Zimbabwe Women Mobilize

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Fighting Colonialisms: Women in Guinea Bissau
Stephanie Urdang

The Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which led the Guinean people in a successful guerrilla war to overthrow the Portuguese colonialists, did not view the armed struggle as an end in itself. Rather, it was one aspect of their goal, which was to establish a totally new society. Another aspect was the emancipation of women from their dual oppression by colonialism and by patriarchy. This book is an examination of the achievements of the PAIGC since 1974, based on a study of conditions before and after independence. Its conclusions emerge most strongly from interviews with leaders as well as with many of the women and men in the city and in the countryside.

September

The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa
Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane

In this important contribution to understanding the current crisis in South Africa, Magubane provides a detailed and historical analysis of the interrelationship between race and class, and of the social and economic forces that underlie their development. Within this framework, he discusses such topics as the displacement of the indigenous Africans, the migrant-labor system, and the development of "native reserves." He probes beneath the surface events to analyze the contradictions that have developed between different capitalist interests, as well as between sections of the white population, and concludes with a discussion of the growing opposition movement.

November

Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings
Amilcar Cabral

Amilcar Cabral launched the Partido Africano da Independencia da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) in 1956. By 1973, at the time of his assassination, his movement had effectively defeated the Portuguese colonialists. His revolutionary thought and action are fully demonstrated in the pages of this book, which contains his most important speeches and writings. As Basil Davidson puts it in his introduction, Cabral's ideas were the "keys that could unlock the seemingly impassable door to freedom," and the body of his work is gathered together here and made available for the first time in English.

The collection contains an introduction by Basil Davidson, and a biographical essay by Mario de Andrade.

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JULY/AUGUST 1979/SOUTHERN AFRICA
New Basis for Anglo-American Diplomacy in Zimbabwe

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moore met with British officials in London in late June for “consultations” on Rhodesia.

The London meetings were expected to produce the outlines for future British-American efforts to secure a Rhodesian settlement. Britain's new Conservative government has already told the State Department that it doesn't intend to pursue Anglo-American plans drawn up under the former Labor government. This stance by Britain, more than any purported change in Rhodesia, led to recent statements by the Carter administration suggesting a “new reality.”

“Britain doesn't want to go back to square one,” said one State Department official deeply involved with Rhodesian diplomacy. “Square one” means the basic assumptions of the now-abandoned Anglo-American proposals: that because Rhodesia's government is illegal it cannot unilaterally establish a viable settlement, and that an effective settlement must have Rhodesia's conflicting parties agreed on drafting a constitution, a transition process and United Nations-supervised elections.

The “new reality” accepts the Smith constitution as the basis for negotiating a settlement and focuses British-American diplomacy on improvement and refinement of that constitution. When queried about the Anglo-American proposals, one State Department source, reflecting acceptance of the British policy, acknowledged that “the United States does not think it possible to start from scratch.”

The London meetings which have also included policy planning chief Anthony Lake and UN ambassador Andrew Young, are based on the report and recommendations of a British team headed by Lord Harlech who visited African front-line states and Nigeria. Their purpose was to explore ways of “improving the substance of Rhodesia's constitution,” and ways of selling this approach to Africa's front-line states, the Patriotic Front and Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

But there have been fundamental differences on how best to pursue this emphasis on “improving” the constitution. American officials want to stress persuading the front-line states and the Patriotic Front to accept “significant” reform of the constitution. British officials believe persuading Bishop Muzorewa to take the initiative and offer a reformulation is crucial.

Underlying this divergence is a disagreement between US and British officials over real and potential power in Rhodesia. US policy makers believe that no settlement in Rhodesia will work without backing from the guerrillas, and that a guerrilla government will be friendly to the West if it is aided in securing independence by the West. British officials, on the other hand, believe that if Muzorewa makes “significant” constitutional reforms, he will be able to secure and consolidate popular support, thereby undermining guerrilla strength and giving a “moderate” government a reasonable chance for survival. Particularly important, they believe, are economic measures which would deliver material benefits to blacks.

Both Britain and the United States are agreed that a government friendly to the West and cautious towards backing armed struggle in South Africa is vital.

Meanwhile, in Rhodesia, Prime Minister Muzorewa is already having difficulties in showing that he is in charge. He attempted to replace Cabinet Secretary Jack Gaylard with his own nominee, a Rhodesian of Indian origin, but the candidate was disallowed by the white-controlled civil service commission, and the post taken by Solicitor-General George Smith, a white who had played a leading role in formulating the present Rhodesian constitution.

Muzorewa is having no trouble continuing the war policy. In late June Rhodesian ground and air forces attacked ZAPU guerrilla targets in the suburbs of Lusaka, the first attack on Zambia since Muzorewa took office on June 1. Twenty-two people were reported killed.

PAC Trial Ends in Heavy Sentences

The 17 members of the Pan Africanist Congress whose 19 month trial is reported elsewhere in this issue have all been found guilty of conspiring to overthrow the government and have been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Zephania Mothopeng, 65, a former teacher and a founding member of the PAC, who had already served two prison terms of political resistance received the stiffest sentence, two concurrent fifteen years terms. Other sentences ranged from five to fifteen years.

Vorster Resigns

For John Vorster, the curtain came down on June 4. Just six months after the judicial commission investigating South Africa's Department of Information scandal had given him a clean bill of moral and political health, the same commission reserved its findings. In a second report, the Erasmus Commission charged the former Prime Minister “knew everything” about the secret funding of a pro-government newspaper and other projects involving more than $70 million of taxpayers' money.

Within hours after the report was released, Vorster stepped down from his largely ceremonial position as President. In so doing, he apparently brought to an end a political career that took him from internment as a Nazi sympathizer during World War II to 12 years as Prime Minister of the apartheid state. Along the way, Vorster made his mark as a ruthless Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons and earned an international reputation as both “the butcher of Soweto” and “the architect of pragmatic apartheid.”

By joining Connie Mulder, Hendrik van der Bergh and Eschel Rhoodie on the outside looking in, Vorster became the most prominent victim yet claimed by the scandal. But he may not be the last. Newspaper reports suggested that Vorster has been angered by Prime Minister Pieter Botha's failure to come to his defense. The Erasmus Commission's latest findings repeat its earlier conclusion that Botha's "hands are clean in every respect." But it does reveal that some projects, including the attempt to buy the Washington Star, were paid for out of then-Defense Minister Botha's budget on Vorster's orders. Botha's hands stayed clear, the report contends, because he objected "from the start" to the secret projects. If Vorster is angry enough, he just might be in a position to dispute that claim.

Unity in Struggle

"The spirit of solidarity which unites our countries," commented the Jornal de Angola in an article on Mozambique, "cannot be explained by the fact that both have adopted the same official language. What unites us is the spirit of struggle, forged in the course of age-old resistance to colonialism." To those familiar with this feeling, and with the existence during the wars of independence of the CONCP (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies), it came as no surprise that a summit meeting of the ex-Portuguese colonies should take place without the presence of the ex-colonial
power. But the meeting, held in Luanda on June 9-10, was nevertheless a striking contrast to the Franco-African summit held the previous month in Kigali, Rwanda.

Gathered in Luanda were not only the heads-of-state of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome, but also defense chiefs, economic ministers, and heads of state-banks. Unity and intensified cooperation among the countries, the conference agreed, should be based on a common political and ideological perspective. A ministerial commission was charged with preparing more specific plans of cooperation, which could be taken up at the next summit to be held in Maputo, Mozambique.

The five countries, with widely separated geographical locations, face major problems in developing significant economic or military cooperation. But in spheres such as reconstruction of their legal systems, coordination of air travel, and development policies, there has already been a significant exchange of views. And while the details differ, all have faced major problems in resolving post-independence disputes with Portugal, which seems more interested in good ties with the West than with its ex-colonies and unable to overcome saudades (nostalgia) for the more authoritarian days of colonialism.

On African and international issues, the summity communiqué made a special point of stressing support for the southern African liberation movements SWAPO, the Patriotic Front, and the ANC, and for the struggles of the peoples of Western Sahara, East Timor, and Palestine.

**Mozambique Expects Abundant Rice Harvest**

The rice harvest in Mozambique's Limpopo Valley has begun, and initial estimates are that production will reach 56,000 tons, substantially above the goal for this year of 42,000 tons. The target set by the FRELIMO Congress for 1980 is 60,000 tons.

Last year a lack of planning and technical problems made the use of mechanical harvesters difficult, and only a vast mobilization of volunteer workers succeeded in saving the harvest. This year it seems that many of these difficulties have been overcome, and teams of workers harvesting by hand will be supplemented by a fleet of 154 combines.

With production from other Mozambican provinces, the rice harvest is expected to total over 80,000 tons. But, concludes Tempo magazine, this is still only two-thirds of the nation's requirements, and the fight for self-sufficiency must continue.

**SWAPO Closes Windhoek Office in Response to Repression**

In early June, Daniel Tjongarero, vice chairman of SWAPO's internal wing and the only member of the internal executive still in the country and not under detention, announced the closure of its Windhoek office and the dissolution of the national executive. The office would remain closed, he said, until the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 and achievement of an internationally-acceptable solution in the country.

The move followed new curbs by South Africa on Namibian opposition forces. In late April and early May almost all the leading officials of SWAPO's internal wing were arrested, and its Windhoek offices were raided by a group identified as the "White Resistance Movement." When the Council of Churches of Namibia, which has often opposed the government, called for a halt to arrests of SWAPO executives and members, its offices were raided by police.

Also in May, martial law was imposed on large areas of central and northern Namibia, and one of the largest operations of the war was launched against SWAPO guerrillas, who have penetrated deep onto the country as well as kept up attacks in the northernmost Ovamboland area. In one attack in early May guerrillas sabotaged the main communications line between Windhoek and the north, and white farmers in the area south of Ovamboland have appealed for greater government protection. According to reports from Windhoek as well as from SWAPO sources in Angola, the guerrillas' military capacity has stepped up substantially in recent months.

**New Oil Crisis For South Africa**

Since June 8, when Minister of Economic Affairs Chris Heunis announced South Africa's third price-increase for gas in less than six months, motorists in that country have been paying $2.45 a gallon for gas or diesel fuel, up 38 percent over the price in force from March through May. Most of the increase goes for an equalization fund used to cover the premiums South Africa must pay for oil on the international spot market, where prices can range up to double those paid for oil on long-term contracts. So far, according to the Johannesburg Financial Mail, South Africa has been unable to obtain assured long-term suppliers and will have to continue with spot-market purchases for the foreseeable future.

Heunis also announced changes in filling-station hours and speed limits, and said that supplies to commerce, industry, and agriculture would be reduced by an average of 20 percent of 1978 consumption. Because, according to the Financial Mail, the physical volume of oil imports is down as much as 40 percent, individual consumers can expect an even greater reduction in supplies.

So far, higher earnings for gold and mineral exports, which have also experienced rapid price rises, have cushioned the financial effects of the oil squeeze on South Africa.

**UPDATE** this month was jointly prepared by Africa News and Southern Africa.
Recently in an exclusive interview, President Samora Machel spoke at length to Iain Christie and Allen Isaacman about progress and problems in Mozambique. Historian Allen Isaacman, now teaching at the University of Maputo, is a former member of the Southern Africa collective. Journalist Iain Christie works for the Mozambique Information Agency.

The Marxist-Leninist party FRELIMO, created just two years ago,1 began its first major campaign to admit new members in February last year. How would you describe the party's presence in the country today?

The party structuring campaign which ended last November made it possible to create hundreds of cells in priority work places and residential areas. Tens of thousands of new members have been admitted.

Today, the party is present, through its militants, throughout the country. The party's leadership role in state and society is thus guaranteed.

Mozambique has a high level of illiteracy. What implications does this have for popularizing Marxist-Leninist concepts among the largely illiterate workers and peasants?

This question reflects some misconceptions about Marxism. It suggests that Marxism is like the Bible, "How can they learn the catechism if they're illiterate? How can they read the Bible if they can't read or write?" That's the concept behind the question. The idea is that it is a foreign experience. How will they learn it if they can't read. But listen — this is the principal point — Marxism-Leninism is a class science.

Do you agree that there are classes in Mozambique, that there is a working class?

Yes, of course...

So your question falls. Who is it who makes Marxism? Who is it who makes this science, after all? Is it the scientist closeted with his books?

A science belongs to its creator. Who is the creator of Marxism-Leninism? It is a science of class. It belongs to its creator — the working class. Its creator is the people, the people in their centuries-long struggle against the different forms and systems of exploitation. Its creator is, above all, the working class which, because of its specific role in society, is capable of conceiving of a new society, of new types of relations among the people.

Now then, who is the best Marxist? Is it the person in the library reading tomes or the one doing the job? Scientific socialism was not forged and developed among those who spend all their time in libraries and universities. That is a lie! It was not the agronomists who invented geometry; it was the peasants, in the demarcation of their land. They invented the science right there.

The Mozambican workers have a long experience of suffering and struggle against slavery, feudalism, and capitalism. How do you interpret this? Who were the people who took power in Russia? Who were they? Were they from the university? Who were the people who took part in the Long March in China? Who were they? Were they from the university?

Tell me Iain, when I marched with you, what were we doing? Those who were there with you, helping and defending you, what were they doing? They didn't know how to read and write, those people! The war taught them! The war, experience, practice.

But you yourself have said that socialism cannot be built with an illiterate population.

That's right. During the literacy campaign. Party members are the object of a special literacy drive aimed at raising their scientific knowledge and conceptions of the world. To be able to read, to have the capability to synthesize experiences, to raise them to the level of theory.

There are two things here: one is to see where the theory comes from, where the ideas come from. They come from praxis! Now we want the people to synthesize this praxis, to have the capability to synthesize their experiences.

Thus the illiterate peasants in Cabo Delgado learned the essence of the system of exploitation of man by man that the new exploiters of the Simango/Lazaro group2.

1. The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was created in 1962 and after ten years of armed struggle (1964-1974) won independence from Portugal. At the front's Third Congress in 1977, the decision was taken form a Marxist party, which retained the name FRELIMO.

2. Iain Christie visited the liberated areas of Mozambique with Samora Machel in 1973 as a reporter for the Tanzania Daily News.

3. Uriah Simango and Lazaro Kavandame were two FRELIMO leaders expelled in 1969 for corruption. They were subsequently implicated in the assassination of the movement's first president, Eduardo Mondlane.

SOUTHERN AFRICA/JULY/AUGUST 1979
It was the peasants who struggled and brought about the victory of the cooperatives over exploitative private commerce and the big landowners.

In Mozambique, the Peasants' Liberation War was fought by the peasants against the landlords, who were supported by the colonial and fascist governments. The war was fought to achieve independence and to establish a socialist society.

The peasants, who were largely illiterate, were able to overthrow the landlords and their supporters because they understood the needs of the people and were motivated by the desire for freedom and justice. They were able to organize themselves into cooperatives and to take control of the land and resources.

The party, which was led by Marxist-Leninist ideology, supported the peasants and helped them to achieve their goals. The party was able to organize the masses and to mobilize them for the struggle.

The struggle was not only about the overthrow of the landlords, but also about the establishment of a socialist society. The party worked to ensure that the peasants had access to education, healthcare, and other basic services.

The struggle was not easy, and it required a great deal of sacrifice and dedication. However, the peasants were able to overcome the barriers that were put in their way, and they were successful in achieving their goals.

The struggle in Mozambique is an example of how the peasants can be successful in overthrowing oppressive regimes and establishing a more equitable society. It shows that even the most marginalized people can achieve great things if they are able to organize themselves and to work together for a common goal.
historical, economic, and political conditions under which our country has been forced to live for centuries. Colonial domination did not permit normal economic development and left behind such grave problems as a 95 percent illiteracy rate and a backward rural economy. Our country was forced to produce raw materials to fuel the industries of the metropole, and industrial development was never permitted. This reduced the use of our natural resources for our own industries and created an underdeveloped economy. In addition, the colonial-capitalist system, based on the exploitation of cheap manual labor, never allowed Mozambican workers to acquire technical skills. And because unemployment is a permanent condition of both colonialism and capitalism, Portuguese domination, by definition, created the underemployment of a portion of the working class.

These problems can only be resolved by the development of socialism. Only a planned economy permits full employment and gives real meaning to the right to work, which is guaranteed to all citizens by our constitution. Only a planned economy can assure the satisfaction of our material, cultural, and moral needs.

