstrators who hailed Biko as a great leader in their struggle against white supremacy. "They have killed Steve Biko," the protesters chanted. As Biko’s widow Nontsikelelo drove away, she saluted the crowd with a clenched fist.

A Lonely Death

The weight of the evidence presented during the inquest certainly lay with the demonstrators. Boiling it down to its bare essentials, Biko’s lawyer Sydney W. Kentridge was able to state the case in three sentences. "There is indisputable evidence that on the morning of September 6, Mr. Biko went into the interrogation room alive and well. On the morning of the 7th he came out a physical and mental wreck. He died a miserable and lonely death on a cold prison floor."

As Kentridge pointed out, the facts were mostly undisputed. Biko was arrested on August 8 as a healthy young man of 30. He died 26 days later. During those days, he was kept...
shackled, naked, left after a severe head injury to lie semi-conscious on a urine-soaked mat on the floor of his cell, and finally dumped into the back of a Land-Rover and driven 700 miles to a prison hospital where he died the next day.

The only issue in dispute was how Biko came by his fatal head injury. And by the end of his cross-examination, Kentridge had the policemen who had taken part in the interrogation disputing each other’s accounts almost as much as his own suggestion that the lethal blows were delivered during a beating. Although they clung to their story that Biko bumped his head against the wall during a scuffle, some of the policemen had him tumbling over backwards against the wall, others forwards. And none of them could explain why an expert neuropathologist found evidence that the five brain injuries that killed Biko must have been caused by at least three separate blows.

Magistrate Marthinus J. Prins apparently felt no explanation was required before rendering his decision. And the demonstrators on the street outside didn’t need explanations to reach their verdict either. Raising their fists in a black power salute, they sang, “What have we done? Our sin is that we are black.”

Protests
The inquest findings were denounced around the world. Even the Carter administration, which had just blocked stiff economic sanctions against South Africa at the UN, joined in the chorus of condemnations.

But the evidence, the decision and the accompanying protests did not appear to disturb the South African government or the white minority which returned it to power in a landslide election victory two days before the inquest ended.

As one veteran observer of South African politics at the American Committee on Africa remarked, “My own theory is that they staged the whole inquest not to show that they respect legal formalities but to show that they don’t give a damn what anybody thinks or says.”

The government’s actions seemed to bear this theory out. A few hours before the decision was announced, security police raided several black townships and arrested at least 13 people, including Stephen Biko’s brother Kaya and his cousin Solomon Biko.

Whether these actions were more likely to quell or inspire further resistance remained an open question. So far as anyone knows, Kaya Biko had not been politically active since he was arrested in 1963. His jailing at that time was later cited as a turning point, a decisive radicalizing experience, for his younger brother Stephen... and thus, perhaps, for the entire nation.
on the big day, BophuthaTswana was welcomed as a new nation only by South Africa itself and the Transkei, which became the first independent bantustan in October 1976.

Opposition to Independence

If the international community expressed its disdain for the proceedings in studied silence, opposition from those who suddenly became citizens of BophuthaTswana at the stroke of midnight, has been expressed far more vociferously.

About two-thirds of the nominal population (1.4 million people) lives outside the boundaries in South Africa. With the declaration of "independence" these people exchanged the emaciated rights of South African citizenship for the even more dubious distinction of being "Bophutha-Tswanas."

Not that there is likely to be much difference between the two. Under Pretoria's hand-picked leader, Chief Lucas Mangope, BophuthaTswana has already installed carbon copies of much of South Africa's repressive legislation. Shortly before the 'general election' that ensconced Mangope firmly in power, Mangope's chief advisor, Zephania Mothopeng, called in the Johannesburg Sun for a "general strike," rather than a "general election," to be held the following day. The state responded by sending in the police in the so-called independent Transkei.

They Held An Election And (Almost) Nobody Came

Last August, BophuthaTswana held elections and Chief (now "President") Lucas Mangope's Democratic Party won 39 of the 43 contested seats. In South Africa this election was hailed as an indication of "Tswana" support for independence.

There is only one problem. Hardly anyone voted, although the polls were open for several days. In the Johannesburg area, some 4,500 people registered to vote out of 122,900 'eligible' "Tswana." And of those who registered, only about 500 actually voted. In the rest of South Africa 12 percent of the potential voters went to the polls.

police to even shoot my own child," he said.

Apparently the students took note of his attitude. When Mangope and four of his cabinet ministers tried to address an election meeting in Krugersdorp this July, a group of students burst into the hall singing political songs and carrying signs proclaiming: "To hell with independence. Mangope is a sell-out." The meeting was cancelled and Mangope and his colleagues were stoned as they prepared to drive away.

