An Explanation and an Apology

Dear Readers,

This is a combined April/May issue of *Southern Africa*. Because we are desperately short of funds we have been forced to combine these two issues. Subscribers will get an extra issue added onto their subscription period, so in the longer run no one will get fewer than the eleven issues covered by a subscription.

We apologize for dropping an issue just now. With a newly independent government in Zimbabwe, renewed support in the US for apartheid and minority rule, and tensions mounting in South Africa and Namibia as a result of the victory in Zimbabwe, this is no time to miss publication.

There is really never a good time, and we are at the point where we must concentrate our meager resources on strengthening our subscription base or face the likelihood of being unable to bring you any future issues.

It will be impossible to avoid running into these crises until we have ten thousand subscribers. That would give us a solid enough foundation to save us from the monthly nightmare of scrounging for money to cover printing and typesetting bills, and would also allow us to pay staff salaries on a regular basis.

Because this is a double issue we will now have time to work on a number of projects, that are already underway, to help boost our financial resources and increase our subscriber base. But we do need your help.

We know from your letters that you think the magazine is important. Please help us to keep it alive and growing.

The Southern Africa Collective
Army Call-up

South Africa’s threats to intervene in Zimbabwe during last month’s elections were apparently not just idle talk. According to documents sent to the London-based Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR), the apartheid regime is preparing to call up the Citizen Force, the South African equivalent of the Army Reserve.

The mobilization order, marked “urgent and confidential,” was sent to soldiers of the 81st Armored Brigade, which is among the first reserve units to be mobilized in emergencies.

The Citizen Force is South Africa’s third line of defense, after the career army and the sixty-thousand man conscript force. Until 1978, troops in the Citizen Force received two years training, followed by thirty days active duty each year for ten years. Two years ago, operational duty was extended to three months, in response to South Africa’s fears of being surrounded by the front-line states and growing liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa itself.

According to COSAWR, the stand-by order is an unusual method of call-up for the Citizen Force. Normally, reservists are simply told where and when to report for duty. In this case, however, the reservists were told to standby and be “ready to report for duty within a few hours.” In addition, reservists were told to draft wills, and arrange their personal and financial affairs.

With the reserves on perpetual standby, South Africa threatened during the Zimbabwean election campaign to intervene in the event of foreign involvement, a massacre of whites, or an outbreak of “chaos,” meaning a Mugabe victory. Most observers agree that only ZANU-PF’s overwhelming sweep at the polls prevented an invasion by South Africa, or a coup by the Rhodesian military.

The onerous, and increasingly dangerous, obligations imposed by the South African military on its young men are meeting some resistance. Eight South African draftees were recently convicted by a military court for an attempted mutiny in February. They join over 100 conscripts who were convicted for desertion during the “Uprising Rebellion,” in which an estimated three hundred men staged a mass AWOL protest over conditions in the Upington army base last October.

More than half of the 63,000 men drafted in 1976 for deferments, and since 1975 over 2,300 have been convicted for refusal to serve. This prompted South Africa’s President Marais Viljoen to complain in parliament that “subversive elements” were undermining army morale.

Space Research Probe Continues

The case against the Space Research Corporation, which has been building for more than a year now, has taken some startling turns, topped by indications that the company may be a partial subsidiary of the South African government as well as an arms supplier to the apartheid regime.

Space Research is the American-Canadian defense contractor located on the Vermont-Quebec border, that had been discovered smuggling long-range howitzer shells and a sophisticated artillery system to South Africa, in violation of the UN arms embargo against Pretoria.

The Burlington Free Press reported in mid-March that South Africa owns twenty percent of the company, as a result of a $10 million investment that the South African government made in the firm in 1977. It could be one of the most spectacular examples of the long-hinted-at projects financed by the South African slush funds. Revelation of those funds brought the downfall of former Prime Minister John Vorster last year.

The South Africans closed the deal on Space Research three years ago, after the company had fallen into difficult financial circumstances. Providing the cash at the investment meeting in London was J.S. Coetzee, the chief manager of commercial sales for ARMSCOR, the manufacturing arm of the South African military. The transaction was a complicated one, obviously meant to veil South Africa’s participation. The money was invested through a firm in Amsterdam, which is connected to the defense contractor located on the Vermont-Quebec border, that had been discovered smuggling long-range howitzer shells and a sophisticated artillery system to South Africa, in violation of the UN arms embargo against Pretoria.

The Burlington Free Press, “Where that money came from, I have no idea, but if they wanted to put money in—terrific.” Lusen later said that he thought that Coetzee, the investor, spoke English with a Dutch or Belgian accent. But as long as the money-man was not a gangster, Lusen said he was not going to be concerned with his real identity.

The Vermont Grand Jury got its first real break in late March, when company founder Gerald Bull and former company president Rodgers Gregory pleaded guilty to making illegal arms shipments to South Africa. The grand jury, which has been conducting an on-going but lackadaisical inquiry into the matter for over a year, has subpoenaed eight present and former officers of the First Pennsylvania Bank and is considering indictments against some of them. A separate grand jury is also getting under way in Philadelphia.

The two investigative reporters who broke the story, Sam Hemingway and Scott Malone, also believe that Space Research may have been involved in smuggling a component of the nuclear device that the South Africans all-but-certainly exploded in the south Atlantic last September. Space Research has manufactured a 155mm carrier shell for tactical nuclear weapons used by the US army in Europe. The two reporters believe the same shell could have been used in that mysterious explosion last September, estimated to have been a 2.3 kiloton nuclear bomb.

Through its board of directors, Space Research has had murky links with the CIA and the Pentagon. The recent revelations about South African ownership imply as close a relation as has been documented between the American defense and intelligence community and the South Africans.

“Hard to come to pass had it not been approved in some form by the US government.”

Cuba-Angola Reaffirm Ties

Cuba and Angola reaffirmed their close ties during a recent trip that the new president of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, made to Cuba.

Dos Santos and Cuban President Fidel Castro met during the visit and both said that relations between the two countries were better than ever. “We are optimistic for the future of Angola,” said the Cuban president. Cuba still maintains thousands of military personnel in Angola, although many of them have taken up work in the civilian sectors of Angola’s economy. Castro said that the two countries would continue their close collaboration for many years.
Amid the Celebration, Mugabe Faces Tough Problems

Robert Mugabe's victory in the Rhodesian election was as stunning as any victory, in any election in recent memory. It was a landslide. Mugabe's ZANU-PF party polled 63 percent of the total vote taking 57 of the 80 African seats in the new parliament.

In second place was Joshua Nkomo. His Patriotic Front party (formerly ZAPU) polled 24 percent of the vote and won twenty seats. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who joined last year in a government with white leader Ian Smith, was the big loser. Muzorewa only managed 8 percent of the total vote, bringing him three seats.

Taken together then, the two wings of the Patriotic Front guerrilla alliance polled a whopping 86 percent of the total African vote. It was an overwhelming mandate, and a clear vindication of their joint war for independence over the last decade.

Mugabe was immediately appointed prime minister by the British governor Lord Soames and invited to form a new government.

"For my party, for the Patriotic Front as a whole, this is a great moment," Mugabe said just hours after the election results were announced on March 4. "It's a moment of our victory, the culmination of our national struggle which has cost so many lives and much suffering." Mugabe said he was overwhelmed by the size of the victory. "The Patriotic Front has won, and won handsomely," he said. "Although we fought the election separately, we knew the result would accrue to both components of the Patriotic Front. While some of you may think in terms of a purely ZANU victory, our own thinking is that this is a victory for the Patriotic Front as a whole."

Throughout the campaign, Mugabe had repeated his intention to form a coalition with Nkomo whatever the result of the balloting. Nkomo, on his part, never committed himself, and there was much speculation around Salisbury that, had Mugabe's tally been low enough—say forty seats—Soames might have designated Nkomo prime minister as the individual "in his opinion best able to form a government," which is the way the Lancaster House agreement is worded. There was much talk of Nkomo forming a coalition with Muzorewa and the white Rhodesia Front party, which already had secured the twenty seats still reserved for whites.

But after the results were announced, that was out of the question.

Reportedly, Nkomo was crushed when he heard the news. But he recovered quickly and appeared before the press just one hour later. "Together, ZANU and ZAPU, we have 77 seats," Nkomo pointed out. "I think this is vital. We fought for Zimbabwe. We fought for the independence of our country. We have done it over the years. Finally we have got Zimbabwe. This is the great thing I feel that has happened. It's a step toward the independence of Zimbabwe."

It was only after the election that it became clear why Mugabe and ZANU had decided to split the Patriotic Front alliance, which had so successfully pursued the guerrilla war over the past four years, and go it alone in the election. At the time of ZANU's decision in late December, it had seemed such a dangerous move, an incredible gamble.

Mugabe had made a casual remark in an interview two weeks before the election that had been the answer. When asked why ZANU had decided to run alone, he said, "The burning question was leadership. It would have been more divisive to settle the question of leadership of the Patriotic Front at that time."

Because the Patriotic Front had never formed a single political party throughout the war, it was too late to do it just before the election campaign. Ironically, Mugabe had concluded that it would have been more divisive to run together than to run separately.

After the election, after the people of Zimbabwe had spoken so clearly, there was a basis for sorting out who would run the government. Clearly, ZANU was the overwhelming victor, but despite some pressure to the contrary within his central committee, Mugabe was committed strongly to include ZAPU in the government.

The process of deciding who would take what positions in the new government was not easy. Nkomo was first offered the position of state president, a largely titular but prestigious position, which he turned down. Nkomo wanted a more important position: deputy prime minister, foreign minister, or defense minister.

ZANU's central committee balked.

Finally after a week of difficult discussions, ZANU offered four of the 22 cabinet ministries to ZAPU. Nkomo was appointed home affairs minister. He will have responsibility for the tribal trust lands, the African reservations where most of the country's almost 7 million people live. He will also take charge of the 8,000-member police force and 35,000 reservists. In addition ZAPU members will head the ministries of natural resources and water development, public works, and posts and telecommunications.

Mugabe also appointed two whites to his cabinet in a move clearly designed to reassure Rhodesia's white population and encourage as many whites as possible to stay. Mugabe was not expected to choose a member of Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front, but in a surprise move, he designated David Smith, minister of finance under both the government of Ian Smith and the internal settlement regime of Bishop Muzorewa, as minister of commerce and industry.

Perhaps Mugabe's most canny decision was the appointment of Dennis Norman, the leader of the white Commercial
Reporters Notebook: Scenes from the Triumph in Zimbabwe

by Mike Shuster

Many Rhodesian whites are fond of saying that Africans will never tell a "European"—meaning anyone who is white—what they really think. "They'll tell you what they think you want to hear," is the familiar refrain. It was a way for white Rhodesians to believe only what they wanted to believe of Africans, and to discount everything else.

In the election in Rhodesia in late February, Rhodesia's African population finally told Rhodesia's whites something they didn't want to hear. It was almost as if the vast majority of Africans in Rhodesia had been keeping their own little secret from the white population for years, and now was the chance to let it out.

In one trip to the vast Triangle sugar estates in southeast Rhodesia—this was one of the trips that the Rhodesian administration organized for journalists and observers—the group was accompanied by a public relations man for the sugar plantations. This man did everything he could to keep journalists away from Africans.

