Who Will Decide:

The People or Soames?
CONTENTS

SPECIAL REPORT
2 Selling the Black Middle Class
4 Mozambique and Zambia: Solidarity at High Costs

ZIMBABWE
5 Britain Undermines Free Elections
6 Mugabe on Patriotic Front Unity
7 British Violations
9 The International Outcry

UNITED STATES
10 Senator Tsongas on Southern Africa
11 US Visitors: Looking Things Over
11 AID Programs—Carrot and Stick

MOZAMBIQUE
12 Teaching a People to Read
12 Rediscovering History

NAMIBIA
13 South Africa Maneuvers Around Namibia

SOUTH AFRICA
16 Operation Daisy—An Agent Surfaces
18 Bank Takeover—Urban Warfare Escalates
19 Ultra-Right on Trial
19 A Scuttled Tanker—Secret Oil for South Africa

DEPARTMENTS
2 Update
22 Action News and Notes
Taking Stock: A Call for a Conference to Review Anti-Apartheid Work

Southern Africa is published monthly except for July-August, when bi-monthly, by the Southern Africa Committee, 17 West 17th Street, New York, NY 10011.

ISSN 938-3775

Southern Africa is available on microfilm through University Microfilm Xerox Company, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106, and is listed in the Alternative Press Index.


Typesetting by Liberation News Service
Cover and layout by The Letter Space

Subscriptions: Individual (domestic)$10.00; Institutional/$16.00; Individual (foreign) $13.00; Institutional/$21.00. Airmail: Africa, Asia, Europe/$22.50; South and Central America/$19.50.

Members of the Southern Africa collective who contributed to the production of this issue: Michael Beauble, Jim Cason, Jennifer Davis (Editor), Truman Dunn, Mike Fleschman, Bill Hartung, Craig Howard, Richard Knight, Edgar Lockwood, Andrew Marx, Mallin Reeves, Rebecca Reiss, Christine Root, Karen Rothmyer, Mike Shuster, Stephanie Urdang, Jim Welkart

Special thanks for their assistance to: Africa News, Anne Crane, Jennifer Link, Josh Nessen, David Brooks, Susan Stout, Steve Goodman, Sybil Wong, William Johnston, Tom Tuttle
Observers Protesting Pre-Election Intimidation

At a Salisbury press conference two days before the elections in Zimbabwe, a group of American observers told reporters that there would be no free and fair elections under the conditions currently prevailing in the country.

Stressing that intimidation of the electorate and campaign by the Security Forces and auxiliaries was a serious problem, the observers set out five minimum requirements for the holding of fair elections and urged Governor Soames to implement these immediately:

- The auxiliaries—most of whom are loyal to Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s UANC—should be returned to their bases.
- The Commonwealth monitoring forces should remain at the guerrilla assembly points until a new government is formed.
- The buffer zones around the present cease-fire assembly points should be extended from five to ten kilometers.
- The present call-up of Rhodesian troops, initiated to provide forces to “monitor” the elections, should be cancelled.
- The British governor, Lord Soames, should announce before the elections that he will ask the African party with the largest percentage of the popular vote to form a government.

The American observers have issued several reports expressing particular concern about the role of the auxiliary troops in the up-coming elections. They note that the Security Forces have been recruiting auxiliaries to maintain law and order in the tribal trust lands. The Security Forces claim that these auxiliaries are recruited from among the local populace, but closer investigation has revealed that the auxiliaries are made up almost entirely of members of Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC. Reporters visiting one district in the far east portion of Manicaland found, on questioning “local” auxiliaries, that only seven out of a total of 62 auxiliaries were actually from Manicaland—the rest had come from special training camps outside of Salisbury. Asked where he was from, one auxiliary responded, “from Bishop Muzorewa.”

Observers speaking with social workers in the Sinoia area learned that employers have been urging their employees to vote for Muzorewa’s UANC. An employee at the Vanguard Chrome Mine was dismissed because he was the local chairman of ZANU-PF. Another social worker witnessed the beating of a ZANU sympathiser who was attempting to stop a UANC member from forcing a woman to go to a UANC rally.

Additional reports indicate that repatriation of the 250,000 Zimbabwean refugees—a crucial element of the London agreement—has simply not happened effectively. The United Nations had estimated that at least half of these refugees could return to the country before the elections.

In Botswana—the country where ZANU and ZAPU have had the least contact and influence with the refugee population—the UN estimate seems to have been accurate, and about half of the Botswana refugees are now in Zimbabwe. Yet refugees from Zambia and Mozambique—countries where ZAPU and ZANU have had much more influence with the refugee population—have had a very difficult time getting back into Zimbabwe.

Barely 4,000 refugees from Zambia have returned to Zimbabwe, and of the nearly 150,000 refugees in Mozambique, only 9,000 have returned.

The British failure to repatriate large numbers of refugees has effectively disenfranchised a significant portion of the people of Zimbabwe.

South African Clergyman Opposes Investment

“Investment in corporations in South Africa is only prolonging the injustice and suffering, and providing the means for fast militarization of the country,” the Reverend Theo Kotze told an audience at the Lutheran School of Theology in Chicago on February 12.

Kotze, a white South African banned in his own country and now living in exile, was formerly co-director of the Christian Institute in Capetown, which was closed by the South African government in 1977. Kotze was invited to visit the campus to participate in the ongoing debate about the impact of investments in corporations and banks that are involved in South Africa.

For the last three years, students and other members of the Lutheran community have been calling on the seminary to join the growing list of institutions that have withdrawn their funds from banks making loans to South Africa.

“The time has come and gone by for the West to take action,” said Reverend Kotze. “Revision of investment policies is essential.” Reverend Kotze went on to point out that as corporate involvement in his country has grown, conditions for blacks have worsened and repressive legislation has increased. The pass laws have always been a source of humiliation and anger, but the recently passed law imposing a $500 fine for employing an unregistered worker has pushed the black population to a point of desperation. The Terrorism Act which allows people to be banned and detained without trial is, according to Kotze, institutionalized violence.

When questioned by members of the audience as to the effectiveness of disinvestment, Reverend Kotze said, simply, “It is a moral decision, and at this point, the only non-violent intervention possible.”

Pretoria Flexes Military Muscle

On the eve of the elections in Zimbabwe, armour and motorized infantry units of the South African army have moved into northern Natal province, on the Mozambican border. According to sources in New York, the area is now under military control, with army personnel performing police duties. South African reinforcements have also been moved into position near the Zambian border with Namibia.

In late February the South African police claimed to have discovered a large weapons cache in Natal near the Mozambican border. Pretoria has attributed both the weapons cache and a recent attack on a shop in the region, to the ANC. In a letter dated February 20, South Africa threatened to attack Mozambique for allegedly harboring ANC forces, claiming “the right to take whatever steps may be necessary, wherever and whenever, to protect South African life and property.”

Alfred Nzo, secretary-general of the ANC, denied any ANC connection with the arms cache or the attack on the shop, claiming the incidents “were deliberately set up by the Botha regime to give a basis for its false claim that Mozambique is directly and indirectly involved in military operations against the apartheid State.”

The troop movements and verbal admonitions appear to serve two purposes: to increase South African leverage on the front-line state during the crucial post election period in Zimbabwe, and to provide a basis for moves to counter increased guerrilla activity by SWAPO and the ANC.

Recent reports indicate that South Africa has continued strengthening its northern defenses. Pretoria has begun construction of a number of new army bases in the border areas, is now offering financial incentives to whites who remain on border farms, and is beefing up security on these farms by providing farmers, with sophisticated radio communications equipment.
Selling the Black Middle Class

by Gloria Jacobs

The black man wears a pin-striped suit, complete with a fresh white handkerchief in the pocket, his wide and bushy afro providing the only counterpoint to a sleek, establishment look. He leans back in his chair, legs casually crossed, but his hooded eyes and set lips belie the look of ease. "I'm cool," says the image and so do the words: "If you want to sell me anything, white man, you'd better know what you're talking about." This isn't real life in South Africa, of course. It's an advertisement created by and for J. Walter Thompson, the American advertising agency, and it's currently running in South African trade publications and major newspapers. It is a powerful symbol of the "new" social and economic policies being adopted by big business and the Nationalist government. It's telling white business people that there's a new market out there—the black middle class.

The ad, aimed at flattering the small black elite, is also intended to inform white businesses that the easing of certain job-related restrictions, increased attention to technical education for blacks, and cosmetic changes in the apartheid system, will make that black middle class an important market for white entrepreneurs.

The tone of the ad appears to pull no punches, yet it only hints at the centuries of racial oppression at the heart of South African society, preferring instead to talk about a rosy future of infinite consumption.

What J. Walter Thompson and similar advertising and public relations firms such as SSC&B Lintas and McCann-Erickson all understand is that for economic and political reasons the government has now given its blessing to the growth of a small black middle class. The apartheid government wants to encourage the growth of this class and nourish its image of itself as having its own special interests, so that it will act as a buffer between white authority and an increasingly militant black population.

Business adds to these political interests an eagerness to win a new and growing market, which it hopes to woo with a wide variety of consumer products, from hair...
straighteners and sharp clothes to hi-fi sets. This would serve the dual purpose of creating a profitable market while distracting the black middle class from playing an active political role.

One recently developed effort to win the allegiance of this nascent middle class revolves around the creation of a new, sophisticated "black press"—which takes the form of both newspapers and magazines. Control of these instruments remains firmly in white hands, although black reporters and even editors staff the front offices.

**Andy Young Approach**

The South African journal, *Work in Progress*, published by a collective at the University of Witwatersrand, recently explored the role the new periodicals have played in defusing black opposition by promising a golden era of consumerism. In its view, the media operates to remind people that if they give up militant struggle they can gain instead cars, homes, whiskey and deodorants.

Some cynics have called this the "Andy Young" approach, in which the authorities cut down the militant leadership and help install moderates through material and social blandishments. The moderates then help keep in line those who haven't been able to accrue the "rewards" of the system.

**The Journals**

The extremely manipulative aims of the new journals are best revealed by an examination of their ownership.

A Black fist is raised, and behind it the words "Black Power" are etched in strong letters against a dark background. The fist contains a wad of ten-rand notes. The ad is for *Pace* magazine, the "new" black magazine that claims to cater to the "new" black, a person who's obviously angry, but just as obviously can be coopted, according to the ad:

We're not going to bore you with the details of the immense spending power of the black market. We just want to tell you that to communicate with this market Hortors have committed R1½ million to launch *Pace*. The new monthly Black magazine that moves with the times...

... *Pace's* unstressed, underlying theme is: Black man be proud, have dignity, know yourself. Hold on to your aspirations for a greater acceptance in an ever more integrated society.

*Pace*, as the ad copy indicates, was until quite recently, owned by Hortors. In the 1978-1979 Muldergate scandal, Hortors was exposed as having close ties to the South African Department of Information, and to have received large sums of money from the government.

On the trial of the Soweto 11, the black South African students who were convicted in 1979 for their part in organizing the Soweto uprising, *Pace* ran a picture of the prisoners giving the clenched fist salute, then intoned, "violence and willful destruction is not the path to a better way of life in the future."

As WIP notes, "There are some token gestures towards real opposition." A letter from one reader said, "one can wonder why most of our parents, leaders and brothers, although they see how bitter the situation is, so strongly condemn violence. The answer to this is simply because they are rich and they oppose violence in order to secure their wealth."

The only magazine to approach *Pace's* overt politics is *Drum*, once respected for its exposes of prisons and farm labor conditions in the '50s, but now reduced to sensational stories on immorality act cases and show business personalities. Owned by Jim Bailey, a wealthy South African who also has other mining and press interests, *Drum* now has a steadily decreasing circulation of 85,000, although it too takes pot shots at authority now and then.

**Black Middle Class**

A black South African who recently came to the US reports that some educated blacks have become very excited about the government's new programs. "There's a great deal of upward mobility right now," she told *Southern Africa*. "There's always been a middle class, but it's never grown at the rate it is moving now. Several new middle class townships are already in the works for the area around Johannesburg."

*Pace*, new jobs, and the new suburbs all reflect the "latest response to resistance in South Africa," according to WIP. Aimed at a minority of blacks in terms of real effect, the ideology of the middle class is being promulgated at all levels in an effort to hook the young on consumerism.

