

Volume XII Number 5

SOUTHERN AFRICA

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June 1979

**Focus on
South Africa**



Pretoria:

- **Extending control over neighbors**
- **Making phony reforms**
- **Jailing student leaders**

Tanzania 8 shs

Mozambique 35 esc

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Volume XII Number 5
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Four of the “Soweto 11” defendants—expressing militancy before being sentenced on May 11. Left to right are: Kennedy Kgotsietsile Mogami (19), Reginald Teboho Mngomezulu (21), Michael Sello Khiba (20), and George Nkosinati Yami Twala (23). [Laserphoto]

Members of the Southern Africa collective who contributed to the production of this issue: Jennifer Davis, Craig Howard, Richard Knight, Patrick Lawrence, Mike Martin, Andrew Marx, Malik Reaves, Christine Root, Karen Rothmeyer, Witney Schneidman, Mike Shuster, Stephanie Urdang, Jim Weikart, Julie Weirman.

Special thanks for their assistance to: *Africa News*, Michael Beaubien.

Typesetting by Liberation News Service.
Cover and layout by The Letter Space.

Southern Africa is published monthly, except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 17 West 17th Street, New York, New York 10011.

Subscriptions: Individual (domestic and foreign)/\$10.00; Institutional/\$18.00; Airmail: Africa, Asia, Europe/\$22.50; South and Central America/\$19.50.

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilm, Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 68206, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index.

Distributors: New York, NY: Triangle Exchange, Delhi Distributors; Washington, DC: Liberation Information Distribution Co.; Boston, MA: Carrier Pigeon, Third World Distributors; Chicago: Guild News Agency; Minneapolis, MN: Rainbow Distribution; St. Paul, MN: Isis News Distribution.

ISSN 0038-3775

Poll Shows Americans Favor Economic Pressure on Pretoria

In a massive compilation of its poll results from 1935 to 1971, the Gallup Organization reports only one question asked about Africa: Should the US help start a university in Africa? (59 percent said yes to this 1961 query).

But recently pollsters have begun to pay more attention. In 1976 and 1977 the Harris Survey posed several questions on Africa. And earlier this month, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reported the results of a special survey on South Africa carried out by the Response Analysis Corporation. Some of the results:

- In November 1977, the Harris Survey reported that 63 percent of respondents said that apartheid, described as a system "under which the white minority runs the country and the black majority is kept separate and given less rights," is not justified. Twelve percent said it was. In the Carnegie poll, in February-March 1979, 86 percent responded to a more detailed description of the South African system by saying it is "wrong," while only 2 percent said it was "right."

- Harris found in 1977 that pressures on South Africa "to give the blacks there more freedom and participation in government" were approved 46 percent to 26 percent, including a full arms embargo (51 percent to 24 percent), and "preventing all new U.S. business investment in South Africa" (42 percent to 33 percent). The Carnegie pollsters reported for 1979 a margin of 43 percent to 37 percent in favor of "cutting down trade" with South Africa, 48 percent to 32 percent for "restricting business investments," and 55 percent to 23 percent for "supporting black organizations seeking peaceful change."

- Options seen as more drastic or interventionist were generally disapproved. In 1977, the tally was 51 percent to 21 percent against "ending all trade with South Africa," and 64 percent to 12 percent against "helping build up military pressures in Africa on South Africa." In 1979, 77 percent opposed "supporting black organizations willing to use violence," while only 11 percent were in favor. If the UN were to approve a resolution calling for a

cutoff of trade, however, 46 percent favored US compliance, as compared with 33 percent against.

- Black respondents showed consistently larger margins for action against South Africa.

- Even postulating "increasing internal violence," "communist support" for black insurgents, or direct involvement of "communist troops," large pluralities were for non-involvement. In the case of the involvement of communist troops, for example, 46

percent favored non-involvement, 17 percent supporting the whites, and 3 percent supporting the blacks.

While congressional action on southern African issues is currently sparking much talk of a swing to the right, the poll results seem to indicate that the public, on the contrary, is willing to go further than the Carter administration in applying economic pressures against South Africa. And critics who contend that the US is already involved in indirect support, military and otherwise, for the South African regime, can plausibly argue that if asked the public would also show a willingness to end such involvement. □

Mozambique Executes Rhodesian Agents

In a move indicating the continuing escalation of the southern African conflict, the Mozambican government has instituted the death penalty for treason. Ten people were executed on March 31, and 13 more in April and May, after the verdicts were approved by a newly established Revolutionary Military Tribunal.

FRELIMO, the ruling party in Mozambique, has a long tradition of applying re-education rather than capital punishment, in accord with orientations established during the decade-long war of liberation. But the increasing severity of Rhodesian attacks and the involvement of Mozambicans and Rhodesians in espionage and sabotage has led to popular demands that stronger measures be taken. In late March a Rhodesian-sponsored unit blew up oil storage tanks in Beira, Mozambique's second largest city, and other bombings have heightened insecurity in urban areas as well as in the border districts which are constantly under attack—and from which foreign aid personnel have been withdrawn.

In this context Mozambique moved to implement the new Law on Crimes against the Security of the People and the People's State, passed in February. The law provides for the death penalty, after review by a national tribunal, for a variety of crimes including high treason, espionage, assassination attempts, and sabotage. Lesser penalties are imposed for less serious offenses.

Of the ten executed in March, seven held

Mozambican nationality, two Rhodesian, and one Portuguese. Almost all had been trained in Rhodesia by Rhodesian and South African security agencies, and afterwards infiltrated back into Mozambique. Some had carried out reconnaissance for Rhodesian attacks on Zimbabwean refugee camps and Mozambican targets, while others had actually participated in attacks on civilians. Among them Goncalves Carimo admitted attacking a bus and derailling a passenger train causing the death of more than 20 Mozambicans, while Manuel Arnaldo Jambo boasted of killing over 50 civilians in attacks on Chicalucuala, Mapai, and Pafuri.

Another, Lamucas Chauque, made his way to South Africa in early 1978, after leaving a re-education center where he had been sent for rape. He was trained by the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and infiltrated into Mozambique through Kruger Park in October 1978, with the mission of spying on the South African liberation movement ANC and recruiting new BOSS agents among Mozambicans. □

UPDATE is written by Africa News Service, which also publishes a weekly digest available to individuals for \$20 per year. Address correspondence to P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702.

CIA Recruitment for Africa: The Case of Howard University, Washington, D.C.

Kemba Maish, 33, is a professor at Howard University in Washington, D.C., the pre-eminent black university in the United States. She teaches clinical and community psychology. She is a member of the Association of Black Psychologists and has been very active in black organizations since the '60s. Her doctoral dissertation was on Black Power and Pan-Africanism.

Imagine her surprise, some months ago, when she returned a phone message she had received at Howard and heard the operator answer, "Personnel, CIA."

This was the beginning of uncovering a pervasive and sinister CIA recruitment program for Africa, aimed at black professionals at Howard and elsewhere. Kemba Maish debated whether to say anything to anyone; simply being contacted by the CIA can raise questions with friends and colleagues. But she realized that not speaking out would be falling into the CIA's trap. It was more important that the community be aware of what the CIA was doing. She taped an interview with WHUR, the Howard University radio station. The night

her interview was to air, between the 5:15 news summary and the 6:00 news program, the tape of the interview disappeared.

The CovertAction Information Bulletin contacted Maish, and she agreed to tell, once more, her story—alerting black students, teachers, and professionals to this menace threatening the black community in America and, ultimately, African people wherever they are in the world. The interview was conducted recently by the Washington staff of the Bulletin.

Because of the importance of this issue Southern Africa is reprinting lengthy extracts from this interview which appeared in the April-May issue of the Bulletin.

Tell us what happened, how you first had contact with the CIA and when you realized what was happening?

Approximately April of last year—I had been at Howard almost a semester at that time—I received a call from someone named Roy Savoy. I was out at the time and he had left several messages.

Did you know the name, or who he was?

I had never heard of him. Naturally, I tried to get back to him. The first time I called, the person who answered said, "Personnel, CIA." I was very curious as to why Personnel, CIA, was trying to get in touch with me. When I finally talked with him, of course I was still upset, but I decided to sit back and relax and hear what he had to say. I wanted to hear his whole program. He said that he was black, which was very clear from our conversation, and that he was the director of some section of the CIA which was recruiting black people, specifically black psychologists, to go to Africa and develop profiles on foreign nationals. I asked him what he meant by foreign nationals, did he mean develop profiles on African people. He said no, that I would just be developing profiles on communists that were in Africa, so I wouldn't have to worry about spying on my own people. He went on to talk about paying me a fantastic salary, paying my way to Africa, all kinds of very enticing programs.

Did he mention sums when he talked about money?

No, he really didn't, but he implied that it was much more than I would be getting at Howard. Then he went on to tell me how he got my name, without my asking. I was wondering, but I was going to wait. He said he had gotten my name from the University of Maryland, that first he had gone to the director of one of the black programs at Maryland.

Did you know who that was?

Yes, somebody who was outspoken on the Maryland campus and generally concerned about black people. Savoy told me that he had received the names of professors from him, but that Oscar Barbarin in the psychology department gave him my name.

Had he been a professor of yours?

Yes, I had worked with him very closely; he was on my thesis and dissertation committees. Both my master's thesis and my dissertation involved looking at the relationship between political activism, political orientation, and positive mental health in



black people. Barbarin had worked with me for two or three years, so he knew my interest in issues related to the liberation struggles of all African people.

After Savoy told me that Barbarin had given him my name, I was still sitting back, not saying anything. When he finally finished, I told him he was a traitor to the African people. I went through the whole thing, about the connection between the FBI and the CIA, about what the FBI had done with the Black Panthers, Fred Hampton, Mark Clark, and Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, within this country. Then I mentioned how in Africa the CIA had organized a *coup* against Kwame Nkrumah and had actually murdered Patrice Lumumba. I went on down the line. I said, how could you possibly do this?

Then he said he was sorry he'd called me if he had upset me. I said I was glad he had called, I was glad that I had the opportunity to say what I wanted to say to him, and he just said he was sorry, that he wouldn't bother me again.

After the call, I started to be concerned about being contacted. I began to wonder why, with my background, the CIA would contact me. In a way I was personally incensed, how dare they? I tried to figure out what it was. Either they hadn't done their homework, which I doubt very seriously, or they thought that if they could get me, a black psychologist who knows African history, African politics, and who had been involved in political organizations for some time, they would have a perfect person.

I had been assuming they would think I couldn't be bought, but why should they think that? They've obviously bought other people; this was just one more person. Obviously I wanted to go to Africa; maybe they could make me think I was doing some service to the African people.

So after I thought about it, it began to make a little sense. I thought they would think, well, even if she says no, she wouldn't go public because of all the paranoia. But my feeling was that it is better to be in the open about it. I felt I had to let African people know what is happening so that they can protect themselves. That was when I arranged for the interview with WHUR.

