The US State Department is a Southern Africa subscriber, but that rarely seems to affect department thinking on southern Africa. October 1979 news of a secret State Department report on Cuba-Angola links made us wonder whether officials might have started reading their copies to help sort out their position on Africa. The report conceded that Fidel Castro was no Soviet puppet, and had not been under Soviet orders when he sent Cuban troops to help Angola drive out South African invaders in the first months of independence. But the State Department must have been using back issues of Southern Africa. Our readers had already found that out in 1975.

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Front Cover: Michael Scurato
ANC Fighter to Hang

James Daniel Mange is the second South African freedom fighter to be sentenced to hang by the South African courts in the past year. The charge? High treason.

Mange was tried along with eleven other members of the African National Congress on charges of undergoing guerrilla training abroad, returning to South Africa with the intention of overthrowing the government, and storing caches of Soviet-made weapons. None were charged with actual violence, arising from a battle with the police near the Botswana border that left two of his companions dead.

Mange himself was arrested as he headed for the Mozambique border in a car, dressed in priest's robes. He aroused the suspicion of a policeman when he drove through a red light.

Most of the defendants had been active in the 1976 Soweto uprising and were in their early twenties, although their ages ranged from 20 to 46.

Mange was not charged with graver offenses than his fellow defendants but was singled out nevertheless to die. The others received sentences between 13 and 16 years. Mange was the obvious leader of the group, which refused to recognize the legitimacy of the court. When the judge ordered the public excluded from the court; the defendants dismissed their lawyers and militantly defied the court. They sang freedom songs during the proceedings and on the day of sentencing displayed placards from their dock reading, "Apartheid is a crime against humanity," "Apartheid is high treason," and "Never on our knees."

Nuclear Meeting Bars South Africa

South Africa was barred on December 5 from attending the 23rd annual conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a move which may presage its eventual expulsion from the 110-member agency. IAEA is the autonomous United Nations agency responsible for safeguarding against nuclear proliferation.

The move urged by African nations, followed the September 22 "fireball" monitored by the US which, it has been suggested, was in fact a South African nuclear explosion.

The expulsion was the first in the agency's history, and was opposed by 24 members including the US, Israel, Italy, and West Germany.

Ford (SA) Faces Major Labor Dispute

As the year ended, Ford South Africa found itself the center of the most serious labor dispute involving black employees that has occurred since a wave of strikes in 1973. In an unprecedented act in late November, Ford management dismissed 700 black workers who had walked off their jobs in an act of solidarity with a fired black employee. Ironically Ford, which employs a total of 3304 blacks and 1979 whites in South Africa, had worked hard to establish a reputation as a leader in industrial race relations. The company had been one of the first signatories of the Sullivan principles, the US designed "equal opportunity" code of conduct for American operations in South Africa.

The dispute occurred in Ford's assembly plant in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. A black community leader, Thozamile Botha, was employed in a draftsman program at Ford. Botha also headed the Port Elizabeth Black Civil Organization (PEBCO), the local equivalent of Soweto's Committee of Ten, and an organization with a strong popular base, which has drawn thousands to its meetings in recent times.

In early November, Botha was pressed to resign by Ford management. When he left, the entire 700 strong African work force walked out in the middle of the day. Ford paid the workers for their time off the job. By November 5, the black work force had returned to face increased hostility from the white employees who are part of a powerful white union. Insulting racial remarks were made by white workers and the black employees demanded that Ford extract an apology. One foreman complained that the integrated canteen facilities were dirty because Africans were abusing them. Meanwhile workers refused to work overtime, there were slowdowns on the job and increasing tensions between black and white employees.

On November 19 Ford management (closely in touch with Detroit) declared that anyone who refused to work overtime or walked off the job would be fired. Ford is apparently trying to negotiate with the black union, the (African) United Auto Workers, but some black workers now find the union much too moderate. However the union has had well-attended meetings in the townships to discuss grievances. UAW organized workers at General Tire have also been on strike.

After the dismissals, community leader Botha sent Ford a letter listing grievances and asked Ford Detroit to start a Commission of Inquiry to look into the situation. By presstime Ford had not responded.

Observers have commented on the high level of political awareness and solidarity displayed by the workers in the total walkout of the entire black assembly plant workforce. Such actions put in jeopardy not only jobs and income but also the right to remain in Port Elizabeth.

Despite Ford management threats to hire new workers to replace the strikers, as of the beginning of December, only 170 of the strikers had returned to work. And on December 7, as the dispute continued, South African security police arrested 21 blacks as a result of what they termed "labor unrest."

Lesotho Dissidents Flee to South Africa

In an ironic twist of history, members of the opposition Basotho Congress Party (BCP) on the run from Lesotho police have been reported taking refuge in South Africa. One white farmer in the Orange Free State, near the South African-Lesotho border, said that uniformed police "hunted like dogs" the 19 BCP members he had temporarily sheltered.

In 1970, South Africa backed Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan's Basotho National Party in a disputed election apparently lost to the BCP, considered to be a leftist opposition to Jonathan's rule. Now, the South African authorities are allowing the refugees to stay and officials have said they may set up a camp to house them.

The Lesotho government has denied reports of killings and has accused South Africa of aiding BCP infiltration and attacks. One wing of the BCP leadership, headed by Ntso Mokhele, has been in exile since an unsuccessful uprising in 1974, and this year has been accused by the government of a series of bombings and other attacks. Another BCP leader, Gerard Ramoreboli, joined Jonathan's government in 1975.
In May, explosions at the central post office and the Lesotho Electricity Corporation's headquarters in the capital Maseru caused serious damage, while electric pylons on the South African border were damaged by an explosion in September. The latest reports of clashes, denied by Lesotho government sources, allegedly involved clashes in late November between police and BCP supporters, leaving some 15 dead.

Lesotho, which is surrounded by South Africa, remains economically dependent on that country. But in recent years Prime Minister Jonathan has repeatedly annoyed South Africa by strong statements on apartheid. This year Lesotho gained its first direct air link to independent Africa when flights were inaugurated to Maputo, Mozambique, and aroused strongly negative reaction in South Africa by establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba.

If South Africa is engaged in actively backing BCP insurgents, it is likely the aim is less to overthrow Jonathan than to remind him pointedly not to go too far in opposing South Africa.

For his part, Mokhehle, in a mid-December interview in Botswana with a BBC reporter, denied any dealings with South Africa. The BCP claimed a force of 500 men, based on a group of 65 guerrillas trained in Libya, were operating in Lesotho against Jonathan's government. Their main problem, he said, was a shortage of weapons, though they had obtained some in recent raids on a police post and a cabinet minister's farm.

Mozambique Pardons Collaborators With Rhodesia

Mozambique's Vice-Minister of Defense, Sebastiao Mabote, has announced pardons for 45 participants in armed attacks on Mozambique carried out by the Rhodesian-backed "Mozambique National Resistance." The mid-December announcement at a rally in Beira came a few days after five others had been sentenced to death and 12 to prison terms for crimes against the security of people and state.

Mabote said that while some had joined the opposition group voluntarily, the majority had been forcibly recruited during attacks on targets such as buses and schools, being told that they would be killed if they didn't join the anti-FRELIMO guerrillas. Following recruitment they were trained in Rhodesia before being sent into action in Mozambique. The Mozambican government, Mabote concluded, had no intention of executing those who abandoned the enemy camp and consciously rejected its aims.

Some of those among the group pardoned had been captured by Mozambican government troops in October when a base camp in the rugged Gorongosa mountains, which had been used by the guerrillas, was captured in the largest confrontation to date. One hundred of the more than 300-strong enemy contingent, including 500 men, based on a group of 65 guerrillas trained in Libya, were operating in Lesotho against Jonathan's government. Their main problem, he said, was a shortage of weapons, though they had obtained some in recent raids on a police post and a cabinet minister's farm.

white Rhedian officers, mercenaries and anti-FRELIMO Mozambicans, were reported killed, and one Rhodesian helicopter was shot down on October 18 while trying to evacuate the group.

The "Mozambique National Resistance" is the latest in a series of anti-FRELIMO groups which since independence have been supported by former Portuguese settlers and the Rhodesian government. Their core of support among Africans is built on a nucleus of former members of the Portuguese armed forces, including a special African paratroop unit known as Grupos Especiais Paracaidistas (GEP). External spokesman for the group, according to South Africa's To the Point, is former Portuguese settler Orlando Cristina, one of the original organizers of the GEP.

They have also gained recruits, however, among deserters from FRELIMO, opponents of Mozambique's socialist direction, unemployed or others who blame their personal hardships on the independent government. According to To The Point, MNR commander Andre Matsangaissie, in the FRELIMO army from 1972 to 1975, became disillusioned after being deprived of a Mercedes-Benz car he bought, and sent to a re-education camp in 1976, where he escaped after six months.

The MNR, whose military communiques are regularly broadcast on the Voice of Free Africa from Rhodesia, has carried out an increasing number of sabotage actions in Mozambique this year, most strikingly the destruction of oil tanks in Beira in March. They have operated most extensively in Manica and Sofala provinces, along the railway from Rhodesia to the port of Beira, and sometime this year established a permanent base high in the Gorongosa mountains, in a game reserve area also used by FRELIMO guerrillas during the war against Portugal. According to one of those captured in October, their base was supplied three or four times a week with food, arms and clothes dropped by Rhodesian planes.

Mozambique's successful assault on the base began with taking an outlying base at an abandoned English-owned cattle ranch on October 13, followed by the shelling and capture a week later of the main base higher in the mountains. In the final days of the attack, Joseph Hanlon reported in the London Guardian, the Rhodesians began sending three or four helicopters a day to provide additional supplies and evacuate the white commanders.

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Advocates for Africa on Capitol Hill

There are two lobbyists in Washington on US/Africa policy doing a very good job with very little money.

by Michael Shuster

For the past several years, two unusual lobbying groups have been at work in Washington. Without big budgets or the extra cash that lobbyists usually use in one way or another to make life more pleasant for many a legislator, both Transafrica and the Washington Office on Africa have been steadily pressing the government to side with the interests of black Africa on many foreign policy issues. The work of these two organizations has been by no means easy. Their staffs are small and both rely heavily on volunteers. But both groups believe that, without their pressure, neither the Carter Administration nor Congress would have maintained even a semblance of progressive policy on Africa. In fact, with regard to Rhodesia—especially on the issue of sanctions against Rhodesia—the Carter Administration probably would have lifted sanctions long ago had it not been for the work of Transafrica and the Washington Office on Africa.

The director of Transafrica—its primary guiding force—is Randall Robinson, a tall, trim, 38-year-old graduate of Harvard Law School who once was a legislative aide to Michigan representative Charles Diggs. Robinson, who is the younger brother of ABC-TV newscaster Max Robinson, has directed Transafrica since its birth in 1976 at a national meeting of black leaders in Washington. That two-day meeting, attended by about 130 prominent blacks from around the country, was convened by Diggs and then-Congressman Andrew Young, who were disturbed by Henry Kissinger's policy on Rhodesia. The meeting yielded two results that could be considered the initial steps in creating a major forum for the involvement of the black community in foreign policy: The participants drafted an Afro-American manifesto on southern Africa, and they created Transafrica.

Black leaders at that meeting recognized that they needed a permanent vehicle through which black Americans could express their views on foreign affairs, particularly US policy in Africa and the Caribbean.

For the past three years, Robinson and Transafrica have worked full-time on a host of issues affecting Africa—World Bank support for development in Africa, for example, and black representation on the National Security Council—as well as on events in Namibia and Rhodesia, and apartheid itself.

Focus: Rhodesia

Right now, it is Rhodesia that attracts their urgent attention. On November 14 Robinson and ten black leaders, including Ron Brown of the National Urban League, Althea Simmons of the NAACP, and Maurice Dawkins of Opportunities Industrialization Corporation met with President Carter. Among other things, the group wanted to know what Carter intended to do—in the light of a possible settlement at the London peace talks on Rhodesia—about lifting sanctions against Salisbury.

Says Robinson: “Given an even opportunity to win an election, there's no doubt in my mind that the Patriotic Front will win. But the front doesn't have the coffers of large Western resources to turn to as Bishop Muzorewa, the current prime minister, does. Any curb on contributions to the campaign would hurt Muzorewa more, if the curb is effective. But it would help make it an even election.”

Robinson believes that companies such as Allegheny Ludlum and Union Carbide, long-time supporters of former white prime minister Ian Smith, are eager to contribute handsome amounts of money to Muzorewa.

While acknowledging that such corporations could make contributions through South Africa or Great Britain, now that London has lifted its ban on trade with Rhodesia, Robinson nonetheless believes that “there's a case to be made that the sanctions have been at least moderately effective by making it more difficult for corporations to give the kind of money they might ordinarily have given. Some of these companies have already made inquiries at the State Department about whether they will be able to contribute. So it's meaningful to them, which must mean that the sanctions have imposed some impediment.”

Robinson favors the Patriotic Front, and he wants the US to maintain the sanctions until after elections take place and a new government is installed in Salisbury. It is entirely unlikely that Carter will wait that long to lift sanctions, so short of that, Robinson would like the US to wait until at least the beginning of the election campaign. “In our meeting with Carter,” Robinson explained, “he said unequivocally that the sanctions wouldn't be lifted at the point that the British governor arrives in Salisbury. He said to us clearly that the sanctions would extend up until the time of the elections or the beginning of the electoral process. We take him in good faith and quite seriously on that point.”

Whether Carter eventually makes good on that pledge remains to be seen. But Robinson can legitimately claim some credit for forcing the Administration to remain firm on sanctions in the face of intense pressure from the right in Congress to lift them as early as last summer. Precisely how much credit is due—to Robinson, Transafrica, or the Washington Office on Africa and other groups—is difficult to say.

“Your know, one never knows in this process,” Robinson says smiling. “One never knows any clear relationship between cause and effect. You simply get in, and take out a position and fight like hell for it. It's difficult to say that you got this result because of this specific quantity of pressure. The mathematics of it just aren't that clear and exact.”

Political Clout

What is clear is that Transafrica's political clout comes from the voting booth. To the extent that Robinson can mobilize black opinion and pressure, he can be effective. It is common political wisdom that without the black vote, Jimmy Carter would not be president. “The president understands that without the support of the national black community, he can't hope to be re-elected. So that's meaningful,” Robinson adds in characteristically understated fashion. “That's the substitute for a large budget.”

That considerable clout has led to three meetings between Robinson and Carter, and between Robinson and Secretary of State Vance. Robinson also estimates that
he talks at least once a week to Richard Moose, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and as regularly to others at the State Department and the National Security Council.

But it is Congress that is especially susceptible to Transafrica's pressure, particularly the House of Representatives. In many districts, especially in the South, blacks comprise as much as 40 percent of the vote. Transafrica, through its network of contacts and volunteer workers, aims to mobilize blacks in those districts in particular. "On these kinds of issues," says Robinson, "we have a tremendous potential for power and impact and leverage on those members of Congress.

"We're less of a political factor in the fortunes of the members of the Senate. The Senate has been absolutely indefensible in its attempts to lift sanctions against Rhodesia, but this has nothing to do with new developments in Rhodesia.

"They simply want the retention of privilege for the white minority, and they still work to salvage whatever of that objective they can."

The most responsive pressure point in Washington for Transafrica's brand of lobbying is the House subcommittee on Africa, presided over by Brooklyn Democrat Stephen Solarz. Many of its members are liberal and young—three of them belong to the congressional black caucus. When the question of sending observers to the Rhodesian elections came up, Solarz's subcommittee voted 9 to 0 to turn down Salisbury's invitation. Even conservatives on the subcommittee agreed.

Randall Robinson (right), speaking with ZANU President Robert Mugabe at the OAU summit meeting last fall

"While we lobby the black community on the outside," explains Robinson, "the subcommittee lobbies the Congress on the inside. But without a constituency on the outside, the liberals in Congress feel very lonely, and at some point they lose the steam to persevere."

Mobilizing Response

So Transafrica's role is as much that of an organizer of black sentiment as it is that of a pressure group on Capitol Hill. But Robinson alone cannot do that organizing. That falls also to Transafrica's board of directors—headed by Gary (Indiana) Mayor Richard Hatcher and composed of such other notables as Harry Belafonte and Congressional Black Caucus Chairman Parren Mitchell—and to its membership of 10,000 individuals. Robinson says that it is his job to keep large sections of the black community informed. To do that, he must "trigger movement from black leadership."

On a given issue, Robinson will speed telegrams to all members of the board and to other black leaders to urge them to telegram the president.

To streamline that system, in late November Transafrica met with its congressional coordinators from around the country—members of Transafrica who volunteer their time and energy—to polish the mechanics, as Robinson describes it, of delivering 250 letters or telegrams on 24-hour notice "to any pressure point we need touched on any given issue."

