- How they gave South Africa the bomb
  page 2

- What the Angolan Prime Minister thinks of them
  page 8

- How they almost made war in Zaire
  page 5
Become a Sustainer to Southern Africa Magazine

SPECIAL OFFER—

If you become a Southern Africa sustainer, we will send you this beautiful book of poetry and photography from South Africa.

Zindzi Mandela is the 16-year old daughter of Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned president of the banned African National Congress of South Africa, and of Winnie Mandela, sentenced to silence as a "nonperson" under South Africa's apartheid laws. Zindzi Mandela is also a poet. Her warm and poignant poems speak powerfully for her, her parents, and all black South Africans.

Peter Magubane, a prize-winning black South African photographer who has spent more than two years inside apartheid's jails, has been documenting life in South Africa's black townships and homelands for more than two decades.

Now they have collaborated on Black As I Am, a 120-page, large-format paperback book. Because it is published by a small press in California, however, it is not easy to find.

We will send you Black As I Am free, if you become a sustainer of Southern Africa magazine.

Southern Africa has been providing consistent, reliable, comprehensive coverage of political and economic developments in the area each month since 1965. With events changing almost daily, it is vitally important to subscribe to and support Southern Africa.

Here's just one reason why. US investment in South Africa has always been controversial. Now it's becoming a very hot issue on campuses and in communities all over the country. Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young have taken the public position that US corporations are good for South Africans, white and black alike.

But while Andrew Young argued last year in Johannesburg for "change through the marketplace," the then-U.S. Ambassador to South Africa was cabling home just what Young denied: that South African blacks wanted the US out.

Who reported it? Southern Africa published the full text of the cable in its April 1978 issue. One activist from Campuses United Against Apartheid at the University of California at Berkeley wrote that the cable would be "very helpful in organizing. We will give it wide circulation on the campus. Your magazine helps build the movement."

There's a lot more. These are just some of the special features Southern Africa has published in 1977 and 1978:

- Britain's Stake in Apartheid, by Richard Leonard.
- American Publisher Peddles South Africa, by Steve Weissman.
- Carter in Africa—The Shape of Things to Come, by Edgar Lockwood.
- Zimbabwe: Expelled Nun Reports People Support Guerrillas.
- Destroying World Poverty: President Nyerere Speaks.


If you are one of our regular readers, you know all about us. But there are many who don't know about Southern Africa and who don't know where to turn for reliable coverage of these events.

We need your help to reach them. But we can't on the income from our present subscriptions alone.

If you believe in the need for Southern Africa to continue and to grow, and if you believe it should be reaching many more subscribers and appearing on newsstands across the country, then become a sustainer for $25 or $50 a year. If you can't send it all at once, you can still become a sustainer by pledging to send $5 or $10 over the next five months.

When you fill out and return the coupon below, we'll send you Black As I Am by Zindzi Mandela and Peter Magubane as a special gift.

I want to support the continued existence and growth of the magazine. Enter my sustainer subscription for:

☐ $25.00  ☐ $50.00
☐ I enclose the full amount:

☐ I enclose $5 ☐ $10 for this month. I will send the same amount for the coming months.

name
address
city state zip
Mail to: Southern Africa, Room 707, 156 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010
Contents

2 SOUTH AFRICA GATHERS NUCLEAR STRENGTH

5 SPECIAL REPORT
5 ZAIRE BATTLEFRONT – WEST STAKES FRESH CLAIMS IN AFRICA

7 INTERVIEWS
7 ‘OUR WAR WILL CONTINUE’ SAYS GEN. MBUMBA
8 EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH ANGOLA’S PRIME MINISTER

11 NAMIBIA
11 STILL WAITING FOR INDEPENDENCE
12 ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN NAMIBIA
12 SOUTH AFRICA’S PRESENCE DOMINATES

18 SOUTH AFRICA
18 SOWETO – TWO YEARS AFTER

20 ZIMBABWE
20 SALISBURY LIES ABOUT DEATH OF MISSIONARIES
21 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA SAYS MUGABE
22 DISSIDENTS FAIL IN TAKEOVER
23 OIL SANCTIONS BUSTING: UNCOVERING THE UNCOVERING THE COVER-UP

25 UNITED STATES
25 UNIONS MAP APARTHEID FIGHT
25 STUDENTS BEWARE . . . SURVEY AIMED AT IDENTIFYING DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT
26 WASHINGTON NOTES

13 OVERVIEW
14 NEWSBRIEFS
16 UPDATE
28 ACTION NEWS NOTES
Late in June Gerard Smith, President Carter’s ambassador-at-large in charge of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons went to Pretoria. His mission, according to Washington sources, was to persuade a hitherto intransigent South Africa to sign the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and accept stricter international control and inspection of its atomic energy program. On the face of it Washington was trying to prevent South Africa from using its atomic energy program to develop weapons.

But things are rarely what they seem in the public picture of US relationships with South Africa. Thus, only a month before Smith’s trip to Pretoria, a series of experts had told a special meeting of the United Nations Committee Against Apartheid that South Africa already has ‘the bomb,’ that the US, France and West Germany helped it get it, and that South Africa is more
likely than most intermediate powers to use it.

Then why the Smith visit? It flowed from the apparent contradiction between Carter's declared commitment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries and the long history of US and general Western collaboration with South Africa in the field of nuclear development.

It is possible that the US would have preferred South Africa not to develop the bomb because of the degree of independence that this confers on the Vorster regime. But it is even more certain that Washington does not want South Africa to make any public display of its nuclear ability. This would severely embarrass the US—raising not only a storm of protest, but also of questions throughout the third world, exposing the hypocrisy of the US commitment to non-proliferation.

Making A Deal

Thus Smith went to Pretoria prepared to bargain when he met with top South African representatives, including Foreign Minister Roelof Botha, and South Africa's nuclear program chief, Abraham Roux, chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board. Terms of the bargaining have been kept very quiet, but New York Times correspondent Burns, writing from Johannesburg commented:

It is known that Mr. Smith... arrived here with the aim of gaining South African accession to the nuclear treaty in return for a pledge of continued co-operation between the two governments in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

In other words, if South Africa would sign a treaty promising not to use its nuclear capability to develop atomic weapons, then the US would continue to give it the kind of technical and material support that has already enabled it to achieve weapons capability!

South Africa will have made two main demands on the US. First, a guaranteed continued supply of nuclear fuels, both for its research reactor, Safari I, and for its first nuclear power plant, due to begin operation in 1982. The US halted the weapons-grade uranium fuel shipments necessary for the research reactor in 1976, in an attempt to bring South Africa into the non-proliferation camp.

Secondly, the South Africans will want guarantees that the US will supply vital technology and equipment for the construction of its planned future uranium enrichment plant.

US Seeking Control

The US does not want to block South Africa's nuclear program, but it does want the ability to exercise some control over it, and it has the power to do so.

Tension between Pretoria and Washington on this question seems inevitable. The US has long regarded South Africa as a junior partner in defense of its interests in Africa. But South Africa, while recognizing the survival value of its close relationship with the US wants to develop more flexible options, and a greater capacity for independent bargaining. Vorster is seeking to expand South Africa's nuclear capability, while Carter would like to exercise control over its pace and direction.

Embargo Vetoed, Loophole Opened

The US has never tried to shut down South Africa's nuclear development. Quite the contrary. In 1977 the US, along with other Western members of the Security Council vetoed the resolution which called on all states to "refrain from any co-operation with the South African racist regime in nuclear development." The resolution adopted said only: "All states shall refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons."

Speakers at the recent special UN meeting concluded that the veto had provided Western nations with a massive loophole through which they could continue shipping South Africa the supplies and technology it needs to amass a nuclear arsenal.

NATO Agreement

Several speakers at that meeting pointed out that the West will not even conform to the working of the limited embargo as it now stands. Indeed Sean McBride, Nobel Peace Prize winner and former United Nations High Commissioner for Namibia presented the meeting with an alarming report indicating growing US military commitment to South Africa.

McBride revealed that at the hush-hush September 1976 Zurich meeting between then Secretary of State Kissinger, Vorster of South Africa and General Alexander Haig, Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces it was agreed "that a secret collaboration should be developed between South Africa and the military and naval command of NATO." According to McBride "this collaboration would extend to provision of military technology, military supplies, and also assistance in the development of South Africa's nuclear capacity."

History of Collaboration

These plans for nuclear assistance in a military framework may seem incredible, but they follow logically on years of more general co-operation in nuclear matters.

South Africa's ability to build a nuclear bomb is the direct result of the development of a broad-based level of research, technological know-how and actual experience and experimentation. The US and other Western countries were closely involved in all the stages involved in the process—including the mining of uranium, the production of enriched uranium and the development of nuclear research facilities.

Research Reactor

The US has consistently given the apartheid regime access to information, training and technical aid. More than 155 US nuclear experts have been sent to assist South Africa, and 90 South African nuclear scientists had completed assignments in the US by mid-1977.

Safar I, South Africa's major nuclear research reactor was designed and built by a US corporation, Allis Chalmers, in 1965. This machine lies at the

Heart of South Africa's nuclear development; knowledge gained from this machine will have helped South African scientists learn how to construct nuclear weapons.

Because it was built with foreign help the reactor falls under the safeguards provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but critics have questioned the stringency of these conditions. In addition the reactor runs on weapons-grade fuel—enriched uranium—supplied by the US. Under the IAEA provisions (reinforced by US safeguard provisions), South Africa is not supposed to use Safari I to produce nuclear weapons. But South Africa has apparently not been subject to strict materials accounting procedures, and the US has provided it at least 231 pounds of this dangerous material, enough for ten bombs!

The UN also heard testimony that South Africa now possesses a second reactor. Ronald Walters, a political scientist at Howard University in Washington, told the Committee that the reactor, called Prelindaba Zero, was developed by South African scientists on the basis of acquired technology, and is not subject to any international controls.

Uranium Enrichment

The decisive process for the production of nuclear weapons is uranium enrichment. South Africa produces a large fraction of the world supply of uranium, but 'raw' uranium is not generally used to generate power and it cannot be used to make weapons. Less than one percent of normal uranium is suitable for such use. The desired form, known as uranium 235 needs to be separated from the rest, and the fraction or uranium 235 then has to be "enriched" until it forms over 80 percent of the material for weapons, or three percent for power production.

This is a difficult and expensive process, but South Africa set about developing its uranium capacity both to provide itself with weapons material, and for strategic reasons.

The power hungry industrial countries of the West are rapidly turning to nuclear energy as a substitute for oil. As a major source of fuel for that process South Africa hoped to guarantee for itself long-term Western friendship and support.

Thus in 1971 South Africa announced that its scientists had developed a new uranium enrichment process. In 1975 Prime Minister Vorster announced that the first part of a pilot plant for the production of enriched uranium was operating successfully, and by late 1977 the South African government revealed that it had plans to establish a commercial uranium enrichment plant, to be built by a French consortium.

Anti-apartheid groups in Europe and the African National Congress of South Africa have challenged South Africa's ability either to develop its own uranium enrichment process or to build an enrichment plant without substantial help from other nations. Specifically, these groups charge that South Africa's "unique" uranium enrichment process was an adaptation of the "jet nozzle" method developed by a German physicist, Dr. Erwin Becker of the West German National Nuclear Center, who helped in the adaptation. A German state-controlled company, STEAG, provided financing and technical know-how in the design, planning and construction of the enrichment plant.

The German Anti-Apartheid Movement has further charged that German collaboration has increased since the adoption of the mandatory arms embargo. Companies in the US, Germany, France and Switzerland have continued important deliveries to the enrichment plant, but they have camouflaged the supplies, according to the group. The West German group believes that the construction of two nuclear power stations at Koeberg, near Cape Town, is being used to disguise supplies of a military nature destined for the enrichment plant.

A French physicist told the UN gathering that these reactors would themselves be the source of a future supply of plutonium, produced during the processes involved in electricity generation.

Cutback?

In early 1978 the South African government announced that it was cutting back on the size of the proposed commercial uranium enrichment plant, and that it would restrict itself to enlarging its original pilot plant. Many observers thought that international pressure opposed to South Africa's nuclear industry was having an effect.

The German Anti-Apartheid Group believes the announcement was a lie. It argues that camouflaged supplies will allow the plant to be built to its original specifications, and alleges that the plant is being built secretly, as part of the giant SASOL II oil from coal plant now also under construction.

On the other hand, political scientist Walters suggests that the South Africans may have plans to develop a less costly yet efficient enrichment process using laser technology. South Africa may have acquired this technology, still in the experimental phase, through Israeli scientists who have worked with American corporations. "The same could be said of France," states Walters, "where laser research in this field has also been in progress and where France is a prime sponsor of South African nuclear technology."

A Made-in-South Africa Bomb

Even President Jimmy Carter and the CIA now admit that South Africa is capable of setting off a nuclear explosion.

Such suspicions were confirmed a year ago, when Soviet reconnaissance satellites discovered what appeared to be a nuclear weapons test site in the Kalahari Desert. 400 miles west of Johannesburg. At that time Carter reportedly threatened to break off diplomatic relations if a test were carried out. According to the President he received the necessary assurances. At about the same time, the South African Finance Minister declared that if his country wished to use its nuclear potential for other than peaceful purposes, it would "jolly well do it according to our decision and our judgment."

End All Collaboration

In this context there can be no peaceful nuclear collaboration with South Africa. Co-operation simply helps South Africa expand its weapons capability.