The fact that they are recruiting and using Howard as a training ground was extremely important for black people to know, to be aware of. The interview was taped, and a small part of it was played on the 5:15 news summary, a summary of what is coming later. Then, about 45 minutes later, at the time for the regular airing, the tape was mysteriously missing. As far as I know, WHUR never found out what happened to the tape.

What did you do then?

I decided to go back to Maryland to talk to both people who were involved in giving



names. I did just that. I went back and talked first with the director. I asked him how he could give out names to the CIA, and first he said, well, he didn't give them my name. I told him that it did not matter, that he was still acting as a CIA agent whether he realized it or not. He became quite angry that I had come to him because he hadn't given anyone my name. He said that they come to him for all sorts of information.

I should add here that Roy Savoy was a student at the University of Maryland. He had just graduated in the last year or so, and he came to the director as an ex-student now working for the CIA and interested in having some names of people to do whatever. Perhaps that made it a little more palatable to him.

How did the director justify this with his political beliefs?

His rationale for what he had done was that they could have gotten the names anyway, so he didn't feel that he was giving away anything they couldn't find out themselves. I explained that by giving them certain names from the department he was giving them information, he was telling them which professors would be the most likely to have information about black students. He saved them from having to go through the department chair, who might not have had the knowledge of the black students and professors that the director of a black program did.

We eventually talked for a long while, and finally he said he had learned a lot from our discussion and would never do that again. He just hadn't realized the implications of what he was doing. He is a serious person, and I never thought he would do what he had done purposely. So he was another of those unwitting agents.

Then I went to see Oscar Barbarin, who had actually given my name. Barbarin at that time had been at the University of Maryland about three years. We are both members of the Association of Black Psychologists. I've known him since about 1973, and he knows my political persuasion and the many activities I've been involved in.

Had he been supportive of them?

Certainly. He was concerned about black people, and I don't think he would ever consciously do anything against black people. I went to see him, and I was furious. He knew what it was about; he was physically upset; he knew why I was there. I don't know whether the director had called him, or he just knew that in a matter of time I'd be there.

I asked him how he could do it, how he could give the CIA my name? He said that a number of government agencies come to him for names and information; he saw the CIA as just another government agency. I was shocked that he would even say that. I told him that he was supposed to be politically aware, that he had to know what the CIA has been doing, not only in Africa but also around the world. And he said he never stopped to think about it. He said that after he gave them my name he realized maybe he shouldn't have done it but then it was too late.

Did he say what they asked him for, what sort of criteria they had when they were asking for names?

He said they were looking for black people who wanted to go to work in Africa. Barbarin knew that I knew a lot about African history, African politics, as well as having been politically active. He said he didn't think I would be interested but I

might give them the names of people who would be interested.

I told him that was even worse. Not only was he acting as an agent for the CIA, but he was assuming that I would also act as one. I told him that he had no idea what he was doing, that he could get me killed, just by having my name on a list. He said he was really sorry, and he didn't realize the implications of what he had done, and he was very upset that I would call him a CIA agent.

But I told him that was the role he was playing, whether he realized it or not. That's the key point to me. A lot of people don't realize what they are doing, and they are getting a lot of other people involved in something they have no idea about. Or they are closing their eyes to it; they don't want to face the fact that if they turn down the CIA, they might jeopardize some funding or grants. Perhaps they want to cooperate so it won't interfere with the development of their careers.

Right after this, I called the Association of Black Psychologists, and I told them the CIA is recruiting black psychologists to go to Africa. Savoy had already contacted them, and they knew his name. We discussed how dangerous it was for African people all over the world. The CIA knows that where African people are, we could fit in—in Africa, the Caribbean, South America. They've already used black people from this country to infiltrate liberation movements and progressive groups both in Africa and in the Caribbean, basically using one group of African people against another. [When Professor Maish went to the Association's conference in August 1978, she discovered] that Roy Savoy was there, had his name tag on, had set up a room, and was already recruiting.

I managed to get the executive committee to allow me a few minutes to explain my experience with Roy Savoy, and to point out that he was already at their convention. A lot of them were shocked. He had registered openly as CIA, and I tried to explain the implications of this to them as an organization.

They proceeded to get rid of him then, but by that time he had already contacted a number of students and professionals. I began to speak with people there and realized that a number of professionals around the country had been contacted. Not only professors at Maryland, but also professors at Howard, and elsewhere, had given names.

What I'm saying is that it is not just me as an individual; many students and professionals are being contacted. Just the other day a student at Howard told me that he'd been contacted by the CIA, and he was angry too.

It sounds from all the evidence that they are doing blanket recruiting, that they will contact a large number of

people and be turned down by so many percent, and so many percent will agree. If you said no, well, you were just one. What they didn't count on is your going public, and we should talk a bit about that, about why you feel it is important to go public.

I guess it's most important for African people to understand the implications of all this—what these people have done in the past, who they are, what their connections are. The major corporations are tied up with the police and the intelligence network, as well as the military. And a lot of people look at the spy programs on TV and think there's nothing wrong with being a spy, all these people have exciting lives and are doing a service to their country.

People must understand that they are not doing a service to us in America, they're doing a service to the large corporations and to the American government, and to maintain profits—but in terms of our lives, all the FBI and CIA have done for us as a people is to kill us and our leaders and to destroy our organizations, not only here but around the world. They're doing it through our institutions, through our black organizations—they're recruiting us and we think we're doing a service to our people when actually we're helping to destroy our people.

It's important that people understand this and begin to work against it, to expose it every time it happens. I know of about ten people at Howard and other places who had been contacted, and not one of them had said a word. Yet, when I spoke up, they contacted me, too. But they just kept it to themselves and were angry about it. You have to expose this, to let people know you've been contacted, and it's easier to do that once we all do it. Then there isn't as much paranoia and suspicion, and we have each other's support against retaliation.

What were these students told?

Basically the same kind of thing, that they would be helping the African people and they would be working against communism. That's been played up so much both in Africa and here that a lot of people think they would be doing a service. Also a lot of black psychologists have gone to Africa, and a lot more want to go. There is a big push toward African psychology, and if you want to know anything about it, well you have to go to Africa, and this is a way to go to Africa. Sometimes they do this very indirectly, and people don't know under whose auspices they're going. They're just getting the money to go.

I should mention that all of this applies to foreign students, too. The CIA has a program where they recruit "nationals"—people born in a particular country—to go back to that country as a CIA agent. We should talk about the dangers here. These students need to be alerted, need to under-

stand whose agents they are if they work with the CIA. They will not be working in the interests of their people, but working against them.

How could you sum this all up for our readers?

I want to make the point of how organized this recruiting effort really is, and how dangerous it can be, not just to African people, but also to all people of the Third World. At this point in time, in the Third World in general, and the African countries (Africa and the Caribbean) in particular, the masses of people are rising up against the old order characterized by centuries of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The CIA has had a long history of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. By putting down just rebellions of the people, destabilizing governments, destroying organizations, planning and financing *coups* and murdering leaders, the CIA has attempted to change the course of history in places such as the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Cuba, Chile, Iran, the Congo, Ghana, and Angola, just to name a few.

In the African world they have found it much easier to infiltrate by using black agents rather than white. In fact, it was black CIA agents, born in America, who were instrumental in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966 and in the invasion of Guinea in 1970.

This use of black against black is also reflected in the position Andy Young occupies as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In that capacity he travels throughout the African world, seeking to make American imperialist policy more digestible simply because it comes in black hands rather than white. African leaders aware of this ploy have told him it won't work. The revolution of the African world is not the civil rights struggle of the '60s. The people will not be placated, they will not be bought off.

We must not become the enemies of our people. We must organize against all CIA activity. We must fight the CIA. □

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We thank *Covert Action Information Bulletin* for permission to reprint this interview. The April-May issue from which it is taken contains an interesting Africa supplement, with articles by Robert Moltano and Ken Lawrence on the role that North American academics have played in attempting to subvert southern African liberation struggles, and a detailed listing of 29 active CIA personnel currently operating in 21 African countries.

The issue costs \$2.00.

For more information, write: Covert Action, P.O. Box 50272, Washington, D.C. 20004.

Building a Fortress— South Africa Seeks New Friends in Africa

A little more than five years ago, in April 1974, the tensions generated inside Portuguese society by its colonial wars exploded in a movement led by Portuguese officers that swept away the fascist dictatorship in Lisbon and led to the establishment of three independent states in Africa. A series of events were set in motion that soon changed the balance of power in southern Africa.

For the white rulers of South Africa, the trend has been all downhill since then. South Africa quickly lost the buffer states of Angola and Mozambique to socialist-oriented governments. Soon support from these countries was helping SWAPO, ZANU, and ZAPU build pressure for majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe.

But an event took place recently that Pretoria hopes will begin to turn the tide. With the elections in Rhodesia, which will lead to the installation of Bishop Abel Muzorewa as prime minister, the rulers of South Africa are viewing the future of southern Africa with renewed confidence.

To greet the new day, Afrikaner leaders have dusted off an old scheme that various Nationalist administrations have advanced at strategic points since 1948. The Nationalists refer to it as a "constellation of southern African states" or a "southern African security and cooperation pact." Opponents of apartheid call it "Fortress South Africa." To David Sibeko of the Pan Africanist Congress it's a "diabolical scheme." ZAPU's Callistus Ndllovu says it's a "scheme designed to subject the African sub-continent under a South African military and economic sphere of influence."

Building a Fortress

What is it? It's a recent South African foreign policy proposal advanced in April by Prime Minister P.W. Botha. The idea is that South Africa will take the initiative in forming a "cooperative bloc" of southern African states, with South Africa in the lead, to fight off what Pretoria's leaders consider to be the onslaught of Marxism in southern Africa.

Botha only referred to the plan vaguely in a recent speech before South Africa's parliament, but South African political analysts are abuzz with the idea. They say the scheme will include a Muzorewa-led Rhodesia, a nominally independent Namibia, led by South Africa's favorite,

SOUTH AFRICA PLAYS ITS BISHOP



Scurato/Southern Africa

the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, the "hostage" states of Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana—all independent black nations whose economies are completely tied to South Africa—and finally the South African bantustans of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and others expected to be created soon. These are mini-enclaves that South Africa has tried unsuccessfully to convince

the world are independent states.

Differences with the West

Behind the scheme is a complex mixture of Afrikaner desires to regain a wider defense perimeter for the protection of apartheid, and resentment of the West, which the Afrikaners believe is forcing changes on them they have no intention of

accepting. The result may well be wider war in southern Africa.

Ironically, while progressive critics of Western policy have pointed to a willingness to compromise with and to preserve the apartheid state as a bulwark against communism, the South Africans have frequently tended to snap at the hand that shields them. The Western bloc has steadfastly refused to adopt measures such as oil and general economic sanctions, which might seriously challenge the apartheid state's ability to survive.