Many Problems

Even without a rebellious populace, the new bantustan would face monumental problems. Aside from foisting it off with token "independence," South Africa has bequeathed its new clients a feeble, dependent economy, hamstrung by the same structure of job reservation by race that operates in South Africa, utterly devoid of any possibility for providing employment and subsistence for the supposed BophuthaTswana population. The "homeland" does boast some mining properties, which account for fully half its production. Needless to say, they are white-owned. Beyond that, the main economic hope appears to be a proposal to construct a massive "Las Vegas-type" complex. Presumably most of the high stakes gamblers would be whites from across the border in South Africa, where betting is outlawed.

Whites will chaperone most of the government for some time to come. One white official is already at work establishing a Department of Justice. Five others, assisted by one black, are developing plans for police, traffic and security forces.

But that is only to be expected in a "nation" which includes not a single black lawyer or engineer, only five black doctors, and rations out teachers with often only one for every 100 students.

Political Trials Multiply

At least five political trials involving members of the banned African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) are underway presently in South Africa. The state has brought charges against dozens of Africans under the Terrorism and Internal Security Acts accusing them of a variety of offenses, including membership in the organizations, both of which were banned and thus driven underground in 1960.

The largest trial involves 18 alleged members of the Pan Africanist Congress, including Zephania Mothopeng, 65, a long time PAC leader who has served time on Robben Island, and at least two journalists, Moffat Zungu, of the now banned The World, and Mike Mzileni of Drum magazine.

According to the PAC, some of the accused were arrested by SA security police in the so-called independent Transkei.

In an almost 50-page indictment, the defendants are charged with taking part in terrorist activities between 1963 and 1977. The charges include holding meetings while in prison on Robben Island, with the intent to reorganize the PAC, recruiting people to undergo military training for the PAC abroad; and undergoing guerrilla training both inside South Africa, and in Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania, Zambia, Libya and other places unknown to the state. The 18 face trial early in January.

The state has also named 86 others, including Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, the President of PAC, as unindicted co-conspirators.

Four of the co-conspirators died while being held in detention in 1977. Police explanations for the deaths of Bonaventure Malaza, Aaron Khoza, Samuel Malinga and Dr. Naboarth Ntshutsha ranged from suicide (3), to
natural causes (1). Torture, given the evidence presented at the recent Biko inquest, is a far more likely explanation of these deaths.

The trial of the 18 is the first major trial in recent years in South Africa of alleged PAC members. Three smaller trials now in progress involve six other members of this organization. They face such charges as establishing a guerrilla base inside South Africa, recruiting for the PAC and the murder of six people including a policeman.

All the defendants face the death penalty under the terms of the Terrorism Act.

The Pretoria Twelve

At the same time 12 Africans who have been accused of belonging to the African National Congress face retrial after the judge in the case died of a heart attack in early November. The Pretoria 12, as they have come to be known, have also been charged with sabotaging railway installations, bringing arms and explosives into the country, and recruiting people to undergo military training.

During the initial trial, several important witnesses for the prosecution retracted their testimony on the witness stand and said the police had forced them to testify. One witness, after giving evidence for several days, directly addressed the judge and declared that he had perjured himself because he had been tortured.

Both the ANC and the PAC have called on the international community to build a campaign for the release of these and all other South African political prisoners. They are also urging the redoubling of efforts to condemn and isolate the apartheid regime.

The 18 PAC members on trial are: Zephania Mathopeng (65), Moffat Zungu, John Ganya (48) of Soweto, Mark Shinners (37) of Pretoria, Bennie Ntoele (38) of Pretoria, Hamilton Keke (42) of East London, Michael Khala (24) of Soweto, Alfred Ntshalintshali (47) of Swaziland, Julius Landinge (30) of Cape Town, Zolile Ndinda (26) of Cape Town, Goodwill Moni (24) of Cape Town, Jerome Kodisang (26) of Soweto, Mike Matsobane (36) of Krugersdorp, Johnson Nyathi (32) of Krugersdorp, Themba Hlatshwayo (21) of Krugersdorp, Mthlalengi (22) of Krugersdorp, Rodney Tsoletsane (20) of Krugersdorp, and Daniel Matsobane (31) of Krugersdorp.

The ANC Pretoria Twelve are: Martin Ramokgadi (57), Joe Gqabi (48), Petrus Nchabaleng (50), Nelson Diale (41), Michael Ngubeni (42), Naledi Tsiki (21), Mosima Seke (24), Elias Masinga (24), Lele Motaung (23), Paulina Mohale (25), Simon Mohlanyeneng (23), and Jacob Seathole (47).

South African Economy —
Between The Rock And The Hard Place

A few years ago the headlines would have been as shrill as the attacks would have been extraordinary. Not any more. After more than a year and a half of school boycotts, demonstrations and daily clashes between angry blacks and police, bombs and arson have also become an acknowledged element of daily life in South Africa. And the headlines in the South African press are almost laconic: "Cape bombing — Two security guards were allegedly held down by students while a petrol bomb was tossed into the Bantu Administration Board Building in Zwe lithsha near King William’s town last night"; "Pamphlet bombs explode in city"; "Blast outside Johannesburg police station"; "Blast in train: guard hurt"; "Bomb blast at Carlton."

