Rhodesia Becomes Zimbabwe
A Fragile Peace
A Cloudy Future
Front Cover: Zimbabwe, guerrillas return home to a delicate peace

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Looking to the Future

Fourteen years after a small handful of guerillas fired the first shots in a struggle to achieve the liberation of Zimbabwe, sufficient battles have been won for the freedom fighters to come in out of the bush and hills in the hope of starting to build the society they fought to achieve.

But their victory is not yet clearly established; the terms on which they return home place serious restrictions on their ability to carry through a fundamental restructuring of Zimbabwean society. Power is not yet in the hands of the Zimbabwean people—and the settlement now being implemented is designed by Britain and the Rhodesian settlers to constrict as tightly and as long as possible any transfer to the people of effective power.

Yet the struggle for Zimbabwe has been bravely fought. It seemed to be following a strategy which had achieved dramatic victories for the people of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau against Portuguese colonialism in the mid-seventies. Why now the apparent check in momentum?

The difficulties currently being confronted by Zimbabwe's liberation struggle bring into sharp focus issues that were more easily ignored in the brief euphoria that followed Portugal's retreat from Africa.

Victory against Portuguese colonialism had been achieved in armed guerilla struggles led by political movements which drew strength from the broad mobilization of peasant populations. It was often said that the enemy controlled the air, the movements the ground. Thus inside all three countries, liberated areas were achieved with elements of a real transfer of power—areas where the movement led the people in beginning the process of constructing an alternative society, within the context of a developing socialist political consciousness.

But activity and strength were always concentrated in the countryside—almost universally the towns were dominated and controlled by the Portuguese.

And despite the obvious similarities there were also profound differences in conditions within the three colonies—differences of culture, terrain and political history, and also of the extent of economic development, urbanization, and the degree of economic differentiation within the population. Such trends, as well as the non-Portuguese western economic involvement, were in general most clearly manifest in Angola.

All these factors had an impact on the political lives of MPLA and FRELIMO, and explain at least in part the Mozambican movement's greater ability to achieve mass unity within a single organization. Yet although anything more than a casual glance reveals crucial differences between the struggle in Angola and Mozambique, these were often ignored, at least by outside commentators.

Human beings are fond of looking for models. But despite the traditional saying, history, in fact, never repeats itself identically, despite obvious logical progressions. Thus Zimbabwe is different from both Mozambique and Angola—and no model of struggle can be neatly transferred from one place to another.

Recent Zimbabwean experience should prove a valuable reminder of this sometimes forgotten lesson to those concerned for southern Africa's liberation, at the same time serving to underscore problems about the nature of the struggle that still lies ahead.

As in Mozambique, so in Zimbabwe, any movement that sought change had to mobilize the peasantry. But it also had to operate inside an economy with extensive commercial agriculture, with significant portions of the population physically removed from the land and crowded into special reserves, and with an industrial economy which had produced considerable black urbanization and serious economic differentiation within the black population.

Far greater internal economic development in Rhodesia than in Mozambique, greater western and South African investment, also had their effect on the opposition to Zimbabwean liberation, making it tougher, stronger, more rooted than the Portuguese, and providing it with very determined external allies.

Considerable peasant mobilization was achieved in Zimbabwe—as witnessed by the consistent popular support for the guerrillas. But there appears to date to have been little if any parallel mobilization manifested in the towns and mines—a potentially serious weakness in an economy where these areas constitute real centers of power.

A second problem raised in relying heavily on the guerilla warfare strategy in the face of a powerful antagonist is the potential vulnerability of the movement to secondary pressure. Both SWAPO and the Patriotic Front have seen supportive host countries like Angola, Mozambique and Zambia attacked with increasing ferocity by Rhodesia and South Africa. Such attacks have differed quantitatively and qualitatively from Portuguese incursions into Tanzania in the days of that country's support for FRELIMO, and raise serious questions about the ability of any southern African state to provide significant shelter for large scale liberatory forces.

A third question inevitably presented by the current Zimbabwean situation relates to the issue of political unity. Any lack of unity in Zimbabwean forces is many times multiplied in contemporary South African ranks. Explanations which look only to personality and ethnic rivalries will miss the most important element—black Zimbabwe or South Africa can no longer be classed as even crudely economically homogeneous. Future healthy political growth may thus require an intensification of political differentiation—or at least a clearer explanation of the basis on which alliances are being made than the broad, race-related groupings of the past.

All this is not to say that nothing has been won in Zimbabwe. But it is certain that the biggest struggles probably still lie ahead even for Zimbabweans, and that the problems they will have to confront are those that will face black South Africans even more intensively as they move to seize power over their own future.

Jennifer Davis
Food Crisis in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau

With drought newly afflicting the Sahel region, affected countries including Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau are appealing for substantial emergency food aid for 1980. So far, international responses to the appeals launched in late 1979 remain far short of needs.

Drought has become chronic in the Cape Verde group, where the 1978 rains were the first in twelve years. The PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde), which has administered the island nation since the achievement of independence in 1975, has worked steadily to cope with the twin problems of water and jobs. With substantial international assistance, the government has employed large numbers of persons who were forced by drought off the land in schemes to entrap water when it does fall, to discover and tap underground water sources, to stop erosion and expand irrigation. By 1979, over 5100 acres were under irrigation, and 650,000 trees had been planted.

With these measures, international aid and money sent by Cape Verdeans residents in Europe and the United States, the government has been able to ward off famine and even improve living conditions. But the 1978 rains were inadequate, and the corn crop failed again. There was a 70,000 ton shortfall that year, and in 1979 the drought was back in full force—virtually all non-irrigated crops were lost. And again for 1980 a food crisis looms.

Guinea-Bissau, which is located on the mainland, is considered much richer agriculturally and has had less occasion to call for food assistance. As drought again enveloped the Sahel last year, however, Guinea-Bissau found itself with a 40 percent shortfall in basic food grains. Now, in order to insure a daily ration to both its urban and rural population in 1980, the country needs to import over 57,000 tons of cereals.

Like Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau is governed by the PAIGC. The party’s founder, Amilcar Cabral, who was assassinated by Portuguese agents on January 20, 1973, began his career as an agronomist, and the party organization has always stressed the importance of agricultural development and food self-sufficiency.

Cooperatives have been encouraged and have scored some notable successes. Under PAIGC leadership, agricultural exports grew meeting 70 percent of import costs by 1977 as compared with 9 percent in 1974. Yet since 1977 the return to drought has meant insufficient harvests for food, export, or processing at the new Cumere agro-industrial complex. Until this year at least the rural population has had enough food, with imports needed mainly for the towns. Now even the rural areas need help, and lacking adequate exchange reserves, the nation must for the present rely on donors.

Angola Re-Shuffle

Angola’s defense minister, “Iko” Carreira, has been quietly removed from his position on the political bureau of MPLA. Carreira is one of MPLA’s earliest members, and he was one of the first to participate in the guerrilla struggle against the Portuguese. He led MPLA’s army during the war in 1975-76, and he has been defense minister since Angola became independent.

The move is the most significant government re-shuffle in a year, but the only explanation to emerge from Angola so far comes from ANGOP, the government news agency. ANGOP announced that Carreira had been sent abroad for “a further course of study.” ANGOP gave no further details, but added that Carreira would retain his post as defense minister.

Some long-time observers of the MPLA are skeptical. It has been suggested that Carreira has really been ousted from his posts, and that he may have left Angola for political reasons. Why? Some believe that Carreira has been removed because he is a mulatto. The attempted coup against the late president Agostinho Neto in 1977 revealed a strong current of anti-mulatto and anti-white sentiment within MPLA that may not have disappeared altogether.

British—Rhodesian Violations Threaten Ceasefire

Just before press time, we received the following information via cable from Sister Janice McLaughlin, who is working in Zimbabwean refugee camps in Mozambique. Sister Janice reports that, in flagrant violation of the Rhodesian cease fire agreement, on January 12 the Rhodesian airforce bombed areas of northeast Rhodesia. Lord Soames, the British governor in Salisbury, has also officially deployed 16,000 auxiliaries—members of the private army originally recruited by Bishop Abel Muzorewa—to counteract guerrilla influence in rural areas. Sister Janice says that this deployment has sent more refugees headed for Mozambique.

Under the agreement, the refugees should be going home. But Sister Janice reports that the authorities in Salisbury are claiming that cholera has broken out in the Mozambican refugee camps and are therefore seeking to restrict the refugees return. The claims of cholera are disputed by World Health Organization officials on the scene. Officials of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees are also protesting the decision by the provincial commissioner in Umtali, on the Mozambique border, to refuse refugees permission to enter a reception center at the Umtali showground. The showground, it seems, is in a white-only part of town.

From other reliable sources, we have received reports that as many as 4000 South African troops—ten times the number that have been reported in the US press—may be deployed in units in various parts of Rhodesia. One of those units, sources say, is stationed at Victoria Falls on the Zambian border.

Rural Police Station Attacked

Three guerrillas attacked the police station in the small town of Soekmekaar in the northeastern Transvaal province of South Africa, on January 4. In spite of an intense search by police, aided by the all-white paramilitary commandos, the men escaped. The Soekmekaar attack, described by the black-run Sunday Post as “the seventh guerilla attack in South Africa since the Soweto uprising in 1976,” left one black constable wounded. Two police were killed during a similar assault in November on the Orlando police station in Soweto, and one died during an attack on the Moroka police station in the same township in May. Police say no one has been arrested in either incident, and a sergeant who had been jailed as a suspect following the earlier attack later escaped.

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Tactics for Change in Southern Africa—A View from Mississippi

Western proposals for majority rule in Zimbabwe and Namibia rely heavily on electoral process. Black American experience in the South indicates the pitfalls in this route to liberation.

United League President Skip Robinson (on left), was arrested several times on election day while trying to prevent harassment and intimidation of Black voters.

“By law and custom blacks... were allowed to hold only certain jobs, mainly as servants. Initially education was denied to them; later schools for blacks were kept separate and inferior to the white schools. Similarly, the right to vote was initially denied to blacks and, once they had achieved that right, thousands of tricks were used to prevent them from exercising that right.”

A drowsy or distracted member of the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee could easily have listened to those sentences in a petition on Namibia last November without even realizing they were part of an historical analogy. But they were. They described not Namibia in 1979 but the southern United States prior to the civil rights movement.

The analogy is as irresistible as the differences are irreducible. Over the years, blacks in South Africa have drawn on the writings and experiences of the American civil rights and black power movements for ideas and inspiration. Over the same years, American politicians, both black and white, have drawn on the history of civil rights struggles to lecture South African whites on the need for change and South African blacks on the need for moderation.

If the lectures have not been enthusiastically received, it is hardly surprising. While considerably impressed and influenced by the theories and spirit of such American black leaders as Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael, blacks in South Africa also remain acutely aware of those irreducible differences. Most of all, as one member of the SASO executive wrote in 1970, they see an enormous distinction between being an oppressed minority and an oppressed majority. “The Afro-Americans accept that they will never be in a position to change the system in America,” a paper delivered to the SASO executive after study of works by Carmichael stated. “Whereas... purely from a consideration of who we are, we realize that it is we who must be allowing others to participate in our system.”

South Africa’s white rulers, undoubtedly with the same glaring differences on their minds, have ridiculed analogies as preposterous. But they haven’t managed to do away with them. Late last year, for example, assistant NAACP director Michael Meyers, speaking on behalf of the International League for Human Rights, presented a petition on Namibia to the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly. Meyers used an account of the role played by the federal government in the southern United States to argue for “a strong and determined UN role in the elections process in Namibia.”

“We believe that a number of important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the civil rights movement in the American South,” Meyers stated. The lesson Meyers pressed upon the UN committee was the fact that “true progress in black registration and voting only came about in the American South with the introduction of supervisions and control from outside.” In Namibia, he urged, the UN would have to provide that “supervision and control.”

Meyers didn’t mention certain other lessons that could be extracted from developments in the southern US—lessons that could prove highly instructive to both sides in the mounting struggle for southern African liberation. For observations during a recent visit to the heart of the region confirm that whites in the southern US have relinquished little of their power and have devised effective strategies to ensure that they won’t be forced to do so anytime soon.

Mississippi Revisited

Just a week before Meyers presented his petition at the UN, the state of Mississippi was conducting its elections. For blacks in the state, the results marked a major stride forward... along a road that still stretches a very long way ahead. In a state where official census figures say blacks make up nearly half the population (and where many blacks suspect that they are really the majority) 17 blacks were elected to the state legislature—out of a total of 174.

More than fourteen years after passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, hailed as the crowning achievement of the American civil rights movement, whites retain a firm grip on political and economic power in the state which has by far the highest percentage of
In SPECIAL 4 SOUTHERN AFRICA/FEBRUARY 1980 blacks in the nation.

