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Hard Labor on Robben Island: Breaking Stones

by Hilda Bernstein

LONDON — Small and rocky, windswept Robben Island rises from the Atlantic just outside the entrance to South Africa’s Cape Town harbor. Once lepers were sent there. The surrounding miles of ocean made prisoners of the outcasts and effectively protected their countrymen on the mainland from infection.

The island still serves South Africa as a kind of leper colony, though now the contagion isolated there is not bacteriological, but political.

Today, Robben Island is the white government’s maximum-security prison for non-Europeans. Thirteen hundred men and women—blacks, Indians and people of mixed race, the so-called coloreds—are held there. 800 on outright political charges. 500 for other reasons.

Their physical isolation is reinforced by a regulation that prohibits prisoners from receiving any news of the outside world for the duration of their sentence. Moreover, since few visitors are permitted and since the South African news media publishes no descriptions of prison conditions, the outside world knows little of life on Robben Island.

Recently, however, I spoke with two men now free after serving long terms on the island. Both are South African-born Indians: Indries Naidoo, who spent 10 years on Robben, and Mac Mararaj, who served 12. The portrait they paint of life in South Africa’s toughest prison is chilling.

The prison colony mirrors South African society: every authority figure is white. Every aspect of daily life is governed by regulations which demand different treatment for members of each racial category and which distinguish between the male and female members of each.

Naidoo, whose father was an adopted son of Mahatma Gandhi, grew up in Johannesburg, where his family home was a local center of political activity. In 1964, he was arrested, convicted of attempted sabotage and sent to Robben Island.

Mararaj was arrested at about the same time and, along with four other men, convicted of attempting to revive Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), the military wing of the African National Congress, a nonwhite political party suppressed in the early 1960s. His 12-year sentence was the shortest meted out to his group.

After their release from prison, both men were “banned,” that is, restricted to their homes by government order and forbidden contact with anyone but members of their immediate families. Ultimately, however, Naidoo and Mararaj managed to slip away and—with the covert aid of friends—made their way to London.

Both describe their prison years as a period of almost unremitting humiliation and torment. On Robben Island, even such elemental items as food and clothing are strictly apportioned along racial lines. For example, colored and Indian prisoners are entitled to a daily bread ration, but until 1972 blacks were not. Since then, the African inmates have been given about four ounces of bread twice each week. Similarly, colored and Indian prisoners receive a portion of jam or syrup and about two ounces of sugar daily. Blacks get no jam or syrup at all and only about 1½ ounces of sugar.

Since prisoners of all three nonwhite racial categories eat and work together, their unequal diets are manifest to all. “We would sit in the quadrangle eating the same meal, side by side,” says Mararaj. “But I would have a full tablespoon of sugar on my porridge and the African next to me only a half. I would be given bread every day, he would be given only a soft, watery pap (porridge made from cornmeal). For years, the Africans were not permitted even a scrap of bread. But it was illegal for me to share one speck of sugar or my piece of bread with my African comrade.”

The allocation of clothing is yet another reminder that on Robben Island some nonwhites are even more unequal than others. During Cape Town’s bitter winters, which often bring dripping fog and high winds, warm clothing is not just a luxury, but a necessity.

Yet, according to Mararaj, “In winter we (Indians and coloreds) were given long trousers, shoes and socks and a felt hat. The Africans had open sandals, no socks and shorts all year round. You are there, side by side. You come under the same lash. But still there is this terrible discrimination—
no one can conceive how bitter it is, no one.”

**Housing by Politics**

Housing is the one area of life on Robben Island where race is not the overriding consideration. Instead, prisoners are divided according to politics.

When an inmate arrives on the island, he is assigned to one of four levels: A, B, C or D. Prisoners assigned to the D level receive the fewest internal privileges. For example, they are allowed to mail and receive only one letter and have but one visitor every six months. All political prisoners are automatically consigned to the D level, while all other inmates—including murderers—have their cases considered individually.

Then, whatever their racial category, most prisoners are assigned to a section of communal cells: one for general prisoners; one for those convicted under South Africa’s notorious Terrorism Act, and one for inmates from Namibia, who are not allowed any contact with South African prisoners. Recently, another section was added to house men and women convicted during the wave of political trials that has occurred during the past year. Apparently, authorities hope to prevent these new arrivals from passing fresh news of the outside world to longtime inmates.

About 40 prominent D-level prisoners are confined in so-called single cells. They include Nelson Mandela, 59, president of the proscribed African National Congress, Walter Sisulu, 63, the party’s general secretary, Govan Mbeki, the group’s national chairman, and Andre Mlangeni, an influential party member. All are serving life sentences.

The cells in which they are confined measure 7 by 7½ feet and open onto a courtyard. Single-cell prisoners may never work near or speak to inmates held in communal housing. Mararaj, who spent most of his 12 years in the single cells, recalls what it was like:

“Our first job was breaking stones with a four-pound hammer. Every day, we were taken from our cells into the enclosed yard, and there we sat in the same place week after week. We never saw the outside world, never a blade of grass, just the quadrangle into which our cells led and patch of sky. We were evenly spaced out and never permitted to speak to each other.”

Naidoo, on the other hand, passed his 10-year sentence in communal cells, where crowding rather than personal isolation was the major problem:

“We were 80 or 90 in a cell built for no more than 25, so we tried to maintain the utmost discipline. We formed a committee, but this was declared illegal. We were never allowed to speak on behalf of others. When we made a complaint it had to be 'I,' but still we said 'We.' Then, they wouldn’t listen to us.

“For the first five years, most of us worked in the quarries. We had to break stones, to fulfill a certain quantity of work each day. If not, we were punished at the weekend by the deprivation of three meals.

“In the first years many of us had this punishment. I for one was never able to fulfill my quota. It was impossible. Others helped me or I would steal from the previous day’s stones. In 1971, the quarries were flooding, they had gone below sea level. So, we were employed bringing stones from the quarries to the prison yard itself. Quarry work now is supposed to be only a form of punishment.

**Psychological Assaults**

Most prisoners, however, suffer far less from physical abuse than they do from their white jailers’ almost constant psychological assaults. For example, South Africa’s Prisons Act obliges authorities to allow all inmates to remain in contact with their families. Yet over the years, such communication has been severely restricted.

“More and more, we were cut off completely from the outside world, even from our families,” says Mararaj.

Nelson Mandela, ANC President, sentenced to life on Robben Island.

“I once received a letter where all that was left was the address of the sender. The entire letter had been cut away, the blank paper between what had been paragraphs held the whole page together and at one end was the signature of the sender. But that counted as a letter received, when I was allowed only one every six months.

“At first they cut letters going out of Robben Island in the same way. But now they make it seem as though they have not been censored. They make prisoners rewrite them, leaving out certain sections and if, after the second or third time, they are not satisfied, they won’t send it. But the letters prisoners receive—they just use the scissors.

“When my wife, Tim, visited me she told me she was leaving the country on an exit permit. I then asked the commandant, as she is leaving, please let me combine my next three or four letters (each letter is limited to 500 words) so I can deal with all sorts of family problems, misunderstandings between us.

“He said: Yes, it was okay. I wrote a five-page letter and was assured it had been sent. All those years I believed she had received it and perhaps understood... until I came here. Yes, she had received bits and pieces of my letter, all cut up. She never knew what I had really wanted her to know."

Even when family members are allowed to visit an inmate, watchful guards are careful to see that the absolute prohibition against outside news is maintained. Any remark that does not relate directly to family affairs automatically terminates a visit. A family member may not, for example, say, "There’s been an earthquake in Iran or an election in the United States."

In time, however, prisoners learn to interpret certain signs of outside turmoil. For instance, when magazines circulate with an extraordinarily large number of articles clipped from their pages, it is usually a sign that political activity has increased in South Africa. Moreover, such periods are usually accompanied by increased brutality on the part of the guards.

Such physical abuse, which once included outright torture, has been moderated of late by United Nations, Red Cross and Amnesty International complaints and in response to protests by the prisoners themselves. However, when one group of inmates recently staged a hunger strike, they were convicted of "endangering their own health" and given longer sentences.
Such punishments are part of Robben Island's incredibly intricate system of internal discipline, which specified more than 20 types of punishable insubordination, including disrespect, negligence at work, conversing without permission, singing, whistling, lodging a false or frivolous complaint and acting in a way contrary to good order and discipline.

Inmates guilty of such infractions can be put in solitary confinement, deprived of food, whipped or demoted to a lower classification level. For literate prisoners and those in single cells, the latter penalty is particularly feared, for it automatically deprives them of one of their most cherished privileges—the right to study.

Studies Restricted

Robben Island inmates are sometimes allowed to take certain correspondence courses, though they must pay all fees themselves. For many of the better-educated men, work and study are the only ways of maintaining sanity. But the island's work itself is a punishment and study has become a weapon willfully used by prison authorities.

"They knew how important our studies were to us," says Mararaj. "There always seemed to be an excuse—some trivial offense; you were charged, sentenced, then deprived of studies for the rest of the year. This always seemed to happen at examination time. So, you lost the 200-300 rand (about $230-$345) in fees and couldn't take your exams."

Moreover, even when it is permitted, study is restricted by a harsh and arbitrary code. No post-graduate programs are permitted—a particularly cruel restraint on professional men. At the undergraduate level, all legal courses are banned, as are physical and political sciences and all foreign languages. Inmates may order only those books required for their particular course and not those on recommended reading lists.

"There are always tremendous difficulties in getting prescribed books," Mararaj recalls. "Sometimes, a book would arrive, was approved and passed by the censor, but just held back. Then another year would pass before you could take your exam. One chap had the Oxford dictionary taken from him because he could not prove it was a book prescribed for his course."

Finally, the money to finance correspondence courses may be obtained only from the prisoner's next of kin.

But despite white administrators' calculated attempts to demoralize the political prisoners on Robben Island, they have failed. In fact, people forced to live under this prison apartheid seem to gain an even greater political awareness.

Mararaj describes his own experience: "This was the first time for me, as a black man, that I had whites with me day in and day out, on an ordinary level. I came to understand what they said. I realized the importance of learning Afrikaans history, of reading Afrikaans literature, of trying to understand these ordinary men, the warders, the white elite—all whites are elite in South Africa—with whom we are dealing, how they are indoctrinated, how they react. "They all have a blank wall in their minds. They just could not see the black man as a human being."

Prisoners, supported by a nebulous community invisible to the guards, learned to draw strength from each other. Mararaj says: "In a sense, I also became more tolerant. I came to realize that we each have our weak points."

"When I left Robben, I came away with one unshakable conviction. I saw that we had to fight to overcome this system, and that it cannot be done by peaceful means, that you cannot humanize apartheid by modifications or by cosmetic changes."

"It must be overthrown by force of arms. Not one of us who passed through prison, whatever our previous beliefs, came out believing that change can come by peaceful means." — Washington Post

Britain's Stake
In Apartheid

by Richard Leonard

Eight years after British businessman Neil Wates explained to his colleagues why he would refuse to invest in South Africa hundreds of British, American and other Western companies have invested in South Africa, have indeed turned great profits from exploitation and have gained a vested interest in apartheid.

While organizations and publications in the US concerned about apartheid have focused most of their attention on US investments in South Africa, apartheid's main foreign connection remains overwhelmingly with Britain. British investments in South Africa now stand at more than $5.8 billion, with the US and West Germany in an approximate tie for the second spot with some $1.7 billion each invested. There are some 630 British companies operating in South Africa in all sectors of the economy. British exports to South Africa were valued at more than $1.2 billion in 1976, while imports from South Africa were worth $1.1 billion the same year. Britain bought 22.2% of South Africa's exports in 1976 and remains one of its biggest trade partners.