But there have clearly been tactical differences between Pretoria, Washington, and London on the necessary elements in a long-range survival plan.

The Afrikaners, even before they lost their allies in the Portuguese colonies, had been willing to have dealings with some independent black states. But their capacity for accepting real black independence is limited both by racism and by the fear of encouraging a domestic liberation struggle. Pretoria shies away from Western proposals that involve negotiating with and thus legitimizing successful liberation movements.

In Washington such a policy may be designed to contain the extent of change, limit confrontation and conflict, and thus avoid the radicalization of the liberation movements. In Pretoria it is read as dangerous capitulation.

South African foreign policy toward the rest of southern Africa has been basically consistent throughout the Nationalist reign: establish an African political context that was ideologically and politically favorable to white minority rule in South Africa itself. To put it more bluntly, make Africa safe for apartheid.

This was the basic idea behind former Prime Minister John Vorster's "detente" with black Africa. With this in mind, South Africa undertook the role of power broker in Rhodesia several years ago, almost at the same time that it accepted the negotiating process over Namibia. In return, according to South African political analysts, Pretoria believed, or was led to believe by the West, that it could gain normalized relations with key black African states and maintain continuing tacit support from the US, UK and western Europe. The belief behind detente was that a skillful foreign policy could make apartheid less repugnant to the outside world, thus protecting it.

But things didn't turn out quite the way the Afrikaners had hoped. The West insisted that the guerrilla fighters of the Patriotic Front and SWAPO be included in any settlement in Zimbabwe or Namibia. Ian Smith proved intractable, and in the end, Pretoria just couldn't stomach pulling in their defense perimeter hundreds of miles closer to white South African homes.

For the Nationalists, Western demands have proved unacceptable, and they have led to somewhat strained relations, especial-

ly with the US. In his speech suggesting the southern African "bloc," Prime Minister Botha had few warm words for the West. "We have been taught the hard way," said Botha, "that in international relations, there is no friendship, especially from great powers, but only self-interest."

Playing to the Afrikaner audience back home, which bitterly resents "outside interference," Botha warned that in retaliation South Africa would go it alone in southern Africa, and the West could no longer count on South Africa in the Western political sphere. "We shall have to endeavor to remove ourselves, politically, as far as possible from the East-West disputes and avoid involvement in their future conflicts while we trade with whomever it is in our interests to trade."

Editorial comment in Nationalist newspapers, while backing Botha to the hilt, is also a good reflection of wider Afrikaner sentiment. One editorial argued that South Africa must reduce its traditional ties to the West. The southern African security bloc would be a powerful military machine that could guarantee South Africa new bargaining power in international diplomacy. "We want to untie ourselves from the West," editorialized another paper. "We rather want to become the foster mother of a large area."

Wooing the Bishop

White leaders in Rhodesia and Namibia may have been seeking the role of foster child for some time, but getting black internal leaders to join the family may be tricky. Before the Rhodesian elections, South African expectations were that Muzorewa would be all for it. According to *The Observer* reporter Colin Legum, well over a million dollars of South African government money was poured into supporting Muzorewa and his United African National Council in the year before the election. The Bishop, according to a South African radio broadcast in late March, "speaks unreservedly today in favor of the maintenance of close ties with Pretoria and of the formation of a southern African common market." Muzorewa also vowed tough action against the Patriotic Front, with the weapons expected to come via South Africa.

But some South Africans are now sounding a more cautious note. "Muzorewa will play the South African connection very cool," said John Barratt, the director of the Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg, in late April. "Obviously he will want to keep the connection but he can't afford to be accused of being a South African puppet." Barratt thinks the South African government will understand this and not push too hard at first, preferring instead for some break in Western hostility to the Rhodesian regime.

If no international recognition comes for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after three or four

months, Muzorewa will have to depend more and more overtly on South Africa. The inevitable escalation of the war could easily lead to South African intervention. "The South African government will not allow the establishment of a Marxist regime in Zimbabwe," says Barratt. He adds, "The decision has probably been taken not to allow an overthrow of the new Zimbabwe government."

No Surprise

Pretoria's newly found "independence" from the West comes as no surprise to Western diplomats who have been negotiating with the South Africans. Sources in the National Security Council had already assumed in early May that South Africa would back Muzorewa fully as well as move toward an internal settlement in Namibia. And in mid-April David Owen, outgoing British Foreign Secretary, told the *Rand Daily Mail* of South Africa that he too had come to the conclusion that South Africa would deepen its involvement in the Rhodesian war. "All things start in a small way, as the Americans discovered in Vietnam. You can get sucked in very quickly," Owen warned.

"If South Africa commits itself on the ground in Rhodesia—and it has already announced publicly that it will give transport and other assistance in [April's] elections—it will be sucked in."

Like Owen and other Western diplomats, African leaders know that when Pretoria talks about cooperation and security pacts with African countries, the emphasis is on the military. Many African members of the UN expect the South Africans not only to strengthen their own security by taking up positions on the Kunene and the Zambezi, but also to initiate a more aggressive military plan of action against Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, the front-line states from which the Patriotic Front and SWAPO are bound to intensify their attacks.

Of course, one of the biggest question marks remaining is what will the West do if South Africa proceeds with this plan? The call from the UN for economic sanctions is practically inevitable. No one thought that a Great Britain under a Labor government would support sanctions; under Margaret Thatcher there is simply no question.

No official in the Carter administration wants to impose sanctions on South Africa, but some senior officials know they are coming. US opposition to sanctions, which could come in the form of a veto in the Security Council, will put the US in the South African camp as far as most African nations are concerned. Whether the US will further support South Africa with the weapons it will eventually need isn't certain, but there are a growing number of conservatives in Congress and elsewhere who are going to do everything they can to make the US an unequivocal ally of South Africa. □

M.S.

Defending Fortress Free Enterprise


In the diplomatic arena, the South African government has been playing tough recently. First, it sandbagged the UN plan for peace in Namibia just weeks before a ceasefire was due to take effect. Then in short order it noisily proclaimed its enthusiastic support for Bishop Abel Muzorewa's new regime in "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia," announced plans to go it alone in consolidating a "fortress South Africa," and equally noisily warned that the West could no longer count that fortress among its strong points in the event of war (see articles on Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South African foreign policy). Tough talk from a regime that has long sought to define itself as the West's last bastion on the African continent.

But on the homefront, these actions were matched by equally dramatic moves calculated to show that the regime could be eminently flexible in responding to the needs of its most reliable friends overseas (the multinational corporations) and the criticisms of its most powerful adversaries within the white community at home (the internationally oriented, generally English-speaking, corporate elite). In recent months, the Rhodiegate scandal has dramatized this elite's escalating conflict with the ruling Nationalists over strategies for defending "fortress free enterprise" (see May *Southern Africa*).

The government's show of flexibility came in the form of a series of commission reports and ministerial pronouncements. Among them, they addressed many of the most prominent, and most frequently condemned, features of the apartheid system—influx control (pass laws), trade union rights, and housing for blacks in "white" urban areas. And they recommended substantial alterations in each.

Wiehahn and Riekert

The real attention-grabber among these reports was the one issued by the Wiehahn Commission, a 14-member panel assigned the task two years ago of studying the nation's labor laws. In the space of 60 pages, it urged the legal bulwarks of apartheid in industry be scrapped. Black trade unions should not only be officially recognized for the first time, the commission stated, they should be granted all rights presently held by white unions, including the right to strike. The commission also recommended eliminating racial pay scales and laws reserving certain jobs and separate bath-



Prof. E. Wiehahn (second from right) with other members of his commission.

rooms and cafeterias for white workers.

Within 24 hours, the government announced it had accepted most of the proposals. "The government has launched a new dispensation in the labor history of South Africa," Minister of Labor Fanie Botha boasted, "the most important characteristics of which are dynamism, development, and progress."

And the government moved just as quickly to accept the main proposals contained in a second report published the following week. In that report, a commission headed by former economic adviser to the prime minister Piet Riekert recommended that influx control laws be relaxed and that blacks with residence rights in white areas be allowed to have their families live with them. Pass laws will thus still be in force, but may be more flexibly enforced.

None of these recommendations was drastically new. The government's response was. Many of the very same proposals had been offered by an earlier governmental commission in 1951. They were ignored and even flatly contradicted by subsequent legislation.

This time around, the response was very different. For one thing, some of the legal strictures which the Wiehahn Commission proposed erasing from the books have already dissolved in practice. Of the original 25 categories of job reservation for whites enshrined in South African law, only five remain, affecting less than one percent

of the workforce. Privileged access to more highly skilled and highly paid jobs for whites no longer depends so much on law as it does on contracts with all-white unions and the differential access to education and skills between whites and blacks. The commission did not recommend tearing up those contracts. Indeed, in particular industries where "reluctance of the trade unions concerned" might cause "unrest," it called for delay in removing the legal job reservation system as well.

Safety Valve for Black Pressure

Aside from the erosion of some of the legal barriers over time, industry managers had become increasingly vociferous about the irrationality and inflexibility of a division of labor written into the law and increasingly aware since a wave of strikes in 1973 of pressures for trade union rights among the black workers themselves. Just weeks before the Wiehahn Commission issued its report, black trade unionists announced creation of the first national federation of black unions in almost 15 years. The new Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) brings together 12 union representing 45,000 workers. The figures are not impressive, but the potential is. Out of 9.5 million blacks who make up 80 percent of South Africa's workforce, only 54,400 are presently represented by 29 unions.

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Resistance and Repression

The seven month trial of 11 Soweto students charged with sedition for their part in the 1976 Soweto uprising ended May 11th. Judge H P Van Dyk, who had found all 11 guilty, sentenced the 10 young men and one woman to varying jail terms. Daniel Montsitsi, president of the Soweto Students' Council in 1976, got eight years, Matison Morobe, seven years, and Seth Mazibuko and Susan Mthembu six years each. Four years of each sentence were suspended, dependent on "good behavior." Seven students received five-year terms, all suspended.

In South African terms, these are light sentences, and observers speculate that they flowed from an unwillingness to create symbolic martyrs; they may also reflect a desire to appear reasonable in the eyes of "moderate" black leaders with whom there is currently some "dialogue."

Most recent political prisoners have been charged under the notorious Terrorism Act, a law which has been widely attacked for its arbitrary creation of crimes and vicious mandatory sentences. Charging the students with sedition (the first case in 30 years) may have been an attempt to persuade international opinion that South Africa is not a police state and does not need "special" laws to keep order.

But the Judge's finding left no doubt about the nature of South Africa. Although it was admitted that none of the accused had ever been armed, the Judge dismissed the students' argument that they had intended a peaceful challenge to the inferior

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Still Getting Its Oil

Under the Shah, Iran supplied most of South Africa's oil. Now Iran has embargoed oil for apartheid, but the flow has not stopped.