Some ads and magazines have even gone so far as to imply that black South Africans can now expect to live as black Americans do, which supposedly means having a car and nice clothes. It is even possible to suppose that the South African government has learned some of these techniques from its US friends.

Because it is the only acceptable "above-ground" mentality, this new attitude is particularly insidious. And at a time when booming gold prices and returning economic prosperity makes it possible to offer advances to a small number of blacks, some changes are bound to occur. Whether blacks will see them as anything more than steps to decades of bitterness and frustration is doubtful. But it is possible that the government could temporarily coopt some members of the increasingly militant—and affluent—black leadership.
Mozambique and Zambia: Solidarity at High Costs

by Michael Fleshmen

Mozambique and Zambia, “the firm rear bases” of the struggle against white minority rule in Zimbabwe, have made an invaluable contribution to the diplomatic and military advances of the Patriotic Front. But they have paid a high price for their commitment to the guerrilla war on their borders.

During 1979 in particular, both countries were subjected to devastating attacks by the Rhodesian army as it attempted to weaken the will and ability of these states to continue supporting the nationalist insurgents. These efforts were redoubled during the Lancaster House meeting on Zimbabwe, in order to ensure that the front-line states would in turn pressure ZANU and ZAPU to make political compromises which would end the war.

Now, with a shaky cease-fire in effect, and UN sanctions against Rhodesia suspended, Mozambique and Zambia have begun to assess both the impact of the war on their fragile economies, and their immediate reconstruction needs.

Zambia

Since independence, Zambia has been locked in a low-level economic war with neighboring Rhodesia. For years the border between the two countries was closed, but this situation proved more inconvenient than threatening to land-locked Zambia, which found alternative routes for its copper exports and vital imports, via Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa.

By 1978, however, Zambia’s economic condition had worsened. The Angolan route had been closed since the 1975 South African invasion, the escalating war curtailed trade route though Mozambique, and neither the Tanzanian railway nor its port at Dar es Salaam were capable of handling the increase in Zambia shipping. In October 1979, faced with a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, and under intense pressure from the IMF, Zambia reopened the border with Rhodesia to rail traffic.

Until 1979, despite mounting aggression by Rhodesian troops, Zambian economic and transport facilities had remained relatively undamaged. In April 1979, however, the ferry at Kazungula, which links Zambia to South Africa via Botswana, was destroyed by Rhodesia stranding over 300,000 tons of Zambian cargo including 250,000 tons of desperately needed grain.

In September, representatives of Britain, the Patriotic Front, and the “internal settlement” regime began discussions for the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe. By all accounts, the Patriotic Front seized the initiative, and dominated the early stages of the conference. But in October, Rhodesian forces destroyed the rail and road bridges in northern Zambia, cutting vital trade links with Tanzania. These raids were followed in November by the destruction of twelve more bridges, isolating the Zambian capital of Lusaka. At the same time, Rhodesia announced that maize shipments would be prohibited over Zambia’s only remaining land link with the outside world, the rail line through Rhodesia.

Economy hard-hit

In the aftermath of the attacks, the Zambian economy lay devastated. One foreign diplomat commented simply, “Zambia had been raped.” Foreign Affairs Minister Wilson Chakula presented a similar, if more detailed, picture of the destruction to UN officials on December 11. He placed the costs of repairing the bridges at nearly $15 million. Zambian industrial production, he said, had dropped sharply as thousands of tons of vital imports piled up, forcing widespread layoffs of workers, and exacerbating severe shortages of commodities. The copper mines were forced to reroute 20,000 tons of ore at an additional cost of over $8 million. Especially serious was the shortage of maize, and of fertilizer for the next planting.

When Britain reassumed authority in Rhodesia after the Lancaster House agreement, one of the first actions taken by its governor, Lord Soames, was the restoration of grain shipments to Zambia.

A number of international sources have contributed funds for the reconstruction of Zambia’s transportation infrastructure, but repairs will take at least six months, and in the interim Zambia’s economic survival rests in the hands of the British governor and his Rhodesian bureaucracy. This is likely to constrain Zambia’s ability to offer renewed aid to the liberation movements as a way of responding to any breakdown in the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe.

Mozambique

Less than six months after independence in September 1975, the People’s Republic of Mozambique closed the border with Rhodesia, thus implementing mandatory UN sanctions. This action came as the FRELIMO government struggled to sustain a national economy already near collapse from sabotage, a massive exodus of skilled Portuguese workers, and 500 years of colonial mismanagement and underdevelopment.

The border closure has cost Mozambique between $110-$135 million annually in lost transit fees, and accounts for $175-$200 million of Mozambique’s $300 million yearly balance-of-trade deficit. The hidden costs of

Continued on page 20

Rhodesian armour in Mozambique—striking hard at the economy.
Britain Undermines Free Elections

Mike Shuster, a member of the Southern Africa collective, went to Zimbabwe to cover the elections. The following story was filed from Salisbury shortly before going to press and hence before the prospective election date. His account reveals the strong partiality of the British in their attempts to discredit ZANU-PF, and to prevent Mugabe from coming to power.

Salisbury—The Lancaster House Agreement, as implemented by the British governor in Rhodesia, has in effect resulted in a military victory for the Rhodesian security forces and it may well result in usurping the majority will of the African voting population.

On arrival in Rhodesia, one is immediately aware that the Lancaster House Agreement has not brought a ceasefire to the country. Yet a different kind of war is now in progress. It's still a war between the Rhodesian security forces and the guerrillas, in this case, ZANU-PF, as ZANU is now known for the purposes of the election. But because of the actions of Lord Soames, the British governor, the Rhodesian security forces now enjoy an enormous advantage in the war, one they never were able to achieve on the battlefield.

Soames's first controversial move was his decision to deploy the security forces almost immediately after the final ceasefire date in early January. Most of the guerrillas of both Mugabe's armed force, ZANLA, and that of Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA, obeyed the ceasefire. But some guerrillas, mostly from ZANLA, stayed away. Soames, in deploying the security forces, claimed that it was ZANLA that broke the ceasefire first. The British also say the Mugabe deliberately kept some of his forces out of the assembly places for future use.

Soames Chief Violator

Mugabe says there was simply not enough time—the Lancaster House Agreement gave the guerrillas ten days—to gather almost 20,000 ZANLA troops at the appropriate camps. “I have called the governor the violator-in-chief of the ceasefire,” Mugabe told me in an interview. “Yes, and I have told him to his face that that’s what he is. He violated the ceasefire before anyone else did. He refused to confine the Rhodesian forces and the auxiliaries to their
bases as was required by the agreement. They were to have disengaged first. What bases as was required

Mugabe now freely admits that some ZANLA groups are still at large. "But we have no obligation to persist in assembling anybody at all at this stage," he added.

"What is the significance of a ceasefire if it's just one side? Nobody should complain to us that we still have other groups at large when they still have everybody at large."

That's what the situation is on the ground. Despite the controversy over the initial violation of the ceasefire, there are 22,000 guerrillas—16,000 ZANLA and 6,000 ZIPRA—in the assembly places. The British have never claimed that more than 5,000 guerrillas are still at large.

To contain them, the Rhodesians have deployed upwards of 90,000 troops. The Rhodesians keep secret the exact number of the regular security forces they have deployed, but a good guess is 60,000. Add to that the more than 20,000 auxiliary forces, Bishop Abel Muzorewa's former private army, that was absorbed last year into the security forces. Thousands of reservists have been called up. Thousands more police are scattered throughout the country. Each district commissioner has a small armed force, and several thousand white farmers are also armed.

In effect the Rhodesians are occupying the country, and they have most of the guerrillas surrounded in their assembly places.

Most of the information that is reported about the continued fighting comes from the Rhodesians themselves. There is in fact no means of independently ascertaining the truth. Those members of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force assigned to security force bases have no way of knowing if the Rhodesian version of reported incidents is correct.

Almost every act of violence is ascribed to ZANLA, despite the massive discrepancy in the number of guns in each sides hands. But with the Rhodesians enjoying such an enormous advantage now, it's safe to assume that the security forces have had little or no hesitation in probing into those areas of the country formerly under the firm control of the guerrillas. From a purely military point of view they would be foolish not to. In that case, it's more likely that most of the reported skirmishes with guerrillas are not random acts of violence but attempts by those few guerrillas in the countryside to defend their areas of strength.

First Hand Experience

I had the hair-raising opportunity of seeing the security forces at work and of witnessing how the monitors go about their evaluation. Three of the Americans here to observe the elections and I made contact with officials of ZANU-PF, who put some of their campaign workers at our disposal to travel to several of the nearby tribal trust lands—African reservations.

One trust land, Chiota, is about forty miles southeast of Salisbury. It is generally believed to be ZANU-PF territory, and there had been numerous reports of brutality by the security forces against the local population.

Not long after we arrived at Chiota, a man came running toward our car at the intersection of two dirt roads. He was breathless and frightened.

"They hit me," he said. "Those, the forces." A unit of security forces had just driven off. I could still see the dust from their tracks in the air.

"I was standing there and they came and hit me, without fault." His voice quavered, he repeated, "without fault."

"What did they say?" I asked.

"They said, "You are a terrorist." The man, who was not more than thirty years old, said the security forces had hit him on the side of his head and kicked him on his shins.

"Have they done this to you before?" I asked.

"No," he responded, adding, "But so many people, these soldiers, they hit so many people."

At that moment the green truck of the security forces reappeared out of the dust and roared up to where we had stopped. About a dozen African soldiers, dressed in camouflage uniforms and carrying heavy machine guns and automatic rifles, jumped off the truck and surrounded our car.

They were yelling, and swearing viciously. "The gooks," they cried. "We're going to get the gooks." A nickname, I found out later, that the security forces have recently taken to using when referring to ZANLA guerrillas. The soldiers guns were ready to fire, and they looked like they wanted to kill someone.

"It was a hell of a situation," Tilden Le Melle later recalled. Le Melle was one member of the American observer group, who along with George Houser, Director of the American Committee on Africa and Cynthia Cannady, of the Washington-based Afro-American lobbying group, TransAfrica were also present during the incident.

The security unit was in radio contact with a nearby base, and the soldiers apparently received orders to take us there. During the fifteen mile drive the security force unit detained almost every car it passed on the road. By the time we arrived at the base, we were part of a group that totalled at least fifteen, including one elderly African who had to walk with a cane.

The atmosphere was tense and one soldier kept the barrel of his machine gun next to the head of one of the ZANU-PF militants throughout the journey, his finger never leaving the trigger.

Our arrival at the base, a village called Muhuksa, was a great deal of excitement among the several hundred troops, almost all African, who were stationed there. Soldiers hit two Africans on the side

Mugabe on Patriotic Front Unity

In an interview with Southern Africa's Mike Shuster in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe stressed the importance of unity between ZANU and ZAPU:

How have the discussions with Joshua Nkomo gone?

There have been two meetings between us to discuss our relationship. Our view is that at the end of the elections, the ZANU yield and the ZAPU yield, regardless of the degree of strength each party has attained, should combine so we can constitute an alliance.

He was complaining about the inability of his people to organize rallies and campaigns in areas where we are in control. But . . . it has also happened to us. If we go to Nkomo's stronghold, we do not attract crowds. There was a meeting in one township of Bulaway which is absolutely controlled by Nkomo. The police said there were only a hundred people there. There were more policemen than that. But we don't complain because that's just not our area of control. We are prepared to recognize those facts.

We talked about the need for us to get closer and to formulate at this stage—so close to the elections—what we want to do at the end of the elections. And to combine in the face of the governor's strategy to divide us.

Well, Nkomo was happy. He said there was hard feeling on the part of most of his members, but he was going to talk to them.

I hope we can work out some definite strategy. I cannot see ZAPU aligning itself with Smith after we have worked together. Nor can I in all honesty feel happy at the end of the day that we are working just as ZANU, and constituting a government as ZANU, even if we get a majority. We are duty bound to form an alliance with ZAPU.

How do you feel about the post-election prospects? Are the white Rhodesians going to turn over the reins of power?

No, I think there's going to be real resistance from the security forces. And the Governor is aiding them by mobilizing them.
of their heads as they climbed off the truck. One soldier kicked a man in the chest.

We were all taken to a local police station for questioning. Soon the four Americans were separated from the rest and greeted by the area commander. He was, of course, white.

The commander explained that his troops had been scouring the area for a local notorious guerrilla leader. He said that there were 500 ZANLA forces operating in the area and that we had been in great danger because the “terrorists shoot white people on sight.” We had been detained for our own safety, the commander said.