British investments played the dominant role in the emergence of the modern South African economy. Under the aegis of British imperial conquest in the nineteenth century British capital poured into the gold and diamond mining industries. After the second World War the British investors helped spur the modern industrial
sector with massive infusions of capital and technology.

Official Policy

Like the US, the British government has for a number of years had a policy of verbal condemnation of apartheid while allowing ‘business as usual’ to bolster white South Africa’s economy and military capacities. But since the Soweto rebellions in 1976, Whitehall has come under growing pressure to modify its opposition to economic sanctions against South Africa.

The independent African countries, especially Nigeria, are achieving growing economic influence on British policies. Total British exports to independent Africa were $2.2 billion in 1976, with Nigeria alone buying more than $1.5 billion in goods from Britain, thus surpassing South Africa as Britain’s largest export customer on the continent. The Nigerian economy has been expanding with an influx of petrodollars and there is strong demand for British manufactured goods. South Africa, on the other hand, has been in a period of recession and has been emphasizing local manufacturing capacity, cutting imports from Britain.

In 1977 Nigeria announced that it would no longer award government contracts to firms with links to South Africa, and it followed this up by making inquiries in London about the South African connections of companies exhibiting at the first Lagos trade fair in November. A specific pressure point could be British Leyland, the auto and truck manufacturer, which is controlled by the British government and is a large manufacturer in South Africa. Leyland Nigeria is 60% owned by Nigerian interests.

Other sources of pressure have been the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and the left-wing of the Labour Party; both groups have been pressing for corporate withdrawal from South Africa. The Roman Catholic Church in Britain has recently taken a new activist role, spurring the formation of the interdenominational Christian Concern for Southern Africa, which has criticized the labor policies of British companies in South Africa and called for the recognition of Black trade unions.

No Curbs

After the murder of Steve Biko and the subsequent wave of repression in South Africa the issue of economic sanctions was raised with new intensity. In November the Labour government undertook a review of British-South African economic relations and British Chancellor Denis Healey announced officially that “the government intends to discourage investment by British industry in South Africa.” The press reported that measures under consideration included ending investment by nationalized industries in South Africa, ending trade missions to South Africa, tightening currency exchange control regulations, ending dual taxation agreements, and prohibiting lending by British banks to South Africa.

But there has been no enforcement of any such curbs. The Labour government has said that it will not “go it alone” in taking measures against South Africa. But Britain has in fact not even gone as far as some EEC partners. Holland and West Germany have both already acted to restrict export credits. Britain has always actively opposed any form of sanctions against South Africa, and shows no sign of shifting its policy now.

The extent of British interests in South Africa clearly has a direct influence on policy. Foreign Secretary Owen said that while Britain would take a “hard look” at new investments in South Africa (which would cost very little, since businesses themselves have been cutting back on new investments) a trade embargo would harm Britain and would not be supported.

An article in the New York Times (January 23, 1978) noted that while the British were anxious for settlements to be worked out in Namibia and Zimbabwe, “they are reluctant to push South Africa. A key reason for this attitude is ‘pressures from British business interests as well as the Treasury and Trade Ministry officials in Whitehall, who are eager to safeguard Britain’s enormous export trade with South Africa and investments there.”

The Business Picture

While the British government has yet to enact any curbs on business with South Africa recent developments on the business scene might make some of the measures under consideration redundant. South Africa has been in an economic slump since 1974. Return on investments for British firms average 11% in 1971 but there has been a general downturn in profits from SA, and since the Soweto uprisings British and other foreign investors have begun to see that country as an increasingly high risk area.

The extent of the Nationalist regime’s concern about the views of foreign investors was revealed in an article in the Sunday Times of Johannesburg (October 30, 1977), “Firm Polls UK Firms.” This article described a discreet poll of top British business leaders by the South African Foreign Trade Association, which receives funding from the government. The polls revealed that the business leaders felt that the Biko affair and the subsequent mass bannings had been handled “clumsily.” It was found that while British businesses want good relations with South Africa “they are dismayed at the path South Africa appears to be taking and unless South Africa ‘cools it, there could be serious problems.”

The South African survey also revealed that British companies are feeling pressure from some independent African nations to cut ties with South Africa. One illustration of the effect of
such African pressure was an unsolicited letter sent by the 85 member firms of the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association to British Foreign Secretary David Owen to take to the UN Conference Against Apartheid in Lagos last year. The letter emphasized the desire of the companies to eliminate the countries within the limits of South African law. While such statements remain in conflict with African demands for complete withdrawal (and have a false ring in light of a December report that many British companies continue to pay workers below the poverty line), they show a heightened awareness of the new African leverage.

Bankers

One key element in the total picture of British (and other) foreign investment in South Africa is the attitude of London-based international bankers. This was highlighted in a survey by the South African Financial Mail (October 21, 1977) of British-South African relations. Britain's importance to South Africa includes its status as a financial center where bankers form a consensus on lending policies and the growing consensus has been that South Africa is a bad credit risk. While the growth of international banking in the last decade brought a boom in loans for South Africa, the banking climate has now changed. Banks depend on timely repayment of loans and are sensitive to developments which could upset loan agreements. The result has been a spontaneous bank boycott of South African loans.

The banks see a discouraging pattern in the policies of the South African regime. The continued political repression has its economic counterpart in defensive economic policies to promote South African self-sufficiency and independence from foreign pressures. In fact South Africa can survive with limited foreign investments, but the growth is slower growth, which in turn makes investment even less attractive. Of course Black South Africans suffer the most when the economy is slow, which could trigger more rebellious protests. And South Africa's role in the conflicts in Zimbabwe and Namibia continues to be an economic drain.

Direct Investors Cautious

British and other foreign businesses operating in South Africa have also been hedging their bets. Few companies are preparing to pull out of the country; there are still high profits to be made and the South African government in effect taxes capital transfers abroad. But many companies are finding it advantageous to bring local South African partners in on their operations. Should the political crisis intensify it would be easier to sell out to the local partner than to search for a buyer on short notice. Local partnership provides a new source of capital and also lends a cover against the rising sentiment against 'meddling foreigners' being stirred up among whites by the Vorster regime.

Still Starvation Wages

While British firms, like their American counterparts, have been quick to justify their presence in South Africa on the grounds that they aid Black economic development, the facts continue to show that their operations reflect policies of exploitation rather than advancement.

More than three years ago a British parliamentary committee, acting on the expose of reporter Adam Raphael, recommended that companies in South Africa should pay at least 50% more than the family subsistence level, a wage level calculated as just sufficient to cover a minimum of food, fuel, lighting, clothing and cleaning materials, rent and transport to work. In December a survey by the Department of Trade showed that seven British companies were still paying wages below the Poverty Datum Line—the absolute starvation level which excludes both rent and transport. Forty-nine companies, a majority of the 96 companies which provided complete or substantive information, were still paying below the Minimum Effective Level (or family subsistence level), the amount necessary for a worker to provide for a family with some minimum benefits. The seven companies with wages below the poverty line were British Electric Traction, Burmah Oil, C.T. Browning, Delta Metal, Low and Bonar Group, and Turner and Newall. In spite of these findings, and the fact that the survey covered only a small fraction of British firms or subsidiaries in South Africa, the British Trade Minister claimed the survey indicated 'progress' in improving African wages and benefits.

Naming Names

According to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, British companies have a majority shareholding in 10 of South Africa's top 100 industrial companies, and a further 10 of those top companies are partly owned by British companies. Involvement ranges from Lonrho, which controls South Africa's largest industrial holdings group and Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), which has joint control with deBeers of the South African chemicals giant, African Explosives and Chemical Industry (AECI) to the Charter Consolidated investment in the big Argus publishing group—the publishers of many of the largest daily newspapers, including The Star.

Brief outlines of a few major British undertakings may help to give the flavor of the British connection in South Africa.

Barclays and Standard Banks

Two British banks, Barclays International and Standard Bank, together control some 60% of all banking deposits in South Africa. Through their international links they have played key roles in South Africa's industrial development. Barclays South Africa is 63% owned by Barclays International.
Barclays South Africa has close links with the giant Anglo-American Corporation, which dominates South Africa's economy, and Anglo's chairman, Harry Oppenheimer is on the board of Barclays International.

In 1976 Barclays South Africa bought $13 million in South African Defense bonds. Revelations of the purchase set off protests in Britain, and last December Barclays announced that the Defense Bonds had been sold and the money invested in other government securities. The reaction among South African whites has been to urge greater South African control of banking to stop such "interference."

Shell and British Petroleum (BP)

Shell and BP supply almost 40% of the South African petroleum market. Shell, which is jointly owned by Dutch interests, has investments amounting to $325 million in South Africa (which is owned 51% by the British government) and almost $200 million in SA. Both companies have large-scale expansion plans: Shell plans to invest $650 million over the next decade and BP $520 million in the next five years.

Since South Africa has no petroleum reserves Shell and BP supply a strategic resource to the country's economy. They have also been involved in the South African government's search for oil, and have been accused of supplying petroleum products to Rhodesia in violation of UN sanctions. Both companies supply gas and oil to the South African Air Force and Army.

General Electric Company/Marconi

The General Electric Company (GEC) is Britain's largest electronics company and its investments dominate that industry in South Africa. While GEC's total investments in South Africa have not been disclosed they are believed to be approximately $80 million. GEC is the sixth largest employer of Black labor in South Africa. GEC has provided equipment to the South African military forces. This includes surveillance, communications, data processing, and nuclear power generation equipment. While originally developed for the British armed forces, the materials are now classified as "non-military" and thus escape the British arms embargo. Most recently, Marconi Communications, a GEC subsidiary, has contracted to supply the South African military with a $15 million "Troposcatter" communications system to be used with battlefield sensors in anti-guerrilla operations—probably against SWAPO in Namibia at this point.

British Leyland

British Leyland is controlled by the British government and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Leyland South Africa, controls about 5% of the auto and truck market in South Africa. Leyland South Africa has 41 South African subsidiaries, with activities ranging from foundry development, the manufacture and assembly of cars and trucks, to property and finance companies.

Over the past five years British Leyland has made five times as much profit from each of its workers in South Africa as it has from its workers in Britain.

British Leyland South Africa has massive contracts with the South African state. It is one of the chief suppliers of the South African Defense Force, providing not only tanks and landrovers (which form the backbone of anti-guerrilla operations) but also armored personnel carriers. It also supplies equipment to the South African police, who used it extensively to suppress resistance in Soweto. Leyland has been notable for its refusal to recognize black trade unions, though it is controlled by the British government with the Labour Party in power. The issue of black trade unions goes back to 1973 when the black Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) was founded at a Leyland plant outside of Durban. Despite 95% worker membership in the union, Leyland refused to deal with it. In 1974 workers struck to demand union recognition. Again Leyland refused to negotiate with the union and some of the strong union supporters among the workers were not rehired. MAWU charged that Leyland was responsible for calling the South African Security Police to arrest Alfred Mthawa, the union Secretary, for distributing pamphlets at a Leyland plant in 1974. In November 1976 the MAWU Secretary and two organizers were banned by the government. The union has continued to grow, despite company and government harassment.