Since the beginning of this year, South Africa has received no oil shipments from Iran, the country that supplied apartheid with more than 90 percent of its petroleum needs for years. Yet, by all private and official accounts, there is no oil crisis in South Africa. Despite an oil embargo on the part of most Arab oil producers, South Africa continues to acquire all the oil it currently needs.

Investigators have been unable to ascertain precisely where South Africa is getting its oil. But according to most reports, Pretoria probably gets its oil from three sources: from defectors from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) boycott, most likely Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, or Venezuela, from purchases on the spot market, and from non-members of OPEC, such as Mexico, Great Britain, or the US.

Arab OPEC nations established their boycott of the South African market at the time of the 1973 Middle East war when Pretoria provided Israel with some weapons. But this decision was difficult to implement, because the refining and distribution of most of the oil produced in these countries is controlled by the major oil conglomerates, like Caltex, Mobil, Exxon and British Petroleum. The oil entered a global pool, controlled by the majors, and they continued to make oil available to South Africa.

In addition, defections from the OPEC embargo have been continual, although non-Arab members, apart from Iran, also formally associated themselves with the action. (See box.)

Iran, of course, ignored the boycott and provided South Africa with most of the oil it needed. But in 1978 *Lloyd's Shipping Economist*, a publication of Lloyd's of London, also tracked to South African ports tankers from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.

Most oil experts suspect that several Arab suppliers have continued to violate the embargo, but the original sources are protected through the majors controlled marketing and transport process, a complex exercise of switches, swaps, and re-allocations, which makes it virtually impossible to determine the original supplier.

Recent Deliveries

Despite the elaborate security precautions, New York's *Journal of Commerce*

reported in March that tankers were being hired to transport Arabian Gulf oil to the South African port of Durban. "The best guess," wrote Craig Howard, the *Journal's* reporter, "was that the oil was being exported from one of the United Arab Emirates, such as Dubai or Abu Dhabi, or possibly Bahrain." All three have supplied small quantities of crude oil to South Africa in the past, according to UN studies.

There have been other reports of South African oil deals including several deliveries from South American oil producers and a possible Saudi swap—oil for South African grapes. South Africa has also been reported willing to swap oil for gold.

But the most surprising report came in late February when details emerged of a secret deal with Nigeria through Arab middlemen and an American tanker company.

The report originated in Johannesburg, and it could be used to discredit Nigeria's continuing efforts at the UN and the OAU to press for mandatory economic sanctions against apartheid. Nigerian officials are infuriated at the suggestion that they would deal with South Africa, but they say they can't rule out completely the possibility that Nigerian oil could be shipped to South Africa through intermediaries. Rumored to be involved in the deal is Phillips Petroleum, but Phillips denies any connection. Phillips officials say that all the oil they obtain in Nigeria goes straight to their refineries in the US.

Censorship Imposed

Precise information on South Africa's energy situation is impossible to obtain. Strict restraints on the publishing of such information are already on the lawbooks, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs introduced legislation in late April which will make the disclosure of oil data even more difficult. The bill makes it illegal to publish any information related to "the source, manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, quantity or stock level of any petroleum product" in or for South Africa. The law will apply to South Africans both at home and abroad. It provides for fines of up to \$8,500 and/or seven years in jail, and is designed both to shield the identities of suppliers and to conceal Pretoria's energy needs.

Spot Buying

South Africa has probably been purchas-

OPEC Embargo

In November 1973 an Arab summit conference instituted "a complete Arab oil embargo" against South Africa.

In late 1977, the Organization of African Unity set up a 'Committee of Seven,' consisting of the four African members of OPEC (Nigeria, Gabon, Libya, and Algeria), together with Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. The Committee was chaired by the Foreign Minister of Zambia, Dr. Mwale. Over the next few months, the Committee visited all non-African members of OPEC, except for Iran, which refused to receive it. All the countries visited assured the Committee that it was against their policy for their oil to reach South Africa. These countries have implicitly endorsed this policy since then by voting for UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a UN oil embargo against South Africa.

The 13 members of OPEC are as follows: Algeria, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, plus some non-oil-producing Emirates), Ecuador, Venezuela, Indonesia.

Iran has now joined all the other members of OPEC in banning oil supplies to South Africa.

There are a number of oil-producing countries which are not members of OPEC. Some of these, including the US and UK, are net importers—their domestic production is less than their own needs. A further ten countries are not members of OPEC, but are net exporters of oil. These are: Angola, Tunisia, Congo, Bahrain, Oman, Syria, Mexico, Bolivia, Malaysia, Brunei. □

The US Companies

More than a third of all US assets in South Africa are owned by two oil companies—Caltex (jointly owned by Texaco and Standard Oil of California) and Mobil. Each has South African assets worth about \$350 million. Together they control nearly 40 percent of the South African oil market and 42 percent of its refining capacity. Mobil owns a refinery at Durban with a capacity of 100,000 barrels per day, and Caltex recently enlarged its Cape refinery to handle 105,000 barrels per day.

Both companies have significant government contracts and sell oil for air-force, military and police use.

Exxon also operates in South Africa, but has no refinery, and controls only 2 percent of the retail market. □



The vast US built Sasol plant where oil is extracted from coal

ing some of its crude on the international spot market, a network of small oil handlers who buy and sell quantities of oil in a hurry, usually well above the regular OPEC price per barrel. In normal times the spot market does not function significantly, but in times of crisis purchases on the spot market can skyrocket. The trouble is that on the spot market long-term supplies are not secure, and the type of crude oil acquired is diverse.

For just these reasons South Africa purchasers prefer the crude that the oil majors provide. To make the deals with South Africa attractive, Economic Affairs Minister Chris Heunis says that South Africa may be paying premiums of up to \$6.00 a barrel or nearly 50 percent over the OPEC price, which was \$13.8 a barrel in April. Some South African officials deny that such premiums are being paid, but since the beginning of the year the government has raised the price of gasoline 38 cents a gallon and more price rises above the current \$1.95 a gallon are expected soon.

Fund for Self-sufficiency

Not all of that price hike, though, is a result of higher crude prices. South Africa has established a Strategic Oil Fund, and a large part of the recent increase goes into that. The fund will be used to help secure South Africa's hope for future energy self-sufficiency.

That hope is coal gasification. South Africa already has one small coal gasification plant, SASOL I, in operation, another under construction, and a third in the planning stage. When all construction is completed in 1982 (if work stays on schedule) South African officials hope that oil from coal will account for between 35 and 50 percent of South Africa's needs.

SASOL II, being constructed by the American firm Fluor Corporation, based in Irvine, California, will be the world's largest coal gasification plant when it is

completed next year, at a cost of \$2.8 billion. Total cost of the three SASOL plants is expected to reach \$6.6 billion. It could be the most expensive industrial project now under way in the world today.

The SASOL project is located at Secunda and Sasolburg, about 80 miles southeast of Johannesburg, in the rich Transvaal coal fields. With South Africa's massive coal reserves—some experts believe South Africa's coal will last for 250 years—and with its relatively low oil need (South Africa only relies on oil for about 25 percent of its energy needs compared with more than 40 percent for the US), South African government officials see SASOL as the answer to any oil embargo, local or worldwide.

But in fact SASOL may not be able to rescue South Africa from its energy dependence. Some experts think the South Africans are overestimating the potential output of SASOL. Martin Bailey and Bernard Rivers in a report to the UN Center Against Apartheid concluded that SASOL I and II will only provide 13 percent of South Africa's projected 1980 fuel needs. The addition of SASOL III only boosts that figure to between 26 and 30 percent.

However, financing is SASOL's greatest problem. Despite the combination of the Strategic Oil Fund and other government and private South African investment, SASOL II and probably SASOL III will have to draw as much as 60 percent of their financing from foreign loans or investment. The project is greatly dependent on Western loans as well as on equipment and technology, and thus it is still vulnerable to anti-apartheid movements in the West that hope to end investment in and bank loans to apartheid.

Still, the South Africans are moving full speed ahead on SASOL. The number of workers at the Secunda site has risen to 20,000. Fluor has apparently "pulled out all the stops," as one South African magazine recently reported, to complete SASOL at the earliest possible date. M.S. □

Western Sahara: POLISARIO Struggles for Liberation

Editor's Note: Although the main focus of this magazine is southern Africa, we are moving outside our usual area to publish a brief article on an important struggle for independence in north Africa. As usual, the United States is involved.

Western Sahara was a Spanish colony from 1884 until 1975 when the Madrid government relinquished its control of the territory by dividing it between Morocco and Mauritania. POLISARIO, the Western Sahara liberation movement which had led an armed struggle against Spanish colonialism since 1973, was forced to continue the struggle in the face of Moroccan and Mauritanian attempts to annex the territory. The independence movement has received considerable support from Algeria, and as the two invading armies moved into Sahara, thousands of refugees fled to POLISARIO-run refugee camps in Algeria.

The following update on the situation was written by Richard Knight, a member of the Southern Africa collective and of the staff of the American Committee on Africa. In March he attended the celebrations of the third anniversary of the establishment of the independent state, the Democratic Arab Saharawi Republic, and he visited the liberated areas of Western Sahara. His photographs accompany the article.

With the increasing successes of POLISARIO, the struggle for independence and self-determination in Western Sahara has reached a new height. King Hassan of Morocco, under increasing internal pressures as a result of his inability to win the war, recently threatened that his army "will not hesitate to violate the Algerian border." The US has increased its military sales to Morocco, but Mauritanian Prime Minister Ahmed Ould Bouceif has announced his country's willingness to start formal peace negotiations with POLISARIO, independent of Moroccan actions.

In fact, Mauritania has been holding talks with POLISARIO since a coup in Nouakchott last July brought to power a government determined to end involvement in what had become an economically draining and unpopular war. POLISARIO itself unilaterally announced a cease-fire in Mauritania-occupied Sahara immediately after the coup.

The US claims to be "neutral" in the conflict, but it has greatly increased military

sales to Morocco since the beginning of the war. In 1974, only \$3.2 million was given in military aid, while for fiscal year 1979 the total had reached \$46.5 million, and \$30 million is budgeted for fiscal 1980. The Senate is trying to increase that amount by another \$15 million. Recently, the State Department approved the sale to Morocco of \$2.4 million worth of spare parts for F-5 and C-130 aircraft and \$3 million worth of F-5 ammunition, including rockets and

bombs. The State Department has approved the sale of six Chinook helicopters, which were widely used in the Vietnam war, and it has most recently approved the sale of a Northrup "electronic battlefield" to Morocco.

But despite all this military hardware, Morocco is in a tough position. POLISARIO has in the last year been able to carry the war inside Morocco itself. There have been major battles in the Moroccan



A Saharawi woman making a tent. She makes it in the traditional style of the nomadic Saharawi tents, which gives proper ventilation. Work in the camps is carried out by five different committees: health, social justice, distribution, education, and artisan. All adults belong to a committee and play an active role in the camps.