He took us to the country club in Chiredzi for a long—very long—lunch. Then he took us to a mobile polling station that had moved along hours before. Then to another polling station where no one was voting.

And finally to tour the home-turned-museum of Murray MacDougall, one of the great Rhodesian rugged individualists who had pioneered the sugar plantation before the First World War.

The trip promised to be a complete waste of time, but in the hot, bright sun of the afternoon, as the PR man was going on about MacDougall's million acres, I found a bus driver and a gardener resting in the cool shade behind the museum. Determined to salvage what I could of a frustrating day, I smiled, shook hands, and then tentatively, asked them if they would tell me how they voted.

The bus driver's eyes sparked as his mouth slowly formed a broad grin. After a moment's hesitation, he said softly, "Mugabe." The older gardener, who was toothless, dressed in torn clothes and without shoes, nodded agreement.

They said the whole plantation—actually a complex of three plantations which employed 25,000 workers and housed and fed another 80,000 family members—would vote for Mugabe.

Later the PR man told me that he thought that most of the workers ("our workers") would vote for Bishop Muzorewa. But the secret that Zimbabweans had held from Rhodesians for years is now out. Chiredzi and the sugar plantations are in Victoria province. ZANU-PF polled 87 percent of the vote there and took all eleven seats.

The district commissioner of Chiredzi, and the superintendent of police—both white Rhodesians—lied to observers and reporters about an incident that had taken place at one polling station on the first day of voting.

Two American observers reported that during a visit to one polling station in the area, they saw a dead rooster nailed above the polling station along with a sign that read, "Jongwe is dead." Jongwe means rooster in the Shona language; the rooster was the election symbol for ZANU-PF.

The dead rooster and the sign were clear violations of election regulations, which prohibited partisan political activities within one hundred meters of any polling station. The two American observers said that the incident was meant to frighten people from voting for ZANU-PF. They protested to election officials on the spot.

At the same time, an election agent (a poll-watcher) for ZANU-PF noticed the dead bird and the sign. As he was taking notes on the incident, he was arrested by Rhodesian police, who explained that the ZANU-PF agent was "intimidating" voters by writing in a notebook while people waited in line to vote. Officials claimed that voters might think the ZANU-PF agent was writing down their names in his notebook. That might frighten people into voting for ZANU-PF, the officials said.

Police saw that he was not writing names down in the notebook, but the agent was arrested anyway.

One of the two American observers—Cynthia Cannady who represented TransAfrica—protested this treatment to the British spokesman, Nicholas Fenn, at the nightly press briefing in Salisbury. Fenn disputed the facts of the incident, despite his ignorance of it. Two days later, when reporters returned to Chiredzi and questioned the district commissioner and the superintendent of police, they both denied the incident. "Oh, no, that lady is mistaken," the superintendent of police hastened to assure reporters. "That sign and the rooster weren't anywhere near the polling station. They were too hundred meters down the road."

ZANU-PF's emblem was a picture of a rooster crowing before the rising sun. The symbol has not been used before; it was chosen by ZANU-PF only days before the election campaign began. But by the response of Zimbabweans, you might have thought that ZANU had used the symbol since its founding back in 1963. It was a symbol that was known everywhere. People had taken to crowing or to imitating the strut of the rooster as an expression of their support for ZANU-PF.

The Rhodesian security forces didn't like to hear people crowing. Early in the campaign, Rhodesian soldiers and police began to claim that crowing was a form of intimidation. Eventually people were arrested for crowing during the three days of the election in late February. British officials agreed that crowing could be a form of intimidation.

With Robert Mugabe's landslide victory, it's no longer illegal to crow in Zimbabwe.

In fact, crowing was a popular form of spontaneous affection for ZANU-PF. After the results of the election were announced on the morning of March 4, people poured into the streets of Salisbury, and amid the cheering and singing and dancing, it wasn't hard to find people crowing and strutting like chickens.

Even the traffic police got into the act. One policeman, straight-backed and stern, directed traffic at one Salisbury intersection, all the while waving cars and trucks on with an upraised left arm. Every now and then, a carload of particularly jubilant Zimbabweans would pass by, he would half-surreptitiously, half-proudly flap his left arm, slightly bent at the elbow, unmistakably resembling a chicken wing.

On the morning of the announcement of Mugabe's victory, new posters immediately appeared in the streets of Salisbury. One of them, carried along by people skipping in celebration, had been banned by the British
ZIMBABWE during the campaign because it pictured a man and a woman with AK-47 automatic rifles slung across their backs and proclaimed, "Forward with the Revolution. Vote ZANU-PF."

Another poster declared, "No more baas," a reference to the term Africans were expected to use when addressing white people.

Zimbabwe emerged with remarkable serenity from the election campaign, almost as if an airplane, tossed about by turbulence, had emerged into calm air. The election campaign was brutal, dirty, and there was never any certainty that whatever the outcome, it wouldn't be nullified by a white-led coup or a South African invasion.

Mugabe's overwhelming majority was the single biggest deterrent against any violent reaction. No one had predicted such an overwhelming majority, except Mugabe himself. Perhaps that was fortunate, for had the whites—or the British administration, or the South Africans, for that matter—really believed that Mugabe would sweep to victory, they might never have permitted the election to take place in the relatively corruption-free conditions they did.

The outcome of the election was a shock to the British and the white Rhodesians. After the results were announced, as Zimbabweans rejoiced in the streets, white resignations flowed into government bureaucracies, particularly the police. Husbands, it was reported, phoned wives, telling them to pack their bags for South Africa. Some children had even been sent to school with a bag ready to take a flight. Just 24 hours later, that white panic had been averted by a conscious policy decision on the part of Mugabe himself. Mugabe had appeared on nationwide television and radio to give his first address to the nation of Zimbabwe as prime minister-designate. What he said caused all but a handful of police and civil servants to withdraw their resignations. Whites everywhere were impressed with Mugabe. They may eventually leave, but that will take some time.

"I urge you whether you are black or white," Mugabe said, "to join me in a new pledge to forget our grim past. Forgive others and forget. Join hands in a new amity and together as Zimbabweans trample upon racism, tribalism, and regionalism.

"I wish to assure all the people that my government will strive to bring about meaningful change to their lives. But everyone should exercise patience, for change cannot occur overnight. For now, let us be united in our endeavor to lead the country to independence. Let us constitute a oneness, derived from our common objectives and total commitment to build a great Zimbabwe that will be the pride of all Africa. Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single loyalty. Long live our freedom."

That Rhodesia, which had been the scourge of the continent, will transform itself into a Zimbabwe "that will be the pride of all Africa" is an extraordinary possibility. And that transformation began immediately. "You don't know what this means to us," said one white who hated the Rhodesia Front party of Ian Smith and who had supported the guerrilla movement throughout the war. "We are going to be a part of Africa now, and part of the world. It's incredible."

It was as if, on the day that Mugabe's victory was announced, the nation as a whole stopped looking to the south, to South Africa, for its identity, and turned northward to Africa.

Even the conservative, white-owned Rhodesia Herald understood it. "It is both natural and logical that this country should look to its northern neighbors for the development of new trade links," proclaimed the Herald only two days after Mugabe's triumph. "Zimbabwe could easily become the industrial power house of such a group. It is an exciting thought."

As a measure of how quickly things could change, only two months ago, it was illegal even to mention Mugabe's name on television. Only days before the election, television commentators still referred to Mugabe's ZANLA guerrillas as terrorists. But when Mugabe appeared on television and radio as prime minister, he was introduced as "Comrade Robert Mugabe."

It's customary in articles like this to temper all the excitement and celebration with a serious discussion of all the problems that Mugabe and his new government will now face. But I don't want to do that. The event of the Rhodesian election was too amazing, too miraculous. We can discuss the difficulties in another article at another time.

In fact, I'm going to give you an ending you won't believe.

Late on the afternoon of March 4—the day Mugabe's victory was announced—after a nice hard rain, a rainbow appeared over Salisbury. I know it sounds unbelievable but it's true. A rainbow!

Now I know that the story of the winning of the independence of Zimbabwe was no fairy tale. And the only pot of gold that was at the end of that rainbow was probably in South Africa.

But I thought that at least that rainbow was a good omen. It was a great time to be in Zimbabwe.

Cabinet Members

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence: R.G. Mugabe
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs: S.V. Muzenda
Minister of Home Affairs: J.M. Nkomo (ZAPU)
Minister of Manpower, Planning and Development: E.Z. Tekere
Minister of Finance: E.M. Nkala
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs: S. Mubako
Minister of the Public Service: R.C. Hove
Minister of Labor and Social Welfare: K.M. Kangai
Minister of Transport and Power: E.R. Kandugure
Minister of Local Government and Housing: E.J.M. Zvobgo
Minister of Lands, Re-settlement and Rural Development: S.T. Sekeramayi
Minister of Commerce and Industry: D. Smith
Minister of Agriculture: D.R. Norman
Minister of Information and Tourism: N.M. Shamuvarira
Minister of Natural Resources and Water Development: J.W. Mtika (ZAPU)
Minister of Education and Culture: D. Mutumbuka
Minister of Health: H.S.M. Ushekwane
Minister of Public Works: C.M. Muchachich (ZAPU)
Minister of Posts and Telecommunications: T.G. Shulunda (ZAPU)
Minister of Mines: Msika
Minister of Youth, Sport and Recreation: Ms. Taurai Ropa Nhongo
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office: J.W. Munangagwa

POSITION AVAILABLE
WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA
CANDIDATES ARE NOW BEING INTERVIEWED FOR THE POST OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA. Experience and familiarity with economic and political developments in southern Africa and US policy toward the region. An ability to collaborate with other organizations, speaking, writing, and media relations. Contact: Gretchen Dick, Office for Church and Society, United Church of Christ, 110 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, DC 20002. (202-543-1517).
One out of every four black South Africans does not have a job and the recent economic up-turn is unlikely to have a significant effect on the growing number of South African blacks who are out of work. These figures, presented in a recent study by Aart Roukens de Lange, a mathematician at the University of the Witwatersrand, indicate that black unemployment is already unacceptably high and that unless South Africa can sustain an unusually large economic growth rate over the next two decades, four out of every ten black South Africans will be unemployed by the year 2000.

Solutions to the problem of unemployment are not easy anywhere, but it is an especially intractable problem in South Africa, where the economic and political system is structured in such a way as to permanently exclude certain sectors of the population from full participation in the work force.

Precise statistics on black unemployment are hard to come by. Figures on the number of blacks willing to work—the work force—range from 5.5 million to approximately 10 million. Estimates of the unemployed range from 501,000 (9.2 percent of a 5.5 million work force), the latest figure given by the South African Department of Statistics (last May), to an estimate of a possible 32 percent made in the de Lange study.

Such dramatically divergent estimates reflect differences in the way terms and categories are defined.