In response to a MAWU call for support from British unions, Leyland informed the British Trade Union Council (TUC) that it could not "recognize an African trade union for bargaining purposes...without setting our business and employment at risk." In fact, however, while black trade unions are not officially recognized by the South African government, there is no legal barrier to companies bargaining with them.

SOUTH AFRICA

Resistance Survives Bulldozers

Protected by armed policemen, a bulldozer plowed through the first flimsy structures of the Unibel camp on January 16, as the South African government continued its drive against squatter camps in the Cape Town area. The walls came tumbling down. Cardboard, wood and tin cannot stand for long against the blade of a bulldozer. But the spirit of the people who lived at Unibel and several nearby squatter communities demolished during the last year, does not appear to be crumbling so easily.

In the past year the government has stepped up its campaign of flattening the homes of an estimated 400,000 illegal squatters in the Cape Town area. At the end of November, the Squatter Control Section of the Divisional Council of the Cape reported proudly that it had demolished 1,487 "unauthorized" shacks during the 11 month period ending on August 31, 1977. "Because of the urgent necessity for their services, the staff of this section has been augmented by the engagement of six coloured people as laborers on a casual basis to carry out demolition work," the reported added.

As an added incentive to uproot people who have been declared "illegal aliens" in their native land, the government has offered free rail passage to the "homelands" for blacks who will take them. The response has not been enthusiastic, despite an additional government offer to chip in free
transport of "excess baggage such as bicycles, sewing machines, rolled mattresses and trunks... but not furniture." In the wake of the largest demolition to date at the Modderdam Camp in August, the government reported that only 130 squatter families representing 350 people had taken up the offer.

Far more typical, apparently, was the response of one Modderdam squatter as he watched his home destroyed. "I don't know the Transkei," Clifford Nyarashe told a reporter, "I've lived all the time in Cape Town. I'm from because there is no work there."

"I've lived all the time in Cape Town. I don't know the Transkei," Clifford Nyarashe told a reporter, "I've lived all the time in Cape Town. I'm from because there is no work there."

Despite government claims that the Cape has been reserved as an area for "coloured" and not black labor, many are the black squatters like Nyarashe who have never seen their reputed homelands in the Transkei and Ciskei. Those who have are hardly more anxious to hop on the train.

Not Going Back

"I came here to work, to feed and clothe my family and maybe to provide them one day with a real home," another Modderdam squatter explained. "I cannot do it in Ciskei where I came from because there is no work there. Why must it be a crime for me to want to give my family what the white people want for theirs?"

"My home was just a shack," he continued angrily. "It was made of tin and wood and board. But it was my home. Now they want me to take my things and go back to Ciskei. Go back to what? Not to a job. Not to a roof over my head. To nothing. We will never forget what they have done to us."

In the face of fierce black resistance and outrages from liberal whites, the government has refused to budge from its position.

"If we do not stand firm, we will make more sorrow for more people in the Western Cape," Deputy Minister of Bantu Affairs W. A. Cruywagen told a sympathetic congress of the ruling National Party in Cape Town. He pointed out that if squatters were tolerated in the Cape then squatting would have to be allowed in the rest of South Africa, undermining the official view that, unlike whites, blacks have no right to live where they choose.

Community Spirit Strong

While many whites had been impressed by the community spirit of Modderdam and Unibel, Cruywagen saw evidence of a sinister plot. According to a report in The Argus, "Mr. Cruywagen claimed those who said there was no organization behind the establishment of squatter camps in the Peninsula area "must tell another story."

Aside from laying out their shacks in neat rows, the squatters have managed to provide services at least on a par with those available in legal communities. The Modderdam-Unibel Committee set compulsory sanitary requirements for every household and zoning regulations to discourage overcrowding. Disputes were settled in a community court which convened every Sunday.

Even after Modderdam was reduced to splinters in August, Unibel squatters invested the energy and money to establish a clinic and their own school with five salaried teachers and 200 eager students. The "Nonzwakazi School" (School of Beauty), was crammed into a one room wood-and-iron shack, only about 20 by 40 feet. But squatter children are used to cramped quarters. Principal Annie Bawtie reported that attendance ran at 100 percent. "We instruct pupils in the basic three Rs, geography, history, Afrikaans, English, Xhosa and health and hygiene," she said. "The health and hygiene subject is made especially relevant to camp life. For instance, pupils are taught the necessity of cleanliness around their shacks, personal cleanliness and gardening."

By now, Nonzwakazi School too is splinters. But the children may well be applying what they learned there to the hygiene of new shacks. For the options open to them and their parents remain as limited as those available to the rest of South Africa's black majority population.

"I have been a squatter for a long time," remarked Philemon Radebe, a 45-year-old laborer and father of four. "I have lived in many camps because it is the only life I am allowed. I could live in bachelor quarters. But I am a man. And like all men who have families, I want to live with my family. So I will move from here to some other place and from there to another place because my wife and children will stay with me no matter what the government does."

Where would he go next, he was asked. "Somewhere," Philemon Radebe said. "In another bush."

Official Schools Still Empty

While the government may have succeeded in destroying Nonzwakazi
South Africa's Exiles—Tough Going for Most

Daily Dispatch editor Donald Woods became an instant hero. His written account of escaping from South Africa to Lesotho appeared in its entirety in the New York Times and other Western newspapers. Almost as soon as the camera crews could get to him, he was flashed across the television screens of America via a half-hour network interview.

Naturally, the media loved him. Not only had one of their own suddenly broken through as a celebrity in his own right, a newspaper editor transformed into a dramatic figure by the intransigence of the government that placed him under virtual house arrest, and by the somewhat embellished daring of his escape, complete with disguises, tense moments, and the final plunge across a flooded stream. But Woods had more going for him than that. He also had the distinction of being, by his own testimony, “a conservative”—white, educated, and a firm believer in the free enterprise system. So the press quoted him, the British High Commissioner welcomed him, and a special charter flight was arranged to whisk him out of Lesotho en route to London and eventually, the United States.

Less Feted Fate

The fate of literally thousands of others who have fled South Africa in the last year and a half has not been so happy. Most of the refugees flooding out of South Africa since the national uprising that began in Soweto in June 1976 have been young blacks. In the front ranks during demonstrations that all too often turned into massacres, students in Soweto and other black townships have been the targets of frequent police sweeps. Many have been detained by the security police, others have been shipped out of the townships and off to their supposed “homelands” in the countryside. Still others have headed for the nearest border to escape the dragnet.

School, it remains singularly less successful at filling the classrooms in Soweto and other townships. Emptied by boycotts and often gutted by arson after the government took them over from local authorities last September, the Soweto secondary schools did not graduate a single student in the school year that ended in December. As the deadline for applications for the new year neared, only “a few thousand” applications had been received. A year ago, the secondary schools in Soweto opened with more than 27,000 students enrolled.

And when the primary schools opened in mid-January, less than half the students returned to classes. Reports from Johannesburg included accounts of policemen beating school-aged children on the streets, despite the fact that education is neither compulsory nor free for black South Africans. Meanwhile, hundreds of Soweto students are attending classes organized like those at Nonzwakazi School completely outside government channels and taught by some of the more than 400 teachers who resigned in protest of government policies last fall.

Estimating exactly how many have chosen voluntary exile isn’t easy. The government of neighboring Botswana reports that about 1,000 refugees have arrived from South Africa and been officially registered in the last 18 months. Presumably others have made their way to Mozambique and Lesotho.

Difficult Choice

None of these new exiles have been accorded the hero’s welcome granted to Woods. Rather, they have been faced with great hardships and difficult choices as they seek to begin new lives.

Many have joined one of the older political movements—the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, or the Unity Movement of South Africa—either because of previous underground links inside the country or after making contact once outside. Some of these young men and women have gone for political and military training, others have taken up scholarships arranged for them in Africa and elsewhere.

A large number who were active in the student and black consciousness movements have not made that choice and face difficult decisions. Scholarships are hard to find so that continuing their studies is not easy. Political considerations make some cautious about accepting scholarships from Western countries, while others are dubious about going to particular African universities. Hundreds have found that there seems to be no place to go.

The Botswana Christian Council has provided regular monthly stipends for those who have remained in that country while awaiting opportunities elsewhere. But there have been problems because there are so many students who have not moved on quickly, and recently the Botswana government has talked of a plan to construct a special refugee camp on the edge of the Kalahari Desert.

As one of the poorest nations on the continent, Botswana lacks the resources to provide education for the thousands of refugees who have poured across the borders from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. Several hundred South Africans have remained stranded in Botswana, and the South African press has taken some satisfaction in pointing out that many of these had hoped to get to the United States . . . only to find that US pronouncements against apartheid did not extend to providing visas for its victims.

Black America has helped inspire not only the black consciousness ideology in South Africa but much of the culture with which young South Africans identify. This has induced many of the refugees to think of the US as a place of exile where they might feel almost at home. But so far, the US government has been doing its best to make them feel at home by exhibiting the same disdain they received from the white supremacist government in Pretoria. Only a handful of this new wave of South African refugees have been accepted into the United States or any of the Western European countries that have joined in lionizing Donald Woods.

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First Protest, Then Exile

Even-Handed Hostility Choices

The one thing that can be said for US policy in this area is that it has been relatively even-handed towards blacks and whites. Botswana has recently begun to attract another, smaller wave of refugees—young, white draft resisters and deserters. And they too have found western nations distinctly less than anxious to receive them.

A group of draft resisters in Botswana estimates that several hundred whites have fled South Africa rather than face the mandatory two years of active service (including possible combat duty in Namibia) to be followed by eight years in the Active Citizen Force. Most of them have managed to go to Europe on the pretext of continuing their education. But those who have arrived without that camouflage have had a hard time finding countries that will take them.

Veteran correspondent on Africa, David Martin of the London Observer, spoke with several deserters and draft resisters in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana. One of them explained that he left South Africa four days before he was due to report for three month's service in Namibia. "I would not have left South Africa if I had not been called up," he said. "I am not prepared to do active service in Namibia. One knows that the security forces are basically a suppressive force and that Namibia is an illegally occupied country."

Although the claim by five western powers to be negotiating South African withdrawal from Namibia would appear to reflect agreement with this position, none have shown any willingness to harbor South African draft resisters. The same resister reported that he met with "antagonism" in the British High Commission from a diplomat who advised him to go back to South Africa. Even Sweden, which accepted many US deserters and resisters during the war in Indochina, has turned a cold shoulder to the South Africans.

Apartheid Enemy Victim of Assassination

In the early hours of the morning of January 9, someone knocked on the front door of Richard Turner's Durban home. When the banned lecturer, an active opponent of apartheid, opened the door, no one was there. He went into his daughter's bedroom and peered out into the dark, trying to spot the unknown visitor. A shot was fired through the window. A few moments later he was dead.

The assailants are thought to be rightwing vigilantes or someone acting on behalf of the security police.

This was not the first attack on an outspoken critic of the government. For years similar incidents have plagued the lives of liberals and radicals alike. Just two weeks earlier, a shot was fired into the home of Fatima Meer, the banned sociologist, while she sat with her husband and a friend at dinner. Their guest was wounded. Donald Woods' young daughter was injured by a T-shirt impregnated with acid which was sent through the mail. Richard Turner himself had been subjected to petrol bomb attacks and rifle shots at his house.

Until recently these incidents seemed designed to intimidate only. Turner was the first person to have been killed. For many whites in South Africa, this is a turning point. Suddenly they feel that all strong opponents of the government, both radical and liberal, are exposed and vulnerable to such attacks—even those who had felt safe because they were careful to do nothing illegal.