A view of one of the 23 Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. POLISARIO, which runs the camps, estimates that there are 110,000 people living in these camps, almost all women and children. All the needs of the people must be provided for, including food, clothes, education, health care, even water.

towns of Ta Ta, Tan Tan, and Zag. And at the end of April, POLISARIO launched a major military offensive against Morocco.

I traveled extensively inside Western Sahara with POLISARIO. I was impressed by POLISARIO's ability to go almost anywhere. When we traveled at night, most of the time our headlights were on.

I saw the sites of a number of major battles, with the remains of tanks and empty munitions cases with US markings, and I actually witnessed part of a battle near Tifariti, which resulted in 6000 Moroccan troops being driven out of an important base.

Pressures on Morocco

King Hassan faces major problems if he follows through on his threat and attacks Algeria because of its support for POLISARIO. Such action would undoubtedly provoke international anger. Because the POLISARIO army is based inside Western Sahara, the only target for Morocco would be the refugee camps run by POLISARIO in Algeria. Algeria itself has an army that is considered capable of defending Algeria's territorial integrity.

Apart from its military achievements, POLISARIO has also been successful on the diplomatic front. POLISARIO proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Arab Saharawi Republic in February 1976. Sixteen African countries now recognize the POLISARIO government, including Algeria, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Tanzania, and more than ten other African countries, including Libya and Nigeria, recognize POLISARIO itself.

The struggle for independence and self-determination is far from over. Yet it appears that the next period of time will witness a continuing tide in POLISARIO's favor. And once again, a small people show the world that they are a nation, and must be treated as such. R.K. □



A unit of the POLISARIO army that travels on camels. This unit includes women. In many areas of Western Sahara camels are the only viable means of transport.



A POLISARIO soldier holds up an empty case of mortars that the US sold to Morocco. The US is a major arms supplier to Morocco.

Muzorewa Takes Shaky Charge

As expected, Bishop Abel Muzorewa emerged the "victor" in the carefully managed Rhodesian elections—elections conducted under conditions of massive intimidation of the voting population. Officials claimed that 64 percent of the eligible population voted, but critical observers have pointed out that with no system of voter registration such figures are meaningless.

It seems probable, for instance, that several hundred thousands migrant farm workers from outside Rhodesia were among the forced voters. Voter turnout was highest in white-controlled urban areas, on white-owned farms and in government run "protected" villages.

In guerrilla strongholds, the voting turnout was much lower. Only 10 percent cast votes in Matabeleland in western Zimbabwe, where ZAPU is concentrated. Similarly, in the Fort Victoria area, a ZANU stronghold, the *New York Times* reported that only 150 out of 40,000 eligible voters showed up the day reporters and observers were there.

When the Bishop takes office as prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, he will face formidable obstacles to being recognized as head of a legitimate African government rather than Ian Smith's heir.

Rhodesia's parliament, consisting of 72 black and 28 white legislators, met for the first time on May 7, without the 12 representatives of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, who charges that the election was rigged. And Muzorewa's own UANC, which holds 51 seats, may still face intra-party dissension. During the 13 months of the internal settlement, a number of party officials deserted Muzorewa, charging him with subservience to the white power structure. Now UANC Vice President James Chikerema is accusing the party of "Blatant nepotism and tribalism."

In putting together his cabinet, Muzorewa will be trying to answer such critics, and to choose carefully the 25 percent of posts pledged to Smith's Rhodesian Front.

Muzorewa will also face a series of tests on established policies that are opposed by African opinion. The UANC, for instance, called for a halt to executions of government opponents, but the Salisbury High Court in early May dismissed an appeal for a ban on martial law hangings. Prosecution of the unpopular war will present further problems. Muzorewa has repeatedly threatened to unseat President Kuanda of Zambia by military means if he continues to

support the Patriotic Front. But the Bishop may find this task beyond his capabilities.

The new government has offered an amnesty to all returning guerrillas, but it has coupled the promise with dire threats about the fate of anyone who continues to resist. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the war will continue.

International Outlook

While South Africa has pledged military aid, the front line states have expressed their continuing support for the Patriotic Front guerrillas, as has the OAU.

In Britain, the newly-elected Conservative government is expected to delay moves to recognize the internal settlement government until after the Commonwealth conference, scheduled to meet in Lusaka in

August. The Thatcher government did hasten to send a high-level special representative, Sir Anthony Duff, to confer with Muzorewa, but it seems likely that discussions probed possible modifications of the internal settlement as a pre-requisite for British recognition, rather than simply guaranteeing British support.

It also seems likely that the US and Britain will now seek to adopt a common strategy based on some such line of argument. (See Sanctions Stay, But Only Just.)

If Western countries do not recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and lift sanctions, they will have to face the hostility of such countries as Nigeria, Britain's most important trading partner in Africa and the second largest supplier of oil to the US. According to Lagos radio, a May 1 statement by the Nigerian government "made it clear that any breach of the UN sanctions or resolutions on Zimbabwe would be regarded by Nigeria as a calculated slight and a deliberate challenge to the OAU and the black race. Such a move, it emphasized, would be met with an appropriate response." *Africa News/J.D.* □

British Observers: Elections A Gigantic Confidence Trick

The British all-Parliamentary group on Human Rights sent two representatives to Rhodesia to observe the elections, Lord Chitnis and Eileen Sudworth. In their 53 page report they present extensive evidence of intimidation, and recommend that "these elections should be discounted in any government policy decisions about Rhodesia."

This is a very different view from that of the various US observers. We reprint below a few brief extracts from this important document.

"The recent election in Rhodesia was nothing more than a gigantic confidence trick designed to foist on a cowed and indoctrinated black electorate a settlement and a constitution which were formulated dishonest promises of peace, and intimidated in the most callous fashion to vote. torate was brainwashed by propaganda on an alarming scale, cajoled by false and dishonest promises of peace, and intimidated in the most callous fashion to vote.

"In our view, the enthusiastic cooperation of white employers and farmers with [the Elections Directorate Chairman] Thompson resulted in considerable coercion of their black employees to vote. Mobile polling stations serviced large numbers of mines and factories. When the mobile polling stations arrived, mines and factories shut down operations and told their employees to go out and vote.

"We heard reports, in the Mazoe area for example, that employees had been threatened with the loss of their ration card (which enables the laborer to obtain his food rations twice a day) if they did not vote. We also heard reports that people were afraid of losing their jobs if they did not vote, and this fear was particularly acute among the immigrant farm laborers.

"Confidential directives were issued to teachers ordering them to serve as polling officers. . . A group of fifteen teachers at Shabani Mine School. . . had been arrested and imprisoned for refusing to be polling officers.

"One of the most bizarre features of the election was that the Rhodesian security forces, one of the main protagonists of the civil war. . . should be appointed the protectors of the people and the guardians of the democratic process. It is the same security forces who have burned down homes, destroyed crops and cattle, herded people into protected villages, and killed people for breaking curfew or 'running with terrorists,' who during the election period were urging people to vote and 'escorting' them to the polls. . . Not surprisingly there was a clear correlation between a high poll and areas where there was a concentration of security forces.

"In protected villages to the southeast of the country between Chipinga and Mozambique, polling was near to 100 percent.

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Sanctions Stay, But Only Just

The fallout from the Rhodesian internal settlement election has pushed the Carter Administration into an uncomfortable political corner. As a State Department official said in mid-May, "Smith outflanked us using these elections."

Reports of the 65 percent turnout in the April election opened the floodgates to a torrent of anti-sanctions sentiment in the Senate, and to an urgent search for a new compromise policy by the administration.

The politicians' perceptions of the election were framed by the almost universally positive reports coming from the major media and American observer teams, and virtually all the observers went to the election already committed to the internal settlement. The American Conservative Union, the American Security Council, the Heritage Foundation, and the American Rhodesian Association were hard at work trying to get the US to lift sanctions against Rhodesia long before they sent observers to the election.

The Election's Authenticators

The most influential observer team, with at least an aura of objectivity, was that sent by Freedom House, an ardently anti-communist human-rights group. [See Observer story]. Avoiding the issue of the extent of intimidation used to get Africans to the polls, the Freedom House report concluded, "The country had never had so inclusive and free an election. Elections in most developing countries are less free. . . This election was a useful and encouraging step toward the establishment of a free society in Zimbabwe Rhodesia."

The black star of the Freedom House team, Bayard Rustin, was quoted extensively in the major US media while major statements opposing the election by black mayors, the NAACP, and the Congressional Black Caucus were ignored. Allard Lowenstein, a former New York congressman, also enhanced the image of the election. Regarded as an old Africa-hand because he has written a book on Namibia, Lowenstein has had tremendous access to Washington politicians since the election. Many progressives, on the other hand, have been suspicious of Lowenstein ever since he knowingly accepted CIA money as president of the National Student Association in the late 1950s.

Both Rustin and Lowenstein said under questioning after the election that they did not support the immediate lifting of sanctions. Rustin told *Africa News* that he had been misquoted by Senators "who fought

against everything I've been for," and that the elections "were not free and fair." But after having been quoted for three weeks as backing the election, Rustin's turnabout suggests he wants to have his cake and eat it too.

The Senate Embraces "Rhodesian Zimbabwe"

The April elections gave Senators the excuse to urge the lifting of sanctions that many had been wanting for the past year. The Case-Javits amendment passed last summer, which requires the president to lift sanctions if he should determine that the election was free, is now clearly revealed as a planned first step toward lifting sanctions rather than the neutral compromise it was described as at the time of passage. Admitted one State Department official after the vote, "We made a pact with the devil, and now the devil has come to collect."

For the vast majority of Senators who know little about southern Africa, images counted most. Two weeks of front-page stories on the "majority rule" elections provided them with a convenient picture of Rhodesia as the battleground between African democrats and terrorist guerrillas. On May 15 conservative Senators Jesse Helms (D-N.C.) and Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.) cleverly maneuvered to force a floor vote on the election issue in place of an amendment that would have delayed Congressional action until after the president's determination. The vote, declaring it the "sense of the Senate" that the elections had been free and that the Case-Javits criteria for the lifting of sanctions had been

met, was overwhelming—75 to 19. Obeying a political herd instinct, even liberal Senators such as Foreign relations Committee chairman Frank Church, Edmund Muskie, Charles Mathias, Mark Hatfield, and Harrison Williams voted for the Schweiker amendment.

Although the Senate vote did not bind the president to lift sanctions immediately, it put Carter in the worst possible political position. If he now determines that the elections were not free, he will be going against the tide of three-quarters of the Senate and will face an immediate showdown with Congress on new legislation to lift sanctions. If he determines that the elections were satisfactory, he will lose all credibility with independent Africa. Andrew Young could well resign as UN ambassador, and it would appear that Carter had yielded to conservative pressure.