Petty apartheid—US style—has more or less disappeared, although activists in Holmes County, just fifty miles north of the Mississippi state capital, point out that signs designating separate “white” and “colored” waiting rooms at a local medical clinic only came down last year. But if far-sighted planners in Pretoria want to see how the signs can come down without bringing drastic changes in the realities of power, they need look no further than Mississippi. For the fact is, as civil rights activist Julian Bond told a conference in Mississippi during November, “Black Mississippians and black Americans are worse off in 1979 than they were in 1964.”

And in Mississippi, as in the rest of the country, there are still two societies, one black one white, separate and unequal.

District Manipulation

A graphic example of this fact was presented by long-time black Mississippi activist Henry Kirksey in describing the election district in which he ran for the state Senate in November. “At one end of my district,” Kirksey explained, “you have precincts that are 95 and 96 percent black. At the other end is a precinct that is 100 percent white. The median black income in the district is $3000 a year. The media white income is $9000. The average black voter in the district has completed eight years of schooling. The average white has completed more than twelve years.”

Inclusion of two such distinct populations in one election district didn’t happen simply by accident. Kirksey calculates that any effort to draw lines around “compact and homogeneous districts... would unavoidably result in at least 30 to 40 percent of the districts having a black majority.” For fourteen years after passage of the Voting Rights Act, he battled in the courts to reapportion the state along those lines (and replace a system which made it virtually impossible for any black candidate to win a seat in the legislature). A month after a special court decided in favor of a plan based on Kirksey’s work, a higher court issued its own plan, carving up the state into new districts. 

“People have called us and mentioned that a white person offered to pay for their groceries and give them a ride home,” Sister Beverly Weidner reported. “White candidates raised a lot of money in this county, but they didn’t put up a single poster with it, they didn’t buy time on the radio with it. You can’t tell me they raised the money and didn’t spend it.”

United League President Alfred “Skip” Robinson voiced similar charges at the League’s headquarters in Holly Springs. “They were giving families $50 not to vote and then they had people waiting out in front of the polls with lists to see if they tried to come and vote anyway.”

Robinson’s claims sounded entirely plausible to two reporters who had been harangued for several minutes on a nearby street corner the day before the elections. When he had finished telling them that meddling reporters were the only source of trouble in Holly Springs, their middle-aged white antagonist continued on his way to the local liquor store. A few minutes later, he emerged with several cases of whiskey—in pints, a useful denomination of payment if not of consumption.

Tally of the vote and election aftermath: While much of the rest of the state has followed the rest of the country into the voting-machine age, Marshall County still relies on paper ballots and on the highly subjective perceptions of the election commission members who count them. While tallying up November’s returns, for instance, white members of the Marshall County election commission, who had always been sticklers for throwing out ballots that used “x” marks instead of checks, suddenly started pushing for a liberal interpretation of the rules when it came to a white write-in candidate. They insisted on counting anything that remotely resembled her name, regardless of spelling or of where it had been written on the ballot. They prevailed because one of the three black members of commission changed his vote and sided with them, reportedly after spending half an hour closeted with the county clerk.

That incident highlighted what Robinson called “our second big job” in the aftermath of the elections—“keeping an arm around the people who were elected to see if they function right.”

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Censored:
A Nuclear Conspiracy

"I found this book extremely interesting, but what astonishes me is the lack of reviews I have seen in the English press. I think I have only seen one. Is there an explanation for this?"

—Graham Greene on The Nuclear Axis

A funny thing happened to The Nuclear Axis on the way to the market. Nobody heard about it.

This is particularly unfortunate, because The Nuclear Axis concerns a highly explosive subject: how the West helped South Africa develop a nuclear bomb.

The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa was written by Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers and published simultaneously in Great Britain and the US in July 1978.

Using government documents provided to the authors by members of the African National Congress and anti-apartheid activists in West Germany, the book makes a solid case that West Germany, with help from the US, Great Britain, France, Israel, Iran, and Brazil, collaborated with South Africa on the construction of a uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba, South Africa. This plant has permitted South Africa to build its own nuclear weapons, evidence of which became public this past fall with the satellite sensing of a nuclear blast in the Indian Ocean off the southern coast of South Africa.

When reviewed, the book has been favorably treated. Le Monde Diplomatique called the study "the most comprehensive study of South Africa's nuclear program from the very start." The Library Journal said the book's documentation is "thorough," and the Los Angeles Times added that the documents "speak for themselves, and they depict West Germany rapidly and clandestinely constructing nuclear reactors and weaponry, and they show that the US winks at the growth of a nuclear-industrial-military complex."

But reviews have been few and far between. Almost as sensational as the story the book reveals has been the story of the book since its publication a year and a half ago. Stated simply, The Nuclear Axis has faced a near-total press blackout in West Germany, Britain, the US, and France—the nations where public knowledge could have some impact on the policies of the governments that have collaborated with Pretoria. Deliberate Blackout

That press blackout is the subject of a study by one of the book's authors, Barbara Rogers, which was submitted to the International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, a project of UNESCO, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Southern Africa has obtained a copy of that study, which documents the overwhelming lack of coverage of The Nuclear Axis in the Western press and examines some possible explanations for what appears even at first glance to be more than a remarkable coincidence.

Publication in the US was met with complete silence from the press. The New York Times was on strike at the time, but on the day of publication the Washington Post did file a request with The Guardian in London, with which the Post has an arrangement for exchanging news stories for its story on the book. Unhappily, The Guardian—despite the presence of half a dozen Guardian reporters at the press conference at which the publication of the book was announced, despite the commission of a news story on the book two weeks in advance of the publication date, despite the belief of its reporters, according to Rogers, that the book contained information of major importance, and despite the actual preparation for publication in The Guardian of more than one article—made no mention of the book or the press conference on the morning following publication.

Nor therefore, did the Washington Post. The Post's request did prompt the editors of The Guardian to run a story the following day, but news momentum had been lost, and the Post never mentioned the book in print. The Guardian's editors never explained why they killed the story in the first place.

With the single exception of the Los Angeles Times, no American newspaper of any significant circulation or prestige has covered or reviewed this book, despite its publication by Times Books, which is owned by the New York Times. And no news story out of London reached print in the US press.

Rogers attributes this to the suggestions made by Foreign Office officials to reporters that they downplay the story. It was an issue, these officials made clear to American journalists who inquired about the story, that the British government preferred not to have discussed in public. Rogers indicates that many American reporters permanently stationed in London rely on background press briefings by such officials, who can be very uncooperative when articles embarrassing to the British government are published. Thus reporters are susceptible to pleas from officials to kill a story.

Sudden Death

In Great Britain, The Nuclear Axis has not been as completely ignored, but when it has been overlooked, the cases have been more shocking. Most incredible has been the treatment by the prestigious Sunday Times, which offered a large amount of money before publication for exclusive world-wide feature rights to the book. The Sunday Times put a top writer on the story who confirmed the research done by the authors and added some new detail, particularly as a result of interviews in West Germany. The Sunday Times also investigated, with the help of some British government agencies, the background of the authors to make certain that the story had not been planted by the Soviet Union. A lengthy article was prepared for publication, and the editors of the Sunday Times approved the article several months before the book itself was published.

But as publication date approached, the Sunday Times' article still hadn't appeared. Finally, on the date of publication, July 26, 1978, a senior representative of the Sunday Times telephoned the book's British publisher to say that the article had been dropped. It "did not hold together," the representative said, in direct contrast to the paper's earlier enthusiasm for the material. With that, believes Rogers, the channels to worldwide distribution of the information were closed. All inquiries about feature rights had been referred to the Sunday Times; the publisher had not made alternative plans, and ironically, an offer from the BBC had been dropped when the authors made the deal with the Sunday Times.

Rogers believes that the paper could have told the authors weeks before publication date that the story wasn't worth printing. No representative of the paper has given any explanation of why it had to wait until the last minute to withdraw from the deal. In Rogers's opinion, "the paper could have told the authors weeks before publication date that the story wasn't worth printing. No representative of the paper has given any explanation of why it had to wait until the last minute to withdraw from the deal. In Rogers's opinion, "the paper could have told the authors weeks before publication date that the story wasn't worth printing."
A Delicate Peace

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Despite a negotiated ceasefire and preparations for elections, serious tensions in Zimbabwe still threaten to disrupt the transition to majority rule.

With just a little more than a month until new elections in Zimbabwe, two developments of major importance are likely to shape the character of the election campaign and its outcome. Robert Mugabe appears to have decided—there's been no official announcement yet—that ZANU has the strength to win the election on its own and that it will run as a separate political party from ZAPU. At the same time, ZANU and the British governor, Lord Soames, appear set on a collision course. There are signs that the British are considering banning ZANU from the election and that could lead to the resumption of war.

If ZANU's headquarters in Maputo, Mozambique have been officially silent on the question of whether there will be unity within the Patriotic Front during the election campaign, individual ZANU members have been outspoken in their assertion that there won't be. ZANU representatives, from Salisbury to New York, have made it clear that there will be separate ZANU and ZAPU slates when Zimbabweans go to the polls from February 27 to 29. "We expect to fight the election as separate parties although we will collaborate by speaking from common platforms," said a senior ZANU representative in Salisbury. "After the election, even if we in ZANU win an outright majority, which we expect to do, we will form a coalition with ZAPU, allocating cabinet offices on the basis of the results."

Unity Urged

ZANU predictions of victory might seem plausible under the best of circumstances, but with ZANU and the British more and more in open conflict, many observers are worrying about the wisdom of running separately. Not the least of those observers are the presidents of the front-line African states. Alarmed at recent developments in Rhodesia, the front-line presidents met in Beira, Mozambique on January 10, and among their conclusions, which they made public in a communiqué, the presidents called for "unity in action within the Patriotic Front." Mozambique's President Samora Machel, who has been ZANU's strongest supporter, has spoken publicly several times—including at the funeral of ZANU military commander Josiah Tongogara—in favor of unity.

The front-line presidents also criticized the British, who they accuse of "blocking the carrying out of the Lancaster House accords in their entirety." Several of the charges made by the presidents echoed charges from ZANU itself: the British refusal to force the withdrawal of South African troops inside Rhodesia, and the British failure to restrain the activities of the auxiliaries, those military forces loyal to Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

British Violations

Mugabe himself, in a letter to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, has accused the British of these "flagrant violations," adding to the list the British authorization of the use of Rhodesian security forces against guerrillas who have not gathered at designated assembly points.

Lord Soames has shown himself to be particularly immune to such criticism, and some of his statements are almost unbelievable. He has completely dismissed the issue of South African troops—which have been variously estimated by American reporters at 300, by British reporters at 2,000, and by ZANU and Mozambican authorities at 3,000—by saying in typical upper-class British style, "It's a bit like the chambermaid's baby. It is a baby, but it's a very small one."

As for the activities of the auxiliaries, the British refuse to take ZANU's criticism seriously, because, say British officials, Mugabe's fighters continue to infiltrate across the border from Mozambique and because ZANU, they say, has sent a number of non-combatants to the guerrilla assembly points. "It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that their objective is to carry out intimidation during the election campaign," said a British spokesman, who added that Soames found it "particularly hard to be criticized by one of the party leaders in view of the performance of some of his supporters."

The same could probably be said of Mugabe's attitude toward criticism from Soames. Both ZANU and ZAPU officials find it extraordinary that Soames has permitted the South Africans to stay, particularly because the London agreement specifically called for South African troop withdrawal. ZANU officials maintain that the South Africans are not only in Rhodesia to guard the railroad bridge at the southern border with South Africa, as the British have maintained. South African troops have also been deployed along the Mozambique border, say ZANU officials, and some units are included in the Rhodesian security forces. That charge appears to be corroborated by an item in late December in the Johannesburg Star that a South African serving with the Rhodesian air force died when his helicopter crashed.

The British have permitted the South Africans to remain, most observers on the scene believe, in order to bolster the fragile confidence of Rhodesia's white population. That decision could end up being at the expense of Mugabe and ZANU. As the conflict between ZANU and the British becomes more heated, the British hint more and more openly that they might prohibit ZANU from running in the election. That move could easily lead to more war.

State of Emergency

As if to underscore that possibility, Soames has extended the state of emergency that has existed in Rhodesia for the last fourteen years for another six months. The emergency decree was to have expired January 25. Its extension will mean that the elections will take place under conditions where censorship, martial law, and detention without trial are possible.

Criticism of the British has not only come from the guerrillas. British Commonwealth commissioners, the Catholic Commission

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Tragic Death of Guerrilla Leader

In one of fate’s bitter twists, Josiah Magama Tongogara, guerrilla leader and chief of defense of the ZANU wing of the Patriotic Front, was killed in a motor accident in Mozambique on December 27, one day before the ceasefire that had just been negotiated at the London Lancaster House conference came into effect.

Tongogara, a key figure in the organization of the war that laid the basis for that settlement, had crossed the border into Rhodesia clandestinely many times as he directed the guerrilla effort. This time Zimbabweans were already planning a huge welcome when stunned crowds heard of his death.

Widely respected as a military strategist in both his own and the ZAPU wing of the front, Tongogara was also a strong proponent of complete Patriotic Front unity.