Intimidation A Reality
After two hours, we were released. Later all the Africans were also released. No one had been charged with a crime or arrested. The soldiers had not found their “gooks.”

But the soldiers had succeeded in doing one thing: scaring us and the local people. “If you are anybody, a Zimbabwean or an observer, said Houser, “and you are faced with men who are carrying guns that they are ready to use and who seem to have a trigger-happy finger, who are nervous with those weapons in their hands, you are going to be intimidated. This is the daily experience that the people in that area are having.”

“We had been told by some of our friends here that they are intimidated. We can believe it, because we saw it and we felt it.”

Two Australian commonwealth monitors were stationed at Muhusekwa base camp. We had the opportunity to speak with one of them, a lieutenant about 25-years old.

“Everything the security forces have done today is completely legal,” he volunteered quickly. He explained that under martial law and with the deployment by the governor, the security forces were in effect free to roam the land and pick up anyone they wanted. He saw nothing wrong with this.

The monitor explained that he never left the base to travel with the security forces. He was informed each time there was a “contact” or skirmish, and then he was brought on the scene. Generally the security forces provided the only information about such incidents.

After our release, we had to wait at the base camp for a least an hour and a half. After awhile I remarked offhandedly, “I bet you didn’t expect that when you joined the Australian Army you’d end up in Rhodesia.”

“Oh,” he said. “I wanted to volunteer for the Rhodesian Army.” Later he asked me, “What are the Americans going to stand up to the Russians? Are they going to war over Afghanistan? When are they going to stop backing down?”

With such an observer, there is simply no way of gaining an impartial understanding of what is happening in that area.

The British themselves repeatedly insist that they are impartial. But after this incident, one British spokesman for the governor challenged my decision to go with ZANU-PF. He exhorted me to go on trips to the countryside organized by the Rhodesians.

I did travel with the Rhodesians once, to the Makoni tribal trust land in the east between Salisbury and the Mozambique border. The itinerary was completely planned by the Rhodesian district commissioner. Several British election supervisors accompanied the group of journalists and observers. As the group was departing for Salisbury at the end of the afternoon, one of the supervisors, who had travelled extensively throughout the district, complained to the district commissioner that the group had seen nothing typical of the district. The commissioner was forced to agree.

Keeping Mugabe Out
The partiality of the British runs deep. When I asked the British spokesman why he would not divulge the strength of the deployed security forces, he answered baldly “Because we don’t want to let the bad guys know how many good guys are out over

British Violations

Britain’s systematic violations of the Lancaster House accord have virtually destroyed the prospect of free elections in Zimbabwe. Numerous actions were taken by the British government that specifically contravened the London agreement, actions aimed at blocking the election of a ZANU-led Patriotic Front government. The major media in the United States have only seldom referred to these violations, despite their frequency. For example, the British have:

- Permitted the Rhodesian Security Forces to return to full operational footing, moving freely throughout the country while over 20,000 Patriotic Front guerrillas are confined to sixteen assembly points. The Rhodesian air force has continued to bomb ground targets in northeastern Rhodesia, while ground troops have been deployed around the guerrilla camps, raising fears that the Rhodesians are preparing to massacre the assembled guerrillas after the elections.

In mid-February at Assembly Area Bravo, a Rhodesian patrol came within one hundred yards of the camp. Later, it was discovered that an observation post had been established within the five kilometer buffer zone around the assembly point, a clear violation of the agreement.

Paul Eilman, a correspondent for the London Guardian, described the handling of the incident by the Combined Operations Command, still the only official source of reports on cease-fire violations, as follows: “The military command in Salisbury flatly lied about the incident, claiming that the men had been subjected to an unprompted attack beyond the buffer zone.”

- Deployed over 25,000 armed “Auxiliaries” loyal to Abel Muzorewa, into areas vacated by the Patriotic Front. By all accounts, these auxiliaries are engaged in widespread and violent intimidation of voters.

- Allowed an estimated six thousand South African troops to remain in widely scattered positions inside Rhodesia.

- Failed to pursue instances of terrorism and assassination directed against the Patriotic Front—ZAPU and ZANU—PF officials and their supporters. Particularly disturbing is the lack of official response to two assassination attempts against ZANU President Robert Mugabe, and the bombing of black churches in Salisbury by members of the notorious Selous Scouts, trying to discredit ZANU. Two Scouts were killed by their own bomb while driving to another church.

- Promulgated a decree giving Soames the power to disenfranchise voters and prevent elections in certain districts. All 21 of the districts likely to be affected are considered ZANU strongholds, and account for half of the nearly three million voters.

- Banned ranking ZANU officials and election candidates. They have also arrested between three and six thousand ZANU campaign workers in recent weeks on such charges as “shouting slogans.” Independent observers have confirmed that the British now hold between three and six thousand people in detention.

- Permitted the Rhodesian army and air force to engage in political activities on behalf of Bishop Muzorewa, even allowing Rhodesian air force planes to airdrop Muzorewa’s campaign leaflets.

- Obstructed the return of an estimated 200,000 refugees to Rhodesia in time for the elections. The first nine hundred refugees to return to Rhodesia were immediately arrested, ostensibly as a temporary measure to check for guerrillas. At present, only five hundred refugees per day are allowed to return, and many of these are children.

- Confiscated ZANU and ZAPU campaign literature and vehicles, including 26 tons of Patriotic Front election material at the Salisbury airport.

- Deployed over 25,000 armed “Auxiliaries” loyal to Abel Muzorewa, into areas vacated by the Patriotic Front. By all accounts, these auxiliaries are engaged in widespread and violent intimidation of voters.

- Allowed an estimated six thousand South African troops to remain in widely scattered positions inside Rhodesia.

- Failed to pursue instances of terrorism and assassination directed against the Patriotic Front—ZAPU and ZANU—PF officials and their supporters. Particularly disturbing is the lack of official response to two assassination attempts against ZANU President Robert Mugabe, and the bombing of black churches in Salisbury by members of the notorious Selous Scouts, trying to discredit ZANU. Two Scouts were killed by their own bomb while driving to another church.

- Promulgated a decree giving Soames the power to disenfranchise voters and prevent elections in certain districts. All 21 of the districts likely to be affected are considered ZANU strongholds, and account for half of the nearly three million voters.

- Banned ranking ZANU officials and election candidates. They have also arrested between three and six thousand ZANU campaign workers in recent weeks on such charges as “shouting slogans.” Independent observers have confirmed that the British now hold between three and six thousand people in detention.

- Permitted the Rhodesian army and air force to engage in political activities on behalf of Bishop Muzorewa, even allowing Rhodesian air force planes to airdrop Muzorewa’s campaign leaflets.

- Obstructed the return of an estimated 200,000 refugees to Rhodesia in time for the elections. The first nine hundred refugees to return to Rhodesia were immediately arrested, ostensibly as a temporary measure to check for guerrillas. At present, only five hundred refugees per day are allowed to return, and many of these are children.

- Confiscated ZANU and ZAPU campaign literature and vehicles, including 26 tons of Patriotic Front election material at the Salisbury airport.
ZIMBABWE

there." In an atmosphere like this the British simply refuse to believe Mugabe's charges of harassment and intimidation by the Rhodesian security forces, and they automatically accept the claims of the security forces that Mugabe's troops are violating the ceasefire.

Under these conditions, it's fair to ask the question: Who is intimidating whom? One British election supervisor told me that he thought the deployment of so many Rhodesians with guns was intimidating in itself. At the same time there have been hundreds of incidents of arrest and harassment of Mugabe's campaign workers.

Everything the British have done in Rhodesia appears to have one goal in mind: to keep Mugabe from power. But all the predictions before the election were that Mugabe would still do well. In that event, Soames has an ace-in-the-hole.

According to the constitution negotiated at Lancaster House, Soames can ask any elected member of the assembly to try to form a government. Explained spokesman Kieran Prendergast: "The Lancaster House Agreement simply says the president, who for the purposes of this election shall be the governor, 'will appoint as prime minister the person in his opinion best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the house assembly'."

The power of the governor is, as Prendergast put it, "very broadly phrased." Under what circumstances could Soames not choose the highest vote getter to form the new government? As it turns out, under most circumstances.

"The governor has himself spoken publicly of the expectation that he will use this power unless the verdict of the people was unmistakably clear in the way of a 51 votes or more to any one party," said a spokesman. "Beyond that we shall have nothing to say."

This means that ZANU-PF could win a majority of the African votes—say 51 percent—but only receive 40 seats in the assembly because whites already hold twenty seats and Africans only elect eighty seats. To win 51 seats, a clear majority, an African party would have to pull 68 percent of the vote.

Stated another way, the governor could ask a member of a smaller party to form a government. If that person formed a coalition with the whites, only 31 African seats would be necessary to form a majority in the assembly. But that majority would represent only approximately forty percent of the total electorate.

The Lancaster House Agreement could result then in the continuation of minority rule in Rhodesia.
The International Outcry

Britain's early handling of the ceasefire in Rhodesia and the transition to independence quickly angered Africa. In response to British violations of the London agreement on Rhodesia—the OAU met in emergency session Dar es Salaam in late January. The result: an angry denunciation of British Governor Lord Soames and a call for a meeting of the Security Council to hear African complaints.

The Security Council met in early February, and Britain really received a drubbing. Representative after representative took the floor to condemn the British tactics of support for Bishop Muzorewa and opposition to Robert Mugabe. In the end, despite hours of wrangling over the wording of a resolution, the council adopted a draft that, in effect, called on Britain to stop violating the London agreement. The vote was 14-0. Britain refused to participate in the vote.

"We feel we are being sold down the river by the administering power," ZANU representative Tirivavi Kangai told the council. Kangai said that ZANU is "confident that if elections are conducted freely and fairly, the people will participate and choose their government democratically."

But, Kangai added, "Time is of the essence. If corrective measures are not taken soon, we shall not have any alternative besides that of continuing the armed liberation struggle."

Britain blamed all the trouble on Mugabe's ZANU. British Ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons, while denying altogether British responsibility for events in Rhodesia, said that ZANU alone had violated the ceasefire. "There have been serious breaches of the Lancaster House agreement," Parsons said. "But they have not been committed by my government." A Tanzanian delegate called Parson's remarks an effort to "refute the irrefutable."

There was clear evidence though that London was taking the council's deliberations very seriously. In the hope of undercutting the Africans' major argument, London and Pretoria announced just as the council was beginning its debate that several hundred South African troops stationed on the Rhodesian side of the South African border at Beitbridge would be withdrawn. But Africans hit back with the charge that several thousand more South African troops are still inside Rhodesia, stationed as far north as Victoria Falls on the Zambian border.

Despite the decision of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU to run separately in the February elections, a ZAPU representative was on hand to add his criticism of the British actions, especially Soames's decision to deploy the auxiliaries. "Our members have been subjected to intolerable acts of intimidation and unprovoked violence," said ZAPU's Callistus Ndlovu. "In the past two weeks some of our people have been killed or maimed. I personally witnessed an incident in which a young man wearing a Patriotic Front t-shirt was dragged from the street and killed. He was killed by supporters of Muzorewa. We obviously cannot allow this to go on unchecked. It is entirely up to the British authorities in Salisbury whether they will take immediate and effective measures to correct the situation or whether the Patriotic Front will be forced to make a commensurate response in defense of its members."

The resolution that eventually passed the council was a severely weakened form of the OAU declaration. Fearful of a British veto if the resolution was worded too strongly, the final version of the resolution called on London to "take all necessary steps in order to insure that all Zimbabwe nationals freely participate in the forthcoming elections." Britain obviously could not veto such a resolution despite its obvious anger at the critical words it heard throughout the debate. US Ambassador Donald McHenry played an important role in diluting the thrust of the resolution, but Africans went along, and the US voted in favor of the draft.

After the vote, McHenry attempted to absolve London of any specific wrongdoing. The US does not accept "the charges of violations of the Lancaster House agreement," McHenry said, after Parsons announced that Britain would not consider the measure binding in any way.

Yet the Africans had made their point forcefully. They had strongly condemned the British, passed a resolution that keeps the Security Council involved in the matter, and avoided a British veto. If the Rhodesian election collapses altogether, Africans plan to return to the council for further action.