The last three headlines all appeared during a single week. In the first two weeks of December, four bombing attacks were reported in the Johannesburg area alone. Such episodes are now part of the political landscape. And the question addressed with increasing candor by the captains of South African government and industry is how the once-proud economy can hold up under the growing threat.

"The insurance industry and the government have had high-level talks on the possibility of setting up a national riot or urban terrorism fund," The Star reported in late November. "Insurance spokesmen said the potential for loss by companies was ‘astronomical’ and for this reason firms were unwilling to offer riot coverage. Another executive said bluntly: ‘We don’t see ourselves offering urban terrorism cover’."

Insurance may be one of the least of the worries besetting the South African economy. But it is symptomatic. So was a 50-page supplement put out by the Financial Mail on November 10 — its cover featuring the word SECURITY in two-inch high red letters, right below the fangs of a snarling attack dog. "There are still people who think that the ‘troubles’ that first bubbled over in Soweto last year will go away, when the evidence is that they could get far worse before they get better," the foreword warned. The next 49 pages of advice on alarm systems, guns, private guard services and various gadgets make it clear that "the evidence has created at least one new growth industry."

But the rest of the economy is not flourishing. The signs for the future are not auspicious. And the growth of black resistance to apartheid protrudes through the statistics as rising inflation (11 percent this year) and sinking profits as a decisive fact of economic life.

It shows in the unsettled mood of major sectors of South African industry and consumers. As, for instance, when one newspaper headlines "Swing about in migration hits house building." With whites no longer flocking to the country at a rate of 30,000 a year, the article explains, experts now predict a net loss of 2,000 white citizens and a deep slide in demand for new homes for white families next year.

And the impact of political resistance shows even more in the increasing pressure from abroad, as the United Nations seriously contemplates an oil embargo and major corporations talk about cutting bait.

South African officials boast bravely about stockpiles of oil and the wonders of coal gasification. But independent researcher Bernard Rivers sounds considerably more convincing when he estimates that no more than six to nine months of oil has been stored.

Officials also make a point of shrugging off recent announcements by several western companies that they are pulling back from further involvement in South Africa. But the changing climate seems clearly as Polaroid announces an end to its vaunted "experiment" and a vice president of Citibank proclaims, "We are certainly not going to put any new money in there." Only last spring Citibank was appointed as

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1978/SOUTHERN AFRICA 21
South Africa's most important and faithful US banking ally, after Chase Manhattan showed signs of getting cold feet.

Talk is cheap. Corporations have always shown a willingness to indulge in a little from time to time . . . as long as they could also indulge in cheap South African labor and spectacular South African profit margins. But statistics suggest that at least some corporations may now be re-evaluating their positions.

According to a major study by the US Congressional Research Service released this month, US corporations which formerly plowed back 60 per cent of their South African earnings as increased investments in apartheid are now shipping 65 percent of their profits home. The study predicts that power and transport will be the first sectors of the South African economy to falter because of a shortage of foreign capital. And that this in turn will make investment in mines and factories less attractive.

The dollars are not coming home because US corporate managers have suddenly been afflicted by pangs of conscience after years of reaping profits from white supremacy. A University of Delaware study suggests quite another reason. Ranking countries around the world on a "political risk index" for prospective investors, the study shows South Africa plummeting from the "moderate risk" deep into the "prohibitive risk" category over the next three to seven years.

US activists who have long called on American corporations to leave South Africa are currently mounting a nationwide campaign focusing on general economic disengagement. They may find an unlikely but powerful ally in the figures now turning up on the pages of the financial press.

ZIMBABWE

Smith Settlement Talks

Amid reports of increasing violence in his war with Zimbabwean nationalist guerrilla forces, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith opened talks with a group of moderate black leaders late last year. The move represented Smith's final rejection of the Anglo-American initiatives to bring about a settlement in Rhodesia. It also signaled a new resolve to defend an "internal settlement" on the military front, and in this the new Rhodesian offensive against Mozambique and Salisbury's political efforts are very much connected.

Smith's most recent effort to install a pro-minority administration has met with total rejection from both the Patriotic Front and the five front-line states, who denounced the plan after meetings in Maputo December 18, two weeks after Smith's initiative was announced. Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo have in the past said that they do not reject negotiations, but that they oppose any talks not geared toward the genuine transfer of power to the black majority in Rhodesia.

For their part, British and American officials also claim to have rejected Smith's internal settlement plans. But in a letter to David Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, December 8, Mugabe and Nkomo argued that Owen was allowing the Anglo-American proposals, which include removing Smith and dismantling his army, to be replaced by Smith's attempt to reach an internal settlement.