The Department of Statistics, for instance, does not include in its survey, people who are residents of the so-called independent homelands, nor does it count as unemployed any person who works five hours a week or more—those who are woefully underemployed. It also does not include the many desperate work seekers il-
legally living in urban areas to avoid being exiled to the jobless bantustans. The government itself cannot agree on unemployment figures. In contrast to the Department of Statistics' half-million figure, the minister of Manpower Utilization, Fanie Botha, recently put the unemployment figure for all races at "over a million" most of whom, he said, were not white. Independent unemployment estimates also differ considerably, with a number of sources suggesting figures for black unemployment at over two million.

If only blacks living legally in "white" areas are included, this produces an estimated 5.5 million active black work force and figures for the unemployed can be expected to hover around the Department of Statistics' nine percent. Work force statistics which include blacks living in the homelands, or residing illegally in "white" areas, however, are likely to range much higher—-with unemployment hovering around 25 percent for a total working (or willing to work) population of just under ten million.

Economic Growth No Answer

Long term projections indicate that high unemployment in South Africa is not simply the temporary product of a cycle familiar in the Western world economic system. The problem is enormously exaggerated and entrenched by that society's fundamental political and economic structure.

De Lange calculates that an annual growth rate of between six and seven percent would be needed to stabilize unemployment at present levels. Other estimates maintain that at minimum an eight percent growth rate is needed. Even such unusual growth would simply stabilize or maintain the current 25 percent unemployment rate.

Yet, the official government Economic Development Report (EDR) for 1977-87, published in October 1979, offers little hope of reaching such growth rates. The report estimates five percent per annum as the highest annual growth rate that South Africa can hope to reach over the next ten years.

The EDR report implicitly acknowledges that this leaves the prospect of increasing unemployment looming large, a prospect which pushes the planners into offering a number of alternative approaches to the problem. Essentially, the report suggests that the government should offer incentives to labor intensive industries while providing a mechanism to push up what it terms the "unnaturally low" cost of investment capital. These solutions are both based on the premise that unemployment in South Africa is in large part a result of a shift towards capital intensive production—that is, faced with the choice of either hiring more workers or buying a machine to do the work, South African employers have tended to choose the latter mode.

Some part of the unemployment problem undoubtedly stems from the growing tendency toward increasing job mechanization. For instance, agricultural output has continued to rise over the last ten years, but employment in the agricultural sector of the economy has leveled off. As a result, agriculture, the largest single employer of black labor in South Africa, no longer absorbs significant numbers of new job seekers entering the economy.

A related development in the rapidly expanding industrial sector has produced the paradoxical situation, that while many black South Africans cannot find jobs there is an acute shortage of skilled labor. This shortage is largely a result of two elements of the apartheid system—the industrial color bar and the discriminatory system of education—which deny a substantial portion of the population both entry into skilled jobs and adequate training for such skilled work.

Urban Growth, Rural Poverty

South Africa has achieved a substantial economic growth rate over the past 50 years. Gross domestic product grew in money terms by an average of eight percent a year. But growth has been uneven, occurring in large part, in a few highly industrialized areas of the country. For instance, in 1975, four major metropolitan regions accounted for over 81 percent of all growth in the manufacturing sector. This gap between areas of high and low economic activity has widened in recent years.

This apparent division of the internal economy has led some observers to talk of a dual economy in South Africa, with a developing industrialized economy and a semi-subsistence economy existing side by side, having very little relationship with one another.

Thus mining, manufacturing, the railroads, the steel mills, large scale agriculture, are all features of a developing market economy, and this sector provides most of the formal employment in South Africa. It is heavily dependent on foreign trade and capital investment for growth and, in fact, for survival.

The two million unemployed are seen as surviving in a sort of sub-economy, often referred to as the second sector or economy. It includes far more than the temporarily unemployed, covering millions of people who do not actively participate in the industrialized market economy, in particular the people living some form of subsistence life in the bantustans, mostly on the basis of very low yield agriculture.

In reality it is deceptive to see these two sectors as separate. They are integrally related—the so-called second economy performing a vital function in the overall South African economic structure. It provides a pool of labor from which the developing industrialized economy can draw at any time when additional workers are needed for expansion. At the same time, this sub-economy ensures that the growing industrialized sector does not need to provide substantial support for those people for whom it cannot find jobs. It serves as an out of sight waiting area for a potential work force which is not currently employed in the system. Its effect has been to ensure a continuous supply of cheap docile black labor—each new worker accepting minimal wages because the alternative back in the bantustan is even worse.

Living conditions in the bantustans are so deplorable that a recent study by Dr. Jan Lange of the University of South Africa showed that black South Africans could benefit from working in urban areas, even if they had to go to prison as a consequence.

According to Lange, there is a 702 percent improvement in living standards for a worker from the Ciskei bantustan who works illegally in Pietermaritzburg for nine months and spends three months in prison, a 170 percent improvement in living standards for someone from Lehowa who works six months in Johannesurg and spends six months in prison, and a 28.5 percent improvement for a person from Bophuthatswana who works only three months in Pretoria and spends nine months in prison. Someone from Ciskei who works illegally in Pietermaritzburg for three months and spends nine months in prison improves his living standards by 234 percent.

An Old Pattern

Unemployment, underemployment and the perpetuation of a cheap, controllable labor force are all linked in a common design with a long history in South Africa. When large scale mining began to develop in South Africa in the late 1900s, there was an acute shortage of labor, and workers were actually imported from countries like China. As the economy grew and the demand for labor increased, the government intensified its system of coercing black farmers off the land and into the work force. It was a brutal process because farmers were reluctant to move off land which had been supporting their families for hundreds of years. In the end, the rural population was forced to move by taxation, land ownership laws, and war. Rural blacks were crowded into a tiny 13 percent fraction of the land they had previously been able to occupy.

This forced dispossession of African farmers resulted both in the development of an urban labor force and in the consolidation of white-run agriculture into fewer and
SOUTH AFRICA

larger agricultural units. The land, which had once supported large numbers of small farmers, became concentrated in a smaller and smaller number of white hands.

As the South African economy continued to grow, the intricacies of apartheid and the demands of the market system ensured that small white farmers who had been forced off the land found jobs. The growing black population was not so fortunate, however. Black South Africans were not always provided with employment. Desperate men and women fought for scarce jobs in the urban areas, often defying the laws which attempted to keep them out of towns until they had employment.

In sum, government policies of forcing rural people off their land have created a large urban population which the economy cannot now employ. In addition, in forcing those black farmers off their land, government policies created a rural agricultural system which cannot provide employment for its own increasing numbers or for the growing black population in the urban areas.

Prospects for Change

For the majority of unemployed black South Africans, improvements in their present situation are not likely to come easily. The Pretoria regime recognizes the problems, and indeed the dangers, of having a large unemployed black population, particularly one concentrated near critical centers of white control in the cities. Committee as it is to minority interests, however, the government cannot undertake the profound reorganization of the economy necessary to solve problems of massive unemployment and underemployment.

Instead, the government is likely to seek interim solutions by promoting a small number of blacks to higher positions in the labor force, seeking to woo their allegiance by the appearance of reform which may give them some small privileges. It is in this context that reforms recommended by the recent Rieker and Wiehahn Commissions must be seen. Such reforms, which may indeed improve conditions for the minority black population fully absorbed into the market economy, are intended to build a co-operative work force. But they promise nothing more than intensified poverty, influx control, continued unemployment, and confinement to the bantustans for the majority of black people in South Africa.

Botha’s ‘Total Strategy’

Even before Robert Mugabe’s landslide election victory in neighboring Zimbabwe, the increased militancy of blacks in South Africa had touched off the most intense wrangling among that country’s white supremacist rulers in four decades. In the wake of Mugabe’s triumph, the wrangling escalated, in the words of a report in the British Guardian, to “the brink of political civil war.”

Just three days after Mugabe swept to victory, the long simmering conflict between Prime Minister P. W. Botha and the extreme right wing National Party faction led by Transvaal Party leader Andries Treurnicht boiled over. As the Afrikaans newspaper Beeld pointed out, the timing was no coincidence.

The immediate cause of the dispute was remarkably trivial—participation of “coloured” schoolboys in a previously all-white rugby tournament. But its roots go much deeper. “In essence,” the Guardian noted, “it relates to the question of how to respond to the challenge of advancing black nationalism . . . which revolves in turn around another question—how far and at what pace should South Africa desegregate its traditionally segregated structure to accommodate the aspirations of her black and coloured peoples?”

Although Botha and Treurnicht managed to patch up their differences, this time short of an outright party split, their feud is sure to continue. The challenge of “advancing black nationalism” represented by Mugabe’s victory isn’t about to go away. Rather, as the following report from Africa News correspondent Reed Kramer in Cape Town suggests, it is likely to grow even stronger, both in Namibia (see story on page 9) and within the borders of South Africa itself. Events in Zimbabwe may have startled and unnerved South African whites. But they inspired blacks, contributing to a new campaign for the release of imprisoned African National Congress President Nelson Mandela.

Cape Town—The National Party debate focuses on how best to preserve white interests in the face of heightening domestic and international pressures. In spite of heavy opposition led by Transvaal Province party leader Andries Treurnicht, Prime Minister P. W. Botha has reiterated several times this month his determination to pursue the reforms he sees as necessary to stop violent confrontation.

Recent skirmishes between Botha and Treurnicht and their followers have been well publicized, but a major clash which many observers believe will split the party lies ahead. The prime minister has announced his intention to set up an all-race advisory “States Council” on which urban blacks will be seated. This would depart from the longstanding National Party (NP) policy that denies city-dwelling Africans political rights except as citizens of a designated “homeland.” While the Botha wing sees this as a necessary adaptation, the conservatives feel it will irrevocably undermine the policy of separate development.

In the public sphere, Botha was boosted by a recent public opinion poll commissioned by the Sunday Times of Johannesburg, which indicates he has overwhelming backing from the white electorate. Using a “scientifically constructed” voting sample of 1,000, the mid-March survey found that 71 percent support Botha’s position, and 81 percent consider him the best NP leader.

His policies were endorsed by seventy percent of those who identified themselves as members of the Nationalist Party, 86 percent of whom named him as their preference for party leader. Another twenty percent of both the entire sampling and the non-National Party members within it favored a compromise between Botha and Treurnicht, while only nine percent in each category backed the Transvaal leader’s conservative stance.

Clearly related, the Sunday Times, which regularly editorializes in favor of the moderate reforms Botha advocates, proclaimed that the results “indicate the extent to which the party machinery has become alienated from its own voters.” The most dramatic illustration of this disparity between the sentiments of voters and party politicians is in the Transvaal, where Botha might muster only 22 out of 66 votes among Nationalist MPs. As a result, the prospect of a Treurnicht-led rebellion in that province remains real.

Earlier this month, the former prime minister and state president, John Vorster, emerged from political obscurity to deliver a stinging attack on the reformers. He criticized Botha’s plan to revise the 1936 Land Act, which allocates about thirteen percent of the country’s territory to the ten designated homelands. He also rejected the idea of urban black representation on any national council, saying this would inevitably lead to demands for representation in Parliament.

Botha’s Total Strategy

Fighting back, Botha last week declared that the twelve-point plan he outlined six months ago at National Party provincial congresses is the only approach which can
debunked the widely held white view that intimidation explained Mugabe’s success, saying his win could never have been so overwhelming had he not embodied the black population’s aspirations. And Die Vaderland declared that radical leaders have more support than traditional leaders whom whites view as the legitimate black spokesmen. One Afrikaans editor whose newspaper has advocated dialogue with “true black leadership” said privately just before the election, “We believe we will have to talk to the ANC at some point, but we don’t feel the time is yet right to print this.”