According to commentator David Martin of the Observer, before leaving London at the conclusion of the Lancaster House conference, Tongogara and the commanders of Joshua Nkomo’s ZIPRA military force had agreed that integration of their armies would begin immediately at five of the sixteen assembly points designated for front guerrillas under the agreement. This would lay the foundation for a Zimbabwe national army and help to allay fears that the two guerrilla forces might become embroiled in a civil war.

Tongogara had carried his belief in the need for political change into practice in many spheres—one of the most striking of these being his integration of women into ZANU’s active fighting force. Sister Janice McLaughlin, who was in London during the protracted settlement conference, tells how consistently he urged women to take up their responsibilities and rights in the struggle:

“One evening some leaders of ZANU women’s groups in Britain came to see him and they discussed the role of women in the struggle until 2 a.m. Tongogara spoke highly of the women commanders in the ZANLA army. He pointed to traditional customs which held women back and told the women they must be prepared to challenge their parents.

“He also asked them if they had ever taken the initiative and told a man that they loved him. When they protested and said a woman couldn’t do that, he told them they wouldn’t be liberated until they could.”

Josiah Tongogara had spent most of his life struggling for Zimbabwe’s political liberation. Born of a poor family in Selukwe in southern Rhodesia, he was much influenced by its own tradition of resistance to oppression. His grandfather had refused to move when the colonizers wanted his land. “We’ll stay,” he told the settlers, “even if you have to kill us.” The name Tongogara epitomizes that spirit. It means, “we’ll just stay even if there are difficulties.”

When Southern Africa’s editor spoke with Tongogara in Zambia in 1974, he stressed two things: that impatience and short-cuts would win no fundamental changes in the life of Zimbabwe’s people, and that simply labelling all whites as evildoers was no basis for designing a new society.

His death is a serious blow to Zimbabwe, but he leaves behind a tradition on which others can build a new society.

One of the things that league did was to speak about the land at the time.

Yes, and the way the people were being treated, even the white people did not possess enough livestock, cattle and other things, which impressed us very much at that time.

What does it mean, the land, for you, as a guerrilla, not as a leader?

Well, let me first of all tell you that I learned much of my politics from my parents. As a kid I used to listen to my parents talking about the shortage of land. Whenever given a piece of land they would complain: it’s barren land, land which is not fertile, that most of the good land was given to the white patriates. So land to me is derived from my background. It’s very important, and even when we started the armed struggle we made a scientific investigation among the masses according to their national grievances, and land comes on top. Anyone who joins the armed struggle, is joining on the basis of land. We are deprived of our land, so it’s very important.

But we are speaking about how you became a guerrilla. How did you join?

My background is really very com-
ZIMBABWE

As young as twenty years I had already become a chairman of a ZAPU district, in Zambia then, not in Rhodesia. So I was in charge of a big province where we had more than 70,000 Zimbabweans. And I was in charge in my youth. When in 1963 we decided to change our approach to the political conflict in Zimbabwe, and formed ZANU, I became again the first chairman of the ZANU [section] in Zambia in 1963. I had a duty to go for military training in order to enforce the idea of direct confrontation, that is, facing the enemy right in the bush. In 1965 I left Zambia for my military training, and did nine months training in Tanzania.

And then the party decided that I should go to Peking for specialization. In 1966 I went to Peking—well why don't you ask what did you go to specialize in, I know you want to ask this question! But they sent me to specialize mainly in political organization, mobilization.

When was the first time you went back to Zimbabwe as a guerrilla?

I returned at the end of '66, October, and was appointed the commander of the ZANLA forces, in charge of reconnaissance and intelligence. From there I was given a very hard task. I was posted to areas where they felt we should start armed struggle, to go and really make a thorough investigation. I was then posted to the northern province, close to our entry points, from Zambia into Zimbabwe. I spent much of my time along the border and inside Zimbabwe.

When was your first contact with the enemy?

It was in 1967. What happened was that, after having been satisfied that comrades could enter into the country—although the area had natural barriers, the Zambezi, and we had to use dug-out boats to cross—each time we had comrades going in I would lead them, because I knew of all the entry points in the area. I would take them from Zambia to their operational areas, and then leave them with instructions and explain to them the situation around the area. One of my first encounters was near Binga in northern Zimbabwe. After we had crossed the border at night, at about 9:30 pm, we walked about fifteen miles inside, and didn't realize that the enemy had tracked our footprints, because we had been there a week before, to counter-check the situation. So we happened on an ambush at dawn; we only had a hundred bullets.

What was your reaction?

The first five seconds it was very terrible, I couldn't realize what was happening. I only found myself lying, and thought probably I was shot, but later on I discovered I had not even a slight wound. We had about 10-15 minutes of fire, and then we quelled the enemy fire. And we proceeded. That was my first encounter.

When was your last contact?

March 17 [1979]—I won't forget that one—I was wounded in the arm. I was listening to BBC till 8. At about 8:15 I heard some sound, then I realized that the enemy was coming. I tried to tighten my shoes, but the enemy had already approached and was bombing. So we all took position and started fighting. We were kept in that encirclement until about 2:30 p.m.

And what was the result?

The result is that I'm here. If we hadn't succeeded I wouldn't be here. In fact I should say the enemy suffered. There were around 12 planes, and from my recollections, half of them remained there.

What is the present military situation in the country?

Well, on our side we look at the situation inside as excellent. We have made a lot of progress. This 1979, we termed it the year of the people's storm... the central committee decided that we should try to fulfill the transformation of the war—transforming purely military exercise into a people's exercise, that is giving the people the task to fight, turning the war into the people's war. In this we have succeeded.

What does the London conference mean for you?

We treat London as our second front. We have the home front, which is the front for confrontation, and then we have the London front, which we term a peaceful front. In the home front, whenever we go to the battle, you put on your uniform, get your kit bag and your gun and everything. Now in London you put on your suit and a tie and then you go and talk. So it's a peaceful front. But the fact is that this conference is a product of what is happening on the home front. What we are discussing here should reflect what is happening at the front. What I mean is that what is happening at the front in the way of achieving peace.

The British are saying that you did not come here as the winners of the war. What is your comment?

The British can never say we came here as the winners of the war. We have the home front, which is the front in the way of achieving peace. We look at the whole situation in Zimbabwe that way, that we are fighting in order to have independence for the people of Zimbabwe. If the Rhodesians had accepted this principle of independence in the 1960's they wouldn't have taken up arms. So we are not fighting for the sake of fighting. We are fighting in order to liberate Zimbabwe. Any form which can bring independence, we are not opposed to it. This is the reason why we are here [in London]. If the Lancaster talks can produce peace, independence for the people of Zimbabwe, this is exactly why we are in the bush.

You are in London, and your leaders have been saying that you will run for the elections, as one party. You have ZAPU and ZANU—how will you do it?

We don't talk of ZAPU and ZANU at the moment. We are a Patriotic Front, the Patriotic Front, which embraces ZAPU and ZANU, and we have formed this not because we were going to go to Geneva, or Malta, Dar es Salaam, and London. We formed it in order to achieve national unity. So there is no way of thinking that the Patriotic Front is there for London. It is not there for London. It is there in order to bring unity for the people of Zimbabwe.

So you will run the election as only one party.

Sure, we are seeking an agreement under the Patriotic Front and we will go back as the Patriotic Front. That's all.

And do you hope to win the elections?

It's something that is natural. I don't have to hope.

How do you see the transitional period in Zimbabwe?

The way I visualize the transitional period is that it will be a peaceful period where lost children will be meeting with their parents who have missed them for years, joining hands to enjoy their freedom, where people will be rejoicing over their victory. So it must be a peaceful period.

What is your reaction to the Zimbabweans who are in the regime's forces?

Once the bad elements and the mercenaries are pulled out, what will remain in the Rhodesian army are those true sons of Zimbabwe, black and white, who want to see peace. We will join hands and say "A luta continua."

You are prepared even to rebuild an army in Zimbabwe according to the conditions you have laid down?

We want to create an army for Zimbabwe, of the people of Zimbabwe, irrespective of their color or their old inclination. We are going to produce a new Zimbabwe from every Zimbabwean who is
committed to seeing peace in Zimbabwe, to seeing stability.

You, guerrillas, do you have contact with the farmers?

Oh yes, we have contacts. In much of the area we have covered there are farmers, and in those areas we have committees and some of the farmers have joined the committees, but mainly the blacks. You could not expect the whites to do so. Some of the white farmers have sympathized with us and given us some help.

What kind of help?

Without mentioning names of the farmers, if you go to their farm and ask for food they give you food. You ask directions, they give you directions and tell you, "the security forces are there. Go this way." We have taken these white farmers as our allies because they want to see that the people of Zimbabwe are free. Just to give you one example, we have gone across to some black farmers in Zimbabwe to get food. He says, "OK, he'll get some food. He runs to the enemy to report you—black, like myself! You go to a white farmer and he gives you food and tells you where the security forces are. Who is your real ally there? The white one who saves your life. I think they are as equal as my Zimbabwean in the bush.

They will receive special treatment after independence?

Not special treatment. They will have that special treatment which is given to every Zimbabwean.

What about the farmers who do not give you support?

Some of these farmers who don't give us support, and some of the soldiers who oppose us, they think they must fight to maintain white supremacy. But once a government of the people's choice is there, I see the possibility of those people changing their mind. Once they accept the reality, there is no reason to go round and say, "You don't support us." You might as well say everyone who used to be in the barracks of the enemy is our enemy. I have got the facts from Zimbabwe. Some of the young men in the [government] army—blacks—have joined not because they have got conviction, but because, say, one wants to get married and hasn't got the money, or he wants to buy a suit, or food and he hasn't got money. What does he do? He goes to the army because it's the only job open to him. That is not commitment.

You will allow the white farmers to produce and work on their land?

We will allow every Zimbabwean to run what he's supposed to and irrespective of his color. We are trying to destroy this idea of race which we think is very dangerous. Every Zimbabwean is a Zimbabwean, regardless of color.

What do you ask from the white farmers who want to remain in the country to work?

We are going to ask those people to realize that now a new Zimbabwe has been created and the struggle is not yet over. We should enter into the struggle for reconstruction to make Zimbabwe into a flourishing country for us all.

It will be an anti-racial society?

Yes it will be an anti-racial society.

The South Africans have threatened to intervene in the country. If they do not do so, what will your relations be with the South Africans?

If it doesn't intervene, it would be wrong to treat South African as our main enemy.

"We are trying to destroy this idea of race which we think is very dangerous."

We will put it in its place as it is put by other OAU countries. We will still talk to them because they will have done nothing to us.

Do you think the South Africans will invade your country if you win the elections?

This is a foolish idea for the South Africans. If South Africans invaded Zimbabwe who is going to be killed? Zimbabweans. Not ZANLA forces, not PF forces. The ordinary people will be caught in the cross-fire, because we live with the people. We have transformed this into a People's War. And if the British are going to back this, the world must see that the British are the real murderers in this exercise. If the British are prepared to endorse that plan, let me assure them they will learn a lesson. The Zimbabwean people will not lay down their arms, will not succumb to what the British want. We will fight them to the last Zimbabwean. We are prepared for that.

$Smell of Profit in the Air$

International business and finance has high hopes for a "new Zimbabwe" free of economic sanctions. The Confederation of British Industries (CBI), for example, has sent out a "reconnaissance team" in preparation for a full-scale trade mission in March or April. Britain's department of trade considers it likely that British exports to Zimbabwe will reach the $220 million mark within the next year.

To ensure a favorable investment climate, British industrialists helped raise more than $200,000 for Bishop Muzorewa's campaign in the April 1979 internal settlement election. The London Financial Times reports that the fund was established after a meeting of CBI company chairmen and overseas directorate staff, at which Muzorewa promised that as prime minister he would encourage foreign investment.

A similar fund is being raised for Muzorewa for the February elections. According to South African reports, millions of dollars are now pouring into Rhodesia to help the Bishop. America's Union Carbide, which has substantial interests in Rhodesia's chrome mining industry, is among those Western and South African donors already identified.

South African investors are also anxious about future opportunities in Zimbabwe. South African commerce already has an estimated $1.2 billion stake there, and this will likely grow quickly as a result of the cease-fire.

"Businessmen in this country," the Johannesburg Star reported in December, "are now poised to shore up the bulwark against the communist threat in the politically sensitive area with a new injection of free enterprise and expansion of their interests."

US corporations have been pushing for the lifting of sanctions for some time. US investments at the time of UDI totaled $57 million, 70-80 percent of which consisted of Union Carbide mining operations.

US breaches of international sanctions were formalized with the Byrd Amendment in 1971, which allowed commodities on the "strategic and critical materials" list, such as chrome, to be imported from Rhodesia. Mobil Oil and Caltex openly supplied oil to Rhodesia under their own brand names, presumably supplied by their refineries in South Africa.