At the moment it is still dependent on external assistance, and needs to import enriched uranium, both for the research reactor Safari I, and for the power reactors at Koeberg, due to come on stream in the early eighties.

Informed South African sources indicate that Safari I has been forced to operate on a half-time basis since the US cut off its fuel supply in 1976, and will be forced to shut down by the end of the year if new fuel does not arrive.

Opponents of the apartheid regime would welcome such a shut down. In fact it is certain that any treaty Washington signs with South Africa for continued nuclear collaboration will generate a storm of protest, both nationally and internationally, increasing the belief that ultimately US policy continues to support white supremacy.
SPECIAL REPORT

Zaire Battlefront — West Stakes
Fresh Claims in Africa

This report was compiled by Mike Shuster and Witney Schneidman

The atmosphere in mid-May was reminiscent of that surrounding the Gulf of Tonkin incident off of Vietnam in 1964. Katangan guerrillas had occupied the key Zairian mining town of Kolwezi. US administration officials, not excepting the president himself, were bombarding the news media with charges that the Soviet Union and Cuba were behind the 'invasion' and that the US would not stand idly by. It seemed almost as though the US was looking for an excuse to go to war.

Almost as suddenly as it had started, the propaganda barrage has ceased. By late June the US had sent a high-level envoy to Angola, the country from which the invasion was supposed to have been launched. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had quieted down, for the moment. In this rapid apparent shift of events, the American people must inevitably be left as confused as ever about African politics.

Despite the contradictory moods, the events in Shaba province have not been without their benefits for the West. In the aftermath of a so-called 'rescue-operation' officially intended to evacuate some 2,500 Europeans from areas behind FNLC lines, key towns in Shaba have been occupied by what is essentially a NATO military force. The West has moved swiftly to form an anti-communist joint African security force. The military events in Shaba could affect the future of the liberation struggle in the remainder of southern Africa.

Second Rebellion

This spring's attack in Shaba began in the early morning hours of May 13, when some 4,000 well-trained guerrillas of the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo attacked the copper-mining town of Kolwezi for the second time in 14 months. This time the FNLC did in two days what it hadn't done in 80 last year: it caputed Kolwezi, its mining operations, and its airport.

Despite the standard version of the events produced by the media, the attack simply cannot be called an invasion. All the attackers were Katangese, that is, natives of Shaba province, formerly called Katanga. Only Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko has insisted that Cuban and Soviet personnel accompanied the attackers, and he has produced no proof of these allegations. Indeed some US officials have become increasingly embarrassed both by Mobutu's claims, and by Washington's inability to produce any hard evidence in support of Carter's claims that Cuba was "politically and morally responsible" for the Zaire events.

Brutality, Terror, Corruption

It is highly unlikely that the CIA or any other intelligence agency could have provided any proof, for the area where the rebellion took place is classified as intelligence-deprived, which means that intelligence agents never really knew what was going on there before or during the fighting. Had the administration known anything about the political and economic life of Shaba, it would have realized that the rebels enjoyed strong support from the local population as a result of the brutality, terror, and corruption of the Zairian army since the first rebellion over a year ago. After those events, more than 200,000 refugees poured into neighboring Angola, according to United Nations statistics.

French troops operating in Kolwezi.
Those who stayed behind continued to live under conditions of poverty, hunger and chaos as the fabulous wealth of the Shaba mines failed to provide the basic necessities of life for the province's people. Shaba produces more than 60 percent of Zaire's mineral exports, yet Zaire in its 18 years of independence has become a food-importing country (most of it comes from South Africa). And most of the imported food doesn't get to Shaba.

Even some of Mobutu's lieutenants don't entirely accept laying the blame on "Soviet-Cuban penetration." One Zairian general who led the forces that opposed the rebels told European journalists that "next time the natives from the border areas will stand 100 percent behind the rebels."

Mbumba: Not Defeated

The leader of the FNLC had told reporters, "We are not defeated. We are merely regrouping for the next blow." He also says that fighting never stopped after Moroccan troops with French support dispersed the FNLC in the spring of 1977. Mbumba says his troops stayed on in the Shaba countryside, undergoing intensive training. They have carried out armed attacks on the Zaire army in both Shaba and Kasai province during the past year, Mbumba says.

If the attack was an invasion, neither US officials nor the media has been able to explain how 4,000 troops managed to cross the border from Angola, then from Zambia, and slip into Kolwezi overnight without being noticed. Mbumba's version of the events is also strengthened by reports in the Western press of the presence of large stockpiles of arms in and around Kolwezi which the FNLC guerrillas were able to use.

With Kolwezi firmly in FNLC hands, the guerrillas released political prisoners, organized public meetings, and gave orders for the restoration of necessary public services, according to Mbumba.

FNLC Threat

By May 16, it had become clear that the Zaire army alone could not dislodge the FNLC from Kolwezi. As Western powers rallied to plan a joint attack, the situation in Kolwezi turned increasingly tense. Mbumba says it was then that the FNLC issued a communiqué stating that it would seriously damage the mining installations if foreign troops attacked. "We thought that this was the only argument we could use to prevent foreign intervention," Mbumba said in an interview with Afrique-Asie.

The FNLC also stated that it was not opposed to the evacuation of the 2,500 Europeans who lived in Kolwezi and who staffed the massive mining complex known as Gecamines. Only the Angolan news agency, ANGOP, reported this seriously. It appears that the attitude of the FNLC troops became overtly hostile to the Europeans only after news reached them on May 17 that the French and Belgians were parachuting in troops.

Obviously, some indiscriminate killing took place in Kolwezi, but who killed whom and why are questions that have not yet been clearly answered.

French sources put the total of Europeans who died at 200 while the Belgians counted only 73 white bodies. Some wire service reports suggested that bodies may have been counted more than once. More than 500 Africans died in the fighting. No one knows how many have been killed in "mopping up" operations since the crisis abated.

It seems clearly that both guerrilla and Zairian forces murdered civilians. But Western news reports had to depend on the Zaire news agency, AAZP, for their information. Foreign journalists were not permitted to enter Kolwezi until May 21, eight days after the attack began.

NATO Hard Line

FNLC guerrillas were dispersed by a joint force of between 1,000 and 1,600 Belgian and French paratroopers, but relations between the Belgians, the former colonizers, and the French quickly broke down. The Belgians were willing to negotiate with the FNLC for the release of the Europeans, but the French, after consulting with US and NATO officials, decided on a quick military action, as they felt the Belgians were too weak to oppose Soviet-Cuban designs on Zaire's vast resources.

By the time French and Belgian troops rescued Kolwezi, the FNLC had apparently carried out its threats: due to flooding and broken pumps, the mines would be out of order for at least six months, according to press reports.

Carter Support

The Carter administration supported the Western intervention from the beginning. Carter placed the crack 82nd Airborne Division on full alert almost immediately. Not only did 18 US Air Force Hercules C-141s transport Belgian soldiers from Brussels to Zaire, but the White House issued a memorandum on May 19 stating that $17.5 million in "non-lethal" materials, including spare parts, fuel, medical supplies, and communications equipment, would begin moving to Zaire within a week. The White House also approved $2.5 million for the training in the US of high-level Zairian general staff officers during the coming year.

The administration blamed Cuba and Angola publicly. At the same time, Carter expressed "frustration at Vietnam war-inspired Congressional restrictions on White House action to help beleaguered friendly governments resist Communist insurgency." Carter was chafing at the restrictions of the so-called Clark amendment to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 which prohibits direct or indirect US aid to any nation or group of nations planning military action in Angola.

The potential scope of the conflict increased dramatically on May 24 when Senator Dick Clark (Dem.-Iowa), head of the Senate sub-committee on Africa, announced that he believed "the president is considering reimvolving this country in the Angolan civil war." Earlier, Clark said, he had been approached by CIA Director Stansfield Turner and a Brzezinski aide with a plan to transfer US arms through third parties to UNITA which continues to skirmish with MPLA forces in Angola.

Administration efforts to fan the fires of American indignation flagged when officials were never able to offer publicly hard evidence that either Angola or Cuba had aided the Katangese. Carter's claims were further discredited when it was learned that Fidel Castro had attempted to find a way to
halt the attack but was unsuccessful. Castro had called in an American representative in Havana on May 17 to give him the news.

President Carter was aware of Castro's statements when he told a Chicago news conference a week later, "We believe that Cuba had known of the Katangan plan to invade and obviously did nothing to restrain them."

**Domestic Considerations**

Now it appears that Carter's attempt to make Cuba the scapegoat for the Shaba uprising was as much based on domestic political considerations as on foreign policy objectives. Carter's popularity has slipped drastically in the polls since his election. Several aides counseled Carter to take a tough anti-communist stand to reverse his appearance as an indecisive president.

All in all, the Carter administration's response to the fighting seemed badly orchestrated, and only underscored his apparent uncertainty in foreign affairs. Only two months ago, "globalist" (read anti-Soviet) Brzezinski was Carter's choice to re-ignite the spark that could touch off a new Cold War. Now Brzezinski's star has faded a bit, and Cyrus Vance, by all accounts a more level-headed diplomat, has been designated the Carter spokesman on foreign affairs.

**NATO Advances**

Still the hardliners are not disgruntled, especially those in NATO. This year's Shaba crisis saw a higher degree of coordination among NATO allies than in 1977. The Western operation was coordinated first at a meeting in the West German capital of Bonn, according to New African magazine.

Several NATO officials view the operation as an initial step to extend NATO's sphere of operation beyond the north Atlantic. "From a military viewpoint it would be an advantage," said Gen. H.F. Zeiner Gunderson, chairman of the NATO military committee, "if NATO were more able to project its military interests more outside the present boundaries decided by the NATO treaty."

"NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Alexander Haig has repeatedly urged NATO to take a more active interest in conflicts outside the traditional NATO sphere. He is likely to use the Cuban presence in Africa as a pretense to push his views more vigorously. This year's Shaba operation, Haig boasted, was "the first concerted Western military response to the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa."

---

**INTERVIEWS**

‘Our War Will Continue’

**Says Gen. Mbumba**

Who is the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo, and what do they want?

The core of the group is comprised of ex-Katangan gendarmes who fought against Mobutu and for Moise Tshombe’s secessionist Katanga province in the early 1960s.

Their political allegiances have only been consistent over the past 15 years in their unflinching opposition to Mobutu. In Angola where they initially sought refuge, the Portuguese organized them into counterinsurgency units to fight against the MPLA.

But after the Portuguese left Angola, MPLA organized them to fight against UNITA and FNLA. It has been reported that during recent years, many members have come under the political tutelage of MPLA cadre.

All the members of the FNLC, said to number 10,000, cannot be old enough to have fought against Mobutu before 1964. Many have fled the repressive Mobutu regime more recently. This year's rebellion must have drawn support from the more than 200,000 people who have fled from Zaire into Angola since the first Shaba rebellion in 1977.

The FNLC leader is a self-proclaimed general named Nathaniel Mbumba. In the early 1960s, Mbumba was a driver to the Gecamines Company, the joint Belgian-Zairian concern that operates Kolwezi's mines. Later Mbumba became security chief in Kolwezi at the time of Tshombe's secession. Afterwards he fled to Angola where he helped from the FNLC in 1968.

It is not totally clear whether the FNLC still continues to fight for the secession of Shaba or for a more comprehensive revolution in Zaire. It does believe, however, that Mobutu must be overthrown. Contrary to most reports that label it secessionist, some of the members of its executive council originate from provinces other than Shaba.

---

In Afrique-Asie, the French bi-weekly magazine interviewed Mbumba. We are reprinting excerpts from that interview.

What actually happened between March 8, 1977 and May 13, 1978 when you mounted your second attack on Kolwezi?

Since the liberation war on March 8 last year our freedom fighters have never left their homeland. We have had enthusiastic popular backing throughout the period which Mobutu describes as "the 80-day war." The war never ended.

After the French-Moroccan-Egyptian intervention we melted into the bush and carried out intensive train-
Our fighters have frequently attacked units of the Zaire army, blowing up industrial installations and main routes of communications, both in Shaba and in Kasai.

Why did you choose May 1978?

We knew that Mobutu's army was extremely demoralized. It had suffered extreme humiliations, repression going so far as to eliminate a number of the high-ranking officers. Our friends in Kinshasa and in the main towns of Zaire told us of the total decomposition of all the main state organizations and of the administration, and of the incredible spread of corruption.

As for the people, mainly those in Shaba and in Kwilu—where recent rebellions against the local authorities were put down in a river of blood—we knew that ferocious and widespread repression had increased the terrible misery in which our people had lived since the colonial era.

Everywhere we found the main wish of the whole population was to know when they could rise and overthrow Mobutu's regime. We were unable to wait any longer.

How did you liberate Kolwezi?

On the night of May 12, our fighters encircled the town. At 5 a.m. they attacked the barracks of the Zaire armed forces, FAZ, the gendarmerie, and the Impala Hotel where there were mercenaries, Western military advisers, and members of UNITA.

Total surprise caused panic, and they practically fought among themselves to escape on all sides.

In town, isolated groups of European soldiers tried to counter-attack but were scattered, and a few of them were captured. Their barracks were stuffed with arms of all kinds, including heavy arms, and we were able to make use of most of them.

The soldiers of the FAZ, fleeing in chaos, shouted to the people to follow them. They hoped after a long campaign of propaganda against the FNLC to terrorize the civilians. But after a first moment of hesitation and surprise, when our forces freed the political prisoners, including many soldiers, from Kolwezi prison, the population gathered in various parts of the town, and the political commissioners of the FNLC held meetings explaining our aims.