The Patriotic Front has reportedly said that both Washington and London are covertly supporting Smith, using the British-American plan as a cover for such support.

Smith Plan

The stated aim of the new talks is to establish a government that would include a number of black members of parliament and black administrators, while preserving white ownership of property and industry, and offering safeguards for the minority's position in the future Zimbabwe. With the rapidly escalating war and the thinness of minority forces, time is a crucial factor. The first meeting took place December 2, with the goal of proceeding as quickly as possible to a peaceful constitutional settlement.

More specifically, Smith's proposal envisages an elected parliament in which one-third of the seats are reserved for whites, the remainder open to free election without regard to race. Combined with another point in the proposal—that any new legislation would require more than a two-thirds majority vote in parliament—the stipulation of percentages virtually guarantees minority control of the future government.

Reports from Salisbury at the year's end indicated that after 11 sessions, the talks appeared headed for a deadlock. The two principal African delegations, Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's faction of the African National Council, dare not concede too much ground, for they must be constantly aware of the risk that any agreement they reached might be denied recognition by the rest of the world.

(Left to right) Jeremiah Chirau, ZUPO; Bishop Abel Muzorewa, UANC; Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, ANC
While Bishop Muzorewa is reported to have agreed initially to a one-third white bloc, with a blocking percentage in the legislature, he and Sithole now appear to be shifting toward calling for whites to be represented in only a fifth of the seats.

Smith, on his side, is seeking acceptance of the principle of "primary" elections, in which only white voters would choose white candidates, and is suggesting that these elections be held separately from the one-person, one-vote poll he is publicly pledged to accept.

Also attending the talks as one of the supposed representatives of Rhodesia's African population is Jeremiah Chirau of the government-supported Zimbabwe United People's Organization.

Prime Minister Ian D. Smith's economic figures on the economic workings of recent elections as proposed by Smith, and his side, is seeking acceptance of the principle of "primary" elections, in which only white voters would choose white candidates, and is suggesting that these elections be held separately from the one-person, one-vote poll he is publicly pledged to accept.

In early December, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda announced that he would no longer support the Anglo-American plan. Kaunda was one of the Western powers' key links to the front-line states and thus to the Patriotic Front itself.

Kaunda's rejection of the British-American plan increases the likelihood of British support for Smith's settlement proposals with either Sithole or Muzorewa as the leading figure. Both participants in Smith's talks welcomed Kaunda's December 6 statement. "We would mourn his participation," Muzorewa said, apparently because the participation of the front-line states would hamper the only kind of settlement possible with Prime Minister Smith.

### Black-White Pay Gap Widens

The Rhodesian Economic Society recently published some interesting figures on the economic workings of Prime Minister Ian D. Smith's embattled country. In an article entitled, "Who Bears the Brunt of Inflation?" published in November 1977 in The Rhodesian Journal of Economics, statisticians in Salisbury proceeded to answer that question—and several others along the way.

The average annual salary for the African worker in Rhodesia increased by 59% from 1964 to 1975—an impressive percentage at first glance. In agriculture and domestic work, the two sectors of the economy that employ the most Africans, wages increased 44% and 50% in the same period. Inflation during those 12 years rose at a 44% rate.

It is with such figures as these that the minority governments in both Salisbury and Pretoria often argue that

### ANNUAL WAGES

(Figures are quoted in Rhodesian dollars: US $1 = R $0.65)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AFRICAN</th>
<th>NON-AFRICAN*</th>
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* This category includes the White (200,000) and small 'Coloured' and Indian population

** No figures given, presumably because there are few non-African domestic workers.
Africans in their countries, while deprived of their political rights, are far better off than the citizens of black-rulled states in Africa by virtue of their share of a greater economic pie. But the figures say otherwise:

- In agriculture, a 44% increase means that the African farm worker's annual wage went from $124 Rhodesian to $179. Farm labor employed some 293,000 African workers in 1964, and 353,700 in 1975. "By contrast," The Rhodesian Journal notes, "gross European agricultural output during this period increased by 154%." Thus, while real wages for African farm workers remained virtually the same, and the number of farm workers rose by only 18%, white income in the agricultural sector, derived from black labor, increased significantly.

- Annual wages for Rhodesia's African domestic workers rose from $236 Rhodesian to $353 in the period of the study; the number of domestic workers went from 93,700 to 136,700.

- In other sectors, increases in African wages were somewhat greater. In the construction industry, annual African wages went from $340 to $662, a 94.7% increase; in manufacturing, African pay rose by 81.4%—from $398 to $722 annually; in education, pay went from $462 to $1,045 for a 126.2% gain.

Widening Wage Gap

Despite these increases, White wages still offer a sharp contrast in base pay figures. The average annual non-African salary in all sectors of the economy rose from $2,492 in 1964 to $5,062 in 1975—a 103% increase. African wage increases in all sectors of the economy averaged a gain of 89%. With base pay so much lower for African workers, the percentages mean that the white worker's pay has increased sharply more than the African's. "One can observe from the graph," the Journal concludes, "that the gap between non-African and African earnings continues to grow, and that since 1970 it has been accelerating sharply."