Says Robinson, "I can only be as effective if members of Congress perceive me as representing a constituency that has a potential consequence for them. To the extent that I am perceived as representing only my opinion, I have no effect whatsoever.

"It has not been difficult at all to mobilize the black leadership in foreign affairs. The cooperation there has been tremendous. The second stage of what we are doing is the more difficult one, and it's necessarily more painstaking. That is, to have a systematic capacity in each congressional district where we have more than ten percent of the population to move opinion from the population to the congressperson, or to the president, or to the secretary of state."

Critical of Carter

Robinson and Transafrica have learned the lessons of American political organization well. But even Carter's extreme sensitivity to the black vote has not made him a pliant president on southern African issues.

All in all, Robinson is not enthusiastic about Carter's much-touted "new" Africa policy. On issues relating specifically to South Africa, says Robinson, "there's no reason to have any more faith in this administration than we've been able to have in any previous administration. South Africa is where the US interest—economic and otherwise—is larger. The record is the same."

And on the decolonization of Namibia, Robinson expresses dismay. "Fairly soon the South Africans are going to have to answer on the Namibia question. They have resisted, and responded, and rejected the five-power Western diplomacy on so many occasions as to make it tragically comic. At
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Slow Learning 

The House of Representatives over the years has changed with events, but only in response to crisis situations, like Soweto or the death of Steve Biko. Those are moments when you can make some kind of headway in the House."

Lockwood has been applying pressure on the Hill since the Kissinger era (under Presidents Nixon and Ford) as well as in the Jimmy Carter period. That timespan includes the several years before and after the 1974 coup in Portugal, which signaled a major change in the balance of forces in southern Africa. To Lockwood, the two periods have similarities as well as differences.

"I still come up against the same kind of arguments about black Africa being incapable of governing itself and the view of maybe 150 conservatives in the Congress who regard South Africa and Rhodesia as democracies. That hasn't changed. What's changed is the victory of the liberation forces, first in the Portuguese colonies. That was totally unanticipated, both, I think, by us and by Kissinger.

"What has affected our work most in the past year or two is the fact that the Patriotic Front seems to be winning in Zimbabwe. That means that the old communism-versus-the-capitalist-world argument comes to the surface—in the minds of the liberals. The liberals in Congress are now running scared on a whole range of issues that the conservatives have raised. Carter's first early burst of liberal initiative on southern Africa has given way to a very low profile, an attempt to appease the conservative renaissance which is in full cry."

Staving Off Revolution 

Lockwood considers the administration's attitude on South Africa a key barometer. "In the last year," he explains, "the South Africans have made enormous strides on their image in this country. They now have the image of moving toward some kind of progressive solution. I think that is a very dangerous development.

"The fact is that apartheid is stronger than ever. It's more entrenched than ever. It's more determined to strengthen itself and fight for white domination. Until the basic structure is altered, South Africa is an unjust society, an immoral society—an unstable society—on a level that no other country in the world is like."

Unlike many critics of US policy toward Pretoria, Lockwood doesn't think Carter has retreated from liberal policies staked out early in his administration, such as those policies reflected in the meeting in 1977 between Vice President Mondale and then prime minister John Vorster. "I think that meeting had the purpose of trying to shake up the South Africans and make them realize that they were in danger," says Lockwood. "At the time, I tended to think it was just rhetorical fury," he says of Mondale's vocal criticism of apartheid. "But now I've come to think that it's purpose was to get beneath the South Africans' veneer and move them. That process has now succeeded. Vorster is no longer there. Botha as prime minister has been told by his military men that there is no way that there can be a solution in southern Africa unless there is a solution internally.

"But they don't mean to do away with apartheid. They mean to create and co-opt a black middle class, to create an aristocracy of labor. That's the intent of the Wiehahn and Rickert Commission findings. Those blacks might even be granted citizenship, for all I know. But they would still be subsidiary to the overall powers that be—the white power. And there will still be that 80 percent of the African population, out in that ring of bantustans, deprived of their citizenship.

Continued on page 27
"Inadequate, Infrequent and Insufficient"

US press coverage of southern Africa reflects a pre-occupation with the status of whites, little concern with the status or future of the black majority.

by Michael Beaubien

In 1869, James Gordon Bennett of the New York Herald sent Henry Morton Stanley off to Africa with these instructions: "I want you to attend the opening of the Suez Canal and then proceed up the Nile. Send us detailed description of everything likely to interest American tourists. Then go to Jerusalem, Constantinople, the Crimea, the Caspian Sea, through Persia as far as India. After that you can start looking around for Livingstone."

Little has changed in the reporting from Africa since Stanley undertook his voyage of discovery. But, in contrast to Britain and France, where journalists have made a prestigious career as authorities on Africa, American journalists still approach any part of Africa as a short-time assignment in the safari tradition. Few have acquired the background necessary to do more than the most superficial of jobs.

W.A.J. Payne, a long-time commentator on US African reporting points out that journalists "have not yet come to terms with Africa as it is, but continue to package it in boxes that fit our expectations of the ways in which governments ought to make decisions, armies ought to fight wars, and people ought to choose leaders."

Apologists for US press coverage of southern Africa argue that limited time, space, money, and reader interest affect a reporter's priorities, and they contend that there are too few journalists in Africa to do an adequate job. Indeed only 4 percent of the world's correspondents are in Africa, making it one of the worst-covered major regions in the world.

Such apologists also complain that political barriers place obstacles in the way of comprehensive reporting on Africa. Thus New York Times correspondent Henry Kamm complained, in 1976 that "the foreign correspondent is increasingly becoming a casualty of the self-assertion of the Third World toward the West." Many countries that in the past granted entry visas more or less routinely have sharply curtailed that practice since 1975. And Kamm says, "the practice of allowing journalists to visit a country while carefully restricting his contacts and his travel opportunities is on the rise both in Africa and Asia."

Several southern African countries across the political spectrum have restricted US press access in recent years. Pretoria and Salisbury have both excluded "unfriendly" Western journalists, as well as all socialist and most Third World correspondents.

Countries such as Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania have also been cautious about allowing US journalists access. This seems hardly surprising in view of the revelations of the Congressional Select Committee on Intelligence in 1977, which found "to a degree never widely suspected, the CIA in the '50s, '60s and even the early '70s had concentrated its relationship with journalists in the most prominent sectors of the American press corps, including four or five of the largest newspapers in the country, the broadcast networks, and the two major weekly news magazines."

A Southern Africa check with the major US wire services and newspapers revealed that whatever their difficulties there are very few US journalists permanently assigned to southern or even all sub-Saharan Africa.

* The Associated Press maintains bureaus in Johannesburg, Salisbury, and Nairobi, with respectively five, one, and two full-time correspondents. Associated Press foreign editor Nat Polowetzky says that this represents a growth of two to three
correspondents since 1975. A.P. also employs the services of stringers in Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique.

- U.P.I. also has bureaus in Johannesburg, Salisbury, and Nairobi, according to foreign editor Jerry Loughran. There are three full-time correspondents in Johannesburg, two in Nairobi, and one in Salisbury. These figures represent an increase of no more than one additional correspondent in the last ten years.

- The New York Times had no permanent correspondent in South Africa between 1966 and 1976, following Joseph Lelyveld's expulsion in 1966. It took ten years and some careful checking for Pretoria to allow the Times back in. John Burns is now the only official Times correspondent in southern Africa, although the paper occasionally carries articles from correspondents such as Carey Winfrey and John Darnton stationed in other areas of Africa. Times' total foreign staff has dropped from 60 to 30 correspondents in the last decade—and there are no plans for increasing the number of correspondents in southern Africa.

- The Washington Post currently has two full-time correspondents in southern Africa. Caryle Murphy, based in Johannesburg, makes trips to Salisbury, and Jay Ros is based in Zambia. The Post recently opened a West African bureau staffed by Leon Dash and his wife, Alice Bonner, at Abidjan in the Ivory Coast. Dash, who wrote a series of favorable articles about the CIA-backed UNITA in Angola, won the Polk Award in 1974. Long-time Africa correspondent David Ottoway is currently on a year's leave of absence to work on a book. The Post has no plans for more full-time Africa correspondents.

- The Los Angeles Times, has two full-time correspondents in southern Africa, one in Johannesburg and the other in Nairobi. According to foreign editor Robert Gibson the Los Angeles Times does not employ stringers outside the United States and has no plans for southern Africa expansion.

- The Christian Science Monitor has full-time correspondents in Johannesburg, Salisbury, Lusaka, and Nairobi, and stringers in Mozambique and West Africa, some of whom are African nationals.

- The Knight-Ridder chain and the Chicago Tribune plan to open bureaus in Africa in the very near future. All three US television networks have opened bureaus in South Africa in the past few years.

A Marketing System

Another aspect of the criticism directed at the American media concerns the nature of the institution itself. The policy continues to be: sell the latest and most exciting news at a profit. Primary markets for major news agencies are the Western industrialized countries, so the commodity must appeal to that market. Problems result from trying to adapt foreign affairs to the standards of the mass market. The process clearly inhibits complete, continuous, and interpretive coverage. "The assignment," according to commentator Payne, "is to produce instant history in the language of familiar models, and to identify the 'good guys' and the 'bad guys.'"

Even apologists for US press coverage acknowledge that foreign news is mostly reported from the perspective of US foreign policy, but they have not yet faced the tough questions concerning the nature of that foreign policy as it relates to Africa. The hard truth of the matter is that the press in this country acts as one of the chief bulwarks of US interests around the world. It exerts a profound influence on the man and woman in the street and controls what information is and is not disseminated to the public.

Not once in the last decade has any major member of the US media chosen to provide consistent, insightful or sympathetic reporting on the struggle for liberation that has dominated the lives of the people of southern Africa.

The examples of the failure to do this are legion, as indicated by the brief examples examined below.

Mozambique 1974-1975

Mohamed El-Khawas of the University of the District of Columbia has looked closely at US press coverage of the decolonization process in Portuguese Africa, and particularly in Mozambique, following the April 1974 Lisbon coup. Reading the Christian Science Monitor and Los Angeles Times for 1974 and 1975 he found that before the coup, the papers carried scarcely any news on events that were shaping the future of Mozambique. In the first four months of 1974, neither paper printed any news relating to the liberation struggle in the territory. Over half the stories appearing in the Los Angeles Times about Mozambique during 1974 originated with U.P.I., A.P., and Reuters news agencies. The Monitor relied less heavily on these sources, but El-Khawas found the content of reports in both papers "sensational, controversial, and highly speculative." The overall coverage was "inadequate, infrequent, and insufficient."

The editorial-opinion columns gave scant attention to Mozambique—two columns in the Los Angeles Times accounting for the entire coverage. And, says El-Khawas, both pieces reflected "a pre-occupation with the status of whites in Mozambique, expressing little concern with the status or future of the black majority."

Soweto Uprising 1976

US coverage of the Soweto uprisings in 1976 provides a classic example of how the lack of sophistication and understanding of the complexities of South African society leads to serious omissions in reporting.

Most reports reaching US papers from journalists in South Africa attributed the uprisings in Soweto to a government requirement that students were to be instructed in some subjects in Afrikaans, the language of the Afrikaner settlers of South Africa. To accept this view—that the most massive rebellion in South African history (from Soweto the rebellion spread to almost every black community in South Africa) was over the issue of language—is to see only a tiny fragment of the story.

Commented Winnie Mandela, an ANC activist and wife of the imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela, "The language issue was merely a unifying factor in black resistance; it could have been anything." The rebellion was much more than an issue of language, it was a struggle against the en-

Black Press Weaknesses

The Afro-American newspapers have long devoted a higher proportion of their newspaper to coverage of Africa and to cultural exchanges between the two continents than do the general interest mass media. Yet, a study by Professor Constance Hope at the University of the District of Columbia has revealed some surprising results.

Hope's study sought to determine whether the black press was a viable alternative to the white-dominated press for information on Africa. The answer seems to be no. Hope talked about one example of coverage at a recent African Studies Association conference, confining herself to 1974 and 1975 reporting on Angola and Mozambique in two national weeklies, the Baltimore Afro-American and the Pittsburgh Courier and two local weeklies, the Atlanta Daily World and New York's Amsterdam News.

Because of the prohibitive costs of maintaining overseas correspondents, all the papers relied upon the international wire services, so coverage showed few differences. Analyzing the sources of the Afro-American articles (the paper that provided the best coverage of those examined), Professor Hope discovered that of 33 articles published in 1974, more than 39 percent were from U.P.I., more than 12 percent from National Black News Service, 3 percent from the Afro-American's New York correspondent, 6 percent from the National Newspaper Publishers Association and 40 percent had no by-line. Most surprising, however, was Hope's finding that articles from NBNS and NNPA used the same biased language as that found in stories from the major news agencies.
tire system of apartheid that keeps the African people subjected to the worst forms of slavery by denying them basic human rights.

Part of the problem stems from US journalists’ reliance on the authorities of the apartheid regime for interpretation of events. Former Prime Minister John Vorster, senior police officers and Minister of Police J. Kruger were all quoted extensively in the US press during and after the rebellion. Yet reporters consistently ignored black opinion, making little attempt to seek out popular representatives. Even in the US where the liberation movements have readily accessible representatives, their views on major developments are rarely sought. It appears that their approach is thought to be too radical, so that their political perspective is seldom acknowledged in the American press.

Instead, white South African liberals, particularly Alan Paton and Nadine Gordimer, seem to have almost annual access to the US press. Boston reporter Danny Schecter believes that “this failure to report on black liberation movements might be rooted in the structure of contacts that American correspondents have in South Africa. Most US journalists are middle-class whites with liberal sympathies who tend to seek out their counterparts in South Africa. Thus, a few white South African liberals, who are relatively ineffectual politically in their own country, often receive inordinate attention in the American press.”

Another part of the problem is the attempt by US journalists to describe apartheid simply as a perverse system of racial discrimination. Despite its surface similarities with the form of racial segregation that characterized much of the American South, apartheid is not simply a South African version of US racial segregation. It is an organized and highly structured method of controlling and exploiting black labor. Most US journalists have yet to discover the economic base of apartheid. One notable exception, Andrew Silk, who has written for The Nation, believes that “most American journalists are not well versed in looking at class issues; it’s difficult for them to see it.”

Steven Biko 1969-77

The life and death of Steven Biko provides another obvious example of the serious flaws in US reporting from southern Africa. Professor Trevor Brown of Indiana University’s School of Journalism has used the Washington Post and the New York Times, 1969 to 1977, to assess typical press coverage of the growth of the important black consciousness movement in South Africa. Brown begins by posing the question, “Had the press reported enough information and analysis of Biko from his emergence as a student leader in 1969 to his death in 1977 to enable readers to understand and evaluate Biko’s stature in South Africa and that of SASO and BPC, the political organizations he helped found?”

The New York Times had published only one extended article on Biko during the eight years. In a 1976 interview John Burns characterized Biko as a radical who “favored a policy of black socialism, severe restraints on private enterprise and sharply cutting, if not eliminating, foreign investment.” Like the Times, the Post seems to have carried only one article about Steven Biko before his death. From 1973 to the Soweto rebellion of 1976, both papers concentrated their coverage of black politics on Chief Buthelezi. The growing influence of Biko, SASO and BPC was simply not reported.

Biko’s horrifying death at the hands of the security police made him newsworthy, although several previous black consciousness leaders had been killed—by letter bomb, torture, or “accident”—with scarcely a passing mention.

The change was almost certainly a product of the year-long dramatic rebellion that was still shaking South Africa in 1977. Brown speculates that American journalists were exploiting Biko’s death to demonstrate their own abhorrence of apartheid. Nevertheless, quite uniformly, the press chose to represent Biko as a “moderate” and “responsible” advocate of evolutionary change in South Africa.

This post-mortem characterization of Biko resulted in a serious distortion of Biko’s political history and philosophy. But only a sanitized Biko could serve as a presentable martyr. The reality of the politics that moved not only Biko but also a new generation of young black South Africans seems to have been thought too radical to present to American readers with any approval.

Rhodesia

The struggle for Zimbabwe has posed some special problems for foreign correspondents. Since the 1965 settler declaration of independence, the regime has imposed varying forms of censorship. The Law and Order Maintenance Act, amended on 32 separate occasions, now makes it a crime to publish anything “contrary to the interests of public safety or public order,” or anything likely to “cause fear, alarm, and despondency.” The government also controls foreign journalists by issuing residency permits valid for only 29 days and censors all war reports.

Journalists are barred from all operational areas (where martial law prevails) unless they have government permission to travel and a security force escort. This essentially puts most of the country, except for cities like Bulawayo and Salisbury, off limits. Journalists running afoul of the authorities are expelled. Since 1963 Rhodesia has expelled more than 100 journalists.

But there are problems in US press coverage of Rhodesia that go far beyond the obstacles imposed by the illegal white minority regime. Some of these were detailed by Professor Beverly Hawk of Howard University at a recent meeting of the Southern Africa Research Association. Hawk based her conclusions on a systematic analysis of all news articles about Rhodesia that appeared in the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times in the three-year period ending June 1978.