Sanctions had blocked foreign accounts in Rhodesia, and the multinationals may now repatriate some of their newly-freed capital. Nevertheless, the enthusiasm with which the international business community greeted the lifting of sanctions indicates a strong interest in increasing investments in what it hopes will be a stable Zimbabwe.
Refugees Preparing for Home

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 220,000 Zimbabwean refugees in camps in Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana. According to the terms of the London agreement on Rhodesia, they are supposed to return to Zimbabwe before elections take place there at the end of February.

UN officials say that "spontaneous repatriation of refugees has already begun," primarily from Botswana. Meetings began in early January— involving the UN, the British, the Patriotic Front, and the front-line states—to plan the return of the refugees. But the problem is so vast that the parties have agreed, according to Klaus Feldmann of UNHCR, to divide the operation into two stages: before and after the elections. "It's likely that a majority of the refugees will be returning after the elections," Feldmann said.

Sister Janice McLaughlin is an American nun who worked for several years inside Rhodesia, and who will be working in the refugee camps in Mozambique as the UN attempts to organize repatriation to the new Zimbabwe. She visited some of those camps late last year, before the peace accord was signed. Her report follows.

Zimbabwe's refugees did not make the headlines like the boat people of Vietnam or the starving Cambodians. Even when their camps in Zambia and Mozambique were bombed, and they were brutally murdered, the rest of the world hardly heard about it.

Yet until the signing of the Rhodesia peace accord in London, they were the fastest growing group of refugees in the world. There were 150,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique, another 60,000 in Zambia and 20,000 in Botswana. These thousands of forgotten exiles have not only a story of hardship and material deprivation to tell, but also an heroic tale of self-reliance and determination. They are already building the new Zimbabwe in the refugee camps, which have become models for the future.

Matenje Camp in Mozambique's Tete Province is a striking example of the achievements that have been made under Patriotic Front leadership, despite endless problems. The headquarters for ZANU's educational programs, Matenje is the home of 3,000 students, 200 orphans and several hundred teachers. It also accommodates ZANU's teacher training center and research unit.

The day begins at 4:30 A.M. at Matenje—long before enemy planes flying in search of targets to attack, might disrupt activities. Freedom songs echo through the forest as the refugees exercise and march for several hours in the early morning mist before the sun rises.

Though they have had no breakfast, at 7:00 A.M. students and teachers march enthusiastically to their school in the forest. Matenje is one of eight ZANU schools in Mozambique that teach 23,000 students from Standard I through high-school. The classrooms are scattered among the rocks and in the shade of trees and bushes where students have built bamboo desks and benches. The classes are small, approximately 35 students per teacher, so there can be more personal interaction between the students and teachers. Each class has a large blackboard, which is carried carefully to and from the forest each day. Despite the scorching sun, students participate eagerly, answering questions and discussing issues.

Teaching methods stress involvement by the pupils rather than long lectures by the teachers. Group work and demonstration are encouraged. Because of the shortage of books, teachers rely heavily on the blackboards and students copy the lesson notes from the board into their individual notebooks. Students are very vocal and preface their answers with revolutionary slogans: "Pamberi ne chimerenga. Pamberi ne hondo. Pasi ne imperialism." ("Forward with the struggle. Forward with the war. Down with imperialism."

They study the usual subjects for primary and secondary school, but all the lessons are put in the context of the liberation struggle and their situation in the camps in Mozambique. ZANU, which is responsible for education, medical care, and develop-
Zimbabweans in Mozambique, trained in the camps they now have a vital role to play in building their new nation.

Zimbabweans have begun to produce its own textbooks. The first two in the series of Shona language books have been published and are being used. The title, "Svinurai"—which means "Open Your Eyes" or "Wake Up"—is more than symbolic and represents the political consciousness that is developing.

Not long ago, I sat in on many different classes at all grade levels. The political education lesson that week was "How to Combat Liberalism," and the teachers used mimeographed lesson notes prepared by the research unit. In one science class a student was presenting a lesson on climatic changes and had drawn pictures on the board to illustrate her explanation. Her classmates enjoyed asking very tough questions but failed to stump her. The agriculture class was studying terracing, accountability students were learning about debts and credits.

I was surprised to discover that most classes are conducted in English. The students also study Shona and Sindebele, but the Shona literature classes suffer from a shortage of books. Using the one or two books available per class, which had been brought by freedom fighters from schools inside Rhodesia, a student would read a paragraph from a Shona novel and then the teacher would ask the class questions about that passage.

Training Teachers

The teacher training course was also in session, and I spent a morning with the sixty participants involved in an intensive four-month course designed to prepare them for the new education system being created in the camps. They asked me difficult questions: "How does the American economic system affect the education system? Do students accept the system the way it is? Are there any revolutionary movements trying to bring about change in the United States? What's happened to the civil rights movement? Do the workers in America support the Zimbabwe struggle?"

At noon the refugees have their first meal of the day. It consists of sadza (stiff maize meal porridge) or rice and occasionally some vegetables or dried fish. Food is a major problem, though each camp has a garden where students grow vegetables to supplement their starchy diet. They have plans to raise chickens, rabbits, and pigs if they get the necessary funding. The UN World Food Program supplies the bulk of the food for the 150,000 refugees in Mozambique, but shipments are often late and there are shortages. Sometimes students go several days without eating.

Work in Progress

After lunch, the students engage in production. They were building new houses while I was there, which meant walking far into the forest to collect grass for the roofs, collecting bamboo poles for the walls and weaving reed mats for the walls. Older refugees from a nearby camp came to teach the children building skills and to supervise the construction. The girls had built the education and research office by themselves and were proud of their achievement. Traditionally, construction was a male monopoly and Shona women would not have been allowed to participate.

Some students work in the garden growing vegetables, others have responsibility for cooking the evening meal in big tin drums. Water had to be carried up a steep hill from a nearby river. All the tasks were distributed equally among the inhabitants. There were no full-time cooks or farmers, but everyone took turns so that all could attend class. Teachers were not exempt from manual labor—they were responsible for sanitation in the camps, a task which included keeping the pit latrines clean and building new ones when necessary.

Cultural activities are an essential part of the weekly schedule. Music, dance, and drama give the students an appreciation of their culture and history and provide an art form to convey the present political realities. The melodies are traditional but the words I heard referred to the internal settlement, the massacres in the refugee camps, the sacrifice and courage of the freedom fighters, and the aspirations and hopes of the people.

Mabel Mutasa, the cultural officer with whom I lived, guides the students in their activities, but they form their own groups and create their own songs, dances, and plays. One Sunday I was treated to an all-day, masterful performance. Even the small children joined in the dancing. A play, "Black Is Beautiful," was the climax of an unforgettable day—broken by a two-hour intermission to put out a forest fire!

The nights were unforgettable too. As soon as the sun went down the rats appeared. They would jump from the grass roofs onto the beds and play games on the top of the blankets. But after such exhausting days, even the rats couldn't keep us awake. There were many jokes about the growing rat population. The children had names for all the rats—and most of them were named after members of ZANU's Central Committee!

A more serious matter was the constant threat of attack by the Rhodesian security forces. The children had survived raids on schools at Nyazonia, Chimoio, and Gondola. For the first few months at Matenje, they lived in fear and would run to hide in the forest at the sound of a plane, cutting and scratching themselves on bushes and trees and going without food for several days. In almost every conversation I had at the camps, the refugees would mention that the enemy might come to kill them at any time and destroy everything.

Despite the danger, the poverty and lack of facilities and supplies, the refugee camps are places of hope and joy. They are in fact a form of liberated area where the new Zimbabwe is being built. The communal lifestyle, the policy of self-reliance, the new educational system are models for the type of social transformation needed after independence. The men, women, and children who have had this experience may play a vital role in restructuring society—serving as the nucleus of change—when they eventually return home. Their resettlement will be a first—and major—step in the creation of the new society.
Diary of a Missionary—Report From Inside Rhodesia

The following is a selection from the 1979 diary of a Christian missionary who lives in the Gwelo-Ft. Victoria area of Rhodesia. The missionary has spent more than fifteen years in Rhodesia and is well-qualified to observe the changes in the life of the local people under the recent conditions of guerrilla struggle. He indicates both the progress being made in popular participation in areas where the Patriotic Front could exert its influence, and also the constant harassment of the population by the Smith-Muzorewa government. Southern Africa obtained these excerpts from missionary sources in London.

Re: New structures set up by the ZANLA forces

- 23 July: One notices the improved appearance of the villages: clean-swept yards, newly thatched and plastered huts, freshly ploughed fields, vegetable gardens, etc. It is said that this is due to the establishment of committees of leaders (plus eight substitutes) in each village. Each member is responsible for a certain department (hygiene, education, etc.) Cooperation is greatly encouraged, e.g. payment of school fees for poorer members of the community.

- 11 August: A new structure of local government is being built up by the vakomana. (Vakomana is the Shona word for boys, the term used by local people for the freedom fighters.) In each line, a line committee is formed with each committee member being responsible for a certain department. Two to three lines elect a base committee which consists of a chairman, secretary, and treasurer, and their substitutes. This committee deals with all civil and criminal cases, contributions for the cause from the villages, etc.

The elections are conducted freely and the committee goes into any complaints thoroughly. The vakomana leave these matters to the committee. It is planned to form also a defense committee in which all the lines will be represented. Any activity for the development of the local population is encouraged as long as it is not tied to government: women’s clubs, adult literacy, cattle spraying.

Re: Action of the security forces and auxiliaries

- 17 May: Army collected people (about 400-500) and made them remove roadblocks. They were given no food and blankets, and kept in school overnight. Some severely beaten.

- 5 June: Army in helicopters attacked, killing five (one girl) and injuring fifteen, one mukomana, (guerrilla), the rest mujibas, (civilians).

- 19 June: Two land mine explosions. Twenty villages were burned down again. Others looted, people beaten up and some even shot two days afterwards. One, Mr. X, received a stomach wound one day afterwards in broad daylight when he wanted to go to help people affected. The wife of catechist Y was beaten so badly she is still in hospital. One man was shot through the chin and had been beaten badly. He showed me the wounds and said, “See what Bishop Muzorewa has done to me.” Nowadays especially the auxiliary forces are involved.

- 9 July: Security forces burnt down the huts of eight families after they took what they liked of the furniture, clothing, blankets, etc.

- 12 July: There was a land mine explosion on 8 June. The army took revenge on the residents nearby: the houses of four families burnt, granaries burnt, eight heads of cattle of headman killed, some people beat up. On 15 June another land mine incident on the same road. In retaliation 47 houses and 36 granaries were burnt.

- 13 July: In the early afternoon of Friday, 13 July, the security forces launched an air attack. It is so far the worst incident around here. Soldiers were dropped by parachutes and then supported by nine planes and helicopters. A circling spotter plane gave instructions to the people and to the ground forces, such as: “There is a woman coming from the river carrying water, surely for the Magandangas (bandits). Shoot her.” And they shot her. “You girls, don’t hide under the granary, surrender and hands up.” They did not follow those instructions, so one of them was hit by an incendiary device (napalm?) and killed, and the granary and sleeping room set on fire.

Two grade four boys (twins) who climbed up a tree were shot and killed. Those who were killed: two twins, married man and two children (nine and three years), man (eighteen years), married man, etc. (nine civilians, three guerrillas). Several people were brought to the hospital.

- 14 July: Auxiliaries took three girls, raped one.

- 18 July: Guard force made people pick cotton on white farm. In retaliation the vakomana attacked the farm.

- 23 July: There are reports about two other incidents in the southeast: on 16 July with three or four killed and one on 19 July where eighteen believed to have died.

- 8 August: Four shots, two at midnight, one in the back in the a.m. 95 homesteads burnt, men shot are Samuel, Kaston, Kota, and Maonda, all with families. Army raided another area nearby and arrested many.

- 13 August: Huts burnt after land mine explosion. Security forces rounded up many accused of being collaborators.

- 17 August: Security forces killed two vakomana, six civilians (including a girl who was in the field and a headman running from them). In the X area they burnt sixty houses, granaries, and cattle kraals.

- 30 August: Army camp attacked by the vakomana on 21 August. Army then shot three people in broad daylight, many villages were burnt in another incident. Soldiers took things from Mrs. M’s store.
Botha Visits Rumored

A speech made in New York late December by British Prime Minister Thatcher has prompted rumors in the South African press that she plans to meet soon with South African Prime Minister Botha.

Thatcher referred to "welcome changes in South Africa's domestic policies"—words greeted as "encouraging" by the South African press, which has also reported that Botha may soon visit France for talks with Giscard D'Estaing.

Nationalist party papers have been urging Botha to push against any door which has opened, if only a crack,—and suggest that a visit to Washington would be very useful.

Congressional Visits to South Africa

Recent congressional delegations to South Africa have given the Botha government a chance to "sell" its strategic and economic importance to the United States. Its latest trump card is the advanced coal gasification technology developed by SASOL, the para-statal oil from coal project, which already has one plant in operation.