To achieve maximum production and a high level of productivity, we must use all available existing resources to their greatest capacity. This requires the systematic upgrading of the labor skills of Mozambican workers to meet the scientific and technological demands of development. We must also create the type of factories and workshops that are consistent with our economic developmental needs and the requirements of our economic plan. This means giving priority to heavy industry and the already planned or partially begun investments in factories that make agricultural implements, trucks, textiles, paper, and steel, among others. Finally, the transformation of the countryside through the creation of communal villages and the improvement of both state farms and their supporting industrial infrastructure is needed to absorb the rural labor force.

These interrelated actions will allow us to implement our policy of rationally using our work force in conformity with the priorities established by our economic plan. The achievement of this goal will also be facilitated by a salary structure that guarantees equal pay for equal work and to each according to that person's capacities.

Criticism is a constant with us, criticism in party structures and criticism by the masses

In light of the difficulties that a number of countries have faced in their attempt to organize communal villages and other cooperatives on a voluntary basis, how has FRELIMO fared?

The party's decision to create communal villages and cooperatives was received enthuasistically by the peasants. The obvious benefits flowing from the establishment of this form of collective production and the concommitant elimination of exploitation stimulated the rapid development of communal villages and cooperatives. Today, there are more than 1,000 communal villages, with more than one million residents, and over 500 agricultural cooperatives with over 30,000 members.

Because of the success of these communal villages and cooperatives, many other peasants have taken the initiative and organized collective production units. Take the case of cotton, whose production during the colonial period was based on forced labor, leaving deep scars on the peasants subjected to it. Today, it is common for peasants to join together and create cotton-producing cooperatives.

The collectivization of production gradually leads to collectivization of other activities as well. Thus, consumer and marketing cooperatives have been created; there is collective construction of houses, and we are beginning to collectively resolve problems of health and education.

The communal villages are centers of collective production and centers of political, social, and cultural life, which will permit us to industrialize, urbanize, and socialize the rural areas. In sum, the communal villages are essentially centers of organized life, collective life.

Naturally, the existing cooperatives have encountered various problems—material problems. For example, we need to develop techniques to permit us to make the most of our natural resources, such as the construction of small dikes and dams to control the course of rivers and use them for irrigation. There are still problems in developing techniques to fight against natural calamities, such as floods, droughts, hailstorms, and insect plagues, whose effects we can protect against or even wipe out.

What about the role of the state farming sector?

Development is proceeding quickly. We already have more than 500 square miles producing cotton, rice, corn, potatoes, peanuts, and alfalfa under the control of state farms.

The state farms are centers for the diffusion of advanced techniques of use to the cooperatives—the best seed for each kind of soil, the most advanced cultivating techniques, the highest quality fertilizer. They are also centers of scientific-technical training for peasant-cooperative members, centers of high productivity and high revenue.

At the time of independence Mozambique's industry was virtually paralyzed as a result of the flight of most European technicians and factory owners. Since then, how has this sector of the economy been reorganized?
Only a planned economy can assure the satisfaction of our material, cultural, and moral needs.

Industrial production is recovering on all fronts. Since independence the principal steps taken include combating the sabotage brought to a head by capitalism in flight—by the settlers who abandoned the country—and establishing priorities for industrial recovery. We have defined strategic sectors and set up state administrative structures to oversee them, and we have set clear objectives for production under new socio-economic conditions. Thus, for example, we have transformed the cement industry into an exporting sector; we have begun to produce agricultural implements; and in the textile, shoe, and furniture sectors we have reduced the number of models and simplified the production process in order to increase production and ensure that our people's needs are satisfied at prices they can afford to pay.

We have also established training programs at all levels to improve the skills of both the directors and the workers, and we have progressively introduced planning and scientific control of production in priority sectors.

The statistics reflect the success to date of our economic recovery and industrial reorganization. From 1977 to 1978 industrial production increased by 20 percent and industrial productivity by 15 percent, and we expect production this year to rise by another 23 percent.

Worker direction of national industry has begun to be felt. Workers participate in discussions of the purposes of production, and the control of the results of production is increasingly in the hands of workers who, through their representatives, have access to all information needed to control production. The direction of enterprises is also being assumed by persons of working class origin, and many directorates already include a representative of the enterprise's workers.

In spite of serious unemployment problems, there does not seem to be a great deal of crime in Maputo. Most policemen are unarmed, and people freely walk the streets at night. How do you account for this, and will it last?

One of the fundamental characteristics of a socialist society is the establishment of cooperation among all people—where individuals stop preying upon other individuals. The struggle against the causes of crime—the social situations that produce crime—is an integral part of the struggle to build a socialist society.

During the war, we practically eliminated crime in the liberated zones. At the same time, it constantly increased in the regions occupied by the enemy, especially in the large cities and areas controlled by the latest colonial army. The unemployment, the idleness which was forced on the people in the concentration camps called "protected villages," the systematic contempt for women, the indifference to the moral and physical degeneration of young people, were essential elements of colonial policy which encouraged crime.

At our moment of victory, there were in our country thousands of prostitutes and drug addicts, drug trafficking and gambling networks, gangs of professional thieves. These networks had many links with the colonial police, especially the political police, and functioned as informers for the Western secret services.

Our struggle against crime has three components—the political struggle, the economic and social struggle, and administrative measures. Its objective is the reform rather than the punishment of the delinquent, and, above all the elimination of the causes of delinquency.

Soon after victory, during the transitional government, we launched large-scale campaigns to organize and involve the people in the struggle against crime. The newly formed dynamizing groups played a fundamental role in these campaigns.

Simultaneously, we took administrative steps to close those establishments where criminals and delinquents tended to congregate, and we opened re-education centers for prostitutes, drug addicts, petty criminals, pimps, and drug dealers. From the beginning, most of the gang leaders changed their nationality and left the country.

In the re-education centers, delinquents learn professions and develop good work habits. Already many thousands have been reformed and reintegrated into society.

Statistics from the capital demonstrate the kinds of results we have already achieved. They are especially significant because, at one time, the capital was the major center of crime in the country.

Before independence about 1500 homicides were committed each year. In 1977 there were 171 homicides, and in 1978 there were 83, of which only 2 involved robberies. The rest were crimes of passion, crimes motivated by superstitions, or quarrels provoked by drunkenness. From 1977 to 1978 corporal offenses dropped from 329 to 234 for all of Maputo Province. Thefts have also declined considerably, from almost 5,000 incidents in 1977 in the city of Maputo to about 4,000 for the whole province in 1978.

The creation of many new jobs through the development of suburban farming zones around the major cities and increased industrialization, the improvement of the general level of education and culture, the growing social pressure against drunkenness, the increasing responsibility felt by citizens toward their society, the restructuring of the police forces and their improved relations with the masses, and the development of vigilance groups are all fundamental factors which permit us to be optimistic that crime in our society will be virtually eliminated in the relatively near future.
ZANU Women Meet

This seminar has opened our eyes. Women from all parts of our country and from abroad came together for a week. We didn't just talk. We showed each other in practice what we could do...how we train militarily and use our weapons, how we write reports, how we gather intelligence from behind enemy lines, how we mobilize the people. We helped each other to see that women can do many different kinds of work....It was beautiful. We have intensified the fighting spirit of the female comrades.

Tendai Chitsotso, member of the Political Commissariat of the ZANU liberation army, (ZANLA) general staff

The first ZANU women's seminar took place in Xai Xai, Mozambique from May 21-26, 1979. It was "a grand school for us all," Tendai Chitsotso told a press meeting in Maputo where she and other ZANU women militants reported on the achievements of the seminar.

"By meeting together, people who participate in many different parts of the struggle—the women who fight on the front lines, those who support us from the rear, recent recruits from inside, women living in Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Europe, and North America—could exchange views, share experiences, and learn from each other," she said. A six-year ZANU veteran in her early 20's, Chitsotso has been doing political work in Mutambara, near Umtali, and had come from inside Zimbabwe to attend the seminar.

More than 200 people came to the gathering, which was organized by the ZANU central committee in order to increase women's participation in the liberation struggle.

In his opening address ZANU President Robert Mugabe described the central tasks facing the group—the study of the role of women in the nationalist struggle and in the building of socialism, the establishment of an expanded structure for ZANU's Department of Women's Affairs, and the development of a program for women.

Many reports reflected the work already being done by women in various sectors and countries. "We heard that there are women learning engineering skills, working in auto mechanic shops, and training to use sophisticated weapons, but not on the scale that we would like," Charm Zvipange said. A member of the defense finance section of the army, she too had come from inside Zimbabwe to attend the seminar.

"One of our purposes has been to analyze why women do not participate fully in the many tasks which are necessary for our struggle," Zvipange explained. "We analyzed why it is that we suffer from inferiority complexes and often don't believe we can do many things." For example, she continued, "why should we wait for the male cadres to interpret the news we hear on the radio. We must learn to analyze it for ourselves, to understand politics, and to think for ourselves."

Seeking to understand current weaknesses in the role women play in the liberation struggle, seminar sessions explored the position of women in both traditional and colonized society. "We spoke of how women always looked to men for guidance and the right answers and that this must stop," Zvipange explained. "We analyzed lobola, the bride price paid by a man for his wife, so we could understand better how this made us into commodities who were not respected by others and did not respect ourselves. We discussed how women are at a disadvantage under polygamy so we can better oppose that as well."

The seminar discussed the double oppression of women under colonialism—by men a. by the colonialists. It also noted that the colonial experience had forced men and women to come together to fight their common oppressor.

A History of Resistance

President Mugabe stressed the important role women had already played in opposing colonialism. He cited the women's demonstration against the 1961 constitution which gave only 15 out of 65 parliamentary seats to Africans. Two thousand protesting women were arrested and put into the Salisbury prison.

When fined in court, they refused to pay, preferring to serve their sentences. Unfortunately, Mugabe recalled, their husbands paid the fines and threatened to find other women if their wives didn't leave the prison and come home. In this instance, Mugabe concluded, "Women had shown greater courage and resolve, indeed far greater commitment than the cowardly men."

Today ZANU policy declares that there can be no national liberation without the emancipation of women. "For us this means our active participation in all aspects of the armed struggle," stressed Sarudgo.
Churchumunzwa, a ZANLA cadre who teaches secretarial skills in the Mt. Darwin area. "We don't mind the difficult life we teach secretarial skills in the Mt. Darwin Churuchmunzwa, a cadre. With no home, no permanent bed, always ready to go where we are needed to do what has to be done."

The seminar discussed problems which sometimes arose between seasoned ZANLA women cadre and those who had not been through political and military training. "They haven't experienced what we have and can feel inferior to us," Churchumunzwa explained. "Sometimes our objectives are somewhat different. They don't understand that we are fighting for the soil. The soil is our asset. It's not just butter, sugar, cars, a new face in the government, or to be able to go into the bars with the men. We must be prepared to accept as a cadre who is not antagonistic and can stand this, that we must change the whole surface mail.

"Our position is that men as well as women should be workers in the nursery schools and that both men and women should take an active role in child care. The men at our seminar agreed to this. They had to be included. Otherwise it would have made no sense."

Discussion at the seminar led to a proposal that a research team be established to investigate current male and female roles, to develop a political program that can educate men and women together into new roles, and to study what the behavior of emancipated women in a free Zimbabwe will be.

Leadership roles
Participants at the meeting urged that more women be immediately included in advanced educational training programs. "Right now only five percent of the cadre be solved peacefully by discussing things and working together."

Several men had attended the seminar. This was natural, the women reported, because many of the proposals require new roles for both men and women. "Take for example our proposal to establish nursery schools so that women can work more actively in the struggle," Chitsotso explained. "Our position is that as well as when people first join us, they don't understand this, that we must change the whole of the economic and social system."

"The main antagonism is between us and the enemy," she concluded. "That's Smith, the South African forces supporting him, and the capitalist system they represent. The contradiction between men and us, on the other hand, is not antagonistic and can..."
Cuba's Africa Aid: Education for Development

In 1963, Cuba, still severely strained by the US blockade, sent a medical brigade to Algeria. Cuban assistance today is much greater—but it flows from the same belief that the Cuban revolution is part of a world-wide struggle to end exploitation and build new socialist societies.

On July 19, 1978, a boat approached the harbor in Havana, Cuba, laden with a unique cargo: 900 Ethiopian children, bound for school on Cuba’s Isla de la Juventud—the Island of Youth.

There is much controversy and more misinformation in the West concerning Cuba’s military role in Africa. There is, on the other hand, almost total silence surrounding other aspects of Cuba’s relationship with Africa, which throw a crucial light upon the question of the relationship of Cuba to the African continent.

The presence of Cubans in Africa does not begin in 1975 with the South African invasion of Angola; it predates this by more than a decade. Nor, from the beginning was it only a military presence. As early as 1963, four years after the Cuban revolution took power and two years after the US Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba, severely isolated and under the strain of a US-imposed blockade, sent a brigade of medical personnel to Algeria to work in hospitals that had virtually been stripped bare by the French of trained doctors and nurses. In the following years, similar medical missions operated in Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Guinea-Conakry, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Tanzania.

The relationship has changed over time mainly in terms of scale. The various “maps” released by the US State Department as evidence of Cuban imperialism in Africa rarely reveal that the number of Cuban technicians—teachers, medical personnel, construction workers, engineers—working in African countries has grown significantly. There has been a parallel increase in the number of Africans now studying in Cuba as well.

Carolle Bengelsdorf, currently teaching at Hampshire College, has worked for many years with Southern Africa support groups, and has also spent considerable time working on Cuban issues.

Why Aid?

What does all this activity get Cuba? For the Cubans, it serves in fact a variety of purposes. It puts into concrete terms clearly understandable to the Cuban people their country’s emphasis on “internationalist” values. This emphasis developed with the evolution of the revolution itself. It grew as much out of the very real needs of the revolution for international support in order to physically survive, as it did from ideological considerations. It was the Cuban revolution’s way of fighting against the isolation which the United States was attempting to impose upon it. The early and continuing support for international struggles showed itself openly in the sixties with regard to Vietnam and Latin America, and with less fanfare, with regard to Africa. These were the years of the Tricontinental, of the Havana Cultural Congress, of the efforts of Che Guevara in the heart of South America.

Tempo

Mozambican students work in their school's fields.

The failure of Che, and to a large extent, of the Tricontinental (which was to be eclipsed in importance by the Non-Aligned Movement) removed only the most overt manifestations of Cuban internationalism.

In a sense, Cuban efforts in Africa, and particularly in Angola, brought new life to internationalist values in the daily lives of the Cuban people. Having a child or a relative in Africa, either in a military or technical capacity, is a source of pride to the great majority of Cuban families. Angola became an extension of the Cuban revolution itself.

The Angola Connection

The impact of the Angolan experience on the Cubans is perhaps nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the case of the “Che Guevara Brigade.” Now in its second term of service, the Brigade is made up of a group of 700 Cuban youth, male and female. Their function is to participate in Angolan efforts to provide basic primary-school education in a country which was, in 1975, 99 percent illiterate. The Che Guevara Brigade is the 1970’s version of the Cuban literacy campaign brigades of 1961, brigades in which some 100,000 young Cubans, between the ages of ten and 19, went out into the countryside in a highly visible and successful effort to eradicate illiteracy in Cuba. It was this experience which, in part, converted the Cuban revolution into a mass evolution made up of millions of active participants, from whom the future cadres of the revolution would be drawn. For young Cubans of the present generation, the literacy campaign is a thing of the revolutionary past, a past which is not in their concrete experience. The Che Guevara Brigade provides the possibilities for recreating that concrete experience.

Cuban activity in Africa also reinforces and underlines the relevance of the Cuban experience as a model for the Third World. Speaking about the Cuban involvement in Africa, Fidel Castro has emphasized over
and over again the historical blood ties that exist between that continent and the Cuban people. But there is another level, equally organic and perhaps more relevant in a practical, current sense: that is, the experience of underdevelopment and Cuban experimentation with methods or possible routes out of that underdevelopment.

This is not by any means simply a Cuban understanding. In response to the question, "Why study in Cuba?" African students recently cited the relevance of the Cuban experience. A young student from Guinea-Bissau discussed with me his decision to study physics in Cuba rather than in East Germany. Cuba, he reasoned, was far nearer, in terms of its level of development, to Guinea-Bissau than was Germany.

In the Cuban concept of development, the provision of educational facilities played a fundamental role. It seems logical therefore that a major part of Cuban aid to African countries consists of educational efforts.

The provision of educational facilities in Cuba itself has taken a variety of forms. At the higher levels of the educational structure, Africans are integrated into faculties providing training in critical fields such as medicine or agriculture. This type of educational effort is not new. Much like the Cuban technical presence in Africa itself, it has been a common practice almost since the beginning of the revolution.

