Death of a Freedom Fighter
Report from Angola

Agostinho Neto 1922 – 1979
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Volume XII Number 8
October 1979

CONTENTS
SPECIAL REPORT
2 Front Dominates London Talks

ANGOLA
4 The Death of a Freedom Fighter
5 Angola in the "Year of the Cadre": Political Consciousness "Their Most Impressive Armament."

NAMIBIA
7 Terror in Namibia
7 Action Flash

SOUTH AFRICA
9 Venda Independence: Pressing on with the Bantustans
11 Black Journalists Meet—Pledge Future Activism

ZIMBABWE
12 Under Muzorewa—More Repression

UNITED STATES
14 US Agency Seeks Influence in Africa
15 Unequal Justice
16 New Lead Player—Same Play

CULTURE
17 Afro American Entertainers in South Africa: Performing in Concert with Apartheid

DEPARTMENTS
1 Update
18 Film
24 Letters
25 News Briefs

front cover: Agostinho Neto
Jeffrey Blankfort/LNS

Members of the Southern Africa collective who contributed to the production of this issue: Michael Beaublan, Jennifer Davis (Editor), Truman Dunn, Bill Hartung, Craig Howard, Richard Knight, Edgar Lockwood, Andrew Marx, Malik Reaves, Christine Root, Karen Rothmyer, Mike Shuster, Stephanie Urdang (Managing Editor), Jim Wekart, Julie Weiman.

Special thanks for their assistance to: Africa News, Jim Cason, David Brooks.

Typesetting by Liberation News Service
Cover and layout by The Letter Space
Namibia Deal
Approaching

Sources at the United Nations indicate that SWAPO and the front-line states have been excluded from the negotiations currently underway between the five Western nations and South Africa over Namibia.

The original "western plan" presented to South Africa in April 1978 was a watered down version of a 1976 Security Council resolution outlining the path to Namibian independence. Yet, after initial acceptance, South Africa balked, refusing inter alia to allow SWAPO bases inside Namibia during any transition, although insisting that South African bases would remain. This produced a long rupture in negotiations.

In July 1979, quiet talks between US representative McHenry and Angola's President Neto produced a proposal for the establishment of a demilitarized belt—60 miles wide, 900 miles long—along the Angola-Namibia frontier. This was intended to prevent SWAPO infiltration, and Angola hoped it would also stop direct and indirect (via UNITA) South African attacks.

Britain's Sir James Murray carried the proposal to Pretoria, where he spent several weeks before returning for discussions at the UN with UK, Canadian and US military representatives.

SWAPO military representatives were not allowed into these discussions, nor was SWAPO kept informed of their content. A reliable source indicates that the cordon sanitaire now looks like a piece of Swiss cheese—the holes being inserted at South Africa's insistence for its own purposes.

The current "western plan" seems to involve finding a compromise acceptable to the five and to South Africa, which will then be presented to SWAPO and the front-line states as a fait accompli, to be accepted "or else."

SWAPO, meanwhile, has continued its military battle to liberate Namibia. In early September South Africa was forced to initiate a convoy system under security force for traffic moving over a 160 km distance on the main road which runs through Owambo in northern Namibia south to Tsumeb and Windhoek.

Non-aligned Conference
Supports Liberation

The members of the liberation movements of southern Africa came away from the recent conference of non-aligned nations in Havana extremely encouraged by the level of support that was generated for their struggles.

The resolutions passed were the strongest that the body has agreed to in its history and cover a wide range of issues. Besides unequivocally condemning colonial, neocolonial and imperialist interest in the area, the body urged its members to provide equipment, financial aid and training for the fighting forces of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, as well as support for refugees and development.

New Attack on Sanctions

Recent moves in Washington indicate that US conservatives are renewing their attack on Rhodesian sanctions.

In early September, Senators Jesse Helms sent tough-talking aide John Caruso to London to tell Muzorewa that sanctions would soon be gone. "We are going to roll right over the State Department" was his promise.

His optimism seemed based on a provision to lift sanctions immediately which has been hidden deep in the Senate version of the Defense Department Authorization Bill, Section 802, as it is called, had been fashioned in the Senate Armed Services Committee by Senator Harry Byrd, author of the notorious Byrd Amendment.

As written, the House version of the same bill contained no comparable language. But observers feared that when the bill came up for finalization in the conference committee drawn from both houses, conservatives who dominate the committee would push through acceptance of the Senate language lifting sanctions.

If that happened the bill would still have to go back to the floor of each house for final confirmation, but no amendments can be made at this stage. As the bill contains very important defense authorizations, rejection over a single item such as sanctions would require considerable determination on the part of the liberals.

The Washington Office on Africa is urging concerned Americans to reach their congressional representatives on this issue.
Front Dominates London Talks

London—The Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe is finally becoming known to the rest of the world and by all indications many people, particularly in the West, are surprised at what they are seeing.

Surprise number one. Contrary to the predictions made by most of the foreign policy pundits in European capitals and in Washington and New York, the Rhodesia Constitutional Conference that opened here September 10th has not broken down and by mid-September it showed no real signs of breaking down in the near future.

Following shortly after the early September Rhodesian attacks into Mozambique which hit the Republic’s army bases for the first time as well as several ZANU camps, the conference certainly got off to a shaky start. The initial skirmishing over the conference agenda was widely reported by the international press, which covered the opening of the talks in anticipation of a walkout. Press coverage has decreased in proportion to the increase in seriousness and detailed discussion by the participants.

After 10 days the conference seemed on track and Patriotic Front officials described themselves as confident, appearing uncharacteristically “upbeat.”

Surprise number two: The Patriotic Front itself. Most observers here expected co-leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe and their joint delegation to approach the conference with all the subtlety of a rampaging elephant. But the Front leaders have taken to the precarious craft of diplomatic maneuvering with the deft balance of a cat. It is not the quality that the West usually attributes to guerrilla leaders but Western expectations of such individuals are usually based on ignorance.

The Front has come to London demanding to be taken seriously and if the West, with the British in the lead, doesn’t take the Front seriously the results of the London talks may be surprising indeed.

Then there is the third surprise, the one over which Washington and London may be most despondent. That is the poor showing, so far, by Salisbury Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his “democratically elected, non-racialist” delegation.

More than a week into the talks, Muzorewa and his delegates fell almost totally silent and in retreat they proposed instead of the three-way talks of the first week, bi-lateral discussions where the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, would hold separate talks with the two other delegations. Muzorewa’s ineffectiveness is the key to the apparent failure so far of the Western strategy in the Rhodesia talks.

Salisbury London Link

It seems fairly certain that in the words of one observer here, “Carrington would go in after Muzorewa without a life jacket if he could.” Despite Carrington’s success in convincing British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that recognizing Muzorewa’s current government would be diplomatically disastrous for Great Britain, there is obviously an attachment between Salisbury and the British Foreign Office. The British government would like to recognize Salisbury and lift sanctions but that can’t be done without removing some of what Thatcher called “defects” in the current constitution under which Muzorewa holds power.

Muzorewa, with Ian Smith’s support, came to London prepared to give way on his constitution’s defects if that would bring recognition. Carrington’s “gamble” in the words of The Economist “is that Zimbabwe’s present constitution can at this conference be improved between himself, Bishop Muzorewa, and Ian Smith.”

What about the Patriotic Front? The British hope was that Mugabe and Nkomo would either be trapped into accepting the “improved” constitution and “get stuck” in Zimbabwe politics on those terms or would be provoked to walk out. In fact, some observers here see the preconference attacks on Mozambique as planned to precipitate the hoped for walkout.

Front Proposals

But the Front has really turned the tables. Not only have the guerrillas withstood the attacks but they have also managed to adopt a carefully balanced approach—one of firmness and conciliation. The first indication of this came in the initial disagreement over the agenda for the talks. Not unexpectedly, Muzorewa and Carrington anticipated that the talks would deal only with the constitution. But Mugabe and Nkomo quickly proposed their own agenda which included detailed discussions covering arrangements during the transition to independence—especially those involving the army and the police—the structure and function of the transition government, and a ceasefire.

The agenda took three days to iron out. Carrington at first resisted the Front’s proposals but it soon became clear that the proposals were sensible, especially after the Front agreed to discuss the constitution first. In the negotiating process, Mugabe and Nkomo extracted a commitment from Carrington, to hinge agreement on the constitution on agreement on all the rest.”

Front Proposals

But the Front has really turned the tables. Not only have the guerrillas withstood the attacks but they have also managed to adopt a carefully balanced approach—one of firmness and conciliation. The first indication of this came in the initial disagreement over the agenda for the talks. Not unexpectedly, Muzorewa and Carrington anticipated that the talks would deal only with the constitution. But Mugabe and Nkomo quickly proposed their own agenda which included detailed discussions covering arrangements during the transition to independence—especially those involving the army and the police—the structure and function of the transition government, and a ceasefire.

The agenda took three days to iron out. Carrington at first resisted the Front’s proposals but it soon became clear that the proposals were sensible, especially after the Front agreed to discuss the constitution first. In the negotiating process, Mugabe and Nkomo extracted a commitment from Carrington, to hinge agreement on the constitution on agreement on all the rest. “The
British government understands," Carrington told the conference, "that for both sides agreements on the constitution must be dependent on agreements on arrangements for implementing it."

Muzorewa In Trouble
This was the first great blow to Muzorewa and Smith. Now the possibility could arise that the Salisbury leaders would make the appropriate compromises on the constitution but would get something in return they had not bargained for—the Patriotic Front in a power-sharing agreement in Salisbury. The adoption of the agenda produced immediate disarray within Muzorewa's camp and an outburst from Muzorewa himself.

"Anyone who thinks or tries to persuade others to believe," Muzorewa said in a crowded press conference three days into the talks, "that they are still fighting for freedom from colonial rule of a white minority, or for liberation from a government which declared unilateral independence is suffering from delusions bordering on insanity."

Muzorewa continued: "the people will reject with every means at their disposal any attempt by one or two arrogant dictators in the making to impose themselves, or their foreign communist or Marxist ideology and doctrines upon our country. The few who continue to oppose our democratically and popularly elected government are blood-thirsty murders intent on genocide and the subjugation of seven million people."

Disagreement within the Salisbury camp broke out quickly thereafter. At the end of the first week of talks, Muzorewa composed a "message for the people" to be broadcast back home. In it the Bishop admitted publicly what many of his aides had been saying privately throughout the first week, that Muzorewa supported some changes in the current constitution.

"We have already witnessed a miracle of mutual respect and cooperation between Black and White under majority rule," Muzorewa proclaimed. "All of our positive-thinking, far-seeing white people, with the true spirit of good will, must now be convinced that given the correct Black leadership they have nothing whatsoever to fear." Comparing Rhodesia to Kenya, Muzorewa said that the fears of white settlers in Kenya over majority rule and political safeguards proved to be "not really that important after all." And Muzorewa reaffirmed that he would discuss the constitution and nothing else.

By this time Ian Smith, mostly very quiet during the first week of talks, had become clearly uneasy. He decided to speak out. "I just cannot believe that anybody would say such a thing," Smith said of Muzorewa's broadcast. Smith called the blocking mechanisms in the current constitution, which preserve substantial white power, "absolutely vital."

Through it all Nkomo and Mugabe have pressed their advantage. Soon after the British tabled their specific proposals for a new Rhodesian constitution, the Front had an equally specific and comprehensive draft. The differences between the two are serious, but not insuperable, and even Front sources have indicated privately that some sort of compromise is likely.