She found frequent oversimplification in stories at the expense of more informative coverage. The conflict in Rhodesia was often presented as a border war between Rhodesia and those countries where Patriotic Front guerrillas had rear bases. Other short-hand descriptions of the conflict depicted a struggle between “blacks” and “whites” or an East-West proxy battle in the still-simmering cold war. According to Hawk the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune were most frequently guilty of the latter bias as a result of their dependence on wire service copy.

Confirming the charges made by other critics, Hawk found an inordinate amount of attention given to the killing of whites in Rhodesia and scant attention paid to black casualties. US correspondents gave consistent credence to Rhodesian government versions of these events, usually ignoring any statements by members of the Patriotic Front. Those statements, if used at all, were reduced to a few sentences buried in the middle of an article, often written in language indicating the reporter’s doubts.
McGoff Comes Out Ahead

Small town Michigan publisher John McGoff took South Africa on an almost $12-million ride—that is the conclusion of the first independent in depth American investigation of the key US contact man in South Africa’s recent “Muldergate” scandal.

Seen as something of a crank in his tiny hometown of Williamstown (population 3,000) and sacked even from his local school board, the “stocky, cocky” Pittsburgh steelworker’s son used his South African connection to parlay a four percent holding in a deficit-ridden local newspaper chain for a luxury life and a sizeable private empire.

In return, South Africa obtained little more than a scattering of favorable articles and editorials in a collection of small dailies and weeklies. The report is the result of a year’s work by Karen Rothmyer, former Wall Street Journal reporter and a regular contributor to Southern Africa. Funded by a grant from the California-based Center for Investigative Reporting, the study appears in an article in the November/December issue of the Columbia Journalism Review.

Rothmyer concludes that while McGoff himself was not a particularly effective or impressive advocate for South African interests in the US, the saga of his South African connection suggests how easily some elements of the American media might be converted into propaganda vehicles for foreign governments.

McGoff is currently the subject of a Washington, D.C. federal grand-jury investigation that is seeking to establish whether, despite his denials, McGoff violated federal law by acting as an agent for the South African government. The Securities and Exchange Commission is looking into the purely financial dimension of his activities but to date has made little progress, as McGoff refuses to hand over documents, claiming that his right to freedom of the press is being violated.

Uncovering the Covers

Rothmyer’s probe has reached beyond McGoff’s unsuccessful bid in 1974 for the Washington Star. McGoff’s attempt to buy the Star was financed by Eschel Rhodie’s South African Information Department slush fund, which secretly transferred $10 million to McGoff via a phony Swiss corporation, the Thesaurus Continental Securities Corporation.

Rothmyer uncovered the first evidence that, though the same Swiss company, the South African government controlled property in Miami, also ostensibly owned by McGoff. She traced still more abortive bids for American publications, including the Oakland Tribune and The Trib, a short-lived New York daily. She also probed possible US intelligence links with McGoff and his Panax Corporation.

Rothmyer notes that McGoff partner and

Saturday Evening Postscript

The Columbia Journalism Review report on the activities of John McGoff carries with it a fascinating postscript on the activities of another US publisher who admires South Africa. Written by Karen Rothmyer, the piece highlights not only direct connections between a US newspaper and South Africa, but also more shadowy links to the US intelligence community.

According to the Review, Beurt SerVaas, the sixty-year-old chairman of the Curtis Publishing Company, which publishes the Saturday Evening Post, was one of the group of investors that supposedly bought a South African daily, The Citizen, in February 1978. The operation of The Citizen, a stridently pro-government paper, was in fact being funded by the South African Department of Information, in an exercise which eventually cost it some $55 million.

The recent report of the Erasmus Commission in South Africa, set up to investigate department of information operations, indicates that SerVaas came into the venture after John McGoff had turned down a request by Secretary of Information Eschel Rhodie to take over the paper from government front-man Louis Luyt, an Afrikaner fertilizer magnate. The report says that at the time SerVaas and others "bought" The Citizen, "the department of information undertook to supply the newspaper with funds from the exchequer [treasury] for at least two years."

SerVaas was quoted in the South African press at the time of the takeover as saying, "I view this as an opportunity to fill a need in the publishing industry in South Africa."

He has also been identified in the South African press as having served as a director of Afripix, a newspaper agency that was disbanded early in 1979 after it too was revealed to have been a department of information front-organization.

The Review article notes that "SerVaas has been linked to the intelligence community. During World War II he served in the OSS, and he has described himself as a close friend over many years of Richard Helms, former director of the CIA. According to Spooks, written by Jim Hougan, a Harper’s Washington editor, and published last year, during the 1960’s SerVaas ran a private investigating firm called International Investigators, Inc. The firm’s staff, according to Hougan, included several former FBI agents and at least two persons who went on to work for CIA front-organizations. Hougan speculates, on the basis of other information, that the SerVaas firm was one of several set up during the sixties to operate outside of normal intelligence channels."

"SerVaas’s Saturday Evening Post—which his wife, Cory SerVaas, edits—has been a loyal supporter of South Africa and its friends. Last year, the Post treated its readers to a strong dose of pro-South African and pro-Rhodesian prose. The January/February 1978 issue carried a two-page, unsigned editorial entitled ‘America’s Irresponsible Policy Toward South Africa.’ The piece began by arguing that the U.S. should not have supported a United Nations resolution calling for an arms embargo against South Africa and went on to criticize Vice President Mondale for urging that country’s leaders to adopt America’s one-man, one-vote model. Why do we do such things? the editorial asked, and replied: ‘The real answer seems to be that the American black community, an important part of Carter’s electorate, is being paid off cheaply in Africa because there is no money to pay them off at home. In addition, the Carter team is buying goodwill with left-wing elements in the American press and in the Third World.’"

"In the May/June Post, the SerVaases devoted five pages of their magazine to ‘An Open Letter to the American People’ by Ian Smith, then prime minister of Rhodesia. The blurb to this piece was a bungle: ‘When Post editors visited Rhodesia, so moved were they by the brave stand of the Rhodesians and their courageous leader that they invited Prime Minister Ian Smith to tell the Rhodesian story in his own words. We promised not to edit.’"

"Smith’s piece was accompanied by a three-page paean to the Rhodesian people, black and white, entitled, ‘A Worthwhile Cause.’ It was written by Otto von Habsburg. Von Habsburg, an Austrian conservative, was one of SerVaas’s associates who, in 1977, ‘bought’ The Citizen."

"The Saturday Evening Post, which the SerVaases resurrected in 1971, has only one foreign office—in Cape Town."
Panax director Richard Melon Scaife once headed the parent company of Forum World Features, a London-based news feature agency shut down in 1975 as it was being exposed as a CIA front.

Among previously unreported McGoff offers was a $250,000 bid, made jointly with Scaife early last year, for the Washington Journalism Review. Disclosing this, publisher Roger Kranz said that he had held out for more and "they soured on the deal."

History
Rothmyer traces the story from McGoff's early days.

He had promoted college concert groups and his first venture was a small music-and-news radio station set up in the garage on an old farm. Panax headquarters now stands on the site.

Teamed up with Michael Dow, a grandson of the founder of the Dow Chemical Company, he acquired his first newspaper, with a circulation of 6,000, in 1963, the same year he set up the Panax Corporation.

Five years later, he had three more small papers and met L.E.S. de Villiers, then a South African information official in Washington. Soon after that McGoff was off on the first of many trips to South Africa, where he was wined and dined by senior government men such as Connie Mulder and information chief Eschel Rhoodie.

In 1974 Rhoodie unleashed his covert information department blitz, and McGoff went after the Washington Star. At that point McGoff's Panax was losing money and the total McGoff shareholding was worth less than $100,000.

According to Godfrey Kauffman, who represented the Star's owners, McGoff "pretty much said it was Dow" who was keeping him.

"If he said that, it was not true," Dow assured Rothmyer.

According to Kauffman, though the McGoff offer was for about $25 million, it never reached the stage of a firm proposal.

But McGoff went ahead and found other uses for the money he had secretly received from South Africa and finally raised its total to at least $11.7 million.

In the years that followed, this small-time regional publisher "raised his sights," and without any visible fresh funding:
- bought the Sacramento Union;
- bought a 50 percent interest in UPTIN, the second largest newsmagazine producer and distributor in the world;
- bought weeklies in California, Illinois, and Texas;
- became a philanthropist, acquired the use of the Miami Beach house—sold last year at a profit of $168,000—and a 100-foot luxury yacht to go with it;
- almost doubled his Panax salary to $125,933, and increased his Panax holdings to a controlling 40 percent. The Panax chain, meanwhile, grew to six dailies and 61 weeklies spread across the country.

For South Africa, there was the small return of sympathetic articles in newspapers without major national impact.

"McGoff, meanwhile, was able to put together a private media empire and to rub shoulders with presidents, prime ministers, and big-city publishers," Rothmyer concludes, "The canny Irish-American, in short, seems to have come out well ahead of the South Africans."

Savimbi Arrives With Open Hands
Jonas Savimbi, president of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), the group still resisting central government control, with help from Pretoria, came seeking US friends last November. He visited with an influential selection of Americans, most of them associated with Freedom House, the conservative New York organization which sponsored his trip.

His itinerary, arranged by Carl Gershman, executive director of Social Democrats, U.S.A., included meetings with AFL-CIO leader Lane Kirkland, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, and several members of Congress.

Savimbi arrived shortly after the death of Angola's President Neto. He appealed for general American support but denied he was seeking resumption of the kind of covert CIA and military assistance he received in 1975 and 1976. Seeking US sympathy he took as his central theme criticism of the Cuban troops who have been helping forces counter South African and internal subversion. "We are beating them," he claimed in several of his public appearances—a view challenged by such experienced Angola observers as former CIA head of Angolan operations, John Stockwell.

Savimbi vacillated in commenting on the extent that UNITA is being supplied and supported by South Africa. But he admitted receiving significant assistance from Pretoria. He tried to minimize the importance of the South African role by claiming that arms—from China and elsewhere—are being flown directly into bush areas where UNITA operates.

John Stockwell, in a recent letter to the New York Times contends that "since Savimbi lost the Angolan civil war, he has survived in the wastelands of central Angola, but he is unable to show his face, except to raid, in any significant town or hamlet, and he has so completely lost popular support that he has resorted to urban terrorism even against his own Ovimbundu tribe—his movement, UNITA, claims credit for bombing Ovimbundu market places at prime time."
The third report on the signatory companies to the Sullivan principles was released in mid-October by Arthur D. Little, Inc., the Reverend Leon Sullivan’s monitoring group on the activities of US corporations operating in South Africa.

The report indicates that 20 more companies have joined the list, bringing the total to 135. Calculating any company operating in South Africa with a minimum 19 percent US ownership as a US company, the report indicates that 164 US companies have not signed the principles, including such major operators in the area as Allegheny-Ludlum, Newmont Mining, Dresser Industries, and Coca-Cola.

The report notes the belated addition, earlier this year, of an amplification of the principles to include some recognition that blacks should have trade union rights. No more than five US companies have actually recognized and begun bargaining with African trade-unions—and even where this has happened the union and workers’ rights appear tolerated only so long as it suits the mood of the corporation. Thus Ford Motor Company was an early union recognizer, but in a recent action at its Port Elizabeth categories, more workers than ever—99 percent in white-collar jobs. Company brochures appear tolerated only so long as it suits the mood of the corporation. Thus Ford Motor Company was an early union recognizer, but in a recent action at its Port Elizabeth plant, nearly the entire black workforce was fired over grievances including union rights. (See p. 19.)

Once again the methods of reporting appear designed to conceal specifics, and it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the supposed “progress” of US companies in implementing the principles. The worst possible category a company can fall into is “Need to Become More Involved.” Those in this category include Carnation, International Harvester, and International Mining and Minerals. The majority of companies fall into the middle category, “Making Acceptable Progress,” a category so broad that it includes firms such as the Masonite Corporation, which has been paying its 500 migrant workers a wage of $36 a month. The barest minimum survival wage in South Africa is now estimated at $192 a month, an amount far below the average wage for whites.

For the first time, this third report admits that companies have been fudging their figures. For example, in reporting the integration of work areas, companies have included blacks and whites who are in the same job category, but not necessarily the same location. When this fact is taken into account, the third report reveals that the percentage of blacks working in integrated work areas has actually decreased from 29 percent to 27 percent since the last report.

When tinkingering with the figures has not resulted in the appearance of progress, the companies have resorted to other means. As in past reports, the third report indicates that nearly 3,000 employees were “missing” in the statistics submitted by US firms.

Despite its vagueness, the report cannot conceal the continuing job discrimination and increasing wage gap between blacks and whites in US firms. Africans continue to comprise three-fourths of the so-called unskilled labor force, that is, the lowest paid workers. The percentage of unskilled whites decreased with a corresponding increase in “coloured,” unskilled laborers.

The truth behind the facade of the Sullivan principles is best demonstrated in the hiring and wage records of US companies in skilled and salaried categories. Reflecting the South African government’s image-building claims that positive changes are taking place, US firms have responded to shareholder critics with elaborate brochures complete with photos of blacks in white-collar jobs. Company brochures do not mention that in the highest job categories, more workers than ever—99 percent—are now white. This is 10 percent more than the number recorded in the previous report. Further, despite claiming to adhere to principle 3, “Equal pay for equal work,” the percentage of blacks in US firms earning the average income for their job category decreased from 20 percent to 17 percent.

Even within the narrow confines set by the Sullivan principles, which are exclusively oriented to the workplace, progress towards “change” seems mythical rather than real.

**SA Engineers at Nuclear Lab**

A United States Department of Energy laboratory in Argonne, Illinois, near Chicago is currently helping South Africa build its nuclear capability.

This was revealed by several black members of the laboratory staff in a strongly worded protest, November 10.

“We as black American citizens employed at Argonne National Laboratory protest the participation of two South African engineers in the Inter-National Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear-technology transfer program conducted by Argonne National Laboratory at the expense of the taxpayers.

“The fact that our government, through its State Department, is host to citizens of a nation which symbolizes the negation of black people in particular and humanity in general is abhorrent. As American citizens we demand the immediate expulsion of these South African nuclear trainees, especially in the light of the alleged recent South African atomic explosion.”

This telegram representing the views of twenty black employees of Argonne National Laboratory was sent to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, President Carter, and presidential candidate Ted Kennedy, and was shared with the NAACP, Urban League, and Operation PUSH, after it was learned on November 6 that two white South African engineers were participating in a six-week course on nuclear reactor safety, siting, and other facets of reactor technology, at the laboratory.

An employee at Argonne involved in the protest told *Southern Africa* that the protesters had been particularly concerned because of the dual role of reactors. “Information is easily exchangeable into weaponry,” the employee said.

Upon learning of the participation of the South Africans in the program, a dozen black employees went to the Department of Energy offices on the Argonne site and demanded the immediate expulsion of the South Africans from the program. But the State Department replied that the engineers had valid visas, and that not only would they complete the program but Argonne’s director would take measures to insure their safety during their stay.

This response drew together the larger group of black workers who wrote the protest telegram. Officials at the laboratory warned those who had spoken out that they should be careful about how they treated the issue. As a result no active open campaign was carried out among workers at the lab, which employs about 4500 people—450 of them black—because employees were concerned about their jobs and about possible future harassment by the State Department.

More than 155 South African nuclear scientists and engineers have visited the US since the inception of the “Atoms for Peace” program in the 1950s. But these were the first South Africans known to have participated in the nuclear technology transfer program at Argonne (which began in 1966), according to a spokesperson for the black employees involved in the protest.
Bank Funds South African Arms Deal

The First Pennsylvania Bank appears to have been involved in financing illegal shipments of artillery shells and testing equipment to South Africa, according to the *Burlington Free Press* in Vermont.

Documents obtained by the *Free Press* show that the bank, which at one point was owed as much as $14 million by the Space Research Corporation, encouraged the sales to South Africa in the hope of recovering part of that debt. The bank's involvement in the arms embargo violations came via a $2.2 million letter of credit it granted to enable Space Research, which has been heavily implicated in arms embargo violations (see *Southern Africa* Nov./Dec. '79), to purchase some 53,000 artillery shells from the Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation, which runs a US Army ammunition plant in Scranton. These shells were eventually shipped to South Africa.

Although the bank denied any knowledge of the shells' destination, Edward Treon, former Space Research treasurer, asserted that “knowing the bank, I would say they knew quite a bit about it [the South African sale].” The bank had extended a loan and revolving credit to Space Research dating back as far as 1972 and in exchange held company assets as collateral. The bank also had the right to approve all decisions about the firm's operation.