What happened when the first foreign troops arrived?

Thirty or so of the first group of French paratroops were beaten back by our forces on May 16 in the suburbs. On the 17th they tried to mount another attack from the west, but they were again repulsed.

Despite the tension caused in the town by this fighting and the continual bombardments, a meeting was held between two of our political commissioners and the delegate representing foreign personnel at Gecamines, Mr. Renard, in front of other foreigners. We wanted them to know that our war of liberation was not directed against them personally and that we could collaborate in the running of the town.

They accepted and agreed to take an active part in the town committee which was set up between our fighters and the people. Mr. Renard even signed a document setting up this agreement and recognizing that the conduct of the FNLC fighters was worthy of praise, unlike that of the Zaire troops.

Zaire continues to harbor rebels against Angola. Have you come across them in the field?

Holden Roberto does not have his training camp in this part of the country. But since the end of the liberation war in Angola, Savimbi's UNITA has continued to grow. We came across a group at the hydro-electric dam of N'zilo. We liberated the area on May 16, but the UNITA elements put up resistance and had time to sabotage the hydro-electric station before we arrived. That was why Kolwezi was deprived of electricity.

What are your relations with the neighboring countries which are accused of supporting you?

Since the liberation of Angola in 1976, we have been infiltrating secretly into Zaire, until the time we unleashed the armed conflict on March 8, 1977. Since then we have not left the country. We get our supplies from the Zaire army.

As for Zambia, we have never had any true relationships, and we have had no reason to cross its territory to arrive at our targets as we have always been established in our own country.

Exclusive Interview with Angola's Prime Minister

Lopo do Nascimento, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Angola, in New York for the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, was interviewed by Robert Van Lierop for Southern Africa early in June.

It has been reported that President Carter and high officials in his administration wish to increase or resume US aid to insurgents opposing the government in your country. How does your government view this new policy of the Carter administration?

As a matter of fact, the American administration has always had in mind the destabilization of the People's Republic of Angola. The Americans know that we are strong enough so that any type of aid they may give to FNLA or UNITA will not endanger our government. Their objective is the destabilization of Angola. It is not an attitude aiming only at destabilizing Angola, but also African and progressive countries. Angola being a firm base for the liberation of Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, its destabilization will mean some delay in the process of liberation. Therefore, the attacks against Angola should not be viewed in a purely national context, but rather in an international context, in the African continent.

What do you think of reports in the press that the Carter administration is hoping to stir up difficulties for the Angolan government as a way of tying down Cuban troops and keeping the Cubans from going into other parts of Africa?
I can only link this speculation to the statements by South Africa's Minister of Defense when he said that South Africa was ready to again violate Angola's borders. This means, actually, that there is a common strategy between the American administration and the South African government to destabilize and attack Angola. This is not news to us, but it might educate other African peoples, because we know precisely that although the Carter administration appears to have different objectives from previous administrations, its strategy remains the same.

What is your response to accusations by President Mobutu of Zaire that Angola has supported an invasion by secessionist forces in the southern part of the country?

These accusations are completely false. They serve to justify the fact that the army of a country which has been independent for so many years is unable to defend one town. In 1975, we fought against the Zairian army, which had invaded Angola at that time. From the experience of 1975, if we were now fighting on the side of the rebels, they would not have stopped at Kwozwi. By now, we would have reached Kinshasa!

Hardly a day goes by that we are not told that the Soviet Union and Cuba are now trying to colonize Africa. What are the relations between Cuba and Angola, and the Soviet Union and Angola, at the moment?

Who is actually dominating the economic life of most of the African countries? Is it the Soviet Union and Cuba or the imperialist powers? Which overseas powers are exploiting the oil, uranium, gold, diamonds and coffee in African countries?

In my country, Cuba and the Soviet Union do not have oil or mineral concessions. They are not owners of any enterprises or farms.

All the imperialist powers, and particularly the former colonizers now recognize that it is better to have neocolonialism rather than classic colonialism. Then the former colonial powers continue to own the means of production and the wealth of the country. They display some people who behave as though they were the leaders, as though they were in command of the destiny of their countries. But in fact the wealth of the country is transferred to the imperialist powers.

There is a concept of re-colonization which in our view is a mantle covering a new form of exploitation. We think that the re-colonization of Africa refers precisely to countries which became politically independent, but as the years went by, became more and more economically dependent on imperialism. In Angola, the coffee production belongs to the state. Coffee is one of the main sources of foreign currency for us. Are we more colonized than the other countries which have their main sources of foreign currency controlled by the multinationals?

We hear a great deal about the military assistance that Cuba has provided to Angola. What other types of assistance has Cuba provided to your country?

There is quite a bit of non-military assistance from Cuba to Angola, especially in the fields of construction, education, health, and agriculture.

With the Cuban comrades, we introduced pre-fabricated houses. With this technique, we can build many homes quickly, which, although not as luxurious as the ones built by the Portuguese, do satisfy the needs of the bulk of the Angolan population.

In the field of education, out of our six million inhabitants, this year we have enrolled 2,200,000 students. One out of every three Angolans is study-

Some commentators have described Angola as a rich country. But under Portuguese colonialism, the people were very poor. There was a high illiteracy rate, very poor health services, food production was very low. What progress have you been able to make in changing the social system that you inherited?

Angola is a very poor country. Potentially, Angola is very rich, but potentiality shouldn’t be taken into...
account. The fundamental question now is to transform that potentiality into real wealth.

Two years is a very short period to make dramatic progress, because during this period what we actually had to do was to organize the state, to organize the internal life of the country. We have not succeeded in organizing everything, because we achieved independence with the transport, communications and trade completely destroyed. Almost everything was destroyed at the time of independence.

Our task was to put to work all the sectors of priority such as transport, agriculture, and so on. In spite of all types of pressure, military pressure, psychological warfare, etc., which have been put against us, we have succeeded in some things. But it is true that conditions are not yet perfect.

Still Waiting For Independence

On July 27, after months of speculation and rumour about a Namibia settlement the Security Council met and passed two resolutions aimed at implementing a peaceful end to South African rule.

But nothing has been signed, no firm commitments have been made, nothing is binding, everything is still fluid. All the criticisms made by SWAPO of the text of the Western proposal still stand. The exact role and status of the UN special representative is not clarified, so that the South African Administrator is still in charge; supervisory procedures are left vague, allowing South Africa too much room for maneuver; Walvis Bay has not been formally included as part of Namibia, its status is left open for negotiation at some future date.

Namibia is not yet free and independent, and the road ahead seems heavily mined, despite Western assurances that all is well.

Role of the Five

Some fifteen months ago the five Western powers on the Security Council—the US, UK, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada—began a series of exploratory diplomatic meetings with South Africa, SWAPO and the United Nations, in an attempt to narrow the issues which divided them.

Projecting themselves as neutral, public-spirited participants in the negotiations, the Five sought to veil their own economic and military interests in southern Africa, as they pursued their meetings around the world.

As discussions proceeded clear areas of disagreement emerged, particularly in regard to the role of the UN in any transition arrangements, the future of Walvis Bay and the presence of South African forces of repression. Essentially, solutions to these questions revolved around the fundamental issue of who is to control a future Namibia.

The Western proposals, as they are referred to, evolved to include a rough sequence of events which should take place to put UN Resolution 385 (1976) into operation. The plan called for UN-sponsored elections for a Constituent Assembly, the withdrawal of South African forces and administration, the release of all Namibian political prisoners, and the abolition of apartheid and repressive legislation and practices. The UN Security Council resolutions passed in late July 1978 provided for the appointment of a Special Representative to do an on-the-spot investigation of the best way of implementing independence through free elections, and also declared that Namibia must be assured of the final reintegration of Walvis Bay into its territory.

The Western plan for a settlement is the product of negotiations among a handful of states and SWAPO. But credit for any pressure South Africa is now feeling must go to SWAPO which has carried on an armed struggle for a dozen years and has organized politically and diplomatically to bring an end to the era of South African occupation.

Time Table Established

The time table provided for in the plan runs roughly like this:

The Security Council authorizes the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari, current United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, as Special Representative and he goes to Namibia for his investigation of what needs to be done to implement Resolution 385 and hold 'free elections.' The transitional plan will begin officially when the Security Council adopts the Secretary General's plan which would be based on Ahtisaari's survey, assumed to be ready in August.

"Weeks 1-6 of the plan will see the 'general cessation of all hostile acts' by South Africa and SWAPO whose forces would be restricted to their bases. Shortly afterwards a UN military force composed of units from African and the smaller European countries will begin
monitoring functions of the South African police, army, and the ethnic forces. By Week 6 South Africa's forces should be reduced to 12,000.

During Week 9 Namibian exiles are due to return. All remaining discriminatory laws and restrictive measures are to be repealed. By Week 12 South African forces are to be reduced to 1,500 men and all military installations along the Namibian border are to be deactivated or civilianized.

The election campaign for the constituent assembly is scheduled to start during Week 13. The date for the election itself is to be set by the UN representative. A week after certification of the election results, all South Africa's troops are to have been withdrawn, SWAPO will have closed its bases, and the constituent assembly will be convened. After the elections a date will be set for an end to assembly deliberations on a new constitution and for the installation of the new government. The plan states independence is to be in effect by December 31, 1978.

Security Council Speakers Urge Caution

Despite Western enthusiasm, caution pervaded the speeches of the SWAPO representative and the African delegates at the UN Security Council's July 27 meeting on Namibia. Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, stated, "This time we want to be certain that, right from the beginning, everything must be carefully planned and executed, at each stage, with caution and deliberation. We are willing to take a political risk." He went on to say, "We only want to make absolutely certain, while we can, that the independence that will finally come to our troubled Namibia, as it inevitably must, is a genuine and complete one for which our people, the past generations and present ones, have suffered, sacrificed and died." Nigeria urged the Council not to forget the series of broken promises which had characterized South Africa's behavior in the past. The time had hardly come to shed weapons stressed the delegate from Mali.

Walvis Bay

The inconclusiveness of the Western proposal on the future of Walvis Bay drew the most fire. This port and settlement of 26,000 people and 434 square miles has been an integral part of Namibia's economic and political life since shortly after World War I when South Africa incorporated the enclave into the International Territory. In mid-1977, however, South Africa announced the annexure of Walvis Bay which would henceforth be part of South Africa.

Ninety percent of Namibia's trade, including all of its mineral exports, passes through Walvis Bay, the only deepwater port in Namibia. The lucrative fishing industry facilities are located there and the Rossing uranium pits, estimated to be the largest known uranium deposits in the world, lie just outside the area. Continued South African control of Walvis Bay would effectively make Namibia a landlocked country despite its 1000-mile coastline.

South Africa has extensive military installations at Walvis Bay, including an airbase with a long, low-altitude runway useful for coastal reconnaissance, bomber, and interceptor aircraft. Desert warfare, artillery, and counter-insurgency training exercises are carried out at Rooikop. The naval base has the latest communications equipment. NATO countries have already used the Walvis Bay facilities according to Angola's UN representative Elisio de Figueiredo.

South Africa argues that Walvis Bay is indisputably part of South Africa. Somewhat snidely, using the hypocrisy of the 'Five' as a lever, South African Foreign Minister Botha suggested that if there was a general move to eliminate enclaves, perhaps such examples as Guantanamo Bay (US base in Cuba), Northern Ireland, Berlin, the Panama Canal, and Hong Kong should be subjected to scrutiny.

Speaking on behalf of the 'Five,' US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance explained that since the opposing positions on Walvis Bay had initially seemed "irreconcilable," the Western proposal had contained no position on Walvis Bay, but that did not mean the group had no position on the question. The 'Five' viewed Walvis Bay as critical to the future of Namibia and felt it appropriate that the Security Council adopt a resolution calling for the initia-
Economic Interests in Namibia

In a short article entitled "The Western Countries Have Important Economic Interests," the Paris daily Le Monde (7/26/78) recently summarized some of the huge corporate interests held in Namibia by the five Western countries who have recently been managing 'settlement' efforts.

Major UK interests include Consolidated Diamond Mines, whose parent company DeBeers is a South African company with significant British participation, and Tsumeb—12% of Tsumeb's capital is British. Between them CDM and Tsumeb control 90% of Namibia's current mineral production. Rio Tinto Zinc, which holds 46.5% of the Rossing uranium enterprise is also British-based, sharing ownership with the South African parastatal, Industrial Development Corporation. Other British mining interests include the South West Africa Co., involved in the extraction of lead, zinc, and wolfram.

Largest US interest is in Tsumeb Mines, 55% owned by the American corporations AMAX and Newmont Mining. Le Nickel, CFP-Total, BRGM—three French companies—are presently involved in oil and mineral prospecting, and several big banks, including Banque de l'Indochine, Paribas, and Rothschild, are also involved in Namibia. South African parastatal, Industrial Development Corporation. But only the naive would ignore the fact of Walvis Bay as an integral part of Namibia. And if South Africa continues with its illegal occupation this will be considered an act of aggression against the Namibian people and a threat to world peace and international security.

Beware South Africa

The clearest message to come out of the UN Security Council maneuvering in July is that Namibia is not yet safely on the threshold of independence. South Africa has long operated with undisguised contempt for international law and opinion. SWAPO has already indicated that it is aware of the pitfalls of its current course. Observers note that the movement has never unconditionally accepted the vague terms of the Western proposal.