Preserving Privilege
The sorest point is the special provision that the British draft allows for white settlers. A third of the seats in the upper house of the future legislature would be reserved for Whites, and the British have also proposed a double voting roll. In effect Whites would elect Whites and Blacks would elect Blacks.

Incidently the British use of language on this issue is curious. Under the proposal for special white representation in the Senate, the British draft says that one third of the members would be elected by the "ordinary" members of the assembly and one third by the "European" members of the assembly. Later the British draft states that black members of the assembly will be elected by voters on the "common voters roll" and white members elected by voters on the "white voters roll".

Front officials have reacted strongly to this language. The Front's primary spokesman, Edisson Zvobgo has called it "sick."

"We make no provision," Zvobgo said, "for representation in Parliament based on ethnic, tribal, sex, religious or any other difference. The British propose to perpetuate racism in their own proposal. We do not believe that there is any case in 1979 for wanting to perpetuate racism in any country, any place."

Still the British are sticking to this point, although Carrington has qualified his original stance slightly. Special provision for Whites would be "temporary," according to Carrington, for an "intermediate phase" while the white minority "adapts itself to the new circumstances of majority rule."

"We expect the minority," Carrington continued, "to give up the power they hold at the present to block constitutional amendments and other legislation, but in terms of what is practically possible it is unrealistic to expect them to do so without a provision which will encourage them to forget the past and face the future as equal citizens of Zimbabwe."

New Threats
There is no question that, at least in the early stages of the conference, the momentum of the talks lay with the Front. But Salisbury, and to some extent London, still have some cards to play. Muzorewa hinted at one in his radio broadcast. The Bishop warned the front-line states of the results a failed conference could bring. "The security forces of our country," Muzorewa said, "and the whole of our seven million people will rise and defend themselves. The brunt of that tragedy and its consequences will be borne more by the states that neighbor on ours."

The Economist was more blunt. "This is Britain's last play" the magazine wrote impatiently. "Those fighting inside what was Rhodesia and those fighting outside and the countries all around it now all stand to suffer grievously if the play is not allowed to work. And Western support will be pitted against or withdrawn from whichever side was destroyer of the gamble Lord Carrington took."
The Death of a Freedom Fighter

Agostinho Neto, September 17, 1922-September 10, 1979

Agostinho Neto had been president of Angola only four years when he died, but he had been an active freedom fighter for most of his life, and leader of a revolutionary organization for 17 years. It was those experiences which shaped the brief years of his presidency, in which he set his country to building socialism, initiating construction of health clinics, schools and cooperative farms rather than conference halls and luxury hotels.

Neto was born in 1922, the son of a Methodist pastor in the village of Bengo, just south of Luanda. One of the few Africans to complete secondary education in Luanda, Neto went to Portugal in 1947 on a Methodist scholarship to study medicine.

Yet from his early days, Neto never used his relatively privileged position to live a privileged life. In Portugal he took an active if clandestine part in anti-fascist political work. He was no stranger to the inside of a prison, having been arrested first in 1952, and several times after that for both anti-fascist and Angolan nationalist activity. Still he completed medical school in 1958 and returned a year later to Angola.

In 1959 while practicing medicine in Luanda, he assumed leadership of the clandestine MPLA. Scarcely a year later, he was arrested again, flogged in front of his family and taken to prison.

A thousand of his neighbors from the villages of Bengo and Icolo marching to the local administrative center to protest were met by 200 heavily armed soldiers who killed 30 people, wounded 200, and then burned the two villages to the ground.

Soon after that uprisings broke out across Angola. In 1962, after three prison terms, Neto was chosen president of MPLA.

Neto's radical politics and the politics of MPLA were not formed in isolation. The young Neto was part of a community of young intellectuals from the Portuguese colonies whose discussion and organizing were a germinal force behind the liberation movements that produced such leaders as Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau and Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique and that eventually won independence for all three Portuguese colonies.

A New Politics

The politics hammered out by Neto and his contemporaries initiated a new level of struggle in southern Africa and had a powerful impact throughout Africa. Moving beyond the divisions of color, the new leadership recognized that anti-colonial nationalism, although a powerful force, would not eliminate all exploitation. Thus the three movements that emerged in Portugal's colonies late in the 1950s, MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC, based themselves on a policy rooted in the interests of the peasant majority and the workers and set about mobilizing people in the countryside.

While a type of elite nationalism still dominated much of Africa's politics, in Angola the MPLA set the task of building a movement which would transform the whole of society rather than widen the boundaries of privilege.

Armed Struggle

A soft-spoken and sensitive poet, Neto nevertheless turned to armed struggle in the face of Portugal's increasingly repressive refusal to decolonize Angola. For more than 13 years, Neto and the MPLA fought for Angola's independence, which was finally won—not before a second bloody liberation war—in 1976.

Two weeks before he died, Neto, who as a doctor could not have been unaware of his increasingly grave illness, completed a series of grueling trips to Malange, Uige, and Huambo provinces, where he met with local leaders about regional problems and gave major addresses at mass meetings.

For African historian Basil Davidson, Neto had always been “a man of action, [with a] vision of himself as having no personal career outside the meaning of his people's life, as enjoying no worthwhile privileges save that of sharing in a necessary struggle for the future, shaking off the past, transforming the present.”

No one can stop the rain

Here in prison
rage contained in my breast
I patiently wait
for the clouds to gather
blown by the wind of history

No one can stop the rain

—from “Here in Prison”
by Agostinho Neto
PIDE Prison
Luanda, July 1960
In July Prexy Nesbitt of the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies spent two and a half weeks traveling in northern Angola along with Mary Jane Gomes and Charlotte Maxwell, members of a Canadian support group.

In a 1600-mile journey they visited towns, factories, farms and agricultural projects, clinics and schools in Luanda, Cuanza Norte and Uige provinces. They talked to Angolans at all levels, from Lucio Lara, secretary general of the MPLA and Ruth Neto, head of OMA, the mass women's organization, to teachers, workers, peasants, old experienced political cadres, and young men and women just joining the struggle to build an independent, socialist Angola.

Malik Stan Reaves from Southern Africa talked to Nesbitt on his return.

What were the major tasks being undertaken in the reconstruction process? Can you talk about both achievements and problems?

We were very impressed with the high level of politicization of the Angolan people. They are also an extremely armed people. They carry weapons everywhere, because of the constant aggression against them by the South Africans, the Rhodesians, and UNITA.

But their most impressive armaments lie in the political consciousness of the people. The MPLA party is making deliberate efforts to broaden this awareness. This year has been named “Year of the Formation of Cadre” as part of the political rebuilding effort, as part of the work to generalize political consciousness and spread out the political responsibilities of Angola.

Several party schools have been set up, one all the way down in Mocamedes province in the south, one in the central part of the country and one in the north. These schools are charged with the task of increasing the number of trained cadre on which MPLA can call.

But in addition to that, Angola has a history of political experience that not many African nations can equal. Angola has gone through two liberation wars. Angola's MPLA has survived many crises, involving both external attempts to destroy it and internal factionalism starting as long ago as 1965 and operating again in the 1977 Nito Alves coup attempt. All these things provided a political school for the people of Angola, so there is a high level of political consciousness apparent among the population.

We asked people who they thought was the primary enemy of Angola. Whenever we asked this, people in the countryside, people working in the factories and the shops never once defined the enemy in terms of color. It was always defined in terms of imperialism or in terms of the political role that different forces have played.

I think this creation of consciousness is a key part of the reconstruction effort in Angola. And it's being done with such incredible enthusiasm. We went to mass meetings and saw people turn out in the thousands.

I think that the process of political fortification is happening more slowly in the south. But it is beginning to happen at a very rapid rate, particularly in the central provinces of Bie and Huambo. There, the people have begun to feel so strongly about the MPLA that UNITA troops, flown into by South African helicopters, cannot go back into towns nowadays although they once used them as their bases.

What specific areas of reconstruction are making a difference in people's daily lives?

Education and agricultural especially.

In 1973-74, just before the coup in Portugal, there were half a million Angolan children in primary school. In 1979, two million children are getting schooling at the primary level, and there is also a massive adult literacy program.

In agriculture, we were impressed with the experimenting on the state and cooperative farms we visited. We saw the new efforts at diversification of agriculture. People are growing vegetables, trying out tomatoes, potatoes, greens, and soy beans. These are crops that weren't cultivated by Africans under Portuguese colonialism. State farms and cooperatives work in tandem with each other. State farms provide much of the heavy equipment, such as tractors and harvesters, on loan at no cost to the nearby cooperatives. But the bulk of government emphasis and investment is going into the development of state farms.

Another major task of reconstruction is the rebuilding of the whole infrastructure in Angola. All of the eight or ten factories that we visited were characterized by the major use of manual labor. Machines that once had been part of the factory had often been stacked up outside by the former factory owners and then sledgehammered or otherwise sabotaged in order to prevent it from being used. Many people are doing things manually which once were done by machine. There is also an acute shortage of transport. The departing Portuguese and the FNLA destroyed some 20,000 to 30,000 trucks in the last days of the war.

How extensive is the damage being done by UNITA and South African sabotage?

Angola is a big country with a relatively small population, and it has a very long border with Namibia. And that means, as Lucio Lara said to us, that a considerable portion of Angolan resources has to be devoted to “nothing else but just defending ourselves from this constant South African aggression. Every week and every month we have a little Kassinga.” In the two and a half weeks I was there every second or third day there was a report of some kind of aggression by the South Africans or Rhodesians against Angola. Angola recently reported to the UN that between March 1976 and June 1979, the South African army killed 570 Angolans, three refugee South Africans, 198 Zimbabweans and more than 600 Namibians; Angola was subjected to 25 attacks by ground forces, 24 aerial bombardments, numerous artillery bombardments and smaller “infiltrations.” This is the daily reality that is scarcely reported in this country, and it is sapping much of Angola’s resources.

I think UNITA is a myth. The UNITA presence is the South African presence. There is no separating UNITA's offensives from South Africa's offensives with its Alouette helicopters and Mirage jets, which have been reported spraying some type of paralyzing gas on the population. The helicopters bring in the UNITA troops, sometimes also South African troops in blackface. They terrorize the people and then are lifted back out. By the time FAPLA forces can reach the area, the helicopters have gone back to the Caprivi Strip or northern Namibia.

In agriculture, we were impressed with the experimenting on the state and cooperative farms we visited. We saw the new efforts at diversification of agriculture. People are growing vegetables, trying out tomatoes, potatoes, greens, and soy beans. These are crops that weren’t cultivated by Africans under Portuguese colonialism. State farms and cooperatives work in tandem with each other. State farms provide much of the heavy equipment, such as tractors and harvesters, on loan at no cost to the nearby cooperatives. But the bulk of government emphasis and investment is going into the development of state farms.
Angola has been giving SWAPO very significant support in its struggle in Namibia. Is this likely to continue?

The Angolan MPLA party and the Angolan people use a slogan all over Angola. They say Angola will be the firm trench of the African revolution. I think it is Angola's support for SWAPO and the struggle in Namibia, Angola's support for the struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa that makes it one of the main targets for the West. Hence Brzezinski's hostility and the US insistence on getting the Cubans out and the continuing Western economic sabotage. There's no question that SWAPO's struggle is a very costly one and candidly I think that the Angolans and SWAPO were maneuvering for other arenas in which to conduct the struggle apart from the very costly military front. Hence MPLA was very open to working with the West to seek a settlement of the Namibian struggle. But Angola would never compromise on the necessity for a just settlement in Namibia.