As part of this lending arrangement the bank was also given the patents for Space Research's special extended-range artillery shells. One of these patents was registered in South Africa. Furthermore, the bank's patent rights on the extended-range shells were sold to South Africa in October 1977, according to company records obtained by *Free Press* reporters.

First Pennsylvania also guaranteed a loan to a “just settlement,” White House officials said.

Patriotic Front representatives have maintained that sanctions should not be lifted until the transition is complete and a new independent government is installed in Zimbabwe. But it was never likely that the US would hold out that long. There has been significant pressure to lift sanctions before the election. E.F. Andrews, vice-president of the specialty steel producer Allegheny Ludlum Industries, and a long-time lobbyist against sanctions, went to the State Department in November to ask how soon he would be able to make campaign contributions, presumably to Muzorewa's UANC. His voice seemed to carry more weight than that of a group of black leaders who met with Carter on November 14 and urged him to keep the sanctions at least throughout the election period. But the thrust in both Congress and the executive branch in the past year has been toward compromise, moving step by step to lift the sanctions in conjunction with the British.

The United States appears committed to participating financially and logistically in the transition and post-independence period in Zimbabwe. Administration officials told the House Africa subcommittee on December 5 that US planes will transport personnel for the Commonwealth monitoring force, with costs to be reimbursed by the British. The US will also give financial assistance for resettling refugees, funding this out of the maximum $5 million allotted by the recent foreign aid bill for assistance to “refugees inside Rhodesia.”

AID has not yet made public any details of likely US involvement in the fund for Zimbabwe, out of which white farmers may be compensated for their land. Goler Butcher, AID's assistant administrator for Africa, emphasizes that the AID program will be regional in scope and that, in Zimbabwe, it will provide for a variety of agricultural and other development programs, not only for buying out whites. No information is yet available on the level of US contributions to this multilateral fund, or on how the fund will be administered and the specific programs it will support.

Undermining Arms Embargo

As we went to press, the State Department was considering opening several loopholes in the total ban on exports of US-origin goods and technology to the South African military and police. The regulations were under review as part of a world-wide re-evaluation of foreign policy export-controls mandated by the Export Administration Act of 1979.

Some of the loopholes proposed by the economics and business section of the State Department would allow the sale of some foreign-manufactured commodities with less than 20 percent of their components originating in the US to the South African military and police; the resale to the military or police of “insubstantial quantities” of US-origin goods and technical data; fulfillment of contracts with the South African military or police entered into before the February 1978 regulations went into effect; and transportation and communications equipment in emergencies. The Africa bureau in State is reportedly opposed to all of the changes excepting the provision re medicine.

The new export controls were to be reported to Congress by December 31, 1979.
New Constitution Deeply Flawed

British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington has received considerable praise for both his tough ability as a negotiator at the London peace talks on Rhodesia and his startling capacity as a peacemaker, a talent that had eluded his predecessors at Whitehall for more than a decade.

But there is considerable evidence that the new constitution proposed by the British for Rhodesia—and the one already accepted by the Patriotic Front—has planted within it the seeds of political discord for the future Zimbabwe. And despite the Foreign Office’s touting of the constitution as a praiseworthy compromise, the new charter, according to some analysts, cannot solve the central problem facing a new government in Salisbury-land.

The new constitution first and foremost does not bring straightforward majority rule to Zimbabwe. Parliament will be composed of two houses, a senate and an assembly. The assembly will have 100 members, 80 of which will be African and 20 non-African. The latter will be elected by white voters only. As Claire Palley, a British authority on Rhodesian constitutional history and law points out, the electoral power-balance is such that all 20 non-African members are likely to come from Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party. A party which does not enjoy the support of the Rhodesian Front must win 51 of the 80 African assembly seats, in fact almost a two-thirds majority of the African seats, in order to govern effectively.

If neither the Patriotic Front nor Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC receives such a large majority, concludes Palley, “a future Zimbabwe government will be unable to govern effectively without support from minority parties either African or white.” In effect, if Africans cannot form a majority coalition—and Palley believes that will be the election result—then the white members of the assembly will in effect have “a veto on daily government.”

Palley believes that the prospects for a crisis—and the possibility of a coup d’état—are brought about less by the number of seats reserved for whites than by the electoral system, embedded in the constitution, which permits only whites to elect whites. “If all, or even half, the white members were elected by a common roll of voters of all races,” Palley points out, “then Europeans, Asians, and coloreds opposed to the RF and willing to cooperate with any African party would be returned for a third of the white seats. This would prevent an African majority government with less than 51 of the 80 African seats being at the daily mercy of Smith’s RF.”

Palley also argues that other terms of the constitution “encourage funding and balance of payments crises to pay [British] officials, farmers, industrialists, international corporations, and city speculators” who aided Smith’s rebellion.

And as further evidence of the almost inevitability of a coup, Palley notes the provision concerning the armed forces. The charter provides for a military elite beyond the control of the prime minister’s cabinet. Concludes Palley, “This provision, making the armed forces operationally independent of any elected government, renders probable an eventual military coup and dictatorship.”

Land Reform

Everyone who knows anything about Rhodesia agrees that no future government can stay in power without confronting the problem of land reform. Currently, less than 7,000 white farmers control overwhelmingly the good farming land of Rhodesia. Each European farm is 100 times as large as every African farming unit. At the same time those lands allotted to Africans, which used to be called the African reserves and are now known as the Tribal Trust lands, are overpopulated, according to recent estimates of the Salisbury regime,
Settlement Signed

After fourteen weeks of often bruising negotiations in London, the Patriotic Front agreed on December 17 to accept proposals for ending its seven-year-long war with the regime in Salisbury. Two days later the front signed the three-part agreement it had concluded with Salisbury and the British government on a new Rhodesian constitution, arrangements for elections and procedures for the transition to independence.

In announcing the ceasefire agreement, the front revealed that Britain had added two minor concessions to its final ceasefire proposal. It had increased the number of Patriotic Front bases—"assembly places" as they are referred to in the agreement—from fifteen to sixteen, and that sixteenth was to be located in "the heartland of Rhodesia." The British also agreed that more bases would be allocated to the front by the British governor in Rhodesia if circumstances required.

"The whole successful conclusion of this conference," declared front co-leader Joshua Nkomo in London, "has been brought about by the patience and persistence of the Patriotic Front."

To that must be added a healthy dose of British pressure. British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, the conference chairman, issued four ultimatums to the front during the talks, the final one accompanied by Carrington's declaration on December 15 that the talks "were over." Only four days before that, the Salisbury regime officially handed over authority to a new British governor, Lord Soames, and London unilaterally lifted the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, declaring that the fourteen-year rebellion was ended. On December 16, the Carter administration followed the British and also ended sanctions. With this kind of pressure, the front had little choice but to accept the ceasefire proposals, although it was anything but happy with them.

Ceasefire Problems

The London talks cleared two major hurdles—the constitution and the transition to independence—before they stumbled on the third and clearly the most difficult obstacle—the ceasefire. All sides announced in early December that they had agreed to the general principles of the ceasefire. Lord Carrington proclaimed euphorically that it would take only "a few days" to resolve the details of implementing and maintaining a ceasefire.

But that announcement was premature. In the ensuing week and a half of intense negotiating, it became clear that the details were far more important than the general principles. The British proposed confining Patriotic Front guerilla soldiers to fifteen bases in remote areas of the country, but Carrington had made no similar provision for the Rhodesian Security Forces. There had been talk of confining security forces to a far larger number of bases—as many as forty—in the more populated areas of the territory, but the front had raised a series of still-unanswered questions about the status of the Rhodesian special forces, such as the Selous Scouts, and of the local "auxiliary" forces which are loyal to individual black leaders and not under the jurisdiction of the security forces.

Front leaders had called the designated assembly points "death camps." "We would be signing our own death warrant," said Nkomo "and we have not fought a successful war to do that."

The front was reluctant to accept the arrangements as they stand now because its forces, once brought out into the open, would become prime targets for the Rhodesian air force and army if the ceasefire breaks down. Salisbury had already agreed to ground its air force during the ceasefire. Despite its acceptance of the proposals, the front is still dissatisfied with the proposed monitoring force. Front pressure quadrupled the force size to 1200 soldiers, to come from Kenya, Fiji, Australia, New Zealand, and more than half from Great Britain itself. But the monitoring force is not a peacekeeping force; it will have no means or authority to police the ceasefire. Britain's chief of defense said in New Zealand in early December that if hostilities did break out during the transition period, the monitoring force "would get the hell out of it."

So, understandably reluctant to trust its future safety to the word of Muzorewa and the Rhodesian army generals, the front had asked for unequivocal assurances from Carrington that no forces would be free to move out of their camps once they have been assembled at bases. Carrington's answer was unequivocal: he would give no such assurance!

It has been pointed out that the British could have avoided this disagreement if they had agreed to a peacekeeping force for Rhodesia as was proposed in the defunct Anglo-American proposal for a Rhodesian

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ZIMBABWE (RHOESIA)

Area: 150,803 sq. mi.
Population: 7,040,000 (December 1968 est.)
6,750,000 African (96 percent)
250,000 white (3.5 percent)
24,200 colored (33 percent)
10,000 Asian (.1 percent)
Population figures in recent years are uncertain because of massive population dislocations due to the war. Neighboring countries harbor thousands of Zimbabwean refugees and the current estimate of white flight is put at close to 1,000 per month.

Capital: Salisbury


GNP: US$3.56 billion

National Currency: Rhodesian Dollar (US$1.75 = 1 Rh$)

Political Status: (as of writing) A British colony. Rhodesia had been in an official state of rebellion since November 11, 1965 when a white minority under Ian Smith declared unilateral independence (UDI). After March 3, 1978 an "internal settlement" government headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa came into existence. 1979 London discussions between Muzorewa, the PF, and Britain established an agreement on a procedure for achieving free and independent elections to lead to a true independence. Under this agreement, on December 12, 1979, a British governor, Lord Soames, arrived in Salisbury, formally returning the rebellious colony to British control.
In London, at Lancaster House talks with British, Front leaders Mugabe and Nkomo sought to preserve gains won on ground in settlement at table (above).

Inside Zimbabwe, Patriotic Front built military and political solidarity among the people (right).
Driven by Rhodesian and South African aggression, nearly 200,000 people crammed refugee camps in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia (far left).

Mozambique's support for Zimbabwean liberation brought harsh Rhodesian retaliation—destroying scarce resources such as this Ministry of Health ambulance in Gaza province.

Mozambique and Angola place heavy emphasis on education. Here workers in a Mozambique garment factory attend a literacy class during lunch time.

South Africa's image makers talked reform but Soweto's population spoke with a different voice when PM Botha came visiting in August (left).
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settlement. Now without a peacekeeping force, some critics argue that the ceasefire proposals will likely lead to violations, and Britain has no military power to enforce its terms.

Pressure Tactics

Although Carrington ended the Rhodesia talks on December 15, in the hope of forcing the front to accept the ceasefire proposals, front leaders Nkomo and Mugabe remained in London to engage in diplomatic contacts. Front spokesperson Eddison Zvobgo initially said there was no chance of accepting the present ceasefire proposals. “The British government is embarking on a dangerous course,” Zvobgo said. “They believe we can be cajoled into following them... but our answer is an emphatic no.”

The emphatic no changed to a reluctant yes after the Carter administration lifted sanctions on December 16. The earlier British decision to lift sanctions had also been taken against the wishes of the Patriotic Front. The British then pressed the Carter administration to take limited action but US officials, lead by UN Ambassador Donald McHenry, declared that the US would prefer to lift sanctions only after an agreement was signed and under conditions of “general international consensus.” This was a reference to Security Council action, which had been proposed by the front-line African states, but was specifically opposed by Great Britain.

In international affairs, one event may impinge on another. Only days after Britain lifted sanctions, Secretary of State Vance was in London seeking British support for a possible sanctions call against Iran if the American hostages there were not released. A week later on the day before British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was due to arrive in the US, Carter lifted sanctions, without an agreement in London and without a Security Council meeting. Sources in Washington say Thatcher threatened to cancel her visit if Carter would not lift sanctions, a charge hotly denied by US officials.

Governor in Salisbury

When he first arrived in Salisbury, the new British governor, Lord Soames, lost a perfect chance to demonstrate London’s good will toward the Patriotic Front and dispel critics’ charges that all along London was prepared to sell the front out. Soames could have immediately lifted the ban on both ZAPU and ZANU. Instead, he sat back as Rhodesian police dispersed a peaceful demonstration of some 2000 ZAPU supporters on December 13. Carrington, in what Nkomo had characterized as a “school mistress” attitude, had dangled legalization of the two wings of the front as the prize for agreement on the ceasefire.

And contrary to some initial press reports, Soames did not immediately ban all Rhodesian raids on neighboring territories or all executions of political prisoners now sentenced to die. Raids have been suspended but with a stipulation that they could resume if Rhodesian commanders present compelling evidence for such a move. And Soames had not initially put a stop to hangings, twenty of which per week, on the average, were taking place before his arrival. Soames was also holding out a pledge to free the 15,000 political detainees held in Rhodesian jails.

By December 17, Soames had lifted the six-week-old ban on corn imports to Zambia. Salisbury had imposed the strategic cutoff in early November in connection with a brutal series of attacks on Zambia and Mozambique. Those attacks took place while the London talks were underway, and despite British verbal condemnation, they appeared to serve the British purpose well.

The fact that Zambia was being strangled economically forced Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to travel to London to confer with all the parties. Most observers agree that the raids were instrumental in putting front-line pressure on the front to compromise, thus helping Britain achieve its goals at the talks.

This calculated way of treating Zambia is just one example of the reasons for the mistrust and suspicion which characterized the Rhodesia settlement negotiations in London.

A ceasefire has been signed now and seven years of war is officially ended but the transition to independence could prove to be a more dangerous period than any that the front has yet lived through. M.S.

Keeping Rhodesia Flying

One of the main channels for violation of the arms embargo on Rhodesia has been a network of British companies closely tied to the British government through its Ministry of Defense. These startling revelations have emerged from an investigation conducted by consultant Sean Gervasi for the United Nations Security Council Committee on Sanctions. Although the report itself will not be available to the public until it has been presented to the Security Council, Mr. Gervasi recently talked to Southern Africa about some of his findings.

Most of the companies involved are members of the British Air Transport (Holdings) group, a subsidiary of British Airways and Commonwealth Shipping of London. Included in this network are Airwork Services of Dorset, Bristow Helicopters of Surrey, Rhodesian United Air Carriers, Technical Support Services of Johannesberg, Airwork Services of Salisbury, and the Airwork Service division of Purex Industries, a California-based corporation.

These companies have, it appears, played an important role in maintaining Rhodesia’s combat-aircraft capability by providing servicing and training as well as at least the promise of aircraft. They have also provided training for the South African air force.

The Airwork group dates from the establishment in Britain of a flying school in 1912. In the thirties the company branched out into aircraft maintenance in England and abroad, and civil air transport largely on government contracts. Eventually it began to provide troop transport and other services for the British Ministry of Defense and other governments. The ties are so close, Gervasi concludes, that the Airwork companies have in effect been a branch of the Ministry of Defense and a miniature defense department.

Among the most important of the embargo violations involving Airwork and its subsidiaries and affiliates:

- Airwork, through associated companies Rhodesia United Air Carriers and Airwork Services Ltd. of Salisbury, as well as Technical Support Services of Johannesburg, has recruited skilled maintenance personnel for the Rhodesian Air Force. Technical Support Services, Airwork employees have told researchers, also services the South African Air Force, and operates facilities at the Air Force Flying Training School at Dunnottar in the Transvaal.
- Airwork plays a major role in the operations of the British-backed Oman Air Force, where the ruling Sultan has carried on a longstanding war against leftist guerrillas. In the autumn of 1978, according to New Africa magazine, Rhodesian officers attended a helicopter training course in Oman, probably without the knowledge of the Omani government, and almost certainly with the participation of Airwork personnel.
- On October 24 Airwork affiliate Bristow Helicopters placed an order through the US based Airwork Division of Purex for five CH-47 helicopters from the US firm Boeing. The Chinooks have a capacity for 44 troops or heavy military cargo. Although published reports say the helicopters will be used in North Sea oil operations, investigators maintain that the aircraft are scheduled to be transferred to Rhodesia after Airwork Division takes delivery of them. A subsidiary of Purex since 1968, Airwork Division has close ties with the international Airwork group and operates a trading and maintenance business in Milville, New Jersey. If sanctions are lifted by the time of the transaction, this deal would not be illegal.
More Delays on Settlement

The United Nations effort to organize elections in Namibia and bring the territory to independence is as deadlocked as ever. Despite UN talks in November on Namibia in Geneva, the government of South Africa continues to oppose the UN plan for Namibian independence, which has already been accepted by the UN Security Council, the five Western nations that have negotiated the plan, and by SWAPO.

Not only has South Africa continued to obstruct the implementation of that plan, but there is now mounting evidence to indicate that Pretoria is strongly beefing up its military forces inside the territory.