Speaking after the passage of the Resolutions on July 27, President Nujoma told the Security Council that South Africa is still trying to prevent SWAPO from organizing politically outside Namibia. In fact two members of the SWAPO delegation to Luanda, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Festus Naholo and the Secretary of Transportation, Franz Kambangula, had been arrested by South Africa on their return to Namibia.

SWAPO faces difficult times ahead. A variety of pressures have persuaded it to set aside continued armed struggle and attempt instead to win an election. But only the naive would ignore South Africa's capacity to rig any election under its control.

We battled in order to gain concessions from the Western powers that the Security Council resolution will include Walvis Bay in the independence of Namibia. We have rejected and condemned the racist regime's colonial and aggressive attitude in annexing Walvis Bay to its racist republic. SWAPO is going to see to it that the Security Council treats Walvis Bay as an integral part of Namibia. And if South Africa continues with its illegal occupation this will be considered an act of aggression against the Namibian people and a threat to world peace and international security.

South African Presence Dominates Everywhere

By Marja Liisa and Kimmo Kiljunen

Marja Liisa and Kimmo Kiljunen, two Finnish researchers, spent a month in Namibia from April 15 to May 15. Sponsored by the Scandinavian Institute for African Studies, the purpose of their visit was to collect information for a book they are writing and to provide more background for general solidarity work.

Their report refers frequently to ongoing organizing for elections. These were the elections South Africa was arranging under its version of an "internal settlement."

The passage of the Security Council resolutions on July 27, has created a supposedly new situation, in which free elections will be held under UN supervision.

We are publishing this report because it provides important indicators of the dangers that still exist in the present situation. We are certain that the South Africans will continue to use the techniques described in this report in an all out effort to cripple SWAPO and prevent it winning the election.

The article has been slightly shortened and edited for language.

In Namibia we visited Windhoek, Rehoboth, Matchless, Walvis Bay, Swakopmund, Tsumeb, Grootfontein and several places in Ovamboland. During the visit we met and interviewed in Windhoek, among others, Lucia Hamutenya, Viktor Nkandi, Gerson Max, Zephaniah Kameeta, Daniel Tjongavero and Brian O'Linn (Namibia National Front), Rev. Edward Morrow, and in Ovamboland, several Finnish Missionaries, Kleopas Dumeni (deputy bishop) and "Prime Minister" of Ovambo bantustan Cornelius Ndjoba. Everywhere we met lots of less famous but perhaps more important rank-and-file people.

The situation in Namibia was very tense, but at the same time people were more militant and hopeful than people in South African townships. SWAPO has succeeded surprisingly...
Elsewhere in this issue, we report on the serious problems still standing in the way of genuine Namibian independence, despite Western claims that a settlement is now well underway.

As we were going to press, we received a copy of an urgent memorandum presented by Namibian church leaders to United Nations Special Representative Ahtisaari on his arrival in Windhoek.

Reflecting the churches basic position of moderation and their desire for a peaceful settlement, the message nevertheless underscores the dangers now facing the Namibian people.

Memorandum to His Excellency Martti Ahtisaari, United Nations Special Representative for Namibia, for Namibian church leaders. 11 August 1978.

Your Excellency,

It is with great joy and thanksgiving that we welcome you in Namibia as an answer to prayer. Your presence here represents the fulfillment of hopes cherished by many Namibian people for a generation.

You will know of the many declarations and actions which we have undertaken during the past ten years against the racism, exploitation and systematic torture of South African rule. Although we have tried only to echo the cry of our people we have been branded as 'terrorists,' and yet it is we who have repeatedly tried to bring calm to situation of civil unrest and senseless bloodshed.

And you will know that we have concerned ourselves intimately with the Western initiative since its inception, and were the first to accept these proposals, and urge their speedy adoption by all parties, when they were finalized on 30 March this year.

Today, though we see it as our continuing responsibility to remain critical and independent, we have come prepared to listen respectfully to whatever suggestions you may have for cooperation between yourself and us in the achievement of your mission.

There are, however, a number of matters which we feel we should bring to your attention immediately.

1. The majority of voters who have been registered so far (under the sole authority of the Administrator General) have not done so freely. Criticism of this law leads to immediate imprisonment. And people have been coerced by employers. A very worrying aspect of this operation has been the close co-operation between the DTA and the South African officials concerned.

2. Continuing collaboration between the South African Defense Force and UNITA. While the exploits of South Africa in Angola during 1975 are now common knowledge, it is not so well known that the links between South Africa and UNITA have, if anything, been strengthened since then. In particular, South Africa has been recruiting UNITA soldiers into its own army. These poorly disciplined troops—who may well rejoin their compatriots in Angola, and who have nothing whatsoever to gain from a South African troop withdrawal, can wreak havoc in the northern parts. Indeed that is what happened, for instance, at Omundaongo at the end of 1976 when a whole village was terrorized, people killed, women raped, and so on. We believe that many hundreds of these UNITA troops have been trained by South Africa at secret bases in the Kavango area. We now view with particular alarm the recent reports by the SADF that ‘SWAPO terrorists in South African uniforms’ have been responsible for murders and sabotage in the northern parts.

3. Election date. In view of the extreme importance of these elections, the necessity that the people should gain confidence in the electoral process, the need for people to have time to become properly informed and make a considered choice, we feel that pressing ahead with elections before December this year will be asking for confusion, mistrust and everything that is undesirable and unsatisfactory in an election.

4. Immediate release of all political prisoners. It is well known that the churches have played a significant role in working for the release of Mr. Andreas Shipanga and his associates from detention in Tanzania. In response, the Administrator General has gone on a spree of imprisonment and banishment inside Namibia. This is unfair and intolerable: We demand that all political prisoners, and in particular, Mr. Herman Ya Toivo should be released immediately.

5. Banishment churchmen. A matter which grieves us personally is the summary and unjust expulsions to which church people have been made subject during the past decade. We insist that these, our brethren, should also be allowed to return to Namibia to play their rightful role in the development of a free and just Namibia.

Lastly, we wish to assure you of our prayers in the many difficult decisions which await you.

United Evangelical Lutheran Church
Roman Catholic Church in SWA/Namibia
Anglican Church
African Methodist Episcopal Church
SOUTH AFRICA seems to be finding the going easier in the international financial markets.

In the past ten months, South African public sector borrowers were well received in West Germany, where statistics show that direct investment increased by nearly 9 percent in the second half of last year. Issues were placed privately by public sector borrowers such as the South African Railways, Escom and Iscor, who raised $230 million with 15 separate issues.

London bankers also confirmed that conditions had improved for this country's borrowers, and intimated that the government would be able to raise funds in the future.

However, the South African Reserve Bank's first quarter report still indicated a "huge outflow of short-term capital" amounting to close to $400 million.

The British computer company, ICL, is going all out to boost the South African connection, according to a company executive, Les Cole.

He said in London that ICL business with South Africa "is very healthy and we want to keep it that way."

The South African company's turnover was $54 million and Cole said there was no pressure on ICL either in Britain or in any other market where it was active, to reduce its South Africa commitment.

Otis Elevator Company, a subsidiary of United Technologies (US) is about to acquire an as yet unnamed firm in South Africa.

According to the Managing Director, the acquisition would prove Otis' intention of remaining in South Africa. He said, "We have been here for 80 years and we intend to be here for a long time."

Further evidence that strategically sensitive industries in South Africa are moving into local hands came with the takeover by the $29 million Johannes- burg construction group, Grinaker Holdings of the South African subsidiary of the British Racal Electronics group.

In the $14 million deal, existing technical and research staffs will stay on with the new ownership with the result that technical expertise will not be lost to the South Africans.

Big United States banks—including Irving Trust—are reportedly canvassing support for a Nedbank (South Africa) invitation to US and Canadian religious and university leaders to make a 'fact finding' tour of South Africa in October or November. The Irving Trust official, who admitted that "I am very aware that this type of visit could be viewed as propaganda for the South African government," went ahead with the canvas anyway. And this despite the bank's recent announcement that it will give no more loans to the South African government or its agencies.

When the South African government cannot find sufficient reason—even through its extensive repressive laws—to bring an apartheid opponent to trial, it simply puts him or her in detention for months at a time. When the regime does have something to pin on the 'offender,' he or she is brought to trial. But the purpose is defeated if the accused are subsequently acquitted by the courts.

The answer to this dilemma is to make it harder for defendants to have access to qualified defense. Lawyers fees are costly and few lawyers are willing to make a big reduction in fees lest they be tainted by the political sympathy brush. Lawyers provided by the state are regarded with suspicion, and do not have the experience or interest needed for such trials. The majority of political accused are poor and black; it is out of the question for their families to raise these fees, and they have had to rely substantially on donations from outside of the country.

Hence the law passed recently by the South African Parliament, geared towards curtailing this kind of fundraising, both inside the country and externally. Private organizations collecting money from the public will have to register with a new government-appointed director of fundraising, detailing the exact use of the funds. This extends to funds coming from abroad, through a clause which states that such money "shall be deemed to have been collected from the public in the republic."

One such group to be affected is the Washington-based Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, which has supported many accused in South Africa. Millard Arnold of the Committee told Southern Africa that his group intends to test this immediately through the proper channels.

The ruling comes at a time when there are 66 trials in preparation, involving some 300 people.

A top African detective, Orphan "Hlubi" Chaphi was killed in Soweto at the beginning of July when he got out of his police car in the back yard of his home. While police are denying that the assassination was political, they have stated that he was killed with a Russian Tokarev sub-machine gun. A number of informers and state witnesses have been killed recently in various parts of the country.

South Africa has found a good friend in ex-President Gerald Ford. He was the keynote speaker at an unpublicized seminar of over 250 top US business executives in Houston at the end of June. Organized by the South Africa Foreign Trade Organization (SAFTO), it focused on South Africa's business and investment potential—under the title: "South Africa, a Golden Opportunity: A Seminar on Business Opportunities in a Free Enterprise Economy."

Heavily criticizing Carter and Vance, Ford said that with the 'kind of cooperation we are getting from the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, I think we could have continued to work out a solution to the arms embargo.'

Other speakers included Dr. Connie Mulder, the Minister of Plural Relations; Lucy Mvubelo, secretary of the black National Union of Clothing Workers; and Arthur Grobbelaar, general secretary of the all-white Trade Union Council of South Africa.

Arrangements for the seminar were handled by the Madison Avenue public relations firm, Sydney S. Baron, Inc., who has a $650,000 contract this year from the now reorganized Department of Information.

ZIMBABWEANS living in the rural areas are suffering from widespread starvation and disease, according to the director of international aid of the British Red Cross.

After a recent visit to Zimbabwe he predicted that the food situation will become even more severe in the coming months, since many Africans have missed the opportunity to sow crops, due to the establishment of "protected villages" and the fact that many have fled to the towns.
Zimbabwe refugees continue to pour across the border into Botswana, bringing the number—by the end of June—to 12,000.

The refugees, including elderly people and children, are living in three different and very overcrowded camps.

BOTSWANA President Seretse Khama banned a group of his country's youth from attending the World Youth Festival in Cuba at the end of July.

The delegation consisting of 30 members of the opposition Botswana National Front was accused of planning to travel on to another country after the festival to undergo military training.

The announcement said that "as part of the training, these youths would be given specific instruction to subvert and overthrow the Botswana government." [The delegation] is being used as a cover for the real objective, which is to recruit and train a group of young Botswana who would then form a nucleus of a terrorist organization.

That the Botswana government is becoming increasingly wary of the radicalization of its youth, can be seen in its reaction to the thousands of young refugees pouring into the country from South Africa and Zimbabwe. It appears particularly wary of the Soweto students, who are now to be placed in a camp far away from Gaborone, the capital.

IN NAMIBIA, three churchpeople who were active opponents of South Africa's illegal rule were given deportation orders in mid-July.

They are Rev. Edward Morrow, Anglican vicar general, his wife, Laura Morrow, and the Rev. Heinz Hunke, provincial superior of a Roman Catholic order.

The Morrows, South African citizens, went to Namibia in 1971 and set up a church-owned not-for-profit construction company which gave training and provided jobs for Africans. Their deportation—ordered to take effect within seven days—followed the Anglican Church of Namibia's declaration "The Freedom to be Free," which strongly condemns South Africa's administration of the territory.

Fr. Hunke, a West German national, was co-publisher of "Torture: A Cancer in our Society," which was published in January in Windhoek and immediately banned.

A hunger strike of 30 Namibians held at Gobabis prison 200 kilometers east of Windhoek entered its twelfth day as we went to press. The hunger strikers, who began their protest on July 19, were demanding to be put on trial or released immediately.

Under emergency legislation imposed on Namibia by South Africa this year the South African-appointed Administrator General can arrest and jail indefinitely without trial anyone who opposes the brutal South African occupation. The hunger strikers are among the scores of Namibians arrested under these laws in recent months as South Africa prepares for "elections South African-style."

MOZAMBIQUE's major export to South Africa under Portuguese rule was labor for the gold mines: in some years 100,000 men joined the annual trek south to earn a miserable wage that was still better than the amount being offered locally.

In recent years the vagaries of the international monetary system made this export of labor particularly profitable for the Portuguese government—as 60% of Mozambique miners' pay was remitted to the government in Lourenco Marques in the form of gold, at the "official" price—for many years $35 an ounce. The colonial government was then free to make a high profit by selling the gold on the international market at current ruling prices—which can range close to $200 an ounce in the same period. (Of course the miner got re-paid at the official rate, while the government kept the profit.)

The arrangement was continued after Mozambican independence, almost certainly because maintaining the flow of labor was important for South Africa.