Nor is it limited only to the higher reaches of the Cuban educational structure. In the sixties, the Cubans began to provide homes and schooling for the children of those who fought and died in the anti-colonial struggles of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola. This practice has continued.

The Republica Popular de Angola is a pre-university school, consisting of the tenth or eleventh grades, located about a half-hour's drive outside Havana. It is set amid fields of growing vegetables, which are tended by the school's students. Among the more than 500 students are 18 young people from Guinea-Bissau who came to the school as a group. Together, they completed their last two years of basic secondary school in Havana.

The 15 boys and three girls follow the same schedule as the Cuban students: a course of study which touches upon ten subjects taught in Spanish as well as a half day's work daily in the surrounding fields. The general model is one largely of assimilation. There is an assumption that what is to be learned is relevant to both the Cuban and the Guinean experience. The young people from Guinea-Bissau work and study on the same schedule as Cuban children, they participate in the same extracurricular activities, and on the weekends when most Cuban children return home to their parents, the Guineans often go with them. Over and over again, the Cuban teachers at the school described them as "almost indistinguishable from the Cuban students."

Indeed, it was partly this quality that attracted the Guineans to Cuba in the first place. The proximity of Cuba to Guinea-Bissau, in terms of culture, language, climate, and perhaps most crucially, level of development, means that the process of adaptation for the Guinean students has been a relatively easy one.

Isle of Youth

There is a second model, one which is later in its development, larger in its scale, and, perhaps, different in its impact. That is Cuba's Isle of Youth, so called because that is exactly what it is, an island largely populated by young people. Much of its permanent population is derived from the pioneer campamentos of the late 1960s, when thousands of Cuban youth came to the Isle to study, live in makeshift housing, and plant and care for the beginnings of a Cuban citrus crop.

Interspersed in the now bountiful fields of lemon and grapefruit trees are modern prefabricated buildings which produce the Isle's other major harvest. These buildings are schools in the countryside, boarding schools at the junior high level, in which students drawn from various parts of Cuba spend half their day in studies and half tending to the surrounding citrus fields. Construction of new schools seems a never-ending process on the Isle of Youth. Of the nine schools presently under construction, six have been allocated to Mozambican, Angolan, and Ethiopian children. That boatful of young Ethiopians was going to the Isle of Youth. There they joined some 2,000 Angolan and Mozambican students, who have been on the Isle of Youth for a year, studying at one of the four schools already in operation, two for Mozambicans, two for Angolans.

In the Agostinho Neto Secondary Basic School in the countryside, almost 500 young Angolans between the ages of 14 and 17, about 40 percent of them female, are in the midst of their second year of studies. Most of these students were participants in the liberation war, some as combatants. All belong to the Organization of Angolan Youth. What is most notable about these students is their enormous energy for study and work and their remarkable level of discipline and organization. One teacher of geography at the Presidente Samora Machel School for Mozambican children told me, "We can say that these students practically direct themselves." It is as if these students understand themselves to be among their countries' most precious resources.

The idea behind turning entire schools over to Angolan, Mozambican, or Ethiopian children has several purposes. It facilitates on a larger scale the crucial processes of providing the next generation of Angolan, Mozambican, and Ethiopian youth with the training that is not available on a large scale in their own countries.

But it also allows the schools' staffs to gear the level of education more precisely to the level and needs of the young African students. For Cuban secondary basic schools in the countryside, for example, begin at the sixth grade level, and the Cubans expected that the Angolan student is arriving at the Agostinho Neto School would be at a sixth-grade level. This did not in fact turn out to be the case. Cuban instructors had to improvise and convert...

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What Kind of Hero?

US boxer delivers body blow to SA sports boycott

Knoetze and Tate: True victor is South African propaganda machine

When the referee, Isidoro Rodriguez of Venezuela, was forced to stop the fight between John Tate of Knoxville and South African Kallie Knoetze in the eighth round, many of us were both relieved and jubilant. Our fears that the world heavyweight championship would pass into the hands of apartheid's chief contender vanished as the brawler from Johannesburg received a boxing lesson at the hands of the young Afro-American contender.

Yet, as the camera scanned faces at the June 2 bout held in Bophuthatswana, the black spectators were quiet and stoic. Perhaps they recognized what must have escaped many. Despite the loss suffered by its heavy-weight champion, South Africa had scored a major public relations victory with the scheduling of this fight. It was the culmination of years of effort by the apartheid regime to bring professional championship boxing to South Africa.

The demonstrations and protest that surrounded the Knoetze bout with Bill Sharkey last January in Miami clearly had an impact on preparations for the Tate fight. (See Southern Africa, Feb. 1979). Even the N.Y. Post was moved to remark, “Quietly, ever so quietly, Bob Arum and CBS [the fight promoters] have slipped a neat little package of ugliness into our laps for Saturday evening viewing.”

None of the organizations active in the effort to prevent Knoetze from fighting in the U.S.—they include Jesse Jackson’s Operation Push, the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society (ACCESS), the American Committee on Africa, and the NAACP—had advance warning of the Tate fight. The secrecy with which the fight was planned was also cited by Dennis Brutus, president of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) as preventing any prior contacts with John Tate or his managers.

CBS Makes Money

Once again CBS has demonstrated its preoccupation with ratings and profits to the exclusion of any moral considerations. While CBS’s promotion and sponsorship of the Knoetze bout in Miami amounted to $100,000, the Tate fight is reported to have cost even less. The low promotional costs to CBS can be attributed to the financial backing of the Southern Sun, a South African hotel chain which owns the only hotel in Mmabatho, the capital of Bophuthatswana, South Africa’s latest apartheid black state.

U.S. promoter Bob Arum, president of Top Rank, Inc., has long functioned as a front for Southern Sun. They had previously teamed up to promote an Ali-Spinks rematch in Bophuthatswana, with Southern Sun putting up $14 million.

Black boxing promoter Don King condemned Arum’s involvement. “He’s the epitome of a mercenary,” King said. “He tried to take Ali to South Africa, but he couldn’t make it stick because there was such a hue and cry. He’s constantly trying to take black fighters there and get them voted white.”

Pretoria Makes Propaganda

King’s remarks serve to highlight the apartheid regime’s practice in recent years of allowing foreign black sports figures to play in South Africa as “honorary whites.” This practice is bitterly resented by black South Africans and seriously undermines their efforts to achieve a genuine multiracial policy in sports. Those overseas athletes who have previously competed as “honorary whites” include tennis players Arthur Ashe and Evonne Goolagong, American boxer Bob Foster, and golfer Jim Dent.

At the fight’s conclusion John Tate said, “I did what I came to do and I did a good job of it.” He clearly did not understand the significance of his agreement to fight before a privileged almost all-white audience. Nor did he probably ever question how he could get honorary white status while his fellow blacks in South Africa were left outside the stadium clinging to the television towers and the surrounding fences.

International Sports Boycott

The fight was also a considerable setback for the international sports boycott of South Africa. The boycott has its origin in the 1966 formation by African countries of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa. One of the first undertakings by the Council was the passing of a resolution calling for a boycott of the 1968 Olympics if South Africa was allowed to participate.

The United Nations addressed the problem of apartheid in sports for the first time on December 2, 1968, when the General Assembly adopted resolution 2396 which requested “all states to suspend cultural, educational, sporting, and other exchanges with the racist regime and with other organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid.”

The UN General Assembly again addressed the question on December 14, 1977, when it adopted the International Declaration against Apartheid in Sports. The declaration stated that “states shall take all appropriate action to bring about the total cessation of sporting contacts with any country practicing apartheid and shall refrain from official sponsorship, assistance, or encouragement of such contacts.” Article Three requested that “states shall take all appropriate action towards the exclusion or expulsion of any country participating apartheid from international and regional sports bodies. They shall give full support to national sports bodies attempting to exclude such countries from membership in international and regional sports associations or to prevent such countries from participation in sports activities.”

The international sports boycott of South Africa has been one of the most effective international actions against apartheid. South Africa has been excluded or expelled from the Olympics, the Davis Cup sponsored by the International Tennis Federation, the International Amateur Boxing...
Streamlining Controls

The 1976 Soweto uprising forced some strategic rethinking in white leadership circles—but the resulting “reforms” are designed to save apartheid, not bury it.

For those who have glanced over two recent South African government reports (see Southern Africa, June 1979) and hailed them enthusiastically as steps toward the dismantling of apartheid, publication of the first formal legislation based on the reports came as a cruel disappointment. For those who had glanced over the reports and dismissed them as meaningless cosmetic tinkering, the ensuing legislation read as an invitation to indulge in a round of “I told you so’s.” Neither response was entirely justified.

The proposed legislation did indeed retreat from some of the more far-reaching reforms recommended in the Wiehahn and Riekert Commission reports. Yet it remained true to much of the underlying strategy shared by the two reports. And that strategy clearly amounts to more than a mere cosmetic touch-up for apartheid. That much was attested to by the frenzied opposition with which the plans were greeted by the white labor movement and by the hard-liners within the National Party. The powerful Mine Workers Union actually decided to secede from the South Africa Confederation of Labor after that body voted to go along with the government’s proposals. And the champion of apartheid orthodoxy in the National Party leadership, Andries Treurnicht, saw fit to warn fellow cabinet minister Pieter Koornhof that he would “have some explaining to do,” after Koornhof, on a trip to the US, had gone so far as to predict that the hated passbooks might ultimately be abolished.

Creating a Buffer. Elimination of passbooks had not been recommended specifically in either the Wiehahn or Riekert reports. In fact, some such form of documentation will be absolutely essential to enforcing Riekert’s proposed system of “influx control.” But the suggestion that the passbook system might be modified in some fashion was entirely consistent with the thrust of the two reports, as was the audience to which it was addressed—a largely sympathetic assemblage of US business interests. Writing in the Manchester Guardian, two editors of South Africa’s leading business publication, the Financial Mail, linked the government’s new strategic approach directly to pressures from business. “Probably the single most important element common to Riekert and Wiehahn,” they wrote, “is the desire to win selected black allies to the side of the ruling white minority—not all blacks, but those whose labor gives them a passport to the central economy. The government thus has finally acceded to demands from the business sector—greatly stepped up after the Soweto upheavals in June 1976—to build up and stabilize a black labor aristocracy and a black middle class in the major cities and towns.”

Migrant Workers As a step in that direction, the Wiehahn Commission recommended extending trade union rights to some black workers. The key to the strategy lies in the word “some,” as the government demonstrated when it translated Wiehahn’s recommendations into a legislative package. The proposed legislation would exclude “migrant” black workers from the new dispensation. Under Pretoria’s definition of the term “migrant,” the Financial Mail estimates that that would leave out all but one and a half million of the nation’s eight million black workers. All the rest are officially counted as residents of one or another tribal “homeland,” and as migrants in the 87 percent of the country set aside for whites.

PAC Leader Assassinated

On June 11, David Maphumzana Sibeko was assassinated in Dar es Salaam, apparently as a result of internal dissensions within the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC).

Sibeko was a well-known international figure, whose tremendous energy and enthusiasm had played an important part in building support outside South Africa for the PAC, the smaller of the two internationally-recognized South African liberation movements. A founding member of the PAC, he continued to work inside South Africa after the movement was banned and forced underground in 1961, but eventually escaped in 1964, after having been charged under the Sabotage Act with attempting to overthrow the state.

Sibeko was a member of the PAC National Executive Committee, its foreign affairs director, and its chief representative to the United Nations. He was also one of three members of the recently formed presidential council that now directs the organization, sharing that task with Yussumzi Make and Elias Ntloedibe.

The formation of that presidential council was interpreted by many as a reflection of serious internal conflict in the PAC. After PAC founding president Robert Sobukwe died last year in South Africa, the longtime acting president Potlako Leballo, who had run the movement from Dar es Salaam, was elected chairman. Then, this April, in a brief release, PAC announced Leballo’s resignation “for reasons of health.” The move followed open splits at a 1978 congress of the organization, which led to the expulsion of the chief military commander and his supporters. While Sibeko had supported Leballo in that episode, there were also indications of other tensions, involving younger PAC members, who organized a public demonstration against Leballo in Dar es Salaam at the time of the recent 20th anniversary of the founding of the PAC. Reports circulating in Dar es Salaam speculate that Leballo followers may have been responsible for the killing.

One of the six PAC members arrested by the Tanzanian police in connection with Sibeko’s death was a Leballo bodyguard. David Sibeko is survived by his wife, Elizabeth and four children, Lindiwe, Bongani, Temba and David.
This exclusion would totally bar black union activity in the mines, where virtually the entire labor force consists of migrants. It might also obliterate the black union movement around Durban, regarded by many, says the Finanical Mail, as the backbone of the entire movement. By geographical circumstance, most of the black townships bordering on Durban lie within the borders of the KwaZulu ban-tusan, making all their residents migrants in the white city.

While the case of Durban is extreme, it is not unique. In fact, the government recently suggested that any future expansion of Soweto should take place not on adjoining land but almost 50 miles away in Bophuthatswana. And the idea of erecting higher barriers around the urban areas is enshrined at the heart of the Rieker Commission report.

Rieker recommends allowing blacks already holding urban residence qualifications to keep them. The report even proposes that such people be given greater freedom to change their jobs and to bring their families into the towns. But at the same time, the report proposes even tighter restrictions that most blacks penned up on the already overcrowded "homelands." (In KwaZulu, for instance, a study has concluded that a million people already living on the land will have to be uprooted or moved away from any serious agricultural development can even begin.) As one critic of the plan stated, "Isolating a privileged group of blacks in the urban areas is going to take place at the expense of a vast number of people in the homelands. Starvation appears to be the inevitable result."

If so, it is apparently a result the government is quite prepared to accept, just so long as the plan also yields a more manageable urban black population. The wave of urban uprisings that began three years ago in Soweto signaled the need for a more strategic thinking, and nervous business interests demanded action, not to bury apartheid but to save it.

Still, it remains far from clear whether the government can deliver. Under pressure from the white right wing, the Botha regime has already backed away from the idea of multi-racial unions, handed white unions a veto over changes affecting them, and dropped the idea of punishing white employers for hiring "illegal" migrants.

Black Anger

And the most decisive opposition may yet come from the very people whose growing resistance forced the government to consider new strategic alternatives—the black population. On paper, registered unions hemmed in by legal requirements may seem easier to control. And stabilized black urban communities may appear more suscep-

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Despite the UN Security Council's passage of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in November 1977, evidence continues to pile up that the apartheid regime has had little difficulty acquiring the sophisticated weapons it desires from other countries, and that US equipment makes up much of the flow. There is also mounting evidence that South Africa is becoming increasingly self-sufficient in light weapons production and in the production of some sophisticated military hardware such as combat helicopters.

Among the weapons recently acquired by Pretoria from abroad, the cases of the smuggling of long-range artillery shells by the Space Research Corporation and of the transfer of 25 Agusta-Bell 205A (Huey) helicopters have already been amply documented. A federal grand jury in Vermont is currently hearing testimony in the Space Research case, but its work is proceeding very slowly. A Canadian equivalent of the grand jury is expected to hand down some indictments this summer.

Less well known is South Africa's recent acquisition of the M-113 armored personnel carrier, the M-109 self-propelled 155 mm. howitzer, and sophisticated computer systems by the South African police and air force.

The acquisition of the M-109s and the M-113s was reported in the December 1978 issue of Armies and Weapons magazine, a well-known military trade journal published in Monaco by Interconair Technomedia. Pretoria "seems to have managed to buy a sizeable batch of M-113s," the magazine reported, adding that South Africa's obsolete mobile cannon "have been or soon will be replaced by modern 155 mm. M-109s." The magazine stated that both weapons were "almost certainly" built in Italy under license from the US by OTO Melara.

Other specialists have charged that Pretoria had already obtained these weapons. Researcher Sean Gervasi made the charge in testimony in 1977 before the Africa subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee. At the time State Department officials bitterly attacked Gervasi's allegations. The revelations in Armies and Weapons are the first to come from a source friendly to the apartheid regime.

Such deliveries would represent a major violation of the UN arms embargo and of US arms export regulations, which govern third-country sales by foreign producers of US-designed weapons. All the evidence suggests that very serious embargo violations are being allowed to continue, unchallenged by US officials.

More recently, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that Control Data Corporation of Minneapolis had supplied computer equipment for computer systems sold to the South African police. The systems were manufactured by International Computers Ltd., a British firm, which had also sold a computer to Atlas Aircraft Corporation of South Africa. Atlas produces aircraft for the South African air force. The Post-Dispatch report cited Control Data documents indicating that corporate officials were aware that ICL was supplying the equipment to South Africa and that such sales violated US export regulations. To date there has been no official action against Control Data for the embargo busting.