Richard Turner himself was a particularly outspoken opponent of the apartheid system. At 36, he was well-known for his Marxist views, had written on the subject, and until his banning five years earlier, had taught Marxism to his university students. To

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Overview

The US is again deeply involved in mediating Middle East affairs—once again usurping a role best left to the international community. Increasingly, the Western powers, most often led by the State Department, have found themselves forced to defend their global position by stepping over the UN and the international conference table in the guise of moving toward it. Readers of Southern Africa are doubtless aware of the strategy.

We note with alarm the diplomatic initiative that Washington has taken in recent months to defend Israel and push through a pro-Western, pro-Zionist settlement in the Middle East, to the total exclusion of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. More than the Gaza Strip, more than the Golan Heights, more, even, than the important issue of the West Bank of the Jordan River, it is the question of the Palestinians that shows US policy for what it is.

A pattern is emerging in post-Kissinger US foreign policy. If Washington’s global strategy has remained largely the same—imperialism is a system, not a policy—then its tactics, too, have come to be recognizable in the world Kissinger left behind, particularly when the US is defending its allies, such as Israel and South Africa, against popular liberation movements. Such tactics will already be familiar to those concerned with the liberation of southern Africa and the construction of new socialist states where once stood Western-supported colonial and settler regimes.

The pattern seems clear:

• Develop regional partners by locating weak links among countries in the area and isolate them by appealing to their unique needs, not those tied to the region as a whole. This usually involves countries with capitalist economies that are heavily dependent on Western multinational investment and financial credits.
• Shift the focus of negotiations away from the demands of liberation forces by working with pliant partners and committed pro-Western allies; “agreement” is to be reached between them.
• Finally, present progressive forces with an ultimatum. This last is known as “negotiating a compromise.”

These tactics have been plainly visible in the Middle East; some, if not all of them, are being utilized in southern Africa. The current position of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat, for instance, is roughly comparable to that of, say, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. The two leaders’ economies are somewhat similar in their dependence on the West; and a year ago, when Kaunda’s “humanism” was being praised in lengthy puff pieces in the New York Times and other influential publications, it was plain that he was being considered for the kind of role Sadat is now playing in the Middle East. That is why Kaunda’s recent rejection of the Anglo-American proposals on Rhodesia was so significant—although it received little attention in the Western press.

As for the liberation forces, Washington apparently felt confident enough in its Middle East maneuvers by mid-December of last year to announce that PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat had forfeited any role in a renewed Geneva conference because of his “intransigence.” Until that time the US had felt obliged to deal with the PLO—not for any great love of either it or the people it represents, but for the sake of international credibility. Since Carter’s December 19 renunciation, his administration has inched steadily closer to Prime Minister Begin’s own version of the “internal solution”—an Israeli-occupied West Bank or a flimsy Palestinian “entity”—there is really no word for it—tied to Jordan.

It is for reasons of credibility, too, that US negotiators have continued to recognize and meet with leaders of the liberation movements of southern Africa. But, like the West Bank mayors, lined up to exclude Arafat, the Kapuus, Sitholes, Muzorewas, and Chiraus are ready and waiting in the wings. Already US officials involved in Washington’s various schemes for southern Africa are grumbling at the “intransigence” of SWAPO leaders and representatives of the Patriotic Front. With internal solutions which exclude the liberation movements by defining them as “external forces,” being designed in both Zimbabwe and Namibia, it seems reasonable to speculate if these have not been encouraged by the State Department and the Foreign Office. The question may well be, will Washington and London attempt to isolate these liberation movements, too, and then move toward some form of support for the internal settlements being crafted in Salisbury and Pretoria?

—P.L.
Kaiser Matanzima, has stated in our joint future regardless of race. He wants to talk to us about mapping out Africa as one people in one land. We will therefore talk to anybody who is formed in mid-January, is, according to Buthelezi, to "lay the foundation for a possible future multiracial national convention to map out a non-racial community and a new constitution for South Africa."

"We regard the people of South Africa as one people in one land. We will therefore talk to anybody who wants to talk to us about mapping out our joint future regardless of race."

Transkei Prime Minister, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, has stated his intention to take over the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, and establish a separate Methodist Church of Transkei.

The move, he said, was prompted by complaints by Transkei Methodists that the church was insulting the dignity of the Head of State. He also indicated his displeasure that some clergy at the church's last annual conference were unhappy about the possibility of recognizing Transkei.

The Methodist church is the largest church in Transkei, where every fourth person is a Methodist. Chief Matanzima is a Methodist himself. Methodist clergymen who refuse to join the new Transkei church will be expelled.

The Minister of Labor and Mines, Fanie Botha, announced that the government was going to eliminate 20 of the existing 25 categories of job reservation.

Much of the job reservation, however, is a question of custom and white Trade Union pressure. This decision will make it possible to hire a Black when a white man cannot be found to fill a job, but it is not expected to bring about real changes or to offer any real thrust towards upward mobility for Blacks.

US INVESTORS own gold and other mining shares in South Africa believed to be worth some $2.3 billion. Quoting Johannesburg sources, Newsday, the Long Island daily, reported that 50% of South African gold shares were owned by American investors. The total value of the shareholdings is well above the total amount of direct US investment in South Africa, currently estimated at $1.7 billion.

Henry Ford spent eight days visiting South Africa in January. He met with Prime Minister Vorster, the Foreign Minister, as well as a number of blacks including Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and toured his assembly plant in Port Elizabeth.

The point he reiterated throughout his visit was that, "In our opinion, we do more for the people of South Africa by staying here and employing them and having equal opportunity rights to the extent that we can."

With a 1977 investment of $110 million and sales in 1976 of $288 million, the Ford company ranks among the top ten US companies operating in South Africa. Its automobile and truck assembly plant in Port Elizabeth employs the largest number of South Africans—4,600 in 1976—of any US firm in the country.

Ford's announcement that it intends to stay in South Africa is most heartening to the South African government, coming at a time when the call in the US for disinvestment has sharply increased.

Three firms have announced plans to expand their South African concerns. One is a US company—John Deere machinery group, and two are European—BMW of West Germany and Fiat South Africa of Italy.

According to John Deere's chairman in South Africa, the expansion planned at the agricultural, earth moving, and construction equipment plant near Johannesburg is an expression of the company's confidence "in the long-term agricultural outlook for South Africa."

BMW has opened a large multi-racial industrial training center at its works near Pretoria, costing over $100,000. Acknowledging that the center has been built at a time when some overseas companies are withdrawing or at least reducing their operations in South Africa, the company's chairman said that "BMW is in no doubt about its future activities in this country. We are here to stay and intend to grow and develop fully."

The BMW factory near Pretoria is the only one outside West Germany. "This in itself indicates the extent of BMW's commitment to this country," he added.

Fiat South Africa is also planning to expand, according to managing director G. C. Barsotti. The plant at Rosslyn, Pretoria, which has a capacity of 60 cars a day, will just about be able to cope with this year's expected sales but will not be able to meet next year's expected demand.
In contrast to the confidence in the business climate expressed by the expansion plans of these major companies a survey conducted by the University of Delaware presents a gloomy political risk index to prospective US investors in South Africa over the next seven years.

The survey places South Africa as the highest “moderate risk” at present—with only one country, Indonesia, as a higher risk. In three years’ time South Africa will become a “prohibitive risk” together with Spain and Indonesia, and in seven years, South Africa will be the highest prohibitive risk of all countries.

The University of Delaware survey is sent yearly to all American banks and prospective foreign investment companies in America. Because of its “risk” status, South Africa is already paying an extremely high premium on overseas loans.

THE RHODESIAN regime imposed stringent censorship regulations on January 7, prohibiting foreign and Rhodesian journalists from reporting anything but the official version of events in the five-year-old guerrilla war.

The new censorship orders, issued under Rhodesia’s Emergency Powers Maintenance of Law and Order legislation were the toughest the government has yet imposed.

These orders were introduced after black nationalist guerrillas had made a series of bold attacks that official sources said seriously undermined morale.

Journalists who break the regulations face up to a year’s imprisonment and a $1,500 fine.

Foreign correspondents say the new rules will prevent any objective reporting of the war and project only one side of the conflict.

An organization of 100 Rhodesian journalists is objecting to these new laws.

ON THE NAMIBIAN battlefront, even the South Africans are admitting the growing success of SWAPO troops in confronting South African troops. Major General Wally Black, defense force director-general of operations recently admitted that South African casualties had increased during the past year and the standards of SWAPO’s efforts had “tremendously improved.”

A SWAPO press release from London reported that South African forces violently broke up a SWAPO rally held in the black township of Ondangua, northern Namibia in mid-December.

The army set up roadblocks for over a mile from the meeting place and thoroughly searched the people and cars for weapons. Despite this, 8,000 people attended. The press release stated that:

“A well-organized group of about twenty ‘tribal soldiers’ in plain clothes, who identified themselves as ‘Njoba’s fist’ (Chief Minister of Ovamboland), armed with thorny palmbranches, hand-grenades and rifles, did everything in their power to provoke the audience, [They] threw sand amongst the crowd and beat people indiscriminately while a group of South African police in seven anti-landmine vehicles stood by smiling.

The meeting was eventually broken up when tear gas was thrown at the people. The “tribal army” then charged the dispersing crowd with palmbranches, batons and rifle butts, and several shots were fired into the air.

‘In the ensuing commotion’ the release continues, ‘many people were injured, of whom about ten received medical treatment at [the] hospital.

Property was damaged; people robbed; SWAPO T-shirts and shirts were confiscated. Even the women comrades with SWAPO T-shirts were undressed at gunpoint, and others were left only in their panties.”

ANGOLA has refused to divert water from the Cunene River to Namibia—wrecking plans to generate power from the huge hydro-electric plant at Ruacana for Namibian mines. Although touted by the Portuguese in the 1960s as they key to a development plan for southern Angola, the Cunene River dam project was financed primarily by South Africa to provide cheap electricity for the large mineral mines of northern Namibian. Most work stopped on the project in early 1976 after the MPLA gained power.

MALAWIAN miners are returning to work on the South African gold, copper and platinum mines, thus helping to meet the shortage of labor the mines have been experiencing. The number has risen from 200 early in 1976 to 12,000 in November, to 17,600 in January.

Malawi put an end to mine labor recruitment in 1974 after an air crash killed a large number of homeward-bound mine workers. As many as 130,000 Malawians were working on the mines at that time, exceeding the number of South Africans.

This re-opens a major foreign exchange-earning avenue for Malawi, and gives the mining industry access to an important source of labor at a time of uncertainty about recruitment from other states. At present only 38,000 migrant workers come from Mozambique, a significant reduction from the pre-independence figure.

THE CANADIAN government announced that it was to end official support for commercial relations with South Africa and phase out its consulates. Commercial consuls were withdrawn from Johannesburg and Cape Town and all support given by the Government’s Export Development Corporation to companies trading with South Africa will be withdrawn.

Mr. Jamieson, Canadian External Affairs Minister, said the measures were part of a new Canadian policy concerning South Africa’s racial separation policies. Condemning the South African governments for its apartheid policies, Jamieson said that although it is not the only country where human rights were violated on a daily basis, it is the only one with an established government structure making “decisions affecting humans on the basis of race and color.”

AMERICAN business in South Africa is the target of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) who have called for their total withdrawal from that country because of the government’s policies of racial separation.