African nations strongly condemned British actions in Rhodesia. Pictured here, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania addresses the security council meeting on Rhodesia.
With his two years experience as a Peace Corps volunteer in Ethiopia, Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts has a longstanding interest in African issues. On a recent Africa trip from December 28 to January 11, Sen. Tsongas stopped in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola and Nigeria, as well as South Africa. Then, in a letter to President Carter, he called on the US to give South Africa six months to show its willingness to dismantle apartheid, and he also pressed for official recognition of Angola, economic assistance to the front-line states, greater British communication with the Patriotic Front and US aid in Rhodesian refugee resettlement. Last week AFRICA NEWS questioned the Senator further about his views on the situation in southern Africa. Excerpts from the interview:

How do you evaluate the changes made in South Africa itself to date?
I think the changes that have been made are really cosmetic at best. There have been a number of statements that have gotten great international acclaim. But long-term change is a completely different thing—it seems to me that there has to be an acceptance of the inevitability of black majority rule, and [acceptance] that the separate development policy is intellectually bankrupt and cannot be sustained.

What about your six-month deadline suggestion?
The six months give us, one, the session of Parliament which will show in very concrete terms what it is they are prepared to do. And, secondly, Namibia should be resolved in that time period, and, if it is not resolved, we'll know why. And, thirdly, we can look perhaps at smaller policies such as passport controls, that kind of thing.

There's no question that six months from now we'll have a very good idea whether South Africa is simply doing what's necessary to stave off public opinion for a while or whether they have indeed abandoned apartheid and are moving—however one may argue the pace—towards majority rule. I don't think it's that difficult to make a determination.

If there has not been responsiveness, what particular measures do you think the US should take?
If you have intransigence on the part of the South Africans in the case of Namibia, then clearly we have the UN mandate that we should pursue, and our allies, I would hope, would be equally committed to that process.

Beyond that it's my analysis that the pulse of South Africa really is economic and that US corporations should be convinced both by the president and by the Congress to push very serious changes, and in the absence of that change should be prepared to get out. I think that until the South Africans really believe that it is in their interest to change, that the change will be simply a surface change.

In the present political climate, isn't US policy likely to move the other way, towards US cooperation with South Africa, as in financing Savimbi in Angola, for example?
Well, it really is hard to understand where we are going. In a presidential year, obviously, whoever ends up in the White House will have a lot to say about what kind of policy we will advocate. But I would think we would eventually see, both in terms of South Africa and in terms of Angola, a certain amount of realism creep into our policy, and I'm hopeful that that would happen sooner rather than later, and not as a result of the violence which at this point, I think, is inevitable in South Africa.

Your position would involve strengthening relations with all the front-line states, including Angola?
Oh, yes. The non-recognition of Angola is just as insane as non-recognition of China. Now that we are siding up to China as an ally against the Soviets, the bankruptcy of our policy is all the more arguable. Moreover I do believe many of the front-line states are reassessing their commitment, not so much in public statements as in private, towards socialism—at least as practiced in some countries—as a viable economic system. My own view is that there has to be some kind of private incentive solution, and given the long-term economic problems, I think forces are at work in this direction that are very favorable to the United States. My deep regret is that we don't seem to recognize this, that we always seem to react to problems rather than anticipate them.

US Senator Paul Tsongas with Samora Machel, president of Mozambique
**US Visitors: Looking Things Over**

Johannesburg—drawn by interests ranging from regional politics to technological exchanges, a long procession of prominent Americans have trekked through South Africa in early 1980.

As part of Washington's continuing reassessment of its policy in the subcontinent, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose toured South Africa's major urban areas and also visited a resettlement camp in Transvaal in January. In addition to a meeting with Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha, Moose talked with many prominent black figures.

In Port Elizabeth, for example, he saw officials of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization, as well as the wives of three PEBCO officials, Thozamile Botha, Phalo Tshume and Mono Badela, who were detained just after the Ford strike was settled.

In Durban, Moose met with Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and in Johannesburg he talked with representatives of several black consciousness organizations.

Most numerous have been the US Congressional delegations on business in the Republic, part of an unprecedented exodus to Africa during the current Congressional recess in Washington.

An entourage of 40 persons, including House of Representatives members and staff, accompanied majority leader Jim Wright here in early January. Their primary aim was to inspect the South African coal-gasification plant known as SASOL 1, as well as two larger facilities now under construction, SASOL II and SASOL III.

As noted in *Southern Africa* last month, seven members of the House Armed Services Committee, a group led by Chairman Melvin Price, toured these facilities in November of last year.

"I think SASOL technology is exactly what we need in the US today," Wright declared at the end of his visit. Admitting "he is not an engineer," Wright added that he believes American developers should fully explore SASOL's experience.

Last year the Carter administration approved the idea of using SASOL methods in the United States but ruled out a direct US-government-SASOL business deal. In addition, Texas Eastern Corporation of Houston has reached agreement with SASOL on studying the feasibility of employing the method in the US.

The desire to avoid appearing closely linked with South Africa has complicated Washington's approach to the coal-gasification technology, and House majority leader Wright declined comment on political issues during his stay. One of the twelve congressmen on the tour, however, did speak out. Representative William Gray of Philadelphia, a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, said during a dinner in the South African township of Soweto that he was shocked at what he had seen of conditions in the country.

Another recent visitor, Senator Paul Tsongas, also delivered criticism of South Africa's racial policies. Tsongas said that Prime Minister P.W. Botha must demonstrate during the parliamentary session which begins on February 1 that he is serious about major reforms. After the coming six-month period, the Massachusetts senator commented, he would favor actively discouraging US investment unless major changes had been set in motion. (See interview.)

A more sympathetic view of South Africa was taken by Representative James Santini, who chairs a mining subcommittee of the House Committee for Interior and Insular Affairs. Although Santini said at the end of his visit that he hoped for new changes to ensure stability, the Nevada Democrat declared that South Africa's mineral resources are vital to Western interests and are often undervalued in the Carter administration's strategic planning.

The most recent American delegation to visit here was a twelve member Rockefeller Foundation Committee studying US policy towards South Africa, which completed its tour late in January. Like Moose, the Rockefeller Commissioners, headed by Ford Foundation President Franklin Thomas, saw a cross-section of South African society. They are scheduled to return later this year for more specific discussions before completing their report in early 1981.

**AID Programs—Carrot and Stick**

While the Council on Foreign Relations is asking "Did Afghanistan begin in Angola?" there is no question that the heightened cold war resulting from the Afghanistán crisis will have its effect on southern African politics in Washington this year. The impact is already evident in the initial Congressional reaction to the administration's foreign aid request for year 1981.

Mozambique's vote in the United Nations against the US-sponsored resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has opened it up to increasing attack on Capitol Hill. The administration has requested $9 million Mozambique program for the purchase of agricultural implements, seed, and small farm machinery, and for construction of food storage facilities. Representative Millicent Fenwick, a usually liberal Republican member of the Africa Subcommittee, blasted Mozambique for acting like a Soviet "satellite," saying "Why do we continue to reward those who are unsympathetic to us?" Fenwick had previously advocated that the ban on aid to Mozambique be lifted, but she will oppose the $9 million this year. Fenwick's view is likely to be sympathetically received by other House members when the aid bill gets to the floor this summer.

The administration also put greater emphasis on competing with the Soviet Union as its rationale for aid to southern Africa as compared to previous years. The Congressional Presentation Document states, "The southern Africa area, rich in minerals, beset by conflict and political turmoil and the target of Eastern Bloc influence, has become increasingly important to the United States. Against this backdrop, US economic assistance is a most important instrument of US foreign policy..."

In order to "support an explicitly political scenario—the peaceful reintegration of southern Africa economically and politically," the administration requested $90 million in Economic Support Funds for southern Africa. The FY 1981 request is $20 million greater than the sum expected to be appropriated for FY 1980. The main new program this year is a $22 million project to upgrade existing road links, primarily between railway lines in Malawi and Mozambique, and to upgrade food storage facilities in the region. Training in railroading and in management are also included, as are studies to develop a scheme for promoting small-scale entrepreneurial activity.

Zambia continues to be the largest recipient of bilateral Economic Support Funds, with a $20 million grant primarily for purchasing US exports such as fertilizers. AID is requesting $2 million for more research, feasibility studies and sector assessments, an indication that AID expects its activity in southern Africa to expand considerably in the future.

Military aid to Africa is also going up, to over $49 million for FY 1981. Most of the increase is accounted for by a $30 million request for the Sudan, more than three times the amount requested last year. The administration also hopes to get $8 million in foreign military sales for Zaire, even though Congress cut a similar request last year.

**C.R.**

**African News**
Teaching a People to Read

When Mozambique achieved independence in 1975, it inherited an illiteracy rate of more than 85 percent from the Portuguese colonialists. In July 1978 the Mozambicans launched a broad-based literacy campaign and eighteen months later an estimated 250,000 Mozambicans have already taken their final exams and at least half of those involved are expected to have achieved a functional ability to read and write.

FRELIMO has given priority to mass education, as opposed to training a few high level cadre. Mozambique's "grassroots" approach to literacy is a controversial one, which has not won widespread international encouragement. Mozambique originally avoided turning to international organizations such as UNESCO for aid, fearing that the specialized agencies would exert pressures against FRELIMO's decentralized approach to literacy. Considerable help was, however, given by the Tanzanians, and the fact that over 125,000 adults have been taught basic reading skills in the first year is a clear sign of the campaign's success.

The literacy campaign is a typical example of the way in which the Mozambicans have dealt with problems resulting from 400 years of Portuguese colonialism and indicates how they are struggling towards self-reliance. Yet, despite its major successes, the literacy campaign has faced many difficulties.

President Machel has contended that because so few people are literate, it was necessary to "turn the country into a school in which everyone learns and everyone teaches." The program is based on the concept that each cooperative, organization or company should be responsible for making its members literate. Schools are run in three shifts with regular pupils in the morning and afternoon, and adults in the evening. The adult literacy program runs nine months and the program is roughly equivalent to the first two years of primary school. Classes are usually held for two hours after work in the workplace and students take the full program in addition to their normal everyday work load.

Educational priority is given to what President Machel has termed "vanguard sectors of the economy"—communal villages, state farms, factories and cooperatives as well as the army, FRELIMO cadre and members of the women's organization. People in the non-priority sectors have also been encouraged to organize their own courses but FRELIMO has been forced to admit that providing teachers for them is difficult, and the limited number of handbooks available has meant restricting the supply to only a few per class.

One major difficulty the campaign has faced is the approximately one dozen local languages spoken in Mozambique. Because Portuguese was chosen as a common language to unify the country, the Portuguese literacy campaign is particularly important. At a language seminar held by the National Directorate of Literacy and Adult Education (NLDNA) in October, it was emphasized that Mozambicans are expected to become bilingual. Portuguese is used in the areas of education, government and trade. However, Mozambican Portuguese, unlike Brazilian Portuguese, will be distinct from the colonial language and will incorporate local Mozambican idioms. Yet at this point, less than half the people speak Portuguese and many Mozambicans are studying to read a language they speak poorly if at all. In addition, there are so few

Continued on page 20

Rediscovering History

Independent Mozambique's first archaeological museum near Manyikeni (about thirty miles from the coastal town of Vilanculos), was officially opened on November 24, 1979. The exploration of the ruins at the site, which date back as far as 1200 AD, provides important evidence of Mozambican culture and pre-colonial history in southern Africa.

The existence of Manyikeni's stone-walls had been known for centuries, but the site was never excavated by the Portuguese because they were reluctant to acknowledge any tradition of African history. Thus in 1972, the Colonial Historical Monument Commission announced that these walls were the product of pre-historic Portuguese who voyaged from Tagus estuary, site of Atlantis, in ships which carried gold for King Solomon's Temple!

A very different picture has now emerged. Manyikeni was occupied from 1200 to 1750 and appears to have been an important

Continued on page 20
South African Maneuvers
Around Namibia

On March 4 in Cape Town, United Nations officials and the South African government will begin yet another round of talks about independence for Namibia. UN Special Representative (and Commissioner for Namibia) Martti Ahtisaari and his political and military team are scheduled to meet with South African Minister Roelof F. (Pik) Botha and other South African officials.

The timing is interesting. Parliament will be in full session in Cape Town, and the Zimbabwe elections results should just have been announced. It appears that South Africa has been marking time in the Namibia negotiations, wanting to watch the outcome of the Zimbabwe negotiations and elections before determining whether to accept a UN-monitored election in the territory.