Bribes and Kickbacks

In addition recent evidence has come to light that not only did the South African government run a massive slush fund to buy influence around the world—the scandal known as Rhodesia—but that the South African state-controlled arms group, ARMSCOR, ran a secret defense fund far bigger than the Information Ministry's fund. The Observer in London reported earlier this year that now-Prime Minister P.W. Botha's Defense Ministry administered the fund and has been able to keep most of its transactions secret.

The Observer article, carefully researched by Anthony Sampson, charged that, according to international arms dealers, transactions with Pretoria also required kickbacks, which were usually paid to Swiss bank accounts. Ostensibly, the payments were made for the benefit of the Afrikaner secret brotherhood, the Broederbond, but according to Sampson, very frequently they actually benefited individual South African officials.
Goal Self-sufficiency

There is no question that there have been major Western violations of the UN arms embargo. But if the recent remarks of high South African officials can be taken as any indicator, South Africa is also becoming increasingly self-sufficient in weapons. And some of them are quite sophisticated.

Prime Minister Botha boasted in late April that South Africa had largely overcome the problem of the embargo. Among his claims, which were made before a session of parliament, Botha said that:

- South Africa was capable of producing its own helicopters.
- South Africa was already producing a new generation of missiles and a very sophisticated defensive missile system.
- South Africa had already put into naval use an initial number of high-speed missile carrying strike craft, built locally.
- A new, locally made 150 mm cannon, which compared favorably with the best in the world, was now in use.
- And the South African army was now using a new rifle, also produced locally.

Botha denied press reports that South Africa had acquired the 150 mm field gun abroad and had smuggled it into South Africa.

South African officials have bragged that ARMSCOR (The Armaments Development and Production Corporation) developed the cannon in less than two years from design to production. Pretoria’s generals found, as a result of their invasion of Angola in 1975, that their cannon in use at that time was inferior to those of their opponents in Luanda.

Unfortunately, little more information is available on South Africa’s production of helicopters or missiles, and tracking the role of Western technology, licenses and components is even more difficult than following the secret transfer of heavy equipment to South Africa.

It is known, however, that defense allocations in Pretoria’s 1979-1980 budget show a whopping 33 percent hike over the present fiscal year. Next year’s expenditures are budgeted for more than $2.1 billion.

South Africa has also begun the extensive development of black combat units under white officers, while the white draft is the highest it’s been since World War II. All these developments reflect the military’s increased contingency planning. Pretoria’s military specialists insist, though, that the buildup is purely defensive in nature. Neighboring states such as Zambia don’t need arms to protect themselves from attack from South Africa or Rhodesia, Botha told parliament in late April. In a classic example of double talk Botha called South Africa’s forces “peace forces,” which promoted good relations among South Africa’s various races.

Draft Resisters Defy Army

“My orders were to recruit Ovambos from neighboring villages to be spies for the South African army,” a recent deserter from the South African army told SAMRAF (South African Military Refugee Aid Fund) staff members in New York. “I realized finally just how directly I was acting against all that my conscience knew was right. I also knew that sooner or later the villagers would discover the spies, and that then they might mysteriously die one night. It happened regularly and here I was about to be indirectly by bribe responsible for the death of people with whom I had no quarrel.

“I refused, and after weeks of pressure to obey was about to be court-martialed for refusing orders. I escaped, and after a series of nightmare experiences am now seeking asylum in the United States.”

This deserter is one of tens of thousands of white South African youths who have voted with their feet and refused to participate in South Africa’s growing militarization. This build-up of military power is a development which poses a serious threat to the security of independent African states such as Tanzania, Angola, and Mozambique. It opposes the achievement of independence by the people of Namibia and Zimbabwe, and above all it is an instrument being prepared to destroy any effort by South African blacks to liberate themselves from apartheid.

Since the Soweto uprising in 1976 the army is increasingly being used alongside the police to maintain internal control of the population, as well as to patrol borders, to illegally occupy Namibia, and to carry out constant raids into neighboring countries which air the liberation struggle.

All White Men Drafted

All white men are subject to compulsory national service in South Africa and serve their training period in the Citizens Force. In 1977 the period of service was doubled to two years, to be followed by eight years of annual service in the Citizens Force, usually for a three-month period each year. Draftees can expect to do at least ten months “border duty,” which frequently means fighting against SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement inside Namibia.

Recruitment into the volunteer permanent force of the South African army has also increased by 80 percent between 1975 and 1978 and is still rising. In addition, commandos, a form of local militia, operate in almost every white community, and these groups are eager participants in regular counter-insurgency training exercises organized by the army. Ottosdal, a typical small white South African town boasts that only five percent of its men are not involved in either the Citizens Force or the commandos.

White school boys are compelled to undergo cadet training, and “youth preparedness,” a racist indoctrination with a heavy paramilitary bias, is a compulsory subject taught in schools.

Those Who Refuse

But not all white South Africans are willing to join in the tasks of aggression and repression.

According to official government figures, nearly 4000 men out of an annual draft of 20,000 failed to report for their military service call-up in 1978. The penalty for refusing service in the armed forces is three years detention, after which the detainee is again called upon to serve and can be jailed again in three year cycles until age 65.

There are already more than 1000 white men in jail for draft resistance. In addition, thousands more appear to be operating in a shadowy “underground,” because once having refused to report for service, they dare not go on living where they can easily be tracked. They cannot get a normal job because income tax law requires collaboration with Defense Force intelligence, and they cannot enroll as students anywhere in South Africa.

In addition to all these men, and the thousands who have fled in advance of the draft, there are numerous active soldiers, revolted by the things they were called on to do.

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Don Morton, an exiled South African, is a founding and staff member of SAMRAF based in NY. For further information write: SAMRAF, 138 Berkeley Place, Brooklyn, NY 11217.
Oil in the Caribbean

Desperate for oil, the South African apartheid regime has been looking worldwide for new oil trading partners. An oil refinery on a Caribbean island friendly to Pretoria could offer South Africa access to Latin American crude. Only Ecuador and Venezuela are members of OPEC, which enforces an oil embargo against South Africa. Other Latin American oil exporters including Mexico and Bolivia are not OPEC members and may allow sales to Pretoria.

A BBC report late in May claimed that a major agreement had recently been concluded between South Africa and the Caribbean island of Dominica which attained independence from Britain in 1978. In exchange for the right to build an oil refinery, a petrochemical plant, and a deep water harbor to move the oil, the South Africans are to provide Dominica with an international airport and hotels, purportedly to develop Dominican tourist trade. All construction would be financed by South Africa.

The central figure in this deal was self-styled leader and arms dealer, Sydney Benedict Alleyne. Originally from Barbados, Alleyne has frequently turned up in Africa. Finding big money in arms dealing, he worked for the Belgians in the Congo and the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola. In Mozambique he claimed to be a colonel in the Portuguese army.

Attempted Barbados Coup

In the mid-seventies, Alleyne returned to Barbados hoping to overthrow the government of Tom Adams and install himself as president. In late 1976 Alleyne chartered a small yacht in the West Indian island of St. Bartholomew, loaded it with rifles and dynamite, and sailed for Barbados. But word of his plans reached French police on Martinique, and he was arrested and sentenced to a year in prison.

Unsuccessful in his coup attempt in Barbados, Alleyne then turned his attention to the neighboring island of Dominica. In July 1975, Alleyne had made a deal with Dominican Prime Minister Patrick John and Foreign Minister Leo Austin to form the Dominican Development Corporation. Alleyne was to be in charge and responsible for funding. Alleyne made promises that his own bank, the Alleyne Mercantile Bank, would provide development funds.

But the Alleyne Mercantile Bank was no more than a conduit for Portuguese funds going to South America from Angola and Mozambique, and Alleyne couldn't pay his debts. The bank closed.

Nevertheless, upon his release from prison, Alleyne moved to London, still in charge of the Dominican Development Corporation. In September 1978, Alleyne contacted British mercenary recruiter, John Banks, notorious for mercenary connections throughout southern Africa. Banks was commissioned to draw up a new invasion plan for Barbados and was assured of four million pounds to spend for arms and 350 mercenaries.

Now Alleyne needed millions of dollars, both for the Dominican Development Corporation and for the invasion of Barbados. When interviewed recently by the BBC, Alleyne openly admitted that the South African government was ready to pay for the entire scheme.

But the invasion never took place. The plan was leaked to the British press and then-Prime Minister Callaghan sent British vessels to Barbados, warding off the planned invasion.

Oil Scheme

Failing again in Barbados, Alleyne turned once more to Dominica. He still had South African funding for the Dominican development scheme. South Africa wanted an oil refinery, either in Barbados or Dominica. And with Alleyne in control of either island, South Africa was assured of oil supplies. "I want to trade with South Africa," Alleyne told the BBC. "I respect South Africa, I admire South Africa's greatness, and I sympathize with South Africa's determination to determine her own internal policies."

South Africa received further assurance of oil supplies when, on January 18 this year, Alleyne wrote to G.L. Williams of the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation to confirm the "offer to buy for and sell crude oil to SASOL with the approval of the government of the Commonwealth of Dominica."

Although denying the connection, Dominican Prime Minister John and Foreign Minister Austin have also been involved in talks with the South African government. On February 6 Austin sent an official letter to G.J. Coetzee, commercial

Become a Sustainer to Southern Africa Magazine

Truman Dunn is a doctoral candidate in ethics at Union Theological Seminary and has been a research associate with the Africa office of the National Council of Churches.

Truman Dunn
The struggle will continue: One of the many militant students charged in the courts, gives the power salute after receiving a suspended sentence at the end of the "Soweto Eleven" trial in May.

Despite the veil of secrecy behind which South Africa attempts to hide political opposition, the rising number of political trials and convicted political prisoners indicates the continuing growth of the resistance.

Many trials go unreported, and many political opponents are not brought to trial. Instead they are held in detention for many months and then released. If they are tried it is often in tiny out-of-the-way places, out of sight of any reporters. But the occasional reports that do surface in the press indicate widespread opposition at many different levels.

Collecting evidence about political prisoners is also difficult because many so-called crimes carried out for political reasons, such as assaults on policemen and other government representatives or breaking curfews to attend meetings, are prosecuted as ordinary common-law crimes and not under political legislation. Thus, 132 people were hanged in 1978, but it is not clear how many of those convicted had been politically motivated in their actions.

Nevertheless, even under these constraints, the International Aid and Defense Fund publication Focus, reports that there were 550 political prisoners in South Africa in January 1979. A year earlier the reported number was closer to 440.

Almost 200 people were sentenced to a total of more than 688 years in prison in 1978 for political crimes. Of an additional 100 accused, 39 were acquitted or had their charges dropped. The rest were still on trial at the end of 1978.

The 1978 South African Department of Justice's annual report itself states that terrorism and sabotage cases are taking up increasing amounts of the attorney general's time. In 1978, 76 political trials were held under those laws. Thirty-two of those were under the Terrorism Act, twenty-two under the Sabotage, Internal Security, and Explosives Act. In February of this year, at least 14 political trials were in process, involving 55 people. Hundreds of political detainees were also being held under the Terrorism Act and the Internal Security Act.

Deaths of Detainees

Detainees are subjected to outrageous abuses at the hands of the authorities, and many have died while being held. Torture is common, as is constant physical and psychological abuse. Clauses in the Terrorism Act and the Internal Security Act allow for indefinite detention of state witnesses, suspects, or potential terrorists in total isolation, without any access to the outside world—no lawyer, family, or even doctors. Four of the co-conspirators named in the ongoing Bethal 18 case have died in detention. Their names are Dr. N. Ntshunsha, Samuel Malinga, Aaron Knoza, and Bonaventura Malaza. At least 50 political detainees have died in detention in recent years, the most famous victim being Steve Biko.

It is common practice in South Africa to hold individuals in detention under the most brutal conditions for months or even years, and then to persuade them to testify in cases, often against former friends and fellow workers. Even a few judges have admitted that evidence given by a ten-or-twelve-month detainee should be questioned very carefully.

One such man, Jairus Kgogong, was recently brought to court to testify about conversations he had with the accused in a political case. According to the prosecu-
tion, discussion had included a plan to leave the country for military training for the purpose of "returning to overthrow the regime by armed revolution," and studying Marxism for the purpose of "bringing about a social, economic, and political change." Kgosong testified that he in fact had conversations with the accused but never about those two topics. With considerable bravery he asserted in court that while his statement had been written down in jail, those two phrases had been inserted at the insistence of a policeman whom he named. He then produced in court the slip of paper, in the policeman's handwriting, carrying the two incriminating phrases. No one challenged the validity of his court statement, or denied that the policeman had indeed written those incriminating phrases, but Kgosong was himself charged with theft of government property, for stealing the piece of paper and obstruction of justice for changing his statement in court. He was convicted on both counts.

**Women in Jail**

Among the "recognized" political prisoners (people held or convicted under security legislation for their political beliefs) are a number of women, including the following:

- **Dorothy Nymba**, 48, sentenced to 15 years, in 1969 for participation and recruitment with the ANC.
- **Edith Thenjiwe Mbaile**, 50, sentenced to three years for distributing pamphlets for the ANC, in 1977.
- **Paulina Lekula**, 22, a Soweto student sentenced under the Sabotage Act for five years, in 1976.
- **Happy Joyce Mashamba**, 28, sentenced to five years for recruiting and membership in the ANC, in 1977.
- **Zandile Tshiki**, 24, a student from Port Elizabeth sentenced to five years under the sabotage Act, in 1976.
- **Esther M. Maleka**, 35, sentenced in 1976 to five years for recruiting for the ANC.
- **Josephine Bookholoane**, sentenced to 8 years under the Terrorism Act in 1979.
- **Mrs. Koleka Foley**, sentenced to three years under the Terrorism Act, with two years suspended, but she is now out on bail pending an appeal.
- **Mothopheng**, a founding member of the PAC. He spent two years in prison from 1961 until 1963 and upon his release was again sentenced to three years of hard labor. At the end of that sentence he was placed under house arrest.
- **Ganya** was arrested in 1977 in Soweto and previously served five years on Robben Island for being a PAC member.
- **Marc Shinners** is accused of being "the key PAC organizer in the Northern Transvaal and Pretoria area."
- **Hamilton Keke** was previously sent to Robben Island with his brother for involvement in "the widespread activities of Poqo" (the insurrectionary military wing of the PAC) in the Transkei and the Eastern Cape in the early sixties.

The other accused are: **Bennie Ntoele**, 38, **Michael Khala**, 24, **Alfred Ntshalintshali**, 47, **Julius Daniel Landinge**, 30, a former member of the Black People's Convention in the Western Cape. **Zolole Ndindwe**, 26, **Moffat Zungu**, 28, former photographer for the now banned World Newspaper. **Johnson Nyathi**, 22, **Jerome Kodisang**, 26, **Thembu Hlatshwayo**, 21, **Mothlagi Thlale**, 22, **Rodney Tsoletane**, 20, **Daniel Matsobane**, 31, and **Goodwill Moni**, 24. Zungu is accused of distributing PAC funds for internal operations and for "manning the PAC underground railroad."

On January 31, 1977, one of the accused, Johnson Nyathi, was thrown out of a window by security police during an interrogation in Krugersdorp. As a result he sustained injuries to his spine and legs and is now suing for $28,000 in damages.

According to the indictment, the accused engaged in mobilizing recruits for training outside of South Africa. These activities are said to have extended nationwide where meetings were secretly held, literature was circulated, and the accused "participated in and/or organized acts of terrorism relating to urban unrest."

**Bethyl 18**

This trial, which began over a year ago, is likely to become the longest of its kind in South Africa. The 50-page indictment which spans 14 years, claims that four of the principal accused tried to revive the PAC (Pan Africanist Congress) while imprisoned on Robben Island in 1963. The 18 accused are being charged with two major counts under the Terrorism Act. The indictment also names 92 co-conspirators, who are not currently charged, but many have been held in detention as witnesses for almost two years, and four have died in detention.

The principal defendants are Zeph Mothopeng, 65, a former president of the Transvaal Teacher's Association, John Ganya, 48, Marc Shinners, 37, and Hamilton Keke, 42.

Mothopeng is a founding member of the PAC. He spent two years in prison from 1961 until 1963 and upon his release was again sentenced to three years of hard labor. At the end of that sentence he was placed under house arrest.

Ganya was arrested in 1977 in Soweto and previously served five years on Robben Island for being a PAC member.