In this no-win political situation, the administration is urgently seeking a new-look Rhodesia policy that Carter can announce in mid-June along with his determination about the election. Both the White House and the State Department hope the House will delay action on the Senate provision until Carter makes his decision, thus providing a few more weeks for maneuver. The aim is to maintain credibility in the eyes of independent Africa without taking any tough action against South Africa, now openly committed to protecting Muzorewa from the liberation forces of the Patriotic Front.

Administration officials express skepticism that Muzorewa can survive politically but they believe that his only chance depends on his being seen as capable of eroding white power. Along these lines, Lowenstein proposes the US should hold out the prospect of lifting sanctions if Smith steps down and is not included in the new government, if the Muzorewa government conducts an African referendum on the constitution, and if it holds some kind of new election. But Muzorewa is well aware that Congress is in a mood to lift sanctions now; he is unlikely to feel much need to adjust his actions to US demands.

But the bigger problem is that such a plan ignores the Patriotic Front. Administration policy-makers know the war can't be ended without the Patriotic front's cooperation. But the history of ineffective Anglo-American diplomacy and the administration's weak political effort to retain sanctions will make it almost impossible now to sell to the Congress a policy that makes any concessions to the Patriotic Front. C.R. □



Sen. Jesse Helms

Election Observers Wear Heavy Blinders

by Michael Beaubien

One would suspect that an election process where 90 percent of the country was under martial law, where half a million voters were confined to "protective villages," where 100,000 troops were mobilized to usher 2.9 million voters to the polls, where the two major black political forces were excluded, where private armies of the political contenders escorted thousands to the ballot box, where voters were not even registered, that such an election could not in all seriousness be described as a "relatively free expression of the will of the people."

But that's how observers from the Freedom House Foundation described the recent elections in Zimbabwe which resulted in the election of Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa as the new prime minister. Not everyone was that happy with the proceedings. (See Zimbabwe elections story.)

In early May the UN Security Council declared that the election in Zimbabwe was "null and void" and called on member states to continue the economic boycott against Rhodesia. The vote was 12-0, with the US, Britain, and France abstaining. Even Andrew Young, US ambassador to the UN, described the elections as "rigged" and called for a new and internationally supervised vote.

Nevertheless, the 72-page report by Freedom House Foundation observers stated that "in spite of the several ways in which the election is opened to reasoned objection, it is the mission's judgment that the election represented a significant advance toward multiracial majority rule in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia."

Although the proposal to send US observers to Zimbabwe during the election was defeated in the House by a narrow margin, 21 Americans made the journey as private citizens. They included the nine-member delegation from Freedom House, representatives from such organizations as the American Rhodesian Foundation, the American Conservative Union, the Heritage Foundation, the American Security Council, the Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, and the Institute of American Relations, which the *Village Voice* describes as a "new rightist organization whose executive director comes from the American Conservative Union." Also along on this junket were representatives from the offices of US Senators S.I. Hayakawa (R-Ca.) and Jesse Helms (D-N.C.), who are leading the effort in

Congress to repeal all economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

War Mongers in Vietnam

The Freedom House Foundation was formed in 1941 as a private organization that professed to be concerned with human rights and civil liberties around the world. Throughout its history the organization has demonstrated little concern for the human rights and civil liberties of Americans at home. Freedom House has been a long-time recipient of CIA funds, which it received in part from the infamous CIA conduit, the J.M. Kaplan Fund. Under the leadership of the late Senator Paul Douglas and Leo Cherne, the founder of the International Rescue Committee and a member of President Ford's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Freedom House was a staunch supporter of the US role in Vietnam and a bitter antagonist of the anti-war movement in the US.

One reason why the Freedom House report has received favorable coverage from the press is the credibility gained from the participation of Bayard Rustin, well-known black civil rights advocate, and liberal Democrat Allard Lowenstein. Also included in the Freedom House delegation to Zimbabwe were: Howard Penniman, who runs the election-monitoring unit for the American Enterprise Institute, a right-wing think tank; Leon Weaver, criminal justice expert from Michigan State and author of a study on internal security in South Africa; and Morris Woodard, a member of the political science department at Howard University who is on a leave of absence.

Bayard Rustin—Pro-Settlement

Bayard Rustin is executive director of the A. Phillip Randolph Institute, an organization established in 1964 to promote voter registration, economic equality, and better relations among blacks, liberals, and unions. Although Rustin is a veteran of 30 years of struggle in the civil-rights movement and was once considered an important tactician, his views have increasingly been at odds with that of the majority of the black population.

His close links with the official AFL-CIO leadership of the US trade union movement have strengthened his cold war stance and weakened his stand on methods of enforcing affirmative action programs. Many black leaders have also been critical of his insistence that only non-violent tactics of struggle have any legitimacy; they have also

condemned his staunch support for Zionism and his failure to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people.

In the late 1960s, at the time of New York City's school crisis, Rustin placed even greater distance between himself and most progressive blacks by allying with the United Federation of Teachers' president Albert Shanker in opposing black and Puerto Rican demands for greater community control of schools.

Rustin's objectivity as an independent observer is subject to question when one recalls his advocacy of the internal settlement in an October 1977 issue of *Commentary*. He wrote: "Would the United States be prepared to assist a pro-Western black government in Zimbabwe—say of Bishop Muzorewa—against forces backed by the Russians and Cubans? One would hope so, but the present policy line of the administration does not inspire confidence."

Allard Lowenstein is presently an adviser to Gov. Edmund G. Brown, Jr. of California. He was a key adviser to Brown's 1976 presidential bid and is expected to play a role in Brown's 1980 challenge to President Jimmy Carter. Lowenstein has made several unsuccessful bids for Congressional office from New York.

Despite his liberal image Lowenstein has managed to win considerable conservative support. In his 1974 congressional attempt, he was endorsed by Henry Jackson. In his 1976 race, Lowenstein won the endorsements of William Buckley, Dr. Ernest van den Haag, once a Conservative Party candidate for State Assembly, and Rita Hauser, co-chairperson of Richard Nixon's re-election committee in 1972. In 1977, Lowenstein was named by Carter as an alternative representative for special political affairs with the rank of ambassador in the US delegation to the United Nations. During a 1978 trip to South Africa, Lowenstein reportedly told the Pretoria press club that "America's attitude toward South Africa should be seen as one of affection, concern, and brotherly identification."

If the recent activities and statements of Rustin and Lowenstein aren't enough to impeach their credibility, Mark Allen in a recent issue of *People's World* provides even further evidence. In June 1966, Rustin and Lowenstein accompanied Norman Thomas to the Dominican Republic as members of the US Committee for Free Elections to monitor elections at the time. Despite the imposition of martial law by the US Marines with its accompanying violence and intimidation, and despite the house arrest of popular presidential candidate Juan Bosch during the campaign, the US observers proclaimed the elections in the Dominican Republic fair and free of violence and coercion.


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committee at the UN, known as the Committee of 24, called on the Security Council to adopt mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa.

'An impossible dream'

Western reaction to the South African move was circumspect. Just a week before, in testimony before the House subcommittee on Africa, Donald McHenry, a US ambassador to the UN and leader of the West's negotiating team on Namibia, had stated, "Our inability to obtain South Africa's acceptance [of the UN plan] would almost certainly be seen as proof of an ultimate lack of will in the West to press South Africa to cooperate with a negotiated settlement. It would be seen by Africans as proof of the ineffectiveness of negotiation for peaceful change as a viable alternative to long and bloody military solutions. It would surely adversely affect the prospects for negotiated settlements in the rest of southern Africa." After the announcement of the Namibian assembly, a gloomy McHenry told reporters that prospects for a settlement were "dimmer and dimmer."

The leaders of SWAPO, the liberation movement, have been expecting the South Africans to make such a move for some time. Theo-Ben Gurirab, SWAPO representative at the UN, said that UN elections in Namibia were now "an impossible dream" and called on the Security Council to adopt sanctions. "The relevant question now is what the Western five will do," Gurirab continued, obviously convinced that the West will be unwilling to support "punitive action" such as sanctions and an oil embargo "against the rebellious and defiant Pretoria junta."



Axel Johannes demonstrates how he was suspended by a rope from this tree while being tortured during a previous detention. He has since been detained once again.

Gurirab said that the West should now take action, not make excuses. "How can the five not agree with us now, support us, and collaborate with us for a change, to overthrow a criminal, illegal administration in Namibia?"

"Alternatively, how can they dare say anything if certain friendly countries give us massive and all-round assistance and cooperation to finish the task of liberating our country?"

To prevent just that, South African authorities began the mass arrest of SWAPO political activists in late April. Among the more than 50 detained are Axel Johannes, SWAPO's administrative secre-

tary, and legal affairs secretary Lucia Hamutenya. These sweeps, coupled with emergency measures announced by Administrator General Steyn in mid-May bring the territory closer and closer to martial law. Under the new measures, police can hold a suspect up to 30 days without permitting consultation with a lawyer. Six white districts including Windhoek and Tsumeb have been declared "security districts" which gives police wide-ranging powers to search without warrant, arrest, and interrogate suspects.

Meanwhile the war in Namibia continues. In May there were reports of guerrilla attacks almost 200 miles south of the Angola border. That's 100 miles south of what the South African Defense Force considers SWAPO's "operational zone."

M.S. □

British Observers

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Given the captive audience of the protected villages, we would not have thought that any form of threats or intimidation would have been necessary. Nevertheless we heard reports that in some protected villages the security forces had told the people that they would not be allowed out of the gates of the village to tend their crops and their cattle until they had voted.

"Whilst on the subject of captive audiences, it is important to note that mobile polling places visited prisons throughout the country recording the prisoner's vote. A senior officer in the prison service told us that a 100 percent poll had been recorded in 19 prisons throughout the country. In Seke tribal trust land, we were told, armed UANC auxiliaries went from village to village, beating up people and forcing them to go to the polls at gunpoint. In Zwimba tribal trust land, we were told, auxiliaries addressed election meetings saying that non-voters would be shot."

SWAPO Bases: Just Another Excuse

South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha maintains that the major stumbling block to Pretoria's acceptance of the UN plan for Namibian elections is the UN's "interpretation" that SWAPO's armed forces will be restricted to bases inside Namibia. No matter that no other party connected with the Namibian negotiations, including the representatives of the Western five, agrees with this view. As recently as early May, US negotiator Donald McHenry told the House subcommittee on Africa that South Africa understood a year ago when it initially accepted the plan that SWAPO would be confined to bases inside Namibia. Botha says this is untrue.

But apparently there were a considerable number of South African officials, primarily military authorities, who had operated until recently under just that assumption. In a March 15 letter from Botha to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Botha made public a working draft of a timetable for implementation of the UN plan pre-

pared jointly by the UN's military representative and South African counterparts in Capetown in January. The documents makes frequent reference to "SWAPO members restricted to base inside Namibia." At one point the draft specifically states that the more general reference to "restriction to base" in the original plan "does not make sense unless 'bases' also refer to bases inside Namibia."