The most recent development in the long, and what appears to be an unending UN attempt to break South Africa's grip on Namibia, occurred in mid-November, when "high level simultaneous consultations" were convened in Geneva. The subject was the "concept of the demilitarized zone" along the northern Namibian border, proposed last July by Angola's late president Agostinho Neto.

Despite what appeared to many at the UN as a positive proposal from Neto, Pretoria had delayed for almost four months giving any hint of its attitude toward the DMZ proposal. Then in early November, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim proposed the Geneva talks. After more than two weeks more delay, during which time South Africa insisted on the participation in any talks of its preferred local political parties in Namibia, Foreign Minister Roelof Botha finally agreed to go to Geneva.

Incidentally, South Africa's attitude toward the internal parties is revealing. Botha insisted in several letters to Waldheim that the parties be invited to Geneva on an equal footing with SWAPO, which is considered by the UN General Assembly as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia. Finally Waldheim agreed to permit the participation of the parties—as they had participated at an earlier round of negotiations in March in New York—in order to hear their point of view.

In typically distorted fashion, Namibia Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen, the senior South African official in Windhoek, declared that Waldheim had given South Africa the assurance that the local parties "will be treated as equals with the other participants at the conference." Viljoen said that, prior to this development, there had been "an unacceptable and scandalous lack of appreciation" for these parties, but that now Waldheim's decision would afford "the democratic leaders" of Namibia a "new recognition on the international terrain." Later, after this latest round in Geneva, Brian Urquhart, Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs and chairman of the Geneva discussions on the DMZ, said of the internal parties, "We will see them if they wish to be seen. On the question of the DMZ, I don't think they really have too much to say."

Geneva Agenda

The Geneva discussions took place from November 12 to 16, and they were attended by SWAPO, South Africa, the front-line African states and Nigeria, and the Western five contact group—that is, the US, Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada. The idea behind the talks was to elicit a pledge from all parties concerned to accept in principle the concept of the DMZ without getting too bogged down in the military details.

Previous to the talks, the UN circulated a "working paper" on the DMZ to all the parties, and it was on the basis of this working paper that the discussions were held. Contrary to initial reports, the working paper does not include a provision that requires armed SWAPO guerrillas inside Namibia at the time of a ceasefire either to give up their arms or to be escorted out of the territory. The paper deals exclusively with the DMZ. In effect, then, the working paper leaves in tact the already-accepted provision for SWAPO bases inside Namibia during the transition to independence.

UN officials say that the talks in Geneva were "intensive." At the conclusion of the talks, both SWAPO and the front-line states accepted the concept of the DMZ, more or less along the lines of the working paper, with the understanding that further talks would have to be held to work out the details. Foreign Minister Botha said that his government would have to study the matter and would respond as soon as possible.

No SWAPO Bases

That response came three weeks later on December 5. South Africa would accept the concept of the DMZ, wrote Botha to Waldheim, provided that certain conditions were met. Most important among them is South Africa's demand "that the claim for SWAPO bases inside South-West Africa/Namibia, which in any case is not provided for in the settlement proposal, will not be revived."

UN and Western officials have so far made no response to the South African preconditions, but SWAPO has. "The fascist Boer junta of Pretoria has been pampered for far too long," declared SWAPO's Foreign Secretary Peter Mueshihange before the UN General Assembly in early December. "To us this is totally unacceptable. Let them not succeed beyond this point to make a laughing stock of the United Nations." Mueshihange called on the UN to adopt mandatory economic sanctions against Pretoria.

It is unlikely that the UN will make any counter-response to Pretoria before January. There is talk in the UN corridors of calling for a Security Council meeting on the matter, but such talk has circulated around the UN since last spring when a special session of the General Assembly called for sanctions. The Western contact group has, all along, opposed such a move, arguing that the council should not meet on such a demand while any diplomatic efforts are still unresolved. Some African representatives at the UN believe that South Africa can maintain indefinitely the ap-

NAMIBIA

Area: 318,261 sq. mi. (including Walvis Bay)
Population: 1.5 million (1979 est.)
1,400,000 black
100,000 white
Capital: Windhoek
GDP: $954.5 million (1977 est.)
Monthly average per capita income: white—$287.5, black—$12.
National Currency: SA Rand (US$1.20 = 1 Rand)
Political Status: UN trust territory illegally occupied by South Africa since 1966. Presently governed by a South African appointed Administrator-General G. Viljoen.

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ANC-Buthelezi Meeting Rumored

In the South African press, the story rated garish front-page headlines—"GATSHA'S SECRET MISSION." The text below went on to characterize the reported meeting between KwaZulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of the political party Inkatha, and top ANC leaders as "a major breakthrough for Chief Buthelezi," which "could have momentous consequences" and might "lead to a cessation of the persistent sniping of black consciousness groups at home and anti-apartheid groups abroad."

To the alleged participants in the meeting, on the other hand, it was no big deal. At least that was their official public stance. Buthelezi acknowledged that a meeting had taken place. But he shrugged it off as "no new thing."

"The government knows," he maintained, "that my dialogue with the ANC...[has] been going on for a long time."

The ANC played down the importance of the meeting even more emphatically—by denying that it had even happened. At least that was the impression left by a hasty reading of an ANC press statement. "It has come to our attention," the statement began, "that the issue of the Johannesburg Sunday Times of November 4, 1979, carries an article that there has recently been a secret meeting in London between representatives of the African National Congress and Inkatha. There has been no secret meeting." That was the last mention of the reported meeting in the two-page statement. Nothing in the succeeding paragraphs clarified whether the insistence that there had been "no secret meeting" might not amount to confirmation that a "non-secret" meeting had taken place.

Despite this calculatedly enigmatic ANC announcement, most observers of developments in South Africa's black political scene seem convinced that some sort of meeting did indeed occur. Many also seem prepared to believe that such a meeting could have major ramifications, particularly in light of Inkatha's rapid growth in recent months and its increasingly rancorous disputes with black consciousness movement groups, which have attacked him as a government collaborator, and sell-out. Beyond that, however, agreement tends to break down, along with reliable information.

Standing on its press statement, the ANC has refrained from commenting on the content of the alleged discussions with Buthelezi and most of his KwaZulu "cabinet." Not so Buthelezi himself. While refusing to divulge details, the Inkatha chief has let it be known that he urged the ANC not to lend its prestige and moral authority to attacks on Inkatha and his own leadership.

According to the Sunday Times account, "The chief confirmed he had told [ANC leader Oliver] Tambo it was not in the interests of the struggle for ANC to continue its support for various individuals and small groups."

To those who follow black South African politics, it was fairly obvious whom Buthelezi has in mind. For the benefit of those who don't, Buthelezi elaborated. "The era of protest politics is past," he told the Sunday Times reported. "Blacks want constructive political involvement. They've seen the failure of the so-called black consciousness movement which does no more than excite people to act in anger only to be crushed by force."

Attack on Black Consciousness

Buthelezi's disparaging reference to the "so-called black consciousness movement"
was entirely in keeping with previous acrimonious exchanges with movement leaders. It also indicated how the Inkatha leader will undoubtedly try to turn reports of a meeting with ANC to his advantage.

Just as he has dressed his followers up in uniforms with ANC colors, Buthelezi has consistently attempted to wrap himself in the mantle of the “tradition of liberation established by the founders of the African National Congress.” His claims have not gone unchallenged. Most recently, Dr. Nthato Motlana, head of Soweto’s Committee of Ten, lashed out at Buthelezi’s efforts to link himself with the ANC, asserting that the ANC would not associate with “traitors.” Within a matter of weeks, South African papers headlined three days of discussions between Buthelezi and ANC leaders.

In the wake of those headlines, black consciousness movement leaders adopted a deliberately cautious tone. Curtis Nkondo, president of the Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO), flatly declined comment, pointing out that he knew nothing about the ANC’s attitude since the organization is banned in South Africa and cannot be quoted.

Such a ceasefire between feuding black organizations would certainly reflect the ANC’s stated strategic objectives. That point was stressed repeatedly by ANC United Nations representative John Makatini in a recent discussion with Southern Africa. Without amending the official ANC statement on the reported talks with Inkatha, Makatini offered some of the ANC’s perspective on Buthelezi, Inkatha, and the black consciousness movement.

“Our position, our strategy, is that of forging a broad national front,” Makatini said. “Our approach is that of bridging whatever differences there are, whether of an ethnic or a political nature.”

Nevertheless, prospects for an extended truce between Inkatha and black consciousness movement groups appeared remote. Particularly in light of a memorandum delivered to both British Under Secretary of State Richard Luce and to the press while Buthelezi was in London for his talks with the ANC. In the memo, Buthelezi explicitly stated his desire to see “Inkatha and the African National Congress (become) a central and dominating force to regulate black opposition to apartheid.” To that end, he continued, the two groups could join forces to “eliminate the growth of third-force factors in the black consciousness movement.”

Attempts to invoke the ANC are not new to either side in the polemics between Inkatha and the black consciousness movement. “It is significant,” Makatini contends, “that all the forces in accusing each other claim allegiance to the ANC. Whatever the role a given individual or organization plays, he must look to the ANC.”

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War Widens—but Some Soldiers Rebel

by Rebecca Reiss and Michael Fleschman

Amid complaints of abuse and harassment, soldiers of the 8th South African Infantry Battalion staged a mass AWOL (absent without leave) protest in late October at the Upington army base in South Africa. The desertion, involving an estimated 300 men, is an unprecedented expression of discontent within the South African military. By early November, only a dozen soldiers had returned, although most of the rest are expected to follow.

The South African Defense Force (SADF) has disputed the size of the walkout, claiming that only about 70 soldiers were involved and attributing the protest to “boring lectures” and the prohibition of cars on base. In fact, the spark for the well-organized desertion came when the soldiers were denied leave after five months of combat duty against SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia. The eighth battalion had been scheduled to return to Namibia for a second five-month tour, a factor which seems likely to have played a significant role in the AWOL decision.

A press statement released by the soldiers began, “We are sick and tired of being treated like dogs,” and went on to allege a deliberate policy of mistreatment at Upington, including poor food, irregular pay, unsanitary living conditions, arbitrary punishment, and midnight drills and roll call. The base commander has promised “severe action” against all AWOL troops, which under the Defense Act could include long sentences in the detention barracks, where seven soldiers have died this year.

Expanding Military Machine

The “Upington Rebellion” comes at a time when over 50,000 South African troops are engaged in combat beyond their own borders and South Africa is expanding its military machine to meet the demands of total war.

Recruitment into the permanent SADF had increased by 80 percent in the last three years.

In 1978, the duration of compulsory military service was extended from one to two years, followed by eight years in the army reserves, and “youth preparedness,” a course in paramilitary training, is now mandatory in the white-only schools.

South Africa’s preparations for war against its neighbors and its own black population are best symbolized by the elevation of former defense minister Piet (“the weapon”) Botha, architect of South Africa’s 1975 Angolan invasion, to the position of prime minister. In a 1977 defense department white paper, Botha laid out his militarization program:

The resolution of a conflict in these over
SOUTH AFRICA

War Widens
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times in which we now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields—military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. Germany had already realized this before World War II. We are today involved in a war whether we wish to accept it or not. It is therefore essential that a Total National Strategy be formulated at the highest level. Our country’s defense is not a matter for the South African Defense Force alone.

An Africa News special report on South Africa’s wider war (November 16) points out that Pretoria appears ready to respond to heightened guerrilla struggle with expansion of its theatre of war to neighbouring countries. The evidence shows a marked pattern of increased confrontation in the 13 months since Botha’s assumption of office.

Africa News details increased South African military and subversive activity in Angola, Namibia, Zambia and Mozambique, pointing out also that military cooperation between South Africa and Rhodesia expanded significantly in 1979.

This was confirmed November 30th when Botha acknowledged in a public statement that South African military forces were already involved in Rhodesia.

Said Botha, “South Africa, after consultation with the Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, has for some time now been looking to the protection of our interests as well as our vital lines of communication, such as the rail links to Beithbridge and the railway links through it.”

Although Botha gave no further details, the South African intervention in Zimbabwe is already quite extensive. According to reports in the December 1 Washington Post, there is one, and possibly two, South African paratroop battalions stationed at Rutenga, in southern Zimbabwe. South African helicopter pilots have flown with the Rhodesian forces, and South African Mirage jet fighters have participated in bombing raids into Mozambique. South Africa is already involved in Rhodesia.

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The group went on to criticize some provisions of the much heralded Riekert report as simply streamlining and tightening up the pass-law system.

“Up to now the only saving factor for the people controlled by the pass laws has been the total inefficiency of the system,” said the Black Sash report, noting that thousands of desperate people had slipped into the urban areas to work illegally. New legislation now imposes a $600 fine on employers of illegal workers, severely curtailing such employment. Some workers have already lost their jobs and been sent back to the bantustans, with thousands more potentially sharing the same fate.

The economic compulsion underlying this “illegal” urban employment was vividly demonstrated in a study by Dr. Jan Lange of the University of South Africa, reported in the Financial Mail in mid-October. Highlighting poverty in the bantustans, the study shows that a worker from the Ciskei could more than double his standard of living by working three months in the city of Pietermaritzburg and spending the remaining nine months of the year in jail!

One Man, One Vote? Never, Says Botha

Currently under consideration in South Africa is a proposal for a “reform constitution” providing for three parliaments, one each for Indian, colored and white South Africans, each to control its own affairs. Africans are excluded—for them there are the bantustans.

Members will be drawn from these parliaments to compose a “Council of Cabinets,” with whites in the majority (they are the largest “racial group” after the Indians), and with a white executive president who holds strong powers. A commission headed by Minister of Justice and the Interior A. L. Schiebusch is conducting hearings on the new constitutional scheme.

In November Prime Minister Botha met with representatives of the Labor Party, the ruling party in the Colored Representative Council, to discuss the constitution. The meeting provoked violent disagreement over the issue of one-man, one-vote, for a single parliament. The Labor Party opposes universal adult suffrage for all South Africans and the creation of a one parliament for all people.

Botha ended the meeting by telling delegates: "In this meeting, again, one-man, one-vote in this country is out. That is over. And now I further want to say this: Don’t try and do something unconstitutional—you will be sorry for yourself!"

Screws Tighten on “illegal” Workers

“Poverty, hunger, and malnutrition have been a way of life for thousands of South African families for many years,” according to an urgent report issued by Black Sash, a liberal South African reform group. The group went on to criticize some provi-

New Security Chief

South Africa’s security guardians no longer work for BOSS, the Bureau of State Security. The new apparatus is called the Department of National Security (DONS), and Prime Minister Botha recently announced the appointment of a 31-year old Orange Free State political scientist, Professor Lukas Barnard, to head up the new department.

Barnard is an ardent anti-communist and a man who believes in the exercise of power. He has urged the formation of highly trained anti-terrorist units to act “lightening fast as a co-ordinated whiplash task force.”

In prolific writings he advocates the use of what he terms “swaard-magsanksie”—sword-power sanction. In his eyes, today’s sword is nuclear power, and he is contemptuous of Western nations which he sees as threatened by a leadership crisis and lack of moral guts, allowing a “cunning Kremlin” to outmaneuver them.

Despite his tough anti-terrorist stance, Barnard recognizes the weakness of relying solely on military strength to preserve what he calls a “Christian state.” He has stressed the need for “loyal citizens,” but it is clear the no one who refuses loyalty to his version of the ideal South African state should expect any mercy from him or his men.

Police Station Attacked

Pieter Botha’s attempt to silence resistance through talk of reform was shaken in early November by an attack on Soweto’s Orlando police station. Two policewomen were killed in the well-planned action carried out by four members of the ANC.

The raid began late at night with a series of explosions outside the Orlando police station. Three of the guerrillas began firing with automatic rifles at the charge office. Two or three black constables returned fire with pistols while more than 60 racks. Two or three black constables returned fire with pistols while more than 60 outriders and unarmed policemen fled from the scene and unleashed a massive man-hunt.

The government immediately dispatched Minister of Police Louis le Grange to the scene and unleashed a massive man-hunt. To date there have been no arrests.

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Golden Glitter

South Africa's economy is on the upswing. According to a recent survey of prominent South African businessmen most businesses feel the economy is in better shape than it has been in almost four years. Expectations are that 1980 will bring more good news.

Despite a looming depression in the world economy, South Africa's gold and foreign currency reserves now total over $4.2 billion and if the price of gold remains stable, these reserves are likely to become even larger. These reserves and South Africa's stronger position in the world economy follow soaring increases in the price of gold and the introduction of the financial rand.

Gold, which had an average price of $193 per ounce in 1978, reached a peak price of more than $450 per ounce in December 1979. This dramatic increase has not only brought the South African economy a flood of foreign exchange but has also provided the Pretoria regime with increased mine tax revenues. Economists speculate that this tax revenue may total between $1.5 and $2 billion by year's end, a significant jump over the $1 billion 1978 total. Some analysts believe that, assuming stable mining costs, foreign currency reserves now total over $10 billion in tax revenues.