MOZAMBIQUE

Rhodesia Attacks Again

The last act of Mozambique's first national elections in freedom took place on December 4, as Provincial Assemblies gathered in the ten provincial capitals and voted their approval of a slate of 226 for the national People's Assembly. The 196 men and 28 women candidates had previously been approved by the FRELIMO Central Committee as well.

But the heart of the electoral process, the culmination of which was celebrated on December 4, was in the complex process at local, district and provincial level, spread out over more than two months since September 25. In that process candidates proposed by the party were subject to public scrutiny and selection, a sifting designed to weed out those not qualified to serve the people (see Southern Africa, December 1977, for a description of the election in one village).

The first step was the selection of local assemblies, from September 25 until mid-November. In Niassa, one of the most sparsely populated provinces, with a long history of liberated areas during the war against Portuguese colonialism, 46 local assemblies were elected. Of 1,334 candidates proposed for election, 107 were rejected by the mass meetings carried out in each locality. The most common reason—the exposure of candidates who had served in the Portuguese colonial militia.

The process was similar in other provinces. In Zambezia, the most populous province, an area of plantations of sugar, tea, and coconuts, 644 candidates were rejected when there was mass insistence that those who had been recruiters of forced labor for the plantations be excluded.

As district and provincial assemblies were chosen in conferences of delegates selected by the local assemblies, the identification of unsuitable candidates continued. At the provincial electoral conference in Inhambane, a peasant woman identified one candidate as having made a woman pregnant and then abandoned her. The candidate was rejected.

In other cases, local and district administrators among the candidates were rejected. One was identified as having participated in another province in a massacre by Portuguese colonial troops. Another was exposed as having embezzled funds collected for a seminar held by several communal villages.

In the cities, initial elections took place not only in residential areas, but in the factories and other workplaces. Among the obstacles to overcome were the greater number of people concentrated and the consequent greater dif-
difficulty of the people in getting reliable knowledge about the candidates. The difficulties were particularly great in the urban area of Maputo, the capital.

Grouping together Maputo with its industrial “suburbs” of Matola and Machava, FRELIMO began the electoral process with meetings organized by dynamizing groups at workplaces and residential areas. In these meetings some 800 people were chosen to participate in a seminar on the elections. From this group and others indicated by the party, the initial slate of delegates to the city electoral conference was chosen, and sent back to local mass meetings for consideration. Finally the delegates gathered on November 27 to choose the city assembly.

Such an extensive electoral process was considered in Mozambique not a diversion from the other pressing problems of the country, but as a stimulus and as an essential means of dealing with problems. Thus even in the provinces affected by attacks from Rhodesia, the elections took their course. In Tete the precise dates of local assembly elections were only known to people in that locality, to minimize the chances of attack. And around the country, agricultural and industrial units took part in “emulation campaigns” of production, with the outstanding units recognized at the time of the election.

In Maputo, the election of the city assembly was marked by a sober speech by the Governor of Maputo, Jose Moiane, who laid out the most urgent problems that the assembly would be called upon to help solve: food supplies, transport, housing, community health, productivity, and city finances.

Mozambique’s hope is that around the country election of the assemblies will mark a leap forward in the responsiveness and efficiency of the state in serving the interests of the masses of the Mozambican people.

National People’s Assembly Elected

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has decided to transform itself from the broad-based, united front movement it had been throughout the anti-colonial struggle for independence during the sixties and seventies into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard political party.

This was the decision of the Congress of the MPLA held in Luanda from the 4th to the 10th of December. Previously it had been thought that the MPLA might maintain its structure as a movement and, at the same time, create a new party for Angola that would consist of more advanced militants. But after six days of debate that followed weeks of nationwide preparation for the congress, the approximately 300 delegates decided to make MPLA the party that would lead Angola toward what the MPLA calls scientific socialism.

Just how MPLA would narrow its membership to its “better militants” is not yet known, but the congress issued proclamations which stated that it would demand “very rigid criteria.” At the same time the congress stated that MPLA would embark on a rapid program to increase substantially the political consciousness of party members and those who aspire to membership.

MPLA is hopeful that the results of the congress will prepare the way for more cohesive activity between the

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<th>COMPOSITION OF MOZAMBIQUE’S PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLIES</th>
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<tr>
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<td>% State workers</td>
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<td>% Others</td>
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Source: Tempo, January 1, 1978 *No breakdown available
party and Angola's people in the years ahead. The new structure aims to prepare the Angolan working and peasant classes, which MPLA sees as the country's primary social forces, to take control of the national destiny.