The black edited Sunday Post, however, started a “Release Mandela” drive the week the Zimbabwe election results were announced. The appeal quickly gathered support not only from political figures but from the president of the African Chamber of Commerce, from the South African Council of Churches, and from several prominent voices. Currently, committees to organize the campaign to free Mandela and other political prisoners are being set up in several cities. The Post is printing petitions in its editions, and during commemoration ceremonies in mid-March of the 1960 Sharpeville shootings even more attention was focused on the drive.

This response suggests that Botha’s reform proposals face an even greater obstacle than conservative opposition. The campaign for Mandela’s release, emerging despite the extensive prohibitions against black political activity, reflects the magnitude of the clamor for full political participation in a unitary state—a demand that the National Party has yet to entertain seriously.

BOSS Recruits Hit-men Through CIA

The same hit team of Cubans who killed former Chilean leader Orlando Letelier also killed South African Robert Smit and his wife, according to the the Wilmington Sunday News Journal.

Smit, a former South African representative to the International Monetary Fund in Washington, was running for the South African Parliament when he and his wife were murdered in their home just outside Johannesburg in November 1977.

At the time the information scandal broke, South African newspapers quoted friends of Smit as saying that just before his death, Smit had learned about high level financial improprieties and had said that he was about to inform a Cabinet minister.

The Wilmington Sunday News Journal now reports that the Smits were killed by a hit team of anti-Castro Cubans originally recruited by the CIA. The team was hired by BOSS, as South Africa’s security agency was then known, to eliminate the Smits in order to protect the security of the giant slush-fund then being operated by BOSS and government members to win international support. According to a copyrighted February 24 story, which quotes FBI and Justice Department sources, the CIA arranged for the Cubans to meet agents of BOSS, and agents of DINA, the Chilean secret police in 1973. BOSS played an important supporting role in the secret South African attempts to win influence overseas which began coming to light in mid-178. In return for the CIA’s help, according to the story, DINA killed at least 17 agents of the Cuban Intelligence Service and BOSS provided information about communist activities in Africa.

Orlando Letelier and an American, Ronni Moffit, were killed by a bomb in September, 1976. An American and three members of the Cuban Nationalist Movement were convicted in that case and two other Cubans were indicted, but remain at large. The News Journal cites a protected witness in the Letelier bombing as saying that the two missing Cubans are currently living off CIA-counterfeit money and South African Krugerrands.

It also quotes an FBI agent as saying, “If we arrest these two, they are going to reveal how the CIA was responsible for the Letelier hit and others. I have got to think that the CIA has a real interest in keeping this from coming out.”

Same Gun Used

According to the story, the same Cuban group involved in the Letelier murder was responsible for trying to kill a second Chilean leader, Bernardo Leighton, in 1975. The same gun appears to be used in both the Leighton and Smit attacks, according to CIA reports from Rome cited in the article.

The News Journal account says that Smit had discovered shortly before his death that $70 million in secret South African funds were on deposit in US banks. It says Smit also “discovered the names of more than 20 American politicians, including US senators, right-wing journalists and publishers, who had received payoffs and bribes from the slush fund in exchange for opposing sanctions against South Africa for its apartheid policies. Some of these Americans had been strong supporters of the Pinochet government in Chile.

The allegations in the story have been denied by current South African officials and by FBI officials. However, Joe Trento, the reporter in charge of the News Journal investigation, continues to stand by his story. He adds that the paper is making further attempts to learn the names of the Americans alleged to have taken the South African payoffs.
Zimbabwe Elections: Lessons for Namibia

"The big lesson is that anybody in southern Africa who gets white patronage is finished."

—Nthato Molana on Robert Mugabe's victory in the Zimbabwean election

In the wake of the Zimbabwean election, South Africa really has only two options as it considers its future plans for Namibia. It can agree now, or soon, to the UN plan for elections and independence without all the phoney objections and issues it has raised as obstacles over the past two years. Or it can opt for an internal settlement, thus rejecting the UN and the five Western nations that negotiated the UN plan. There are no in-between choices.

Mugabe's stunning victory in Zimbabwe was a profound shock to Pretoria and to Pretoria's administration in Namibia. There is evidence that at least a few South African officials are realizing that events in Namibia are likely to take the same turn as they did in Rhodesia. But there are many more South Africans in Pretoria and Windhoek who have reacted to Mugabe's victory by rejecting the UN plan outright.

Foremost among them are leaders of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance who said only a day after Mugabe's victory was announced that the DTA was not prepared to participate in a UN-supervised election in Namibia unless it was "free and fair." Dirk Mudge, the DTA chairman, said that SWAPO would not beat the DTA in a fair election, and he predicted an escalation of the guerrilla war in Namibia as a result of Mugabe's showing.

Mudge expressed confidence that the DTA was "better organized and more representative" than the non-Patriotic Front parties in Rhodesia, a reference of course to Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC, which only gained three seats in the new Zimbabwean assembly.

Right-Wing Stance Hardens

Those to the right of the DTA had an even more negative attitude toward the UN plan for Namibia. One leader of the right-wing Aktur said that the election in Rhodesia "should be a lesson to the five Western powers and South Africa to illustrate that clever constitutional schemes did not work out."

Ironically, the most right-wing reaction was also the most realistic. "If a Rhodesia-type situation developed in South-West Africa," said Sarel Becker, leader of the ultra-rightist Herstigte Nasionale Party, "it is conceivable that a good proportion of the black masses will regard a vote for SWAPO as a vote for permanent peace and a vote for an exclusive black government."

Conceivable? In light of the Mugabe victory, the word could almost be inevitable. If there is any lesson in Zimbabwe, it could be that the longer the liberation struggle continues, the stronger the support for the liberation movement becomes.

Probably the most realistic analysis of the outcome in Zimbabwe came from South Africa's Financial Mail. "Not only is the DTA seen to be run by whites," said the prestigious weekly, "nobody has ever bothered to conceal the fact that it has the support of the South African army, the South African-appointed Administrator General and the white-dominated civil service. Muzorewa's defeat shows that a moderate black leader endorsed by whites has little chance against the powerful forces of black nationalism."

"After 100 years of German and South African domination, which until 1977 meant abject deprivation and hardship, the majority of blacks are in no mood for qualified or shared sovereignty of the kind implied by the party programmes of DTA, Aktur, and a few others," concluded the Mail in an extraordinary display of realism. "SWAPO offers the whole cake; it has the support of the South African army, the white-dominated civil service, the South African-appointed Administrator General and the white-dominated civil service. Muzorewa's defeat shows that a moderate black leader endorsed by whites has little chance against the powerful forces of black nationalism."

Maneuvering Continues on UN Plan

There is still no telling, as the negotiations over Namibia limp on, whether Pretoria's leaders are correctly evaluating the message. The negotiations have entered the phase of "consultations to find out what was the outcome of the consultations," was the way one UN official put it.

In late February, the UN negotiating team led by the UN Under Secretary for special affairs, Prem Chand, the newly appointed commander of the UN Transitional Assistance Group, and Martti Ahtisaari,
**Major South African Actions Affecting Namibia Since Adoption of Security Council Resolution 385 (1976)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fall '76</td>
<td>South African troop strength in Namibia increased to 50,000.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March '77</td>
<td>Turnhalle conference issues proposed constitution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June-July '77</td>
<td>South Africa scraps Turnhalle constitution. Announces appointment of Administrator-General.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. '77</td>
<td>A-G assumes office.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer '77</td>
<td>Creation of South-West African Defense Force begun.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. '77</td>
<td>Annexation of Walvis Bay and Penguin Islands by South Africa.</td>
<td>South Africa begins process of repealing South-West African laws and applying South African laws, including Group Areas Act (which seriously affects resident &quot;coloreds&quot;). Walvis Bay continues for some time to be represented in all-white South-West African Legislative Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. '77</td>
<td>Establishment of Rehoboth bantustant government.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall '77</td>
<td>Turnhalle conference continues meeting fitfully until terminated in November.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. '77</td>
<td>Political parties directed to register with A-G if they wish to participate in future elections.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, '78</td>
<td>Proc. A-G 26 issued: &quot;Detention for the prevention of political violence and intimidation.&quot;</td>
<td>Many SWAPO adherents detained under new proclamation in following months, before UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) trip to Namibia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April '78</td>
<td>South Africa accepts Western proposals.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4, '78</td>
<td>South African attack on Cassinga in Angola.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, '78</td>
<td>A-G issues Registration Proc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July '78</td>
<td>Registration of voters starts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 20, '78</td>
<td>Election Proc. issued.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. '78</td>
<td>UN plan rejected. Elections announced.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 4-8, '78</td>
<td>Elections held under South African control.</td>
<td>Election date subsequently deferred to November. More than 1,000 SWAPO members detained shortly before the election and released afterwards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dirk Mudge, defeated for leadership of South-West African National Party by right-winger, forms multi-ethnic coalition. Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), which supports a Turnhalle constitution modified to gain international acceptance. National Party leader, du Plessis, forms competing multi-ethnic coalition, AKTUR, committed to preserving the March constitution and to opposing racial inter-mixing.

Registration deadline deferred several times. Prohibition on political meetings ended, but SWAPO subject to attacks and harassment by both-official and unofficial groups.

Information received in mid-'79 indicates that many SWAPO members captured at Cassinga were taken to detention camp near Hardap Dam, Marienthal, and tortured. Many apparently still detained.

Intimidation, coercion, and trickery alleged in connection with registration and afterwards with elections.

More than 1,000 SWAPO members detained shortly before the election and released afterwards.

Dec. 22, '78 South African announces it will now accept UN plan and try to convince elected constituent assembly to accept it, too.

March '79 South Africa breaks off negotiations on Namibia. Creation of A-G's "quasi-cabinet," consisting of directors of various departments.

April-May-June '79 Massive repression of SWAPO.

May '79 Procs. 9 of 1977 (Security Districts) and 26 of 1978 (Detention) amended to make them more restrictive. Application extended.

May 21, '79 A-G issues proclamation converting Constituent Assembly into National Assembly and granting it legislative power.

June '79 A-G appoints advisory council.

July '79 A-G signs legislation requiring every Namibian over sixteen to have identity document.

July '79 A-G signs legislation forbidding discrimination in urban residential areas or public amenities, but holds enforcement provisions in abeyance.

Aug. 13, '79 South African prime minister grants National Assembly legislative power.

Aug. '79 South Africa appoints director of Walvis Bay.

Aug. 26, '79 Gerrit Viljoen replaces Justice Steyn as A-G.

Nov.-Dec. '79 A-G makes proposals to National Assembly on future governmental structure of Namibia—promises "responsible government" in two-tiered system.

Dec. '79 Damara "homeland government" established.

Dec. '79-Jan. '80 SWAPO members attempting to re-open SWAPO office arrested.

Jan. '80 A-G announces conditional amnesty for SWAPO members, to run through April.