But FRELIMO plans a different future for its citizens—and the labor-flow has dropped steadily—79,000 in mid-1976 to 35,000 most recently. South Africa has now ended its system of valuing gold at a fixed "official" price and will set its price according to the international market price. So the Mozambique bonus will disappear.

Estimates from South Africa place the annual loss to the Maputo government between $23 million and $29 million, but at the same time concede that Mozambique has been expecting and allowing for its effects in overall economic planning.

The Mozambican government announced on May 12 that it was nationalizing the "Companhia Carbonifera de Mocambique," which operated coal mines at Moatize in Tete Province. Explaining this action, the government said the firm had caused serious harm to Mozambican workers and the state, and cited in particular the company's continuing failure to observe elementary safety rules. Poor working conditions had led to the death of 250 miners in two accidents at the mines in December 1976 and August 1977.

According to the Permanent Commission of the People's Assembly, the body responsible for the nationalization, the firm had shown itself completely incapable of exploiting the Moatize coal deposits in a way consistent with the objectives and needs of the country's mining industry, and was thus jeopardizing implementation of Mozambique's economic plans.

Forty-one percent of the company's capital had been in the hands of the Portuguese group Entreposto and 49 percent had been in the hands of the South African state-owned steel corporation ISCOR.

GUINEA-BISSAU lost one of its finest leaders in a tragic accident on July 7. Francisco (Chico Te) Mendes had been Prime Minister since the country first declared its independence in September 1973, until his death at the age of 39 in a car accident outside the town of Bafata. Ironically, it was in the Bafata region that he first began working as a political mobilizer in 1960, after a period of intensive training with Amilcar Cabral in Conakry.

During the war he was political commissar for the military for the northern front, and member of the war council from 1965 until the war ended. He was responsible for ideology in the Political Commission and for ideological education in the Central Committee.

He had developed a well-deserved reputation for his ideological strength, and for his humility and dedicated service. He will be sorely missed by that young nation.

WEST GERMAN Chancellor Helmut Schmidt paid a five day visit to Africa at the end of June, conferring first with Nigerian head of state, Obasanjo in Lagos and then heading south to meet with Kaunda in Zambia.

With this visit following close on the heels of Giscard d'Estaing's visit, which in turn followed Carter's visit, it looks as if we are being treated to 'Scramble II.'
ANC Backs Muzorewa

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, one of the three African politicians in Rhodesia's multiracial interim government, won the renewed mandate of his African National Council at a mid-August conference. Muzorewa had been challenged by four senior officials of the organization, who charged that the Bishop no longer represented the majority of Zimbabweans.

Meeting in Salisbury, the ANC convention not only gave Muzorewa a vote of confidence but expelled his critics, including former interim government justice minister Byron Hove. Hove had been fired from his post earlier this year for demanding swifter reforms in the judiciary and police force.

The ANC meeting followed a rally at which Muzorewa presented a group of guerrillas who, he claimed, had joined his organization after leaving ZANU.

The Bishop and his two African partners in government are under intense pressure from Prime Minister Smith to bring about a 'de-escalation' of the guerrilla war, but the fighting has continued unabated, with skirmishes fought closer and closer to the capital city.

The black politicians in the interim administration have attempted to negotiate with guerrillas, but their emissaries have often disappeared or turned up dead. Most recently, two aides to Ndabani Ngwema were killed, apparently by guerrillas, on a peace mission in the countryside.

US Votes on Rhodesian Embargo

The US Congress appears to have reached a compromise recently in its lengthy deliberations over continued US compliance with the UN embargo against Rhodesia.

Efforts in early August by Congressional conservatives pushed the House to vote in a measure that would have required the President to lift sanctions after December 31 unless he could certify that Rhodesia's promised elections were not held freely and fairly.

A Senate/House conference committee, however, later passed an amended version of the legislation that gives President Carter greater leeway to maintain sanctions and is thus a victory for liberal forces. Closer to the original Senate legislation on Rhodesia ties, the compromise requires the end of sanctions after December 31 if the President certifies that two conditions have been met: that "the government of Rhodesia has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference held under international auspices on all relevant issues," and that "a government has been installed by free elections in which all political and population groups participated freely with observation by impartial internationally-recognized observers."

Observers expect that both the House and Senate will pass the compromise measure.

Churches Aid Patriotic Front

The World Council of Churches Program to Combat Racism has voted to release a previously-designated $85,000 grant to the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front, the nationalist alliance waging war against the Rhodesian regime.

The grant, first allocated in 1977, was frozen pending a review of the political situation in the turbulent country.

In voting to release the money this year, Program declared that the internal settlement is not leading to full democracy but will entrench minority rule for a decade.

The international ecumenical body says its grant will be used to buy food and clothes, health care and social services for Zimbabwe refugees living in surrounding countries.

During its seven years of granting, the Program has dispersed about $2.6 million—nearly half of which went towards southern African concerns.

US, South Africa Set Nuclear Formula

High-level nuclear talks between the US and South Africa currently center on implementation of an intricate step-by-step timetable aimed at bringing South Africa to accept international accords in return for US aid, AFRICA NEWS has learned.

Among the steps expected of South Africa are: an agreement in principle to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; an invitation to the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect South African facilities; actual signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; implementation of the Treaty safeguards system, which usually takes two years; and a final agreement with IAEA on inspection procedures.

For its part, the US would meet each South African concession with some show of gratitude, supplying South Africa with enriched fuel for both research and nuclear power reactors. (South Africa possesses vast uranium reserves, but its enrichment capacity can not yet meet its own needs.)

As a second stage, the US would actually approve the South African request for special nuclear fuel that has been 'on hold' since March 1975.

Israeli Warships For South Africa

Three Israeli-built warships have set out from Haifa for the Simonstown Naval Base in South Africa. The ships, equipped with rockets and modern anti-submarine weaponry, are the latest of a growing number of South African military purchases.

South Africa is one of the largest customers of Israel's export arms industry, but the link has resulted in both domestic and international criticism of the Israeli government.

Defending the relationship, Israeli finance minister Simcha Erlich said recently: "Some friends in moments of need turn out to be fair weather friends and tend to leave us in the lurch. South Africa has never waivered in her attitude towards Israel."

Challenge to Zambia's Kaunda

The upcoming congress of Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) will witness an unprecedented challenge to the leadership of President Kenneth Kaunda by two former opposition politicians.

Simon Kapwepwe and Harry Nkumbula, both now members of UNIP, have announced plans to seek the party's presidential nomination and will run against Kaunda in the national elections later this year.

Kapwepwe told a Lusaka press conference that he would campaign on a platform of economic recovery for beleaguered Zambia. He says he would preserve Zambia's long-term socialist goals but in the short run would develop a more pragmatic, capitalist economy.
SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENCE
continued from page 12

well in mobilizing people. Pretoria
knows that, and that is the problem.

Official Umbrella for DTA

In Katutura there were several re-
fections of recent violence between
Hereros (DTA-supporters) and Ovam-
bos. Some Herero people were still
living within the Ovambo section.
Police vans were constantly driving
around Katutura. Ovambos were very
scared and unwilling to stay out of
doors after sunset. DTA-supporters
have got guns from the Bantu Adminis-
tration Office or more probably from
the Security Police. Well-known black
DTA members have got official per-
mits to carry arms—an amazing fact in
South Africa.

All SWAPO leaders in Windhoek
had either been detained or had left
the country except Lucia Hamutenya.
SWAPO's public activities have been
heavily suppressed. "At the moment it
would be a suicide to organize SWAPO
meetings or distribute openly our
material," Hamutenya said, adding
that they had though of closing the
SWAPO office in Windhoek.

At the same time other political
parties were already preparing for
elections. All over the country DTA
has organized rallies and now its aim is
to organize regional and local party
cores and study groups, according to
Billy Marais. In the party office there
were lots of different types of election
material. During recent months there
has been an effective campaign of dis-
tributing DTA supporters cards.
Ndjoba claimed that half of Ovambos
already carry DTA cards—which could
be quite close to the truth. Outside the
Onandjokue mission hospital DTA
men were distributing the cards to
incoming patients saying that if they
did not take the card they would not be
treated at the hospital. In other places
people have been threatened that they
will loose their pensions, cattle, job,
etc. unless they take a DTA card.

When we visited very poor families in
one farm near Windhoek the people
showed us DTA cards saying that the
farmer compelled them to take the
cards. Those people actually thought
that they had already voted!

Fear of Reprisals

One can be sure that if people do not
believe or understand that by voting
one can change their future, a great
majority of them will minimize per-
sonal risks and vote as the police,
farmer or black minister tell them to
vote. Fear creates lip-service. Rumors
affect especially old people: "If you do
not give your vote to the government
candidate your cattle and land will be
confiscated," affects frightened peo-
ple. It demands courage from ordinary
people to oppose their governors
whom they have until now humbly
obeyed.

In a country where a black person
has never had a right—and the cour-
age to express opinion openly—what
does the secrecy of elections mean, if it
is the same feared police and adminis-
tration who are organizing the general
elections, despite formal UN satisfac-
tion? The whole political atmosphere
must be change in order to get fair
elections. That clearly demands not
only withdrawal of South African police
forces but also a long election prepara-
tion time, any way, more than the one
month which is enough, according to
the DTA party secretary Billy Marais.

NNF has also started its prepara-
tions for elections on the basis of the
Western proposal. It seems to get more
and more business backing (especially
Anglo-American groups) and the
Windhoek Observer is its main sup-
porter within the mass media.

Black Soldiers

The situation became more and
more tense the further north we trav-
elled. All over Ovamboland we saw a
great number of soldiers, camps and
military convoys. By listing the camps
accounted by the Finnish missionaries
and making rough estimates of num-
continued on page 24
SOUTH AFRICA

Soweto — Two Years After

The second anniversary of the June 1976 Soweto uprising has come and gone, with the one reported burst of police gunfire at black demonstrators virtually drowned out by the sounds of South African officials patting themselves on the back. Getting through the month of June without a major rebellion, it would appear, has now become a considerable accomplishment for the white supremacist regime. After stationing police at roadblocks all around Soweto and searching everyone attending rallies in several Soweto churches, Colonel Tony Visser, head of the Soweto CID, pronounced himself “quite satisfied” with the way things went.

Visser and other government officials were distinctly unenthusiastic about discussing some of the rather drastic precautionary measures taken to ensure that the anniversary passed quietly. During the two weeks leading up to June 16, security police swooped down to round up the largest number of political detainees since the massive crackdown last October. Although security police official Johan Coetzee insisted “there had not been a marked increase” in the number of arrests under security laws, the Rand Daily Mail reported that at least 27 people had been detained during the first two weeks of June. Included among them were nine members of the newly formed Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and two black journalists.

“They are arresting anyone who can organize,” one young black remarked. And that view was echoed by the black daily, the Johannesburg Post, which commented bitterly that “detentions without trial are becoming as much a part of our lives as breathing.”

Mass Arrests

Nor did the police limit themselves to locking up suspected organizers. The detentions under security laws were dwarfed by mass arrests at roadblocks set up around Soweto and other black townships across the country. Altogether, more than 5,000 blacks were arrested during the weeks leading up to June 16, according to the Rand Daily Mail. Visser refused to disclose the exact number of those arrested at Soweto roadblocks or to specify the charges against them. But press reports cited pass law offenses as the rationale for most of the arrests, while commenting on the coincidence in timing. They noted that the roadblocks were thrown up around Soweto within hours after black power slogans were painted on two high schools and the administrative section of one school was put to the torch.

The sabotage at Soweto schools and the swift government response demonstrated once again just how volatile black schools remain politically, two years after protests against “Bantu education” and compulsory use of Afrikaans ignited the first Soweto uprising.

The government tacitly acknowledged the fact by shutting down Soweto schools two weeks early this year on June 8, a week before the June 16 anniversary. Again the timing seemed more than coincidental, and the action more than a desire to give students an extra two weeks of vacation.

In a community where outdoor meetings of more than three people are illegal and students have no access to telephones or transportation, class-rooms provide one of the few opportunities for young militants to get together and make plans.
Soweto Recalled

Despite all these precautionary steps by the government, the June 16 anniversary hardly passed unnoticed. In fact, judged by the standards that prevailed up until two weeks ago, the events of the weekend would have seemed highly incendiary.

Thousands of blacks jammed into churches to hear speeches and sing freedom songs that would have curled the hair of the white citizenry a few years ago. More than 5,000 people packed the Regina Mundi Cathedral, where Dr. Nthato Motlana vowed that "South Africa will revert to its own lands" for their education rather than for their owners. Making it emphatically clear that those owners are not "these palefaces who have been with us for 300 years," the doctor who headed Soweto's Committee of Ten until his detention last October led the crowd in chants of "Power is ours!"

Thirty minutes later, police opened fire on a crowd of hundreds of black youths who were stoning a police car and a bus. No injuries were reported. But the shots reverberated with echoes of the gunfire that felled hundreds of black youths in 1976 and again last June. And the bus at which the youths were directing a hail of stones also recalled a major feature of the June 1976 uprising and the political agitation that has continued uninterrupted since then.

The bus belongs to a company that takes thousands of black commuters to work in the factories of "white" Johannesburg. These same buses became a major target of militants as the Soweto uprising expanded from a student protest into a virtual general strike. And even without a call for workers to stay at home to mark the June 16 anniversary this year, police admitted that morning traffic out of the townships was only about 60 percent of normal on that day.