Mineral rich Namibia is a prize that neither South Africa nor the US and its western allies want lost to a radical independent black government. But long after the UN withdrew its mandate in 1966, Pretoria continued ruling Namibia illegally, seeking to preserve direct control of the territory. This was a tactic the West feared would lead to black radicalization. Hence the western powers have pressured South Africa to come to some settlement with moderate elements among the black population, or even with SWAPO, if that cannot be avoided because of the movement’s increasing internal and international support. Delay in their view will only worsen the terms of settlement.

South Africa now appears prepared to relinquish direct control, but only to a black group of its own choosing, not to SWAPO. This attitude has become clearer as South Africa and the western members of the Security Council—the gang of five—have engaged in round after round of negotiations since 1977.

For South Africa the crucial question in any settlement centers on the exercise of military and administrative control in the transition period, because these are the factors that will help determine the outcome of any elections.

Thus even as it engages in negotiations with the UN, South Africa is trying to maintain firm military control in the area while moving ahead to place its chosen candidates in a position strong enough to confront SWAPO’s political challenge.

The Terms Discussed
Recent negotiations between the UN and South Africa have focused on two major military aspects of the UN proposed scheme for a transition period leading up to elections: these include a demilitarized zone 50 km in depth on either side of the Angola-Namibia border and the issue of SWAPO bases inside Namibia. Pretoria insists that all SWAPO guerrillas be removed from Namibia and the DMZ, but demands the right to maintain its own military bases intact.

SWAPO rejects these conditions, and in mid-February the newly-appointed military chief of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), Lieutenant General Prem Chand, began a series of visits in southern Africa in an attempt to smooth the way for the Cape Town meeting. Accompanied by a group of older UNTAG hands, the new commander talked with leaders of Angola and Zambia and with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma. Then, in Namibia, he conferred with Major General Jannie Geldenhuys, who heads the over 50,000 strong South African army of occupation in Namibia.

Pretoria’s Administrator-General in Namibia, Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, has already indicated South Africa’s reservations about the renewed talks. Viljoen warned that there were two “serious restraints” on the chances for progress. “General Chand,” he said, “is a total stranger in our negotiating process, and will, therefore, have to establish his credibility and trustworthiness.” Secondly, he said, the recent General Assembly reaffirmation of SWAPO as “the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people” would inhibit negotiations.

Smashing SWAPO
Administrator-General Viljoen and his South African police have relentlessly pursued their aim of ensuring that SWAPO will not be able to represent the people in an independent Namibia. Country-wide SWAPO leadership was placed in detention in April 1979, and although some have since been released, a new method of control has been instituted in the territory. This is a form of arbitrary banning, prevalent in South Africa itself, which restricts its vic-
tims to a specific town, village or country area, and prohibits attendance at any gathering (more than two people). In mid-February five SWAPO members attempting to re-open the movement’s office in Windhoek were arrested. South Africa continues to hold at least 200 ‘prisoners of war’ in isolated camps.

Viljoen has also tried to weaken SWAPO by offering an amnesty to SWAPO guerrillas. An intensive two-week campaign which included airborne pamphlets, radio appeals, and helicopter-borne loudspeaker exhortations in war-ravaged northern Namibia, reportedly produced three takers!

Constructing an Alternative

In 1975 Pretoria began the process of setting up an internal settlement by summoning carefully chosen representatives of Namibia’s black population, selected on a divisive ethnic basis, to the Turnhalle talks.

This led to the eventual formation of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), composed of conservative black groups and middle of the road whites. When South Africa ran its own unilateral elections in Namibia in 1978, no one was surprised that the DTA came out way ahead. The resulting Constitutional Assembly was transformed into the National Assembly in May of last year—by decree of the Administrator General—amid talk of that body becoming an interim government for South West Africa/Namibia. Viljoen then delegated executive powers to a twelve person committee of the National Assembly, made up entirely of DTA members led by white politician Dirk Mudge. In January 1980, Viljoen granted full executive powers to this shadow cabinet.

For some time, Pretoria has been playing out a double strategy: inching toward an independent South West Africa/Namibia and creating a governmental infrastructure, while at the same time maintaining negotiations with the United Nations and the Western Five.

In point of fact however, the DTA, South Africa’s chosen agent in this strategy, is a wobbly creature and has at best the slimmest support from Namibia’s black population. Western officials, though not disapproving of the Turnhalle group being assembled, have long recognized its inadequacy, and have encouraged the development of a middle force, based on non-SWAPO, non-DTA black and white elements. Most recently Western hopes have focused on the Namibia National Front—a coalition of six groups that were excluded from the DTA—and SWAPO D, a small group of breakaways from SWAPO. These groups are regarded as having a sophistication lacking in the DTA and an earnest dedication to Western values. Unfortunately for their Western backers, they lack a popular base. But Pretoria has manifested some cooperation by enlarging the National Assembly from 50 to 65 delegates so that a few of these middle-of-the-roaders might be accommodated. Attractive financial support for a NNF-SWAPO D merger has been reportedly proffered by West German and American interests, but internal leadership disputes seem to be delaying the emergence of the new party.

Containing White Reaction

Meanwhile, many of the whites in Namibia—less than one-tenth of a total population of a million plus—have grown restive over what they consider a threat to their continued domination. They have turned to AKTUR, the hard-line Afrikaner Nationalist Party, refusing to accept any integration of even the most moderate blacks into the power structure.

Prime Minister Botha sent in Broederbond leader Viljoen to handle the crisis. AKTUR, after a period of boycott, has decided to resume its six seats in the 50-person National Assembly. AKTUR is now pressing for a whites-only election, confident it can prevail against the white members of the DTA—the Republican party—and thus become ensconced as representing the whites in the territory, and prevent any further integration.

SWAPO Victories

As outlined above South Africa is now in the midst of a series of complex national and international maneuvers, all aimed at keeping some hold on Namibia.

The only serious challenge to its success comes from SWAPO—and the liberation movement appears to be gaining strength, despite Pretoria’s military build up and political crack-down. SWAPO’s guerrillas.
political crack-down. SWAPO's guerrillas have been making larger and stronger attacks in the north and reaching deeper into central Namibia. "The Windhoek Observer" of February 9 reports an admission by General Geldenhuys, "that despite substantial successes in the bush warfare, infiltration in the last months of 1979 and in the start of 1980, was still being stepped up."

Geldenhuys asserts that the SADF recorded 10 'insurgent' deaths per month in 1978; the figure leaped to 80 per month in 1979. He claims a kill ratio of 100 SWAPO guerrillas to 3 of his men. Yet South African casualties have mounted steadily. Six died in shoot-outs with SWAPO's soldiers in the first week of February. The Pretoria high command is deeply concerned over the morale of its men fighting a foreign war. Signs of strain, AWOLs, draft dodging, and even outright mutiny can be seen more clearly every day. The Namibian war is becoming a threatening sore.

Lately, the South African military has tried to relieve pressure on its forces by recruiting blacks into its armed services, but the "Windhoek Observer," continuing its report of the interview with General Geldenhuys, indicates that this has created new problems. According to the report, "The General . . . strongly dismissed a report that shooting had occurred in the ranks of his forces in Kaokoland. There was an unconfirmed report that white and dark-skinned soldiers had opened fire on one another. When the question was put to General Geldenhuys, he looked at Commandant Sonnekus, shaking his head, and the Commandant likewise said there was not a vestige of truth in the report."

March Meetings

Despite its crucial role, SWAPO has not been invited to the March 4 Cape Town meeting. It will be restricted to South African and UN personnel, thus also excluding the front-line states and, presumably, the Western powers. Although American, British, French, Canadian and West German ambassadors will, as is their custom when Parliament sits, be at hand in South Africa's legislative capital.

No one can be certain of the outcome of the meeting, but the frequently well-informed British publication, "Africa Confidential," reports that the Western powers and Pretoria have reached an understanding "which contains the seeds of an agreement not only virtually to exclude SWAPO from the election, but to use the DMZ as a deterrent to any attempt by SWAPO's military arm, PLAN, to wreck one." UNTAG's 7,500-man force would run the DMZ, PLAN would be disarmed (and certainly have no bases), the South African army, though reduced in numbers, would "retain headquarters in the DMZ, and be allowed to move freely throughout it."

It is difficult to see how such an agreement could be made acceptable internationally. The African states, in particular, are increasingly angered by the stalling over Namibia. It is doubtful that Western-conceived negotiations could survive a further stalemate at Cape Town, and their failure would most likely produce a strong move for economic sanctions against Pretoria. Such action would almost certainly be countered by a Western nation Security Council veto.

Lest the real issue get lost in all this maneuver and counter-manuever, SWAPO recently restated its position quite simply: "The real problem is not the interpretation of some aspect of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) (the UN plan for an election in Namibia) or the implications of the DMZ proposal. In simple terms the real problem is that South Africa is still in illegal occupation of Namibia after 13 long years of numerous UN resolutions, and that it is still continuing to entrench itself and has no intention of withdrawing."
Operation Daisy—An Agent Surfaces

by a special correspondent

South Africa is infested with racist laws. And spies... It has been suggested that there are more informers, both black and white, than there are police. At any meeting—church or social—where there are more than ten people, at least one can be assumed to be a police informer. But although an occasional cover has been blown, so far nothing as intriguing as Operation Daisy has been revealed since the 1960’s, when Abram Fischer, a prominent Afrikaner jurist and leader of the South African Communist Party, was betrayed and sentenced to life imprisonment on the testimony of a spy called Gerald Ludl.

Operation Daisy was run by South Africa’s Security Police. At the center of the web was Craig Williamson, a.k.a. Captain Williamson a.k.a. South African Security Police Agent Number RS 167. He had penetrated the top echelons of the renowned Geneva-based International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), a relief organization funding anti-apartheid groups and individuals inside and outside of South Africa, and used this position to win the confidence of many southern Africans who held positions of leadership in the liberation struggle. Operation Daisy collapsed, or is believed to have collapsed, on January 18, 1977, when Williamson confessed that he was a spy. In less than two years, he had a meteoric rise within IUEF to the position of Deputy Director under IUEF head Lars-Gunnar Eriksson.

Because of IUEF’s extensive international network of activities and funding sources, Williamson’s disclosure sent shockwaves throughout Europe, Canada, Africa, and the United States. The urgent question was not only how much damage Williamson had done but whether there were others of his ilk still operating undercover.

Policeman, Student, Spy

In order to understand this bizarre story, one needs to go back to South Africa and trace the history of its main character. Craig Williamson was born in South Africa in 1949, attended a well-known private school, and at the age of 18, like other white men, was required to join the army for two year hitch. After he came out in 1968, Williamson chose to join the police force. He was stationed at Brixton, a notorious police station known for its brutal torture and killing of black “criminals.” While at Brixton, Williamson was promoted to the rank of sergeant and also, apparently, was introduced or attracted to undercover police work. He next turned up at an ideal spot to launch this new career—the University of the Witwatersrand, where a lively anti-apartheid group existed. Wits had a liberal tradition well-known both inside South Africa and overseas. In fact, John Vorster, former Minister of Justice and later Prime Minister, regarded Wits students as “communists.”

In 1971, Williamson enrolled for a Bachelor of Arts degree at Wits and joined the Student Representative Council (SRC), a vehicle of student dissent on campus. Williamson openly admitted working for the police in Brixton and explained that he had been “politicised” by this experience. By 1972, he had already been elected into the executive of the SRC. There were six members of the executive at the time. It has now been disclosed that three of those members worked as undercover agents for the police!!!

At the end of 1974 Williamson abandoned his studies at Wits and travelled to Cape Town to work full-time in his new job as financial officer of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), an organization which was itself operating a variety of overseas funded anti-apartheid projects at the time. Within two years, just as the government was becoming concerned about the gradual rise and strength of the Black Consciousness Movement which was receiving almost all its funds from the IUEF, Williamson had risen to the position of vice-president of NUSAS. Mike Stent, NUSAS president at the time, remembered Williamson as “a very intelligent, very competent person....”

In a move that is now interpreted as having been aimed at giving Williamson more credibility in anti-apartheid circles, the government withdrew his passport. In January 1977, after being assured that he would get a job with the IUEF, Williamson planned what looked like a daring escape and fled the country into Botswana. He went across the border with Eric Abraham, Cape Town journalist who had been banned and harrassed by the government. With hindsight this can now be interpreted as a bold way of strengthening his reputation.