Practically, in order to rebuild the Angolan economy it would help Angola to have the cooperation and not the animosity of the West. Lucio Lara expressed that very well when he said to us, "Our relations have been historically with the socialist countries, but we are ready to establish relations with some others, for example West Germany and the United States, but we're not worried about this. We can well continue our life without these kinds of relations. We base our foreign policy on principles. It is a question for us whether the United States can ever be involved with a country on a principled basis. When it can, we are ready to do so."

They are prepared to work with the United States and want to have the cooperation of the West, but not in exchange for abandoning the principles that they stand for. And one of those principles is continued support for SWAPO.

You were in Angola shortly before President Neto's death. What effect do you think this will have on Angola, its stability and its policies?

The current press predictions of disaster in Angola following Neto's death reflect typical American perceptions of political leaders. They remove Neto from the context of the whole central committee of MPLA—the leadership of Angola is not simply Neto. Neto was an expression of the leadership of Angola but I think his role can't be separated from that of the many other fine leaders in the central committee of Angola.

Certainly Neto's loss will be tremendous-ly felt throughout Angola and Africa. It may effect the political strength of the front-line states.

One has to salute Neto's incredible courage. I saw him, shook his hand, and talked with him briefly when he was opening a meeting in Luanda. He looked strained and in pain. The last two years have been very difficult for him, but he continued in spite of that. He went to the Commonwealth conference, the front-line heads of state meeting, and just before he left for Moscow for the last time, he was out in the rural areas.

The Western press has been speculating about the different so-called factions in the MPLA, particularly regarding non-alignment. Do you think changes may emerge in MPLA's strategy?

I don't think so. Angola's strategy has been based on combining a firm line with maximum flexibility: For instance the recently concluded new contract with Texaco, which allows Texaco to join Gulf Oil in undertaking oil exploration in Angola, is based on the understanding that oil is a constant source of revenue and that Angola's developing economy itself must have that oil. I think they will want to have the oil revenue and at the same time will look for more openings for aid for reconstruction.

But Angola is not a member of the World Bank, it can't get World Bank or IMF money. The United States has explicitly undermined any efforts by multi-lateral organizations to provide aid to Angola. The US is still waging a mini-war against the Angolan economy—for example spare parts for American machinery and equipment are not getting to Angola.

The state television people produce valuable material, which the people can see in hotels and restaurants and public places. There is a plan to use television more in factories and schools for political education. But much of the equipment installed by the Portuguese was American hardware, and television people told me that orders for new parts have not been filled for two and a half years.

The US press constantly implies that the Cubans are a repressive force being used to control a restless Angolan population. What sort of attitude did you see Angolans display towards the Cubans?

I always laugh when people ask me about the Cuban presence. They are everywhere, they are absolutely everywhere, and they are loved everywhere. I never saw one bit of animosity. Once when we were travelling—our group included an MPLA external relations representative, the driver, myself, and two white Canadian women—we got out of the car and Mary Jane started taking pictures of the children. Suddenly people started running from all over. This was weird because people are very accustomed to photos in Angola and don't usually get excited about photographers. But after talking to one of the women who kept holding her child up to be photographed, it turned out that she thought we were Cubans and were going to take the pictures back to Cuba, and she wanted to have her picture in Cuba.

The Cubans have no arrogance. They live right there in the barrios, or in the rural areas with the Angolans. Perhaps this is because the Cuban experience is so similar to the Angolan experience, and because Cuba also can recall the international solidarity that made it possible for revolutionary Cuba to survive its first few years.
Terror in Namibia

by Gloria Jacobs

"The evidence of the suffering is on every hand: the shattered wrecks of cars and trucks... the graves of many victims, usually innocent farmers and children... as well as the hundreds of stories I have heard of intimidation, torture, detainment and death—primarily at the hands of South African Army units."

Thus begins the report of the Rev. Dr. Paul Wee, General Secretary of the Lutheran World Ministries, describing his recent trip to Namibia. Dr. Wee's report—one more devastating brick in a mounting wall of evidence of South African brutality in Namibia—comes at a time when government terrorism is reaching new extremes. In an effort to intimidate Namibians before the implementation of either a western-backed or a South African "independence" plan, government troops have instituted martial law through much of the country and are resorting to extensive torture and brutality. "Windhoek is fast becoming the Belfast of Africa," begins a recent article in the Financial Mail. In fact the entire country has been subjected to the new round of violence.

In its current attempts to settle the Namibian issue Pretoria appears to have adopted a three-pronged strategy. On the one hand it claims it is moving forward with its own independence plans because UN talks have collapsed. On the other hand it is still involved in a behind-the-scenes negotiating to facilitate a UN-backed independence plan and is now discussing proposals with western diplomats for a demilitarized zone between Namibia and Angola.

But whichever plan is finally implemented, Pretoria is determined to protect its interests by minimizing SWAPO's ability to play a strong role in any new government that emerges. Hence the vital third prong in its strategy—the attack on SWAPO and its supporters.

Mobilizing Force

South Africa is reorganizing and consolidating its forces in Namibia. It has been sending its own police force into the area to serve in its military operations. Besides increasing the size of the military presence, this would allow the government, if the western plan goes through, to claim that soldiers are police. This is important because according to the UN plan, South Africa's military presence in the territory would be heavily cut, but existing police units would be allowed to remain.

As far as Pretoria is concerned, "fortress South Africa" already exists, with little or no difference between police and soldiers: "A policeman on the border seems a far cry from the traditional 'bobby on the beat,'" reads a glowing blurb in the official South Africa Digest on the country's police force. "But the basic reason for the existence of a police force remains the same—to protect the citizens of a country." Thus police are trained for border duty around South Africa and in Namibia with the aim of "countering insurgents," says their commanding officer Col. E.J.J. Brand, "which in a sense is affiliated to the idea of preventing rather than solving crime."

But, as Dr. Wee's report indicates, the police and the army are initiating rather than preventing crime. "There is no longer any semblance of order and the rule of law in Ovamboland," he writes. "The evidence of South African Army brutality among all segments of the population is so overwhelming, pervasive and capable of documentation that it makes a mockery of the

Action Flash

The Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa have put out an urgent call for action in support of detainees now being held in Namibia. The detainees, who have been held incommunicado and without being charged since early May, began a hunger strike on August 7.

Write—or cable if you will do so:

Protest to:
Professor Gerrit Viljoen
Adminstrator-General for South West Africa
Windhoek 9100
NAMIBIA

Send messages of support to the detainees:
c/o Brigadier A.J.C. Gouws
Commissioner of Police
Windhoek
NAMIBIA

For further information, please contact the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, 853 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10003, or phone (212) 477-0066.
South African Government's claim to be responding to the request of the Ovambo people for protection... SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma has also called attention to the escalating violence in his country. In a telegram to the Lutheran World Ministries sent in July, he documents the following incidents and trends:

- In June a group of Ovambo villagers at the town of Ongula Ya Netanga were herded into a ditch by South African secret agents. Villagers accused of sympathizing with SWAPO were bayoneted to death while the others looked on.
- On June 23, 5000 people were arrested in and around Windhoek and detained in an open air camp near the city without food or water for five days. Five people died from hunger and exposure.

In late April, in a move aimed directly at SWAPO’s organizational base inside Namibia, the police began detaining all known members of the movement’s internal leadership and prominent activists. Almost 100 people were held under the draconian proclamation AG 26, which allows for indefinite detention incommunicado. Only a few of those detained have been released, and at last report over 70 were engaged in a hunger strike.

Large areas of the country are now under martial law, with the military operating against the people at will.

Church Protest

Church leaders have been among those speaking out against the atrocities, only to find that because of the respect many Namibians hold for them, they are also the targets of government arrest and attacks by white vigilante groups. Several ministers have been detained by the police. In an open letter to the South African Administrator General of Namibia, Justice M.T. Steyn, the Council of Churches of Namibia last May called upon Steyn to either bring the thousands of detainees to trial or to release them immediately.

Steyn’s response fairly sizzled with righteous indignation that anyone could question the government’s right to terror in its campaign against SWAPO: “Accept your request that they [the detainees] be accorded the benefits of a system designed to regulate the affairs of peaceful, law-abiding citizens... be ever mindful of the truism that the garden hose, designed to nourish flowers... cannot extinguish a conflagration... For such peril far more robust measures must be resorted to.”

Those measures include search and seizure without warrant, arrest and detention without charge for indefinite periods—and torture.

Axel Johannes, SWAPO administrative secretary, described how he was arrested after passing two police vehicles while driving north to visit his family. He was stopped, beaten and then arrested when the police realized they had a SWAPO leader. At the station, Johannes says, “I was made to lay down on a concrete bench at the end of which were two iron standards.” After being tied to the standards while blindfolded, “they then proceeded to pour cold water over my body... and put a type of cap over my head and administered electric shocks to me.”

Despite these measures white vigilante groups have been formed, charging that the government has not responded with enough force to black militancy. The Windhoek Observer reports there are two new groups, and at least one of them, Blankswa (white wagon), composed largely of young Afrikaans-speaking men, has pledged “armed revolt should it become an exigency.” The more ominous Wit Weerstands beweging (white resistance movement) was established by members of the German-speaking population and has compiled a death list headed by black church leaders.

Stickers for the group have appeared on Windhoek windows, displaying a three-armed Swastika and the slogan, “Wake up white South Africa and South West.”

The South African police, not to be outdone by these groups, have also allegedly set up an unofficial contingent of 90 sharpshooters, black and white, whose purpose is to assassinate SWAPO leaders and their sympathizers among church leaders, teachers and the business community.

The ultra-right groups are also attacking those whites they feel have gone too far in advocating “liberalizations” such as the proposed relaxation of social and residential apartheid. But as observers have noted, black Namibians are held without charge for acts they did not commit, while the whites suspected of killing one white and injuring five others with a grenade were questioned by the police and released.

New Administrator

Nevertheless, the South African government knows it must appear to have some control over the Namibian situation if it is to win recognition for its “independence” plan. In an attempt to regain at least the semblance of control, to placate right wing whites and still impose some form of “independence,” Pretoria replaced the territory’s Administrator General in mid-August. The new AG, Professor Gerrit Viljoen, is a member of the Broederbond, the Afrikaner secret society which has provided much of white nationalist apartheid ideology.

In a recently published book, Viljoen states that it is the task of the Afrikaner to keep political power in the hands of the white man. “We dare not accept any adapt-ation that will cost the white man his political control,” he writes, while allowing that some adaptations might be necessary in outdated institutions.

In his role as the “great white hope” Viljoen has called for second-tier or ethnic elections. These are part of a plan in which Namibians are divided into tribal or ethnic groups (whites forming one group), with each sector voting for its own representatives. The government has been putting off the elections, partially for the same reason that whites have been calling for them: the belief that the new white resistance groups will be brought into the power structure.

Initial indications are that some of the more hard-line groups are not going to fall into line, even for Viljoen. Aktur, the South West African National Party Front, has initiated a Supreme Court action to stop the liberalization of apartheid laws, as enacted by the National Assembly set up in the territory by Pretoria. Aktur has recently announced that it will continue its Supreme Court case, a position at least one newspaper has called, “throwing down the gauntlet to South African Prime Minister Botha” who appointed Viljoen.

Aktor has referred to the anti-apartheid legislation as “discrimination leading to forced integration.” Viljoen, on the other hand, has promised to “lead the country to independence without unnecessary delays.”

Whatever the outcome of negotiations within the white camp, it seems likely that the violence directed at SWAPO and its supporters will continue as long as the West refuses to support a real Namibian settlement by exerting strong pressure on South Africa.
Venda Independence: Pressing on with the Bantustans

During recent months, South African Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha has been busy cultivating a new image as an advocate of reform. "We can go into the future only with a message of love rather than of hate," the man previously nicknamed "Piet Weapons" for his hawkish stance as minister of defense stated piously on one recent occasion. And he has risked the wrath of his own party's right wing by unveiling proposals that would relax some of the restrictions on Blacks living and working in "white" urban areas (see Southern Africa, June and July, 1979).