A number of earlier NAACP resolutions had urged the US government to call on American companies to stop investing in South Africa until apartheid is ended, but this is the first NAACP call for total withdrawal.

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The departure of the South African Botha left the conference to seek further consultations with the foreign ministers of five Western powers. New York to meet with representatives of five Western powers.

Among the chief issues that remain unresolved in the negotiations are the phased withdrawal of South African troops and the status of the port of Walvis Bay. South Africa is refusing to trim its troop strength to levels acceptable to the Contact Group and SWAPO, and the white regime is also insisting on continued control over Walvis Bay, Namibia's only viable port.

Inside Namibia, meanwhile, widespread opposition to South African rule continues. In one incident in early February, the health minister of the Ovamboland homeland, Toiva Shiyagaya, was assassinated at a political meeting of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. The Alliance, formed after the breakdown of the South African-sponsored Turnhalle constitutional talks, hopes to form the government when Namibia gets independence.

Anti-Apartheid Groups Target Davis Cup

Pressure is building against South Africa's participation in the North American Zone finals of the Davis Cup tennis competition, despite South Africa's eleventh hour appointment of a Coloured player, Vanderbilt University junior David Lamb, to a spot on the squad.

The Coalition for Human Rights in South Africa, a US group which includes the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the American Committee on Africa, and the National Urban League, met in late February with US Tennis Association officials, but failed to persuade them to call off play. Officials argued privately that while they do not want to risk suspension for refusing to play, they have asked South Africa to withdraw voluntarily from next year's competition.

Protests are expected for the Cup finals, which are to be played in Nashville. The NAACP estimates that as many as 40,000 demonstrators may be on hand for the matches, on March 17, 18 and 19.

Soweto Election Fizzles

South African authorities announced that fewer than 6% of the eligible voters turned out for the government-sponsored community council elections late last month.

A boycott of the balloting had been urged by the Soweto Action Committee, a newly-formed group that has assumed the mantle of informal township leadership, and by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement.

In spite of the poor turnout, however, authorities say they will work with the election winners.

Security Tightened On Zambia's 'Copper Belt'

Government officials imposed a midnight to dawn curfew on Zambia's 'copper belt' last month, after the second bombing in as many months by some 300 white miners.

The miners were protesting attacks of armed thugs which in January took the lives of one white and one Asian woman, both wives of Roan Consolidated Mines employees.

An African employee was also attacked in recent weeks, leading to speculation that the gangs are motivated by money rather than race.

Israel Firms Up South Africa Ties

Israeli Finance Minister held eight days of talks in South Africa last month and laid plans for expanding trade and industrial ties between the two countries.

The growth of links between Israel and South Africa has been a topic of debate within both nations, particularly since the visit to Israel last April of South African Prime Minister John Vorster—one of the few times the South African premier has ventured out of his beleaguered country. The trip called public attention to both military and economic cooperation, which includes Israeli training of South African counterinsurgency forces, railway and irrigation projects, and several joint scientific ventures.

Patriotic Front Rejects Zimbabwe Settlement

Guerrilla forces of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front have, as expected, rejected the 'internal settlement' forged in Salisbury, and promised an intensification of the armed struggle.

The settlement, a provisional accord between Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and moderate nationalists Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau, calls for universal suffrage but gives whites a blocking mechanism in the legislature. Of the projected 100-member parliament, whites would get 28 seats; of these 20 would be elected by a whites-only voters roll, and eight would be selected by a common roll from nominees of Smith's Rhodesian Front party.

Other provisions, which critics say amount to the preservation of minority rule, include maintenance of the Rhodesian army and police, and the independence of the judiciary and civil service from control by the black-dominated government.

The Western powers' reaction to the settlement was cautious. The US and Britain stopped short of accepting the accord and declared their intention to launch new international talks on Zimbabwe similar to those just organized between Rhodesian Prime Minister Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau, calls for a 'timid' agreement.

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South Africa Leaves Namibia Talks

South African Foreign Minister Roelf Botha last month walked out of the 'proximity talks' on the future of Namibia, a high-level conference that brought the South African official to New York to meet with representatives of five Western powers.

After three days of discussions, including consultations with the foreign minister of the U.S., Great Britain, France, Canada and West Germany, Botha left the conference to seek further instructions from his government. The departure of the South African envoy led to speculation that Pretoria is ready to quit the UN-sponsored peace talks and proceed with its own plan to hand over power to Namibian tribal leaders later this year.

The Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO, which also took part in the New York meetings, has expressed a willingness to continue negotiations, and commended the Western 'Contact Group' for making a 'serious effort' in the talks.

Among the chief issues that remain unresolved in the negotiations are the phased withdrawal of South African troops and the status of the port of Walvis Bay. South Africa is refusing to trim its troop strength to levels acceptable to the Contact Group and SWAPO, and the white regime is also insisting on continued control over Walvis Bay, Namibia's only viable port.

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A memorial service was held in New York on January 24 for Duma Nokwe, a leader of the African National Congress of South Africa who died in Lusaka.

Duma Nokwe graduated from Fort Hare University with a science degree in 1949 and became a teacher. He was thrown out of teaching because of his political activism, and then studied law, becoming the first African advocate. During the next seven years he was arrested, charged in a 1956 treason trial, detained in 1960, banned under the Suppression of Communism act, and placed under house arrest. In between he managed to defend political cases and continued his activities as a leader of ANC.

In January 1963 he left South Africa at the instruction of the ANC, and from then on devoted his energies to working full time for the organization. He represented the ANC at numerous international gatherings and was Director of Political Affairs and Assistant Secretary General of the organization.

Southern Africa expresses its sympathy and solidarity with Duma's family, and with his comrades in the African National Congress.

Looking for Oil Independence

I should like to remind you that the main object of Sasol II is to diminish South Africa's dependence on imported petroleum and to reduce the heavy outlay in foreign exchange to pay for these imports.

—D. P. deVilliers, Chairman South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corp., Ltd., October 27, 1977

Talk of oil sanctions at the United Nations and the rising cost of importing oil to meet the demands of its industrialized economy have encouraged South Africa to seek ways of freeing itself from total dependency on foreign oil.

It is estimated that South Africa imports about 15 million tons of oil per year at a cost of $1.6 billion. This is a major drain on South Africa's foreign reserves, which are already under constant pressure.

While South Africa does not have any oil and must import all of its needs, it does have extensive coal deposits. It is now building a plant called Sasol II to transform that coal into oil. A small pilot plant at Sasolburg has been in operation for several years.

Capital Costs

The eventual capital cost of the construction of Sasol II and its feeder mine is estimated at $2.8 billion, excluding the cost of building a township and housing, interest during construction and working capital. This is an expensive undertaking, but the long term foreign exchange savings will be significant.

According to the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation, the parastatal corporation building Sasol II, the plant will save South Africa $830.5 million (R350 million) per year when in full operation. It will reportedly also supply up to 30% of South Africa's oil needs.

It is currently estimated that $1,615 million (R1,405 million), 57 percent of the capital cost of Sasol II, will be spent in South Africa. By the end of last year, 228 contracts had been placed with South African contractors and consultants.

The remaining 43 percent will be spent outside for equipment and expertise not available in South Africa. The main contract for the construction of Sasol II has gone to a major West coast firm, Fluor. While the South African claim to have developed the process used in Sasol II, the Fluor contract covers the total development package from planning through construction to the operational phase. Clearly the construction of Sasol II would be impossible without foreign technical know-how.

Continued from page 11

white radicals and members of the black consciousness movement. He had openly defied his ban and lived with an Indian woman whom he married according to Muslim rites, thus breaking South Africa's racist "Mixed Marriages" and "Immorality" Acts. Turner had been sufficiently careful to prevent legal charges being pressed against him.

But as one of the most impressive of the present generation of young radicals and revolutionaries, who are developing a Marxist theory of revolution for South Africa, he was too much of a threat to be left alone.

Assassination became the weapon used to annihilate him. As the struggle in South Africa intensifies, more such actions can be expected.
Looking for Funds

South Africa has already sought foreign assistance for financing as well as construction. In 1976 Fluor attempted to get a $450 million direct loan from the US ExportImport Bank. The Ex-Im Bank did not approve the loan, but it seems likely that some financing will still be provided by US sources.

Fluor has in turn contracted the services of the East coast Raytheon Corporation through its Cambridge, Mass. subsidiary, Badger Corporation. Richard Hill, Chairman of the First National Bank of Boston (FNBB), is on the board of Raytheon, and Badger Corporation banks at FNBB. This interlinkage could very well persuade FNBB that it should make a major loan towards the construction of Sasol II.

Another indication of South African interest in obtaining capital from the US is the retention of the Wall Street underwriting firm, Dillon, Read to oversee Sasol II’s financing. Peter Flanigan, a Dillon, Read executive, made a “private visit” to South Africa in 1976, in the company of a group of international bankers including representatives of Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers Hanover, and Bank of America. Dillon, Read seems reluctant to talk about its current connection with the project.

According to South African sources, $565.80 million (R492 million) of the total financing of Sasol II, will be loan finance in the form of export credits. $345 million (R300 million) will be obtained from parliamentary appropriations for which share capital will be issued and the balance of the funds will be provided by the State Oil Fund and earmarked as equity capital. Thus the government will effectively control the project.

UNITED STATES

Senate Report on South Africa Corporations

Senator Clark released a major report on US bank loans and investment in South Africa in late January, and made a series of recommendations to the Carter Administration which he described as “moderate.” The study was more than a year in the making. One section details current bank lending to South Africa, and was prepared by Bill Raiford of the Congressional Research Service. Raiford found that bank loans from US commercial banks totalled about $2.2 billion from 197476, roughly the equivalent of the South African government’s military and oil expenditures. US commercial banks have provided approximately one-third of South Africa’s foreign borrowing.

The second part of the report is a compilation of responses to a questionnaire that Clark sent to all US corporations with investments in South Africa. Corporations Help Apartheid

Clark said the findings contained in the report indicate that US economic interests in South Africa “have been pivotal in directly assisting the South African government.” He said the report also shows that US corporations operating in South Africa “have (collectively) made no significant impact on either relaxing apartheid or in establishing company policies which would offer a limited but nevertheless important model of multinational responsibility.”

Clark said these findings make the current US policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging new US investment in South Africa “no longer tenable.” He stressed, however, that the new policies he is recommending represent a “moderate” approach to the situation. He said they are virtually identical to policies adopted by the government of Canada in December 1977.

Clark said he does not feel that “more extreme measures,” such as broad trade and investment sanctions or full disengagement of US investments, are wise or possible at this time. Instead, he said, his recommendations are aimed at “fostering specific and meaningful changes in the role which US corporate interests have traditionally played.”

Clark added, however, that stronger measures may be advisable in the future if these policies do not have their desired effect. “Much depends,” he said, “upon events within South Africa and the willingness of all participants there to accept constructive transformation.”

Concrete Actions

Clark commended the Carter Administration on its “more forthcom-
Commerce Delays Action On Cessna Sale

It appears that public and Congressional protests have delayed Commerce and State Department approval of Cessna’s application to sell 44 planes to a commercial distributor in South Africa in the first eight months of 1979. When a State Department press officer told a UPI reporter of the pending application in mid-December, numerous objections were raised. Evidence of South African Air Force use of civilian aircraft flown by private pilots in paramilitary Air Commando units was widely used as a reason for opposing the sale. Although this information has been on the public record for several years, it gained publicity only after the Administration continued to license aircraft to South Africa in spite of agreeing to a mandatory arms embargo at the United Nations last November.