Jan. 31, '80 A-G grants full executive powers to "executive committee" of National Assembly.

DTA—41
AKTUR—6
HNP—1
Namibian Liberation Front—1
Namibian Christian Democratic Party—1

Thousands of SWAPO members, including entire leadership, detained. SWAPO forced to close Windhoek office. Torture of detainees alleged, including Cassinga raid victims brought back to Namibia. Ovambo villages enclosed by barbed wire fences.

Application of Security District Proclamation (in effect, martial law) extended to most of north and central Namibia, as far south as Windhoek.

Proc. provides for fifteen additional seats in the assembly to be filled by parties which boycotted elections. (Not filled because parties continued boycott.)

Proc. provides that assembly can enact legislation that becomes effective upon signature of A-G, without signature of South African state president. Also provides for appointment of twelve assembly members as advisory council to assist A-G in his executive duties.

Council consists of DTA members only after AKTUR refuses to accept two seats, insisting on minimum of three.

Violent white reaction against DTA-sponsored legislation.

Action taken to end litigation brought by AKTUR challenging the authority of A-G to grant such power to the National Assembly.

The provincial administrator and executive committee of the Cape Province authorized to delegate necessary administrative powers to the director.

New A-G is rector of Rand Afrikaans University and reputed chief of Broederbond. Purpose apparently to pacify right-wing whites antagonized by Steyn's favoritism toward DTA (vis-a-vis AKTUR) and support of anti-discrimination legislation.

Plan reported to give Namibian "transitional government" full powers except in fields of foreign affairs, defense, and security.

Government to be two-tiered, with second tier controlling land tenure, agriculture, education except at university level, health, and social welfare and pensions.

National Assembly to have cabinet ("executive committee") with full executive powers.

Continuing detentions and releases of SWAPO members on apparently random basis.

Applies only to persons not guilty of crimes of violence (excluding military actions). Surrendering members are to be subjected to month of rehabilitation before being amnestied and released.

Two SWAPO members have accepted amnesty so far, as of Jan. 19.
Carrying the Burden of Apartheid

Almost twenty-five years ago, on August 8, 1956, the serene, manicured and very white capital of the South African regime found itself playing reluctant host to 20,000 women, mostly African, who had converged on Pretoria from every part of South Africa. Their protest was directed against the recent extension of the pass laws to include African women. Until then only men had been forced to carry the notorious pass book and suffer under the myriad of restrictions that came with it.

The march had been far from easy to organize. As preparations had gained momentum, police intimidation had mounted. Ignoring this, the women staged fundraising events, chartered buses, organized cars, and paid for train tickets. In anticipation, the government banned all demonstrations in Pretoria that day. Undaunted, the women circumvented the law by marching in groups of two or three. Once assembled, they stood for thirty minutes in total silence in the wintry sun, before bursting forth to sing their national anthem.

The hurdles strewn across their path by the apartheid regime weren't the only resistance the women had to overcome. Some of their male allies in the liberation movement clearly felt threatened by the independence of the action. As the husband of one of the leaders of the march recalled wryly some fifteen years later, with a flash of lingering irritation: "We asked the women what we could do to help them and to protect them. They were taking on a potentially very dangerous task. You know what they answered? 'If you want to help us, you can stay at home and look after the children.'"

But while the march raised questions about the role of women, the women themselves made it clear that the apartheid regime was the main target of their struggle. The Pretoria march was a high point in the 1950s—a decade marked by frequent militant demonstrations, by the increasing repression of the National Party government, and finally by the banning of the liberation movements. Throughout the decade, women played an important and active part, not only as supporters, but as initiators and organizers.

While the march could not change the laws, it showed a determination on the part of the women to continue their resistance against apartheid.

Stephanie Urdang, a long-time member of the Southern Africa collective is the author of a book on the role of women in Guinea-Bissau, Fighting Two Colonialisms. She has recently worked on a study of women under apartheid for the United Nations.

Women have historically played a major role in the struggle against apartheid. At the same time, it is the women who have been the most severely affected by the pervasive and oppressive laws of the apartheid system.
Lilian Ngoyi, whose exceptional talents as a leader and political activist won her wide respect both within and beyond the borders of South Africa, died in Johannesburg at the age of 68 on March 13.

She was already forty when she joined the African National Congress and, with her flair for public speaking and her strong personality, soon became one of its most active leaders. She was elected president of the African National Congress Women's League, and a few years later became president of the Federation of South African Women. Founded in 1954, the federation was reported to have 230,000 members, mostly African. It had two major aims: to oppose apartheid and work for change, and to work for the rights and freedom of women.

Ngoyi was one of the many ANC active leaders. In 1956, she led 20,000 women in their march to Pretoria to protest the extension of the pass laws to include women.

It was not surprising that, in 1961, at the height of her effectiveness, she was placed under heavy banning orders. In 1973 these were lifted briefly, but were reimposed before too long, so that for sixteen years of her life she lived an isolated existence. Despite the extreme hardships she endured, and the fact that she lived almost a third of her life as a "non-person," she was not broken. As she said in an interview: "I must say I had a tough time, but my spirits have not been dampened. You can tell my friends all over the world that this girl is still her old self, if not more mature after all the experiences. I am looking forward to the day when my children will share the wealth of our lovely South Africa."

Although she did not live to see this day, she knew it would happen. Her contribution as an extraordinarily fine leader at a critical time in the history of resistance to apartheid had a vital impact on the course of events and will long be remembered.

Lilian Ngoyi
1911—1980

The effects of apartheid on women have been especially harsh. They had reason to protest.

Harsh Life in the Reserves
The apartheid regime has an insatiable need for cheap labor in order to fuel its economy and ensure continued high profits from its vast mineral resources, which are critical for both South Africa and its industrialized West.

Out of this need has come an intricate set of repressive laws designed to maintain and control all facets of the lives of the vast majority of the people. While African men provide most of this labor and receive unlivable wages, it is the women who bear the heaviest burden. This can be seen most starkly in the reserve areas.

In pre-colonial society, African women played a vital role in the economic life of the village, with greater responsibility for, and input into, subsistence production than the men. The advent of colonialism and development of apartheid have seriously eroded this role.

The apartheid policies and the critically reduced land area have diminished women's economic productivity, and with it their political and social role. This has increased women's dependence on their husbands, their fathers or their male guardians, thereby reinforcing the existing patriarchal system.

The premise lying behind the establishment of the so-called "bantustans" is that Africans may only be permitted into the prescribed "white" areas—the towns—in order to work. Once a man can no longer sell his labor, he is expected to return "home," regardless of how long he has lived in the urban areas.

The meager wages he receives for his labor barely cover his own basic needs, let alone those of his family left behind in the reserves. In theory, this family is presumed capable of providing for itself off the land, thus justifying the low wages paid migrant workers. In reality only a tiny fraction of families produce sufficient food for their own survival.

A depressing picture emerges. Much of the limited land made available for subsistence farming is not arable. It is simply impossible to survive without supplemental incomes from migrant workers. But women waiting at home find the flow of money from the men away at work both insufficient and unreliable. Very often the money does not arrive at all.

Yet to earn this pittance, the men have to work on contract for years at a time, perhaps returning for a two-week period each year, often staying away from their families for several years at a stretch.

This disruption of family life is one of the
cruelest manifestations of the apartheid laws. Besides economic hardship, it creates severe emotional stress. Wives do not have the same possibilities as their husbands for alleviating their loneliness, and must wait month after month, hoping for a letter, particularly hoping for one that contains some money.

In desperation women have left the reserves to find their husbands in the towns. This does not always end in a happy reunion.

One woman from the Tranksei, interviewed in 1978, described what happened to her. After failing to hear from her husband for months, and after agonizing over her hungry children, she borrowed money from friends and set off for Cape Town. When she finally tracked him down, he was embarrassed and angry. “He looks away but eventually tells me about this other woman. I can sense that it is this woman who has been eating the money that my husband should have been sending me and our children. She is now fat and attractive. I am starved and ugly in my husband’s eyes. I have become a burden to my very own husband.

“Marriage is not worthwhile for us black women. It traps us. Men are having it all right in town—with their girl friends and money, while we must keep home on empty pockets and empty promises. We feel lonely in that desolate place.

Little Better in Towns

Strict regulations prescribe the precise conditions under which a person may be permitted to remain in the urban areas. Given that women are not encouraged to be there, these laws affect them even more adversely than the men. The laws are so extensive and pervasive, so arbitrarily and differently carried out by government officials, that only a small proportion of women can actually consider themselves urban dwellers. The rest live constantly under the cloud of possible “endorsement out”—the rubber-stamped order that forces the bearer of the pass to return home.

To the woman endorsed out, “home” can mean a barren area where no living relatives remain and where she has no contacts, or it can, and regularly does, mean a notorious resettlement camp unfit for human habitation.

In order to remain legally in the town, it is necessary to qualify in terms of the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, Section 10 (a), (b), (c) or (d). In essence, a woman has the right to remain in an urban area if she has lived there continuously since birth; or has worked continuously for the same employer for ten years or in the same area for fifteen; or is married to a man qualified under the previous two, on condition she entered the area legally in the first place; or if she has...
Zimbabwe's Women—Moving Forward

In the struggle for liberation, women have realized that they can do something more than watch their children and wait for their husbands.

by Mike Shuster

Women have been an integral component of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, and in the historic election of the first Zimbabwe parliament, nine women—six from ZANU-PF and three from the Patriotic Front (ZAPU)—won seats.

In addition, two ZANU-PF women leaders were appointed to government posts: Teurai Ropa Nhongo, minister of sports and recreation, and Victoria Chitepo, deputy minister of education and culture. It is also expected that the Department of Women’s Affairs will be elevated to the ministry level.

Women were crucial to the election campaign. ZANU-PF sent 300 women from Mozambique into Zimbabwe to work on the campaign with hundreds of ZANU-PF women already there. Women were always in evidence at ZANU-PF offices around the country, and they were active participants in political meetings during the campaign.

ZANU women had pressed for even greater participation on the slate of candidates. Originally hopeful of thirty percent representation of women on the slate, ZANU women finally settled for approximately ten percent of the seats after ZANU officials expressed fears that the people of Zimbabwe might not vote for a slate that included so many women. As it turned out, voters showed no hesitation in voting for the ZANU slate, which even at ten percent included more women than had ever been elected to parliament, under the white Rhodesian regime.

Resisting Subordination

Women in traditional Zimbabwean society had always been subordinated to men. "The general principle governing relationships between men and women has always been that of superiors and inferiors," Robert Mugabe said in a speech delivered at a ZANU women’s seminar in Mozambique.