Lest anyone imagine that Botha anticipates dismantling the structures of apartheid, observers, such as the Financial Mail, have defined his objectives as an attempt "to stabilize a black labor aristocracy and a black middle class in the white cities and towns." If the strategy succeeds, it would yield an urban counterpart to the traditional chiefs and their supporters who have functioned as instruments of apartheid policy in the tribal "homelands."

In the meantime, the Pretoria regime has been pressing ahead with its plans to bestow nominal "independence" on these rural "bantustans."

On September 12, a bright new flag was run up over two small parcels of land in South Africa's northeast corner and nearly half a million Africans instantly became citizens of a new "country" known as Venda. In the same instant, the 449,000 Venda-speaking people of South Africa, including those working in cities and mines hundreds of miles away, suddenly became "foreign blacks" in the 87 percent of South Africa set aside for the white minority. And the Pretoria regime had moved one step closer to its ultimate goal—a day when there will be "no black South Africans" as former Minister of Information Cornelius Mulder once put it.

Seven to Go

Before that day arrives, seven more homelands will have to be groomed for independence, seven more capital cities constructed, seven more flags designed. But when the process is completed, all of South Africa's 20 million blacks will be listed as citizens of one or another of the 10 bantustans sketched onto the grand map of apartheid.

Compared to most of the other homelands, including Transkei and Bophuthatswana which preceded it into independence in 1976 and 1977, Venda is relatively fortunate. For one thing, 300,000 of its "citizens" actually live within the borders drawn for it in Pretoria. For another, while it shares the absolute lack of industries and urban centers common to all the bantustans, its land is reasonably fertile.

But the differences end there. And the devastating similarities begin.

Venda Poverty

Like all the other homelands, Venda is drastically overcrowded. Its population density is 53 per square kilometer, compared with only 18 per square kilometer in the white areas. As a result, even though the land is fertile and even though most of the population works on the land, the area falls far short of being the regional "breadbasket" Pretoria planners predict it could become. In fact, the territory has to import 60 percent of its food needs from South Africa.

Although the territory is believed to have valuable deposits of coal and other minerals, prospects for getting enough of them out of the ground to pay the food import bills and other such necessary expenses

The Bantustan patchwork
SOUTH AFRICA

remains remote. Before Venda mining operations become an attractive investment, somebody will have to put up the money for major infrastructure development. At present, there are no railroads and few decent highways linking the territory to the outside world.

Even within apartheid's framework Venda independence is totally fraudulent. According to the Washington Post, "a report by an Afrikaans University estimated that to assure the sustained growth necessary for independence to be meaningful, Venda needs an investment of $117 million a year for the next 21 years—hardly a sum Pretoria could provide." If South Africa doesn't have that kind of money to spend, the new Venda government certainly doesn't. In fact, Chief Patrick Mphephu will have to rely on South African aid to cover $36.3 million out of his budget $43.6 million for the first year of "independence."

As if this budget weren't inadequate to begin with, a great deal of it is being splurged on a facelifting operation intended to give the small town of Sibasa, with its one paved street, at least the appearance of a national capital. Working around the clock during the final weeks before "independence day," construction crews were frantically trying to complete a $6 million parliamentary building, a $750,000 presidential palace for Mphephu to move into and a $400,000 national stadium.

After all the flashy construction projects have been paid for, Mphephu won't have much left for other, more urgent needs, such as schools. At present, a shortage of classrooms and teachers yields a student-teacher ratio of about 45:1. Even so, the Venda economy can't provide decent work for students once they finish their schooling. As the Bantu Education Journal noted some time ago, "Unfortunately, when they're qualified, the people do not find enough work in Venda." As a result, an estimated 67 percent of the male work force has to go looking for jobs as "foreign blacks" in white areas.

A Labor Reserve

For the foreseeable future, the money those migrant workers send home to their families seems likely to remain essential to Venda's economy. Three years after it became the first "independent" bantustan, Transkei finds itself locked firmly into the same position. As even one white official was forced to concede, "One can hardly speak of the Transkei economy in any meaningful sense. More properly, one must call it a labor reserve."

Critics of apartheid have long contended that that was about all the bantustans were intended to be. It certainly seems to be what they are doomed to remain, despite the insistence of a white official in Venda to the

Washington Post that "We don't want half-baked paraplegic states.... We want strong nations." Despite such assertions, the Pretoria regime appears to have abandoned efforts to palm the bantustans off as nations diplomatically. No other country has yet recognized Transkei or Bophuthatswana. And the only foreign delegation present at Venda's flag-raising ceremony came from the Muzorewa-Smith regime in Rhodesia.

Building Buffers

Since South Africa has been the only country to recognize the Salisbury government, the Rhodesian regime could hardly fail to return the favor. But the presence of its delegation also underlined the role shared by Muzorewa and homeland leaders like Mphephu in Pretoria's plans for a "fortress South Africa."

Apartheid planners have embraced Rhodesia's "majority rule" government as a buffer against both a radical, potentially hostile Zimbabwe and black-ruled countries to the north. And as Patrick Lawrence wrote recently in the Guardian, "When the process of independence is complete, the bantustans will form a snug buffer around...the country's industrial heartland."

Venda, for instance, sits strategically in the corner where Mozambique and Zimbabwe border South Africa. And the Pretoria regime clearly hopes to confine skirmishes with revolutionaries infiltrating back into the country to an area safely removed from white population centers. "The newly built airbase at Madimo in Venda will continue to be used by the South African Air Force," the Washington Post reported, "and a six-mile-wide border area between Venda and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia is patrolled by South African soldiers."

Mphephu is also busily building his own security forces, headed by a man who served for 20 years in the uniform of the security branch of the South African police force. They may have their hands full just keeping Mphephu in power. So far Mphephu has staged two popular elections, in 1973 and 1978. He lost both times. He has only remained in power because of votes from local chiefs nominated by him to fill the majority of the seats in the "National Assembly" under a constitution written for him in Pretoria.

Following the Soweto uprising in 1976, mass protests spread to Venda, culminating when 100,000 students boycotted classes in 1977, shutting down virtually all of Venda's schools.

Similar protests have erupted in several other bantustans, and given the long tradition of peasant militancy it is not unlikely that some of them could become hotbeds of resistance to apartheid. Still, to apartheid strategists they would have the advantage of being hotbeds safely isolated from the white population, prefabricated free-fire zones. And so the push continues. By the time it is completed, according to a recent study by Black Sash, a white liberal opposition group, more than 3.8 million people will have been uprooted from their homes and resettled, all but 8,600 of them black.

A.M.□
Black Journalists Meet—Pledge Future Activism

by a Special Correspondent

"Do you figure this conference is infiltrated?" an observer asked a black journalist at the outset of the gathering in a church center outside Johannesburg. "No question," came the reply. "No matter how hard we try and weed out informers, they find out everything that's gone on at our meetings."

"So they nab us, and ban our leaders," he shrugged. "We re-form into another group; we survive."

The Writers Association of South Africa (WASA) is itself a reformulation of the union of Black Journalists (UBJ), which was banned in the October 1977 crackdown on black consciousness organizations. Among the 250 participants in its recent three-day conference were former members of the banned Black Peoples Convention (BPC), the South African Students Organization (SASO), and a former defendant in the Soweto 11 students trial.

The organization has been subjected to continual harassment since its formation, and every regional report to the Congress listed incidents of police questioning, threats, raids, refusal of press passes and general intimidation.

WASA's president, Sunday Post editor Swelakhe Sisulu (son of senior ANC leader Walter Sisulu, imprisoned for life on Robben Island), was recently sentenced to a nine-month jail term for refusing to answer questions about wire-tapped phone consultations on news stories with fellow Post reporter Thami Makhwanazi. Makhwanazi himself disappeared into detention in June.

WASA Transvaal Region Secretary Enoch Duma was detained in solitary confinement for five months before being charged, and ultimately acquitted of acts of "terrorism" and "sabotage." Duma, a senior journalist at the Sunday Times has been forced to turn down offers for overseas study because the government refuses to give him a passport. WASA member Juby Mayet was banned last year, as was Isaac Moro, who fled the country this summer.

The 1978 WASA Congress had to be switched to Durban after it was banned by the local chief magistrate in Port Elizabeth, and this year the government refused a visa to the invited representative of the International Federation of Journalists, Ole Eriksen. The Norwegian journalist was arrested for entering Soweto without a permit during a fact-finding tour to South Africa last year. After Eriksen's visa denial, the IFJ sent Mike Pliso of the Lesotho Union of Journalists to WASA's 1979 Congress.

New Commitments

WASA was ostensibly founded as a trade union to defend the rights of black journalists and writers, but at this 3rd annual congress the organization's commitment to the rights of all workers and to the philosophy of black consciousness emerged as dominant themes.

"Up until now we have been a rather amorphous association which, though espousing a certain adherence to the greater liberation struggle, has been without a clear definition of its goals and strategies," admitted WASA President Sisulu at the close of the congress. "We have now disassociated ourselves from any elitist stance and fully committed our efforts to the decisive element in our struggle—the workers."

A catalyst for this crucial reassessment of WASA's role was a paper delivered by Quoraish Petal on the search for an ideology. Petal, a former BPC member now editing at the Rand Daily Mail, recalled that it was ten years since the initial articulation of the awareness of South African blacks' collective strength which came to be known as black consciousness. Now, he said, the "once dynamic system of thought has become virtually lifeless ... stripped of its liberatory fervor." He urged WASA to revitalize the black consciousness movement via a focus on black labor.

"If WASA accepts that a qualitative change in the psyche of workers is the essential condition for liberation, we watch the birth of a new phase of the struggle," Petal concluded.

After hours of intense debate, WASA resolved to shift its focus radically from a professional orientation to the immediate goal of expanding its membership to include black workers at every level of the newspaper industry, with the ultimate aim of agitation on behalf of all black workers.

False Reforms

Speaking on trade unionism, former UBJ President Joe Thloloe noted that the South African government has been quick to realize the potential threat to the system inherent in a strategy such as that WASA is currently evolving. The reporter, who now conducts Post's "Job Watch," condemned recent so-called reforms proposed by the Wiehahn Commission as an invidious division of workers.

"It is no longer just white, Indian, Colored, and their conception of black," Thloloe said. "It now distinguishes between black workers who are 'permanent' in so-called white South Africa, those who commute into this 'white South Africa' on a daily basis, and those who are migrants. God, migrants in the land of their forefathers!"

Thloloe urged WASA to remain independent of the new Industrial Conciliation Act, which requires unions to register, after obtaining government approval. WASA should take its battles "directly to the people confronting us, the employers." "Asking for registration is an acceptance of the 'right' of the white man to make laws for us and decide our destiny," he warned.

"Though WASA's membership of three hundred represents 70 percent of South Africa's black journalists in the English, Afrikaans and (mainly white-controlled) black press, the South African Association of Newspapers (SAAN), the Argus Group and Perskor (the Afrikaans publishing conglomerate) have all refused to negotiate with WASA on labor issues. WASA vowed at its congress not to cooperate in any way with the white South African Society of Journalists (SASJ) and to press its demands for direct dealings with management.

Individual Responsibility

Speaking on the role of the individual black journalist in this "abnormal" labor context, Father Lebamang Sebidi told the WASA members, "You are journalists in a society involved in a titanic ideological struggle and therefore you are charged with a commitment; it's the price you pay for relevancy."