On arrival in Europe, Williamson was first employed as Information Officer for IUEF, winning a promotion to deputy director two years later, based in large part on strong recommendations from anti-apartheid sources.

Some Doubts

Duncan Innes, a former South African NUSAS leader now living in Britain, twice made strong representations to Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, director of the IUEF about suspicions of Williamson. After their first encounter, Eriksson claimed that he had made “independent investigations” which cleared Williamson. In a letter to Innes, he wrote: “I now hope we can close the file on this nasty affair and return to what I regard as sanity....”

The following year, Innes visited South Africa again and found more information casting suspicion on Williamson. Again he communicated his fears to Eriksson and IUEF. “Lars was again upset about what he regarded as useless rumor-mongering,” Innes recalled.

When Innes visited South Africa in 1979 and came out with even more suspicions, he made no attempt to “upset” Eriksson further. Instead he passed information to friends and others likely to deal with Williamson. Even after the African National Congress (ANC), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) Education Secretary Dzingai Mutumbuka, and Rord Palmlund, voiced their suspicions that Williamson was a spy, Eriksson told the IUEF annual conference late last year that he retained the fullest confidence in Williamson.”

Meanwhile, Williamson was increasing his influence inside IUEF. He was already in charge of funding activities inside South Africa out of IUEF’s $9.5-million budget, provided primarily by the governments of Sweden, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. IUEF programs included the provision of several thousand scholarships and the funding of a variety of community level projects.

Until Williamson came along, one of the organizations that got the bulk of its financing from IUEF was the Black Consciousness Movement (an umbrella of several political bodies operating openly in South Africa until October 19, 1977). Williamson apparently was more interested in infiltrating the ANC, which unlike BCM, operated entirely underground inside South Africa, and was increasingly sending freedom fighters into South Africa. He lob-
bied that IUEF support ANC exclusively and his wishes were met. But IUEF continued to maintain links with the BCM leadership, and appears to have used its influence to press for contact and discussion between the two bodies.

Betrayal Fails?
On December 8, 1979 an informal meeting between the BCM and ANC took place in Lusaka, Zambia. From BCM came Ben Khoapa from the US, Barney Pityana, from London, and Jeff Baqwa from West Germany. The ANC was represented by Secretary-General Alfred Nzo, executive member Thabo Mbeki, and Winston Nkondo, another top aide.

On December 12, Pityana and Khoapa were scheduled to leave Lusaka for Maseru, Swaziland, to connect with a flight to Lesotho, where they were expected to report on their talks in Lusaka. They changed their minds in the Lusaka airport, however, because of reported political disturbances in Lesotho. Both men later flew back to London. Meanwhile, Nkondo, who was booked on the same flight to Lesotho as Pityana and Khoapa, continued on the journey.

The Lesotho Airways flight in which Nkondo was a passenger developed alleged “engine trouble” before reaching Lesotho and instead landed in Bloemfontein, South Africa. South African Airways provided buses to take passengers to the border gate about 100 miles away. Awaiting the buses were security policemen who promptly arrested Nkondo. Had Khoapa and Pityana been on the same flight, they too would be in a South African jail.

Their close escape is more intriguing because IUEF had supplied the tickets for Pityana and Khoapa to travel to Lusaka. It can therefore be assumed that Williamson knew about the timing and other details of their trip to Zambia, both directly and through the IUEF office in Lusaka.

In fact, from December ‘79, Williamson had already been appointed “liaison officer” of the IUEF to the ANC in a projected changed role that followed on his request that he be relieved of the “burden of administrative work.”

Breaking Cover
After this Lusaka meeting, Williamson started to behave “strangely.” His wife, Ingrid “disappeared” from Geneva and was rumored to have gone back to South Africa. Shortly thereafter, Williamson himself dropped out of sight for over 10 days.

At about the same time, another South African policeman named Arthur McGiven surfaced in London as a “defector” from BOSS. In his early disclosures, McGiven made cursory remarks on IUEF. But he made no mention of Williamson, although he later claimed, after Williamson had revealed his Pretoria connection, to have received reports from the IUEF official.

Whether Williamson panicked because of McGiven’s alleged “defection” or because of his own failure to deliver Pityana and Khoapa or even because suspicions about his spying were increasing, is all academic. For whatever reason, on January 18, Williamson telephoned his boss Eriksson and asked him to come to the Hotel Zurich. It was at this meeting that Williamson confessed that he had been a member of the South African police force since 1968. “And I still am,” he declared.

Williamson was quick to explain that he was not a member of BOSS. “We are not as bad as you think. The BOSS, they are...” continued on page 21
Bank Takeover—

Urban Warfare Escalates

Fannie Mofoko, one of three young men killed recently after seizing control of a suburban Pretoria bank, was given a hero’s funeral by his Soweto community. A mile-long procession of an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 people accompanied Mafoko’s body from his home to the cemetery, singing freedom songs and holding aloft pictures of the youth and signs proclaiming him to be a freedom fighter.

Mafoko, along with Wilfred Madela and Humphry, Makhubo, demanded the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela when they took over the Silverton branch of Volkskas on January 25 and took more than 20 people hostage. The three, in their early 20s or younger, were gunned down when police stormed the building six hours later. One hostage died in the exchange and another died later. Several more were critically injured.

Officially, the ANC continues to claim no responsibility for the attack. In a statement issued in Lusaka, the ANC described itself as observing “as far as humanly possible all norms that aim to protect civilians in military conflict.” South African reports suggest that a youth movement independent of the ANC might have been responsible, while police maintain that the three were among the many youths who left South Africa after the 1976 uprisings and received ANC military training.

The demands of the three guerrillas, which they wanted published, could have shed light on this, but the Minister of Police has refused to make these public, saying that it would be “tactically incorrect.” At least three persons were subsequently arrested in connection with the attack, one or more reportedly in an area near the Mozambique and Swaziland borders where a guerrilla base may have been established.

The seizure of the hostages in the Volkskas attack represents a new level of confrontation and a departure from other recent guerrilla actions, which have included assaults on several police stations and on blacks thought to be informers. It is a sign that another stage in urban warfare has been reached, the escalation in step with the increasing number of armed guerrillas clandestinely returning home from post-1976 exile and training. Even though the majority of the militant actions that have taken place since the Soweto uprisings have been in urban areas, this is the first to be directed towards and to result in the death of whites.

The choice of Volkskas “People’s Bank” in Afrikaans, was deliberate, as it is perceived as closely linked to Afrikaner interests. It was founded in 1933 as the first bank to specifically serve the Afrikaner community, which felt itself unfairly dealt with by British and other foreign-owned institutions. Volkskas now owns part or all of a large number of industrial and farming operations in addition to conducting traditional banking activities.

The government’s praise for the police performance in recapturing the bank, reflects the regime’s decision to be intransigent in such confrontations and to deal with them swiftly, whatever the cost. The white community has been jolted by the attack, increasing their sense of vulnerability even in the built up urban areas where Africans’ lives are rigidly controlled and whose presence is only tolerated as units of labor.

Whites in general are likely to be faced with conflicting emotions: the desire for a

Continued on page 21
Ultra-Right on Trial

Steve Goodman

Racist terrorism in South Africa is nothing new but the recent arrest and prosecution of right-wing terrorists is. Of an estimated 1,600 reported cases of right-wing violence in South Africa over the last ten years, the trial of three extremists last August marks the first time the South African government has cracked down on the ultra-right.

Bringing the three extremists to trial for shooting at the home of the leader of the main opposition party in Parliament may amount to no more than a hand-slapping of the ultra-right, reminding them that the government still calls the shots. But some analysts see a greater significance in the trial. They say it is a sign of a growing power struggle on the right.

Typical of the right-wing opposition to Prime Minister Botha’s reformist posture is the statement made by Connie Mulder, former Information Minister, calling on him to “stop making concessions that jeopardise the white man’s position ... rather fight it out while the white man is still in a position of strength.” And true to these words, the ultra-right is trying to “fight it out” through acts of violence and intimidation in an attempt to take things into their own hands.

According to court testimony, only days before shots were fired into the home of Colin Eglin, leader of the opposition Progressive Reform party, he was warned “to stop sabotaging South Africa” by a man calling himself Scorpio.

The extreme right’s challenge to the Botha Administration is in part a response to the problem posed by the growth of the southern African liberation movements. Court testimony shows that the extremists are impatient with what they regard as too weak a government plan for checking the advances of the liberation movements. They are anxious to strike out on their own, fighting to impose their own brand of “law and order” on the left.

Arnold van der Westhuizen and Bryan Cecil Hack, two of the extremists brought to trial, apparently met with an ultra-right wing group of students from the University of Cape Town, hours after the Eglin shooting, to discuss forming combat units trained in guerrilla warfare. Van der Westhuizen told the group called the Conservative Students’ Alliances (CSA), of which Hack is the president, that the group needed to prepare for a massive campaign of urban terrorism in South Africa to be launched by the ANC in the wake of the Rhodesian elections.

While Van der Westhuizen was convicted of sabotage and attempted murder under the Terrorism Act and sentenced to six years in prison, the 23-year-old Hack was cleared of all charges. A third accused, David Beelders, was found guilty of conspiring with Van der Westhuizen in several acts including arson, bombings, and disruption of political meetings. He was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison.

The impact of the trial on the ultra-right is difficult to predict. If Hack’s comments mean anything, the right wing crusade will continue. “If anything,” said Hack after the trial, “the experience has reinforced my beliefs.”

A Scuttled Tanker—Secret Oil for South Africa

Question: South Africa has no oil of its own, and the post-Shah government of Iran has joined all the other members of OPEC in refusing to supply South Africa; so how do the international oil companies surmount the embargo and make their South African deliveries?

Answer: They set up secret schemes of almost Byzantine complexity, involving front companies, swaps, laundering operations—you name it, they use it. Perhaps, indeed, they learned something from thirteen years of overcoming Rhodesian sanctions.

South Africa receives one or two tankerloads of oil per week. Almost nothing is known about how the operations are organized, or which countries are the perhaps unwitting original suppliers of the oil. But in early February, details began to emerge of one shipment where things didn’t go quite according to plan.

See if you can follow this:

Last November 29, a supertanker named the South Sun, then sitting in Dubai, was purchased from $11.5 million in cash by a company named Oxford Shipping. Although registered in Liberia, Oxford Shipping operates out of an office in Houston, Texas, with three desks, a telephone answering service, and a monthly rent of $135. The company owns no other ships, and up until the purchase, it was hardly in a position to buy a rowing boat, let alone a tanker.

Oxford Shipping renamed the tanker the Salem, and immediately chartered it to another Liberian-registered company called Shipomex, which had only been in existence for a few weeks, and was operating out of an equally shabby office in Switzerland. Shipomex couldn’t even afford to pay the rent.

Shipomex arranged to use the Salem to carry to Italy a cargo of Kuwaiti oil owned by a Swiss-based Italian company named Pontoil.

Shipomex hired a Tunisian crew under a Greek “captain,” who in fact had fraudulent papers. The Salem sailed to Kuwait, picked up the oil, and set off for Italy. By fortunate chance, large tankers making such a journey cannot use the Suez Canal, and have to sail right round the Southern part of Africa.

A few days after the Salem left Kuwait, Pontoil sold to Shell all the oil the Salem was carrying. Such sales on the high seas are relatively common. The ship—so we are told—was still supposed to continue all the way to Italy. But as it approached South Africa, the first two letters of the Salem’s name were painted out, one letter was added at the end—and the ship was now called the Lema.

The “Lema” then made an unscheduled call at Durban; and on the night of December 27 (as we now know), it quietly unloaded 176,000 tons of crude oil, worth $56 million. The tanker was then re-loaded with sea water, to give the continued appearance of a full load.

Our schizophrenic tanker then left Durban, changed its name back to the Salem, and sailed on up the West Coast of Africa—all ready to deliver its cargo of high-quality South African sea water to Italy.