In mid-January House Majority Leader Jim Wright of Texas led an energy investigating delegation which included 12 congressional representatives, on a trip that incorporated visits to the oil producing states of Nigeria and Saudi Arabia and a stop to check out the SASOL plants in South Africa. Wright is the second-ranking Democratic leader in the House and would be a major political "catch" for South Africa if he returned from his visit in a mood sympathetic to Pretoria's aims.

In the past Wright has advocated a compromise position on Rhodesian sanctions and opposed the immediate lifting of sanctions in June 1979. He also voted for legislation restricting Export Import Bank financing to South Africa in 1978.

Congressman Bill Gray, a member of the Black Caucus and the Africa subcommittee, took his first trip to Africa as a member of the Wright delegation. Although only a freshman, Gray is becoming an important advocate for majority rule. He made a special stop-off in Soweto and spent more time in Zimbabwe than the rest of the delegation.

Representative Jim Santini of Nevada, who sits on the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee which deals with energy legislation, also went to South Africa to see SASOL in January.

South Africa's promotion of its coal gasification plants is not new. Back in 1975 Representatives Richard Ichord and Harold Runnels and former Representative John Dent traveled to South Africa to see the SASOL operation. This was one of several trips supposedly funded by South African businessman Werner Ackerman, who was later revealed in the Muldergate scandal to have been operating as a front for South Africa's Information Department.

In 1979 Representative William Moorhead, who represents a coal-producing area in Pennsylvania, sent one of his staff members to South Africa. In the last year Moorhead has spearheaded a drive to subsidize the construction of new synthetic fuel plants in the US. While the $85 billion he advocated was cut back, Congress and the administration agreed to a more modest program that will produce oil and gas from coal. As part of Moorhead's plan, he successfully lobbied the Energy and State Departments to loosen restrictions on imports of technical data from SASOL's operation. The State of Kentucky is currently considering construction of a $3 billion plant based on SASOL technology.

Another senior House leader, Representative Melvin Price, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, went to South Africa in November, leading a delegation from his committee that also made stops in the Sudan, Nigeria and Tanzania. Like Jim Wright, Price has generally voted against open support for South Africa and Rhodesia, although he follows the conservative stance of the majority of his committee on military matters. The Price delegation visited the SASOL facilities in South Africa, as well as the Simonstown naval base. Ten of the 45 members of the Armed Services Committee have now travelled to South Africa, either in this latest group or in a 1975 trip by several Republican members.

Price's initial report on the trip echoed South Africa's propaganda. He stressed the critical importance of Africa's mineral deposits and the strategic importance of the Cape sea route. "In our flight ... up the coast to Dar es Salaam from South Africa," he reported, "we ... at times had six tankers under observation at the same time. This line of tankers, in the truest sense, is the jugular vein of the free world." Price was careful not to say anything in his report about his own views on South Africa. Instead he reported on South Africa's desire for an end to export restrictions and for cooperation with the US against Soviet influence in Africa. (A fuller Committee report on the trip was not yet available as we went to press.)

When asked by the Washington Post why an Armed Services Committee group was visiting a country against which the US has an arms embargo, Price replied that South Africa was important to US strategic interests, "... otherwise we wouldn't be here. Our visit is because of our interest in defense matters." One member of the delegation advocated loosening the arms embargo so as to cover only offensive weapons.

Both the Wright and Price delegation visits were funded by Congress.

Export Controls Continued

The Commerce Department lost out to the Department of State at the end of 1979 in an internal administration battle over whether the total ban on exports of US-origin goods and technology to the South African military and police would be weakened. President Carter informed Congress on December 29 that the only change in the South African regulations would be to permit sales of medicines and medical supplies "not primarily destined to military or police entities or for their use."

The executive branch first annual review of these controls and all other foreign policy controls worldwide was mandated by the Export Administration Act of 1979. Although the intent of the congressional committees which urged adoption of the bill was to reduce restrictions on US exports, changes in the South African controls were minimal. In addition to continuing the ban on sales to the military and police, which went into effect in February 1978, the President's decision also maintained the restriction on aircraft sales to civilians unless there is written assurance against military or paramilitary use, and on certain computers sold to the government which would be used to support the policy of apartheid.

Some congressional opposition to the continuation of South African controls is expected. Representative Dan Quayle, a young conservative Republican from Indiana is reported to be working with the South African Embassy to organize opposition to the controls before they become final later this spring. Senate sources have complained that export controls in general should have been further reduced.

The president's report provided some ammunition for those arguing against the South African controls on the grounds that they hurt US interests. In a required statement on the impact of the controls, his letter states that the US share of the South African market in pharmaceuticals, tires, chemicals, trucks and locomotives, motor vehicle components and computers fell from 1977 to 1978 and could have been partly caused by the government export restrictions.
American Legion Urges Friendly Policy

A delegation from the American Legion has recently completed a two-week tour of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia. The Namibian and South African press reported that the delegation included: J. Alvis Carver, a member of the Legion's foreign relations commission and past North Carolina state commander; James Zimmerman, an executive member of the Legion and a wealthy real estate developer in Florida; Jack W. Frint, a former national vice-commander and presently a candidate for national commander of the American Legion (Mr. Flint is also chairman of the American Red Cross and Salvation Army); Judy B. Rowntree, a staff member at the headquarters of the American Maritime Service; and Dr Robert J. Billings, executive director of the Moral Majority and president of the Christian School Action. Dr Billings is reported to head a television network with approximately 3.25 million viewers and is a strong opponent of the World Council of Churches. He has been very active in promoting US investment in South Africa.

The American Legion of War Veterans is said to have over 2.6 million members, of which three-quarters of a million are Vietnam veterans. The organization is primarily concerned with issues directly affecting veterans such as rehabilitation and federal benefits, but it does also take stands on broader issues. While not endorsing political candidates outright, the Legion passes resolutions at its annual conventions for which it will actively lobby. As the largest single veterans group in the US, it is recognized as an influential political lobbying force.

The Legion has sent a number of high-level groups to South Africa and Rhodesia in recent years. Their reports to the membership resulted in the passage of a number of pro-apartheid resolutions at the recent annual convention. The resolutions included:

* The US government should encourage

Carnegie Poll Findings

"There is a clear consensus in the foreign policy community that the United States should exert pressure on the South African regime to change its domestic racial policies." That is the finding of a recent, rather unorthodox poll conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It consisted of in-depth interviews with eighty influential Americans, some of whom are also specialists in the field of US-South African relations.

The people interviewed included prominent government officials, congressional representatives, public interest activists, academics, lawyers, businessmen, and leaders from labor, churches, and the black community.

Questions were addressed to the individual's perceptions and assessments, and not their factual knowledge.

This poll was quite different from the scientific survey that the endowment conducted earlier in 1979, which queried a more representative sample of the American public on the same subject. But the results were remarkably similar, lending credence to the belief that there is a clear American consensus on South Africa. For example, 86 percent of the people responding to the previous poll's questions about apartheid felt that it was "wrong," while only 2 percent felt that it was "right." The overwhelming majority of those interviewed recently echoed that sentiment.

The feeling among those polled was that change in South Africa was imminent, and desirable, and that the US should do all it could to encourage such change. As one prominent executive stated, "Clearly, South Africa will have to make some fundamental changes, and given the background and current politics, this is overwhelmingly difficult. But it is still inevitable."

At the same time, there was a feeling that America had neither the domestic nor the ability to affect events in South Africa. Nonetheless, most of the respondents echoed the sentiments of one labor official who said, "For better or worse, we still are number one in the world. We can influence what other countries do."

Members of both the right and the left felt that current American policy was not effective enough. Both sides also agreed that the Carter administration's policy was headed in the right direction but was misguided in its execution. Some wanted to exert pressure through economic means, while others felt that "economic and diplomatic" disengagement would bring about the desired transformation in South Africa.

Continued on page 21

Sectarian Group Spies for Pretoria

The shadowy United States Labor Party (USLP), an anti-left sectarian group, has recently been linked to the white minority government of South Africa and to the pro-South Africa lobby in the U.S. In 1977-78, USLP activities included meetings with South African diplomats, a conference to encourage investments in South Africa, and the preparation of "intelligence reports" on anti-apartheid groups.

The US Labor Party first appeared during the 1968 uprising at Columbia University as the National Caucus of Labor Committees, a name it carried until 1972. It offered an allegedly Marxist view that the Soviet Union and the United States were joined in a conspiracy against workers. But then Lyndon LaRouche, a former economics professor and leader of the group, returned from a visit to West Germany with a new vision. His party turned to the extreme right and to anti-Semitism. The party ceased tolerating internal debate and began physically assaulting other groups on the left. It has zigzagged continually rightward since then, always appearing to have a great deal of money available for funding its activities.

New York reporter Dennis King has been investigating the USLP. Examining the
New evidence of US government complicity in illegal arms shipments to South Africa was presented in a television documentary, “Hot Shells: US Arms for South Africa,” produced by William Cran and broadcast on January 16 as part of WORLD series of the Public Broadcasting System.

Strong circumstantial evidence of high-level government involvement in the Space Research deals was provided in interviews with Colonel Jack Frost, an international arms dealer, and John Stockwell, former head of CIA covert operations in Angola.

Space Research, which is chartered in both the US and Canada, has been under investigation in both countries since a November 1978 program by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the BBC produced detailed evidence of its involvement in the shipment of artillery shells and related military equipment to South Africa (See Southern Africa, Jan. 1979, Nov.-Dec. 1979, and Jan. 1980). The latest interviews with Frost and Stockwell added further evidence to recent press accounts, particularly in the Vermont-based Burlington Free Press, which indicated that US government officials had helped facilitate Space Research transfers of military equipment to South Africa.

South African interest in acquiring Space Research shells and equipment followed from its battlefield defeats during its 1975 invasion of Angola. The artillery used by the South African invaders was consistently outdistanced by the Russian artillery used by Cuban troops supporting the MPLA.

According to Frost, who operates out of Belgium and had helped Space Research set up its international sales office there, he was approached during the Angolan war by Dennis Ziederberg, a member of Armscor, the South African state-run armaments corporation. Ziederberg was seeking access to the technology needed for producing advanced 155mm howitzers, and Frost referred him to Space Research. According to Frost the South Africans dropped this particular approach because the technology “cost too much money.”

CIA Role

But, according to John Stockwell, head of CIA covert operations in Angola during the war, shortly after they signalled Frost to stop looking, the CIA received a request from the South Africans for 155mm shells. The request was reported to a joint meeting of Pentagon, CIA, and State Department officials, but it was formally rejected when a senior State Department representative threatened to resign if the shells were provided to South Africa. Stockwell asserts, however, that Major John Clancy III, a CIA paramilitary officer, continued to seek out the shells, under orders from the CIA Africa division chief. Clancy told Stockwell that he had found some shells, and that the actual transfer would be handled by informing the South Africans where the shells could be had and letting them arrange the details themselves.

At about this time Frost, the arms dealer, had put Clancy in touch with Space Research. Clancy visited the company's facilities on the Vermont-Canada border. Shortly thereafter a team of South African arms experts, including Dennis Ziederberg, made a trip to the plant.

In March 1976, a second party of South Africans, including Colonel P.M. Lombard, who commanded South Africa's artillery in the Angola war, visited Space Research to work out the final details of the transfer of artillery shells and howitzer technology to South Africa.

State Department Told

Frost, who claims that he told Space Research founder Gerald Bull at the time of his first meeting with the South Africans that he should immediately cut off contacts with them, notified the State Department of the second meeting. “I certainly was concerned that as the person who identified the technology, that if something happened in the future, that somebody might say, well, he arranged it—and that wasn't true,” Frost said. “I immediately made a report to the Office of Munitions Control to explain the transaction. And when I made the report, I thought the transaction was terminated.”

Two separate sources in the State Department confirmed for WORLD researchers that Frost's report, which specifically mentioned Space Research Corporation and the visit by the South Africans, was received by the Office of Munitions Control. No action was taken on it.

This prior knowledge of the relationship between Space Research and South Africa makes the State Department’s later dealings with the company all the more inexcusable. The company had received special treatment from the Pentagon (See Southern Africa, Nov.-Dec.) to allow it to purchase 50,000 rough steel forgings (semi-finished artillery shells) produced at a US Army arsenal in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Similarly the State Department relaxed its definitions, so that Bull’s rough steel forgings would not need export permits from its Office of Munitions Control, since they are not identifiable as parts or components of weapons systems.

Frank Nipper, who runs the Scranton arsenal, told WORLD reporter Jack Cole what he thought of the State Department’s decision in favor of Bull. “You might use them as boat anchors or fence posts, or something of that type, but there is no other practical use for these that I know of except to convert them into 155mm artillery shells. It would be very difficult for me to believe that these rough forgings could be exported as non-military items.”

Lenny Young, a driver for Star Trucking, a small local firm used by Space Research to transport the 50,000 rough steel forgings along with six cannon barrels produced for the company at Watervliet arsenal, asserted that the final machining of the rough forgings into extended-range shells had in fact been done at the Space Research facilities. Nevertheless, the company was able to ship these shells (still labeled “rough steel forgings”), along with cannon barrels, testing equipment, and a complete version of its most advanced howitzer, the GC 45, to South Africa, with the acquiescence of the US government.