The founder of the now-banned Black Priests' Solidarity Group suggested that black journalists take a cue from Afrikaans papers in their steadfast refusal to abandon their (National Party) ideology. "Black journalists should regard themselves as the black peoples' Information Department,'" Father Sebidi said. over
WASA resolved to adhere to its belief in the fallacy of “objective” reporting and to involve itself in relevant issues. The group agreed that “if black consciousness is indeed the necessary base on which workers become conscious of themselves as a class, it is our duty to conscientize black people along these principles.”

Such a commitment raises serious questions for black journalists, who are almost all forced by circumstance to work for white owned and operated newspapers. With considerable realism, WASA concedes that its members are thus often involved in “the promulgation of propaganda.” But wherever possible the organization has sought to strengthen the independence of its members.

Thus the conference learned that the London-based Lord Thompson Foundation of Journalism had offered to fund a training seminar for black journalists in Johannesburg, a proposal welcomed by WASA until it learned that the course was to be held in the SAAN headquarters. Reporting on the issue to the congress, British Embassy attache John Taylor confessed that he had been unaware of the “bad blood” between WASA and SAAN but then warned, “This is a gesture of affection and goodwill; if it is met with ill will we will withdraw.” Nevertheless, WASA resolved not to accept the SAAN link but to urge the Thompson Foundation to select an acceptable venue for the much-needed training scheme.

The issue of sexism within WASA emerged, if faintly, when the Witbank branch announced that it was planning to raise funds by sponsoring a “Miss WASA” contest. Initially, the proposal prompted only titters, but finally an objection was raised on the basis that “such cattle parades do not adhere to our code of ethics.” Although there are some black women journalists in South Africa, the vast majority of WASA’s members are men, the female presence at the conference consisting of a recording secretary, a messenger, and a handful of regional delegates.

Most conference time was devoted to domestic issues but even the minimal debate on international strategies for change pointed up the non-aligned, if not anti-western orientation of WASA. As President Sisulu put it, “You see, we are beginning to leave the United States behind.” It is reported that an offer of US State Department funding for the conference was rejected. The congress did call for wider recognition of WASA from international bodies, and specifically criticized Amnesty International for its allegedly low level of support on the issue of detention without trial of political prisoners.

Having pledged itself to begin working

Concluded on page 22
London—When the last peace conference on Rhodesia took place in Geneva in October 1976, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the head of the United African National Council (UANC) delegation, placed name cards on two empty seats on either side of his own. One card bore the name of Enos Nkala, the acting deputy secretary of the UANC, who had been arrested by Rhodesian police six months earlier. The other card was for Dr. Edson Sithole, a close Muzorewa aide.

When the current peace talks began in London in early September, the seats next to Muzorewa, now the Prime Minister in Salisbury, were filled with other faces. But Nkala and Sithole are still missing. Nkala is detained without charge and Sithole is believed to be held in a secret place of detention. Some nationalists believe Sithole has been murdered.

At the time of the Geneva talks, Muzorewa placed special emphasis on the repressive tactics of the Smith government. “We object to a system,” Muzorewa said, “that allows detention and restriction without trial.” The Bishop went on to demand the immediate release of all political prisoners and detainees, the revocation of all death sentences, and “a general amnesty for all those considered to have committed political crimes, including those outside the country.”

Now, nearly three years later, the London-based humanitarian group, the International Defense and Aid Fund, has released a report on political prisoners in Rhodesia to coincide with the London conference. The IDAF report concludes that since Muzorewa’s statement in Geneva the repressive measures of the Salisbury regime have not only continued but have actually increased. The IDAF report also lists the names of more than 1500 convicted political prisoners in Rhodesia, almost 200 known detainees and more than 150 persons sentenced to death on political grounds.

The basic instrument of political repression in Rhodesia is the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, passed in 1960 and used over the years, according to the report, “to crush African political activity at the grass roots level.” This act was supplemented in September 1978 by the establishment of martial law, which in several successive extensions had been applied to almost all of the country as the London talks began.

When the three African leaders joined with Ian Smith in the Salisbury internal settlement, they assured their followers that they would undertake to “determine and deal” with the release of detainees and review the sentences of those convicted of political offenses. “There has, however,” concludes the report, “been no general amnesty for either convicted political prisoners or detainees.”

Several times within the past year and a half the Salisbury regime has announced the release of political prisoners. These announcements have received worldwide publicity. But the IDAF report points out that the releases have been very selective and that many who were released were later re-arrested.

In August the Salisbury Minister of Justice admitted in Parliament that the release of political prisoners could only be done selectively. Other reliable reports indicate that released prisoners are required to “denounce terrorism and come forward to work peacefully and constitutionally.” If convicted prisoners agree to join one of the private armies of local leaders they stand an even better chance of release.

According to the report, arrests of suspected supporters of the Patriotic Front have “continued unabated” and many who came out of prison found that their “homes, cattle, and property had been confiscated or destroyed by the security forces and their families dispersed.”

Short-term detention has also increased. Under the emergency powers regulations, a police officer, district commissioner or a chief appointed by the regime may arrest without warrant any person suspected of being about to commit an offence or posing a threat to “public order.” Those arrested can be detained without charge for up to 30 days, renewable for another 30 days.

“In many cases those arrested have simply disappeared,” says the report. “The authorities have denied all knowledge of their whereabouts or even their existence and all efforts by relatives and lawyers to trace them have failed.” Church sources inside Rhodesia, IDAF reports, have also indicated that the security forces have rounded up large numbers of African students, all about 13 or 14 years old and have sent them to work for white farmers whose employees have deserted to join the guerrillas.

The report also documents cases of many young girls who have been detained by local private armies to cook and wash for them. Estimates vary as to the total number arrested under martial law, but according to IDAF the number has been steadily rising. The report estimates that 7000 people are now detained under martial law. According to the London Guardian 15000 are estimated to have been arrested and detained without trial over the whole period since martial law first took effect.

People brought to trial have been treated harshly by the courts. “Persons brought before the court,” says the report, “for supporting the liberation struggle may be treated more rather than less severely as a result of the internal settlement government.”

No Defense Allowed

Persons in martial law areas have been brought to trial before special military courts so quickly that neither relatives nor lawyers have been aware of what is happening. Conditions make it almost impossible for defense lawyers to operate effectively. The court president is fully entitled under martial law regulations to refuse to let a lawyer work, on the grounds that this would bog down the proceedings. “Legal representation is allowed,” wrote one lawyer to Bishop Muzorewa in June 1979, “but in practice I have never known it to be permitted.”

Judicial Murder

And then there is the question of punishment. The IDAF report lists 152 people sentenced to death on political grounds. “Hangings take place on Monday mornings in Salisbury’s central prison” says the report. “ Relatives are not informed either before or after the event and have often simply learned that execution has taken place on arriving at the prison at the normal visiting times.” IDAF concludes that the executions are illegal in both British and International law and that they constitute judicial murder.

In 1978, spokespeople for the internal settlement gave various assurances that the political executions would cease. And at a London press conference in 1978 Bishop Muzorewa himself affirmed a pledge to stop the hangings. But, concludes the report, “no death sentences are known to have been actually commuted by the internal settlement leadership” through 1978.

By February 1979 it was finally confirmed that execution of political prisoners was continuing and a prominent Muzorewa aide who held the position of joint justice minister said at the time that “the suggestion that the transitional government gave a pledge not to continue with hangings is not correct. No such pledge was given.”

Under Rhodesian law the President can commute any sentence of death, but this issue has aroused considerable legal controversy in Salisbury. Lieutenant General Peter Walls, the commander of the armed forces has stated—and he has been backed up by an appellate court ruling—that as administrator of martial law he has the last word in all executions.

But lawyers representing the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace petitioned the Salisbury High Court to stop martial law hangings until President Josia Gumede had been given the opportunity to exercise his prerogative of mercy. In a statement to the court Walls characterized the petition as “ vexation”.

Catholic Commission representatives met with Muzorewa who assured them that he was sympathetic and would carefully consider the petition. But a day later the group discovered that martial law hangings had been resumed on the very day of their meeting with the Bishop. Those executions are still continuing.

M.S. □
US Agency Seeks Influence in Africa

The US media commonly links Kissinger to a policy of dialogue with South Africa, crediting Carter with a much tougher confrontation stance. Yet behind the scenes, this administration has been deeply engaged in private, dialogue-type diplomacy aimed at showing South Africa how to defuse the coming revolution. Drawing on America’s experience with civil rights, US cultural and educational exchanges are intended to speed reform and protect US corporate interests, by helping moderate blacks and liberal whites construct a limited, non-violent solution in South Africa.

A large part of this diplomacy is now centralized in the new International Communication Agency headed by John Reinhardt, a black foreign service officer. Reinhardt headed State’s Public Affairs program and served as ambassador to Nigeria before heading ICA. ICA’s informational, cultural and educational programs, once housed at State, include Voice of America broadcasts, information centers and libraries abroad, preparation and distribution of literature and films about the US, scholarship programs and a broad array of cultural and educational exchanges.

The design of ICA’s South Africa work originates with a program laid out in mid-1973-75 by the present ambassador to South Africa, William Edmondson, when he was directing the Africa programs of State’s Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs. He was assisted by James Westmoreland, whose wife, “Maggie,” and her superior, Charles Bell, are presently responsible for ICA’s South Africa program.

ICA’s South Africa program is intentionally political. More money is now spent on ICA’s South Africa program than anywhere else on the continent, Nigeria having recently been displaced from that position.

ICA’s Visitor Program

Through its international visitors program, ICA will this year fund visits of some 100 South African “leaders” and “opinion-makers” to the US. Two-thirds of them will be African, Colored or Indian. They are chosen initially by ICA’s 12 specialists in Capetown, Durban or Johannesburg and by the US embassy in Pretoria. But Maggie Westmoreland and Charles Bell have the final word on who comes, and in some cases they designate certain South Africans for ICA visitor status on their own. The number of visitors has been growing steadily.

This year’s special emphasis is on “verligtes” (enlightened Afrikaners). Dr. Johannes Degenaar, head of the Department of Political Philosophy at Stellenbosch University, for example, toured the United States this summer. Another visitor was Ms. Ilse Treurnicht, cousin of Andries Treurnicht, whose hard-line “verkrampt” policy makes him a powerful nationalistic cabinet member. Ms. Treurnicht leads a political discussion group at Stellenbosch University which is said to be open to dialogue.

While some of these choices are intended to show South Africa that the US programs are “evenhanded,” it also reflects a judgment that Afrikaners have a deep bond to their land, and a special interest in working something out with moderate blacks. ICA has plans to bring over one Afrikaner who is prominent in the Broederbond—the right-wing secret society which shapes Afrikaner ideology—because he favored dialogue. Dutch Reformed ministers are also on ICA’s “wish list.”

Wooing the Church

ICA’s African, Indian and Colored visitors from South Africa have often been church officials. The Roman Catholic Church’s Auxiliary Bishop of Cape Town, Stephen Naidoo, and his Anglican counterpart, Suffragan Bishop Monwabisi Matengwe, have made recent ICA-funded and programmed tours. With black political organizations banned, churches are seen as an increasingly important channel of communication from and to the black community.

International visitors’ vocations are quite varied, but editors and journalists, clergy and educators are chosen in greater numbers than others.