When it was off Senegal, sailing over one of the deepest parts of the Atlantic, another tanker, the British Trident, hove into view. Five minutes later, the Salem was rocked by a series of on-board explosions and started going down. Her crew, clearly a well-disciplined body of men, clambered into their lifeboats to be picked up by the conve-

Continued on page 21
In December 1979, Mozambique president Samora Machel described the impact of those trade-offs as follows: "with $550 million, we could have, all at the same time, one big textile factory, ten technical schools, two good central hospitals, one good health center in each district, 1000 tractors, 100 locomotives, one big agricultural implements factory . . . and we could take electricity from Cabora Bassa to Pemba. We don't argue about the sacrifice. It was worth it. Zimbabwe will be free. Rebel Rhodesia has ceased to exist."

On December 24, 1979, Mozambique formally reopened the border with Rhodesia. Almost $30 million in immediate repairs to Mozambique's transport and shipping infrastructure must be completed before traffic can return to an even flow and Mozambique can handle the expected level of commerce.

The Next Stage

The disruption of regional economic patterns in southern Africa has profoundly affected the process of liberation in Zimbabwe. The nature of the independent Zimbabwe will in turn profoundly affect the reconstruction of those patterns and the political economy of the region.

A neo-colonial settlement in Zimbabwe dooms the newly independent countries of southern Africa to continued dependency as satellites of South Africa. Zimbabwe will then become the brightest star in South Africa's "constellation of states."

On the other hand, if it achieves genuine independence, Zimbabwe's potential industrial and agricultural capacity creates the possibility of regional economic development that can minimize and reduce the dependency on South Africa, opening the way for an escape from the heritage of poverty and underdevelopment.

History

Continued from page 12

regional center. The settlement has a central stone enclosure and is known as a "zimbabwe." The zimbabwes—of which there are approximately 150 in Mozambique and present day Zimbabwe—are particularly significant because they were the first societies in southern Africa with class differentiations. The site at Manyikeni reveals three distinct periods and indicates the development of a class within the enclosed area with a higher standard of living than that of the population outside the wall. Another of the most important discoveries made at the site is that the people of Manyikeni smelted iron.

Contrary to established archaeological norms, Manyikeni is being excavated not by a few archaeologists with hired workers, but for the most part by the Mozambican people themselves. They work under the close supervision of Mozambican and foreign professional archaeologists, but the people have also contributed directly. The inhabitants near Manyikeni are extremely familiar with local plants and animals and are easily able to identify bones and seeds they have found in the diggings. Professionals, however, often had to return to the laboratories to identify findings.

Mozambican President Samora Machel has described the cultural aspect of Portuguese colonialism as "a process of denying the national character, alienating the Mozambican from his country and his origin, and in exacerbating his dependence on abroad, forcing him to be ashamed of his people and his culture."

The opening ceremony for the Manyikeni Museum was marked by 500 people singing and dancing, celebrating the rediscovery of a national culture which was for centuries suppressed by Portuguese colonialism.

R.R. □
Bank Takeover

Continued from page 18

show of force in the hope of curbing such actions, on the one hand, and the fear that many more whites will be hurt and killed when the government takes a hard line. Robert Anderson, whose 19-year-old daughter Cindy died during the gunfire, told reporters, "I feel very bitter about the tragedy. If the terrorists wanted to negotiate and the police refused, I find it unforgivable that innocent people died. Any alternative that could have saved Cindy's life would have been preferable."

Despite the wish of the white press to portray the so-called "terrorists" in as bad a light as possible, the hostages reported fair treatment. Dina Harding, a young woman who escaped from the bank just after the guerrillas took over, reported that one of the three announced, "I'm doing it for my country and my people—I love my country but I love you too." She added that the three said they had political motives, not financial ones.

One of the hostages who remained in the building throughout the siege recalled that all were permitted to have food and water and that the three "said they were recruited to 'get things right' in South Africa. They said they wanted equal rights.

Perhaps the most telling example of how timid the white English-language press has become in recent months, following a nearly successful government effort to effectively muzzle it, was the way in which such newspapers treated the Volkskas story. Besides carrying lurid pictures of the slain men, together with detailed police versions of events, they referred consistently to the three youths as "terrorists."

The Rand Daily Mail switched "terrorist" for "gunmen" in stories filed by two of their black reporters, to which the reporters responded with a public apology. The Post, the black daily, was the only paper to use "guerrillas", and was severely criticized by the government-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation for doing so. The Post commented that "If there is anything at all that has caused us to believe in the crisis situation in this nation, it's the black and white different reactions and attitudes to the three seige guerrillas."

This is reflected in a comment by one African woman in her 50's: "They should have killed them all." The many comments like it show the increasing acceptance on the part of the African population that violence against the apartheid regime is the only way to bring about change.

Some observers suggest that the harsh measures adopted by the government may prove ineffective in halting further guerrilla efforts. Dr. Michael Hough, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Pretoria, was quoted in South Africa as raising the possibility that the trio might be a prototype of future "suicide squads" prepared to sacrifice their lives if necessary for their cause. Hough noted that if this should prove to be the case, no amount of force will be a deterrent.

It is certainly true that at the time of the Soweto uprisings, the students displayed extraordinary courage in the face of overwhelming odds. It is unlikely that this determination can be stemmed by increased repression on the part of the government.□

Scuttled Tanker

Continued from page 19

nently nearby British Trident. Impressive-
ly, the rescued sailors all had packed suit-
cases with them.

Why sink the ship? Well, it had a cargo of
sea water masquerading as crude oil. The
expected recipients might have objected to
paying $56 million for that. Or possibly one
or more of the parties were hoping to claim
the insurance value of their "full" tanker.

Unfortunately for the co-conspirators,
one of the sailors from the Salem disobeyed
instructions, and started talking about the
secret off-loading at Durban. Some curious
press reporters began tracking down the
story. Then the lawsuits started flying.
Shell claimed to be the injured party, saying
that its oil had been "stolen" and had been
quite improperly off-loaded at Durban.
Maybe that's true. And maybe not. For it's
worth recalling that Shell owns a half share
in South Africa's largest refinery, which
happens to be located in Durban. And
which someone, somehow, has to keep fed
with a steady diet of crude oil.

What will they think of next week?

Operation Daisy

Continued from page 17

lunatics and prejudiced people. We are dif-
frent," Williamson claimed.

At about this time, Williamson and
Eriksson were joined by a man in a duffle
cost. Williamson introduced him as
Brigadier Johan Coetzee, chief of the
Security Police. According to an official
statement issued by IUEF's acting-director,
Piers Campbell, Brigadier Coetzee and
Williamson "attempted to persuade"
Eriksson not to blow Williamson's cover.
"Eriksson was told that it would be in the
interest of the organization and the safety of
himself and his family to accept a deal,"
continued the statement.

The IUEF statement went on to express
the fear that the organization may be
smarmed by a campaign by the police. But
as far as the damage that Williamson had
done, the statement was as weak as its
organization seems to have been all along in
its ability to take action against Williamson
when all kinds of allegations were being ex-
pressed about his spying.

Secret Fund

To complicate matters, it has further
been reported that Eriksson, Williamson,
and Neville Rubin, another former NUSAS
leader, had all been directors of a secret
shur fund called Southern Futures, based
in Vaduz, Liechtenstein. It is alleged that
the fund operated with monies diverted
from IUEF projects, but Eriksson never
told the IUEF about this fund, which he
and Williamson used to finance the Pan
Africanist Congress (PAC), the other South
African liberation movement, and the ANC
(Nationalist), a splinter group of the ANC.

On January 24, Louis le Grange, Min-
ister of Police praised Williamson for
"outstanding services." Le Grange claimed
that Williamson had infiltrated the South
African Communist Party, the ANC, PAC,
and the BCM. The government Afrikaans
newspaper Beeld claimed that Williamson
had "negotiated in Moscow on behalf of
leftists and communist organizations."
The Beeld crowed: "His enemies fear him
and admire him." There are reports that
Williamson will star as a crucial witness in
a series of forthcoming show trials.

Give your students a window on current events with Southern Africa.

You can receive bulk orders of 10 or more each month at a 25% discount. At this rate 10 copies would be $7.50 or 75c each.

Please enter my order for


Name

Address

zip code

MARCH 1980/SOUTHERN AFRICA 21
'Taking Stock': A Call for a Conference to Review Anti-Apartheid Work

Prexy Nesbitt is a long-time southern Africa activist, and former national coordinator of the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa. He has recently accepted a job with the World Council of Churches in Geneva and the proposed move encouraged him to review some of the work he has been involved in recently. His comments are offered in the hope that they will simulate both discussion and action to strengthen anti-apartheid and solidarity work in the 1980's.

South Africa encourages concerned activists to take up the discussion in our columns. But keep your contributions brief and direct-no long rhetorical passages please!

Now is the 25th hour. It is time for activists to take an in-depth look at our work, both anti-apartheid organizing—the divestment, anti-Krugerrand and bank campaigns—and African solidarity work (material support drives, information offices) throughout the United States. There is no doubt that the last several years have seen a substantial growth in anti-apartheid and solidarity actions all over the country. But, it is just as true that the last year has seen a serious decline in activity.

Why is this the case? What have we been doing? Where have we been? Where have we headed? These are some of the questions now standing before us. What follows are some observations which I would like to offer as an early contribution to a national discussion on the issues.

It seems useful to recall at this point where we came from, and to recognize that the roots of the anti-apartheid and solidarity groups go back to the early twentieth century. Those roots were nourished by people and organizations coming from the black American community.

Secondly, it is important to remember that there has, and must be, an intimate relationship between anti-apartheid work and the struggle being waged by the national liberation forces themselves. It was in 1948, for instance, that the first exposes were made of the role of international cap-

Black Commitment

The historical and potential readiness for mobilization of the black American community—more than but not to the exclusion of other groupings in the United States—needs to be more widely understood and appreciated, as we think about future organizing. Too many of us have forgotten that in the early 1970s, 40,000 black Americans, West Indians and African led by the ALSC (African Liberation Support Committee) marched in Washington on African Liberation Day to protest US corporate support for apartheid. The current loss of that kind of mass involvement is related to other dynamics such as the systematic state campaign of eliminating black leadership in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But some of the loss of that mass involvement is rooted in the strategies and tactics that have characterized both anti-apartheid and solidarity work.

The close relationship between the struggle inside Southern Africa and solidarity work outside, is reflected in the extent to which the student divestment movement, both in Britain and the United States, has peaked and waned in almost direct proportion to the pace of events inside South Africa. In 1976, 1977, and early 1978, as the Soweto struggle sharpened with students' school boycotts, trials, arrests, and deaths, more and more campus groups geared up to cut their schools' financial linkages to South Africa, by ending investment in US corporations carrying on business under apartheid.

What has all of this activity meant? What is its potential for the future?

It is true that divestment and the sale of stock, have become major anti-apartheid rallying points on a number of campuses. But too often it has been just that. Consistently, there has been a failure to employ...
divestment as only one of many tactics. Student anti-apartheid groups have not gone beyond the "divest now" struggle to other efforts, such as explaining the liberation movements or exposing and publicizing collaborative research which supports apartheid and is conducted by academics on the same campuses. The lack of educational work has resulted in a lack of substantive material support. Sadly, US campuses, with the potential to mobilize hundreds of thousands of dollars for such concrete assistance as blankets, clothing, radios, etc., contribute relatively little to material support.

This short-sightedness is also the product of a political situation in which tactics have become the objective. Instead of viewing divestment work as one of a number of programmatic goals, it becomes the entire program.

In my view, shareholder activism shares the same characteristic. By "shareholder activism" I mean the enterprise of promoting, lobbying, and voting corporate proxies concerning South Africa, largely through institutional investors (originally churches, but increasingly schools, universities, and pensions funds), all of which culminates in either disclosure, non-expansion or withdrawal resolutions at the annual meetings. In the dozen or so years that shareholder activism has been around, it has succeeded—about this there is no doubt—in publicizing issues which otherwise would have received no attention.

But shareholder activism, in the form of voting stock, is a tactic that can only be pursued by a minority of Americans. It seems to me that too much of the scant resources available to anti-apartheid activists is being consumed solely by shareholder activist organizations. Fewer and fewer American churches, proportionately speaking, are supporting the "grass roots" door-to-door type of work being done by most small-budgeted, small-staffed, anti-apartheid organizations.

These statements should not be construed as a retirement order for shareholder activism. Rather, they are suggestions that shareholder activism now assume a secondary role to the greater task of mass-oriented educational and mobilizational work. Further, the annual pilgrimages for shareholder voting—many of which have brought record voting percentages in the last two years—should be coordinated with mass activity. As five or six individuals or institutional investors vote on the inside, five or six hundred should be marching on the outside.