Marc Shinners is accused of being "the key PAC organizer in the Northern Transvaal and Pretoria area."

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In January 1979 Ndlovu was acquitted of charges that he was involved in the stoning of police in Atteridgeville in 1977. Ndlovu is the youth shot by then-Constable Kallie Knoetze (the now famous South African boxer) in 1977. His leg was later amputated as a result of the injury. Knoetze shot him after he was allegedly hit by a stone thrown by Ndlovu. According to Knoetze, "the boy tried to escape over the fence. I shot him while he was hanging there like a fly."

**Stanley Popliza Ndlovu**

Seven people are currently accused under the Terrorism Act of recruiting 75 youths for military training abroad under the auspices of the ANC between September 1977 and June 1978. At the conclusion of the trial in mid-April, Josephine Bookholoane was sentenced to eight years, Eric Ngeleza of Soweto was sentenced to ten years, M. Kalako, 22, was sentenced to nine years, and Mrs. Koleka Foley was sentenced to three years with two years suspended, but she is now out on bail pending an appeal.

**Port Elizabeth Six**

The Port Elizabeth Six, four men and two women, were alleged ANC members, accused under the Terrorism Act. The case opened January 29, 1979, in Humansdorp, with the six being accused of recruiting 75 youths for military training abroad under the auspices of the ANC between September 1977 and June 1978. At the conclusion of the trial in mid-April, Josephine Bookholoane was sentenced to eight years, Eric Ngeleza of Soweto was sentenced to ten years, M. Kalako, 22, was sentenced to nine years, and Mrs. Koleka Foley was sentenced to three years with two years suspended, but she is now out on bail pending an appeal.

**Ngobese and Six Others**

Seven people are currently accused under the Terrorism Act of recruiting 75 people for training abroad in Durban Regional Court. The seven are, Sithembiso Ngobese, 26, Thembu Nxumalo, 26, Nhlenla Ngidi, 25, Eric Mlaba, 26, Penuel Maduna, 26,
Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa's nominal assumption of power in what is now called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia late in May appears already to be an event akin to minority leader Ian D. Smith's declaration of an internal settlement on March 3 of last year. That is, little has been altered, now as then, as a result of the political shifts in Salisbury. There is still the problem of internal dissension among the black leaders who are parties to the settlement—all the more evident now that a "government" of black leaders has been declared. The threat of war, far from being reduced by the May "elections" and Muzorewa's premiership, is slowly but steadily increasing. White emigration, now at an annual rate of 5,000, continues to be a prime concern of white officials, in spite of a wait-and-see attitude reported among many whites. Finally, the trappings of Western-style democracy among Salisbury's new black elite have done little to persuade either the local or international communities that white power has been eliminated—or even altered.

Scarcely had Muzorewa been sworn in May 29 and his cabinet named the next day than Law & Order Minister Francis Zindoga, a Muzorewa appointee, was reporting a plot to assassinate the bishop by nine followers of the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, a partner in the internal accord. Sithole, after the May elections had been decided in Muzorewa's favor, was quick to call foul. Now the bishop was claiming that "innocent people were being tortured and killed" for supporting him, and implying strongly that Sithole, who claims to head a kind of internal ZANU, was responsible.

Further details of the alleged plot are unclear. It may be that either Sithole by assassination or Muzorewa by political sabotage are locked in an ongoing power struggle. What is evident, however, is that the internal jockeying for power that has characterized the administration since blacks joined with Smith last year has not let up.

Chikerema Split

Far more important than the Sithole plot, though, is the disunity within Muzorewa's own United African National Council (UANC) and its impact on the government. A notable absence among the bishop's cabinet appointments on May 30 was James Chikerema, a well-known nationalist and an important political part of Muzorewa's support. The rivalry between the two leaders finally broke into the open when Chikerema led seven other UANC parliament members out with him June 20 to form an opposition Zimbabwe Democratic Party—probably another Western-titled faction. Charges of tribal favoritism on Muzorewa's part were advanced by Chikerema—the two are from different subgroups of the larger Shona group—but the personal ambitions of the two remained evident. Although UANC officials said publicly that they "can hardly believe the defections can last two months," the move will undoubtedly be another blow to Muzorewa's hold on things. There was speculation in Salisbury that Chikerema's group will attempt to form an alliance with Sithole's followers, but even in the highly opportunist context of current internal Rhodesian politics this seems unlikely. Chikerema, expelled from ZAPU, then when Sithole headed the split which formed ZANU. There was a great deal of hostility between the two men. Later, in 1971 Chikerema, expelled from ZANU, then sought to form yet another organization, thus maintaining his opposition to the Sithole-led ZANU.

The Chikerema defection has caused Muzorewa immediate constitutional problems. Chikerema and the seven members of parliament who have formed the new party were all elected on the UANC ticket under a system of proportional representation. Muzorewa has argued that they should now resign their seats and allow

Bishop to South Africa

The Chikerema-led defection from Bishop Muzorewa's ruling UANC isn't the only development that may seriously undermine the bishop's ability to hold the internal settlement together in Rhodesia. In late June it was revealed that hardly two weeks had gone by with Muzorewa in office before he traveled to hold talks with his only likely ally—the South Africans. Muzorewa was in Pretoria in mid-June for four days of talks with Prime Minister P.W. Botha.

The primary topic on their agenda? South African press reports speculated that it was increased defense ties. Even before his election, Muzorewa was expected eventually to discuss matters of mutual military concern with Pretoria, but observers didn't think the meeting would come so soon.

One reason for the hastily convened discussions: so far Muzorewa's government has not been able to win diplomatic recognition from even the most conservative African governments. Those countries such as Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal and Malawi—considered most likely to welcome Muzorewa with open arms—each have taken subtle, and some not-so-subtle, steps to indicate their disapproval of Muzorewa. Only Zaire and Gabon are still considered likely to recognize the Salisbury government.

And with Muzorewa huddling with the gang in Pretoria so soon after taking office, who knows? Maybe Mobutu and Bongo might hold the line after all.
UANC members to take their place. They have refused, and legal experts in Salisbury have told Muzorewa that the new party is entitled to keep the eight seats, and is further entitled to two cabinet posts—which will mean that Muzorewa will lose control of these important positions.

Fighting Continues
Salisbury's war, meanwhile, does not appear to have slowed significantly since the Muzorewa government was installed—despite initial claims that the fighting would soon be over as members of the guerrilla forces responded to an amnesty offer and came home. Salisbury's military leaders now characterize their fighting strategy as "holding, not winning," with long-term military reserve strength clearly to the Patriotic Front's advantage. Even Salisbury officials now admit that the front's troop strength inside Rhodesia has doubled in the last year—13,000 by their estimates, 20,000 or more according to some nationalists.

Salisbury has reported a drop in the number of daily military incidents following the election, and these reports have been matched by others of high-level meetings between ZANU leader Robert Mugabe and his top military commanders. There are a number of possible reasons for these developments. Clearly there was a need to construct a strategy for dealing with any defectors enticed back home by Salisbury's latest offer of amnesty, extended immediately after Muzorewa took office. (The defectors seem to have been few, indeed.) It is also likely that there was a need to see how Salisbury would conduct its post-election military strategy. A number of sources in Washington expect the insecure regime to maintain or increase the level of fighting—including attacks into neighboring countries.

Hardly had President Carter announced his decision not to lift sanctions against Rhodesia in June (see page 4) than Lieut. Gen. Peter Walls, head of Rhodesia's combined military operations, predicted "a bloody awful few months ahead of us now." Walls predicted that front military activities would be especially severe in the weeks prior to the British Commonwealth Conference scheduled for August in Lusaka; he was anticipating a deliberate liberation movement show of strength which would serve to undermine further any argument being made about the legitimacy of the Muzorewa government.

Walls' remarks not only throw some light on the true extent of the war situation but also indicate the failure of the new administration's attempts to lure front fighters out of the bush.

Patriotic Front Unity
The Patriotic Front, meanwhile, took a

Continued on page 32

The Carter administration appears to be regaining the upper hand over Congressional conservatives on the issue of Rhodesia, with a policy recognizing the "new realities in Zimbabwe Rhodesia" following the election of Bishop Muzorewa.

President Carter's June 7 announcement that he would not lift sanctions against Rhodesia under the Case-Javits amendment was aimed at pleasing both liberals and moderates in Congress. His finding that the constitution leaves whites with a veto power and that the Patriotic Front was excluded from the April elections echoed statements that black leaders, and religious and union groups, had been making for months. On the other hand, Carter pointed to "very encouraging progress" in Rhodesia and called the actual voting in the elections "administered in a reasonably free way under the circumstances."

But administration statements since the President's speech have moved closer toward supporting the Muzorewa-Smith government. In testimony before both House and Senate committees in mid-June, Secretary of State Vance stressed that "there has been important movement toward majority rule. We must—and will—encourage further progress." In off-the-record discussions with journalists, other administration officials have stated more clearly that reforming or "democratizing" the current constitution and government structure is their only basis for hope that the Patriotic Front will not win control in Zimbabwe through armed struggle.

And subsequent administration actions in late June indicate that a process has begun that some are already calling creeping recognition. It was revealed that Muzorewa himself has been granted a visa and will be in the US probably on July 9 and 10. His precise schedule is not known, but he is expected to address the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to press for recognition of his government and the lifting of sanctions. White House officials have not ruled out the possibility of a meeting in the Oval Office.

At the same time, State Department officials announced that Jeffrey Davidow has been assigned to serve as a permanent but "unofficial" envoy to Salisbury, although a State Department spokesperson stressed that the move did not imply recognition of the Salisbury government.

Davidow, the new envoy, has a history which is likely to disturb critics of US policy. He began working for the State Department in 1969 and was then assigned to Guatemala, where he served under Ambassador Nathaniel Davis in a period of intense CIA activity.

Then Davis was assigned to Chile, and Davidow followed him. Davis was ambassador to Chile from 1971-1973, the period in which the CIA was financing the opposition which finally overthrew Allende in a bloody coup. CIA director William Colby later testified that Davis was fully aware of the counter-Allende moves.

In 1974, Davidow was sent to Pretoria, with responsibility for Rhodesia, at a time when Kissinger was beginning to display an interest in Africa. In 1976, Davidow was back at State, responsible for Mozambique, and later Rhodesia.

Earlier Allard Lowenstein, who has in recent months been acting as a full-time, self-appointed lobbyist on Rhodesia, expressed more bluntly the implications of this creeping recognition. "The administration should utilize this time to encourage the Muzorewa government to move toward genuine majority rule," Lowenstein told the press. "Then we will be doing the greatest possible favor to Bishop Muzorewa, by making his government acceptable to its neighbors. This isn't inconsistent with the government's needs or goals. We must encourage the process now underway."

In a statement reminiscent of Henry Kissinger, Lowenstein added that the US wants to show "that something besides revolution could end white domination in southern Africa." This stance is not surprising, given Lowenstein's record of civil rights work in the 1960's in Mississippi. Paul Coward in a 1968 Ramparts article de-
Survive, More Likely

described Lowenstein’s deep distrust for what he considered radical and conspiratorial influences on SNCC from the Southern Conference Education Fund (SCEF) and the National Lawyers Guild. Explained Coward, “Lowenstein regarded the progress that had occurred in America during the New Deal as a model for development that could be imposed on deprived and segregated societies everywhere, from Jackson to Johannesburg. And if substantial, radical change could always be brought about by democratic means, without bloodshed, it followed that revolutionaries presented as deep a threat to progress as did reactionaries.”

Lowenstein has taken the role of unofficial point-man for the administration since he observed the April elections as part of a Freedom House team that declared them “a significant advance toward multiracial and majority rule.” Lowenstein has reportedly lobbied more than 100 Congressional offices, met several times with both Secretary Vance and national security advisor Brzezinski, and traveled two times to Southern Africa to talk with Rhodesian politicians and leaders of the front-line states.

Lowenstein is trying to collect as many politicians as possible around a policy approach that he keeps as vague as possible. He claims that everyone from Senator Jesse Helms to Ambassador Andy Young really have the same goals on Rhodesia, and that tactical differences can be resolved in an “American all-parties conference” which he seems to be trying to orchestrate.

Congressional Shift

In response to the administration’s new tone of accommodation toward Muzorewa, the Congress has begun to turn toward leaving the Rhodesian sanctions issue up to the President. In June, a clause lifting sanctions by July 31 was tacked onto the Defense department authorization bill in the Senate. Although a majority of senators voted for the measure, 21 Senators had switched to the administration’s position in comparison with the 74-19 vote taken in May, which declared the Senate’s support for the Rhodesian election. While the 52-41 vote was a defeat, the 41 votes for the administration’s position indicated that the president had enough votes to uphold a veto of the defense bill, which Vance said would be “likely” if the Rhodesian language was retained.

Rustin Changes Line

It appears that Bayard Rustin is now singing a different tune with respect to the elections held in Zimbabwe during April.

Having gone to observe the elections as part of a Freedom House team, he returned to tell viewers of the nightly news MacNeil/Lehrer Report, “I think the election was more free than any I have observed in Africa. It was a major step toward the creation of a democratic, multi-cultural, multi-racial society in Africa.”

Yet a month later Africa News reported that in testimony before the House subcommittee on Africa, Rustin stated that he “did not feel the April elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia were free and fair.”

“I want to make it clear,” he added, “that I am not for lifting sanctions and walking somewhere, but for their use to bring about a democratic inter-racial society, if that is possible, and I do not know that that is all possible.”

Rustin’s testimony must have come as a real surprise to the Freedom House delegation under whose auspices he appeared before the subcommittee. Clifford Case, chairman of the board at Freedom House, had testified that the conclusions reached by the observer team sent to Rhodesia represented the consensus of all nine observers. In addition, the board of trustees for Freedom House, of which Rustin is a member, had adopted on May 7 a resolution calling for the lifting of all sanctions in force against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The explanation for Rustin’s about-face on the Rhodesian question is not found in his contention that he was “misquoted” by the press and some “reactionaries in the Senate.” His statements on the April 25 edition of the MacNeil/Lehrer report are proof enough of his initial stand on the elections in Rhodesia.

Perhaps Rustin’s reversal of his earlier position has more to do with the open letter written by William Lucy, president of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, in which he told Rustin that, “The ultra-right and conservative forces here and abroad could not have found a better spokesman. Since you claim to be a great supporter of civil and human rights, how can you in all good conscience explain rationally your remarks pertaining to the electoral process in one of the most repressive countries in the world?”

Or maybe Rustin’s testimony before the House subcommittee was shaped somewhat by the prior meeting he had with other black leaders. Reports reaching Southern Africa indicate that Rustin was read the “riot act” and convinced that he was out of step with the sentiments of the majority of black Americans. In this instance, the applicability of the expression “better late than never” is subject to debate.

A Turnaround

What explains the turnaround in the mood of the Congress? It is definitely not that a majority of members have been convinced that the April elections were fraught with intimidation and that the Muzorewa government is therefore illegitimate. It’s just that as the euphoria over the election has worn off, pragmatic foreign policy considerations are taking over.

Three concerns have emerged. First, members of Congress are taking seriously the opposition of African states to the new Rhodesian government, and are particularly sensitive to the importance of not antagonizing Nigeria, now the second largest oil supplier to the US. Gulf Oil’s vice president for exploration has been lobbying Gulf Coast Congressional delegates, urging the view that lifting sanctions might disrupt US supplies of crude oil. When a multinational corporation makes the point, Congress is unlikely to dismiss it easily.

Second, many politicians have been persuaded that it is foolhardy for the US to lift sanctions before the British take action. Conservative representative Erlenborn (R.-Ill.) linked these two issues together in a way politicians can understand, when he noted that when constituents are complaining about long gas-lines and Nigeria is threatening to punish the first country that lifts sanctions, why should we take Britain off the hook?

Third, it is becoming increasingly clear that Muzorewa cannot be counted on to stay in power in Rhodesia, much less guide the country toward the end of the war and a genuine solution. Two special representatives of Bishop Muzorewa are telling members of the House that they have information that 38 percent of the Patriotic Front guerrillas have deserted since the election. This absurd claim is not even supported by the regime’s own casualties figures, which show that the war has continued to escalate in the last two months. Muzorewa’s loss of a parliamentary majority as a result of Chikerema’s defection shortly before the House voted on the sanctions issue was a further blow to Muzorewa’s credibility.

These pragmatic arguments have convinced Congressional representatives with widely divergent views on Rhodesia to delay taking any action that would destroy the president’s flexibility. If Britain lifts sanctions in November, though, it will be very difficult to keep the Congress from following suit. In the meantime, both the US and Britain will be watching to see what happens in Zimbabwe.