Apparently South Africa's military leaders did not see this provision as worth jeopardizing the whole plan.

But South African political leaders disagreed, and they also disagreed on making the draft of the timetable public. South African diplomats in New York tried unsuccessfully to persuade Botha not to make public the document. Privately, South African officials can offer little to explain the contradiction between the timetable's provisions and South Africa's public position. "It's just a working draft," said one South African. "That's all I can say." □

**POSITION AVAILABLE
IN AFRICA**

AFSC ADMINISTRATOR OF SOUTHERN AFRICA REFUGEE PROGRAM in Tanzania. Overseas development experience, administrative & reporting skills. 3 years with mid-term US visit visit for interpretation. *Contact:* R. Tuttle, American Friends Service Comm., 1501 Cherry Street, Phila., PA 19102.

Under Fire From South Africa

Determined to undermine Angola's support for SWAPO, Pretoria has intensified both direct military aggression and support for UNITA and FNLA subversion.

The war for Angolan independence ended just three years ago. But war in Angola goes on.

MPLA, with the Cuban troops that fought at its side, faced many enemies in 1975—UNITA and South African troops in the south, and FNLA and Zairean troops in the north. Now South Africa and UNITA continue what MPLA leaders call a "permanent war of aggression" in Angola. FNLA was almost completely destroyed during the war, and peace was established with Zaire in 1978, but there is reason to believe that FNLA is attempting a comeback, probably with the renewed aid of Zaire.

The most serious threat that Angola faces is from South Africa, and throughout this spring South African forces have been particularly active along the Namibian border. Clearly linked to South Africa's rejection of the UN plan, Pretoria's attacks were stepped up just as the negotiating over Namibia began to break down in late February. Through the first half of March alone, the Angolan Defense Ministry reported 70 South African flights over Angolan air space, 13 regions bombed, 132 tons of bombs dropped, 12 dead, and 30 injured. Luanda also said its forces had shot down six South African planes and killed 12 South Africans.

And since then the South African raids have not abated. "The war with South Africa never ended," said Defense Minister Iko Carreira recently.

In a radio broadcast in mid-April, Carreira spoke bluntly to the Angolan nation about the South African problem. "There is a permanent violation of our air space in the south," he said. "There are periodic infiltrations of South African military units in rapid strikes. They penetrate several kilometers, they return. They destroy property, they kill villagers, they rob livestock, and they create a certain type of destabilization in our normal life and in our economy."

But Carreira said that Angola's defense capacity had become stronger and that South Africa had resorted primarily to air strikes in more remote locations away from anti-aircraft defenses.

UNITA Actions

The Defense Minister also discussed

UNITA's continued activity. He said UNITA, with South African backing, has infiltrated Angola mainly in Cubango province in the southeast. "These infiltrations are supported with helicopters. At times they even use airplanes, because the area is enormous and difficult to control. A land vehicle can go for a dozen or even 20 kilometers and return and we might not know about it."

It's in the area of counter-UNITA measures that the Angolan army FAPLA needed to improve its offensive capabilities,



Angolan Defense Minister, Iko Carreira (left) with President Neto

Carreira said. "On the day when we can carry out some type of operation in the puppets' camp at isolated South African army posts in Namibia, we are absolutely certain that South Africa will have to rethink the strategy and tactics that it is using against us."

Benguela Line Attacked

Despite UNITA's concentration in the remote southeast of Angola, there is some evidence that its forces have caused disruptions in areas further north. Prime among the targets is the Benguela Railway. Although the railway is open throughout the width of Angola and now able to cross the eastern border into Zaire, it is still not

carrying Zambian or Zairian minerals to the port of Lobito on the Atlantic. Meetings have been held among the principals involved, and they have included representatives from the UN and the European Community, but Zambia for one has become impatient. "All the high-powered meetings and technical committees cannot control the UNITA guerrillas," an editorial in the *Zambia Daily Mail* stated in April. "The blunt truth is that UNITA's guerrillas are keeping the Benguela Railway closed." The editorial went on to suggest, very obliquely, that perhaps the only way to settle the conflict would be to include UNITA in the Angolan government, an attitude that Zambian officials held during the war in 1975 but have kept largely to themselves since.

At the same time, sources recently in contact with UNITA representatives outside Angola report that it still claims to control at least the southern half of the country and that an "offensive" is being planned for this summer. A UNITA representative in US has been making the rounds of major American newspapers and magazines, offering to take journalists into UNITA-held Angola to see for themselves.

The North

There are also indications that anti-MPLA activity is being resumed along the northern border. Recently, a report emerged through Europe that UNITA and FNLA had renewed their erstwhile alliance and would unify their "military activities." FNLA was almost completely destroyed in the war three years ago; what military activity FNLA can engage in now is questionable.

But Carreira has also referred to attacks along the northern border. "South African actions are always accompanied by other actions in the north," the Defense Minister said. "They occur either in Zaire province [of Angola] or in Cabinda." Carreira said

Angola Under Fire

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that all the FNLA and FLEC bases had been eliminated from northern Angola and Cabinda, but he said infiltrations had resumed.

Only last year, Angola and Zaire had signed a non-aggression pact that was to have stopped any Zairian support for FNLA activity. But this agreement was made as part of an overall Western diplomatic effort to bring UN-supervised elections to Namibia. The idea was that if Angola urged SWAPO to accept the UN plan, the West would convince Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko to curb FNLA's activities. Soon afterward, peace returned to Angola's northern flank.

But with the collapse of the UN Namibia plan, many observers have expected some flare-ups in northern Angola. Apparently Angolan officials have as well, and they are convinced that these actions are well coordinated with South African attacks in the south.

Angola has not been unaffected by this permanent state of war with South Africa. Energy has been diverted from reconstruction and economic development. But in the process of self-defense, Angola has created an army in which most of its citizens participate, some in the regular army, others in the militia known as the People's Defense Organization. Carreira calls it a people's army, "capable of defending our conquests and of helping others, our allies, other African peoples who still suffer from oppression and exploitation.

"It's not an easy task. Our people don't always understand it, and sometimes they fight against it. But it's the only way to consolidate the revolution in Angola." M.S. □


Election Observers

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Cold War Warriors

The truth is that Freedom House has long functioned as a sanctuary for cold war intellectuals such as Leo Cherne, Sidney Hook, and Roscoe Drummond. Honorary chairmen include Sydney Gruson, executive vice-president of the *New York Times*, and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Former New Jersey Senator Clifford Case is chairman of the board and Senator Jacob Javits is an honorary chairman. Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the National Security Council, is an honorary chairman on leave of absence.

Thus, the organization whose endorsement of the recent elections in Zimbabwe has received favorable treatment by the US press has among its chief sponsors the two senators responsible for the law that will force the US to lift all sanctions against Rhodesia if Carter judges the elections to have been "free and fair." □



There is sickness.

We need medicine.

Please hurry...

The war in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) has caused 30,000 deaths and forced 150,000 of us to flee to overcrowded and disease-infested camps.

We desperately need medical supplies.

Please send a check or money order (no matter how small) to the SOUTH AFRICAN REFUGEE RELIEF FUND 126 W. 119 St., N.Y., N.Y. 10026

Make all checks payable to UNICEF (the United Nations agency which purchases and air-freights medical supplies to the refugee camps).

SA Free Enterprise Defended

continued from page 7

At the conclusion of its inaugural congress, FOSATU announced its intention to fight for many of the changes endorsed a few weeks later by the government. At the same time, the federation's general secretary emphasized that "at the moment we are more preoccupied with organizing workers than general political issues."

That statement must have been music to the ears of the Wiehahn Commission members and their backers in industry. Among their chief arguments for reform have been warnings that unregistered black unions would prove harder to control and predictions that recognized black unions could become a "stabilizing force" in industry and in black urban communities.

As one company chairman told a British parliamentary committee several years ago: "Something has to be done to meet the frustration and sense of deprivation which Africans have felt and still feel today. So that in the long run, not maybe this year or next year, it is in the company's best interest to see that the confrontation is handled wisely and with skill, and that can only be done through proper representation and proper communication."

"A safety valve?" the executive was asked.

"Exactly."

In order to nurture their "stabilizing" characteristics, the commission recommended setting up a labor college to train blacks for union leadership. Along the same lines, it recommended extending laws prohibiting political involvement by unions to cover the newly-recognized black unions.

In addition to opening a safety valve for the growing pressure from black workers, multi-national industrial managers clearly hope that the proposed reforms will strengthen their defenses against demands for withdrawal from participation in the apartheid economy.

In the weeks preceding release of the Wiehahn Commission's report, business interests linked with the multinationals had proclaimed the need for major reforms. "If they do not come up with significant changes which have the support of the government," the personnel liaison manager of the Barlow Rand group warned in March, "our associates in the United States will find it extremely difficult to retain trade links with companies here." And *Business Week* commented after the report had appeared that "it was heavily influenced by European trade union theory and practice and by the European Community's multinational corporations' labor code as well as, indirectly, by earlier principles devised to guide US companies operating in South Africa."

Responses Varied

Response to the proposals followed predictable lines. South Africa's English-language newspapers were ecstatic. The *Rand Daily Mail*, frequently a strident critic of government policies, labeled the Wiehahn report "a huge and exciting transformation of industrial relations in South Africa." And the Johannesburg *Star* headlined its May 10 editorial on the series of reform proposals, "Ten days that could save the country."

Considering that these papers are generally regarded as vehicles for corporate criticism of apartheid and considering that they had been at the forefront in uncovering a scandal that threatened to bring down the government, this response must have been gratifying to the Botha regime. But no more so than Botha's promises of reform were to his friends overseas. *Business Week* dubbed the "dramatic policy shift" as "the best news out of southern Africa for Washington in many years."

Response from the people most directly affected by the proposed reforms was considerably more cautious. And with good reason. South African blacks noted gaping holes in most of the grand reforms. For instance, the recommendations for trade union rights apparently will not include migrant workers, who make up one-third of the total black workforce. As more of South Africa's "bantustans" are declared independent, that percentage could swell. Similarly, the Riekert Commission did not propose eliminating the pass laws but only relaxing them, while emphasizing that "control of migration to the cities was still essential."

Despite these obvious shortcomings, many blacks did welcome what one black newspaper editor described as "the phasing away of job discrimination." And even these limited changes produced anger in many of South Africa's white trade unions, who were up in arms about the possible dilution of their privileges.

The leader of one federation of white unions who sat on the Wiehahn Commission voted against almost every one of its suggestions. He may also have been the person who leaked word of the forthcoming proposals to white miners unions several months ago. The miners staged an angry wildcat strike in March, warning that "there would be a clash as never before in South Africa's history if an attempt was made to deprive white workers of their rights and protection."