Generalized Resistance

Taken altogether, events during June 1978 highlighted the most significant feature of developments during the last two years—the degree to which resistance in Soweto and other black communities has become both generalized and permanent.

Although the boycott of Soweto schools ended officially earlier this year, registrations peaked at a figure equal to only a third of those recorded before June 1976. Thousands of young blacks have fled the country. Thousands more have gone to the "homelands" for their education rather than return to the Soweto schools. And hundreds remain behind bars, still awaiting trial on charges stemming from the June 1976 rebellion. The government admitted last year that nearly 300 children less than 16 years old were still locked up. Three Soweto high schools stand empty as monuments to the student revolt against "Bantu education."

The students are by no means the only ones in whom the spirit of June '76 has remained alive. Government efforts to lure Soweto residents to the polls to elect a "representative council" have been an abject failure. Less than 10 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots in two separate elections. Efforts to install government-sponsored administrative bodies have been little more successful in other townships across the country.

Meanwhile, black workers who virtually shut down Johannesburg's industry in a one-day strike on August 4, 1976 have shown a continuing spirit of militancy despite government statistics which boast that the real average wage of blacks has risen by 53% over the last seven years while white averages have crept up only 3%. So far 10 major strikes have been reported this year.

Trials

At the same time, the government's own docket of political trials testifies to the extent to which generalized militancy has led into underground organizations and armed actions. Just before the Soweto anniversary, the deputy chief of the Security Police, Brigadier Johan Coetzee, announced that about 300 people would soon be going on trial in 67 security cases throughout South Africa. In an interview, he indicated that the trials would be related to activities of the banned African National Congress. Even as he spoke, the trial of 18 blacks accused of belonging to another banned organization, the Pan Africanist Congress, continued in the remote town of Bethal.

Many of the defendants in these trials stand accused of possessing weapons or bombs. Yet all the arrests have not prevented a marked increase in the number of armed actions.

Bombs now go off somewhere in South Africa more than once a week. And army officials have reported several clashes between guerrillas and regular troops. Even as the police congratulated themselves on a relatively peaceful June 16, 36 men and women were arrested during a raid on a house in Phiri Township in which firearms and ammunition were seized.

Somehow the overall picture doesn't seem to conform with Soweto top cop Visser's confident statement that "I approach June 16 as any other day."

"I don't know why people don't want to forget it." Visser complained. "It happened two years ago. Since then good relations, bridges, have been built up between us and the community in Soweto."

More to the point were the comments by Nthato Motlana as he announced that a proposed bridge between himself and the government's Minister of Plural Relations Connie Mulder had collapsed. Stating that he was cancelling a scheduled meeting with Mulder, Motlana remarked, "I got a lot of flak from all sides because of it. Blacks don't want to talk to whites because they say whites don't want to listen. Young Blacks ask me, 'What will you get? Concessions? We don't want concessions, we want the political system changed.' 

Soweto 1976: This year they were arrested ahead of time.
Salisbury Lies About Death of Missionaries

"Rhodesian Terrorists Kill Twelve," "Twelve Britons Hacked to Death" was the way the US and British press reported the recent killing of eight white missionaries and four children in Rhodesia. Deliberately excluded from first reports were any references to the immediate ZANU denial of responsibility or to its counter accusation that Rhodesian troops had themselves clubbed and bayoneted the victims to death.

It was Smith's most successful propaganda coup since the beginning of the war, and he played it to the hilt.

More than twelve hours after the deaths at Elim in eastern Rhodesia, the bodies were still in place, deliberately left for viewing by Western reporters who were specially flown to the scene by Rhodesian Air Force jets on June 24.

The desired response was immediate. When the news made front-page Sunday morning reading throughout the Western world, it was complete with gory details, horrifying photographs and Smith's interpretation of the massacre. The guerrillas were condemned as brutal terrorists; conservatives in Britain and elsewhere mounted a passionate cry for immediate recognition for the internal settlement; support for the 'beleaguered' Rhodesian whites surged. In the furor, the killing by Rhodesian troops of 19 civilians, including two Belgian FAO volunteers, at a refugee camp passed virtually unnoticed.

ZANU was immediately blamed for the attack. If reported at all, ZANU leader Mugabe's strong denial of his organization's responsibility was condensed into a few lines way down in the story. The message was clear: the brutal terrorists are killing innocent men, women and children and are on the rampage against the church.

In the days that followed, readers were supplied with front-page details of the funeral and numerous atrocities attributed to the same "brutal terrorists" were dredged up to further intensify the hysteria.

Who Are The Terrorists?

Who is telling the truth? While *Southern Africa* was not among those flown to view the aftermath, it has not been too difficult to take the pieces of information that are available—not only to us—and construct a somewhat different picture.

The denial from Mugabe, Catholic missionary educated himself, was immediate and emphatic. Why should ZANU kill missionaries who had often displayed sympathy for the liberation struggle?

In an interview with *Tempo*, Mozambique's weekly magazine, Mugabe said: "We have always worked well with the mission at Elim," adding that ZANU had been operating in that area for many years. "We have respected all the missionary institutions and all the missionaries that we have come in contact with, and they have respected us. We have asked them for help. They have given us food, medicine and shelter.... In fact they have been persecuted by the government themselves. Some were expelled from the country. Others are in prison. And others are constantly threatened and treated badly every day by the Selous Scouts.

"...The regime would like to see our war discredited. They want to portray us as a party without principles and adopting murderous methods. But in the whole history of our war, we have always carried out our operations through the principle of working in harmony with missionaries and their institutions."

Sister Janice McLaughlin, a Maryknoll nun, who spent three months in Salisbury last year before being arrested and subsequently deported herself, commented that "missionaries who stay in war zones develop working relationships with the liberation forces and often attend their political education sessions, where they hear guerrillas tell the people that they are not against the churches. Some receive letters from freedom fighters who are their former pupils or parishioners. As one religious superior told me, The only missionaries who fear "the boys" are those who've never met them."

Interrogation Rhodesian Style

Baughman/AP
Smith Regime Responsible

Support for Mugabe's statement that the Smith regime itself was responsible for the atrocity came from surprising quarters—including US Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young. Interviewed by Le Matin, Young said that he was skeptical when people attributed massacres to black nationalist guerrillas from the Patriotic Front. "If this was a planned operation of attacks against missions," he asserted, "and that seems to have been verified in the last weeks—they can only have come from the Smith camp."

African members of Parliament, hardly the radicals of the country, have also rejected guerrilla responsibility for the killings. Rhodesian radio reported "angry scenes in the house as black opposition members of Parliament referred to the killings of African civilians by the security forces."

In New York, ZANU (Patriotic Front) representative Tirivaih Kangai accused the Selous Scouts of responsibility. "According to reports from our operational zones, the Rhodesian Selous Scouts...attacked [the mission]... This attack, which took place about twenty-four hours after the Rhodesian army had killed seventeen refugees, plus two UN officials, was partly geared toward diverting world condemnation of Rhodesian raids into Mozambique and drawing sympathy and support for the tottering and almost collapsing regime in Salisbury."

Selous Scouts Atrocities Frequent

The Selous Scouts are a counterinsurgency unit of the Rhodesian army who have been given much autonomy in their actions, which focus on committing atrocities after passing themselves off as members of ZANU and ZAPU in order to discredit the authentic liberation forces and destroy their supporters.

While this tactic has achieved considerable success in the Western press, it has not deceived the Zimbabwean people. Sister Janice told Southern Africa in an interview last year (Vol. X, No. 9, November 1977) that when Rhodesian newspapers printed gory accounts of guerrilla atrocities, "definitely all the Africans I ever met assumed the government did it."

Her own research into torture with the Catholic Commission for Peace and Justice revealed that at least one such massacre—at a tea plantation—had been carried out by the Selous Scouts and not the liberation forces, as claimed in the Rhodesian press.

An interview published last year with a captured Selous Scout, Won-derful Mukoyi, sheds light on recent US press accusations that the guerrillas have attempted to intimidate villagers by cutting off the lips and ears of suspected informers and forcing their wives to eat them. He told Zimbabwe News, the ZANU publication, that he had participated in a number of actions where the Scouts had passed themselves off as guerrillas. He recalled two instances when his group had cut off the fingers and lips of wives of suspects, roasted them and forced the suspect to eat them. Both incidents had been reported by Rhodesian radio, which charged the guerrillas with responsibility for the actions.

The possibility does exist that such acts of random violence as the killings at Elim might have been the result of the activities of an armed group of people acting independently of the liberation movements. Recent liberation movement successes, and the apparent imminent collapse of the Smith regime have produced widespread black desertions from the Rhodesian army. Some of these deserters, trained as killers by their colonial masters, may now be operating in small groups on their own. It will take time for the liberation forces to establish control over such elements.

White Collapse

But one fact is paramount: the Smith regime is in disarray, its control of the countryside in chaos as administration and communication have broken down almost completely.

This is a main theme in press reports coming out of the country. And desperate regimes give rise to desperate acts. Hysteria aside, the total number of white civilians killed since the war began to escalate six years ago is slightly less than 200. In contrast, the number of Africans rises well into the thousands. Even Smith has admitted that 20 Zimbabweans are now dying daily in the war.

Zimbabweans are still paying a high price for their freedom. Yet even US correspondents acknowledge that the liberation forces are taking control of the country as white rule is dislodged.

"With each passing day," reports Washington Post correspondent David Ottaway, "there is yet another sign that European institutions and law and order are crumbling in the countryside.... Scores of schools, hospitals, clinics, churches and rural councils are ceasing to function."

"...A number of the 200 or so reserves set aside for the African population, the tribal trust lands, have been more or less taken over by the guerrillas and about 50 of the 250 rural councils there have been disbanded."

South African Troops in Rhodesia Says Mugabe

Mozambique’s Tempo magazine recently interviewed Robert Mugabe at some length. One question asked was whether South African troops were fighting with Smith’s men in Rhodesia. We reprint the ZANU leader’s response because this important issue has been totally ignored in the US press.

It has been proved that they are there...They are coming now in units. Before, in 1975, South Africa said that it was going to withdraw its so-called police units. After these units were apparently withdrawn from the country but South Africa still permitted its men to join the Rhodesian army as volunteers. However, in truth South Africa never withdrew completely. Its men have continued to support Smith. Now we know that South Africans are operating in the south and southeast of the country, from the bank of the Limpopo River, that forms the border between Rhodesia and South Africa. Our fighters have engaged in armed confrontation with the South African troops there. In truth, South Africa supports Smith by furnishing him its air force. Daily attacks are made in the south and southeast of the country from bases in the Transvaal, in support of Smith’s offensives and also against Mozambique. Mirages are being used and journalists have already seen them in Zimbabwe at Smith’s bases. They were produced in South Africa under license from France.

Israel is also working to train Smith’s pilots in the use of Mirages.

"...The guerrillas now talk as if an outright military victory is just months away while diehard white supremacists are beginning to speak of ‘taking a final stand,’ carrying out a ‘scorched earth policy,’ and ‘going on a ramp-aged.’

Despite all Smith’s and Muzorewa’s propaganda about the success of the ‘internal settlement,’ it is obvious that the real successes are those of the Patriotic Front on the battlefield. By late July, even the highly censored reports coming out of Rhodesia, indicated that guerrilla actions were not confined to the countryside. Armed operations had begun in Salisbury, the very center of the illegal regime. 
Dissidents Fail In Takeover Bids

Internal developments in both ZANU and ZAPU, the two wings of the Patriotic Front alliance formed in 1976, have been the subject of a few sketchy press reports and much speculation in recent months. In Front military operations, the Zimbabwe African National Union had, by many reports, been the more active partner until recently.

ZAPU has reportedly begun to mobilize greater numbers of troops since the Smith regime's announcement of a "internal settlement" in Salisbury March 3. Both ZANU and ZAPU have continued to work for greater military and political unity in their common organization.

But late in April it was reported that ZANU had completed a political trial involving several members of its central committee and a number of other "top officials." The ten were found guilty of plotting the assassination of Robert Mugabe, ZANU's leader. They are now being detained and rehabilitated at Chimoio, ZANU's military headquarters in Mozambique, the site of a brutal massacre of Zimbabwean refugees by Rhodesian security forces last November.

ZAPU Commander Hurt

Just three days after the London Time's April 21 report of the ZANU decision, a Times dispatch from Lusaka quoted "informed sources" as saying that four ZAPU members had been executed at a guerrilla camp after they were found guilty of an attempted assassination of Alfred Mangena, the commander of the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army, ZAPU's military wing. The four reportedly implicated others during the course of ZAPU's official investigation. Mangena has since been killed by a land mine planted by Rhodesian troops on the Zambian side of the Zambezi River.

Both the ZANU and ZAPU incidents appear to have had ethnic as well as political content. But neither seems to have been of a nature or scale that would seriously jeopardize the survival of the Zimbabwean liberation movement. Rather, they appear to reflect the sort of contradictions that are to be expected in the course of any struggle for national liberation and self-determination. "It should be seen as part of every revolution," said Tirivavi Kangai, US representative of the ZANU wing of the Front.

ZANU Plotters

Press reports from Maputo on the ZANU trial described the plotters against Mugabe as a faction that had sought closer relations with ZAPU, but apparently at a pace that was not compatible with ZANU's internal position. But in an interview with Southern Africa recently, Kangai indicated that such emphasis was mistaken. "The ZAPU aspect was really a minor part of the whole affair," Kangai said. Instead, he described the incident as a "matter of personal ambition and tribal ambition," in which the group tried to "consolidate power in a chiquis way." He said that the group had "posed as more progressive" than the ZANU leadership, and that it was through such a posture that they attempted to gain support against Mugabe and his defense secretary, Josiah Tongogara.