Continued on page 23
HELEN JOSEPH, left, played an active role in the resistance struggle, totally identifying with the aspirations of the African people. She was a skilled organizer with a formidable capacity for hard work and played a key role in organizing protests of women against apartheid and pass laws. Under house arrest for ten years, in her old age she continues to speak out and has remained a central symbol of resistance. Here she looks through the bullet-holes in her window, the result of one of many attacks on her house. SOWETO 1976 (center): Girls and boys, women and men came out in their 1,000's to participate in the uprisings which began in Soweto. As one woman said: "Apartheid has
destroyed our family life, left the homelands fatherless with mothers struggling to help the remains of their family survive. Either the women must go mad or revolt." Women have chosen the latter path. WINNIE MANDELA, right, an active leader in the freedom struggle. Since the life imprisonment of her husband Nelson, she has been placed under heavy restrictions, and finally banished to the desolate area of Brandfort. Her profound courage and continued efforts at resistance.
SWAPO Women Mobilize

by Gloria Jacobs

History's wars have, in the main, been fought by men. And most often the very people who have the least to gain from the society which demands their sacrifice have paid the heaviest price—from the poor and working class men who fought the western world's "great wars" to the American blacks who fought in Vietnam. Women, too, have paid their price—the veiled Algerian guerrillas to the American "Rosie-the-Riveters." Like the other disadvantaged, however, their participation generally did little to ensure their more equal role in the societies that followed the declarations of peace.

In those countries where wars of national liberation have been fought more recently, however, this paradox is far less true. Wars of liberation, waged to oust colonial or invading powers, often have goals beyond victory, namely revolutionary social transformation. The women of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique—to take two examples—have both been encouraged to play, and have demanded to play, a continuing part in this process.

In southern Africa, where only two countries remain under repressive minority rule and where the struggle for independence will certainly be longer and more painful than any seen on the continent yet, women have been active as political organizers and, in the case of Namibia, as soldiers.

Fighting for Change

Namibian women remain hampered partially by the profound restrictions placed upon them as Africans and partially by the chauvinism of their own society. "There are remnants of a semi-feudal mentality among our men," admitted Mathilda Amoomo, secretary of the Defense Office of SWAPO, in an interview with Carol Collins in 1977. Racism and poverty do much to intensify these differences between men and women.

"Most of us have no formal education," she continued, "We are in most cases satisfied with the least. As women [we] have to work for another woman, a white woman. And we are women with mostly big families."

Unlike South Africa where women were at one point drawn into the industrial work force by the diversification and industrialization of the economy, Namibian women have been mostly left out of the modern economic system.

African women from the north rarely work in the urban areas of the south, nor are they permitted to accompany their husbands who do have jobs there. Much like the system of homelands and reserves in South Africa, wives and children support themselves on subsistence agriculture.

The jobs Namibian women do hold are menial and they face the most formidable odds in simply trying to move beyond their limited means of survival. Nevertheless, they continue to participate on numerous levels in the fight against the white government. When South Africa extended the apartheid system to Namibia, Africans were removed from cities such as Windhoek and sent to "townships." It was the women who coordinated the boycotts of Windhoek beer halls, cinemas and buses during this period.

As the struggle intensified, women political organizers certainly treated as "equals" by the South Africans. They were arrested, flogged and expelled from their home areas along with men, all in an attempt to break SWAPO and prevent political discussion throughout the country.

In 1973, nearly half the SWAPO members who were publicly flogged were women who were publicly flogged were women. Out of a total of 3,000 women, 2,000 were forcibly expelled to the northern regions for assisting SWAPO's work in urban areas.

Women are now armed soldiers with SWAPO. Previously their participation in the movement had mostly been in the areas of health, education and welfare work, and supplying food, shelter, and medical assistance to male soldiers. Now, "we have two female commanders," says Putuse Appolus, a woman who is among the top officials of SWAPO. She has represented SWAPO at international meetings such as the United Nations.

"In the beginning some men were trying to disobey or get around their orders [from women]," says Appolus. "Through open criticism and self-criticism, we are able to deal with these problems on an ongoing basis."

Other women have joined Putuse Appolus at the top of SWAPO leadership: Dr. Libertine Appolus-Amathila, Namibia's first woman doctor, is now a member of SWAPO's central committee and assistant secretary for health and welfare, while Lucia Hamutenya is Secretary for Legal Affairs and a member of the national executive.

But the role of women at the top would be meaningless unless somehow the daily lives of the majority of illiterate, impoverished women were also being transformed. "The SWAPO Women's Council has succeeded in drawing thousands of Namibian women into our liberation activity," says Netumbo Nandi, a party activist. "It has exposed thousands of Namibian women to many new ideas which are revolutionizing their world outlook."

Gloria Jacobs is a long-time southern Africa liberation supporter and an editor at Seven Days.
Organization of Mozambican Women: Continuing the Struggle

Flavia Gemu, a member of the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) was interviewed in August last year in Maputo by Barbara Isaacman, June Stephen and Susan Rogers. Gemu heads OMM's section for professional training within the Department of Education and Professional Training. In the following excerpt of the interview, Gemu talks about the way in which OMM is organized in order to reach an increasing number of Mozambican women. Susan Rogers prepared the following edited version for Southern Africa from Barbara Isaacman’s transcript of the interview.

Who belongs to the OMM, and how extensive is membership?

Any Mozambican woman over eighteen years of age who didn’t participate in any counter-revolutionary organization during the colonial period can join.* Brigades are sent out to conduct OMM meetings at which applications are given out. Interested women are given cards. There is no entry fee but all members pay monthly dues of two and a half escudos [ten cents] for housewives and more for salaried workers, depending on salary. Peasant women can pay in produce, with the amount being determined by the district OMM. Dues are collected every three months.

It is difficult to know how many OMM members there actually are. The 1979 target was 5,000 members per province. Some provinces, for example, Maputo, have already surpassed this target.

How long has the OMM had a national structure?

OMM had no national structure until after independence. There were OMM provincial and district groups and the liberated areas of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete all had general secretariats; but there were no overall structures for the whole nation. After 1974 and before 1976 when we held the second OMM National Conference, popular initiative led to the setting up of OMM sections in many dynamizing groups. At the second conference, in November 1976, we decided to establish a system of organization that would coordinate the OMM groups at the local level to facilitate a uniform program aimed at the emancipation of women throughout the country.

This meant building the organization where it hadn’t existed before and extending control over groups that already existed so that national programs could be instituted.

Can you tell us more about OMM organization at each level?

There is a national OMM conference every three years at which members are elected to a national coordinating commission. This in turn selects the members of the National Secretariat. Over two hundred delegates representing all levels of the OMM, neighborhood, village, workplace, district, and provincial, come to the national conference. The first OMM national conference was held in Tanzania in 1973.

OMM is divided into six departments at the national level, namely: mobilization and organization, administration and finance, education and professional training, information and propaganda, social services, and external relations. The national OMM general secretary also heads one of the departments. At the moment, Salome Moiane is general secretary and also heads the department of mobilization and organization.

Each department is sub-divided into sections. For example, the department of mobilization and organization has a section responsible for OMM links with neighborhoods and communal villages, as well as other sections responsible for mobilizing and for organizing. The education and professional training department has a section...
for literacy and adult education, one for sports, one for culture, one for professional training, and one for links between school and community. Each of these sections has a responsavai in charge of recruiting women for its work. Sometimes sections still don't function because there are no responsavai and it may happen that one responsavai will have to head more than one section.

All these departments and sections also function at the provincial level, with the obvious exception of external relations. At factory, village, or neighborhood level only three departments operate: social affairs, education, and mobilization, and the secretary heads one of these. All five department heads at the provincial level are paid, but no-one is as yet paid at the district and local levels. The OMM hopes soon to be able to also pay district-level heads.

There is still a serious shortage of trained personnel, and some women are on loan to the OMM from their various other jobs.

You head the section for professional training within the department of education and professional development. What are the major activities and responsibilities of that department?

Our first priority right now is the education of OMM secretariat members in basic literacy. Our goal for the first twelve months of the OMM literacy campaign is to involve 300 women at various levels from each province. We have two types of courses in the program, full-time three months, and part-time six month courses. In theory, all women are supposed to attend full-time live-in courses, but the demands of the agricultural season and other factors make it necessary to provide the six month part-time course as an alternative.

Each province is supposed to establish a center for OMM literacy training, but scarce resources have slowed down progress and only the Inhambane Center is functioning at present. Districts have OMM centers—as many as ten—and district schools are already operating. Women come for half days, either from 8-12 am or from 1-5 pm. This four hours is used not only for literacy training but also for political education, discussion about the goals of the OMM, sanitary education, and training in the rights of women and in law as it effects women.

Besides the literacy centers, are there any other OMM educational institutions for women?

We have two experimental nutritional centers, one in Nampula Province and the other in Gaza Province, because of the need to teach women not only basic literacy and sanitary education but also basic nutrition. These are the three fundamentals. The nutritional centers run three month courses to teach women domestic economics—that is, managing home expenses to provide for basic needs, food preservation, and the growing and cooking of nutritional foods that women aren't familiar with. The women come from the communal villages, specifically, from pilot communal villages that the government is emphasizing. At the centers they cultivate food crops that aren't part of the diet of their home villages and learn basic concepts of sanitation. When they go home to their villages, they are expected to teach other women how to cultivate, cook, and serve these nutritional foods, and to pass on sanitation information as well.

How many women can these centers accommodate?

Each center can accommodate sixty women. They can bring their children, but there are no child care facilities. Some of the women who attend may be chosen to participate in other courses specifically on child care in order to become daycare workers. In all cases, the central responsibility is to teach others what they have learned in the centers. [Courses at the Nampula Center started in December 1979, serving women from the five northern provinces of Nampula, Cabo Delgado, Tete, Zambezia and Niassa. The Gazza Center, serving Gaza, Maputo, Inhambane, Manica and Sofala, was to start in 1980.]

We are planning a 45-day course here in Maputo on organizing and work methods for provincial and district secretaries. Most of these women, often peasants or "housewives," have had no organizational training and think they have to do everything. Through this course, they can learn to delegate responsibility, to establish tasks and priorities, to organize work, to accomplish specific goals, and to keep control over all these things.

How does the OMM disseminate information and mobilize women behind OMM goals?

Twice a month, an summary of OMM activities at the national level is sent to all provinces. At the provincial level, OMM mobile brigades take information to the districts. The OMM also makes use of the radio.

Radio broadcasts are important to the literacy campaign because women often fail to get interested because they don't think the campaign is for them. It's not that they are really resistant, but rather that they tend to say, "I'm too old," or "I've survived so far," or "I've got to take care of the children at home." The OMM attacks these ideas in radio programs.

This year we've also discussed the International Year of the Child on radio programs to get across ideas about child care and to combat traditional attitudes concerning what and when children should eat, i.e., that they should eat leftovers and last. We have also had programs about women and internationalism which focused on women's struggles in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Although the OMM programs are supposed to reach all women, they still don't because of limited radio transmission and language problems. The programs are sent to the OMM provincial secretariats in Portuguese. They are supposed to translate them into local languages, but sometimes they are not sufficiently well organized yet to do this. Also, at the village level, people still have to be encouraged to listen to the radio, and then to listen for information and ideas, not just music. So one OMM task is to mobilize people to listen to the radio, not only to OMM programs but to all news and information broadcasts.

Namibia Lessons

Continued from page 9

UN Commissioner for Namibia, traveled to Cape Town for further talks on the proposed demilitarized zone on the northern Namibian frontier. The team also visited Namibia and traveled on to Angola, Zambia, and Tanzania.

SWAPO, in an unusual difference of opinion with the UN team, openly criticized the trip to Windhoek. In Windhoek the UN team met with representatives of the local political parties.