The State Department has maintained that there is no evidence that American aircraft are used in the Air Commandos. But now, to defuse the impact of the argument that all civilian aircraft sales should be stopped because they could be used for paramilitary purposes, State is proposing to continue the sales, but with a new restriction. In a December 29 letter to Congressman Markey of Massachusetts, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Robert Berckel, said that State is recommending to Commerce a specific export license restriction to prohibit the use of US manufactured aircraft on a full- or part-time basis, in paramilitary or commando activity, whether for training or operational use.

Observers speculate that final action on Cessna’s application will probably not be announced until this regulation has been added to the US arms embargo guidelines. President Carter ordered a review of the guidelines in early November after the UN arms embargo vote, but they have not yet been completed.

US Company Fined For Sanctions Breaking

The Treasury Department has fined a South African subsidiary of an American company $25,000 for illegally trading with Rhodesia, according to a Reuters report of January 13. The subsidiary of Gardner-Denver Co. of Dallas, Texas also had its export license revoked for two months for selling $392,000 worth of mining equipment to Rhodesia in contravention of the United Nations sanctions program.

Treasury officials said this was the first time a fine has been imposed against a company for trading with Rhodesia, although export licenses have been revoked before.

Although the US government generally does not have jurisdiction over sanctions-breaking of South African subsidiaries, such as Mobil Oil of South Africa, it was able to act in this case because the goods sold to Rhodesia were originally shipped from the United States.

Rep. Downey Issues Report On South Africa

The coordinator of the House of Representatives Ad-Hoc Monitoring Group on South Africa released a report on “The Civil Rights Crisis in South Africa and US Policy Options” on January 2. Rep. Thomas Downey of New York said the paper is “intended as a guidepost for Congressional initiatives” on South Africa in 1978. Although Downey authored the paper alone, he believes that many of the other 30 members of the group would support his recommendations.

Declaring that “the US cannot adopt a head in the sand approach to economic sanctions,” Downey supported the following measures which have been discussed in Congress:

- denial of tax credits to US companies which pay taxes to the South African government (Rangel bill H.R. 5796);
- prohibition of Export-Import Bank financing of exports to South Africa (Maguire bill H.R. 9746);
- prohibition of imports into the US of South African goods made by workers subject to discrimination (Markey bill H.R. 9754);
- ending of nuclear cooperation agreement with South Africa;
- ending all “gray area” sales such as “civilian” aircraft, and
- downgrading the US mission in South Africa.

Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York, who is a member of the Africa Subcommittee but not of the Monitoring Group, plans to introduce a two-part bill on US corporations in South Africa in early February. Part one is the first Congressional initiative to prohibit future US investment in South Africa, except for reinvestment of earnings from existing operations. Part two prohibits investors in South Africa from engaging in unfair employment practices there, and is patterned on a bill previously introduced by Congressman Charles Diggs.
Isaiah, South Africa and Black American Churches

By Rev. Muhammad Kenyatta

One of the most electrifying and dramatic moments in the Judeo-Christian scriptures occurs in Isaiah’s vision when this prophet is confronted by the Lord’s call for a singularly difficult and radical mission. Isaiah “heard the voice of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send and who will go for us?” There was no way for Isaiah to dodge the question, for he was the one prepared and called for the mission. To avoid the question would have meant to void the essential purpose of his life.

Without any recorded pause, Isaiah answered directly, “Here am I, Lord, send me.”

The struggle of African masses for liberation in their native lands of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Namibia and South Africa (also called Azania) confronts the Black Christian churches in the USA with an Isaiah-in-the-temple challenge. If black religionists avoid this challenge, we will corrupt the essential purpose of our own historic calling and preparation.

At this point in history, no one—not even the USA government—denies the massive economic involvement of USA-based multinational corporations in southern Africa. In South Africa itself, the USA investment of one billion, six hundred million dollars is second only to Great Britain’s, and the rate of acceleration of USA investments over recent years exceeds that of any other nation. The extent of USA political protection of South Africa was amply manifest at the United Nations, this past Fall, when Ambassador Andrew Young vetoed three successive African-sponsored resolutions for effective economic sanctions against the apartheid regime.

As pointed out by African church leaders and by liberation organization representatives, who joined with 300 black USA leaders in the Black Theology Project’s Atlanta ‘77 Black Church conference, when Africans struggle for self-determination in southern Africa, they inevitably find the US government and corporate establishment either directly opposing or subtly subverting their struggles.

An important part of the government/corporate subversion strategy is to create the impression that black American church leadership endorses the Carter administration’s policy of continuing American economic involvement and political reciprocity with South Africa’s fascist white minority regime. This is why the Reverend Andrew Young, the Reverend Leon Sullivan of General Motors and other black clergy figures are assigned visible roles to “sell” White House and corporate neo-colonial strategies to both Afro-Americans and African “moderates.”

But the black churches of the USA were prepared and born in protest against racism and treachery. Our earliest churches affirmed their African identity: African Methodist Episcopal, African Methodist Episcopal Zion, First African Baptist, First African Presbyterian, etc. And the continuing oppression of our own communities right here in the USA, after the arduous years of our own human rights protests, is stark evidence that African people must not settle for “made in USA” solutions that offer them economic and political second-class citizenship on their native continent.

Black churches and individual believers are being challenged to directly support liberation organizations like SWAPO of Namibia and the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe; to support Christian liberation advocates like black theologian Allan Boesack in South Africa; to work directly with forces like the Patrice Lumumba Coalition, the Washington Office on Africa, the “no bank loans to South Africa” campaign, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility and the dozens of local African liberation support groups.

We, black followers of Jesus Christ, are being challenged to identify ourselves with the most authentic expressions of African liberation aspirations—including armed guerrilla freedom fighters—even if this puts us on a collision course with Wall Street and the White House.

Not long ago, the Reverend Herb Daughtry and the House of the Lord Pentecostal Church in New York City raised and donated over four thousand dollars to the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. I know that congregation has its own local needs and that the parishioners are individuals for whom a dollar given is a dollar sacrificed. But that spirit-filled church saw their Isaiah situation and heard the voice of the Lord in the cries of African babies. It is high time that more black church folks say, like that congregation, “Here are we, Lord, send us.”

The Rev. Kenyatta is national director of the Black Theology Project, a former Merrill Fellow at Harvard University’s Divinity School and an assistant preacher at Kingsway Community Church in Philadelphia. He serves as permanent representative to the United Nations Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) section for the Black Economic Development Conference.

US corporate investment in South Africa without adherence to the investment guidelines and fair employment principles cited above.

Clark said these steps would “bring US policies regarding investment in South Africa in line with general US policy.” Stronger actions would be too "dramatic" and would cut off American "leverage" with the South African government to encourage peaceful change. Clark did not announce any initiatives that he would take in Congress, but rather supported the Administration’s current policy and expressed hope that it would accept his recommendations in the course of the current Executive policy review.

The report, which contains a great deal of useful factual material, is entitled "US Corporate Interests in Africa," and is available from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. 20510.
US Helped Vorster Get IMF Money

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) slipped $4064 million to South Africa in 1976 and 1977 according to two researchers working for a private, Washington based political research group, the Center for International Policy.

IMF meetings are held behind closed doors, but James Morrell and David Gisselquist managed to obtain copies of confidential IMF Executive Board minutes which reveal both the extent of the financing involved, and the consistency with which two US administrations (Ford and Carter) have supported the loans for South Africa, despite considerable opposition from African and other countries.

The documents show that the process began in January, 1976, when South Africa applied to the IMF for help in fighting problems it said had been caused by rising imports, a fall in exports due to the world wide recession and a resulting drain on its foreign reserves.

During subsequent internal discussions delegates representing West Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal challenged the loans on economic grounds, arguing that South Africa had created many of its own economic problems, and should use its resources, particularly gold, to cure itself.

The African representative, Antoine Yameogo of Upper Volta, went further, pointing out that the problems that had brought South Africa to the IMF were short term, and capable of self correction; but South Africa's real problem, he said, was long term and structural — namely its treatment of the black population which represented 83% of the total population and occupied only 13% of the land. His opposition was overridden and South Africa's request for what was termed a stand-by credit was granted.

Later in the year, in November 1976, five months after the Soweto shootings, South Africa was back with another request for $186 million. This too was granted, bringing the total of IMF loans for 1976 up to $366 million.

More Than All Africa

The minutes do not cover 1977, but Morrell and Gisselquist report that the Carter administration quietly supported an additional $56 million loan to South Africa in 1977 even while castigating the white-supremacy government in public. Washington's time honored tradition of slapping the wrist while greasing the palm was observed once more.

The IMF's balance of payment assistance to South Africa in these two years was greater than its combined assistance to all other African countries in the same period. In fact, in those two years only Britain and Mexico received more aid from the Fund.

US Contribution

Of the total received by South Africa, an estimated $107 million came from the US government's contribution to IMF funds. Even more important, the US, as the IMF's largest single contributor, could, almost certainly, have blocked the loans if it so wished.

Instead the US joined with the UK in supporting aid to South Africa. Peter J. Bull, representing the UK, said at the January 1976 meeting that standby arrangements "would give the authorities . . . some feeling of international support, which they deserved." In November, US delegate Thomas Leddy argued that South Africa's need was clearly established and affirmed his support for the aid.

Defending SA Assistance

The US uses a convenient logic in supporting IMF assistance to South Africa. The IMF was established to help its 130 member countries overcome threats to their economies caused by adverse trade balances—imports outstripping exports—with resulting shortfalls in foreign exchange. Aid to a country in such trouble has consequences for all other countries involved in foreign trade, goes the argument, because if a big country like South Africa can no longer buy, sell or pay its debt, that will have damaging chain reaction effects on other countries.

Increasing Defense Expenditure

What the US chose to ignore, in making its argument, was the particular reason why South Africa found itself importing too much. Yet the reason was clearly laid out in a report prepared for members by IMF staff in April 1977. "Defense expenditure has been a major cause of the rapid increase in total current expenditure," said the report, noting that defense expenditure for the 1976/77 budget had risen 40%, and that the 1977/78 budget proposed another 21% increase, bringing total defense expenditure to $1.9 billion.

Thus IMF funds are being lent to South Africa to enable the Pretoria regime to build its capacity to defend apartheid against the growing challenge from the majority of the South African people.

It is surely time to stop these loans.

ZIMBABWE

More Talk, More War

With the Patriotic Front continuing its annual rainy-season offensive, the quest for a moderate settlement has intensified on two fronts.

After two months of talks, the Smith regime has hastened its efforts to produce an "internal settlement" with pliant black leaders cultivated by the Salisbury government who seem willing to sell out their people for their own slice of power. At the same time, Washington and London are anxious to find a "moderate" settlement along the same lines as Smith's, but with wide international backing—which can only come through participation of the Patriotic Front.

Talks In Malta

And so at the end of January, Andrew Young and British Foreign Secretary David Owen met on the Mediterranean island of Malta with Patriotic Front leaders, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, while Smith...
made noises about an imminent settlement in the talks in Salisbury.

Young and his aides—most of whom are black Americans—hold the public view that Patriotic Front participation is a requisite for any legitimate settlement of Zimbabwe independence. Seeking out the Zimbabwe delegates between the formal negotiating sessions, in the bars and corridors of the Malta hotel, Young used his strong personality and flamboyant style to try to win them over to the "merits" of the Anglo-American plan.