Workers and soldiers in the popular army, FAPLA, which represented about one-third of the delegates at the congress, will be heavily represented in the new party structure. Restrictions were placed on the number of possible militants from other strata of society, notably what MPLA has delineated as the petit-bourgeoisie, or "those who do not live exclusively off the fruits of their own labor and who indulge in any form of exploitation of the labor of others."

Response to Coup Attempt
This attack on the petit-bourgeois class—which is seen in Angola as an intensification of class struggle, is an obvious result of the abortive coup attempt last May. During the ceremonies marking the second anniversary of Angolan independence on November 11, President Agostinho Neto lashed out at those who "seek to reestablish their subordination to capitalism," identifying them as the primary support for the coup attempt. For the first time since independence, Neto called for a sharpening of "class struggle" to destroy the attempts of the petit-bourgeois class to reconstitute forms of the oppression of the working class.

Since May, the MPLA has been engaged in a campaign to purge or neutralize sympathizers of those who attempted to take power—what MPLA has called the factionalists. The last of their leaders was arrested in early November after hiding for six months in southern Angola. He is Bakalov, the former political commissioner of the army and member of the tribunal which convicted nine British and American mercenaries in June 1976.

Under Pressure
After the events of the past year, which saw the revelation of a plot to invade the country from Zaire, a rebellion in Zaire's Shaba province for which the Luanda government was labeled responsible, repeated attacks on the northern and southern borders, and the coup attempt in May, it is not surprising that the congress in early December may have felt its country under siege. In response, it has issued a declaration outlining what it sees as the "strategy of imperialism," and specifying what Angola's reaction shall be.

According to the congress, the West has equipped "puppet" guerrilla groups to carry out special wars inside the country, fomenting local wars

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Soweto: A Dramatic Poem

**PROLOGUE**

The child was twelve years old, if that. She was wearing her school uniform. In the eyes of the South African police, she was not a child. She was one of a mass of anonymous, faceless Blacks rioting and looting. A policeman's finger pulled the trigger, and she lay in the street, dying.

And what was the occasion for this tragic event?

On Wednesday June 16, 1976, the South African police turned a peaceful school children's march into one of the most violent clashes between police and civilians in the history of that country. The children were protesting against the compulsory use of Afrikaans, the language of the white Boers, as a medium of instruction in their schools. They associated it with the oppressive laws they lived under, and with the police. They also saw it as a culturally impoverished language, leading to a dead end.

Police violence led to thousands being maimed, hundreds killed, and thousands more jailed, including children, many of them no different in age and innocence from the girl mentioned above. Indeed the carnage continues to this day, having moved all the way south to Cape Town.

*South African poet Daniel Kunene is professor of African Languages and Literature at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has written extensively on African literature, and has had his poetry published in a number of journals.*

Meanwhile the children have made their choice and have joined their parents, and indeed taken the lead, in demanding the removal of apartheid and the total liberation of the black people of South Africa.

But among all those incidents, covering so many different areas and involving so many people, one report kept haunting me: A girl, a child no more than twelve years old, had been shot by the police. That little girl was, for me, the individual manifestation of the terror and the senseless brutality.

And that was the occasion for the following dramatic poem which came to me many days after the event.

---

*Where am I? Why am I lying here in the dust?*

_0, child of a woman, how can I speak the unspeakable to a mere twelve-year-old? Isn't that the problem? Who are you? Where are you? Speak to me. Hold me tight? My mother does not know I'm lying here in the dusty street._

_0, child of a woman, I am and I am not, for I come after the final darkness has closed in._

_Darkness? What are you saying?_ Quiet, just rest a while, child of a man and a woman, seed of the sacred union. Do not worry, little girl.

_Seed of the sacred union? You cannot understand._

_Mother._

_She cannot hear you, 0 child. You do not know what is becoming of you._

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along the borders with neighboring countries, has instituted economic embargoes, and spread intensive propaganda, both internally and externally, that improves the chances of a coup against MPLA and discourages support from progressive people in capitalist countries.

In response to this threat from the West, the congress has proposed a program of “generalized popular defense,” the extension of the policy of “generalized popular resistance” MPLA used during the war with UNITA and FNLA. This policy makes extensive use of local militia, known as the ODP, with the army, FAPLA, seen as the “shock force” though smaller in numerical strength.

Problems With Portugal

The most recent example of western non-military pressure on the Angolan economy has come from Portugal, and threatens relations between those two countries. Many Portuguese bankers and landholders have been angry since MPLA started confiscating abandoned Portuguese property—mainly large ranches, farms, and factories—after the war ended in 1976. On the eve of the signing in Lisbon of a special agreement between Portuguese working in Angolan banks and the Angolan authorities, the Portuguese Ministries of Finance and Foreign Relations dispatched a telegram inviting the Portuguese employees of the national bank of Angola to return to Portugal. The telegram tempted the functionaries with alluring promises of employment and even offered to pay their travel expenses.