C.R.
American Aircraft Break Rhodesia Sanctions Barrier

The arms embargo against Rhodesia has been in effect for more than 12 years. Yet the Rhodesia air force has expanded considerably in the past five years as the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe has spread. Of the approximately 180 aircraft in the Rhodesian air force's arsenal, one-third originated to some degree in the U.S. Until recently in air force's arsenal, one-third originated to some degree in the U.S. Until recently in

The presence of the OV-10 in Rhodesia was first reported in the Los Angeles Times in early 1977, but US officials denied that these plans had reached Rhodesia. But in 1978, the World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute stated that the plane had been added to the Rhodesian air force. The UN report cites industry sources who say the planes were shipped via Indonesia to Rhodesia. The report also quotes an unnamed US government official who said the US government assisted the transfer.

Finally the report documents the case of the Britten-Norman Islander/Defender patrol plane, some 14 of which had arrived in Rhodesia by 1977. Reports in various industry publications indicate that between six and 14 of these planes are now in Rhodesia.

Despite the seriousness of the UN report's allegations supported by considerable documentation, the report has not been made public, largely as a result of British opposition. Both the US and British delegations, in closed-door meetings of the sanctions committee, have criticized Gervasi's findings, and British hostility to the conclusions of the report have kept it bottled up in committee. Southern Africa has learned that in the two meetings held this year that discussed the report, the British representative to the sanctions committee called the report's material "tendentious," and said that the British delegation had strong reservations about Gervasi's continuing his research.

US response to the report has been more circumspect. The American delegate admitted that the US government had undertaken an investigation in the cases of the Bell helicopters and the Cessna aircraft. So far, though, no results have been made public. The US delegate denied that the Rockwell Broncos had reached Rhodesia. US criticism of Gervasi's report centered on its inability to explain how the aircraft were transferred to Rhodesia.

Both Jamson and Aerofrete have been under US investigation since December. Commerce Department officials say they were fooled into approving the sale of the helicopters, according to Africa News.

The Commerce Department says its investigation is continuing but that it has been stymied in its efforts to trace the complicated financial records of the deal.

In Rhodesia, one of the Bell helicopters has crashed since December, killing its poorly trained crew. The remaining ten helicopters are grounded pending additional training of personnel.

In an appearance before the sanctions committee in late May, Gervasi outlined the helicopter transfer. He also traced the transfer of 17 Siai Marchetti Warrior aircraft, an Italian aircraft with US engines that reached Rhodesia in 1977. Since his testimony, Gervasi's assertions on both planes have been corroborated by the BBC. The route leads from Turin, Italy, through Belgium, via Hamburg, to Durban.

All in all Gervasi doesn't think the West is serious about enforcing military sanctions. "Judging from the manner in which this affair has been handled," Gervasi said recently referring to the treatment of his report in the sanctions committee, "one is driven to the conclusion that the major Western powers are not interested in enforcing sanctions."
Diplomatic Stalemate

With the United Nations and South Africa hopelessly deadlocked over Namibia, the UN General Assembly voted in a specially extended session in late May in favor of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa.

The vote—without a single negative ballot cast—came at the end of the week-long session, which was started at the outset by South Africa's unsuccessful attempt to regain the General Assembly seat it lost in 1974. The Assembly also called for increased economic and military aid to SWAPO.

Because the General Assembly cannot take its own effective action, the resolution calls upon the Security Council to "convene urgently to take enforcement measures against South Africa." African representatives had hoped to hold a Security Council meeting soon after the Assembly completed its work on May 30. But the Council meeting has been delayed until at least after the OAU meeting in Liberia in mid-July. In the meantime the stalemate over Namibia continues.

Regardless of when the Council eventually meets, the chances of any effective enforcement measures being taken are nonexistent. Western representatives, including US Ambassador Andrew Young, may have joined in condemning South Africa's unwillingness to implement the UN plan for elections and independence in Namibia—"Our intense opposition to apartheid needs no restating," Young said at one point. "...and our position on the illegal nature of South Africa's occupation of Namibia is likewise a matter of record"—but on the vote the US, nevertheless, abstained as did the other Western powers that negotiated the UN plan. No one at the UN expects the West to permit a resolution calling for sanctions against South Africa to make it through the Security Council without a veto.

SWAPO Angry

SWAPO's representatives at the UN debate were extremely angry with Young's position. In his final remarks, Young condemned both South Africa and SWAPO for contributing to the stalemate. After scoring Pretoria for its attacks against Angola, its move toward an internal settlement, and its repression of SWAPO inside Namibia, Young turned his attention to the liberation movement.

"Similarly, difficulties have been created by SWAPO," Young declared, "notably their loudly voiced mistrust of the West, baseless charges of malfeasance, absurd claims such as a call for a one-sided cease-

fire so that hundreds of their forces might pass freely into Namibia."

Previously, the Western five, including the US, had complimented SWAPO on its acceptance of the plan and its willingness to compromise. Young's charges were a clear turnabout, and SWAPO's UN representative, Theo-Ben Gurirab was furious.

"This statement is clearly unfair, misdirected, and provocative," Gurirab said, "for it seeks to put our legitimate interests for genuine liberation on an equal footing with the colonial claims and preposterous demands of Botha and his fellow racist gangsters. This is the kind of propaganda exercise which consistently links the five in duplicity with the Pretoria racists. And we will continue to expose and denounce them for what they really are—defenders and protectors of their combined interests in southern Africa."

SWAPO president Sam Nujoma, in New York for the Assembly debate, echoed this sentiment. Southern Africa asked Nujoma if he thought the West had done enough to pressure Pretoria to accept the UN plan. Nujoma answered no. "Frankly speaking," Nujoma said, "if the US, Britain, France, and West Germany impose economic sanctions against South Africa, that regime will fall to its knees within a short time. If there is a will on the part of the Western powers, they should support economic sanctions. Then we'll see that they are doing their level best."

South Africa Ousted Again

The end of the Assembly's debate brought no surprises, but no one expected it to begin the way it did. Because of its policy of apartheid, South Africa had been ousted from its General Assembly seat in 1974. But on the morning of the opening session of the Namibian debate, there was Pretoria's delegation, headed by Adriaan Eksteen, quietly sitting in the seats that had been vacant for almost five years. The action took everyone by surprise and was to provide what little drama the session saw.

Apparent the first to notice the South Africans' presence was the SWAPO delegation. Soon the news was being whispered around the conference room. By the end of the first day's session, the Africa group had caucused, the matter was referred to the credentials committee, and the following day, the whole Assembly voted overwhelmingly to remove South Africa once again.

Only the Western nations voted to allow South Africa to remain. "We must agree to talk with those with whom we disagree," said US Ambassador Young, arguing in Continued on page 26

More Repression

Information from inside Namibia is scant these days, but the little there is reveals a pattern of increasing repression.

Almost 70 SWAPO leaders inside Namibia who were arrested in a countrywide round-up in late April are still in detention. Among them are several prominent church leaders, one of whom is Rev. Bartholomew J. Karuaera of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. Karuaera is a member of the executive of the Council of Churches in Namibia and attended the March "proximity talks" in New York as part of a church delegation. That delegation met with representatives of the Western five, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

In mid-May, the South African police raided the offices of the Council of Churches in Namibia. The police confiscated books, photostated articles, files, memoranda, video cassettes, tapes, photographs, negatives, and posters.

The Council of Churches, only a week before in an open letter to Administrator General Marthinius Steyn, had protested the detention without trial of SWAPO and church officials.

Several days later Steyn responded to the church protest. Calling Namibia "undoubtedly a well-ordered and democratic body politic," Steyn wrote that individual rights "must yield to the higher and more general interest, and, if necessary, be sacrificed for the preservation thereof."

Steyn said that the actions of the detainees "mortally imperilled the commonweal. The interests of our New Society consequently required some stringent restraint being put on them. That is why they were detained."

Steyn did not specify the "actions" of the detainees that mortally imperilled the commonweal. So far none of the detainees has been charged with any crime.

Throughout this spring, the South African Defense Force has undertaken actions of its own in northern Namibia. Details are not only unavailable outside the territory, but newspapers inside Namibia can't even tell the story on what has been going on. In early May the front-page of the weekly Windhoek Observer was heavily censored under orders from the defense force, which in effect ordered the printers to stop the presses. According to the Observer, the army had "flatly refused to clear the true facts of what is happening."

A blackout on South African army activities in northern Namibia continued through May, a period of time when the government of Angola reported repeated South African air and ground attacks across the Namibian border.

Continued on page 26
New from
Ravan Press/
Hans Zell Publishers Limited

Ahmed Essop
The Hajji and other Stories.
1978 120 pages £2.95/$6.00 paper ISBN 0-86975-091-7
"Ahmed Essop is a natural master of the story-teller's art with a fine feeling for situation, character and atmosphere. Though never evasive where the harsh social realities of his chosen scene are concerned, his writing is gentle and balanced in spirit with humour and compassion bringing various levels of comedy and tragedy into his scope. This emotional richness, as well as the vivid variety of his scene, is reminiscent of V. S. Naipaul, whose fiction Essop admires." --from the foreword by Lionel Abrahams

Belinda Bozzoli, editor
1979 ca. 220 pages ca. £3.30/$7.00 paper ISBN 0-86975-082-8
A multi-disciplinary collection of original research papers, this book is based upon the premise that an understanding of the Witwatersrand region is important not only because it was the 'crucible of modern South African capitalism', but also because of its unique system of class relations. It covers four general themes 'Township Life and Protest', 'Cultural Alternatives to Hegemony', 'Worker Organization and Action' and 'Structures of Control'. Contributors include P. L. Bonner, Robin Cohen, Rob Davies, F. A. Johnstone and A. W. Stadler.

Eddie Webster, editor
Essays in Southern African Labour History. (Ravan Labour Studies, 1)
This book is the first in a series of readers on labour studies in Southern Africa. It brings together a number of major contributions that have appeared in past issues of the South African Labour Bulletin, grouped by five themes, each with an introductory commentary: (i) informal resistance on the mines, (ii) the class character of the Industrial Conciliation Act, (iii) the assault by Afrikaaner nationalism on the trade union movement, (iv) the history of early Southern African labour history, and, (v) the origins of the Trades Union Congress of South Africa.

Pierre Hugo, editor
Quislings or Realists? A Documentary Study of 'Coloured' Politics in South Africa.
1978 744 pages £16.50/$33.00 cloth ISBN 0-86975-067-4
This is the first major study of its kind, offering invaluable information on contemporary 'Coloured' politics in South Africa. The tide encapsulates the main issue of the recurring debate: are those who seek to avail themselves of the limited instruments of power accessible to the 'Coloured' people under the doctrine of separate development merely political realists, or are they actually traitors to their community? By drawing heavily upon original documents, many never previously published, this book vividly illustrates the policies and strategies of all the major political forces involved in 'Coloured' politics in South Africa from 1945 to the turbulent 1970s.

J. Lukas de Vries
Mission and Colonialism in Namibia.
1978 216 pages £5.95/$12.00 cloth, £3.50/$7.00 paper ISBN 0-86975-071-2 cloth ISBN 0-86975-073-9 paper
Can the Christian mission in Namibia come to terms with the past—in which it too often became the servant of colonial might—and begin to realize its goal of spiritual liberation in helping to shape the future of an independent Namibia? Lukas de Vries, one of Namibia's foremost Christian leaders, sets out to capture the historical perspective, without which no answer to this complex and urgent question can be attempted. This topical study encompasses both the social and political history of the Church and State in Namibia, as well as the theological issues centred on Luther's perennially controversial doctrine of the two kingdoms.

Some forthcoming Ravan titles (to be published during the course of 1979)

Frank Molteno
South Africa after Soweto—A new internal dynamic?
Mothobi Mutloatse
Biko—Feelings for a brother

Mutuzeli Matshoba
A Glimpse of Slavery. (Short stories)
Yvonne Burgess
Say a Little Mantra for Me. (Her third novel)

Christopher Hope
Short Stories

Hans Zell Publishers Limited · 14a St Giles · PO Box 56 · Oxford OX1 3EL · England
Telephone (0865) 512934
Ukubamba Amadolo: Workers' Struggles in the South African Textile Industry
Bettie du Toit
(Onyx Press, London, 1978)
L1.60/$3.50 approx.

South Africa's industrial workers have been drawn from a highly varied population with differences going well beyond those of color and economic status. Deliberate political and ideological manipulation of divergent cultural and ethnic factors has fostered many of these divisions. Their further entrenchment through legislation has subjected workers to widely disparate and unequal conditions, rendering the overriding common experience as an industrial labor force opaque.

Bettie du Toit's *Ukubamba Amadolo* is an account of the experiences of one section of South African industrial workers—the textile workers. Perhaps because the author's perspective is that of a trade unionist, the broader historical context of South Africa's development is sadly lacking. This makes for demanding reading. However, this short book provides many valuable insights into the ways that cultural and ideological factors have fed directly divergent perceptions and consequent choice of action among these workers. These have resulted in a divided labor force—precisely as government and entrepreneurs intended.

In the mid-1930's, there were twelve textile companies operating in South Africa, employing 2500 people, 65 percent white and 40 percent women. The majority of white women came from rural Afrikaner families, forced by poverty into the towns to seek employment. Ms. du Toit was one of these. She quickly rose among the ranks in a fight against abysmal wages and appalling working conditions and became an organizer for the non-racial Textile Workers' Industrial Union (TWIU) established in 1935.

Her early efforts among Afrikaner women in the smaller Cape towns produced an enthusiastic membership. Appeals to racial prejudice from the greyshirts (Afrikaner fascists) and Nationalists did not deter these women from joining a non-racial union. However, when these political elements threatened to bring their ally, the Dutch Reformed Church, to their aid, the women withdrew.

As the central institution of community life in these towns, the Church exercised enormous power. "It needed only a visit from the predikant (priest) to the girl's parents, or the threat that there would be no accommodation in the hostel, and the girls were forced to resign." By the 1960s these workers had become members of the racially-exclusive Blanke Tekstielwerkers Nywereheidsunie, (White Textile Workers Industrial Union.)

There were, undoubtedly, many cases where racism and a fear of being undercut by cheap black labor played the main role in driving whites into racially exclusive unions. But this sort of evidence in du Toit's book challenges conventional wisdom's claim that these were the sole causes for the success of Afrikaner nationalism, by providing pointers to other factors which determined choices and actions.

Experiences among black textile workers too showed a variety of responses to economic exploitation and government oppression. In 1952, African textile workers in Kingwilliamstown in the Cape went on strike after repeated attempts by the union to negotiate for higher wages. "The employers sent recruiting agents through the Transkei and Ciskei, so-called Bantu Homelands, where there was a mass of unemployed black workers, but not one of them accepted the jobs offered them. They had heard of the strike, and did not wish to scab on their fellow tribesman."

Six years later however, in 1958, when Africans struck in Port Elizabeth, employers found their efforts to obtain labor from the Ciskei rewarded. The following year, Zulu workers from the Umbumbulu Reserve went on strike. "They never openly picketed but were always to be found mingling with the passers-by, speaking to them and persuading them not to accept work. They were successful. There were no scabs."

The author does not make clear what causes lay behind these differences in the ability of workers to generate solidarity. Whether they were a result of relative degrees of impoverishment between different reserves, or proximity of factories to the reserves, allowing for greater mobility between the two and hence closer ties amongst kin is left unexplored. What is clear though is their differing effects on the success of workers' actions and consequent morale.

Theory has it that industrialization will result ultimately in a confrontation between those who own and reap profits and those who don't and labor to produce them. The failure by workers to gain true cognizance of this basic division, preventing them from uniting to eradicate it and making them prey to divisive manipulation within their own ranks has been attributed to "false consciousness." Perhaps nowhere more than in South Africa, with its rapid industrial growth, have so many complex categories within those two camps developed, providing evidence that the distinction between reality and workers' consciousness cannot be dismissed so summarily.

In selecting one aspect of Bettie du Toit's book, the intention has not been to ignore others of equal significance: the intimate collusion between government and bosses; the extent of foreign investment, much of it in the reserves where even minimum wage levels were exempt; the tremendous courage and enthusiasm in militant action by workers in the face of police brutality, imprisonment and bannings of successive leaders. Rather, the purpose has been to draw attention to those factors which have played a vital but often overlooked role in shaping workers' struggles in South Africa, and which even this trade unionist author has merely described in passing rather than examined closely.