SWAPO asserted that the UN team was pressured by South Africa to meet the Windhoek representatives. "We strongly condemn the UN officials concerned for being used by the racists for their own diabolical political ends in Namibia," a SWAPO statement said. SWAPO called the trip "ill-conceived" and said the UN team "should know better." Urquhart responded by saying that there had been a "misunderstanding" with SWAPO.

There has been another wrench thrown into the Namibia negotiations. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, the anti-MPLA guerrilla movement that continues to harass MPLA's forces in southern Angola, has asked South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha to permit UNITA to become a party in the talks over the Namibian DMZ. Savimbi made the request in a telegram to Botha in early March. There is yet no indication whether Pretoria will add Savimbi's request to the long list of demands that have held up the Namibia negotiations for almost two years. But Savimbi threatens eventual action against UN forces on the Angolan side of the border, if the UN interferes with UNITA supporters.
Resources on Women in Southern Africa

WOMEN UNDER APARTHEID
(South Africa and Namibia)


This booklet is a useful but limited source of information, good for introductory overview.


Study of the effects of migrant labor on the women left behind in the reserves.


Pamphlets on the impact of apartheid on African women and the resistance of black women, particularly Winnie Mandela.


Study of South Africa's domestic workers. The majority of African women in South Africa who are in wage employment work in the homes of whites as domestic workers. This analytical study is based on interviews with both employers and employees.

Carole Collins, This is the Time: Interview with Two Namibian Women. Chicago Committee for African Liberation, 1977. Pamphlet with photos. Available from American Committee on Africa, see above. $0.75.

A lengthy interview with two SWAPO women militants who talk about the conditions for women in Namibia and the role of women in the liberation struggle.

* Richard Lapchick, The Role of Women in the Struggle for Liberation in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. A/CONF. 95/5. 37 pp. Same address as Urdang, see below.

This paper, along with the Urdang paper, is the most recent and detailed on the subject. A valuable and substantial resource.


This short book is a personal account by an African woman journalist on growing up in Soweto. She is now living in exile in Europe.


Written by a leader in local National Party politics, this pamphlet concentrates almost exclusively on the inequalities white women experience in relation to white men, a discrimination that is substantial. However she does not question apartheid and the goal is the equal right to oppress blacks.


A tribute to the courageous activist incorporating quotes from speeches she has given.


Don't be confused by the similarity of the titles. These are useful documents, but somewhat outdated at this stage. A shortened version of the Landis document is available from the American Committee on Africa, see above. $0.30 (minimum order $1.00).


This paper, along with the Lapchick paper, is the most recent and detailed on the subject. A valuable and substantial resource.


This bound-mimeographed format book gives a simplistic account of the situation and is only marginally helpful as a resource. Expensive.


WOMEN IN ZIMBABWE


Anthropological study of the effects of the racist policies of the Rhodesian regime under Smith, interspersed with the views of the Patriotic Front on social transformation for the future. Although it is now out of date as a result of the PF victory, it is still a valuable study of colonialism's impact on women.


Pamphlet includes a speech given in the United States by Naomi Nhewatiwa, now a member of Parliament in Zimbabwe, and the opening address to the Seminar by Robert Mugabe.

APRIL-MAY 1980/SOUTHERN AFRICA 21
**WOMEN IN GUINEA-BISSAU AND MOZAMBIQUE**

Liberation Support Movement (LSM), "Women in the Struggle: Liberation is a Process" and "Carmen Pereira: Woman Revolutionary." in Sowing the First Harvest: National Reconstruction in Guinea-Bissau. LSM, PO Box 2077, Oakland, CA 94604.

Chantal Sarrazin and Oye Giertna visited Guinea Bissau in 1975 and did extensive interviews which form the basis of this worthwhile book.


Published during the war and contains a speech by Josina Machel, one of FRELIMO's leaders who died in 1971.

* MAGIC, Samora Machel, "The Liberation of Women is a Fundamental Necessity for the Revolution" in Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution. MAGIC, 12-13 Little Newport Street, London WCH 7JJ.

This is the opening speech given by FRELIMO President to the first conference of the Organization of Mozambican Women. Extremely important analysis of the role of and problems confronting women in the revolutionary process.

MAGIC, "Mozambican Women's Conference" in People's Power in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, Jan-Feb 1977. MAGIC, address above.


Vivid account of the participation of women in the revolutionary struggle, based on interviews with women in the liberated areas during the war and post-independence.


**WOMEN IN FICTION**


Two of the central figures of this novel are two African women in a South African township, one a brewer of illicit liquor, the other educated and estranged from her community. Abrahams is a black South African now living in exile.

Bessie Head, When the Rain Clouds Gather: A Question of Power; Maru; The Collector of Treasures, short stories.

Bessie Head, a Black South African, now living in Botswana, is a fine novelist who focuses most of her writing around women. Her novels are published as part of the Heineman African Writers series. (22 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3HH) and are unfortunately difficult to obtain in this country.


Contains stories by three important South African male writers which focus on women in South Africa, Alex La Guma, Richard Rive, and Ezekiel Mphahlele.


This large format book is a collection of poems by Zindzi Mandela, daughter of Winnie and Nelson Mandela and is accompanied by photographs by Magubane.

Miriam Tlali, Muriel at Metropolitan. Raven Press, PO Box 31134, Braamfontein 2017, South Africa.

A vivid description of life as an African clerical worker in a small white business which gives insights into living in apartheid South Africa. She displays a fine sense of humor.

**FILMS ON WOMEN**

Two important new films, prepared for the 1980 World Conference for the UN Decade on Women, will be available in the summer of 1980:

Amanda Produced by Deborah May and filmed inside South Africa in January 1979. 60 minutes

Traces the history of the women's resistance movement in South Africa, centered especially around the extension of the pass laws to women. Includes interviews with Helen Joseph and with women at Crossroads. This film also includes footage of Lillian Ngoyi re-tracing her steps during the defiance campaign.

South Africa Belongs to Us Produced by Peter Chapel and filmed inside South Africa in August and September 1979. 50 minutes.

The most up-to-date footage on the subject. Contains the first filmed interview with Winnie Mandela and centers on the role women have played in the struggle in South Africa.

**JOURNALS ON AFRICA WHICH REGULARLY FEATURE ARTICLES ON WOMEN**

Africa News. Weekly news digest available for $25.00 per year from: Africa News. P.O. Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702, USA.


South African Outlook. Available from: Outlook Publications Ltd., P.O. Box 245, Rondebosch, 7700, Cape Town, South Africa.

Southern Africa Magazine. Monthly, individuals $10 per year. Available from: SAC, 17 W. 17th Street, 8th Floor, New York, NY 10017, USA.


* Works that are particularly useful are marked with an asterisk.
Continued from page 15

last year. “Our society has consistently stood on the principle of masculine dominance—the principle that the man is the ruler and the women his dependent and subject.”

But the struggle for national liberation has gone a long way towards changing that. The growth of the participation of women in the struggle for independence has been gradual, but it began as far back as the 1896 war with the British settlers. At that time, a spirit medium, Nehanda Nyakasikana, fired up her people to fight the British invaders. She herself took up arms and acted as a commander. She was hanged by the British, and according to Mugabe, became Zimbabwe’s “first war heroine and martyr.”

“Since 1896, women of Zimbabwe have taken an increasingly active role in the liberation movement,” says Thandiwe Nkomo, a ZAPU militant. “Over the years, the positions of women in our liberation movement have slowly but surely emerged from playing supportive roles to men to those showing equality. Alongside with men they have been arrested and imprisoned, detained and restricted without trial, harassed, assaulted, tortured and murdered by the regime’s police and army.”

In 1948, women helped to organize a general, nationwide strike. By 1959 when the African National Congress, one of the first Zimbabwean nationalist organizations, was banned, many women were arrested. When the leaders of ANC’s successor, the National Democratic Party, were arrested in 1960, women helped to mobilize a three-day general strike. It was almost totally effective in all the main cities, including Salisbury, Bulawayo, Gwelo, and Umtali.

Then in 1961, women organized a mass demonstration against the settler regime’s new constitution. The demonstration drew more than 10,000 women in Salisbury. Police and dogs attacked the crowd, and many women were injured. Two thousand women were arrested.

Armored Struggle

When the nationalist movement embarked on the armed struggle, the progress of women accelerated. “The revolutionary armed struggle has been the biggest blessing for the Zimbabwean woman,” Teurai Ropa, previously ZANU’s Secretary for Women’s Affairs, has said. “Within a few years it opened the doors which would probably have taken decades to loosen. The struggle for national independence has opened our womenfolk to a world even they would not have dreamed of.”

At first women were overlooked as potential soldiers. But as the war for national liberation intensified, so the role of women expanded. “In 1973 our first women were trained in the same way as men fighters,” said Ana Tekere of ZANU. Since then, women in ZANU’s army, ZANLA, and ZAPU’s army, ZIPRA, have taken on all roles. “Our women’s brigade is involved in every sphere of the armed revolutionary struggle,” said Teurai Ropa when interviewed during the guerrilla war. “Their involvement is total. In the frontline they transport war materials to the battlefield and fight their way through enemy territory. They teach the masses how to hide wounded comrades, hide war materials, and carry out intelligence reports behind enemy lines.”

Into the Future

Now that independence has been won, both parties are pledged to work for the full incorporation of women into the new society. ZANU plans to send teams of women across the country to spread the lessons of the struggle to both men and women. The teams will demonstrate in practice “the right of women to equality with men,” one of the thirteen fundamental freedoms proclaimed in ZANU’s election manifesto.

Equal education for women will be a priority of the new government, say ZANU officials. ZANU intends to continue sending equal numbers of men and women to training courses at home and abroad, and to train women in mechanics, engineering, law, agriculture, and animal husbandry—fields previously the preserve of men.

ZANU also plans to establish women’s centers throughout Zimbabwe to improve academic skills and to teach trades that will enable them to be self-reliant.

Women will be encouraged to participate in the reconstruction and development of Zimbabwe, and the new government intends to establish a system of daycare centers to free women with children to work outside the home.

The new government will also guarantee equal pay for equal work, not a common practice in colonial Rhodesia. As Thandiwe Nkomo of ZAPU has said, “For the women of Zimbabwe the fight for national independence and sexual equality is one.”

Tough Problems

Continued from page 2

Farmer’s Union, to head the ministry of agriculture.

With these two appointments, Mugabe has taken concrete steps to keep whites in Zimbabwe and to keep the economy on its feet. Reportedly, Norman has already presented a land resettlement plan to Mugabe that has located one million acres of unutilized land owned by white farmers. The hope is that land redistribution can begin in these areas without disrupting the productive white farms.

Norman was never a member of the Rhodesia Front, although he supported its policies. David Smith was a member and had primary responsibility for circumventing the economic sanctions imposed against Ian Smith’s Rhodesia.

After some two weeks of meetings and discussion, Lord Soames finally announced that independence day would fall on April 18. Mugabe had lobbied hard for an even longer transition before he and his ministers would actually take over the functions of government. Again, Mugabe preferred to give the whites of Rhodesia more time to get used to the idea that the war was over and that the liberation forces had won. And he wanted his own leaders to have more time to learn how to run the government.