Thirty to 45 day visits to the United States often lead to continuing linkages between US and South African institutions. For example, when Cape Town University’s H.W. van der Merwe visited Chicago, he invited the head of the Justice Department’s regional Community Relations Division, Richard Salem, to give a lecture series on conflict resolution at the university’s Center for Intergroup Studies. ICA picked up the tab for Salem’s visit. Salem says he mediated confrontations at Wounded Knee, Skokie and Kent State. When questioned as to whether a dialogue wasn’t too narrow, if it excluded jailed and exiled African leaders, Salem said his work convinced him that one has to start with those in the center.

Shaping Future Leaders

ICA’s program of “communication for change” has been primarily aimed at established black and white leadership. But it is also engaged in what may be an even more important effort to educate and train elite members of South Africa’s black population for the future “when they will be running things.”

ICA sent a multiracial seminar team to Witwatersrand University recently to help construct an affirmative action program with open admission and compensatory education in all fields. The seminar was designed to do “consciousness raising” among faculty. Wits, with a white enrollment of 20,000, is expected to raise its black enrollment from 200 to 500 this next year. Such educational efforts have had preliminary backing from at least one US foundation. This spring Carnegie Corporation sent Dr. Carl Fields, a black consultant on education, to survey the feasibility of raising the level of African student intake at Wits to 2000.

Meanwhile, ICA’s South Africa desk has been working with multinational companies to set up an alternative school system in Soweto. Control Data and ICA are setting up what they claim to be “a very innovative” program “to meet community needs” and to train computer operators. While Control Data claims to have “pioneered in teaching the unteachable,” its credentials are tarnished by its sales and leases to the South African police state and US educators have been so sharply critical of its computerized education program that the company has had great difficulty in marketing its equipment domestically.

Social Workers

ICA has also made special efforts to reach South Africa’s social work professionals. This May, an inter-racial group of 15 South African university teachers and directors of social work were shepherded around US universities which stress “community involvement and negotiation skills.” While some of the visitors were sponsored by South Africa’s Anglo American Corporation and by US corporations, much of the planning for the visit was done by Dr. Morris Cohen of the University

UNITED STATES
Unequal Justice

by Ena Fox

Unequal sentencing under the law is basic to the administration of justice in South Africa. If proof were needed it is provided by figures which appear in a survey recently conducted by Professor Barend van Nierkerk of Natal University.

Contrary to the much-cherished myth of the "impartiality" of South African judges, the record shows for instance that since 1911, 150 Blacks have been executed for rape of a white woman, but no Whites have been executed for raping a Black woman; many more Blacks have been sentenced to death for murder where the victim is white than vice-versa; the majority of South African Blacks have no legal counsel in court, and thus may receive harsher sentences; and monetary fines are discriminatory because Blacks are economically worse off than Whites living in South Africa.

Much of this may not surprise readers of Southern Africa, who will find it no revelation that racial discrimination operates in the courts of a society based on racist principles.

What may startle some liberal US readers, however, is that this country's criminal justice system does not compare particularly favorably to South Africa in its treatment of Blacks.

- Blacks in the US are approximately 12 percent of the population, but 38 percent of all prisoners are black.
- Racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty and prison-term sentences have been shown in a number of studies. A Washington report found that of 435 men executed for rape since 1930, 90 percent were black; a North Carolina study found that 37 percent of those Blacks convicted of killing Whites received the death penalty, while no Whites were sentenced to death for killing a Black. A recent study by the Boston Globe concluded that Massachusetts Blacks get longer sentences than Whites for the same crime

In fact, the overall US imprisonment rate compares unfavourably with most Western...
New Lead Player—Same Play

African observers watching the drama that led to UN Ambassador Andrew Young’s resignation in August must have had a strong sense that, whatever the name of the man sitting in the White House, some attitudes change very little.

Young was in trouble for meeting with Palestine Liberation Organization representative Zehdi Terzi. Current policy forbids such meetings. Only a few years ago, a similar policy prohibited US representatives from meeting with members of FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC, the three liberation movements fighting against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau.

Nowadays, policy regarding southern African liberation movements is somewhat more realistic and Ambassador Young himself played an important part in making the change. But it is still true that most members of the administration think it more important to keep talking to the policy makers in Pretoria and to white opposition “liberals” than to seek out the views of the liberation movements.

Seeking White Reform

Donald F. McHenry, President Carter’s choice to succeed Young, has probably had as large a role in shaping southern African policy as any other official. His professional diplomat’s approach—in contrast to Young’s more freewheeling style—has reassured some of Young’s critics. But on policy questions, the two men generally agree.

Along with Young, Assistant Secretary Richard Moose and Policy Planning Director Tony Lake, McHenry has pressed for a more open and activist US stance. As a member of the Carter transition team at State (between the 1976 election and the inauguration), McHenry authored policy drafts which set the tone for later decisions.

He was no new Africa hand in 1977. In the eight years (1963-1971) that he worked on UN affairs at the State Department, McHenry dealt frequently with African problems.

In 1971 he was chosen as an International Affairs Fellow by the Council of Foreign Relations, whose membership includes top corporate, financial, academic and diplomatic figures.

For the next two years, as a Fellow and a guest scholar at the Brookings Institute, he conducted what he described as “a study of the business practices of American firms in southern Africa towards non-whites in particular.” He proposed to the council “a quiet, non-polemical study” that he argued “would result in enlightened practices which would make more defensible the continued presence of American business in an essentially unjust political and social system.”

This, he said, would “contribute to improved economic, social, and possibly, political conditions for non-whites.”

He made two trips to South Africa—becoming one of the first black Americans to do extensive research there.

He told a House subcommittee in 1973 that he had “talked with a broad spectrum of South Africans, including government officials” and with “management and employees of more than 50 US corporations.”

McHenry emerged with considerable data on the operations of American companies in South Africa. But despite strongly voiced criticisms of both apartheid and the operations of the corporations, McHenry insisted that the only realistic way of bringing change to South Africa was pressuring the whites to modify their behavior for their own good. Thus he assigned the corporations the role of potential models of good race relations, and dismissed any argument that US economic aid was in fact helping to strengthen the apartheid system.

When Carter moved into the White House in 1977, McHenry, appointed to a top diplomatic position under Young, was ready to help shape a new Africa policy. According to Africa News: “he quietly quarbacked a strategy that began with an exhaustive study of the entire range of official ties with South Africa and which led to a policy of appealing to South Africa to make changes in its own self-interest.”

Namibia

McHenry is not a flashy diplomat, and much of his meticulous work has been carried on behind the scenes. The most public of his activities (apart from the recent affair of the Russian ballet dancer) has been the two-year attempt to achieve a Namibian settlement.

McHenry was prominent among those who urged that the five Western members of the Security Council work out a joint strategy on the Namibia issue in order to strengthen the chances of winning concessions from both the Africans and South Africa. His formula for achieving this result was a mixture of carrot and stick—the pressure to be applied to both sides in the conflict.

On the African side he has had considerable success—notably during un-publicized trips to Angola, the main rear base for SWAPO. But he has had much more difficulty finding support from the foreign policy bureaucracy and from European allies for seriously pressuring South Africa into making concessions on Namibia or domestic policy. Indeed it is not clear that McHenry himself would wish to apply real pressure in the form of sanctions or other tough measures, although it seems certain that McHenry, like Ambassador Young, will work hard to avoid having to cast a veto on any such anti-South African proposal at the United Nations in the coming months.

Much of the material in this article was provided by Africa News.

Donald McHenry (on right), no longer an on-looker
Afro American Entertainers in South Africa:
In Concert with Apartheid

The controversy surrounding Jesse Jackson's recent visit to South Africa (Southern Africa, Sept. '79) has again raised the question—should black Americans visit South Africa?

This is not a new issue, but until recently it was somewhat academic. While white Americans were welcome in South Africa, and their counterpart white South Africans were free to visit the US, Pretoria had tight restrictions on allowing Blacks in or out of the country.

That policy shifted in the '70s, when the regime moved to build itself a new international image as reasonable, flexible and open to change. Pretoria started wooing prestigious black visitors—who were treated very differently from the quarter million African visitors who are migratory workers and find themselves locked up in the mine compounds.

At the same time, some black South Africans, even a few with records as dissidents, were allowed out to visit Europe and the US.

In 1977 Howard University Professor Ron Walters noted, "the South Africans themselves . . . speak openly of a noticeable increase in black visitors from the United States, but they decline to identify the visitors or to disclose how many have come. . . . One official said the number might be as high as 250 in the last few years."

Certainly the list of black American entertainers who have visited South Africa recently is impressive. It includes Al Wilson, Eartha Kitt, Aretha Franklin, Josephine Baker, Billy Cobham, the Supremes, the Staple Singers, Percy Sledge, Johnny Mathis, Isaac Hayes and Jimmy Smith. Ironically the Temptations began their tour of South Africa on May 25th—the date of the founding of the Organization of African Unity and a day universally recognized as "African Liberation Day."

Critics of black American visitors to South Africa seek to remind black Americans of UN resolution 2396, which was adopted by the General Assembly on December 2, 1968. The resolution requested "all states to suspend cultural, educational, sporting, and other exchanges with the racist regime and with other organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid." The Organization of African Unity has pressed hard for this position to be universally accepted.

African National Congress representative to the UN and US Mfanafuthi Makatini told Southern Africa, "all forms of collaboration with the apartheid regime, political, economic, nuclear, cultural and sporting must be condemned as a betrayal of the struggling black people of South Africa and as an act of hostility . . .

"The case of black American entertainers and sportsmen such as Tate, Spinks and others, who, for a mess of pottage are prepared to betray the cause of the Blacks in South Africa, and the dignity of Blacks the world over, poses a big challenge to the black community in the U.S."

He urged the building of a strong boycott to isolate the Pretoria regime.

Cultural Boycott

Many organizations have sought to maintain this boycott of South Africa in the hope of denying the apartheid regime any legitimacy in the world community. In 1967 and 1968, the American Committee on Africa initiated and sponsored a "We Say No to Apartheid" pledge. Leading personalities in the performing and creative arts pledged not to perform in South Africa. Among the 62 signatories were Paul Newman, Jo-Anne Woodward, Dick

Continued on page 23
Films and slide shows are an important resource for activists seeking to build public awareness of the struggle for liberation in southern Africa.

Until recently propaganda from the South African Department of Information dominated the scene and liberation support groups had very little material to use. That is now changing; we list below films and slide shows which we know to be available, with brief comments on their contents and a note on how they are available. Reviews have been written by various people, but the basic work on compiling this list was done by TerriAnn Lowenthal, a summer intern at the American Committee on Africa. Please let us know if you come across other good films and slide shows.

South Africa

Last Grave at Dimbaza
58 min., color, 1974
$15-$100

This is probably the best single introduction to South Africa and its racially-based social, political, and economic problems. Shot secretly inside the country, it reviews the full range of the racial policy, pass system, military might, segregation and inequality in industry, housing, medical services, education, and especially the effects of the system on black family life. High white standards of living are dramatically pictured. However, very little attention is given to resistance by African liberation organizations.

NY-1; NY-11; NY-12; NY-13; NJ-1; IL-5; TN-1; CA-1; CA-2; CA-3; PA-3; PA-4; IN-1; MN-1; MI-1; CAN-3; MN-2; DE-1; MA-2; WI-2

The Rising Tide
44 min., color, 1977
$60-$80

This is one of the most contemporary films on South Africa, which uses rare historical footage to trace the source of today’s events to their colonial roots. The film emphasizes the persistent black resistance to each new white incursion, from the formation of the African National Congress, to the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, culminating in the explosive uprisings of 1976. The importance of the link between the liberation struggles of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa is shown. Included are commentaries by the late Steven Biko, Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, and Joshua Nkomo, co-leader of the Patriotic Front. Bankrolled by multinational corporations and the western powers, the South African regime knows it is fighting for its survival. But as the events of the film make clear, the rising tide of black independence cannot and will not be stopped.