South African Cannon

Besides providing new evidence of US government complicity in the Space Research arms-smuggling scheme, the WORLD documentary revealed the role that Space Research personnel and equipment have played in helping South Africa develop a new 155mm howitzer in what Prime Minister Pieter Botha described as “record time.”

Lenny Young described driving a load of electronic gear from Space Research headquarters in Vermont to JFK airport in New York, where it was put on a South African Airways flight going directly to Johannesburg. Among the equipment shipped was a “kistler piezotronic guage 217C,” which arms expert John Wolfe described as a “device designed solely for measuring the internal ballistics of high performance guns and cannons.”

Bruce Durgin, a Space Research Continued on page 20
News from Namibia in the past month has been scant. But there are a few details of significance to report.

The South African Defense Forces in Namibia are in the process of buying up almost 150,000 acres of land in Okahandja, east of Windhoek, for a new training base and artillery practice field. The defense forces tried to keep the project quiet, but the land proved to be too close to some small towns, and farmers began complaining that practice artillery shells might fly too close to their homes. In size, the base will be "without comparison on the southern African subcontinent," according to the Windhoek Observer.

There are already an estimated 65,000 South African troops in Namibia, and the building of such a base can only preview an even greater expansion of South Africa's occupying forces. South Africa continues to maintain that it will seriously consider accepting the UN plan for independence and elections in the territory—if only certain conditions are met, all of them disadvantageous to the Namibia liberation movement SWAPO—but the building of new bases and the further expansion of the defense forces are in direct contradiction to the UN plan, which calls for South Africa's withdrawal and a reduction of the number of bases.

The South Africa command claims that there was a decrease in guerrilla activity in December and early January. The army bases its estimate of guerrilla activity on a body count, which was down, but if tension could be measured in some areas, it would betray a belief that guerrilla activity is anything but decreasing.

Here's one example. Truck drivers who make the run from Oshivello north to Ovamboland recently did not take to the road for three days as a result of several land mine explosions along the route. One truck was blown up. "The sight was extremely unpleasant," wrote the Windhoek Observer, "and started to affect the nerves of the drivers." The trucks carry fuel, among other products, and shortages resulting from the unofficial strike.

"It was also an unpleasant sight to be continuously faced with blown-up telephone poles," the Observer reported, as additional evidence that the guerrillas are present. In mid-December "eight poles were blown between Oshivello and Ondangua. Although repairs are usually quickly effected, it is a demoralizing sight." The drivers make the run in convoys, and they are protected by anti-land mine vehicles carrying ten soldiers each.

Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen has offered an amnesty to all SWAPO guerrillas who are willing to lay down their arms and come in from the countryside. At the same time, Viljoen is still refusing to release dozens of SWAPO political activists arrested in police sweeps over the past six months. SWAPO offices inside the territory had been closed during the sweep, but after Viljoen's offer of amnesty, Jason Angula, the SWAPO secretary of labor, reopened an office and issued an attack on Viljoen. Angula charged that Viljoen's offer was an attempt to split internal SWAPO from its external wing and bring about the disintegration of the organization. Angula was arrested in early January.

**Diplomatic Moves**

On the diplomatic front, there is only the slightest of movement at the United Nations on the plan for UN-supervised elections, and that movement is meant only to give the impression that the South Africans are still interested in the plan, if it can be modified to suit Pretoria's objections. South Africa had said that it would accept in principle the concept of a demilitarized zone on Namibia's borders with Angola and Zambia, although it laid down certain preconditions for its acceptance. The most important precondition was the elimination in the already-accepted proposal of SWAPO bases inside the territory during the transition period before elections.

Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has so far ignored these preconditions. He is proceeding with plans for further technical talks on the demilitarized zone. At the same time the UN has appointed a new commander for UNTAG, the UN peace-keeping force for Namibia. He is Lt. Gen. Prem Chand, an Indian officer with extensive military service with the UN. He has served in peace-keeping forces from the Congo to Cyprus. Chand had been retired, but he returned to the UN in mid-January and was expected to lead a small delegation of technical experts on a visit later in the month to Angola, Zambia, Namibia, and South Africa.

M.S.

South African artillery in Namibia. More to come?
Township and Shopfloor Resisters Unite

In a cloud of teargas and a flurry of arrests on January 11, the South African government made it official—black resistance is on the rise, both in townships and on factory shopfloors. And the government's vaunted program of "liberalization" is in serious trouble, challenged by a wave of strikes and demonstrations that state leaders clearly found more threatening than the negative publicity sure to follow a new crackdown on political activity.

Hints of a new upsurge of black militancy had filtered out over a period of several months. A paragraph here, a sentence there, mentioning the emergence of a number of new Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) organizations and walkouts by workers at various plants across the country. But as happens so often in trying to decipher developments in South Africa, it was the level of repression that finally gave a measure of the scale of resistance.

On January 11, the Johannesburg Star reported, "Police fired teargas to disperse gathering crowds in Port Elizabeth's Walmer township after a Security Police swoop and the detention of three top black civic leaders." Among those detained was Thozamile Botha, a leader of a powerful local BCM organization, the Port Elizabeth Civic Organization (Pebco), and key figure in a long strike by more than 700 black workers at Ford's Cortina assembly plant in Port Elizabeth.

Less than a week before Botha was detained under the Terrorism Act, Ford had announced a settlement in the strike that had idled their plant since November. But the government may well have cancelled that settlement when it hauled in Botha and two other members of the Pebco executive. "As the news of the arrests spread," the Star reported, "about 3,000 residents of the Zwide township near Walmer held a meeting and decided that unless Mr. Botha was released by noon today, a proposed work stay-away would be implemented on behalf of Pebco."

This had to be heard as potentially more than an idle threat, given Pebco's support in Port Elizabeth's black townships and the fact that the Ford strike had originally been touched off by Botha's forced resignation from a training program in the plant. According to press reports, "Pebco and Botha enjoy wide support in the Port Elizabeth black community. Meetings draw as many as 10,000 people... and many workers at Ford and General Tire display Pebco insignia." When Ford pressured Botha to resign from a draftsman's trainee program because of his involvement in Pebco, its entire black work force walked out. And the strike spread quickly to two other factories located nearby, General Tire and Rubber Company's 26 percent-owned affiliate and a South African firm, Adams Paper Mill.

Political Workers

Particularly ominous for the South African government and its American corporate apologists was the fact that Pebco's activities explicitly challenged key elements of the government's "liberalization" program. Pebco flatly rejects any participation in the "community councils" offered as a vehicle for political participation by urban blacks. In an interview with the Financial Mail in late December, Botha declared, "Pebco is aiming for one municipality for the whole of Port Elizabeth. We reject community councils and do not want separate municipalities for the black townships and white area. And we shall pressurize government by refusing to have anything to do with bodies like the community councils."

In addition, Pebco's involvement in the Ford strike, completely eclipsed the recognized black trade union at the plant. In doing so, it cast a long shadow over government hopes of separating labor organizing from political struggles by granting carefully controlled trade union rights. As the British Guardian's correspondent in Johannesburg wrote, "observers made two deductions: that the conservative white union strategy of imposing 'tame' or parallel black unions on black workers to control them is bound to fail; and that, despite Government beliefs to the contrary, it is impossible to divorce politics from black labor matters."

Ford was apparently forced to make the same deduction. In order to settle the strike, British papers reported, the company ended up "agreeing to most of the strikers' demands" and negotiating directly with Botha and other Pebco members active in the walkout. "Although union leaders were also present" at the final meeting that ended the strike, "negotiations appear to have been conducted mainly with Mr. Botha and other strike leaders," the Financial Times reported.

Botha didn't dispute charges that he was "bringing political issues into the factory." He simply asserted that the political issues
SOUTH AFRICA

had been there before him. "The union doesn't want to involve itself in politics," he told the Financial Mail. "I don't agree with that. The position of blacks in factories is political. So the problem is also a political one, which the union cannot afford to divorce itself from."

Sullivan Principles Challenged

That stance challenged not only the government's labor reforms but the "Sullivan Principles" embraced by Ford and about 150 other multinationals operating in South Africa. "The Ford dispute has confirmed the doubts which existed about the influence the codes can have on the South African labor scene," Dr. Nthato Motlana, chairman of Soweto's Committee of Ten stated at a December press conference. And Botha himself flouted the law against mentioning disinvestment by telling a reporter for the Transvaal Post, "Perhaps an exodus of the American companies from South Africa could bring about a change."

Talk like that, coupled with a strike against one of the largest US investors in South Africa (Ford's 1978 sales in the country totaled $271 million) brought top Ford management and the US government scurrying into the picture. According to press reports, the US consul-general in Cape Town sat in on meetings between management and strike leaders. "Pressure from the US government and from Ford headquarters in Detroit is believed to have contributed to the settlement," the Financial Times reported.

Some Victories

These outside forces may indeed have hastened a settlement at Ford, other observers agreed. But they also pointed out that recently "South African companies such as Sea Harvest and Fattis have also settled with striking workers." More than 700 black women walked out on the Sea Harvest fish packing plant in isolated Saldanha Bay for almost a month. When they did go back in early January, they all went back. As with the Ford workers, they had held out for and won reinstatement to their jobs, a concession rarely granted to striking black workers in the past. And they had also won an increase in wages which for many had been as low as $12 a week.

The wave of strikes by black workers and their success at winning some major demands have "opened a new chapter in South African labor relations," the Rand Daily Mail concluded. "Black workers have shown that they are determined to stick together and demand a better deal—and they are doing so more successfully than at any time in the past."

One key to this increased strength and militancy lies in the fact that black workers have gained more highly skilled jobs, making them more difficult to replace when they go out on strike. But a more important key may be the links forged with what one report called "the renascent Black Consciousness Movement." Certainly the government views that link as important. As usual, it expressed its assessment in a series of arrests and bannings. Along with Botha and other Pebco leaders, the government has arrested most of the leadership of the recently formed Congress of South African Students (formed last June to replace the banned South African Students' Movement).

The new black consciousness groups continue to multiply and grow. Most recently the formation of the Azanian Students Organization (Azaso) was announced, with the goal of organizing students on all South Africa's black campuses. It joins Azapo, Cosas (whose members are high-school students), the Writers Association of South Africa (which groups black journalists) and community groups such as the Soweto Civic Association and Peco.

And as Botha stressed in a meeting at Port Elizabeth's Walmer township, the combination of black labor and black organization can be potent. "The economy rests in my hand and in my numbers," he said, speaking for South Africa's black population. "If I don't go to work tomorrow the country is in trouble. If I don't buy at the shops the country is in trouble."

A.M.□

BOSS Defector Talks

With "Muldergate" barely behind them, South Africa's white rulers are once again caught up in a major political scandal. According to documents obtained by the Observer, the Department of National Security (DONS) better known by its former acronym BOSS, has for years conducted an extensive mail intercept and wire-tap operation against white opponents of the Nationalist Party, including opposition MP Helen Suzman and members of the ultraright Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP).

The documents in question are portions of secret BOSS files allegedly smuggled from South Africa by Arthur McGiven, a senior intelligence officer who purportedly defected to England last September. McGiven joined BOSS as a student informant in 1972, and later worked in BOSS headquarters as an intelligence evaluator.

Charges that the government spies on its white domestic opponents come as no surprise. HNP leader Jaap Marais summed up a widespread reaction when he commented that the scandal "confirms what we have been saying all along" about BOSS and its successor, DONS. Nevertheless, the revelations have made front page news in South Africa, causing an uproar among outraged whites.

Progressive Reform Party MP Helen Suzman said she was "disgusted" about being subject to "the prying eyes of shifty little men in government." She plans to "raise bloody hell" over the matter when Parliament reconvenes. Suzman and Marais have demanded an investigation into DONS activities against opposition politicians. And remarkably, the government quickly agreed to set up a commission of enquiry.

At the same time, Alec van Wyk, current head of the security bureau, denied having files on members of "an acknowledged political party" but failed to challenge the authenticity of McGiven's documents, or for that matter of McGiven himself.

Lightweight Evidence

The way the Botha government has handled the allegations, the pettiness of the charges leveled against the dreaded BOSS apparatus, and the inaccuracy and f1mminess of the documents produced (one old file identifying Jimmy Carter as the "Governor of Alabama" for instance) have some observers questioning the credibility of the entire affair.

One skeptic, British Anti-Apartheid Movement chairman Robert Hughes, commented, "This information can be seen as chicken feed. One wonders if it is not being used to obscure more serious DONS work in Britain or Western Europe." The same may be true of Africa.

McGiven told the Observer about the existence of two DONS spy-rings in neighboring states; Operation Timmerwerk (Carpenfry) in Zambia, and Operation Indiaman in Mozambique, utilizing elements of the old PIDE (Portuguese secret police) network still in existence. But to date, McGiven has failed to release any information that might disrupt or destroy those operations. Instead, McGiven seems to have chosen information calculated to embarrass the Department and infuriate its critics at home. His revelations have not injured South Africa's covert efforts to destabilize and subvert progressive African countries and the Namibian, Zimbabwean, and South African liberation movements.