A report in Africa Confidential, a London-based periodical thought to have sources among Western intelligence agencies, said that dissidents had complained of a "lack of clarity in the direction of the war," and that they had been moving closer to the line advanced by Dzinase Machingura, the young guerrilla commander who was deputy political commissar of ZIPA, the Zimbabwe People's Army, shortly after its formation in 1976. Machingura and his supporters had been critical of what they termed divisive leadership rivalries in ZANU and ZAPU. They had regarded the merger of the military forces of both groups inside ZIPA as an essential prerequisite for the intensification of armed struggle.

Machingura's stance had also called for greater politicization of military cadres, and more political power for the guerrillas themselves. It has also been associated with the demand for a total revolutionary transformation in Zimbabwe, rather than merely the inclusion of blacks in the present system.

Among some Front supporters such positions, supposedly being adopted by the dissidents, have been described as ultra-left. At time of writing, however, few details of the dissidents' line have come to light, so that any ideological differences that may exist between the groups remain unclear.

Front-Line Attitudes

Whatever its role in this particular conflict, the progress of the consolidation of ZANU-ZAPU unity has generated considerable concern and speculation, particularly in Africa. Building the Front's loose alliance into a unified political and military organization is seen as a key step for the Zimbabwean liberation movement, and its ability to achieve victory and thus a legitimate settlement in Zimbabwe. Such a resolution is assuming increasing urgency for front-line states such as Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania, which
have all been paying a high price for their continued support of the Zimbabwe struggle.

Key Figures
The key figure in the rebellion against Mugabe seems to have been the information secretary, Rugare Gumbo. Others involved included manpower secretary Henk Hamadziripi, external affairs secretary Mukudzei Mudzi, and Joseph Taderere, a former chief political commissar.

The dissidents appear to have begun moving in earnest against the Mugabe leadership after the November Chimoio massacre. Gumbo reportedly wrote a paper, "Lessons of Chimoio," in which Mugabe was largely blamed for the costly incident. But ZANU now reports that the plotters had themselves been in touch with Smith officials in Salisbury through South African intermediaries prior to the attack by Rhodesian forces. The dissidents are said to have known of the attack 48 hours in advance.

"Most central committee members were supposed to have been there," Kangai said, indicating that it was through the attack that the dissidents had hoped to eliminate their rivals inside ZANU. "They also hoped to discredit Mugabe by saying he could not consolidate the Chimoio district," Kangai said. Apparently Mugabe and other ZANU leaders were not at Chimoio only because they had suddenly been requested to meet with Mozambican President Samora Machel.

Spreading Rumors
Not unexpectedly, various elements hostile to the Patriotic Front have attempted to capitalize on the tensions inside ZANU. Thus early in July, a Johannesburg press report quoted Bishop Muzorewa's announcement of a major increase in oil sanctions-breaking, see Southern Africa, Sept. 1977

Leaving government service in the early 1950s, Jardim went to Mozambique where he established himself as a wealthy businessman and served as Prime Minister Salazar's personal representative for many years.

At the time of UDI, Jardim was managing director of a Mozambique oil firm, SONAPMOC, and director of the SONAREP refinery in Beira. He was charged by Salazar with the task of maintaining "normal" trade routes to Rhodesia, with special emphasis on coordinating and reporting on fuel supplies.

Jardim was instrumental in engineering the illegal oil flow to Rhodesia, first from South Africa through Beira, and later (following the ineffectual British naval "blockade" and the closing of the Lonrho-owned Beira-Rhodesia pipeline) from Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). The companies involved were Shell (British/Dutch), British Petroleum (British with major government shares), Mobil and Caltex (US), and Total (French).

Corporate Headquarters Quilty
Jardim now defends his key role on the grounds that Portugal was open and consistent about its refusal to honor UN sanctions against Rhodesia. He also offers extensive documentation laying the blame for contravention squarely on the Western oil companies. He has released memoranda of meetings of oil executives, stamped "strictly confidential," which provide indisputable proof that the head offices of oil companies in England, France and the US were all fully aware of the massive extent to which their subsidiaries were engaged in sanctions-busting. The companies were consciously and covertly using their South African and Mozambique-based subsidiaries to continue oil sales to Rhodesia through a South African company, Anglo-American Corporation-owned Freight Services and through the Rhodesian purchasing agency, GENTA.

Jardim's monthly reports to Salazar provide statistical data on the oil shipments of each company from the mid-1960's through 1974. They show how these companies systematically assisted the Smith regime in moving from an oil-poor position of extremely low reserves at the time of UDI to a position of secure stockpiles, simultaneously depriving Zambia of needed oil and undercutting the UN embargo in the process.

Mobil and Caltex
Between 1968 and 1972, Shell/BP's share in oil sales via Mozambique was 47.1 percent of the total, with Mobil and Caltex supplying some 22 percent and Total 8 percent. With annual supplies in 1973 and 1974 reaching 500,000 tons, Rhodesia was able to stockpile the surplus. According to Jardim, "the biggest increase of shipments was made by Shell/BP. In 1973 they had supplied 56.1 percent of all Rhodesia's oil, against 20.7 percent by Caltex, 19.2 percent by Mobil and 4 percent by Total."

Jardim also provides crucial documentation to back up assertions about the companies' conscious complicity and intent. For example, he reports on a meeting held in Salisbury in October, 1965, on the eve of UDI, at which members of Smith's government told him that they had received "personal assurances from...a high British oil executive," and were therefore confident that they had nothing to fear from a possible oil embargo.

Feared Exposure
Confidential notes and memoranda of meetings also suggest that oil executives had only one concern: that their operations might be exposed and their
illega1 activities made public. Outweighing this fear was the concern that no action be taken that might endanger the oil companies’ position in South Africa. According to a “strictly confidential” memorandum prepared early in 1968 by Shell Chairman, Sir Frank McFadzean, South African Prime Minister Vorster had in 1967 warned that any restrictions on oil supplies to South Africa, whether destined for Rhodesia or not, would force his government to diversify supply sources in the interest of maintaining security.

SOUTH AFRICA’S PRESENCE

continued from page 17

bers of soldiers in each camp (by accident one Finnish missionary had managed to hear that in Oshigambo camp, not a very big camp, there were 500 soldiers, i.e. one battalion), we concluded that SWAPO’s estimate of 50,000 South African soldiers in the north is rather too low than too high.

There were quite a lot of black soldiers also—presumably from tribal armies. People seem to be more afraid of black soldiers’ violence and rough methods than of that of white ones. In Ovamboland heavy road construction was being carried out on roads such as one between Oniipa to Eenhana and one from Oshakati to Ombalantu. Also new military camps were being established, a sign that South Africa had no intention of leaving the country.

There were several signs of SWAPO’s military activities. We saw a number of military cars that had been damaged by mines, but we were also very afraid of South African mines in the civilian roads.

SWAPO Zones

Two areas in Ovamboland were called semi-liberated by the population because SWAPO guerrillas can move there quite freely and the South African army and local administration definitely are not able to exercise control over them constantly. Those areas are in the west between Okalongo and Okalongo and in the east between Eenhana and Nkongo going as far south as Onankali. SWAPO’s connections to the people seem to be quite effective also through radio. Every evening we saw people regularly listening to SWAPO’s broadcasts from Angola.

During this spring several thousand Namibians left the country—especially in March and April—and wherever we visited houses, hospitals, schools, churches, etc. we heard that relatives, neighbors, colleagues had left the country. In Oshigambo mission school at the beginning of the year there were 145 students, but by May 27 had left the school and crossed the border.

Attack on Angola

We were in Oniipa and Engela on May 4—the day South Africa attacked Angola—but couldn’t see more than one reconnaissance plane, checking the border area. The previous evening we saw several Mirage fighters flying from Grootfontein to Ruacana. On May 6 we went up to Ombalantu and saw several convoys of military cars coming back from the border area. The anti-aircraft guns were ready in the Ondangwa airport, waiting for counter-attack.

We couldn’t go further from Ombalantu because local people warned us of South Africa’s “clearing” operations in the border area. The attack into Angola was made through Ombalantu and Ruacana. On May 4 in the Ombalantu area, both roads and air were full of military traffic. The Finnish missionary there told us what the day was like in the war [against Angola]. The troops were concentrated up to the border on Wednesday evening, May 3. Early on Thursday morning they bombed refugee camps located just 30 kilometers over the border. Later in the morning, motor battalions followed and started more systematically killing people in the refugee camps who had just left Namibia. The main purpose was to murder. Firstly, the South Africans wanted to stop the flow of emigration and secondly they calculated—better to kill Namibians without with arms.

Returning troops detained all the people they saw on the road in Angola, both Namibians and Angolans. According to the local people in Ombalantu, 149 military vehicles carrying captured people came into the Ombalantu camp, carrying approximately 1000 people, of whom some were killed: some very badly injured and amputated. When we drove back Oshakati we saw a convoy of 30 security police cars coming towards us and going up in the direction of Ombalantu, presumably to interrogate those detained.

Prime Minister Ndjoba told us that he fully supported the South African attack and that he sent a telegram to UN Secretary General saying that his people also support this operation. If something was clear, it was that Ndjoba has practically no support at all among the population. His house in Oshakati was surrounded by security fences and guarded by the bodyguard and a military camp built beside the Minister’s residential area.

The Future

Prime Minister Vorster said when he agreed to the Western proposal that South Africa withdraw its army from Namibia, “South African forces would return to the Territory in the event of hostilities breaking out in the electoral process. Our troops are not there to take or hold the Territory, but to protect life and property.” Could it be more clearly stated? If the results of the election do not suit the South African plan, would it not be very easy to organize a provocation which then would legitimize a South African intervention to protect the “security” of the white population?
Unions Map Apartheid Fight

San Francisco was the site, June 10, of an important conference reflecting growing grassroots union solidarity with black workers fighting for liberation in South Africa. 132 delegates, representing 64 local trade unions met in a conference on southern Africa conceived and planned by rank and file members of Longshore Local 10 and Warehouse Local 6 of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU).

Responding to a call by ILWU Secretary-Treasurer Curtis McClain to concentrate on "corporate programs rather than highfalutin resolutions," the delegates concluded the one-day meeting by pledging themselves to a powerful program of action, aimed at cutting off all US support for apartheid.

South African Unionist Speaks

"To destroy apartheid we need your support," guest speaker John Gaetsewe, General Secretary of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) told delegates.

Gaetsewe, 61-year-old South African labor leader, formerly a laundry worker, had to flee South Africa in 1965 after being imprisoned and then banned. Describing the oppression of black South African workers he told delegates that the whole apartheid system is being propped up by the US government and US corporations. He appealed to delegates to mount a broad campaign to get US businesses out of South Africa, and to "give support to liberation movements in South Africa and neighboring countries."

Challenging the corporate excuse that they cannot leave South Africa because that will cause black suffering he said: "On one end you are being arrested under the pass laws while your children are being shot down in the streets. The suffering is a price we are willing to pay. In South Africa the people have decided the fight will continue until freedom, at any cost."

Resolution and Program of Action

A five-point resolution committed delegates to putting economic pressure on US-based businesses to pull out of South Africa and also to forging an ongoing movement in solidarity with the peoples fighting for liberation in southern Africa. Moving quickly to put muscle into its resolution the conference also adopted an eight-point action program which emphasized the removal of union funds invested in corporations doing business in South Africa or Rhodesia. Other key points of the program were to:

- establish a Continuations Committee.
- actively encourage the boycott of goods to and from countries in southern Africa with white minority regimes and South Africa in particular.
- organize a boycott in the Bay area of the Krugerrand.

Commented one observer, looking at the list of unions represented, which included the ILWU, Teamsters, Hospital Workers, Printers, Auto Workers, Machinists, Newspaper Guild, Building Service Workers and Musicians, "They will sure pack a mighty punch when they once start swinging."

John Gaetsewe, SACTU, addresses Trade Union conference

Students Beware...

Survey Aimed at Identifying Divestment Movement

Academics like to encourage the myth that their research is simply the collection and analysis of objective information and therefore 'neutral.'

Doubt should certainly be cast on that line by news of a current research project, being undertaken by Professor Meyer Feldberg, Director of the Graduate School of Business at the University of Cape Town in South Africa. Feldberg is coming to the US to conduct a research study on "American Student Attitudes Towards US Business Involvement in South Africa."

Student groups on several campuses have already received the questionnaires.
naire, and it seems probable that administrators and others on campus will also be approached to provide information.

What information and for what purpose?

The questionnaire has seven questions—but Feldberg comes right to the point with the first one. Question 1 asks: "Describe the main on-campus student organization that has shown an interest in US-South Africa relations or in South Africa's domestic policy; name of organization; number of members; when founded; and lastly its "contacts or relations with other bodies both student and non-student."

Question 2 asks about the responding organization's policy "regarding the ownership by the university of stock in US corporations with activities in South Africa," wants to know how the policy was established, why, and how it is promoted. Questions 3 and 4 deal generally with attitudes towards the admission of South African students to US universities and to US academics who accept visiting professorships or lecture tours in South Africa.

Question 5 comes back to the nitty-gritty of the whole thing: "Please describe the nature of student opposition, if any, to your university holding stock in South Africa's domestic policy; and how it is promoted. Questions 3 and 4 deal generally with attitudes towards the admission of South African students to US universities and to US academics who accept visiting professorships or lecture tours in South Africa."