Significantly the mines, whose more than 600,000 black workers are virtually all migrants, will not be affected by the proposed reforms. The mining industry, which accounts for more than \$7 billion in exports annually, was singled out as a "sensitive" field where statutory job reservation should be allowed to continue.

But the commission and the government

came in for bitter denunciations from other white unions anyway. A leader in the iron and steel union, Wessel Borman, stated ominously, "If this is accepted by the government, one wonders how long it will take before other legislation near and dear to the hearts of whites will disappear."

For the moment, the government appears to be more concerned about providing legislation near and dear to the hearts of foreign investors and corporate critics at home. But the white unions have long been a major portion of the Nationalist Party's constituency. And while they may not have anywhere else to turn, politically, they already have the government turning back on itself to pledge that "all systematic changes that are in any way significant can be introduced gradually and circumspectly."

The proposed reforms may follow a pattern recommended for decades by economic planners. But following that course will provide a stern test for the government's newly discovered flexibility. For it will require mollifying the white unions while trying to prevent blacks from using their somewhat increased freedom of action to mount a broader challenge to the overall apartheid system. **A.M. □**

Resistance and Repression

continued from page 8

education system. Instead, he found that the students had planned a revolution and that they, and not the police, were responsible for the deaths of hundreds of young people.

Van Dyk equated sedition with any attempt to "assail, subvert or defy" state authority, and said it was not necessary to prove actual violence. In the eyes of the South African regime any opposition to apartheid is a crime.

The students showed no signs of intimidation when they appeared in court for sentencing, saluting their friends with fists in the air.

Police Station Attacked

A vivid indication of the defiant mood of blacks in South Africa was given by a recent successful attack on an important Soweto police station. Three members of the African National Congress walked right up to the station at nine in the evening, began firing with AK 47 assault rifles, ran through the offices destroying all records with hand grenades, and left a burning building with one dead and two wounded black policemen behind them as they disappeared among some houses nearby.

A major man-hunt ensued, but without any immediate arrests. **□**

Black Religious Leaders Oppose Apartheid

In the 1950s and 1960s, the US was rocked by the broad social activism of black Americans and their allies in the civil rights movement. A major part of the infrastructure of that movement was provided by the black church—Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and hundreds of individual congregations throughout the country.

Recently, a major attempt was made to harness the latent energy of these black activist-religionists, their organizing skills, and extensive personal, social and material resources for yet another stage in the struggle against racial injustice. In mid-April in New York, some 200 major black religious figures, most of them veterans of these earlier movements, united in a program of action to stop American support for apartheid South Africa.

Historically the first of its kind, the conclave specifically rejected the Sullivan Principles, authored by one of their colleagues, the Rev. Leon Sullivan of the international jobs- and skills-training program, OIC, and member of the board of directors of General Motors. The principles, designed to be adopted by US corporations operating in South Africa, confine themselves to limited workplace abolition of racial discrimination.

The meeting termed the principles "well-intentioned [but] no longer sufficient" despite an impassioned plea for support from Rev. Sullivan himself. Instead the assembled clergy agreed to work for "total United States economic, political, military, cultural, and diplomatic disengagement from South Africa until the white supremacist government with its policy of racism, brutality, and exploitation is ended."

The conference, termed the Summit Conference of Black Religious Leaders on Apartheid, drew notable participation from the African political community. Front-line president Kenneth Kaunda sent a message of support and encouragement by way of recently returned Zambian ambassador to the UN, Paul Lusaka. Dramane Ouattara, representative of the Organization of African Unity, also addressed the body, as did Johnstone Makatini, chief ANC repre-

sentative to the UN. US Ambassador and fellow minister Andrew Young met with the conferees at the UN, across the street from the conference site.

Call for Sanctions

Other participants endorsing the call for total sanctions included Jesse Jackson who saw the effort as part of a "search for a family reunion" between Afro-Americans and other Africans. He told the conferees that "the time is now for cementing durable bonds of moral support and concrete material aid to advance our common cause of liberation."

Toward this end a broad program of national, local, and individual action is being drawn up by the body for other black religious leaders. The Sunday of June 17th, observed internationally as South African Students' day in honor of Soweto, will serve as the focus for educational sermons and the collection of material aid to help some of the thousands of students who have fled the country.

Other future actions, including a possible national mobilization in Washington, will be geared to:

- dramatizing the plight of the victims of apartheid, especially the children.
- raising the awareness of black Americans and their allies about South African conditions and practices and America's role in supporting them.
- providing practical support, especially through fund-raising for liberation movement schools, health stations, and other needs in the southern African front-line states.

Rev. William Howard, a leading black minister, president of the National Council of Churches, and member of the World Council of Churches Program to Combat Racism, commenting on the Sullivan principles, said, "They are not a formula for social change." He urged the adoption of a new set of principles which would include "a commitment by US investors to withdraw operations from South Africa—until the white supremacist government abandons its apartheid policy."

Veteran activist-minister Rev. Wyatt Tee

Walker of Harlem serves as general secretary of the conference's organizing body, the International Freedom Mobilization. A national figure with strong ties within both the rights and religious communities, Walker has had a major influence in moving the body toward its strong stand in support of freedom for South Africa.

Liberation Support

A notable step taken by the conference was its specific support for a South African liberation movement, the African National Congress, and its tacit support for the already unfolding armed struggle. Support for the use of "any means necessary" by the South African people to supplant the apartheid regime was an important development for many who were reared in King's ethic of non-violence. Said Rev. Dr. William Jones of Brooklyn, talking about the legitimate role of armed struggle in South Africa: "The question is essentially one of self-defense against a systematic violence that is pervasive and unceasing. Genocide, on a massive scale, is being practiced in South Africa. To be non-violent in the context of genocide is to affirm violence and is tantamount to alliance with the adversary. To resist, by whatever means necessary, is the only sane and spiritual response of one who calls himself a Christian." **M.S.R.** □

*For more information write:
International Freedom Mobilization
310 E. 44th St. #1703
New York, NY 10017*

APOLOGY

Our apologies to our Action News readers.

We have received a number of reports, letters and some photographs from groups during the last two months, detailing their activities. We had these written up for the Notes, but had to cut them at the last minute because of lack of space. We plan to remedy this next month. Please keep on sending us actions material.

news briefs

PLANS BEHIND SOUTH

 Africa's new self-reliance strategy are beginning to come to light—and they are not without a role for US corporations. The most recent of these appears to be Eaton Corporation's plans to enter into a joint venture with South Africa for a gear and axle plant that would furnish components for heavy trucks needed by the South African military.

In an article published recently in *Business Week* magazine, the New York financial weekly, the plant was described as following on more advanced plans for a diesel engine plant being built near Cape Town with British and West German cooperation. Together, the two plants would give Pretoria virtual self-sufficiency in heavy trucks—an important aspect of South Africa's plans for independent production of all essential military supplies.

Eaton, a Cleveland-based manufacturer of truck components that already does several million dollars in export sales with South Africa, denied to *Business Week* that it was considering anything more than licensing arrangements with Pretoria. The company said it was concerned about imminent South African plans that would require local participation in strategic heavy industries. But the magazine maintained that negotiations for a joint venture with the Economic Development Corporation, a South African parastatal, were under way, with a decision from Eaton due by June 1. A source close to the magazine, moreover, says privately that the EDC was in this case "a thinly veiled cover for the South African military, which is very eager to get the Eaton deal going."

In yet another case of South African corporations combining operations with large US firms, the Schwartz Fine audit firm of South Africa has taken steps to merge this year with the leading US accounting company, Arthur Anderson and Company.

WEST GERMAN MONEY IS

 helping South Africa pursue its drive for self-sufficiency in energy supplies. West German banks have played a substantial role over the past few years in seeing to it that SASOL II and III, South Africa's program for converting

domestic coal into oil, has been sufficiently capitalized. These banks, some of them controlled directly by the West German government, have injected more than \$116 million in loans into the program since 1976. When confronted with this fact by legislators from the Social Democratic Party, West Germany's Secretary of State Hamm-Brucher refused to reconsider state policy on the loan issue.

BOTSWANA AND TRANSKEI

 are searching out and jailing Southern African liberation fighters. After an intensive search in Gaborone earlier this year, Botswana officials seized four black South African exiles believed to be members of the African National Congress. One of the captives has already been sentenced to three-and-one-half years in jail for illegal possession of explosives and firearms. Botswana has a policy of not harboring nationalist guerrillas bound for Rhodesia or South Africa.

In the Transkei, meanwhile, secret police have arrested a number of liberation fighters who received guerrilla training in China, Libya, and Tanzania. Transkei Minister of Justice D.S. Koyana reported that these insurgents had been placed under arrest between October 1978 and March of this year. The tenacity of Transkeian security police in rounding up cadre of liberation movements has earned them the thanks of South African Police Commissioner Guldenuys. He congratulated Transkeian officials publicly and urged continued cooperation in counterinsurgency efforts.

MOZAMBIQUE CONTINUES

 to suffer sabotage raids from members of the Mozambique Resistance Movement (MNR). Earlier this year members of this movement blew up two bridges on the railway line from Tete to Mutarara, the transport link carrying coal from the Moatize mine. MNR sources also reported blowing up an oil depot in the port of Beira, cutting telephone lines, destroying a granary, and attacking 19 army supply vehicles. In addition to con-

ducting raids into Mozambique, the movement runs a radio station based in Gwelo, Rhodesia called the "Voice of Free Africa." The station propagandizes against the FRELIMO government and regularly issues death threats against FRELIMO leaders.

The capture late last year of three MNR members has given Mozambican officials more evidence about the backing of the group. The captured saboteurs reported under interrogation that they received training and supplies from the Rhodesian government. They received salaries of approximately \$560 a month, and one of the men claimed to have been offered a provincial governorship by Rhodesia if the FRELIMO government were toppled. In addition to Rhodesian funding, the group receives financial aid, according to southern African diplomatic sources, from wealthy Portuguese businessmen whose firms were nationalized after FRELIMO's accession to power. One of the two most important leaders of the movement, Jorge Jardim, was formerly a prominent businessman in colonial Mozambique.


IN NAMIBIA, SWAPO MEM-

 bers have succeeded for the second time this year in sabotaging the country's power supply. In an attack on the Ruacana hydroelectric complex in mid-April, three electricity pylons were blown up. The attack caused a twenty-minute blackout over most of the country including the entire capital city of Windhoek.

ANGOLA WILL PROVIDE

 Brazil with 15,000 barrels of oil a day, starting next year, under an agreement signed in Rio de Janeiro in early May. The agreement was made with Petrobras, the Brazilian state oil company. The price will be at the level then in effect in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The accord also provides for the Brazilian company to drill in Angola and to train Angolans in the oil industry.

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