The BOSS/DONS scandal surfaces at a time when the agency, closely associated with disgraced former PM John Vorster and General Hendrik Van den Bergh, is being restructured. Covert and intelligence gathering functions have reportedly been transferred to military intelligence and the
Security Police, agencies more responsive to the current Prime Minister Piet Botha, a former Defense Minister.

Some observers suggest that Botha plans to use the scandal to complete his victory over his old political foes Vorster and van den Bergh. Last month Botha appointed his own man to head the agency, 31-year-old Lukas Barnard, a professor with no known connections to the South African Security establishment (Southern Africa, January 1980.)

Politicos Escape From Jail

Three South African political prisoners who escaped from the maximum security Pretoria Central prison December 11 have surfaced in Lusaka, Zambia, appearing at a January 2 press conference with Oliver Tambo, president of the African National Congress (ANC).

Alexander Moumbaris, Stephen Lee, and Timothy Jenkin, all whites, had been serving sentences of 8 to 12 years under the Terrorism Act. They had been convicted of charges of producing pamphlet bombs to scatter ANC literature in crowded urban areas. Their escape was followed by an unsuccessful nationwide manhunt and the arrest of at least one prison official alleged to have helped in the breakout.

The last major escape of political prisoners was in 1963. It involved the escape of four men from a Johannesburg police cell. All four eventually successfully fled form South Africa.

Members of the ANC leadership such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Govan Mbeki are all still serving life sentences on Robben Island.

Nuclear Bomb Test

At 3:00 am on September 22, 1979, optical sensors on a nine-year-old US Vela satellite detected a twin flash of light in the southern hemisphere—somewhere in the vicinity of South Africa. A month later the US press revealed that the flash might have been evidence of a nuclear explosion.

In the months following the initial reports, a debate has developed between some scientists who believe the satellite did just what it is supposed to do—detect a nuclear explosion—and certain branches of government, which feel the evidence is not strong enough to confirm speculation.

The South Africans have gone so far as to suggest that a Soviet submarine, known to have been off Cape Town in September, had blown up, causing the twin flash. Other scientists in the US have speculated that the flash was a freak combination of a “super-bolt” of lightning and the simultaneous entry of a meteor into the atmosphere.

But there is good reason to believe that a bomb had been exploded. This is the 42nd time that a Vela satellite has detected the twin flash characteristic of a nuclear explosion, and in the first 41 cases it was always correct. In addition, the Vela satellite’s optical sensors were calibrated for accuracy just a week before the event and immediately afterwards.

Further, the geographic point where the event occurred is in the areas known as the Southern African Anomaly, a point between South Africa, Australia, and Antarctica where the radiation belts surrounding the earth reach sea-level. This point would be an ideal spot for a nuclear test, for radiation from the test would be obscured by the high levels of radiation already present. It had even been suggested that South Africa was actually testing nuclear explosives in the South African Anomaly as early as 1967.

In late December a panel of experts convened by the White House ruled out almost all other possible explanations of the twin flash of light. But in mid-January, the White House released yet another inconclusive report, suggesting that the twin flash of light might have been sunlight reflected back from a small meteorite or mirrored satellite.

But at the same time, scientists at Los Alamos question this rather implausible explanation, citing evidence from “faint but unmistakable echoes of the explosion’s sonic boom on [US] early warning radar.” This evidence, yet to be independently confirmed, is the first indication from a source other than the Vela satellite that the “event” which occurred on September 22 was indeed a nuclear explosion.

South African Immigration Drops

Though whites in South Africa continue to enjoy one of the world’s highest standards of living, the increasing militancy of the Black population and regional political instability have led to a two-fold increase in white emigration in the 4 years ending December 1978. At the same time the number of whites choosing to settle in South Africa decreased by more than 50 percent, falling from 30,464 in 1975 to 18,669 in 1978. In 1978, for the first time in 18 years, emigrants outnumbered new South Africans, with nearly 21,000 whites leaving the country, producing a net loss of more than 2,000 people. The trend continued in 1979.
Mississippi Experience

Continued from page 4

Without an active black organization to keep an arm around them, many of the blacks elected in the past have ended up doing more to disillusion their constituents than to improve their lot. "We didn't have enough strong people prepared to assume leadership," at the time of the Voting Rights Act, commented Henry Kirksey. "So in many cases we just changed the color of the people in office."

Whites have done their best to make that happen, finding compliant blacks to run for office when possible and cozying up to happen, finding compliant blacks to run for office when possible and cozying up to other black candidates once they take office. The only way to combat that strategy, according to Skip Robinson, is to build organized black political power.

That is what Robinson and the United League have been doing for more than a decade, starting in Holly Springs and spreading across most of the state. In November, all those years of work paid off in the election of Marshall County's first black sheriff, along with a number of other black candidates.

It took years of hard work to get to that point. It took dozens of demonstrations escorted by United League members with shotguns to prove that blacks in Holly Springs would no longer back down to Ku Klux Klan terror. On election day, rumors were flying that the Klan would be in the streets in front of the polls. They didn't show up but black voters did. And Robinson stated confidently, "The Klan won't show their faces here because they know we're ready for them."

It took months of boycotting white-owned businesses to give blacks confidence that they could challenge even the entrenched economic power of whites. In the weeks before the election, black sheriff-elect Osborne Bell charged that whites tried to use that power to defeat him. "Some top people in local factories were telling their employees that if I got elected, the factories were going to close up and move out of the county." Bell won decisively anyway.

"When you look at it, we made a lot of gains," Skip Robinson commented after the elections were all over. "We have proved to the system that we can win."

But the most important victories for blacks in Mississippi, as for blacks in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, still lie ahead. Certainly, there are lessons they can learn from each other to hasten success. For their enemies have at least as much in common as they do. And post-apartheid Mississippi could prefigure many of the structures that may shape post-apartheid Namibia, Zimbabwe, or even South Africa, unless the struggle for liberation does not stop with the attainment of the right to vote.

Dellicate Peace

Continued from page 7

for Peace and Justice and other clergymen and Amnesty International have all called into question the impartiality of Soames as governor. Probably their most serious charge is that white Rhodesian officials are still, in effect, in charge.

"Business as usual," said John Deary, chairman of the Justice and Peace Commission. "It seems to be pretty evident that Britain has totally underestimated the manpower required and is entirely dependent on the higher echelons of the Rhodesian civil service, which does not contain one black face."

Independent observers also say that Soames has no way of knowing whether the allegations of ceasefire violations are true. On the basis of those allegations, Soames has extended the state of emergency and threatened to ban ZANU, yet his office has made little attempt to differentiate among actions by guerrillas, bandits, and criminals. The Rhodesian military issues daily communiques alleging the violations, but there has not been a single case reported of violations by the military or the auxiliaries. The Peace and Justice Commission says that there is considerable evidence of ceasefire violations by the auxiliaries. But Soames says they "are an important element in maintaining security."

Among those critical of the British is US Senator Paul Tsongas (D.-Mass.) who visited Rhodesia and the front-line states in early January. Tsongas described the British attitude as "cavalier," and he said that "some very questionable events are taking place," which are putting the peace agreement "in some jeopardy."

"In my opinion the only reason that the agreement will work," Tsongas said in Washington, "is that the Patriotic Front believes it will win, and it won't jump ship, in spite of British provocations." Tsongas said that if the British were really committed to carrying out a fair process, they would demand the withdrawal of the South Africans and replace them, possibly with Canadian troops.

Some indication of support for the guerrillas hit the headlines in mid-January when Joshua Nkomo, the leader of ZAPU, returned to Salisbury for the first time in three years. He was welcomed by a crowd of 150,000, probably three times the number of people who showed up at a rally for Bishop Muzorewa a week earlier.

Immediately Nkomo struck a moderate tone. He called the war "a tragedy" and "regrettable." "Having fought, let us say to each other, it's all over. The war is over," he said.

Nkomo also stressed that there must be reconciliation between blacks and whites in the future Zimbabwe. "I ask all Zimbabweans, let there be no recriminatory statements that bring about misunderstanding. All the people who have chosen to make this country their home, it is their home. They don't have to ask anybody to be here."

In British eyes Nkomo's statement is not completely true. It doesn't apply to at least one person: Robert Mugabe. Mugabe originally planned his return to Salisbury for the Sunday following Nkomo's rally. But Soames said that Mugabe would not be able to organize a political rally because it conflicted with another planned for the same day. Mugabe did not go home, and a date has yet to be fixed for his return.

M.S.

Space Research

Continued from page 15

employee who spent two years in South Africa in charge of an air traffic control simulator, which the company had sold to the Johannesburg airport, admitted seeing a number of Space Research personnel in South Africa who could only have been there in connection with armaments work. Those seen by Durgin included Louis Palacio, the head of Space Research International's Brussels sales office, whose main job is to market the company's extended-range 155mm artillery shell, and Tom Colgan, a range photographer, whose job is to photograph shells in flight during testing of a new shell or howitzer. The Burlington Free Press reports evidence that at least eleven Space Research employees have participated in artillery testing exercises at Schmidt's Drift range in South Africa.

WORLD reporters attempted to check their findings with administration officials, but they found all doors closed. Ongoing grand jury investigations were cited as the explanation for this official silence. To date there has been no denial of WORLD's allegation that high ranking government officials in the Defense Department, State Department, and CIA were all involved in defying the US arms embargo on South Africa.

B.H.
Carnegie Poll Findings
Continued from page 14

In a recent report on the poll, J. Daniel O’Flaherty, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, reviewing confusions in current US policy, commented, "If a violent confrontation of races in South Africa is inescapable, increased American economic involvement is futile and perhaps detrimental. If we do not know which trends to reinforce to promote peaceful change, or if we have deep reservations about whether it is possible at all, then a consensus on the desirability of pressure is meaningless. The disagreements extend into the Carter administration, where uncertainty about trends in South Africa compound its diplomatic problems in southern Africa."

"I don't think there's a lot of hope for peaceful change," one high administration official told Flaherty, "but I think it's important to act as if there is hope. You've got to try." On the other hand, said another high official, "in my view, violent conflict is inevitable and there is little that the United States can do about it. Given this perception, I do not think that we have a policy toward South Africa. We are unwilling, perhaps unable, to confront the real situation and thus write prescriptions for an imaginary illness."

Sectarian Spies
Continued from page 14

South African connection, he reports that Pretoria’s diplomats in Washington and New York admitted associating with the USLP, but deny encouraging it or giving it money from the "Mulder" fund. Karl Noffke, information counselor at the South African embassy in Washington, told King, "They [the USLP] wanted to alert us about certain forces they think are bad for South Africa: the British, the Wall Street bankers and so forth." The USLP also used the opportunity to inform the South Africans about its theory that the US and Israel are conspiring against South Africa.

Writing in New York's Our Town, King disclosed that USLP connections have included individuals involved in the South African influence-buying "Muldergate" scandal. One such person was John McGoff, the US publisher covertly funded by South Africa to buy the Washington Star and other US media outlets.

Our Town obtained a draft copy of a report prepared by USLP security staff in 1978 regarding the National News Council (NNC) — the "ethics committee" of the newspaper industry. According to Our Town, USLP defectors say that they were told by party leaders that the report had been prepared for Panax, McGoff's corporation, and that the USLP was given $1000 in advance with more money due on completion. The report was of interest to Panax because the NNC had recently passed a resolution critical of firings within the Panax Corporation.

In addition, Our Town obtained a USLP report entitled "The Conspiracy to Destroy the Republic of South Africa," written in 1977. It includes profiles of anti-apartheid groups in the US which it describes as "front groups" for international Jewish bankers.

The USLP's most blatant effort to align itself with the South Africans was the staging of a conference on southern Africa in May 1978. The event was ostensibly sponsored by the Fusion Energy Foundation, an organization whose IRS tax address is coincidentally the same as the USLP. Out of thirteen speakers, five were USLP members, including two from the party's national executive committee. The conference came at a time of strong anti-apartheid activity around the country and its basic thrust was to protect South Africa from economic and diplomatic isolation and to stop the divestment movement.

Apparently, the South Africans appreciate the efforts of the USLP because in August 1978, To The Point International (a pro-apartheid South African news magazine, which has been heavily involved in "Muldergate") ran a full-page article paying tribute to Lyndon LaRouche, current USLP presidential candidate.

B.R.

Nuclear Conspiracy
Continued from page 5

not have chosen a more effective way of killing world-wide syndication.""

Coverage in the British press was generally better, though, than in the US. Reports appeared in the provincial newspapers and a factual account was produced in several London papers and on the BBC.

German Response

Coverage was worst in West Germany, against which the book's allegations had been the strongest. Says Rogers, there was "a systematic news blackout together with hostile intervention from the government itself." Not one word appeared in the press on the subject.