And it wasn't gold alone that brought South Africa good fortune. In January 1979 South African authorities introduced the financial rand as a new incentive for foreign investors who wanted to make direct investments in South Africa.

"The availability of the financial rand made the decision to invest much easier," said Adam Bage, financial director of Volkswagen South Africa. The largest direct investment to come into South Africa through the financial rand market (as of the end of November 1979) has come from Volkswagen.

Companies such as General Motors and International Harvester have also been eagerly taking advantage of the additional savings that the financial rand offers. The financial rand provides investors with discounts of up to 40 percent on the price of the commercial rand. Before last January's announcement, corporations that made profits in rand could not transfer those profits into dollars except at losses of up to 45 percent. The new financial rand provides investors with a method of avoiding these huge losses (see Southern Africa, February 1979) by buying rand at a discount rate when they originally invest in the country.

Within the last year the South African central bank has approved applications for more than $360 million worth of foreign investment through this new market.

Israeli Connection Growing

As the price of gold soars on the world market, South Africa finds itself out of the capital crunch of 1976-77 and into the investment dilemma of 1979. Where once the country was begging for western loan and investment funds—which dried up rapidly in the wake of the Soweto uprisings—it is now looking for outlets for its ballooning gold revenues. One current choice is increased investment in Israel, a country which has continued to cultivate friendly relations with the apartheid state.

Trade between the two countries has been growing steadily. It jumped 400 percent from 1973 to 1978, and the products which make up that exchange from the Israeli side have changed substantially, shifting from consumer goods such as processed foods, textiles, paper and plastics, to far more significant items. Israeli exports to South Africa are now chemicals, electronics, and machinery.

Direct South African exports to Israel, on the other hand, have changed little over the same period. Iron and steel, ferroalloys, sugar, tobacco, and asbestos continue to dominate the traffic. But despite their considerable recent growth, the official figures for direct trade between the two countries describe only a fraction of the economic linkage between Israel and South Africa.

In 1978, according to Israeli figures, South Africa sold goods worth $86.7 million to Israel and spent $37.7 million on imports from Israel.

According to Israeli representatives, that constitutes less than 1 percent of its entire world-wide trade. But that figure leaves out the substantial diamond trade, all of which is shunted through the central diamond market operated by De Beers in London. Israel is now the largest diamond cutting center in the world, handling some 52 percent of all roughs marketed. Its imports have leaped from $154 million in 1970 to more than $1 billion in 1978, and the bulk of these stones originates in South Africa.

Those figures also leave out the extensive—and secret—arms sales by which Israel has provided South Africa with Uzi submachine guns, rifles, mortars, and electronic equipment, as well as licenses to manufacture certain Israeli weapons and military ships.

Once these two areas are taken into account, Israel becomes one of South Africa's largest trading partners, although it still lags behind such countries as the UK, US, and West Germany. Total West German trade with South Africa in 1978—imports and exports—amounted to some $2.3 billion. US figures are $2.8 billion, and UK $2.6 billion, compared with Israel's approximately $37.7 million in disclosed trade and perhaps another billion at least in arms and diamond deals.

New Deals

The new trend expected to appear in Israeli-South African economic relations is the joint-trade or investment venture.

To encourage and publicize such endeavors, South Africa's Financial Mail ran a special supplement this past September, entitled "On the Dawn of Shalom: Israel," devoted to explaining the Israeli economy to South African investors and exploring the options available as Israel allegedly transforms its economy from a military to a peacetime footing. The trend in such joint ventures, the Mail explains, is the combination of Israeli technology and South African raw materials, semi-finished goods and some capital.

Pretoria's imposition of tariff and duty barriers continues to keep a lid on Israeli exports to South Africa. "While Israel has consistently liberalized her trade, South Africa continues to maintain administrative restrictions such as quotas, surcharges, heavy duties, and import permits," complains one Israeli official. The effect of this over...
Israel Connection

Continued from page 23

is that South Africa imports less than half the value of goods that Israel does from its partner. The trade gap in 1979 has apparently grown even larger. Israel may hope that joint ventures will tend to equalize the contribution from both countries.

South Africa has another reason for encouraging joint ventures, particularly those based in Israel. It may hope to build new markets by benefiting from the duty-free agreement Israel has with the EEC countries and its special trading status with the United States.

Some experts feel that while South Africa is obviously seeking such benefits, Israel is not the only—or the best—route to them. EEC regulations stipulate that any product with 40 or 50 percent value added in a country with EEC ties can be traded with other EEC partners duty-free. Thus South Africa's export of raw materials or semi-finished goods which are then further processed in any of the EEC countries, offers it the same opportunities it would get by investing in Israel. At the same time, it is clear that South Africa would like to increase its access to the EEC, and Israel's current desire for investments creates a hospitable climate for joint ventures.

According to the Financial Mail, Israeli incentives for new investors are particularly generous at this time and include cash grants and low-interest loans of up to 75 percent of the total investment.

Existing Partnership

The model for the ventures of the future may well be the existing partnership between South Africa's state-owned Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), and Koor Industries, a major investment group owned by the Israeli labor federation, Histadrut. Iskooor Steel Services, the joint company, is 49 percent owned by South Africa and is based in Israel where it manufactures steel products. Israeli imports of rolled steel for this company account for half of Israel's disclosed South African imports.

Other joint ventures already operating include the Taguw Rubber industry at Herzliya, which produces surgical rubber gloves, eliminating any need for imports. A minority share is held by the local management; the know-how and equipment are South African.

Capital flows may take the form of loans to ease the costs to Israel of the treaty with Egypt. One agreement already on paper involves the Hadera coal-fueled power plant which, when it opens on the Mediterranean coast north of Tel Aviv in 1984, will receive most of the 3.5 million tons of coal needed to run the plant from South Africa and Australia.

Two new ventures, one in each country, typify what each country is looking for from the other.

First is Conlog, a joint venture between the Elron Group of Israel and Anglo-American's Durban-based Control Logic. The second is a joint venture by the South African and Israeli sections of the US Motorola Corporation.

Both ventures involve relatively little transfer of capital, a high transfer of technology, and excellent potential for future development.

The Elron group is the third largest Israeli electronics producer and the biggest in locally developed computer technology. Control Logic has developed and currently manufactures industrial controls and automated electronics. Although the trend is for the transfer of Israeli technology, in this case it is the South African company that will provide the know-how.

"To begin with, we will manufacture the identical equipment to that now manufactured in South Africa here in Israel for export to other markets," explains Uzia Galil, Elron's managing director. "Then we will jointly develop new products that will be partly manufactured in South Africa and here.

"This year we probably won't see more than $1 million in sales. But our plans for the future are big. With our backing and that of Anglo American, Conlog can come quite a powerful corporation for exports."

In the case of Motorola SA, Israel's very sophisticated irrigation-systems technology is being transferred. So far production is on a 50 percent value-added system. "We are creating a new market," says Motorola's Data and Control System Division manager.

False Labels

For years, oil, munitions, and other companies have camouflaged their trade with South Africa and Rhodesia by elaborate rerouting and the creation of paper companies. In response to increased international pressure and difficulties in finding markets, the South Africans have been doing a bit of camouflaging themselves.

A South African company, Appletiser Ltd., is currently exporting apple juice to the Middle East—in tin cans labeled in Arabic and labeled "packed in Mozambique."

This ploy was made public when a number of the cans were inadvertently sent to a Cape Town cafe this fall. It seems that, faced by trade boycotts, the South Africans are using every means possible to increase exports. They can't afford to be straightforward, because most countries know South African apples are racist to the core.

Republic of South Africa

Area: 472,359 sq. mi.
Population: 27,880,000 (1979 est.)
4,557,000 white (16 percent)
2,549,000 colored
810,000 Asian
19,617,000 African (71 percent)

Capitals: Cape Town (legislative); Pretoria (administrative)

Liberation Movements Recognized by the OAU:
African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), f. 1912, banned 1960, headed by Oliver Thambo;
Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), f. 1959, banned 1960, headed by Vusumzi Make.

Note: A number of other black political organizations continue to function underground, including the Unity Movement, f. 1943; the Black People's Convention, f. 1972; and other black consciousness groups, most of which were banned in October 1977. Black opposition organizations that continue to function openly are the Azania People's Organization (AZAPO), the Writers Association of South Africa (WASA) and the Committee of Ten.

Head of State: President Marais Viljoen

Head of Government: Prime Minister Pieter W. Botha

GNP: US$42.3 billion (1979 est.)

National Currency: Rand (US$1.20 = 1 Rand)

Political Status: White minority republic with no black franchise. Africans are legally citizens of the so-called bantustans of which three have been declared "independent" by South Africa.
A Decade of Misinformation:
South Africa's Ten Year Effort to Build its Image in the US.

On September 27, 1970, Eschel Rhoodie received a message from information Minister Cornelius Mulder to return to Pretoria for a confidential talk. Rhoodie, at the time the information department official in Holland, had made quite an impression on Mulder with a book he'd written called The Paper Curtain. In it, Rhoodie had argued in favor of an aggressive overseas campaign to counteract what Rhoodie regarded as a curtain of misinformation hiding both the reality of progress in South Africa and the threat of communist expansion on the African continent.

The meeting between Rhoidie and Mulder, an ambitious politician with hopes of becoming prime minister, was to be the first of many as the decade progressed. Within a few months Rhoodie became a special adviser to Mulder; within two years secretary of the department.

For both men, it was a happy match. Rhoodie's bold ideas and suave cosmopolitan style were backed by Mulder's political clout. Rhoodie gained power while Mulder gained a reputation as a man who understood the modern ways of the world. Until a few leaks about free spending with government money began to undermine the foundation of their success, the Mulder-Rhoodie team appeared headed for the top.

Rhoodie did not wait long before beginning to institute changes once Mulder had installed him as his number two man in the department of information. Some of these were straightforward and above board. Rhoodie believed that the department of information should receive more attention to match its growing role in South Africa. Additional officials were added to the department's US staff (professionals now number 17 compared with 13 US information officials in South Africa), and offices were opened in Chicago and Los Angeles (and more recently Houston) to augment those in Washington and New York.

Visits by Americans to South Africa increased substantially. Such visits, costing about $3,000 each, shot up to more than fifty in 1974 from eleven the year before. The department also geared up to blitz the US with information about South Africa. As one example, a half-million copies of a brochure on South Africa were printed in 1974 for distribution to US schools and universities.

These programs, however, constituted only a small part of the department's activities. According to Rhoodie, shortly after he took office and inspired by conversations with people he knew to have CIA links, he began a number of secret operations in the US and elsewhere to win friends for South Africa.

Rhoodie told a South African journalist in 1979 that he had explained the mandate under which he wished to operate his "undercover" programs to Prime Minister Vorster and other top officials in a 1974 meeting. At that meeting, a secret fund was established to fund the operations. As Rhoodie recalled it, he told the officials: "I want you to approve not an information asset but a propaganda war in which no rules or regulations would apply. If it was necessary for me to purchase a sable coat or a mink coat for an editor's wife, I should be able to do so."

Between 1973 and 1978, at least $70 million flowed secretly into the department. Altogether, between 160 and 180 projects were undertaken. The largest of the known projects was the starting and funding of a pro-government, English-language newspaper in South Africa, The Citizen. In the US, according to Rhoodie and to the findings of a South African government-commission, large amounts of money were given to John McGoff, a Michigan publisher, to purchase newspapers and other media outlets in order to give South Africa an opportunity to make its case.

But the good times did not last forever. Following a scandal which began with revelations about personal appropriation or misuse of government funds by Rhoodie and some of the other officials involved, and which went on to reveal the secret funding of The Citizen and other projects, the department of information was reorganized in 1978. Mulder and Vorster were both forced to resign. Rhoodie fled the country, only to be later extradited from France and found guilty of fraud and theft. Most of the secret projects were supposedly ended.

At least 56 of these projects, however, were continued. These remain out of sight, as do whatever projects were undertaken by the department of foreign affairs at the same time, though with less money, than those of the department of information.

Finally, the department of defense, which fed funds into the department of information as well as into its own projects, continues to have at its disposal large amounts of secret funds whose purpose has never been revealed. It was only the defense department's tie to the department of information in fact that brought to light the existence of these funds.

Thus, as the decade closes, it appears that while one of the more flamboyant chapters in South Africa's efforts to make friends has ended, there is every reason to believe that the secret "war" of which Rhoodie spoke continues.

K.R.

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paid advertisement
Rumored Meeting

Continued from page 21

organization is playing, in order to win credibility and support it attempts to link itself to the ANC." In this context, the ANC representative maintains that "the role of the ANC is that of the vanguard, to unify all the patriotic forces in the country."

Black Consciousness Challenge

Up to now, the ANC has managed to recruit many new members from the ranks of the diffuse black consciousness movement. But it has not succeeded in convincing the black consciousness movement as a whole to look upon the ANC as the vanguard or Buthelezi as a "patriotic force."

The ANC has been lobbying hard internationally to gain recognition as the "sole representative" of the oppressed people of South Africa. With the Pan-Africanist Congress (the only other OAU-recognized movement) facing internal dissension, the most obvious challenge to ANC "supremacy" comes from the loose coalition of forces collectively known as the black consciousness movement.

In fact, the reported ANC-Inkatha discussions took place on the eve of a major black consciousness movement convention planned to take place in Kenya during December. Such a convention would clearly challenge Buthelezi’s wish to "eliminate the growth of third-force factors" and might also be seen as a challenge to the ANC’s claim to "vanguard" status.

Within this context, the highly publicized ANC-Inkatha discussions could be construed in any number of ways. Most observers have adopted a wait-and-see approach, pending further clarification from the ANC and other forces within the black movement. Few, however, are waiting with any expectation that differences between Inkatha and the black consciousness movement will be resolved in the near future. At this point, anyway, those differences appear real and massive—on questions such as divestment, participation in government-sponsored elections, and most fundamentally of all on Buthelezi’s political base in the bantustan system.

Makatini admits to sharing some of black consciousness movements’ criticisms of Buthelezi and Inkatha. "We differ with Gatsha on the question of investment," the ANC representative stated. "We are mindful that to call for disinvestment in South Africa is actionable [illegal], but we feel he goes too far in campaigning for investments."

On the other hand, Makatini gives Buthelezi credit for "the non-negative role he has played in blocking 'independence' for KwaZulu." "It is true," Makatini continued, "that he was hesitant to take the role of traditional chief, which subsequently led to the role he presently occupies."

Despite his personal hesitation, Buthelezi was prevailed upon to take the position. "The ANC," Makatini added, "was interested in ensuring that the regime didn’t find a willing stooge to take the place instead."

Still, Makatini and the ANC don’t ignore the fact that "the government hopes to win Buthelezi against the ANC." "The bantustans were created to serve the role of a Frankenstein against the liberation movement," he adds.

At the moment, opinion remains profoundly divided as to whether Gatsha Buthelezi is already playing that role. Opinion also remains divided as to whether recent developments mark a crossroads or a detour on the road to unity and a broad national front. On both questions the verdict will be rendered by time and by the people of South Africa themselves.

US Press

Continued from page 9

about their credibility.

She found the press’s failure to give adequate coverage to activities of the Selous Scouts particularly disturbing. An elite counter-insurgency unit in the Smith army, the Selous Scouts have frequently been identified by eyewitnesses as the real perpetrators of attacks on missionaries and refugees.

Hawk also found that US reporters gave a disproportionate amount of space and credibility to statements from Rhodesian government officials. These officials were quoted in some 42 percent of the time by the Washington Post and 54 percent of the time by the Chicago Tribune, while Patriotic Front leaders were quoted in 13 percent and 9 percent respectively. In all five papers, quotes from white civilians outnumbered those from black civilians by a ratio of two to one; that rose to almost five to one in the case of the Chicago Tribune. Thus, accounts of the war are seen almost entirely from the point of view of the country’s beleaguered white minority.

There is an unwillingness to report the black side of the war even when the opportunity exists. As a result, prominent themes in Rhodesian propaganda— atrocities, abductions, and anti-communism are reflected far too often in US newspapers.

The Future

The prospect for improved US coverage of Africa and the Third World seems unlikely even if more reporters are assigned to those beats. The essential problem is an unwillingness on the part of foreign editors or overseas correspondents to concede weaknesses or bias in their current reporting. Several foreign editors of major newspapers and wire services said that their coverage of southern Africa has “been as objective and balanced as possible under the circumstances,” Jerry Loughran of UPI believes that “overall coverage is comprehensive and fair” and that “cooperation with Rhodesian authorities does not necessarily lead to biased coverage.”