**Worker Role**

An important weakness of shareholder activism thus far has been our failure to help mobilize those elements of the population who are the most capable of putting pressure on the transnational corporations collaborating with South Africa. Thus for instance, in the early spring of 1978, Chicago activists held a meeting with the Motorola Company, a TNC headquartered in nearby Schaumberg, Illinois. When a questioner asked about company activities in South Africa—which included selling radios for South African police vehicles—executives defended themselves by saying that they weren't selling the South African police their best equipment, only their second-best equipment. They kept their best equipment for the Chicago police department!

Chicago has one of the highest police civilian kill ratios in the entire United States. The ongoing local campaign against police abuse, the memory of the 1968 Democratic convention, and the December 1969 sunrise assassination of Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark Clark are all events embalmed in the memories of black Chicagans. This connection should have been built upon so that the discussion with Motorola would have had an active mass base.

Yet instead of it being axiomatic that anti-apartheid work is a component of the general struggle against racist oppression inside the USA, all too often anti-apartheid work has served a substitute function.

Our failure to develop a mass constituency for anti-apartheid work is not just true in the arena of shareholder activism. It is a criticism that could be equally applied, with a few exceptions, to anti-Krugerrand work, anti-mercenary recruitment, university divestment campaigns, and the bank withdrawal campaigns.

There have been of late substantial successes in international anti-apartheid work. Work in the sports arena and the internationally coordinated bank-withdrawals campaign, are two good examples of this trend. What seems to have most enhanced our effectiveness has been the amount of coordination in organizing and timing of actions. The fact that Canadian, US, British, and other European groups have consistently, over the past three years, coordinated their actions against the world's multinational lending institutions is probably the major reason that there are some victories to discuss.

A major direction in which the anti-apartheid movement must move is toward more coordinated international activities. Just as TNC's obtain some of their power from the presence of bases in various countries, so too should anti-apartheid forces construct more multinational, coordinated campaigns.

It is true, of course, that the anti-apartheid forces, most particularly the non-governmental organizations, cannot marshal the resources available to the TNC's. But there are certain specific and concrete steps we can take in spite of our limited resources. Some of them are:

- **Create or support one magazine which can provide a comprehensive and current updating on the various activities going on in different countries.**

- **Prepare more work on the TNC's jointly with various targeted national and international constituencies.** In other words, when an analysis of Ford Motor Company's role in South Africa is being done, let us solicit and jointly compile information that also depicts Ford in Britain, Ford in Mexico, Ford in the US.

- **Organize more contact between anti-apartheid activists from different countries, including perhaps more tours by activists rather than big name speakers.**

- **Strengthen the tradition of international days of withdrawal, and organize international fund raising days to support countries such as Mozambique and Angola which are so much the target of South African aggression.**

- **In view of the important role media coverage plays in organizing campaigns, let us exchange more information on journalists and the media generally (print and electronic).** So that anti-apartheid groups, African governments, and the liberation movements have a better idea of who is who in the international media.

- **Organize a national working conference of anti-apartheid and solidarity organizations to weigh questions of strategy and tactics for the 1980s.**

The period ahead will be filled with obfuscations and grey zones. Already, the South Africa Foundation and various political and corporate allies from the liberal Ford Foundation to the American Chamber of Commerce, are actively promoting the moderate solution candidates, the Muzorewas of South Africa. Lucy Mwubalo, Helen Suzman, Gatshe Buthu-lezi, Nicholas Wiehahn, Pieter Koornhof, all are now riding lecture circuits and making television appearances in various Western capitals.

Recently Reverend Leon Sullivan's organization announced plans to bring hun-
action news notes

dreds of black workers from South Africa to the US for industrial training courses. While in the US, they would travel around speaking on the importance of US corporations remaining in South Africa.

Making Connections

As sectors of the South African ruling class push these activities more and announce more reforms, it is going to be increasingly difficult to mobilize against the South African apartheid system. Still, there are chinks in the armor of the TNC collaborators with apartheid. First, TNCs need to maintain a good image. They compete in the market place. They must continue to do so. One objective of our work should be to link that public image as extensively as possible with the brutality and violence that is inherent in the apartheid system. Recently, 2400 members of various US unions and groups supporting the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union organizing campaign against J/P. Stevens formed a two-mile long “human billboard” denouncing the J/P. Stevens textile company. More than a protest, this was strategically geared to put enough pressure on one corporate executive (from the Seamen’s Savings Bank) to force him to resign. It was one of several steps to isolate the J/P. Stevens Company from the financial and corporate community. We need such imaginative and carefully thought out tactics.

A second vulnerable area of apartheid’s collaborators is their domestic practice. All the US corporations with operations in South Africa also have home bases. We should constantly tie together their involvement in apartheid with their exploitative patterns at home. Economic security, a nuclear war or catastrophe, healthy and safe working conditions, all these concerns that people in Western metropoles will be agitated about throughout the 1980s. Making connections between domestic and foreign TNC actions will help build greater and greater mass awareness and participation.

People, whether they are Black, white, Latin, Asian, or Native American, who have not had the leisure of traveling, living, or working in Southern Africa, and who are down with the escalating war they wage daily to avoid unemployment, foreclosure, and the creditors, are not going to identify with or work on behalf of Southern African people simply out of moral empathy. Rather, it is when people perceive it to be in their material interest that they will act. Everyone, as Cabral used to emphasize, “wants to see their lives move forward” and to see better lives for their children.

It is in this area that we can give our work the mass character that it should have. Such exciting new developments as the recent mergers of several big unions with progressive unions long known for their anti-apartheid stances—the merger of the Service Employees International Union, SEIU, with the Drug and Hospital Workers Union, District Council 1199 is one example—provide new possibilities for us to broaden the labor connections of our anti-apartheid work. As more and more questions are raised about the manner in which pension funds are administered, new opportunities will emerge for us to suggest the removal of large pension funds from South Africa-related investment portfolios.

Additionally, we have often missed opportunities to work with local churches and local government officials—as has been recently done in the bank campaign work in Chicago. This is a result of our inability to carry out long-term educational work instead of organizing instant demonstrations—usually poorly attended—for quick publicity.

These are some of the concerns, questions, challenges, and obstacles that currently face us. I believe there is an urgent need for a national working conference to address the current situation. It might be called A Conference on Strategies and Tactics for the 80s, and it could be organized on the basis of clearly articulated points of unity. It should draw activists and potential activists from Maine to California, from Washington to Florida. Organizing it should not be the responsibility of only one or two national offices such as TransAfrica or the American Committee on Africa. Rather, it should be put together by various organizations, black and white, big and small.

Such a conference will not be easily organized nor is it guaranteed to be a smooth, trouble-free event. But we must set our own goals more clearly, and we must be more competent in our organizing work. In spite of the obstacles, the 1980s must see Africa work being done with more of a base—a broader, better informed, better organized constituency. A national working conference is a starting point to chart a new course.

Southern Africa

Have you asked your librarian to subscribe?

Campus Update

Spring Anti-Apartheid Conferences Planned

Regional conferences will be held this spring in the northeast, west, and the midwest. They will occur during a two-week period commemorating the Sharpeville massacre and the execution of ANC member Solomon Mahlangu. The northeast conference will be held at Princeton University on April 4-6. The mid-west conference will be held March 22 at Western Michigan University. Seattle will be the site of the western conference on April 2. The UN Special Committee Against Apartheid will send delegates to all three conferences.

These conferences are designed not only to educate activists about recent events in Southern Africa, but to develop strategies for anti-apartheid work in the coming year. The possibility of linking anti-apartheid organizing to domestic anti-racist struggles, as well as to the nuclear and draft issues will also be explored.

INDIANA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY ... The University recently divested all its holdings in American corporations doing business in South Africa. Indiana Central thus becomes the eighth school to fully divest, joining Antioch, Hampshire College, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Michigan State University, Ohio University, University of Oregon, and University of Wisconsin.

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY ... Activists continue to organize following last October’s militant sit-in that resulted in twelve arrests. At the last board of trustee’s meeting in January, fifty students staged a guerrilla theatre action highlighting US corporate complicity in apartheid. In February, students organized a large demonstration that was addressed and endorsed by local trade unions and the NAACP. On March 21, activists plan to hold a demonstration to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre and will host the mid-west regional anti-apartheid conference on the following day. For information contact: Don Cooney, 701 Norton Ave., Kalamazoo, MI, 49001 (616-349-3027).

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE ... This campus has seen an upsurge in anti-apartheid activity in recent months. In January and February, activists staged six pickets of corporate recruiters, including representatives of Citibank, Morgan Guaranty, and IBM. Organizers plan more pickets, including a demonstration at First National Bank of Boston on February 23.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY ... The People's Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa held a demonstration on January 26 which demanded divestment and expressed solidarity with the campaign to halt the execution of ANC member James Daniel Mange. On April 4, the Front will sponsor a commemoration of Martin Luther King, Jr. Princeton is also the site of the northeast anti-apartheid organizing conference to be held April 4-6. For more information call (609) 452-5495 or (212) 962-1211.

BEREA COLLEGE ... On January 17, activists held a forum on southern Africa that attracted 250-300 students, out of a school population of 2300. In February, the Tanzanian ambassador to the US came to Berea to speak on southern Africa, as did Mike Morgan, a member of the South African Military Resisters Aid Fund. The Berea Committee plans a big rally in April and will also participate in an African Student Association conference dealing with the Organization of African Unity.

AMHERST COLLEGE ... The Amherst Committee has held informational pickets against Chemical Bank and IBM this semester. In addition, over half the senior class has pledged not to contribute to the college until its investment policy changes, and there is currently an effort being made to mobilize alumni support.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY ... On February 18 the Harvard Committee held a picket of recruiters from Citibank and later that month took part in an action at First National Bank of Boston. Activists are also continuing with educational work and plan to hold a program on March 19 commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre.

Zimbabwe Emergency Concert

Hugh Masekela: Trumpeting for Freedom.

More than 3,000 people turned out at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City on the night of February 9. The occasion was the Zimbabwe emergency benefit concert, organized by the Committee to Support the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe. Fifteen thousand dollars was raised that evening—the net proceeds, some $10,000 was split evenly between the two wings of the Patriotic Front, ZANU and ZAPU.

The Committee, which comprised some 30-odd local, national, and southern African groups, was originally formed to raise funds to aid the Patriotic Front in contesting the February elections. This was felt to be particularly urgent because the Muzorewa forces have been receiving millions of dollars, overtly and covertly, from South Africa and various multinational corporations. ANC of South Africa and SWAPO of Namibia initiated the fundraising drive in response to an appeal from ZANU and ZAPU.

Hugh Masekela and Abdullah Ibrahim (Dollar Brand) headlined a host of outstanding artists, all of whom donated their talent and time free to the effort. Other performers included Machito and his orchestra, the Beaver Harris/Don Pullen & 360° musical experience, the Canaan Baptist Church of Christ Concert Choir, the Rod Rogers Dance Company, and jazz trumpeter Jimmy Owens.

The success of the evening was due mainly to the ability of the Committee to mobilize quickly and work collectively and effectively in support of the Front. The Committee made some important early decisions—including one that kept ticket prices low enough to enable many activists to attend the concert. Careful planning by four sub-committees covering organizational outreach, entertainment, finance and publicity enabled the group to achieve remarkable results in the four weeks between January 14th, the date of the ad-hoc group's initial meeting and the February 9th concert.

After the concert, the committee unanimously agreed to maintain itself for further support activities.
Note Change of Address

Southern Africa Committee
17 West 17th St.
New York, NY 10011

12/81

Northwestern Univ. Libr
Serial Dept/IAAM
Evanston IL 60201

Dear Subscriber,

Unfortunately, this year we were forced to raise the price of the magazine. We have done our best to keep the price as low as possible. However, the cost of printing has increased, and we need to make a change. If you can't afford the increased rate, please return this notice unprompted, and we will cancel your subscription.

We have been pleased with the response we have received from our existing subscribers. To attract new subscribers, we are offering a special promotion. If you become a Southern Africa subscriber for $50, we will send you one of the new hardcover books pictured above. Please mark your order below.

SPECIAL OFFER

Magazine

Southern Africa

To a Subscriber

Becoming

Note: Please send me a subscription and endorse $50.