The government was ready on the day of publication with a denial of the book's content, but Rogers believes that the denial was in fact a sort of confirmation. According to the statement, the allegations that the West German government had disregarded NATO controls, by-passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and helped South Africa to manufacture nuclear weapons were "without foundation."

Rogers says that the West Germans denied allegations that the book did not make. Cooperation with South Africa had been carefully tailored to fall within the letter of NATO regulations and the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The key issue was not the manufacture of weapons but the transfer of the key technology for uranium enrichment, a crucial stage in the production of fissionable material, which in turn would enable South Africa to build its own bomb.

Despite the complete blackout on The Nuclear Axis in West Germany, in November 1978 the Bonn government published an attack on the book's findings, a pamphlet entitled Fact v. Fiction. The pamphlet attacks the NNC, the West German Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the authors, as responsible for a "campaign of defamation" to discredit West Germany in-ternationally, impair the West as a whole and strengthen "the ideological and thus the political position of the Soviet Union in Africa."

Experienced observers of the West German press, according to Rogers, attribute its apparent conspiracy of silence to the influence of the Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), a major agency owned by all the major newspapers, which are also its customers. Little coverage of southern Africa appears in DPA, and therefore there is scant coverage of the region in Germany's newspapers. There has been virtually no mention, for example, of the South African Information Ministry scandal. The authors of The Nuclear Axis did receive some aid from reporters who work for Der Spiegel and Der Stern, but subsequently both news magazines have been silent on the issue.

Rogers does not argue that the story of The Nuclear Axis has faced complete censorship in the Western press. The failure to cover the story, she writes, is based on "the erratic nature of the Western media in general, combined with government influence." She concludes that "the dice are loaded against investigative reporters on this kind of issue. Alternative channels of international news distribution are urgently needed."
The Artist Protects Humanity

by Carole Gregory

Selaelo Maredi, South African playwright in exile, was recently acclaimed for his dramatic work by the Afro-American community, when his play, "Homeland," was nominated for best play award at the Seventh Annual Audelco Awards ceremony. This award was originated in 1973 by a small group of Afro-American women concerned "with recognition of meaningful contributions to Black theater at the professional, non-profit level."

Acceptance as a political artist is especially important to Selaelo, who respects an audience that advocates political change. "Political" is a key word for this playwright. Thus when another artist finally won the award Maredi commented, "When I lost in the finals that did not bother me. Why? Because I knew this person who won is on the same track with me. I knew the winner's work dealt with the problems that political artists should face."

The Audelco founders, Vivian Robinson, Renee Chenoweth, Sylvia Spooner, and Winifred Richardson sponsored the festive award presentations at New York's Symphony Space on November 19.

Selaelo's love of human beings has made him an effective political artist. This same love also helped create an artist who works well with other artists. "When I first took this role of writing political plays, I worked with others to form a group. We were writers, actors and directors. Our goal was to create drama from the experiences of our people. For example, when I was alone I said, 'I am not a politician, I see what is happening. There is nothing I can do. I am angry.' When we were together all of us thought, 'I see the people die every day... Now how can we dramatize this in theater so that our people will see?' It took the South African government a long time to realize that theater can be used as a political medium."

This realization has led to the banning, imprisonment and censoring of many playwrights. Thus Mzwandile Maquina, a priest who wrote "Give Us This Day," a play in which the police mail a letter bomb to a political activist is now in jail for his powerful protest work. Thus other African playwrights who write about the South African government have enacted laws that require every black playwright to submit all plays to white censors.

Selaelo Maredi teaches at York College in New York. The Artist Protects Humanity

Selaelo Maredi

In "Homeland" Maredi dramatizes the role of US corporations in South Africa. His idea was to show that "the US corporations are mercenaries. For instance, a corporation like General Motors goes to the extent of signing a secret agreement with the South African defense force that in case of serious uprisings, G.M. will be taken over by the South African defense forces. So it shows that there is a commitment to protect their dollars in South Africa and that corporations will get involved on a military level."

A young woman, Keentseng, is his central black character. Her warmth, humanity, and dignity serve as a foil to expose the callous, self-seeking brutality of the corporation men.

The relationship between people of color is also explored in "Homeland." Keentseng travels to America as a servant when the G.M. executive goes there for business. She meets Frances Green, a black maid from Harlem. Frances belongs to a people with a system bad. People don't want to share. People have lost their humanity."

"The Residents" is a play still in progress. Maredi has organized several public readings as his ideas have developed, and he urges his small audiences to participate in its growth by commenting critically and frankly.

The acceptance of Selaelo Maredi represents a recovery of something decent and honest in ourselves. We are all inspired to continue to struggle for George Jackson and Steve Biko. The artist reminds us to protect Angela Davis and Winnie Mandela. Surely, this must be some clue as to why we love Selaelo.
**Books Received**

**South Africa—General**


**South Africa—Soweto**


**Zimbabwe**


**Namibia**


**Tanzania**


**Bibliographies/Photograph Exhibits/Other Resources**

*Children Under Apartheid*, a portable exhibition of photographs published September 1979 by IDAF. £4.50.

*Namibia in Struggle*, a portable exhibition, also available from IDAF, published September 1979. £5.00.

Each of the above available from International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 2 Amen Court, London, EC4M 7BX, UK.

Kevin Danaher, *South Africa and the United States: An Annotated Bibliography*. Available from Institute for Policy Studies, 901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. $3.00, orders over 5, 40% off.

*Taking Stock of Divestment*, Truman Dunn and Dominique Colone. Single copy 30¢, 10-20 15¢ each, over 20 10¢ each, plus 13% postase and handling for all bulk orders. American Committee on Africa.


*Southern Africa Literature List Fall 1979*, 100 items listed, American Committee on Africa, free.

The three preceding items are available at ACOA, 198 Broadway, New York, NY.


Inclusion in this list of publications received does not preclude later review.
War Resisters March

For the first time in years, anti-war demonstrators once again took to the streets in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco on Saturday, January 12. Only this time the marchers were South African war resisters and their American supporters. The US actions, organized by SAMRAF (the South African Military Aid Fund), were called to protest the induction of between 25,000 to 30,000 white South African conscripts. Similar demonstrations were held in London and Amsterdam.

At a press conference held in New York the day before the demonstration, activist Dave Dellinger called on progressive Americans to support the resistance movement in the South African military. He pointed to the recent desertion of 300 South African soldiers as a sign of growing opposition to South African aggression (Southern Africa, January 1980). John Collins, co-director of Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC) announced that CALC had helped ship Omkeer (About Face in Afrikaans), a banned soldier’s publication, into South Africa. Collins said Omkeer had been sent directly to the homes of “thousands of troops during the Christmas holidays from lists provided by an officer in the South African Defence Force.”

About 100 activists turned out for the Saturday demonstration in front of the South African Embassy in New York, while 75 supporters braved torrential rain in San Francisco. Don Morton, staff coordinator for SAMRAF underscored the significance of the demonstrations when he said, “These demonstrations are important because it’s the first time the soldier’s resistance movement has been supported publicly, and the first time exiled South African resisters have coordinated their demonstrations in both Europe and the US.”

SAMRAF plans similar demonstrations to oppose South African militarism and help build the resistance movement among South African soldiers. For more information, SAMRAF can be contacted at 138 Berkeley Pl., Brooklyn, N.Y. 11317.

DUTCH OIL EMBARGO... The Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the “Werkgroep Kairos” have met with some success in their efforts to impose oil sanctions on South Africa and force the withdrawal from that country of the partially Dutch-based multi-national Shell Oil Company. On November 19, 1979, the Dutch Parliament rejected a proposal made by the Socialist party caucus for the imposition of an immediate oil embargo on South Africa, but passed a motion instructing the government to consult with European Economic Community member states on the possibility of initiating oil sanctions against South Africa. The time limit for this consultation process is June 1, 1980.

Dutch anti-apartheid activists have worked hard to achieve this victory, having waged an intensive six-month campaign. The effort included door-to-door distribution of information on Shell, film showings, interviews on TV and radio, and mailings of thousands of pro-embargo postcards to Dutch members of parliament. Although Dutch oil exports constitute a fraction of the total South African oil imports, the imposition of an embargo would be an important psychological and political boost for the black resistance movement in South Africa, at the same time delivering a serious warning to the apartheid regime.

BRITISH BANK ACTIONS... Anti-apartheid activists from End Loans to South Africa (ELTSA) held a picket outside the headquarters of Barclays Bank in London on December 6, 1979. The action was part of a series of protests against Barclays’ financing of South Africa’s vital SASOL oil-to-coal project to provide a long-term source of energy. Barclays, a heavy lender to South Africa, has been the focus of several recent demonstrations—including protests organized in seven countries last September.

Appeal to activists: We are trying to improve the Action News and Notes section of the magazine. Please send your reports, assessments, newsclips, and especially graphics to: Action News and Notes, c/o Anne Crane and Jennifer Link, 41 Ballard Street, Boston, MA 02130; or phone: (617) 524-7142.

Editor Southern Africa Magazine

Dear Friends,

We are launching a project in honor of Agostinho Neto—the Agostinho Neto Memorial Collection—and are inviting writers and scholars to donate manuscripts and papers for the Collection. I would be grateful if you would publicize this in Southern Africa—which continues to do a great job.

Best wishes for 1980.

Dennis Brutus

Exiled South Africa Poet
Northwestern University
College of Arts and Science
Department of English
Evanston, Illinois 60201
SOUTH AFRICAN AIRWAYS announced in December that it planned to buy 12 Boeing 737 jetliners for a minimum purchase price of $146 million—the biggest single purchase in the airline's history. The planes, expected to be delivered in 1982, are ostensibly for use in SAA's domestic and regional routes and thus do not fall under the present ban on US arms sales to South Africa.

Yet South African law clearly states that in times of emergency, strategic industries can be commandeered for military use. These planes would be ideally suited for military use because of their design and fuel efficiency.

According to a report in the December 22 issue of the Johannesburg Star, South Africa has sought to purchase 100 Nomad planes from Australia. The article also indicates that a "dispute has developed among senior Australian government ministers over the possible $115 million aircraft sale to South Africa."

The Nomad aircraft can easily be used for paramilitary and police work. Their sale to South Africa would violate UN sanctions against military sales to that country.

The Australian embassy in Washington told Southern Africa that the deal has been rejected. However, the embassy's most recent information is an October 31 report from Radio Australia, which states that an agent claiming to represent the South African government had been turned down by the Australian minister of productivity.

In the past six months, Africans have been hard hit by soaring prices. The latest Household Subsistence Level (HSL) survey shows that breadlines have shot up by as much as 10 to 13 percent in many areas.

The HSL, a six-monthly survey by Port Elizabeth University's Institute of Planning Research, calculates both the bare monthly minimum income needed by an African family of six and a colored family of five to survive.

Durban Africans suffered the most. Their HSL rocketed 13.3 percent to $198 a month.

In absolute terms for Africans, Cape Town is the most expensive city to live in. Although prices are lower, it is not cheaper to live in rural areas. Transportation costs are high and competition to drive prices down is lacking. For example, the rural town Peddie has only one general store.

On December 20, South Africa sold out its 1979 supply of Krugerrand coins. Although the number of coins sold in 1979 dropped from the 1978 6.01 million high to 4.9 million, the increase in the price of gold boosted South Africa's annual earnings from Krugerrands from $1.2 billion in 1978 to $1.7 billion.

In 1970, Krugerrand absorbed only 0.7 percent of South Africa's gold output. By 1979 the coin accounted for fully 23 percent of its total gold output.

In an attempt to broaden the market for South African gold, Pretoria is minting two new smaller and cheaper coins, the two rand and one rand. Just 0.23 oz. of pure gold, the two Rand has sold well: 322,000 in the last quarter of 1979, 52,000 in North America.

Despite a grassroots mobilization against Krugerrand sales in the US, Americans purchased about 50 percent of the coins sold in 1979. The US and West Germany are the leading markets for South African gold coins.

IN MOZAMBIQUE TODAY there are 1.6 million children studying at primary and secondary schools, according to recent statistics issued by the Ministry of Education.

The Ministry reports that there are 1,474,553 day students in the country's 7,080 primary schools. In 1973, one year before FRELIMO's victory over Portuguese colonialism, there were only 588,868 primary school students in Mozambique.

There are now 91,911 day students and 18,387 night students in general secondary schools, with a further 12,448 day students and 3,998 night students in technical secondary schools.

A South African mining company, DeBeers, continues to play a large role in the diamond mines of north east Angola. Since independence in 1975, the Angolan government has acquired a majority holding in the diamond mines, previously owned and run by Harry Oppenheimer's DeBeers. But, according to some reports, production has declined, and in an effort to ease a foreign currency shortage, Luanda asked DeBeers 19 months ago for more help. According to one report, there are dozens of South African mechanics, electricians and experts working in direct recovery at the mines.
Note Change of Address
Southern Africa Committee
17 West 17th St.
New York, NY 10011

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