Robert Gibson of the Los Angeles Times, when questioned whether his paper might not run more balanced reporting if it placed correspondents in Zambia or Tanzania, responded, “That would result in blatant propaganda, and no reporter would consent to advocacy journalism.” Apparently, the restrictions placed on reporters by the Rhodesian authorities and their propaganda activities pose no such dilemma for Gibson.

Some critics have suggested a greater use of African stringers by Western news agencies. The general response to that is typified by one commentator who said, “African reporters do not take care to be precise and meticulous in their reporting. African journalists also have difficulty writing in a syntax required by the world press.”

The experience of Thomas Johnson, the first Afro-American journalist assigned to Africa by a major US news agency suggests that other factors may be involved. Johnson, who represented the New York Times in West Africa, found only one African among his twenty stringers when he arrived in 1972. When he left in 1975, twelve of the sixteen stringers were African nationals.

Americans need to become more familiar with the alternative media. Publications such as In These Times, Seven Days, The Guardian, Africa News, and Southern Africa offer a viable alternative to the misinformation, and bias of the Western media.

Yet, these publications face a precarious future as a result of the inflationary crisis gripping America. The recent demise of the Berkeley-based International Bulletin is a case in point. Progressive Americans concerned about southern Africa may have to accept a greater responsibility for insuring the survival of these publications and gaining them a wider audience. The inevitable alternative is a misinformed public, susceptible to manipulation by some of the more conservative elements in American society.

Thanks

Friends and Subscribers—Southern Africa had a very successful fund-raising party on December 1, in New York. The party was both a financial success and a lot of fun.

So, a huge thank you to all of the people who put so much time into making the party happen.
Lobbyists
Continued from page 6

"I think there are elements within the American government that have, in effect, said, 'Maybe that's not enough, but that's all we can accept without letting in the communists.'"

"Grand apartheid is being put in place, and I think that the Americans are very much a part of that process."

Changing Direction

By all accounts, Lockwood has been as effective a legislative lobbyist as one can be in Washington without a big constituency or a bigger bankroll. Perhaps for this reason, perhaps for others, Lockwood may leave the Washington Office on Africa as early as next spring. "I'm feeling the need for some reflection and some regrouping of energy, for some type of work where you get back more of your creativity. I don't know enough of how people in ordinary life are living and feeling. While I may know a hell of a lot more than I did seven years ago, I'm never sure that what I'm doing is relevant to where people are." (Lockwood, too, occasionally borrows expressions from an earlier period.)

Changing direction in mid-life isn't a new experience for Lockwood. A graduate of Yale and Virginia Law School and a member for several years in a Wall Street firm that eventually merged with Richard Nixon's, Lockwood decided when he was 37 to attend the Virginia Theological Seminary, from which he was graduated in 1957. Later, in 1969 and '70, he took two years' timeout to obtain a certificate from the Corcoran School of Art. "It was an old ambition of mine," he remembers, "I go back to something that was an original love of mine—drawing, painting, and sculpture. Maybe I'll ultimately return to that. But first there's the local Washington campaign against bank loans to South Africa. I'll work on that if for no other reason than to get the experience of how it is to do something locally and bang your head up against some of the corporate interests." □

Namibia Settlement
Continued from page 19

"I think there are elements within the American government that have, in effect, said, 'Maybe that's not enough, but that's all we can accept without letting in the communists.'" Foreign Secretary Muenshange told the General Assembly. He said that South African forces had been occupying vacated farms in Namibia and purchasing others to "transform them into military bases."

Muenshange also said that South Africa was constructing new military bases throughout the country, at Kamanyab, Omaun, Omupindi, Andara, and Ngwezi. "Existing bases are being renovated and enlarged, for example, those at Windhoek, Grootfontein, Walvis Bay, Ondangwa, Runtu, and Mpacha. There is constant movement of troops and equipment by rail, road, and air throughout Namibia."

Independent confirmation of these developments is, of course, impossible. But every now and then, the newspapers in Namibia do give a hint about the seriousness of the situation in Namibia. Recently, in the case of two children killed by a South African-made rifle grenade, the Windhoek Observer on November 17 reported that the judge in the case could not obtain statements needed by the court because of "fear and danger." The judge believed that there may have been criminal liability in the case—and possibly on the part of the South African defense force—but he could not travel to the area where the incident occurred because operations were being carried out against insurgents.

At one point during a hearing, one policeman made reference to a time in the area "when the police were still in control of the place," clearly implying that the area was no longer completely under the control of local authorities. M.S.

Flawed Constitution
Continued from page 14

by 2.5 million people. Current estimates are that 17 times as much land in the Tribal Trust areas is being cultivated as is ecologically desirable. Too much land has been taken away from animal grazing land, much of which is either completely bare or overgrazed. "Each year," concludes Roger Riddell, who has closely studied the problems of land in Rhodesia for the London-based Catholic Institute for International Relations, "the land is becoming less and less productive."

It is extremely difficult to estimate just how much land would have to be resettled and at what compensation price. But in 1977 an independent study by the German Development Institute in Berlin suggested that at least 75 percent of the European land would be necessary to resettle the excess population from the Tribal Trust lands, all the while maintaining a large-scale commercial agricultural sector for export and local production on the remaining European land. And this is certainly not the most radical scheme that has been suggested thus far.

Taking current land values as a benchmark, the total cost of acquiring 75 percent of European land would total $1 billion.

The new constitution provides for "adequate compensation" for lands appropriated, "prompt payment," and a "reasonable time to be remittable" in foreign exchange. But, Riddell says, the constitution does not define those terms. "The burden of this payment to an independent government would be far too great and would be in addition to other large foreign exchange commitments," Riddell points out.

After tough bargaining in London, the Patriotic Front extracted from the British an agreement to establish an international compensation fund—which officials in Washington say they support—to assume the massive economic burden of land redistribution. But the fund is not currently included in the draft of the constitution, and no specific money pledges have been received so far.

Without the compensation fund, a new government will be paralyzed to solve the land problem. "Even if a new government of Zimbabwe," says Riddell, "were committed to implementing a comprehensive land resettlement program aimed at alleviating the acute pressures in the Tribal Trust land, under the proposed constitution it would find it well nigh impossible to carry it out."

M.S.

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1979 Chronology

In the brief space available we could not hope to include every event of importance affecting the current and future lives of the people of southern Africa. We also recognize that chronologies, which focus on dates, apparently isolated events, and the activities of leaders, are no substitute for analysis of the forces at play in a society.

But they can serve as “memory ticklers,” useful notes for people working to mobilize support for the liberation struggles of southern Africa. It is in this spirit that we have compiled the following 1979 chronology.

DECEMBER

- Record monthly exodus of whites from Rhodesia: 2057 leave and only 233 arrive. During 1978 a total of 18,069 whites leave Rhodesia and only 4,000 arrive.

December 4-8

In defiance of United Nations, South Africa holds elections in Namibia in which only one major political party, the DTA, participates. Church officials allege authorities use widespread intimidation to achieve the reported 80 percent turn out.

December 8

In first of many campus actions trustees at the University of Michigan announce will divest $8.5 million worth of stock in 17 corporations involved in South Africa; later in the year reverse decision. Campaign for divestment of holdings in US companies operating in South Africa widens through year, affecting campuses, community groups, city governments, state pension funds, trade unions and more.

December 10

Angolan attempt to eliminate bureaucratic abuses and to increase efficiency involves a major government restructuring which removes Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento from his post.

December 11

Patriotic Front guerrillas, in escalation of guerrilla war, destroy 22 of the 38 oil storage tanks of Rhodesia's main oil depot in Salisbury. Damage, estimated at $18 million destroys one-quarter of Rhodesia's oil supply. Patriotic Front now claims control over 80 percent of Zimbabwe.

December 12

In face of right-wing “stop liberation support” pressure, Zambian President Kaunda wins vote of confidence in election, with 78 percent of the voters affirming his continuation in office.

December 22

South African announces the acceptance of UN resolution 435, which calls for UN-supervised elections in Namibia.

JANUARY

- Rand unpegged from the dollar—exchange value determined by market rises from $1.15 to $1.20 by year's end.
- Creation of “financial rand” announced; cases conditions for moving capital out of South Africa; also makes investment by foreign companies more attractive and up to 40 percent cheaper.
- Congress chooses new heads for the House and Senate Africa sub-committees—respectively Stephan Solarz and George McGovern.
- Connie Mulder, former SA minister of information, resigns from parliament following his implication in the South African information scandal—“Muldergarten.”
- South Africa announces plan for separate constitutions for coloreds and Asians. In March, South Africa shelves plan as a result of widespread conservative opposition.
- Mozambique reports Rhodesian attacks have escalated into a “total war” with raids aimed at vital economic targets.

January 13

Protests fail to stop the fight between boxer Kallie Knoetze, former South African policeman and American Bill Sharkey. Fight, originally scheduled for New York was moved to Florida to avoid pressure from anti-apartheid groups.

January 17

British Prime Minister Callaghan accepts judgement of special envoy Clewdyn Hughes who reports that time not ripe for “round-table” talks on Rhodesia.

January 23

Trade agreement signed in Luanda between Angola and Portugal.

January 30

White Rhodesians ratify a new constitution for the “internal settlement,” which reserves veto power and 28 seats in parliament for whites who constitute 4 percent of the population.

FEBRUARY

February 1

Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran. Khomeini had previously pledged to cut off all oil shipments to South Africa as soon as he returned to Iran. Later in the month South Africa, in response to the cut-off of Iranian oil, announces a complete clampdown on all information about petroleum supplies.

February 11

Two Rhodesian farmers released after 9 months as prisoners of the Patriotic Front. Farmers report being favorably impressed by front. 59 persons are killed when a Rhodesian commercial airplane is shot down. Taking credit for the attack, ZAPU alleges plane also carried military personnel.

February 15

Followag weeks of intensive travelling diplomacy by a UN special representative, UN Secretary General Waldheim announces talks on implementation of UN peace plan for Namibia virtually deadlocked.

February 19

Rhodesia announces renewed bombing of Mozambique and Zambia in campaign apparently designed to prevent PF interference with scheduled April elections. On February 26 Rhodesian planes bomb ZAPU camps 185 miles inside Angola killing 192 people and wounding 987.

February 20

ZAPU guerrillas attack for the first time Rhodesia's main international airport on the outskirts of Salisbury.

February 26

UN Secretary General Waldheim proposes March 15 as date for ceasefire in Namibia. South Africa objects to proposals for SWAPO bases in Namibia, and provision to allow Angola and Zambia to monitor SWAPO bases in their countries instead of UN.

MARCH

- Continued South African attacks on Angola threaten UN plan for Namibia. US calls for an emergency meeting of the five Western nations.

March 4

Iran breaks diplomatic relations with South Africa and asks South African consul general to leave.

March 9

South African white miners on wildcat strike against government move to lift job reservations, reserving certain skilled jobs for whites only.

March 10

Jan Smith offers to bow out of April elections if US and Britain recognize the internal settlement and lift sanctions.

March 14

South Africa bombs SWAPO refugee camp in Angola. Between March 1976 and June 1979, Angola charges South Africa responsible for 1383 confirmed deaths and more than 1800 wounded inside Angola.

March 19

Proximity talks on Namibia open in New York.

March 24

Columbia University announces decision to sell $24 million worth of stock invested in corporations with operations in South Africa. But at year's end stock still not sold.

March 26

Countering the cut off of oil from Iran, South Africa announces will pay for oil with gold.
April

- Muzorewa and Sithole now operating private armies numbering between 7500 and 9000. Population being coerced to attend rallies in support of internal settlement.
- Interim report of the Erasmus Commission, set up to investigate illegal activities of the SA Department of Information, is released. Report clears all present members of South African cabinet of complicity in information scandal.
- New South African law allows blacks to purchase houses in ghettos on a 99 year lease. As of November 1979 only 30 homes actually bought.
- National week of solidarity and action in support of African liberation. Thousands demonstrate across US urging divestment and end to bank loans to South Africa.
- ANC member Solomon Mahlangu is 37th person to be executed in South Africa this year, despite international protest. Mahlangu convicted of complicity in an attack which killed two white men in Johannesburg in 1977.
- South Africa halts the bulldozing of Cape Crossroads squatter camps after much domestic and international pressure. In September, government announces that three-quarters of residents will be sent to bantustans.
- White mini-election in Rhodesia elects members for 28 seats reserved for whites under new Zimbabwe-Rhodesian constitution.
- Ugandan National Liberation Front meets in Moshi, Tanzania to form new Ugandan constitution; chooses Yusuf Lule president.
- Three US embassy personnel, charged with spying, are expelled from South Africa. Incident reveals that US embassy personnel had spied on front-line states and passed information to South African government.
- Controversial "internal settlement" elections are held in Rhodesia, amid widespread charges of voter intimidation and counter claims that elections are "free and fair." Bishop Abel Muzorewa declared winner with 51 seats in parliament. Patriotic Front does not participate, denounces elections and new constitution as fraudulent.
- South African Prime Minister Botha calls for establishment of constellation of cooperating states in southern Africa.
- South Africa launches new wave of oppression in Namibia; 39 SWAPO leaders arrested, more follow. SWAPO alleges that army forces, now estimated at 65,000, detain 15,000 Namibians in concentration camps in next three months.

May

- British all-parliamentary groups find strong evidence of intimidation in Rhodesian elections and recommend "election should be discounted in any governmental policy discussions about Rhodesia."
- Wiehahn Commission releases report on labor legislation; calls for official recognition of black trade unions and granting of all rights presently held by white unions to black unions. Later, government legislation based on report grants trade union rights first to all non-migrant black labor and then, in September, to migrant labor from present or former South African territories.
- Three ANC members attack Soweto police station.
- 11 black South African students convicted of "sedition" for part in organizing 1976 Soweto uprising; receive prison sentences of up to four years.
- Riekert Commission releases report advising reforms in pass laws and other forms of "influx control."
- Justice Steyn, administrator general of Namibia, announces creation of new national assembly with legislative powers based on December elections won by DTA. Many observers fear South Africa preparing for UDI in Namibia.
- Military unity agreement signed by Patriotic Front members ZANU and ZAPU in Addis Ababa.
- Carnegie Endowment opinion poll shows 86 percent of all Americans oppose apartheid.
- Newly elected British government indicates will recognize government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and lift sanctions against Rhodesia.
- Senate votes 75-19 in favor of non-binding "sense of the Senate" resolution requesting Carter to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.
- Abel Muzorewa sworn in as prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia—Sithole maintains parliamentary boycott and claims elections were rigged.

June

- Namibian whites split over DTA plan to liberalize petty apartheid laws. Upsurge in white vigilante violence against moderate whites and Africans.
- The "state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" formally proclaimed.
- John Vorster, former prime minister of South Africa, resigns largely ceremonial post of president after final Erasmus Commission report charges he "knew everything" about secret funding of pro-government newspaper.
- PAC leader David Sibeko assassinated in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, in apparent power struggle within organization; 18 PAC members arrested in connection with murder.
- South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha reshuffles cabinet easing out controversial member Jimmy Kruger.
- Abel Muzorewa travels to South Africa for talks with Botha.
- Third anniversary of Soweto uprising commemorated throughout South Africa with memorial services. No violence is reported.
- James Chikerema, closely linked to South African and US financial interests, splits with Muzorewa's UANC, forms new political party. Eight other UANC MP's defect with him, depriving Muzorewa of parliamentary majority.
- 17 defendants in "Bethal 18" trial convicted of terrorism for forming alleged PAC front organization.
- Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, tours US declaring "apartheid is dying and dead." Pass laws and separate development policies remain unchanged.

July

- Angolan President Agostinho Neto dissolves department of information and security (DISA), creates new ministry of the interior. In dissolving DISA, Neto refers to charges of abuse of authority, stresses need to build unity within Angola.
- In talks with US representatives, Neto proposes creation of DMZ on both sides of southern border with Namibia, to be patrolled by UN peace-keeping forces.
- US assigns first diplomatic representative in nine years to Rhodesia, to maintain contact with Muzorewa regime although there is no official US recognition of "internal settlement."
- Muzorewa in US sees Carter but fails to win recognition for "internal settlement."
- Angola publishes new law detailing conditions for foreign investment including the repatriation of profits, compensation for nationalization, taxation, and customs incentives.
- OAU summit in Monrovia, Liberia. Participants vote overwhelmingly support for Patriotic Front, denounce election in Rhodesia.

August

- South African Prime Minister Botha visits black township of Soweto, tours homelands. Botha is first South African PM ever to visit a black township.
- Eschel Rhoodie tells Dutch journalist that South Africa gave Muzorewa's party, UANC, more than $1 million for use in April elections.
- Gatsha Buthelezi, leader of KwaZulu bantustan, calls for continued investment in South Africa during US visit.
**NOVEMBER**

- At Ford and General Tire plants in South Africa, over 1300 blacks fired after dispute that started with firing of one black worker. Later in the month, South African police called in to control strikers; in December 21 Ford workers detained for part in strike.
- South Africa rejects latest Western plan for Namibian independence.