NY-14; CA-3

There Is No Crisis
30 min., color, 1976
$15

A powerful documentary which features an exclusive interview with Tsietsi Mashinini, a student leader of the Soweto demonstrations in June of 1976. The attacks by the armed police against the demonstrators are described by Mashinini and other black leaders. The speakers make it clear that the struggle that began in Soweto has grown into a challenge to the whole system of apartheid.

NY-7; CA-3; CAN-1; NY-13

Six Days in Soweto
55 min., color, 1978
$75

The Soweto rebellion of June 1976 marked a turning point in South African history. This remarkable, award-winning film looks at the uprising, its causes, and aftermath. Through interviews and verite footage, the camera provides a unique and intimate look at the dynamics of black family life, against the backdrop of the South African apartheid system. The six days are re-created in full, with stories from many of the original participants in the uprisings. The film is not merely a record of rebellion against the violence of apartheid, but an insight into the daily lives and consciousness of the people of Soweto.

CA-3

Come Back Africa
83 min., B&W, 1959
$150

This story of a black family is a composite of events that reflects the barbaric reality of 20th century apartheid society in South Africa. Enacted by Africans whose experiences were in fact not unlike the story’s events, it exposes the brutalizing effect of the life Africans are forced to live in their own country, subject to an official policy of segregation and political and economic discrimination. The film crew worked in secret, disguised as a commercial film unit making a musical, and in constant fear of confiscation and deportation. Tracing the plight of the black man and his family, the film provides a devastating portrait of the African’s tragic existence.

NY-14

South Africa—The Nuclear File
58 min., color, 1979
$100

An important film on a subject of increasing concern in the struggle against apartheid. A thorough report is made on how the United States, almost single handedly, gave South Africa its nuclear capability. The film has valuable footage of South Africa’s actual nuclear facilities at Pelindaba. Among many interviews is one with Donald Sole, a nuclear expert and now South Africa’s ambassador in Washington. Evidence of nuclear weapons testing by South Africa is also thoroughly examined.

NY-15

Generations of Resistance
58 min., color

A history of black resistance to colonial rule in South Africa. The film is produced by Peter Davis whose credits also include “South Africa: The Nuclear File.”

CA-3
Banking On South Africa
Slide/cassette show or filmstrip
18 min., color $5-$10

This slideshow exposes the role that banks play in supporting the apartheid system in South Africa. Major United States banks have loaned billions of dollars to the South African government and government-owned industries, as well as to private industries. The slideshow covers the oppressive system of apartheid, the resistance to it, and how we can take action to help end it.

MA-1; CA-3; CAN-1; CAN-4; IL-3; IN-1

South Africa: Freedom Rising
18 min., color $20
Slide/cassette show

Set to a background of African freedom music and narration, a collection of slides of South Africa that depict the history and everyday experiences of apartheid. The slideshow explains the systematized racism and the fundamental role it plays in the South African economy. Also included is an examination of the role which US corporations play in supporting the apartheid system.

OH-1

Namibia

Colonialism: A Case Study, Namibia
(also released as Namibia: A Trust Betrayed)
23 min., color, 1975 $8-$30

Reviews the period of German conquest and African resistance that led to the near elimination of the Herero, Nama, and Ovambo peoples. Artful use of old photographs helps tell the story of early German oppression. The film succinctly explains how Namibia (then South-West Africa) became a League of Nations Mandate and a United Nations Trust Territory under South African occupation. The latter part of the film deals with the country under South African domination and the efforts of the Namibian people to free themselves.

NY-9; IL-4; CA-3; WI-1; CAN-4

Liberation Struggle in Namibia
40 min., color, 1975 $30

This Swedish television film describes the labor, homeland reserve, and social conditions faced by African peoples in Namibia. The first part surveys the history of German colonization and South African occupation of the country. The second half of the film reviews the guerrilla struggle led by SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) against South African domination and presents the social program of the organization. Sam Nujoma, a SWAPO leader, attacks the Western interests supporting South African occupation and emphasizes the party's commitment to freedom through armed struggle. Includes high quality photography of Windhoek, the Namibian capital.

NY-9

Free Namibia
27 min., color, 1978 $40

Narrated by Ossie Davis, Free Namibia is the most current report on the forces vying to shape a settlement in Namibia. Under South African rule, the black population has been relegated to arid "homelands" where they can find neither food nor work. The film captures the rituals and myths of the affluent white settler society. White intransigence has led to widespread support for SWAPO, the South-West Africa People's Organization. In one unforgettable scene at dusk on a lonely stretch of sand, thousands of Namibians emerge from the surrounding countryside for a SWAPO rally despite the obvious dangers. A woman explains: "We cannot be intimidated any longer; we have decided that we are fighting for our freedom.''

CA-3

Swapo Fights For Liberation
Slide show and cassette sound track 1979 30 min. $10.00 plus postage

Voices of SWAPO leaders and members dynamically bring into focus the conditions of oppression, the United States role, and SWAPO's leadership in the liberation struggle. Includes Namibian music. This presentation goes directly to the important issues of the struggle and the responsibilities of solidarity work. It is both educational and agitational.

CA-4

Angola

Angola: Second War of Liberation
(also released as Angola: The People Have Chosen and Angola Report)
50 min., color, 1976 $35-$75

Filmed by an Austrian-French film crew, this film depicts events from August to November, 1975, immediately before independence. This film shows the problems the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola anticipates in building a nation from a land torn by internal strife and imperialism. Little background on Angola's history or the southern African socio-political context is included.

NY-1; CA-2; CA-3; CAN-2; NY-10

Sambizanga
102 min., color, 1972 $110

A moving and realistic though fictional portrayal of the terrors of secret police, the immorality of servitude, and the struggle for independence in Angola. A woman searches for her missing husband who is taken away, jailed, tortured, and eventually killed by the Portuguese authorities. Portuguese dialogue with English subtitles, the film portrays events common to the period before 1961, which led to armed rebellion in the 1960's. Directed by Sarah Maldoror and centered on the wife's search, this film will carry an especially powerful message to groups interested in third world women.

NY-6

A Vitoria E Certa:
The Story of Angola
Slide/cassette show or filmstrip 30 min., color

This slide show, which includes music from Angola, covers the history of Angola and the liberation movement. Also discussed are the years prior to the 1975-76 "second war of liberation" and policies of the MPLA.

IL-3; CA-3
Mozambique

A Luta Continua
32 min., color, 1973
$15-$50

A documentary on FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), filmed inside liberated territory during the war against Portuguese colonialism. It presents FRELIMO’s efforts to initiate social change, including programs to provide educational, medical, and social services to the people of the areas under its jurisdiction during the struggle against Portugal. Made by a New York Afro-American film team and directed by Robert van Lierop.

NY-1; NY-2; OH-1; IL-3; CA-1; CA-2; CAN-3; MA-2; TN-1

O Povo Organizado
68 min., color, 1975
$40-$125

A sequel to A Luta Continua, this film deals with events in Mozambique since FRELIMO assumed power after independence in 1975. It presents a brief historical overview of the colonial period and liberation struggle, but focuses on FRELIMO’s efforts to deal with internal contradictions inherited from the Portuguese. It describes the difficulties of transforming a revolutionary movement into an established government. Sequences show the difficulties encountered in reshaping Mozambique’s economic system, and how colonialism and imperialism have affected the everyday working people.

NY-1; NY-2; CA-2; CAN-3

Bullets Are Beginning to Flower
27 min., color, 1977
$40

In 1975, after years of fierce guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonial regime, the people of Mozambique finally won their independence. This fascinating Dutch film looks at the transformation of the Mozambican school system since independence. In doing so, it provides a unique glimpse of how the new government is actually implementing the building of a new society. The film effectively counters speculation in the American press that black rule in neighboring Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa will lead to a bloodbath. It provides a vivid example of self-reliant nation building in Southern Africa.

CA-3

Zimbabwe

Who’s Got a Right to Rhodesia?
53 min., color
$20-$50

A report on the roots of the war in Zimbabwe. The film examines the living conditions of the black majority in Zimbabwe and the daily escalation of the war and its effects on the nation’s economy.

NY-16, MI-2

Goodbye Rhodesia

A new film recently completed by Thames Television in the Spring of 1979. The film depicts the lack of support among the majority of Zimbabweans for the so-called “internal settlement” solution to majority rule in Zimbabwe.

CA-3

People’s War in Zimbabwe:
Defeating the US Mercenary Strategy
Color Slide Show, with cassette sound track, 1979
40 min.
$80.00—sale cost
rental fee negotiable

Traces the history of colonial oppression in Zimbabwe and the goals and methods of the liberation struggle being waged by the Patriotic Front. Explains the US stake in the region, emphasizing covert support for the Rhodesian war machine through illegal supplies of oil, weapons and mercenaries. Documents the workings of the CIA/US army mercenary recruiting network which is secretly channeling men to fight against the people of Zimbabwe. Also exposes the links between the mercenary machine and US domestic policy forces and right wing organizations which terrorize and control black and third world communities in the US.

CA-5

Distributors

California

CA-1 Lifelong Learning
Extension Media Center
University of California
2223 Fulton St.
Berkeley, CA 94720
(415) 642-0460

CA-2 Tricontinental Films
P.O. Box 4430
Berkeley, CA 94704
(415) 548-3204

CA-3 California Newsreel
Southern Africa Media Center
630 Natoma Street
San Francisco, CA 94103
(415) 621-6196

CA-4 Southern Africa Solidarity Committee
P.O. Box 14462
San Francisco, CA 94114
(415) 647-1751 or (415) 626-7280

CA-5 South Africa Anti-Mercenary Coalition
P.O. Box 14333, Station G
San Francisco, CA 94114
(415) 863-3717

Canada

CAN-1 Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa
121 Avenue Road
Toronto, Ontario Canada
(416) 967-5562
Canada only.

CAN-2 Development Education Resource Center of British Columbia
Toronto, Ontario Canada
(416) 964-6901
Canada only.