Apartheid is not now nor has it ever been a monolithic, unchanging system. It has undergone many adjustments to promote the interests of state and private enterprise. By the 1960's, the textile industry had grown to 104 establishments, employing 29,142 workers of whom 70 percent were African, the white proportion having dropped to 10 percent. But it would be incorrect to view the entire South African labor force as consisting of white, skilled workers, protected by their enfranchisement, on the one hand, and a crushed, undifferentiated black proletariat on the other. Divisions within ranks continue to evolve on both sides of the color bar, again allowing for manipulations of workers and preventing unity.

"Whether Bettie du Toit's prescription for "ukubamba amadolo"—a national industrial go-slow—would produce the effects she hopes for, the collapse of the apartheid system, remains to be seen. What is certain however is that without an accompanying political consciousness-raising, which she recognizes as vital, industrial action and resulting political change remain hampered. Hopefully her book with its proud as well as illuminating record of the textile workers' struggle will find its way back to South Africa and to those of whom she has written.

A Bend in the River
V.S. Naipaul
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1979, 288 pp.)
$8.95

Progress in fiction about Africa requires two things. Outsiders cannot all be presented as civilized and sensible; Africans cannot all be portrayed as savage and irra-
Diplomatic Stalemate continued from page 23

favor of the principle of universal representation regardless of the nature of the government involved. "We need have no fear [that South Africa's representative] will convince us of the acceptability of apartheid or of the legitimacy of South African occupation of Namibia."

But the Africans, even those representatives from the most pro-Western nations on the continent, didn't buy that argument. For them, noted the Liberian ambassador, "the issue is one of substance, not form." The government in Pretoria does not represent the people of South Africa, the Africans argue. Pretoria's representatives, therefore, don't have the right to participate in the Assembly.

This time it was the South African's turn to be furious. Eksteen said the Assembly's action "made a mockery" of the UN Charter, and he indicated that the move meant that there was little hope left of South Africa's accepting the UN plan. "The denial of the right to be heard," Eksteen said, "has frustrated effectively that degree of understanding which is essential to any form of collaboration whatsoever. The attempts to silence South Africa showed conclusively that a majority in the General Assembly is bent on promoting confrontation rather than cooperation and seeking a settlement of the South-West Africa/Namibia problem on the basis of the bullet rather than on the basis of the ballot."

But the South African reaction was hardly a bombshell. Many UN observers thought that South Africa had expected, and even hoped for, such a move on the part of the Assembly. Pretoria will use the action as an excuse to rule out, in effect, any cooperation with the UN, but Pretoria had already reached that point months before. South Africa's tactic, most observers agree, will be to continue to say that the door is open to further cooperation. But the Africans, even those of the United Nations, don't have the right to participate in the Assembly. Pretoria's representatives, therefore, don't have the right to participate in the Assembly.

That is just what Pretoria did on the eve of the General Assembly debate when South African officials opened the first session of Namibia's "national assembly" in Windhoek.

The West still maintains that there is hope for a negotiated settlement, but if the vote in the Assembly is any indication, few representatives from any other countries agree. By late June South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha was in London to discuss Namibia with the new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. But one African representative summed it up best by saying, "They'll continue to say there's hope until the day South Africa declares its own brand of independence in Namibia."

The first of these hurdles was reached at the start of the century in Conrad's Heart of Darkness. In that story a European, Kurtz, went deep into Africa only to find that he had neither the restraint nor the faith necessary to accomplish his purposes. Conrad used the African jungle as a metaphor for all that was wrong and rotten in humanity's ambitions. On his deathbed Kurtz rambled, "I had immense plans . . . I was on the threshold of great things," and then just before he died he saw the empty brute he really was and he cried, "The horror! The horror!"

Conrad's short novel has spawned a lot of successors; the most recent example is by the Trinidad-born writer V.S. Naipaul. A Bend in the River is also the story of an outsider who travels deep into the Congo jungle and finds the very opposite of salvation. The novel's hero is Salim, a young man of Indian ancestry, born in a place much like Zanzibar. Salim comes of age just as the first wave of independence washes over Africa. He buys a shop in a town much like Kisangani (then called Stanleyville) and journeys there to "the bend in the great river," to seek his fortune. Slowly the town begins to recover from the upheavals of independence. The Vietnam War brings a boom to the copper mines in the south, and this influx of money makes Salim, if not rich, at least well to do. Then the boom fades, the people become restless, and to shore up his position, companies like Salim's are "radicalized" (partly nationalized, partly Africanized). Salim is ruined.

Salim, however, makes no personal discovery to match Kurtz's. After his failure, Salim's understanding of his fate is no more profound than the simple plaint: it's not my fault. The Africans in Naipaul's story are just as frightened and savage as those in Conrad's tale, but this time there is no tempering recognition that the world beyond the jungle is equally brutal.

The notion at the heart of Naipaul's novel is that the fault, dear reader, is not in ourselves but in Africa. It is a profoundly disturbing theme. Those optimists who thought we had gotten beyond Conrad's myth and believed we were now ready for a novel which would brave the second hurdle in fictional thinking about Africa, must now contemplate the fact that we are no longer even up to the level of Conrad's vision. This book, which has been well received in all the major literary reviews, does not have a single outsider who is a savage or a single pure-blood African who isn't.

In part the critics' praise stems from Naipaul's prose skills. His style is first rate; he never uses a wrong word or misses a beat. His characters are all well drawn and sharply described. It will be hard to think about acquaintances in African towns without recalling some of these characters. And Naipaul's gift for presenting local color is remarkable. His details are always right, and the setting has the feel of an African town in a way most books never manage.

Yet critics know that in the end fine writing, a credible array of minor characters, and an eye for the details of a setting are not enough for a novel. If novels are about anything, they are about people and how they are changed by circumstance. At the end of a novel something at the personal core of the central character must be so different that if he were suddenly plunged back into the beginning of the story, the story itself would be different. Salim undergoes no such change. His financial ruin is only a change in his external condition. If he were more profoundly altered, however, it would indicate that his fate was the fruit of his own character instead of his African setting. As it stands, all of Salim's failings can be explained as part of the African disease, something outsiders escape by escaping Africa. Only the blacks—and the ordinary village African is quite invisible in this story—seem somehow hopelessly bound to the savage and irrational rot of the Naipaul setting.

We are left, therefore, with the suspicion that much of the praise for this book is really praise for its portrayal of Africa as a place which corrupts the work of every outsider, no matter how good his intentions. How comforting that theme is to the disappointed. It's not our fault, says the Belgians, the Portuguese, the French, and the British. It's not our fault, say the merchants in the book—the Indians and Pakistanis, the Greeks and Italians. Sure not my fault, says Ian Smith. It wasn't my fault, says Vorster, resigning. 'Tweren't Salim's fault, agree the others. Pretoria's representatives, therefore, don't have the right to participate in the Assembly.

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Edmund Blair Bolles
Edmund Blair Bolles is a freelance writer who has lived in Tanzania. He is author of the travel book Animal Parks of Africa.

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"Six Days in Soweto" was made one year after the June 1976 uprisings. The documentary, produced by Anthony Thomas of British ITV, recreates six days of the student rebellion. From interviews with students, teachers, and parents a story emerges of the "children's crusade that has changed South Africa forever."

To highlight the oppressive conditions experienced by Soweto's 1.5 million residents, the documentary juxtaposes scenes of the township with the extravagant and frivolous lives of the one million whites living in modern Johannesburg, 15 miles away. It creates a strong feeling of empathy for the downtrodden and courageous black students.

Built by the white government in the 1950's to ensure the supply of black labor to the country's most industrialized city, Soweto is a dense concentration of people, isolated from Johannesburg where most of its inhabitants work. The adults trek into the city each day, leaving behind their children who bear the responsibilities of adults as they work hard for the family—cooking and collecting water from outdoor faucets, caring for their younger brothers and sisters.

"They are not children," Thomas points out. "They are men and women." Yet the apartheid system, while forcing them to take on responsibilities beyond their years, denies them the rights of children and then refuses to recognize them as men and women when they reach adulthood.

The film exposes the iniquitous system of "bantu" education, described by Soweto students as "an educational system of slavery." Free and compulsory education is provided for white children with an expenditure of $500 per year for each child. In contrast the government spends only $40.00 per year for each black child's education, which is neither free nor compulsory. Hence, only a small percentage of children have access to education, and once in school, they receive a markedly inferior education in keeping with the assertion of the late Prime Minister Verwoerd that "all you need the black child to learn is the ability to understand the white master." This is vividly portrayed in one scene where a teacher proudly demonstrates to her girl students how to rub clothes white in cold water wash.

The anger of black students toward this education sparked the uprisings that swept the nation. One of the flaws of the film is its depiction of the rebellion as a spontaneous uprising. In fact its roots can be traced to the long history and tradition of black resistance to white rule. While failing to provide a substantial historical context for the revolt, Thomas does capture the drama of the actual events. Scenes are shown of students wrecking and setting on fire such symbols of oppression as Bantu Administration offices, libraries, and beer halls while at the same time demanding an end not only to bantu education but to the system of apartheid itself.

In response the white ruling structure unleashed an uncontrolled wave of violence as the police and paramilitary gunned down children who could only defend themselves empty-handed or at most with sticks, stones, and the lids of metal garbage cans. Any child in a school uniform became a target.

Two maimed girls tell their stories. One describes how she was shot when returning from a visit to her uncle, and although she is now paralyzed from the waist down, she reassures herself, and us, that she can still use her head.

The other had her legs amputated after she was shot at a funeral of students killed by the police. But she will not be deterred from continuing the fight. "The black man must fight," she says, "They can kill us but not all of us. We will die till we get our freedom."

The effect on the students, many still children, has been devastating. One school principal expresses his anguish: "The children, many of them have been ruined."

The students—15,000 strong—had to contend with more than armed police and soldiers. They were attacked as well by Zulu migrant workers. These workers are among the lowest paid of all and frustrated by their conditions, became easy prey to police enticement to attack the students. While the pro-government press used the Zulu attacks as evidence of "black savagery" and "tribalism," Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of the Zulu bantustan, produces evidence to show that the so-called "Zulu attacks" were not spontaneous but were orchestred by the police.

The film portrays Buthelezi as a critic of the ruling structure, ignoring his position as a paid participant in the grand design of "separate development" and thus an objective upholder of the bantustan policy. As such he has proved a skillful ambassador for apartheid. In fact it is the very students whom he appears to be supporting in the film who have denounced him vehemently as a "puppet on a string." The film makes no mention of this.

Against the backdrop of the brutal attacks on the "children of Soweto," the everyday lives of white South Africans provide a stark contrast. Some are unaware of where Soweto is situated. Many like to consider that their lives have been unaffected by the existence of this township, unmarked on many maps. From the lawn of her luxurious suburban home, one distraught Johannesburg woman declares that she found "the attitudes of the blacks terrifying, with their amandla [black power] sign." Her response was to rush out to buy a gun—something that most whites had already done.

"Six Days" is a convincing documentary of the legitimacy and inevitability of the 1976 student rebellions. But the film lacks a broader context. It fails totally to show the West's involvement in the South African economy. Rather it implies that apartheid is created and maintained solely by a repressive minority regime. It ignores the role that Western countries have consistently played in backing up the white government, rescuing the economy in times of crisis with massive bank loans, aiding the country in attaining military self-sufficiency despite a UN arms embargo, and helping it develop its own nuclear capabilities.

Despite these limitations, "Six Days" is a compelling film and a valuable educational tool for schools, colleges, churches, and community organizations.

Pippa Franks

"Six Days at Soweto" can be obtained from the Southern Africa Media Center, California Newsreel, 630 Natoma Street, San Francisco, CA 94103. (415) 621-6196. It is in 16mm color, 55 minutes long, and rents for $75.00.

JULY/AUGUST 1979/SOUTHERN AFRICA 27
Bank Campaign Calls for UN Action

On June 6, the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid heard testimony from four representatives of groups working to end bank loans to South Africa. Activists from the United States, Britain, and Canada discussed the progress of their organizations in the campaign to end all financing of apartheid by banks and made recommendations to the Special Committee as to how the United Nations, in keeping with its anti-apartheid stance, could support the bank campaign.

Reverend David Haslam, representing the London-based End Loans to Southern Africa group, referred to the system of apartheid as a “monster” which is fed by bank loans from the Western countries. Outstanding loans to South Africa totalled $8.6 billion by the end of 1977. Reverend Haslam pointed out that despite the prevailing myth that apartheid could never be destroyed, international opinion would have an effect on South Africa’s policies. He suggested four ways to “poison the monster,” including a worldwide boycott and international days of action against the two largest South African banks, Barclays and Standard Chartered, and increased pressure on banks through organizations such as the UN, the OAU, and the World Council of Churches. While pressure from anti-apartheid groups has forced British and American banks to cut back on their lending to South Africa, Rev. Haslam said, the amount of loans from West Germany and Switzerland continues to increase.

Canadian Actions

A report on the bank campaign in Canada was given by Pat Baker, a representative of the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa. Baker said that Canadian banks make few disclosures concerning their loans, but it was known that at least seven federally chartered banks are involved in lending to South Africa. Bank campaign actions in Canada have included withdrawal of funds in these banks by student organizations, trade unions, and churches, and national days of action against the banks.

Tim Smith, director of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, pointed out that loans to the private sector and trade-related financing have increased. He also warned that the UN was compromising its anti-apartheid stance by having its own pension fund invested in banks and corporations doing business with South Africa.

George Houser, director of the American Committee on Africa, talked about the role of correspondent banking relationships, which are arrangements made between banks to provide banking services and credit facilities. In the South African context such arrangements play an important role in financing apartheid. He singled out Chemical Bank which continues to provide funds to South Africa and pointed out that the bank was in the unique position of actually having a branch inside the United Nations headquarters in New York.

Houser stressed that “any underwriting of the South African economy must be ended for genuine change to take place.” He said that there was no such thing as a “better bank,” which makes constructive loans to South Africa. All lending to South Africa, to the state or private enterprise, supported and strengthened apartheid, and must be ended.

Following on the day’s hearings the Special Committee wrote three letters to Secretary-General Waldheim, requesting him to obtain information from Chemical Bank on its activities in South Africa, asking whether the United Nations Pension Fund owned securities in banks or corporations doing business in South Africa. The letter also stated its intention to ask for information regarding banks used by UN agencies. In addition the Committee decided to issue a press statement reaffirming UN opposition to all bank loans to South Africa, expressing its continued support of campaigns by non-governmental organizations against loans to South Africa. The Committee also decided to send a letter to the Permanent Representative of Japan regarding loans to South Africa by Japanese banks in other countries.

US Coordinator Appointed

US opposition to bank lending to South Africa is growing, and new plans are being made for future organization-building.

The Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (COBLSA), which is currently sponsored by the American Committee on Africa, and Clergy and Laity Concerned, has a new coordinator, Dumusani Kumalo. Kumalo, a journalist who is in exile from South Africa, recently completed a ten-week tour of campuses in the US. COBLSA and about 50 related groups from the US, Canada, and Europe will be holding their annual meeting on the bank campaign in Minnesota on July 21-22.

The bank campaign in the US has had a number of recent successes. Yale University divested $1.6 million from Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. because of its policy of lending to South Africa. Voters in Berkeley, California passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of city funds from banks doing business with South Africa.

Washington Campaign Initiated

A new local bank campaign started in Washington, DC, on June 15 in commemoration of the Soweto uprising. The DC Bank Campaign is demanding of the city’s largest bank, Riggs National Bank, that it end loans to South Africa and to Chile, and end redlining in DC. It is the first local campaign in the country that has combined these three demands; it’s also the first to base its charges against the bank entirely on internal bank documents. Although Riggs has refused to confirm or deny it, the campaign has evidence that Riggs has provided more than $70 million in credits to the Chilean military missions in the US, and at least $1 million dollars in credits to ISCOR, the South African state-controlled Iron and Steel Corporation. In the predominantly black areas of the district, Riggs lent less than $4 million for home mortgages in 1977, although it held $68 million in deposits from those communities.

The campaign opened with a press conference which included a member of the DC city council, the vice president of the Coalition of Black Trade Unions, and Dumusani Kumalo, national co-ordinator of the bank campaign. More than $42,000 was withdrawn from Riggs on June 15 by 20 individuals and a few small organizations, and more than 50 people protested Riggs’ policies in picket lines at two branches. The DC Bank Campaign is initiated by the Washington Office on Africa, a local United Church of Christ task force on southern Africa, and Non-Intervention in Chile.