So April 18 will be a big day in Zimbabwe. But the people have already had a big day, March 4, the day election results were announced. Mugabe had stunned the world with his smashing victory, but the sweetness of the day really belonged to the people. After the election results were announced at nine in the morning, Salisbury exploded with excitement.

People poured into the streets, crowing, whistling, singing, cheering. Clenched fists emerged from buses, cars, and open windows. “Mugabe’s the one man that can lead us,” said one ecstatic young man in the African township of Highfield. “The right one has come to power.”

Euphoria and jubilation enveloped Salisbury like the clouds that gently ring the city each morning. The Rhodesian army and police were out in substantial numbers around Salisbury. Only the night before, General Peter Walls, Rhodesia’s commander of combined forces, had gone on nationwide TV and radio to appeal for calm.

“Anybody who obeys the law need have nothing to fear,” Walls said in his clipped Rhodesian English accent. “Anybody who gets out of line will be dealt with effectively and swiftly, and I may say with quite a bit of enthusiasm.”

But Walls’s men did not get the opportunity to display that enthusiasm. Heavily armed Rhodesian soldiers in full battle dress, backed by armored cars, were stationed at key intersections of the city, there primarily to reassure the white community. In the African townships there were a few potentially dangerous moments. But soon the army had the good sense to withdraw the soldiers and replace them with the generally less ideological police. The city remained calm, as celebrations continued all day and into the night.

Despite the euphoria of the moment, Mugabe and ZANU face serious problems in taking power in an independent Zimbabwe. He must maintain a delicate balance between reassuring the whites and over
Congress is already balking at foreign aid appropriations that were pledged for a Zimbabwe land compensation fund during the Lancaster House conference. And during the current period of renewed anti-communist posturing in foreign affairs, it is unlikely that the Carter administration, in an election year, will make good on promises made to a Zimbabwean revolutionary government.

Mugabe has wisely taken conciliatory positions toward both South Africa and the US for applying pressure on the British wise Pretoria and Washington will be in their dealings with Mugabe and the independent nation of Zimbabwe.

**Burden of Apartheid**

Continued from page 14

White farms, more often than not illegally. And so a point has been reached where one out of three African workers is a woman. There are two broad categories of employment in which African women are found in large numbers, and, not surprisingly, they are the least skilled: domestic workers and farm laborers.

The 1970 census (the latest available) showed that 91 percent of the female workforce was made up of service workers and agricultural workers, with the former predominating. Both these areas of work exclude unemployment benefits or other forms of social security, and are exempted from minimum wage guidelines—negligible though these social services are in the first place. In addition, the average woman workers earn a wage that is less than half of the average male worker, and only eight percent of the white male's income. When they do the same work as men, women earn considerably less.

Most of the women working in the towns work as domestics in the luxurious homes of their white employers. Many work illegally, although this has become more difficult with the passage of a new regulation that imposes a heavy fine on the employer that hires an illegal worker. A woman who breaks these rules runs the risk of being caught in one of the regular police raids on domestic workers' quarters and jeopardizing her job.

Those who have not been able to make it to the towns or as domestic workers in the rural areas, turn to agricultural labor as the only other source of earnings. Farm workers are paid among the lowest wages of all categories of workers and even here women receive less than men. Men will seek other forms of employment if at all possible, but women seldom have this choice.

Since the 1960s there has been a growing need for seasonal workers, as white farms have become more mechanized and squatters and labor tenants have been forced to move off the land. Increasingly farmers are hiring migrants, thus avoiding the need to provide family housing for their workers. This has seriously cut back any of the benefits that might have come from working on a farm and increased the hardships women face in such employment.

The balance of the labor force is made up mainly of factory workers, although there are a fair number of nurses and teachers, relative to the number of African men in these professions.

Many of the laws, which have made the lives of African women so much harder, have been passed since that momentous march back in 1956. The extension of the pass laws initiated many other changes and the situation for both men and women has worsened year after year.

But this oppression has not been accepted passively.

Shortly before the twentieth anniversary of the Pretoria women's march, another important march took place in South Africa. This time it was Soweto students, marching to protest the system of "bantu education." Among them were the daughters and grandchildren of the Pretoria protesters, once again marching peacefully. The police responded with guns, and an uprising spread throughout the country. Over 1,000 students were killed before their resistance was subdued by the police.

The only possibility for real change in the society as a whole and for the particular suffering of women lies in the total abolition of apartheid. That women have a special role in this process has been recognized by many women militants. As Winnie Mandela, who has been persecuted for her efforts, says:

"Black women not only have to face the repressive laws but also grave cultural difficulties. The struggle in this country, I believe, will be won by the women. I am fully convinced that the role of women in the struggle for my people is a major one and despite all the repressive laws they are faced with they have emerged as an outstanding group in fighting for the cause of black people in this country."

How fruitful Mugabe's generous attitude toward the US will be remains to be seen.
SIT-IN AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

On March 16, eighty protesters from the Peoples Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa staged a non-violent all-night sit-in at the Firestone Library on the main Princeton campus. The sit-in was staged to protest the university’s stock holdings in corporations that do business in South Africa, and set the stage for a student strike planned for April 4.

Alumni Trustee Oppit Webster (class of ‘79) and five professors joined the student demonstrators who remained overnight as planned, despite threats of disciplinary action. Peoples Front spokespersons said they had “no choice” but to use “unconventional methods” in view of Trustee obstinacy on South Africa-related issues. Not only have the Trustees refused to discuss divestment, but they would also not send a telegram calling for a halt to the planned execution of James Mange, an ANC activist.

The demonstrators left the library the following morning as a demonstration of several hundred students gathered in support of the occupation. Students again rallied the following evening, as support for divestment continued to grow in anticipation of the planned pro-divestment strike.

CHICAGO HALTS KRUGERRAND SALES...

Two Chicago area organizations working to end American bank loans to the apartheid regime in South Africa, announced on February 27 a major victory in their three-year old campaign. The First National Bank of Chicago, the largest seller of Krugerrands in the Midwest, has agreed to “suspend over the counter retail sale of the Krugerrand.” The bank, however, will continue to wholesale the coin.

Clergy & Laity Concerned (CALC) and the Chicago Coalition on Southern Africa (CCSA) have opposed the bank’s policy of selling the Krugerrand since 1977. “This is a major step forward in limiting the complicity of Chicago banks with the apartheid regime of South Africa,” said Carole Collins, director of CCSA.

DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGNS CONTINUE AROUND THE COUNTRY...

Washington, D.C.—The Riggs National Bank, which has been targeted for its loans to South Africa and Chile and for its redlining of DC neighborhoods, was challenged on March 12 for its failure to meet the credit needs of the District’s lower income and minority neighborhoods. Members of the DC Bank Campaign picketed the stockholders at the bank’s annual meeting, protesting the planned opening of a new Riggs branch in Spring Valley, one of Washington’s most affluent neighborhoods. “This runs counter to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) passed by Congress in 1977,” said the campaign’s spokesperson, Tim Wilson. The CRA “requires that all regulated financial institutions make mortgage loans available in an entire urban area, not just well-to-do sections of a city,” he added.

BOSTON HALTS PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS...

Last year Massachusetts State Representative Mel King successfully offered an amendment to the State budget banning investment of state pension funds in companies doing business in South Africa. In a letter dated January 14, 1980, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means officially notified the Pension Fund Investment Committee that any pension funds which had been invested in corporations doing business in South Africa would have to be divested before the State would pay its share to the pension fund. In addition, no new monies should knowingly be invested in such corporations. Potentially, this could mean that tens of millions of dollars will be divested from corporations involved in South Africa, including five million from the First National Bank of Boston.

MICHIGAN INTRODUCES DIVESTMENT LEGISLATION...

“A public employee retirement system shall not encourage or endorse legally required discrimination against an individual on the basis of race or color, by knowingly making or maintaining after July 4, 1980, an investment in an organization that does business in the Republic of South Africa.” On March 18, the Michigan house civil rights committee approved legislation that would require public universities to sell all holdings in companies that operate in, or make loans to companies that operate in, South Africa and would restrict similar investments by public employee pension funds.

The proposed legislation now goes to the full Michigan House of Representatives, where State Representative Perry Buhlhard will lead the drive for approval. The legislation has been lobbied for and has support from a broad range of local student and community based groups.

Michigan area residents are urged to write their local representatives in support of this legislation.

CHURCH GROUPS TARGET CITI-BANK...

On March 24, three church agencies announced that they have or will be withdrawing funds invested in the nation’s second largest bank—Citibank. The National Council of Churches, the nation’s largest ecumenical organization, announced its withdrawal of a payroll account, which handles nearly $5 million annually. The World Council of Churches announced that it will withdraw a payroll account and Union Theological Seminary announced plans to withdraw accounts with a total cash flow of approximately $1.5 million annually.

According to the NCC, Citibank was targeted because “It is America’s major lender to South Africa, and the only US bank with branches in South Africa. Citibank is presently assisting South African corporations who want to invest in the US.”

In an added irony, the press conference to announce the withdrawals was held in St. Peter’s Church—which happens to be located within the Citicorp headquarters building in New York City.

ANTI-APARTHEID SPORT ACTION CONTINUES...

The February newsletter of ACCESS (American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society) announced that CBS and NBC have agreed not to telecast any of the world championship boxing fights scheduled for South Africa or involving South African fighters in 1980-81. The schedule includes a proposed Tate-Coetzee rematch in Knoxville, Tennessee, this June.

INTERNATIONAL ACTION...

FRANCE: Two hundred miners from the north of France, members of the CGT union, recently occupied the French-owned ship, “Le Penchateau,” in Le Havre harbor, where it had docked with a cargo of 120,000 tons of South African coal. The miners were protesting the closing of French coal mines as a response to wage demands and importing of coal from South Africa where exploitation of labor continues to keep the price of coal down.

In 1967 South Africa sent France its first coal delivery of 18,000 tons; by 1978 the annual import from South Africa had grown to 7 million tons. These imports represent 67 percent of all coal imported from South Africa to Europe for that year and 27 percent of all French coal imports, making South Africa now the primary foreign supplier of coal to France. The occupation of “Le Penchateau” has aroused French public opinion on the question of French imports of South African coal and has been supported by the French Anti-Apartheid Movement, CAO.
Note Change of Address

Southern Africa Committee
17 West 17th St.
New York, NY 10011

Unfortunately, last year we were forced to

Below.

you one of the free gifts listed

will send you the coupon below and

you include your payment by returning the coupon below and

per month.

you can't send it all at once, that's fine. Just make a pledge of $5.00 or $10.00

Please help our work by becoming a subscriber.

these $50 and $100 subscriptions help the

magazine survive, particularly through our

you one of the free hand-covered books pictured above.

If you become a Southern Africa subscriber for $50 per year we will send

SPECIAL OFFER—

Magazine to a Subscriber

Southern Africa

Evanston, IL 60201

University Library

60201

Serials, Dept. 62158

12/29/91

Due

2/14/92

Southern Africa Committee
17 West 17th St.
New York, NY 10011

Please send the above to:

Name

Signature

Address

City, State, Zip

Please make check or money order payable to:

Southern Africa Committee