CAN-3 IDERA
Development Education Resource Center of British Columbia
2524 Cypress Street
Vancouver, British Columbia V6J 3N2
(604) 738-8815

20 SOUTHERN AFRICA/OCTOBER 1979
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAN-4</td>
<td>Audio Visual Library United Church of Christ 85 St. Clair Ave., East Toronto, Ontario M4T 1M8 (416) 925-5931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Peninsular Conference, A-Y Dept. United Methodist Church 139 North State Street Dover, DE 19901 (412) 621-6916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Chicago Coalition on Southern Africa 22 East Van Buren Street Chicago, IL 60605 (312) 427-4511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Audio-Visual Library Office of Communications Christian Church 222 South Downey Ave. Indianapolis, IN 46206 (317) 353-1491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Packard Manse Media Project Box 450 Stoughton, MA 02072 (617) 344-9364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Task Force on Southern Africa Massachusetts Conference, United Church of Christ 6 Ferndale Rd. Needham, MA 02192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>IMC/MSU Educational Films Michigan State University East Lansing, MI 48912 (517) 353-4473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Michigan Media Center University of Michigan 416 - 4th Street Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 (313) 764-5360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Augsburg Publishing House 426 South Fifth Street Minneapolis, MN 55415 (621) 332-4561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>Dr. Alten L. Haldorsen American Luthern Church 422 South 5th Street Minneapolis, MN 55415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Tricontinental Film Center 333 Sixth Ave. New York, NY 10014 (212) 989-3330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Mozambique Film Project c/o Robert van Lierop 240 East 23rd Street New York, NY 10010 (212) 962-5762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>New Yorker Films 16 West 81st Street New York, NY 10023 (212) 247-6110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Union Theological Seminary Audio-Visual Resource Center 3041 Broadway New York, NY 10027 (212) 662-7100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>South West Africa People's Organization 801 Second Ave., Room 1401 New York, NY 10011 (212) 962-7863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Third World Newsreel 160 Fifth Ave., Room 911 New York, NY 10010 (212) 243-2310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>United Federation of Teachers Local 2, AFT 260 Park Ave. South New York, NY 10010 (212) 777-0480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Africa Office National Council of Churches 475 Riverside Dr., Room 612 New York, NY 10027 (212) 870-2645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Icarus Films 200 Park Ave. South New York, NY 10003 (212) 674-3373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Peter Davis Brophy Road Hurleyville, NY 12747 (914) 434-3579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Syracuse University Film Rental Center 1455 East Colvin Street Syracuse, New York 13210 (315) 476-6631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Office for Audio-Visual United Church of Christ 600 Grand Ave. Ridgefield, NJ 07657 (201) 945-7060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Dayton Community Media Workshop 215 Superior Ave. Dayton, OH 45406 (513) 222-0170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>United Methodist Church Board of Global Ministries Service Center 7820 Reading Rd. Cincinnati, OH 45237 (513) 761-2100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Continued on page 23*
ZIMBABWE INFORMATION GROUP

ZIMBABWE INFORMATION GROUP bulletin no. 9-10

Zimbabwe must be free

ZIG is an anti-imperialist group working in solidarity with the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. We produce a regular bulletin which counters the mis-information in the Western press about Zimbabwe, and gives a more accurate picture of the situation. We produce occasional papers on issues of particular significance, and can also provide speakers for meetings. We seek to broaden understanding of the role of Western imperialist powers in Southern Africa and to support the campaign against racism.

Subscription Rates for 5 issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individuals</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK Airmail</td>
<td>£1.50 ($3)</td>
<td>£2.50 ($5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmail Overseas excl. Europe</td>
<td>£4.00 ($8)</td>
<td>£5.00 ($11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Overseas and Europe</td>
<td>£2.00 ($4)</td>
<td>£4.00 ($8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contact ZIG, 1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1.

Black Journalists

Continued from page 12

closely with existing organizations on a variety of issues ranging from opposition to the Tate-Coetzees boxing match to building solidarity with striking workers, the conference closed with an assessment of the current state of black consciousness by Dr. Allan Boesak. WASA, he said, could help fill the vacuum left by the banning of the earlier generation of black consciousness groups. Finally, he urged WASA members to take sides.

"You must be sensitive to these subtle shifts in government policy that purportedly represent change. You must be dedicated to the truth as it is revealed in the struggle of black people in this country," he told the congress. "Neutrality on the part of black journalists in this country is a crime that we cannot forgive."

US Seeks Influence

Continued from page 15

the talk proceeds, South Africa is given time to build its capacity to resist change.

When the United Nations and African countries call for an end to western investment and loans and for economic sanctions, these measures are invariably opposed by the United States and its western partners—in the name of "maintaining contact and keeping the door open."

Secondly, the reforms of the educational system in which ICA is investing may be creating skills, but its whole courtship of the elite is also clearly intended to create a black leadership that will act as a buffer against radical change—change that might upset US economic and political interests.

Unequal Justice

Continued from page 15

capitalist countries outside of South Africa, and racism may be the main reason, suggested a recent study by a member of the US House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime. The 1973 median US incarceration rate of 43.5 per 100,000 for Whites compared favorably with most European countries, but the median incarceration rate for Blacks was 367.5 per 100,000 or 8.5 times the rate for whites. Broken down on a state-by-state basis, all of the states studied “incarcerated Blacks at more than three times their rates for whites, and one-third of them—13 states—had an incarceration rate for black people that was 10 times higher than their incarceration rate for white people."
Black Entertainers  
Continued from page 17
Gregory, Bill Cosby, Diane Carroll, Sammy Davis and Leonard Bernstein. The campaign achieved considerable publicity, taking full-page advertisements in the New York Times and Encore magazine, with additional coverage provided by many black newspapers.

At about this time, a number of black Americans, including prominent writers such as John O. Killens, Louise Meriwether and Imamu Amiri Baraka, formed Black Concern, an organization which called for a "rejection of any dialogue with South Africa... and for the continuation of the boycott of South Africa in economic, cultural, sports and other fields." Although shortlived, this group helped focus attention on an important issue.

The organization that may have been most successful in maintaining the cultural boycott of South Africa in recent years is the African Jazz-Art Society and Studios. AJASS was founded in August of 1956 in the South Bronx by a group of writers, artists, musicians and other culturally oriented people, who believed that Jazz and African dance could be formed into a contemporary African art form. Initially organized to sponsor concerts and other activities to showcase the work of black artists, AJASS became a strong supporter of African cultural groups who came to the US to perform. This relationship, along with the rising nationalist consciousness of the '60s led AJASS to activities designed to support the liberation movements in Africa.

AJASS and the Patrice Lumumba Coalition short-circuited the 1978 tour of South Africa by the Floaters and the 1979 tour planned for the Jackson Five. Black press publicity and the threat of an international boycott provided the keys to success.

These groups also closed down "Ipi Tombi," a South African sponsored theatrical production that sought to glamorize Bantustan life. The 42-day picket line mounted during the bitter winter of 1976-77 cost the producers over $327,000. The action brought together very diverse organizations in an Emergency Committee to Protest the South African Production of Ipi Tombi. Groups involved included the Richard Allen Cultural Center, the American Committee on Africa, Paul Robeson Archives, Black Theatre Alliance, Fight Back, and the South African Freedom Day Coalition.

A similar fate overtook "Umabatha," the so-called "Zulu MacBeth" this summer. In a move to maintain and broaden the cultural boycott, AJASS sent representatives to the June conference of the Black Music Association in Philadelphia. Elombe Brath, a founder of AJASS and spokesperson for the Patrice Lumumba Coalition, was well-received when he described South Africa's use of popular black entertainers as "a brazen attempt to pacify the indigenous black majority. Black super stars are being used as tools against the organizing cadres of the oppressed masses of South Africa while, at the same time, they help gain publicity for a regime whose very image is synonymous with racism, oppression and exploitation."

He added, "Those who accept these deals are working—consciously or unconsciously, wittingly or unwittingly—against the best interests of millions of their suppressed brothers and sisters. They are actually performing in concert with their oppressors."

The AJASS and Patrice Lumumba Coalition position is embodied in their message to black artists that "to visit South Africa, you must first become an 'honorary white.' But when you do become an 'honorary white,' we reserve the right to regard you as a dishonorable Black."

Entertainers are not the only black Americans taking the tour. The guest list includes poets Nikki Giovanni and Michael Harper, actor Richard Roundtree of Shaft fame, politicians, civil rights leaders, and prominent black businessmen. Some have even gone as corporate representatives, including Vernon Jordan for Xerox and Dr. Kenneth B. Clark on behalf of Seagram Distillers.

Walters contends that "some distinction needs to be made between those who go to South Africa to line their own pockets or carry out the policies of backward administrations, and those who have progressive contributions to make while there and on their return to the States." Some observers feel that a special case might be made for black journalists. There are many who would disagree, and no supporter of African liberation has been able to make a case in defense of the entertainers.

And Henry Isaacs, a member of the Pan-Africanist Congress Mission to the UN, told Southern Africa that "We condemn all such visits to South Africa, whether cultural, political or whatever. The end effect is the same. They give comfort to the racist regime and provide much needed foreign exchange."

Isaacs also took exception to those visitors who contend that they're on a fact-finding mission. "There are countless blacks in exile who have testified as to the conditions in South Africa. There has been ample documentation of the deprivation of Blacks in South Africa performed by the UN Centre Against Apartheid, the OAU, and other organizations, some of which have a 30-year history of such efforts. Are these people contending that they can't trust these organizations or the Azanian people themselves, who are leading the struggle against the racist regime?"

The struggle to maintain the boycott is not over. Entertainment industry sources allege that Millie Jackson, among others, is planning a concert tour of South Africa in the very near future. Perhaps many black American entertainers need to be reminded of the words of Paul Robeson: "The artist must elect to fight for freedom or slavery. I have made my choice. I had no other alternative."  

M.B.

Films  
Continued from page 21

Pennsylvania
PA-3 American Baptist Churches, USA  
Film Library  
Valley Forge, PA 19481  
(215) 768-2306

PA-4 Lutheran Church in America  
Board of Publications, Film Dept.  
2900 Queen Lane  
Philadelphia, PA 19129

Tennessee
TN-1 United Methodist Film Service  
1525 McGavock Street  
Nashville, TN 37203  
(615) 327-0911

Wisconsin
WI-1 Lutheran Campus Center  
1025 University Avenue  
Madison, WI 53715  
(608) 257-7178

WI-2 University of Wisconsin-Extension  
Bureau of Audio-Visual Instruction  
1327 University Avenue  
Madison, WI 53706  
(608) 262-1644  

Rents to contiguous states and in Wisconsin only.

OCTOBER 1979/SOUTHERN AFRICA 23
Dear Southern Africa Committee:

In your study on page 29 of the July/August issue, you refer to the Association of Concerned African Scholars of the African Studies Association. ACAS has nothing whatsoever to do with ASA. Some of our members belong to ASA, some to AHSA, some to both, some to neither.

Sincerely yours,

Immanuel Wallerstein
Co-chair, ACAS

Our apologies!

Dear Southern Africa Committee:

Today I received the August issue of your magazine with Samora Macltel on the cover and to my dismay I found something called the New England Fisherman between the covers; not your magazine. What happened? I think your printer threw you an eel. Please send me the real thing.

Steven Galloway

From time to time we wonder how many of our subscribers read the magazine each month. It appears that at least one does! Looks like our new printers decided to run a test! We apologize to our readers for the inferior printing quality in the past two issues.

In order to save money, we have had to switch to newsprint and away from our regular printers—temporarily, we hope.

We will have to continue with newsprint—but not with substandard quality—until our finances are back in the swim. Please help us by sending in a sustainer subscription.

SUPPLEMENT AVAILABLE
BREAKING THE LINKS:
The South African Economy and the US
Reprints of this 20-page resource are available to groups at 50¢ per copy for orders of 10 copies or more. (Sorry, orders under 10 not accepted). Send your check to: Southern Africa, 17 West 17th Street, New York, NY 10011.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN

political attorney Sun Chetty, who has defended many black activists including Steve Biko, fled in August to Botswana to avoid a probable five-year banning order by the apartheid government.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was to appear before the Transvaal Law Society for possible disciplinary actions. He had previously been questioned by the law society about his political sympathies, foreign connections (in reference to funds raised abroad by the South African Council of Churches for political defenses) and finances, and harassed by security police.

In an effort to discredit the exiled lawyer, the South African authorities have since accused Chetty of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.

The day before his self-exile, Chetty was accused of financial mismanagement.

However, the real reasons behind Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political. Last year the Justice Minister attacked Chetty's sudden departure seem political.
Note Change of Address
Southern Africa Committee
17 West 17th St.
New York, NY 10011

Magdalena is a special gift. Zinnia's beautiful photos and photographs by Peter will send you Magdalena. As I am writing by poems by... Fill out and return the coupon below and... one of these letters in the next two months. Will you be? We are pleased with the response.

SPECIAL OFFER—Magazine to a Sustainer

If you become a Southern Africa sustainer, we will send you this beautiful book of poetry and photography from South Africa.