It asks for details on petitions, demonstrations and the "number of students actively campaigning for divestment of company stock held by your university."

Question 6 asks about university administration responsiveness to recommendations regarding stock, and Question 7 asks for comment on the corporate argument that withdrawal would not be in the interests of South Africa's black population.

That's it. All answers are to be sent to Feldberg at Northwestern University in Illinois, where he is a visiting professor in the Graduate School of Management.

No doubt US corporations, campus administrations and maybe even South Africa's secret police, BOSS are all eagerly waiting for the answers. What is the size of the campus movement? Who are its leaders? What are its links? Where is it likely to surface next?

Students, we believe, may choose to send their signals other than via Dr. Feldberg's questionnaire. Anyone who wants to know numbers should have a busy time counting demonstrations this coming Fall!

Progress on Ex-Im

On June 2, the House of Representatives voted by 219 to 116 to accept a compromise restriction of Export-Import Bank financing to South Africa offered by Rep. Thomas Evans (R-Del.). It stops far short of the total ban on Ex-Im financing offered by Rep. Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.) in subcommittee, and which had received substantial margins of victory both there and in the full Banking Committee. The compromise measure prohibits Ex-Im Bank insurances, guarantees, and credits to the South African government and its various state-owned corporations, and requires that any purchaser wanting Ex-Im financing endorse and "proceed toward the implementation of" the Sullivan code of fair employment practices and be willing to engage in collective bargaining with labor unions. In accepting this measure, the House gave South Africa "a whack in the shins rather than a kick in the head," as conservative Rep. Richard Kelly (R-Fla.) put it.

The adoption of the Evans compromise reflects the tension between the demands of the growing anti-apartheid movement in the US and the reluctance of the Carter administration and Congress to implement any corporate sanctions. The compromise came about largely because of the currently prevailing attitude of "enlightened self-interest" on the part of US banks and companies. These recognize that some gesture must be made to express disagreement with South African policies, but they seek measures that would not harm their business interests. Within the past six months, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and other banks in Chicago, Minneapolis, and Milwaukee have said they would no longer lend money to the South African government. And over 100 American corporations have embraced the Sullivan principles included in the Evans compromise.

The success of the Evans measure can be attributed partly to the increasing-
involvement in Angola.

- Ban all aid to front-line states furnishing support for the liberation movements, including Zambia and Tanzania as well as Angola and Mozambique.

Some Senate liberals place part of the blame for growing right-wing momentum against current policies on the Administration itself. To get support on both the Panama Canal and SALT, President Carter has tried to appease the right wing, taking every opportunity to show that he is not "soft on communism." So he and others in his Administration have helped create the anti-communist atmosphere that is the main force behind these amendments.

The attack on aid to the front-line states, which is now an annual event, is the most likely to succeed. Already the Senate has passed an amendment to the foreign relations authorization bill prohibiting aid to countries that allow "terrorists" to operate from their territory. Anti-terrorist sentiment in Congress has usually focused on airplane hijackers and Middle East politics, but debate on this amendment opened June 26 with discussion of the massacre of missionaries in Rhodesia. Although this provision will probably be dropped in conference committee, amendments barring bilateral and multilateral aid to Mozambique and Angola specifically will probably be added to the security assistance authorization bill in late July. Conservatives will also attack bilateral aid to Zambia because of its support for the Patriotic Front.

The effort to repeal the Clark Amendment can probably be beaten back, particularly in view of Angola's cooperation in getting SWAPO to agree to Western proposals on Namibia. The Administration will probably be reluctant to support repeal for this reason, although it was Carter who originally requested that Congress lift restrictions such as the Clark Amendment during the Shaba crisis. In addition, even the most right-wing members of Congress are not eager to get the US directly involved in a war in southern Africa.

Probably the most serious attack was the surprise move to support Rhodesia's internal settlement by lifting sanctions, since southern conservatives have been able to team up with the black partners in the internal settlement—who are portrayed here as moderate African nationalists. Jesse Helms, a long-time friend of white rule from North Carolina, proposed a one-year suspension of sanctions on June 28. It lost by only six votes, and Helms decided to try for a six-month suspension three weeks later, as an amendment to the security assistance authorization bill. E.F. Andrews of Allegheny Ludlum Industries, the main lobbyist for the Byrd Amendment in the early 1970s and now a prime backer of the internal settlement, is a strong supporter of Helms. New right-wing organizations such as the American Conservative Union have become a more important element in this vote than in earlier fights on the Byrd Amendment.

Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, for their part, have teamed up with American conservatives and corporate interests because they need that kind of support to keep their internal settlement alive. Since the settlement is clearly not fair well either in stopping the war or in improving conditions for Africans inside the country, their only hope comes from getting an open-ended commitment of support from the US, starting with the lifting of sanctions.

Muzorewa spent several days in Washington lobbying for the Helms amendment. He appealed to the "gut feeling" of Americans in favor of democracy. A letter he and six other members of the Salisbury interim government Cabinet sent to every Senator on July 9 said in part:

Your vote can help us...and help Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to become a Democratic state...Your vote can help materially by lifting sanctions, injecting new life into the economy and improving the quality of life of our people. Black and particularly black. Your vote can turn the tide in favor of democratic forces which are setting are country on the road to a democratic, pro-Western, anti-Communist, multi-racial society.

Congress Looks At Investment

Congress has started a debate on various approaches to regulating corporate investment in South Africa. Though the actions are clearly in response to the growing movement on campuses and elsewhere, divestiture is not among the options being considered.

Congressman Stephen Solarz, a liberal Democrat from New York, introduced a bill in June that is designed to create a moderate two-fold approach. It would prohibit new investment and bank loans to South Africa, but exempt the largest category of new capital, reinvestment of profits. For companies that already invest in South Africa, the bill would require fair employment practices in order for the firm to be eligible for tax credits, Export-Import Bank financing, export licenses, and federal government contracts.

Liberal elements in the foreign policy establishment favor the proposal as a modest step. Bill Cotter, president of the African-American Institute, testified at the first day of hearings before two House International Relations subcommittees, saying that voluntary corporate compliance with the Sullivan principles—moderate business guidelines for the treatment of blacks, drawn up and signed by leading US corporations last year—was no longer an adequate demonstration that the US supports majority rule in South Africa.

Four corporations—General Motors, Ford, Control Data, and NCR—have come out against the mandatory provisions of the act, saying that their own moves to improve conditions for black workers are sufficient. Mobil decided not to testify because the company did not want to come out publicly against the bill, though it does oppose it.

Congressman Charles Diggs has introduced a tougher measure than the Solarz bill, banning all new investment, including the reinvestment of profits. His bill excludes the second part of the Solarz measure on fair employment practices, although that section was fashioned after a bill Diggs originally put forward three years ago. Congressman Jonathan Bingham, chairman of the International Trade subcommittee, which has joint jurisdiction with the Africa subcommittee over the bill, has proposed that only those companies that do not practice or commit themselves to fair employment practices should be prohibited from investing in South Africa.

After hearing additional witnesses from the NAACP, the churches, and from code proponent Leon Sullivan, the subcommittees may propose a bill that will probably resemble the Solarz approach. It is doubtful that the measure will come before the full House this year, however. The International Relations Committee and the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee must both pass it, and they will probably choose not to deal with it during an election year.
U.S. BANK LOANS DENOUNCED

Nation-wide protests against bank loans to South Africa marked the second anniversary of the Soweto uprisings during the week of June 16.

In New York, several hundred people targeted Manufacturers Hanover Trust in two days of protest, picketing and rallies. On June 16 demonstrators outside the Wall Street headquarters and at branches in Bedford-Stuyvesant decried Manufacturers’ participation in loans of more than $440 million to South Africa, linking this practice to the bank’s massive discriminatory redlining in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant.

For example, whereas Harlem residents comprise 23 percent of Manhattan’s population and have nearly $80 million deposited in Harlem branches of Manufacturers Hanover, a mere quarter of one percent of the bank’s mortgage money constitutes loans in Harlem.

While protestors outside the Wall Street headquarters denounced Manufacturers’ use of black community funds for loans to South Africa while denying loans to that same community, employees in the bank were told not to go out and guards were posted at the bank’s locked doors.

The Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Workers announced at the Wall Street rally the union’s intention to withdraw nationwide all its funds from banks lending to South Africa and to divest from corporations doing business there. In Harlem, a cultural-political program was held with the theme “Harlem—Soweto, Same Struggle, Same Fight.”

Since June 16 a local New York chapter of the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa has been formed. It plans to utilize research done on New York banks’ redlining practices.

California protestors distributed 20,000 leaflets at 60 Bank of America branches in 22 cities. Several hundred accounts were withdrawn and additional withdrawals of $1 million pledged. In Minneapolis demonstrators leafleted Northwestern Bank and people “phoned in” to bank officials to protest their policies toward South Africa. Clergy and Laity Concerned urged people to withdraw bank accounts and to ask their Congressional representatives to vote in favor of ending Ex-Im financing to South Africa.

In Charlotte, North Carolina, a number of people withdrew their accounts from the main branch of the North Carolina National Bank, and rallies in Chapel Hill, Durham, Greensboro and Raleigh called for account withdrawals.

Bostonians protested bank loans for three days, targeting the First National Bank of Boston. A Rochester committee protested Manufacturers Hanover Trust South African involvement.

Protests to mark the second anniversary of Soweto also occurred in Canada and Europe. In Toronto, 300 demonstrators rallied on Commerce Court, that city’s financial district, calling on Canada’s banks to end loans to South Africa.

UNIVERSITY ACTIONS

The Civil Rights Committee of Michigan’s House of Representatives has voted to prohibit schools in Michigan from investing in companies with ties to South Africa. The move could affect over $200 million in college and university holdings.

The bill prohibits private and public schools from having investments in any companies condoning “legally required” discrimination.

If passed by the House, the bill would probably affect most strongly the University of Michigan, which reportedly owns $40 million worth of stock in companies operating in South Africa and a larger amount in the companies’ bonds.

Trustees of Ohio’s Miami University have reversed an April decision to divest stocks in corporations doing business in South Africa. Their action followed the university’s report that after the adoption of the April resolution some firms refused to contribute to a $14 million gift fund and threatened to drop scholarships.

Nearly one-third of the Amherst College graduating class signed a statement challenging the college’s investment policies and pledged not to contribute to its endowment until the school opposes US business involvement in South Africa. At May commencement ceremonies the school’s investment policies were criticized and 150 seniors and 30 faculty members wore armbands of protest.

Columbia University trustees announced in June that they would sell stock and withdraw deposits in banks lending to South Africa unless the banks announced their intention to end loans. At its commencement ceremonies the school’s investment policies were criticized and 150 seniors and 30 faculty members wore armbands of protest.

California protestors distributed 20,000 leaflets at 60 Bank of America branches in 22 cities. Several hundred accounts were withdrawn and additional withdrawals of $1 million pledged. In Minneapolis demonstrators leafleted Northwestern Bank and people “phoned in” to bank officials to protest their policies toward South Africa. Clergy and Laity Concerned urged people to withdraw bank accounts and to ask their Congressional representatives to vote in favor of ending Ex-Im financing to South Africa.
At Yale, which has $175 million in investments and $20 million in stocks and bonds in banks making loans to South Africa, a faculty-student committee recommended in April that various steps be taken to encourage withdrawal and, as a last resort, divestment.

Wesleyan University trustees voted in April to stop buying Certificates of Deposit from banks making loans to South Africa and to establish a study committee on divestment. Students expressed their opinion by taking over the president’s office.

N.A.A.C.P. TAKES STRONGER STAND ... Early in July, the NAACP endorsed the following economic sanctions against South Africa:

* A withdrawal of investments by United States corporations with re-investments in small developing African nations such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.
* A withdrawal by American investors of accounts in banks making loans to South Africa.
* A mandatory arms embargo and the revocation of landing rights for South African Airways in the United States until the airline integrates its personnel.
* The prohibition of South African participation in international sports and cultural competition until South Africans are able to participate in such activities regardless of their race.

The NAACP’s new policy marks a shift from the position it previously supported along with the National Urban League, that the American corporate presence in South Africa was in the best interests of South African blacks. Explained Executive Director, Benjamin L. Hooks: “We have become convinced that the South African government won’t be responsive to pleas from other governments or American corporations doing business there, so we think American corporations should pull out.”

OMAHA ORGANIZES ... The African Support Committee of Omaha (ASCO) was formed in January to educate the Omaha community about African issues and their relationship to American politics and economics. It is disseminating information and mobilizing local leaders for action against apartheid in South Africa and racial and economic discrimination in Omaha.

TEXANS PICKET S.A. DIPLOMAT ... Anti-apartheid protesters in San Antonio picketed the Rotary Club appearance of South African diplomat Pieter Goosen in June. Goosen is the South African Consul-General in New Orleans. The chairman of the San Antonio Committee Against Mercenary Recruitment and US Intervention in Foreign Countries, Mario Salas, declared the visit “a disgrace to the city council which has gone on record condemning the racist, illegal government in South Africa and a disgrace to the people of San Antonio in general.”

TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES INCREASE ... Warehouse Union Local 6 in San Francisco has established a Southern African Liberation Support Committee, which plans to develop ties with other unions.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES:

Individuals (Domestic and Foreign) $10.00 per year
Institutions (Domestic and Foreign) $18.00 per year

Airmail:
- Africa, Asia, Europe $22.50
- South & Central America $19.50