Although failing to do this, he did win praise from Robert Mugabe who said that Young had made a "tremendous contribution" and spoke of the US role in the quest for an internationally acceptable solution as "positive."

David Owen's style was more formal, meeting only with the Zimbabwe delegates during the talks, and letting Andy Young have the spotlight. There is more than the question of style at work here, however. Britain now appears to be ready to abandon its own plan, should an internal settlement be reached by Smith in Salisbury.

Turnabout Anticipated By British

Washington Post reporter David Ottaway, who covered the Malta conference, commented that the Labor Party and the British Foreign Secretary "now seem certain to support Smith's internal settlement. The Labor government feels extremely vulnerable to attacks from the Conservatives who already have charged that Owen was 'sabotaging' Smith's internal settlement effort by dealing with Rhodesian 'terrorists.'" With the possibility of this being an election year for Britain, the Labor Party is finding the Rhodesian question a particularly thorny one to handle, and no doubt feels the need to appease conservative opinion in order to insure reelection.

There have been signs, too, that Washington is prepared to support Smith's plan if efforts to persuade Front leaders to moderate their conditions for participation fail.

In contrast to the earlier low-key role that the US played in the talks, Young is now the key figure. According to Ottaway, he has the strong backing of Nyerere and Machel, "who together have exercised considerable pressure on the Front to come to the negotiating table with Britain and the United States."

Talks Inconclusive

The Malta talks ended inconclusively after being extended into a third day. The question of who should lead the transitional government and who should supervise the elections is far from resolved.

Britain and the US accepted the Front's proposal for a "governing council" to rule during the transition. The Front insists that this council be composed of Patriotic Front members and the British Resident Commissioner. Lord Carver. US and Britain are equally insistent that two members each of ZANU and ZAPU (the two organizations that form the alliance) comprise the council, as well as two members each of Sithole's ZANU and Muzorewa's UANC.

The Front, understandably, rejects being put in a minority situation. Its leaders wish to ensure political and military control so that it is not sold out.

A major deadlock remains over the composition of the future army. Britain and the US have proposed a 10,000-member army, composed of 4,000 guerrillas, 3,000 black troops from Smith's present army, and 3,000 new recruits.

The Patriotic Front wants all its fighters (Ottaway estimates its strength at 15,000 to 25,000) to form the basis of the new army, which would also include a few thousand black and white soldiers from Smith's army. Front leaders have not changed their position on the UN peacekeeping force, rejecting their presence altogether.

Internal Settlement Stalled

Meanwhile, the rumblings from Salisbury that gave rise to speculation that the so-called internal settlement would be announced during the Malta talks, produced no concrete results. The least plant of Smith's chosen African leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who walked out of the talks and boycotted them for a few days, said that he had been insulted and called a liar.

The talks then stalled over the question of parliamentary representation, for which Smith had worked out a complex formula to preserve minority control over the Zimbabwean legislature, while still offering promises of "one man, one vote."

Muzorewa refused to accept Smith's plans for whites to vote separately on 28 of the 100 members of a future Parliament. Sithole proposed a compromise formula, which Smith seemed ready to accept. According to this plan, white voters would elect their members for the first half of the period that Smith has stipulated as necessary to continue white control. It is unlikely that the Rhodesian right-wing (both members and non-members of the ruling Front Party) would accept this proposal. Many have been extremely critical of what they see as a sell-out by Smith.

The question of the composition of the army has become a stumbling block in these as well as the Malta talks! Smith insists that it remain as it presently is; Muzorewa and Sithole insist that the guerrillas be integrated into it. What Smith terms a "broad settlement" will, according to him, be announced "in a few weeks"—presumably by mid-February. Black negotiators present at Smith's press conference on January 25 showed him their full support. "It will make you very happy," said Ntabanini Sithole said of the plan.

A South African press report recently revealed that Sithole has been using a former CIA agent, Neville Romain, born in South Africa, as his chief adviser and advance man. In late 1974, Sithole was ousted as chairman of ZANU.

Samora Machel Supports Patriotic Front Negotiations

President Samor Machel, in a two-hour interview with American journalists in Maputo in mid-January (an interview that apparently was not reported in the US press), dismissed the validity of an internal settlement and expressed support for negotiations based on the British-American peace proposals.

"Mozambique has made great efforts to prevent Mr. Smith from forming his war of aggression into a general war in southern Africa," Machel said, adding that Smith's objective was to "create instability and insecurity in the region and generalize the conflict so the West will find a pretext to participate."

He expressed serious concern over the possibility that Britain and the
United States would back Smith's internal settlement, and turn away from their own plan. "The West will be silent about an internal settlement at first. South Africa will be the first to recognize it, then the West—and the last will be Britain. They will say it is a fait accompli. They will say those still fighting are rebels and Communist agents. An internal settlement is the way to prolong the war in Zimbabwe."

Expressing support for free elections, Machel said, "It is up to the people of Zimbabwe to choose and elect their leaders. If they are for the Patriotic Front or other nationalist patriots in Zimbabwe, the people will know the quality of each leader. We are not saying we exclude other leaders (than those of the Patriotic Front)."

He added with a smile, "If Mr. Smith wants to be elected it is up to the Zimbabweans to elect him."

**War Continues**

As the volume of talk increases at either end of the globe, and as Andy Young prepares for a trip to Africa for talks with frontline state leaders and possibly with Smith in Salisbury, the Patriotic Front continues its struggle for independence, the struggle which brought the disparate leaders to the conference tables in the first place. The fighting has begun to intensify with the start of the yearly rainy-season offensive. What happens on the battle front is critical to a settlement, and the Front is unlikely to phase out any of its fighting without serious commitment from the various parties to true liberation for their country.

In an attempt to strengthen his proposed settlement, Smith recently offered a cease-fire to the guerrillas in Mozambique and Zambia, inviting them to lay down their arms and return home. ZAPU chairman, Joshua Nkomo responded from Lusaka on January 25 by stating that a cease-fire could be acceptable only "as a consequence of an absolute guarantee of the certainty of independence"—a guarantee, Nkomo pointed out, that only the Patriotic Front could provide.

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**ANGOLA**

**Planning A Socialist Future**

*By Michael Shuster*

Of all the important questions taken up at MPLA's First Congress in early December, the problem of the relationship between the countryside and the town probably has the most far-reaching consequences for the future of the Angolan revolution.

It is no accident that the Congress declared 1978 "the year of agriculture," and that soon after the Congress, the Angolan government carried out what one observer called a "light" reshuffling of the Cabinet, which included the replacement of the Ministers of Agriculture, Fishing and Commerce.

At first glance the declaration of a "year of agriculture" might seem to be pretty dull stuff. But in reports to the Congress, it became evident that many leaders in MPLA were beginning to realize that in coming to power in 1975, MPLA had somehow become disassociated from that base of power—the countryside—that had supported it and made it possible to survive throughout the anti-colonial struggle of the 1960s.

When it assumed governmental responsibility after independence the MPLA had transferred leadership from the liberated zones in the far east of the country to Luanda, the capital. But it had been the peasantry in that liberated section who had contributed decisively to the development and progress of the national liberation struggle—because of the shift, the countryside had inevitably come to be seen as separated from the policy debates that flourished in the towns, and from the subsequent decisions that were made.

**War Effects**

It is interesting to note here that during what the Angolans call the Second War of Liberation—fought against FNLA, UNITA, and the South African army after the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship—it was the populations of the towns that were mainly affected by the fighting as the invading forces sought to capture these centers. Afterward, the difficult phase of setting up the central structures of the state—difficulties aggravated by a badly damaged communications system—demanded most of MPLA's energy and attention. Again the countryside was neglected as MPLA failed to create the necessary conditions for the systematic political mobilization of the majority of Angolans—the peasants.

Addressing the problematic relationship between the countryside and the town had further implications for the Congress. Not only did it touch on the political behavior of those living far from Luanda, but it raised serious questions and produced important answers about the political behavior of those in the capital, before and after the abortive coup attempt last May.

**Bureaucrats Survive**

After MPLA came to power and won the war of 1975-76, the state functioned with most of the bureaucrats who worked for the Portuguese colo-
nial administration still at their desks. Most had remained aloof from the profound political change that had shaken Angola over the previous decade. According to many observers, including this reporter, the old functionaries, most of them non-white, had also manifested a real inability to run the state apparatus.

This is not surprising when it is realized that the primary function of the colonial state machinery was tax collection. Ignorant of the reality of life for most of the country's 6 million peasants and indifferent to their plight, these functionaries led a privileged existence. After MPLA came to power, they fought hard to maintain their status.

"There are those," President Agostinho Neto pointed out in his New Year's message, "who concern themselves only with their privileges. From there to corruption, and to sabotage, is but a single step."

"Perhaps it's normal," he added. "But we cannot accept their disobedience."

Many were prepared to defy the new system and its values. Nito Alves and his followers (known now as factionists) organized against the leadership of Neto and MPLA Secretary Lucio Lara. They found a ready audience among the state's functionaries, who were anxious to challenge the power of those leaders and militiants—peasants in origin—who had come from the struggle in the east.

Thus both among many MPLA loyalists and among the plotters against them, the peasantry had come to be considered the political "clientele" of the towns where the absolute "leadership" of the country resided.

Isolation of Militants

The further away MPLA militants were from Luanda, the more they felt this separation. Ironically, it was those in the remotest areas such as eastern Mexico province, where the guerrilla struggle had won MPLA its greatest victories and literally kept the movement alive during the very difficult days of the mid-1960s, who were most cut off. Fortunately they were also the most vocal in their criticism.

In August 1976, I traveled to Mexico and spent three weeks with the MPLA leadership of the province, visiting some of the outlying villages and settlements. Of all the militants and leaders I met in ten of Angola's 16 provinces, those of Mexico were the most politically conscious, and the most in touch with and concerned with the problems of the people.

The land rovers in which we traveled raised thick clouds of dust as we struggled through barely passable dirt roads. Rarely did we awake after dawn during those three weeks. The long distances between villages and the overgrown routes forced traveling in the very early morning hours if the Provincial Commissioner and his entourage were to have sufficient working time with the villagers to mobilize them and gauge their needs.

I traveled with the Provincial Commissioner, Armando Dembo, who was a veteran of the guerrilla struggle in Mexico, and his right hand man, Balthasar Messonge, a clandestine member of MPLA in the 1960s who worked at the Luso branch of the Bank of Angola. During the hours in the dusty land rovers, the talk always turned to politics. One morning, on our way to Caripande on the Zambian border, we talked of politics and its relation to language.

Criticism of Center

Angolans speak dozens of African languages, but the language of the government is Portuguese. During the colonial period, my hosts told me, the settlers considered the local languages "the talk of dogs," and the Luanda leaders had maintained an unfortunate prejudice against non-Portuguese speaking country people. "Many in Luanda don't understand how important it is for us to use the local languages," Messonge said. "It's really important for our people to hear their language on the radio," a rare occurrence, he added.

From that, the criticism broadened to include the already-hardening bureaucracies of the capital. Messonge and Dembo were convinced that the consequent separation of the people from the government would have serious implications.

Messonge had recently attended meetings in Luanda and came back to Mexico fuming over what he termed functionaries bound up with pseudo-intellectualism about revolution who had no contact with the countryside. The bureaucracies had already become so calcified that spare parts for any machine were difficult to acquire. "The endless filing out of forms," Messonge said, would have serious consequences in our work here. It's the way the right can prevent the advancement of our revolution.