**November 1**
Nigeria nationalizes British Petroleum’s interest after learning of plans to circumvent OPEC’s oil embargo of South Africa. According to Nigeria, North Sea crude oil destined for Europe being diverted to South Africa; being replaced by Nigerian imports. Move also seen as attempt to pressure Britain to maintain economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and prevent recognition of the Muzorewa government.

**November 1-10**
In Lusaka, bowing to pressure at Commonwealth conference, British Prime Minister Thatcher proposes plan for all-parties conference to settle war in Rhodesia.

**November 3**
Jesse Jackson, returning from trip to South Africa, avoids direct commitment on important question of economic sanctions against South Africa. Jackson, while in South Africa, receives heavy criticism from white South Africans for outspoken statements against apartheid.

**November 23**
Eschel Rhoodie extradited from France to South Africa.

**November 26**
Gerrit Viljoen, a top member of the Broederbond, secret South African society, replaces Justice Steyn as administrator general for Namibia, in move to bring right-wing white protest under control.

**SEPTEMBER**

- Writers Association of South Africa (WASA) holds conference, attended by many black consciousness activists, to revitalize organizing in face of continued harassment.
- Non-aligned summit conference in Havana, Cuba, calls on all member oil-exporting countries to impose total ban on sale of oil to South Africa.
- In last month price of gold leaps over $200 per ounce, reaching record-breaking heights over $425 per ounce, greatly strengthening South African economy.

**September 1**
Donald McHenry replaces Andrew Young as US ambassador to the UN—no change is expected in US policy.

**September 3**
Muzorewa-Smith regime extends martial law to almost all of Rhodesia (except major cities).

**September 3**
Angolan national oil company, Sonangol, signs $360 million contract for oil exploration and production with Texaco. Contract calls for Sonangol to hold 60 percent share in venture.

**September 6**
Rhodesia begins new wave of raids on Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia specifically aimed at damaging civilian targets and internal economies in an attempt to undermine support for Patriotic Front. Participation of South African Mirage jets in attack was confirmed by US State Department. Mozambique forces down two American-made Rhodesian helicopters. Total damage in raids in Mozambique estimated at over $37 million.

**September 10**
Agostinho Neto, first president of Angola and leader of its revolutionary movement, MPLA, for over 17 years, dies at age 56.

**September 10**
All-parties Rhodesian constitutional conference opens in London.

**September 10**
Report released in London by International Defense and Aid listing growing number of political prisoners under Muzorewa.

**September 12**
Venda bantustan declared “independent.”

**September 20**
Jose Eudoro dos Santos succeeds Agostinho Neto as MPLA party president and head of state.

**September 24**
Patriotic Front, in London, accepts principle that 20 seats in parliament be reserved for whites under new Zimbabwean constitution.

**September 28**
Barclay’s Bank branches in seven countries are picketed to protest bank’s role in South Africa.

**OCTOBER**

**October 1**
Five Western nations release details of new plan for Namibian independence. Plan calls for 30-mile-wide DMZ to straddle northern border of Namibia. South Africa will be permitted to maintain troops in DMZ although SWAPO will be forced to withdraw immediately.

**October 3**
Lord Carrington at London talks proposes draft constitution.

**October 6**
Muzorewa accepts draft constitution.

**October 8**
Eschel Rhoodie, central figure in South Africa’s information department scandal, sentenced to six years for misappropriation of funds; released on bail.

**October 9**
South Africa threatens to intervene in Rhodesia if Patriotic Front wins too many concessions at London conference.

**October 10**
PAC names new chairman, Vusumzi Make, and expels former PAC leader P.K. Leballo.

**October 11**
Lord Carrington threatens to adjourn London talks if Patriotic Front rejects proposed draft constitution.

**October 12**
South Africa indicates reservations about latest Western proposals for Namibian independence.

**October 20**
White South African Gerrie Coetzee fights black American John Tate in Pretoria despite widespread protest. Tate wins and NBC faces boycott at 1980 Olympics by African athletes because of its part in televising fight.

**October 21**
Patriotic Front agrees to final draft of new constitution—after Western nations agree to pick up bill for compensation of expropriated land.

**October 26**
US reports possible nuclear explosion off South African coast.

**NOVEMBER**

- At Ford and General Tire plants in South Africa, over 1300 blacks fired after dispute that started with firing of one black worker. Later in the month, South African police called in to control strikers; in December 21 Ford workers detained for part in strike.
- South Africa rejects latest Western plan for Namibian independence.

**November 1**
Four ANC guerrillas attack Soweto police station killing two policemen. Attack comes at time of upsurge in bombings and sabotage in rural areas of South Africa.

**November 2**
United Nations Security Council condemns South African attacks on Angola which have been escalating in last few weeks.

**November 11**

**November 12-15**
UN talks on Namibia convene in Geneva. SWAPO, South Africa, five Western powers, front-line states, and “internal parties” all participate.

**November 13**
Professor L.D. Barnard, of University of the Orange Free State, selected as future head of South Africa’s intelligence agency—DONs.

**November 15**
James Mange, ANC guerrilla, sentenced to death under South African treason laws. Mange, with 11 other ANC members, charger with participating in “terrorist activities.”

**November 15**
At London conference on Rhodesia, Patriotic Front agrees to compromise proposals for transition period to indepedent Zimbabwe. British propose plan for ceasefire period to begin almost immediately—Bishop Abel Muzorewa accepts and leaves for Salisbury to begin his election campaign.

**November 20**
Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, orders general mobilization of Zambia’s armed forces and declares “full-scale war situation” in wake of recent joint Rhodesian-South African bombings that leave Zambia with only one trade route open—through Rhodesia.

**November 22**
As part of new “total strategy,” South African Prime Minister Piet Botha meets with business leaders to discuss proposals for “softening” hardline policies of apartheid. Just 10 days earlier, Botha declared “one man, one vote in this country is out.”
The D.C. Bank Campaign was launched in June to protest Riggs’ redlining in the District of Columbia and its loans to Chile and South Africa. In only five months, individuals and groups have withdrawn more than $120,000 from Riggs National Bank. The bank has been charged with lending more than $75 million to the Chilean military regime and $7.5 million to South Africa. It has also been charged with a very poor affirmative action record, and poor service to working people in the city. According to Root, “The auditor of the District government rated Riggs National Bank ‘worst in social responsibility in its first annual report on depository activities.’"

Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 6—“Should the City of Cambridge refrain from investing public monies in banks and other financial institutions doing business with or in the Republic of South Africa?”

“Yes” was the overwhelming response to this question in a public referendum in recent Cambridge elections. The positive response won in every precinct, the lowest pro vote being cast in West Cambridge, the wealthiest part of the city.

The referendum result is not binding, but the City Treasurer has said that Cambridge would formulate “some sort of plan to investigate methods of getting authority to look into the banks’ portfolios.”

The Boston Coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa (BCLS), one of the major supporters of the public referendum question in Cambridge, has been waging a campaign against the First National Bank of Boston (FNBB) for its loans to South Africa.

Two other groups in the Boston area have also been campaigning against the First National Bank. ‘9 to 5’, an organization of women office workers, recently polled a large number of unions and community organizations about their involvement with the bank. Anti-nuclear activists have held a sit-in at the Boston headquarters of the FNBB to protest its role in the financing of nuclear power plants.

According to BCLS representatives, a bill will be introduced in the Massachusetts Legislature in the near future which, if passed, would prohibit the investment of state employees’ pension funds in ways which benefit the South African regime.

SA DRAFT RESISTERS SEEK US SUPPORT...Two members of the South African Military Refugee Aid Fund (SAMRAF), Don Morton and Michael Morgan, recently completed a week-long speaking tour in the Midwest. SAMRAF is an organization which provides legal and financial support for South African military refugees and campaigns for asylum for South African war resisters here in the United States. Don Morton is a former Methodist minister and Michael Morgan recently left the South African army. Both live in exile in New York City.

The SAMRAF tour aimed both at raising money for the organization and helping to broaden the base of anti-apartheid work in the Midwest. It included Kansas City and Columbia, Missouri, Lawrence, Kansas, and Boulder and Denver, Colorado. Morgan and Morton spoke with various groups in every city, gave TV, radio and newspaper interviews, and took part in a picket protest the sale of Krugerrands outside Macy’s department store in Kansas City.

On November 4, Morgan and Morton participated in a Chicago conference, co-sponsored by SAMRAF and SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement. The conference was called to discuss the building of US support for the fledgling draftresister and anti-war movement in South Africa. In addition to SAMRAF and liberation movement representatives, participants included more than 40 US activist organizers of the anti-Vietnam war GI and veterans’ movement. SAMRAF representatives outlined the major thrust of their work, which includes providing material support and counseling for deserters and draft resisters and trying to build a national solidarity campaign to support the liberation struggle in southern Africa.

Clement Hlongwane, a spokesperson for the Pan Africanist Congress, told the conference, “We foresee southern Africa as becoming another Vietnam because white people in South Africa are fighting to preserve the corporate interests of the huge American corporations. We are facing one enemy, which is imperialism, and when we win the struggle in South Africa it will not only be a victory for South Africa but for Americans, too.”

MERCENARIES ATTACKED...The Committee of Concerned Citizens on Mercenary Activities held a press conference in the Colorado state capitol building in Denver on October 26, to expose the role that US nationals are playing in mercenary activities in southern Africa. Members of the Committee announced that they would present a petition on the issue to the US Justice Department, and to the Governor, Attorney General and Director of the Bureau of Investigation of the State of Colorado, where Soldier of Fortune magazine is published. The petition appeals to humanitarian groups to oppose all mercenary activity; requests that the At-

Appeal to activists: We are trying to improve the Action News and Notes section of the magazine. Please send your reports, assessments, newscaps, and especially graphics to: Action News and Notes, c/o Anne Crane and Jennifer Link, 41 Ballard Street, Boston, MA 02130; or phone: (617) 524-7142.
STOP THE OIL... In a November 13 action timed to coincide with the announcement of President Carter's decision on the future of Rhodesian sanctions, supporters of Zimbabwe's Patriotic Front invaded the downtown San Francisco offices of Standard Oil, unfurling a huge banner from the third floor window. The banner called for an enforcement of the embargo against Rhodesia, and an end to Standard's illegal oil shipments to that country.

Demonstrators said that two thirds of Rhodesia's oil is supplied by US corporations, "most notably Standard Oil and Texaco (Calvez), along with Mobil Oil." Said protesters, these shipments lubricate the Rhodesian war machine, and help maintain Western domination over southern Africa's vast mineral and human resources.

Sponsoring the action, which also included a picket in front of the building, were the Southern Africa Anti-Mercenary Coalition (SAAMC) and the Southern Africa Solidarity Committee.

Campus Update

Contrary to the predictions of some perhaps wishful observers that the divestment "fad" would soon be forgotten, campus activists across America have been busy this fall.

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY... Eleven protesters including the campus chaplain were arrested as a result of a demonstration demanding that the divestment issue be placed on the agenda at the October meeting of the board of trustees. In a show of solidarity, students and faculty raised $1200 for bail bonds in just two hours. All but one of the protesters were released that day.

Following the arrests, the university sought an injunction against the protesters to prohibit them from raising the divestment issue at trustee meetings. Judge C.H. Mulen ruled that the protesters had a constitutional right to be heard and refused the injunction.

The trial of those arrested will commence on January 10. Telegrams of support can be sent to: Don Cooney, 701 Norton Drive, Kalamazoo, Michigan, 49001, Tel: (616) 349-3027.

OBERLIN COLLEGE... Oberlin College administrators have been in the forefront of national joint corporate-university efforts to head off the divestment movement. They have had little success on their home campus.

From November 12-17, the Oberlin Coalition sponsored a week of activities on southern Africa that culminated with a confrontation between activists and the board of trustees. In an effort to avoid a discussion of the divestment issue, the trustees canceled their regular "open forum" and transformed it into a genteel "wine and cheese" party. Over two hundred students went along to the party—and listened while a member of the black organization ABUSA read a statement demanding action on campus discrimination and divestment.

The next day, the trustees refused to place the divestment issue on their agenda and shut themselves up on the fourth floor of a building behind a wall of security guards. The maneuver failed when 75 demonstrators evaded the security guards and vocally prevented the trustees from conducting their meeting.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE... When the trustees arrived for their annual fall meeting, they were greeted by 100 students conducting a candle-light vigil at the Massachusetts college. After two years of refusals, members of the trustee finance committee finally agreed to discuss the divestment issue with anti-apartheid activists.

Following a strategy session involving fifteen area schools in October, activists from Williams took responsibility for coordinating a National Campus Material Aid Drive. The Williams committee has distributed leaflets stressing the political importance of material aid to the liberation movements and outlining some of the steps necessary to carry on such a campaign.

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE... A major victory was achieved this November when charges were dropped against three students arrested last year for an anti-apartheid protest at a trustee meeting. Recent activities have revolved around the John Tate-Gerry Coetzee fight. Tate, who is a Knoxville resident, was urged not to fight, and the local NBC affiliate was subject to seventeen days of picketing by students and community residents because of NBC's plan to televise the fight. Activists generated enough local pressure to encourage promoter Bob Arum to spirit Tate to South Africa several weeks before the date of the scheduled fight.

TUFTS COLLEGE... The major educational event this fall was a well-attended forum involving a speaker from the Patriotic Front and a prominent South African exile. Activists have been picketing the administration building once a week and they have held educational meetings which resulted in the successful passage of a campus-wide referendum supporting divestment and calling for the trustees to reopen discussion of the issue.

BEREA COLLEGE... Activists at this college in Kentucky have initiated an aid campaign with help from the American Friends Service Committee. They were also successful in making the South African issue a part of a mandatory freshman class called "Issues and Values." The most recent educational meeting featured Dr. Don Mutambara, an exile from Zimbabwe. January activities include a mandatory school-wide convocation on the US student, anti-apartheid movement featuring Princeton organizer, Adimu Changa.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY... During a recent lecture by the vice-president of Exxon, members of the Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa organized a militant picket and held a day-long series of workshops dealing with energy and anti-apartheid issues. The committee also showed a series of films on South Africa. In January, they plan to co-sponsor a showing of "Nuclear File," a film on US-South African nuclear ties.

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY... Throughout the fall, the university trustees have refused to hold open hearings on the divestment issue. In response, activists have been organizing educational forums and an endorser-campaign for their demands. In addition, activists participated in a November 30 protest against the Washington-based Riggs Bank, a prime lender to the South African government and a practitioner of community red-lining.

HARVARD... The Harvard South African Solidarity Committee (SASC) played a pivotal role in achieving success in a November referendum aimed at prohibiting the city of Cambridge from investing public money in banks and other financial institutions doing business with or in South Africa. The referendum passed by a 2-1 margin. Observers cited the large student participation as a decisive factor in the outcome.

SASC has also been staging actions against corporate recruiters. Corporations targeted include Chase Manhattan Bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust, and Hewlett-Packard, a computer firm. A visit to Harvard by Helen Suzman, a liberal South African parliamentarian and noted apologist for corporate investors in South Africa also received the attention of SASC. Suzman was aggressively questioned at an evening forum attended by members of ANC and PAC. Angered, she shed her liberal facade and told the audience that
black exiles were unfit to voice their opinion on South Africa.

When Suzman returned to South Africa, she warned the apartheid government that divestment struggles in the US were not a thing of the past and that more reforms were needed to head off increased pressure.

PRINCETON...The People's Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa held a protest this fall against Princeton's nuclear ties with South Africa. One hundred students took part in the demonstration, which called for the divestment of apartheid and nuclear stocks and the resignation of trustees on the boards of Westinghouse and General Electric, the leading constructors of nuclear reactors and large investors in South Africa.

Another major event was the annual "Run for Liberation" held November 11. The event began with a rally and approximately 25 students then participated in the mini-marathon, which raised $5300 in pledges to be sent to the liberation movements.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE...Events held at this Pennsylvania college this fall included a presentation by exiled South African journalist Dumasani Kumalo and Chris Ioffo of the Institute for Corporate Responsibility. Members of the Haverford committee also participated in the picketing of the Philadelphia National Bank, as part of the Philadelphia Bank Campaign.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA...A recent meeting of the university trustees was accompanied by a protest of more than 125 students and faculty calling for immediate and total divestment. The protest attracted significant media attention, which included a front-page article in the Philadelphia Enquirer. Activists have also protested the school's deposits in First Pennsylvania National Bank, which subsidized the sale of 53,000 artillery shells to South Africa (via the Space Research Corp.).

For a more complete report on campus actions—write or call for a student movement newsletter (bi-monthly) from: Josh Nessen, Student Coordinator, American Committee on Africa, 198 Broadway, New York, NY 10038; (212) 962-1211. Fall issue available now.
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