This move is seen by the Luanda government as extremely threatening. The restructuring of the Angolan banking system taking place now could not continue, it is said, without this personnel. According to MPLA officials, their exodus would have serious repercussions in the effort to reconstruct the economy.

Several functionaries have denounced the offer, and its reliability may soon be tested. The Angolan subsidiary of the Portuguese bank, Pinto and Sottomayor, was ordered to discontinue its business November 19 after being charged with “activities incompatible with the Angolan revolutionary process.” The bank’s 35 employees will have to return to Portugal.

“It is clear that these paternalistic positions or acts of sabotage,” President Neto said in November, “will prejudice the good relations between Portugal and Angola. All the same, if it came to it, we could cut air and sea communications, and the transport of cargo and passengers between Angola and countries who try to compromise the development of our country.”

She will come, my mother. She will hear me. She will come.

I have no comfort for you, O unfortunate child, barely twelve years old. I am now your only companion.

Touch me, I’m hot.

My head is swirling. Hold me.

Please, you thing.

Yes, I am thing and I am no-thing. I must stay away from you as long as possible.

Can you go to my mother and tell her…?

I cannot.

Oh, I’m tired. I’m drowsy.

Sleep. That dust now is hallowed ground, where you lie.

It comes back now. I was walking. Yes, From school. My books, where are they? What happened to me? Why am I here? Oh, mother.

Do not linger long, child. Be released. Let me embrace you.

Please.

Not now.

This dryness in my mouth. I’m thirsty. Mother, bring me some water.

(I am merciful.)

Then bring me water.

O, you heard me. That was not for you, child. How merciful I am you will, mercifully, never know.

There were many people. Policemen. Guns… They shot me! Oh, mother, they shot me! Shot… me. Why?

Because they feared you.

Feared me? Me, a child? Those big, big men with guns and clubs and bayonets? Feared me?

In you, a child, more strength. You to them a greater threat in the young tomorrows waiting to be born. They fear your tomorrow. That’s why they try to kill your today. You understand?

Blood! I’m bleeding! They shot me!

Out of fear, child. But your tomorrow will never die.

For, when I embrace you, you will live in the endless-
California Newsreel has established a media center offering five 16mm films and one slide show, all produced in the last two years and all focusing on events in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola. Films include Last Grave at Dimbaza, Boubaker Adjali’s South Africa: The Rising Tide, and others dealing with the Black Consciousness Movement, US bank loans, reconstruction in Angola, and Zimbabwean refugees.

Fact Sheets on South Africa and on the Krugerrand are available from the Africa Fund, 305 E. 46th St., New York, NY 10017. Cost: 10¢ each; over 10, 8¢ each.

***

You’ll learn independence for Nami-

but will these sources tell you that the “Big Five” is motivated by their desire to have continued access to the vast mineral wealth of Namibia and that Vorster, far from considering independence, has entrenched his hold on the occupied territory even more since the talks began?

In just one issue of Southern Africa magazine—this one—you’ll find all these answers discussed. But this isn’t a ‘special’ issue of the magazine. It is part of our normal, monthly coverage. If you are one of our regular readers, then you know all this. But there are many, many people out there who don’t know about the magazine and don’t know where to go for reliable and analytical coverage of the events.

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SWAPO to Vorster and back again, presenting plans for a ‘peaceful’ settlement.


- You’ll learn of “riots” in Soweto. A year later you’ll learn of more “riots” on the first anniversary. You’ll learn of the death of the black nationalist leader, Steve Biko.

But will you hear of the resistance that has continued non-stop since the uprisings in June 1976? And that Steve Biko is only one of the twenty-five political prisoners known to have died inside Vorster’s jails since the uprisings?

- You’ll learn of massacres in Rhodesia perpetrated on the part of the ‘terrorists.’

But will you learn that the terrorists are not the freedom fighters but Smith’s Selous Scouts who are committing these acts in the hope of destroying the guerrilla’s image among the people? and will you hear that these acts have had the reverse effect? The people of Zimbabwe are not fooled and mass support for the liberation war increases daily.

- You’ll learn independence for Namibia is imminent, thanks to the efforts of the five western members of the Security Council and they go from

In just one issue of Southern Africa magazine—this one—you’ll find all these answers discussed. But this isn’t a ‘special’ issue of the magazine. It is part of our normal, monthly coverage. If you are one of our regular readers, then you know all this. But there are many, many people out there who don’t know about the magazine and don’t know where to go for reliable and analytical coverage of the events.

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UNIVERSITY ACTIONS . . . The Oregon Board of Higher Education voted 8-3 in November to sell its holdings in 27 companies having "substantial" business activity in southern Africa. State education officials estimated that $6 million worth of holdings would have to be sold. Among companies involved are General Electric, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, 3M, Xerox and Exxon.

The Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa wrote to the regents of the University of Wisconsin, urging that the question of the university's holdings in companies doing business in South Africa be viewed as a moral issue as well as a legal one and that the university divest itself of stocks on its own initiative.

Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson La Follette told university regents several months ago that state law prohibits them from knowing investing in any company condoning discrimination and that in South Africa "discrimination is a matter of national policy." The regents decided, however, that the statute doesn't apply to companies which have signed the so-called Sullivan principles, a set of guidelines promoting racial equality in corporations doing business in South Africa.

Trustees committed the University of Illinois to vote stocks in its $30 million portfolio in support of motions to terminate investment in South Africa and to consider withdrawal of current investment there. The new policy requires the university to ally itself with other stockholders taking the lead in initiating proposals about investment in South Africa.

Among companies involved are Citicorp, Texaco, GE and General Motors.

Smith College divested itself of nearly $600,000 in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. stock after the company did not adequately explain its decision to build a new plant in a Pretoria suburb adjacent to a racially segregated area.

The trial of ten students arrested last June in an anti-apartheid sit-in at the University of California at Berkeley ended in September in a hung jury.

NCC ACTS ON BANKS . . . The National Council of Churches governing board voted 29-0 on November 11 "that we undertake the withdrawal of all funds and closure of all accounts in financial institutions that invest or make loans to the South African government or businesses and urge constituent membership to adopt this policy.

In Rochester, N.Y., 44 religious leaders have threatened to withdraw their organizations' money from three area banks unless the banks modify their policies on investments in South Africa.

The group said the three banks, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Citibank and Chase Manhattan, are "financing racism and oppression" by their involvement in South Africa.

EX-IM LOAN FINANCING . . . Export-Import Bank hearings will begin in early 1978, and groups are organizing to pressure the bank to stop guaranteeing commercial bank loans to South Africa. Letters demanding this step should go to Ex-Im President John Moore (Washington, D.C. 20572) or to Congressman Andrew Maguire (D.-N.J.) who recently introduced a bill to prohibit Ex-Im from guaranteeing loans to South Africa.

The Congressional Black Caucus has called on the Carter administration to support an end to Ex-Im guarantees, describing the step as important in stopping the flow of advanced technology to South Africa.

A group of black Americans who recently organized the Emergency Coalition for Human Rights in South Africa has made the same request.

KRUGERRAND SALES STOPPED . . . Carson, Pirie, Scott, a major Chicago department store, stopped selling Krugerrands after demonstrations and other actions by a coalition of anti-apartheid groups.

In Portland, a senior information officer of the South African information office held two press conferences in offices of an investment company which is a major retail outlet for Krugerrands. Local anti-apartheid groups arranged for Thami Mhlambi, the ANC representative to the US, to receive equal time for reply on local TV and radio stations.

AIR WAVES . . . A local NBC affiliate in Chicago has agreed to stop advertising Krugerrands following protests there. Several civil rights organizations including Operation PUSH and the SCLC have demanded that all TV stations end their Krugerrand commercials or face possible boycotts.

Elsewhere, major TV stations in Boston and New York agreed to halt Krugerrand advertising after pressure from anti-apartheid groups. In Boston, a protest was mounted at a meeting of the National Association of Broadcasters, which is responsible for codes of broadcast advertising and ethical conduct.

Doyle, Dane Bernbach, Inc., the advertising agency which handles the Krugerrand account, stopped ads in Boston and New York because of the protests but planned to continue them in 20 other cities around the country.

MARCHING FOR JUSTICE . . . Demonstrations on December 10 in cities including Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland protested escalating repression in South Africa. The march in Boston was supported by more than 45 organizations. It was followed by a rally at a Boston church to discuss the situation in Africa and racism in the US, particularly in Boston.

In New York, a demonstration organized by the Pan African Students Organization in the Americas and Youth Against War and Fascism was held at the Chase Manhattan Bank.

Elsewhere around the country, 200 people demonstrated in downtown Baltimore in November to oppose oppression in South Africa. Speakers related the South African struggle to conditions of American blacks.

Dick Gregory, his wife Lillian, and Massachusetts State Senator Bill Owens were arrested in Washington for demonstrating within 500 feet of the South African Embassy.

The incident, in late November, followed an action a few days before in which about 200 people picketed the White House, protesting the Vorster regime with the slogan, "I'm not free till South Africans are free." The demonstration was called by the National Coalition for Justice in South Africa and the D.C. Coalition in Solidarity with South Africa.

The demonstration called for support of the Caucus' 12-point plan of action, which urges withdrawal of US corporations from South Africa and demands an immediate end to all banings and arrests by the South African government.

CORRECTION . . . The Sisters of Charity did not withdraw accounts from Citibank as previously reported. Such a move was under consideration.
| Name ____________________________________ |               |
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|                                              |               |
| ☐ New    ☐ Renewal                         |               |
| Change of Address __________________________ |               |
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