"It will have to be us, outside of Luanda, who show them how it's done, how to change."

Almost prophetic in his analysis, Messonge and others like him did show Luanda how to change, if the decisions taken at the Congress are any indication. Agriculture had suffered particularly from bad state management. If it was to be the "base of development" of the Angolan economy designated by an initial two year plan, production would have to increase. "In order to do this," Neto said recently, "We will have to create many cooperatives which will coexist with small private plots. This is indispensable."

"The year of agriculture" will be a year not only concerned with growing food. If MPLA's plans for the year are successful, it will affect the political organization of the state and MPLA itself. Coupled with the two year economic development plan put forward by the Congress, it will be MPLA's first political blueprint for a socialist future.

South African Troops: Key to Talks

While its war of liberation with South Africa continues in the north and central regions of Namibia, the South West Africa People's Organization is bracing for a new round of talks with the five Western nations that have been actively urging a "moderate" settlement for Namibian independence since last spring. Talks are now expected to begin in early February, according to SWAPO representatives at the United Nations.
Little indication that South Africa plans to withdraw: Minister of Defense P. W. Botha (right) with Chief of the Defense Force General Malan in Ovamboland, northern Namibia. Botha paid a visit to several South African bases and watched anti-guerrilla action from a helicopter.

The five Western nations—the US, Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada—have apparently been meeting in New York since late in December in preparation for meetings among themselves, South African representatives, and SWAPO leaders. Talks were originally proposed for early in January, but both SWAPO and South Africa have alternately requested postponements.

Officials connected with the US mission to the United Nations have reportedly stated that they have managed to reach workable compromises between SWAPO and Pretoria on 11 of 19 bargaining points. But as in other Western diplomatic efforts, such percentages may be misleading. There are some points on which neither SWAPO nor South Africa appear prepared to budge an inch from their long-standing positions.

Elections
Chief among these is SWAPO's position on the South African presence—both its security forces and its civilian administration—in Namibia during elections in which the liberation movement would participate. "We were the first ones to propose elections in Namibia at the UN," SWAPO's Ben Gurirab said in a recent interview with Southern Africa. "And we remain committed to that idea—long as they are under UN supervision and control."

This position, Gurirab is quick to point out, represents no more than an adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 385, which condemned the illegal South African occupation and spelled out conditions for elections. Western nations endorsed that resolution when it was originally passed in January 1976.

Still, the Western Five, as they are called, are expected to press SWAPO, not South Africa, for a compromise on the occupation issue and on others, such as South Africa's claims on Walvis Bay, the territory's sole deep-water port. Privately, US negotiators have said that they are disappointed in what they portray as SWAPO's intransigence at the bargaining table. South
Africa, they argue, has altered its positions on key issues blocking elections for an independent government with SWAPO participation. But SWAPO, so the argument goes, simply rejects any South African presence whatsoever during elections.

The question of South Africa's military presence is the most glaring example of this tactical shift. There are reportedly a number of proposals being weighed on a compromise to what has been a stalemated issue—all designed to maintain a South African military presence during elections but all in the guise of "compromise solutions." One such would allow the South African administration several thousand troops in a specified area surrounded by a UN peacekeeping force.

Isolating SWAPO

There have been some indications recently that the US is prepared to solve this diplomatic impasses and move toward overt support of the South Africans' plan for a kind of internal settlement through elections, held under open South African control. It would do this by isolating SWAPO on the ground that the liberation movement failed to meet Pretoria halfway at the bargaining table.

In fact, the Western initiative is designed in part to usurp UN jurisdiction as provided for in Security Council resolutions. Donald McHenry, UN Representative Andrew Young's assistant for African affairs, noted recently that there were, indeed, several demands that South Africa must be prepared to accept.

But what was significant in McHenry's remarks, which were made during a speech at the Council for Religion and International Affairs in New York, was what he left out: Military withdrawal was not among the requirements he cited. He also noted that the US could not support "exclusive control" of elections by South Africa—another subtle shift in the Washington position implying that SA could play a role, a position in conflict with the role assigned to the UN as supervisor of elections, under SC Res 385. The questions that seem to remain at this point in the diplomatic maneuvers involving Namibia are how and how far the US will move toward support for Pretoria in attempting to advance post-Apartheid "moderation" in southern Africa.

SO LONG, KRUGERRAND

Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith announced that they would stop promoting and selling South African Krugerrand in the US on December 30. The company reached this decision "reluctantly because "demand for the coins did not attain the optimistic levels forecast . . ." It will continue to offer its customers gold bars, however.

Protests against the sale of Krugerrand occurred in Boston, Cleveland, San Antonio, Los Angeles, Eugene and Portland, Oregon. The actions resulted in TV stations and newspapers discontinuing ads, department stores ending sales, and city councils adopting resolutions opposing the sale of the coins in Denver, Chicago, Portland, Dayton and San Antonio. The Massachusetts House of Representatives passed a similar resolution.

GOOD NEWS FROM DISTRICT 1199 which announced on January 29 that the National Hospital Union Pension Fund trustees had banned all investments that aid South Africa. This is the first time a national labor-management pension fund has taken such action.

The Fund covers 70 hospitals and health care workers. The majority of them are members of District 1199 in voluntary hospitals, nursing homes and retail drug stores in the New York metropolitan area. The Fund has assets of $236 million.

Commenting on the action, Union President and chairman of the Fund's Board of Trustees, Leon Davis, said: "Loans and investments from the United States that prop South Africa's repressive regime are an insult to all Americans who believe in justice and fair play."

STOCKHOLDER ACTIONS... The Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility plans a series of actions at stockholder meetings requesting changes in American business involvement in southern Africa.

Four banks—Citibank, Morgan Guaranty, Continental Illinois, and First Chicago—will be asked to disclose information on their loans to South Africa. Manufacturers Hanover, Crocker, Bank of America, and First Boston will be asked to end all loans.

Texaco, Phelps Dodge, Motorolla, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing and Kimberly-Clark will be asked to withdraw from South Africa, and two other companies—Union Carbide and US Steel—not to expand their operations.

Other resolutions will request that Kennecott ask for disclosure on their mining and smelting operation in South Africa. Southern Co. to disclose details on the purchase of South African coal; Newmont Mining for information about its Namibian operations; and Kodak and Control Data not to sell their products to the South African government.

Texaco's stockholders will ask that company to investigate possible sales by its South African subsidiary to Rhodesia. Mobil and Standard Oil will be asked to cut back sales to South Africa by one-third—since one-third of the oil it sells to South Africa is estimated to be finding its way to Rhodesia.

Stockholder meetings begin in early March.

ATLANTA STUDENTS COMMEMORATE BIKO... One-hundred-and-fifty students and supporters from the community gathered at Atlanta Junior College (AJC) on January 13 to commemorate Stephen Biko who was jailed and tortured to death in September, 1977 by the South African police.

The program was sponsored by the Black and Third World Culture Club of AJC, a predominantly Black campus.
Keynote speaker Modibo Kadalie compared the struggle that Biko led against the racist educational system of South Africa to the fight being waged against the Georgia educational system by the students of AJC.

A proclamation was read by Omar Ujamaa, president of the Student Government Association of AJC, declaring January 13, 1978 Stephen Biko Day.

The evening ended with people rising to "dance for Stephen Biko" to the rhythms of African drums. The whole evening was one of solidarity and determination to continue struggling for freedom from racist oppression and exploitation.

**BANK CAMPAIGN** . . . 48 organizations, involving more than 1,000 people from Boston to San Francisco and belonging to such diverse organizations as the UAW and the Black Theology Project, had joined the bank campaign by the end of 1977. Research has produced known involvement by 59 banks in loans to South Africa and Unions and church groups have already protested this involvement by withdrawing at least $30 million from these banks.

Coordinators of the campaign are Prexy Nesbitt of ACOA (305 E. 46th St., New York, N.Y. 10017) and Gene Jones of Clergy and Laity Concerned (195 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10007).

The New York-based AFRICAN LIBERATION SUPPORT COMMITTEE, which is organizing nationally, has established a newspaper, All Africa Is Standing Up!

The ALSC also played a major part in sponsoring the calling of a meeting to form a NATIONAL COALITION TO SUPPORT AFRICAN LIBERATION. More than 80 people representing organizations and individuals opposed to US support for apartheid met in New York on January 28 to launch the Coalition. Aim of the Coalition is to forge the broadest possible unity among all forces who support the struggle against white minority regimes in southern Africa. It will work to bring together progressive forces taking a stand against their school, union or organization's investments in banks and companies doing business in southern Africa, activists opposing the sale of Krugerrands, etc. Coalition sponsors believe the weight of these actions will be felt much more strongly when coordinated through the national coalition.

Speakers included an African Liberation Support Committee member and principal organizer for African Liberation Day (ALD) 1972, representatives from ZANU and the PAC. Speakers urged participants to unite, organize and work towards the end of US partnership with apartheid.

The Coalition adopted a program which focused the ongoing work around two main themes. The first is that the Coalition endorses and will build for African Liberation Day '78 to be celebrated May 20 in Malcolm X Park, Washington, D.C., and May 27 in Arroyo Park, Oakland, California. The Coalition also voted to take up the following action slogans:

- **DEATH TO APARTHEID** — ALL US INVESTMENTS OUT OF SOUTH AFRICA
- **CUT THE ARM OF THE RACIST BAND** — BAN THE KRUGERRAND
- **DROP A DIME — SHUT DOWN SOUTH AFRICAN AIRLINE**

The Coalition has also set up a speakers bureau. Resources include National Coalition and liberation movement representatives, films, slides, music, and literature.

For more information call (212) 749-2049, or write c/o Box 934, 180 W. 135th St., New York, N.Y. 10030.

- **A CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE EXIM BANK FINANCING US trade with South Africa has been launched by a number of us groups. It is being coordinated by the Washington Office on Africa. The campaign aims to stop the flow of dollars which has grown from $43 million in 1971 to $205 million in 1976.**

- **DAVIS CUP: PLAYERS WITHOUT PARTNERS (ALMOST)** . . . Pressure is building against the Davis Cup Tennis match between the US team and the all-white South African team scheduled to take place in Nashville, Tennessee, on March 17, 18 and 19.

  Leslie O. Harriman, Nigerian UN ambassador and chairman of the UN Committee against Apartheid, has asked the US Tennis Association to refuse to participate in the match. Canada, Mexico, the West Indies, and Venezuela withdrew from the Davis Cup rather than play South Africa, and Columbia refused to grant visas to the South African team, leaving the US South Africa's only willing partner in American zone play.

- **CLOTHING FOR REFUGEES** . . . The American Friends Service Committee and Church World Service are shipping 10,000 pounds of clothing to Botswana for use by refugees fleeing from Rhodesia and South Africa. Further shipments are planned.

  Estimates place the number of refugees in Botswana at any given time at 4,000-5,000, some as young as 8 years old. Most bring little clothing or other possessions with them.

- **MEDICINE FOR MOZAMBIQUE** . . . Aid is going to health and medical programs in Mozambique with the assistance of the Africa Fund. It includes spare parts for boilers in the Maputo Hospital, spare parts for sterilizers, and medicines donated by Pfizer, Inc., including terramycin, bonine, and diabinese, valued at $77,000.

**Export-Import Bank**

Financing of Apartheid

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