TerriAnn Lowenthal

TerriAnn Lowenthal is a student intern with the American Committee on Africa. She studies African studies at Cornell University, and has played an active role in organizing campus awareness in the role played by US corporations in South Africa.
Research Groups Meet in Amsterdam

Late in May representatives of Southern African liberation movement research departments and European support groups met in Amsterdam, Holland, to discuss the research needs and objectives of liberation movements. The meeting was convened by the Transnational Institute, the European branch of the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies.

The meeting followed a similar gathering held in New York at the end of April convened by IPS, Transafrika, and the Association of Concerned African Scholars of the African Studies Association. The New York meeting brought together about 30 different students, professors, and activists. The objective of both meetings was to identify the areas in which research was already underway, the ways in which new work could supplement the informational needs of the movements, and the methods by which materials once produced could be channeled to the liberation movements.

Representatives from the US, Germany, Holland, and France, and from the ANC, ZAPU, and SWAPO attended the two-day Amsterdam meeting.

The ANC research department underscored the need to examine the structure and mechanics of the South African system, to build a clear picture of the dynamics of apartheid and its international connections. Examples of important immediate topics included SASOL II and its support from the private sector and foreign multinationals; the use of Muldergate to bring about fundamental economic and military policy changes; the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to South Africa, the nuclear question in the US and the Third World in general.

ZAPU’s main research department is the Zimbabwe Institute for Research and Cooperation in Lusaka. It has six researchers who have been drawn from other divisions of the party. This has resulted in a body with a multi-disciplinary approach which supplies the publicity department, the information department, and the general needs of policy formulation. The six researchers consist of two economists, one nutrition specialist, one historian, one lawyer and one political scientist.

Though the long-range research objectives of ZAPU revolve around the transitional phase to majority rule, short-term projects are formulated with the aim of informing people inside and outside of Zimbabwe about immediate events. Of special concern is the role of private armies, the effect of Rhodesian air raids and massacres on neighboring countries, the role of the Western media, the flow of arms to Zimbabwe, and the methods of Western economic penetration.

Although ZANU was not at the conference it was noted that a high degree of interaction already exists between the two research departments. ZANU has recently begun an educational institute in Maputo which is doing research on a new educational system, among other projects.

SWAPO suggested that one important area of focus was the military and economic significance of Walvis Bay to South Africa, and its potential role as an international bargaining chip as well as a port through which quantities of goods and minerals reach the international market system. There was also an urgent need to expose the hollowness of so-called changes in Namibia. Confusion about the recent elections, South African propaganda and distortions in the international media all needed to be countered by careful information about the realities of Pretoria’s control and the impact of Western interests on the struggle for Namibian independence.

SWAPO’s main research center is based at the UN Institute for Namibia in Lusaka, Zambia. Its immediate problems are a lack of textbooks and materials on southern Africa. This is complicated by the fact that at the institute only 1 percent of Namibians have English as a first language, while the other languages used are German and Afrikaans.

Support Group Reports

Each group gave a brief report on its work, and on the international context within which it was operating. The Dutch, with their historic links to the Afrikaaners, have a generally high awareness of the problems in southern Africa, and the five national committees dealing with Africa are able to take advantage of this. These support groups exist on public funds, sales from their materials, and government grants for certain aspects of their work.

One of the better known groups is the Holland Committee which changed its name in 1976 to the Holland Committee on Southern Africa.

The Holland Committee is now working on a campaign to end Shell oil deliveries to South Africa. The campaign began in March with the distribution of 1.2 million leaflets by more than 200 organizations. It has been supplemented by posters and national press coverage and has already stimulated significant debate within the Dutch parliament and society.

The German Information Service for Southern Africa (ISSA) is an information center that participates in a coalition of two groups. COCIAA publishes a monthly news magazine called “Apartheid Non,” which focuses on France’s relationship to South Africa. It also functions as a research group. The Anti-Outspan campaign is the action-oriented wing which the research group fuels.

Both the New York and Amsterdam meetings underscored the necessity for support groups to maintain close contacts with each other as well as with the liberation movements in southern Africa. In the US the Institute for Policy Studies and SARAP at the University of Maryland agreed to establish a central clearing house for all research in order to facilitate the flow of these important materials. In Europe it was decided that bilateral organizational contacts would be maintained and strengthened and plans were made to convene other workshops periodically.

W.S.

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Political Prisoners
continued from page 18

and Ms. Sibongile Kubiteka, 29.

Ethel Wauchope and Washington Mlauzi
These defendants were charged under the
Terrorism Act of assisting eight people to
undergo military training between January
and August 1978. After pleading not guilty
in March, 1979, they asked for a discharge
because the evidence presented by three
state witnesses was contradictory. The trial
has been postponed until July 9, 1979.

Nto Mitta Maphike
Mrs. Maphike was sentenced to five years
imprisonment under the Terrorism Act in
mid-May. She allegedly assisted people to
leave the country so that they might
undergo military training. Her application
for bail was refused.

Jabani and Two Others
Evidence is still being heard in the trial of
Norman Vusi Thusi Jabani, 20, Mthunzi
Columbus Mazibuko, 25, and Prince
Mzimkulu Dubu, 20. The three have plead-
ed not guilty on charges under the Ter-
rorism Act. According to the charges, they
joined the PAC in 1976 and were sent to
China. The defendants were said to have
left South Africa during the Soweto upris-
ing in 1976, and to have gone to Swaziland
with 30 others. According to one witness,
they learned how to handle weapons,
studied revolutionary ideology, and then
traveled back to South Africa via
Botswana. In South Africa they were to
make "pockets" where others who had
undergone training would be safe to
mobilize "and make people aware that
whites did not belong in South Africa but in
Europe."

Resistance Robben Island
Even in prison, the level of resistance is
high. According to a May report in The
Star, six prisoners on Robben Island have
recently been charged with attempted
murder. According to the report, in
February there was an incident in which
"members of the prisons department were
injured." A Captain Harding was stabbed,
and "after consideration," the attorney
general decided to bring attempted murder
charges against a group of prisoners. The

ZANU Women
continued from page 9

secretaries for the three branches of the
department: the political wing, Tichaona
Freedom, the external affairs wing, Andy
Changamukai, and the military wing, yet to
be determined.

All the nominations and proposals made
by the seminar will now go to the ZANU
central committee for its approval. Asked
whether this meant that some of the sugges-
tions might be turned down, the women
responded that although that was theoreti-
cally possible, they were confident that
their proposals would be accepted. "It
couldn't be otherwise," Chitsotso conclu-
ded. "The women of Zimbabwe together
with the men of Zimbabwe will be free."  

Barbara Barnes

Slide Show:
The Role of Women
in the Guinea-Bissau
Revolution

Stephanie Urdang, author of Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women
in Guinea-Bissau (Monthly Review Press, 1979) and a member of
the Southern Africa collective is available to present her slide
show and talk on the role of women in the revolution in Guinea-
Bissau. She travelled through Guinea-Bissau during the war in
1974, and again after independence, and bases her presentation
on the many interviews she did with women. The slide show
describes how the effort to build a new society affects their lives as
women, as well as their view that the liberation of women must be
both integral to the total revolution and waged by the women
themselves.

Stephanie Urdang has written widely on the subject and has spoken and/or
presented her slides at numerous colleges and universities—to graduate and under-
graduate seminars, to classes in departments of African studies, women's studies,
antropology, sociology, political science.

For further information write:
Stephanie Urdang, c/o Southern Africa Magazine
17 West 17th Street
New York, New York 10011
Telephone: (212) 989-3557
the course of study in the school to begin at a fourth-grade level.

Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the creation of schools entirely given over to Angolan, Mozambican, and Ethiopian children is aimed at providing the framework within which these children will be able to maintain intact their own particular cultural roots, despite long years of study outside their own countries. The composition of the teaching staff at each of the schools is designed to facilitate the retention of cultural and national identity. At the Agostinho Neto School, three of the 37 teachers are Angolan; they teach courses dealing with history and Portuguese-language studies.

These Cuban-African educational efforts reflect the existence, at many levels, of Cuba's ties to the continent. They speak to the Cuban's conception of aid and development no longer based upon a master-servant relationship with an already highly developed country. In a sense, these ties are part of a vision of a new economic and social order, which breaks the vicious cycle of dependency that has for so long characterized the relationship between Third World nations and the advanced industrial countries of the West.

—Carolee Bengelsdorf

Sports Boycott
continued from page 12

Association, the International Amateur Athletic Federation, the International Chess Federation, and from competing in the World Cup sponsored by the World Football Federation. Yet even this campaign has been only partially successful, as South Africa still retains membership in 48 known international sports federations, thus retaining a large international sporting stage upon which to parade apartheid in sport. The success of this international campaign is dependent upon all states and sporting organizations to implement faithfully the resolutions of the United Nations.

A Phony Independence

The real significance of the Tate vs. Knoetze bout was pinpointed by Paul Zimmerman of the N.Y. Post. "Knoetze is only one issue in this sorry CBS production," Zimmerman wrote. "Bophuthatswana is the real one. A phony country created by South Africa in December 1977, to cover its own apartheid policies. Six little territories surrounded by South Africa and bankrolled by that country. No foreign representatives attended its founding ceremonies. No one officially recognized it, except Transkei, the second puppet state of South Africa."

Dennis Brutus, the South African writer and teacher forced into exile after being imprisoned for his very active struggle for non-racial sports, also criticized the fight on political grounds. "This fight was especially damaging," Brutus said, "because it was held in Bophuthatswana. South Africa with the connivance of CBS was able to promote the myth of an independent nation."

The claim of independence for Bophuthatswana was best refuted by Prexy Nesbitt, former associate director of the American Committee on Africa. "Bophuthatswana is part of the Bantustan scheme of South Africa to set up what would be known in this country as reservations, although concentration camps might also be applicable," Nesbitt said. "The people there have no control of their postal system, currency, defense, civil service, or the police. It is still in the hands of the South African government."

A Media Cop

Richard Lapchick, national chairperson of ACCESS, a coalition of 15 political, religious, civil rights, and sports organizations concerned with equality in sports, described the televisioning of this fight as "South Africa's use of the media to distort the actual reality and its continued use of sports for political purposes."

The entire incident demonstrates the lengths to which the supporters of apartheid will go on to circumvent the sports boycott. The sports boycott has been especially important for mobilizing international attention and concern on the issue of apartheid. It is also a demonstration to the oppressed majority of South Africa of the level of international solidarity with their struggle for liberation. For both reasons, activists promise to keep the boycott alive in the coming months, and those who advocate playing games with apartheid are likely to run into serious opposition.

Michael Beaubien

Controls
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able to co-optation through creation of an elite bureaucracy on the government payroll (as in the bantustans). But the level of resistance and political consciousness within the black communities may have advanced too far for imposition of such a system.

Already, on two occasions last year, the people of Soweto showed their refusal to be drawn by phony concessions. Twice the government stated elections for powerless local councils, and nobody came to the polls. Now, several black leaders, including Dr. Nthato Molotla, head of Soweto's Commission of 10, have spurned offers to meet with government officials. And even white liberal critics, quoted in the Financial Mail, pointed to a long-range danger im-

Draft Resisters
continued from page 15

do in the army, who have fled into exile. Such men find that no western country will grant them the status of a political refugee, and many have found it extremely difficult to maintain themselves outside South Africa.

There is no conscientious-objector status for draft resisters in South Africa. But the laws extend even further. A 1974 amendment to the Defense Act makes it a crime punishable by a six-year jail sentence, $6000 fine or both, to encourage conscientious objection in any way. Organizing, or even publicly discussing the issues around conscientious objection are illegal. Even ministers and priests are prohibited by law from counseling persons who consider draft resistance.

Yet despite these laws, resisters are now circulating an illegal underground paper called Omkeer (About Face). It carries stories describing soldiers' experiences in the army, raises questions about what the army represents and is fighting for, encourages resistance, and provides information such as overseas contact addresses for those who choose not to continue serving.

US Organizing

SAMRAF, an organization of Americans and South African war resisters, has for over a year been assisting war resisters in exile in the US. It has launched a national campaign to win the right of asylum for such resisters, it has begun to prepare careful evidence of ways in which troops are used for internal repression in South Africa, and it has done considerable research about the South African military and its links with Western countries.

Primary resistance to apartheid continues to come from South Africa's black population, but the growing evidence of soldiers in revolt is one sign that as the struggle for liberation intensifies, a growing number of whites will refuse to lay down their lives in defense of apartheid. Some may choose to go even further joining in the right for a free, non-exploitative South Africa.

Don Morton
ASSAULTS ON ZAMBIA BY RHODESIAN MILITARY FORCES continue to exacerbate social and economic difficulties in that front line state. Bombings of Zambia’s ferry at Kazungula have cut off the road route from Zambia to South Africa, the only back-up transport link for the southern railway route. The ferry had been carrying up to twenty trucks a day loaded with such commodities as fertilizer, soap and building materials. Partly as a result of the bombings, more than 31,000 tons of fertilizer bound for Zambia have backed up in South African warehouses and ports.

Meanwhile, raids on Zambian farming regions are increasing the tensions between the Zambian government and the country’s commercial farmers. Already hard-pressed by drought and a failed maize crop, some farmers are suggesting that Zambia has paid too high a price for its support of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle. Arguments to this effect have appeared recently in the Zambian press and probably reflect the opinion of many Zambians.

SOUTH AFRICA INCREASED its balance of payments surplus last year according to statistics released by its central Reserve Bank. Strengthened by rising revenues from mineral exports, last year’s current account surplus grew to more than $1.6 billion—almost double the previous year’s figure. Gold retained its leading position among mineral exports, gold revenues rising 38 percent from the previous year to more than $4.5 billion. Most of the increase was accounted for by the 1978 37 percent jump in the average price of gold. Diamond sales increased substantially, with revenue increasing 73 percent to around $327 million. Coal exports earned over $1 billion, iron sales accounted for $300 million, and ferro-alloy exports rose 72 percent to $400 million.

IRAN IS MAINTAINING ECONOMIC and diplomatic links with South Africa in spite of the Islamic government’s policy of ostracizing the apartheid state. According to the African Research Bulletin, Iran still holds its 17.5 percent share of the National Petroleum Refinery at Sasolburg and has shown no sign of wanting to dispose of the investment. The Khomeini government is also maintaining an unofficial consulate in South Africa.

THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT has announced policy changes and trade arrangements that will increase the country’s economic links with the West. ANGOP, the official Angolan News Agency, reports that Angolan mineral extraction will be opened up to cooperative ventures with foreign countries. According to the agency, minerals will remain the property of the state, but “The law foresees the possibility of association between Angola and foreign undertakings or companies. . . in the operational stage of the mining industry with a view toward speeding up mining development.” Angola is also continuing its program of importing manufactured goods from Western industrial countries. The Angolan Transport Ministry recently announced an agreement with the Swedish automobile manufacturer Volvo. In a contract worth about $25 million, Volvo has agreed to supply 400 buses and heavy trucks, machine shop equipment and spare parts. This is the second large contract Angola has placed with Volvo in the last two years.

RHODESIAN EMIGRATION statistics indicate that the white flight from the country has begun to regain momentum. After a drop in February, the number of whites leaving the country climbed to 1,555 in March, creating a net migration loss of 1,251.

Muzorewa in Trouble continued from page 20

major step toward full military and political unity in late May with the setting up of a coordinating council, defense council, and a joint operations command. The agreement was reached in Addis Ababa on May 12. “This is an interim stage which enables us to work out a further machinery and further step toward the eventual merger of the two parties,” Mugabe said on Ethiopian national radio. ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo added, in a joint interview: “We finalized the constitution of the Patriotic Front—that is a constitution that will eventually be a constitution of one party.”

Speaking at a UN press conference at the end of May, Nkomo amplified the political and organizational implications of the unity agreement. Commenting on the hostile remarks to be expected from those opposed to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle he said:

“People who do not want to see unity in Zimbabwe have been seeing so-called difference between Mugabe and myself. Mugabe might have said one or two things but that did not mean there was no unity in the Patriotic Front. What we did in Addis Ababa was to consolidate further.

“People are going to start saying we are going to have a one-party state. When we have an alliance of two parties, they say we are divided; once we come into one party they say, one-party state. I don’t know what we should do, because this is what is abhorred by the western world—one party. But we have agreed that ZAPU and ZANU should come together into one party, and we adopted a constitution for the Patriotic Front as a party. That means all the other organs of the Patriotic Front combined, including the army.

“This is a solidification of the work in the interim, and this will be passed over as soon as the constitution is implemented. Certain people want to see division. They kept on saying the Patriotic Front is divided. If they want to see divisions that don’t exist, fine. We will continue with our work.”

P.L.
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