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ZIMBABWE SETS MINIMUM WAGE

Zimbabwe's new government has announced that as of July 1 minimum wages will be set at $108 per month for industrial workers and $46 per month for domestic and agricultural workers—wage levels which in some cases more than double those paid at present. It remains to be seen whether the measure will bring to a close the wave of wildcat strikes by black workers in mines, factories, and plantations, which spread around the country in May.

The strikes actually began in mid-March, when workers at industrial plants in Salisbury and Bulawayo went out with demands for higher wages. Incoming Labor Minister Kumbirai Kangai was then successful in persuading workers to return to work, arguing that the new government did not even officially take office until the April 18 independence day.

On May 2, some 4,000 black miners at the Wankie coal fields put down their tools. While later reports indicated that they had returned to work, the situation remained volatile throughout the month of May. The workers rejected as inadequate a pay raise of 10 percent to $2.95 per day, holding out for at least $4 per day.

The Wankie coal strike was followed by a bewildering proliferation of similar walkouts—some as short as a day, others more protracted. The affected enterprises included Chibuku Breweries, Red Cliff Engineering, Inyati Mine, Shackleton Mine, and the giant agricultural estates of Hippo Valley and Triangle Sugar, with some 8,000 workers each. Almost universally the major demand was for wage increases.

Generally effective as a trouble-shooter, Labour Minister Kangai has nevertheless had his hands full. In visits to one strike site after another, he has listened to workers' grievances, called on management to be responsible, and pleaded with workers for patience.

Most employers are expected to make some concessions on the wage front, though officials expect strong negative reaction to the new minimum wage legislation. But even these adjustments may not be sufficient to meet workers demands. Average annual earnings for Africans in 1974 were $560, while whites earned more than $6,250 per year. In mining the comparison was $610 to $7,900, in manufacturing, $885 to $6,270, and in agricultural employment, $220 to $4,810.

If the government should move rapidly in the wage area, however, it runs the risk of increasing the contrast between wage-earners and even poorer peasant farmers, many of whom live on overcrowded rural reserves or were displaced by the war.

Another more immediate obstacle may be the continued need for participation in the economy by whites and foreign investors, who maintain a constant if implied threat to close down or limit their operations if conditions are too unfavorable. Such a threat is likely to surface more vehemently when the new wage legislation goes into force.

ANC TARGETS SASOL

As we go to press, guerillas of Umkonto We Sizwe, military wing of the banned African National Congress of South Africa, conducted their most spectacularly successful operation ever on Sunday, June 1.

The daring midnight attacks were carried out simultaneously against South Africa's strategic and heavily guarded oil-from-coal conversion plants at Sasolburg and Secunda, near Johannesburg. The raiders struck storage facilities at both locations, causing over seven million dollars damage. All the guerillas escaped unharmed, and although one security guard was wounded, no lives were lost.

The brilliantly executed attack is an impressive display of military strength by the ANC, demonstrating ANC's ability to penetrate even the most sophisticated defenses undetected, strike a target, and then vanish into the countryside.

In a statement following the attack, South African Police Minister Louis le Grange promised "retribution" for the action, presumably against the bordering states to the north for allegedly harboring ANC guerillas. In the same statement, le Grange accused Joe Slovo, a white South African communist party member, of masterminding the attacks. But the Rand Daily Mail, in an editorial following the blasts, came closer to the truth when it noted that South Africa had "entered a state of revolutionary war."

SOUTH AFRICANS WITHDRAW FROM US TOUR

Two black South Africans have withdrawn from a high-powered sixteen-member delegation brought to the US to promote closer ties between the two countries. John Sebidi of the Soweto Committee of Ten and Aggrey Klaaste, associate editor of the Post, disassociated themselves from the delegation just after its arrival in Boston.

The tour of Boston, New York, Atlanta and Washington was arranged by the World Peace Foundation in conjunction with the South African Institute of International Affairs. The aim is to bring together elite, influential South African and American leaders in the field of business, finance, the media, politics and academia. An American group visited South Africa in November 1979 under this arrangement.

Included in the group, which is mostly white, are several persons believed to be members of Broederbond—the all male Afrikaner secret society which controls all aspects of the structure of the South African state. Although the delegation is primarily business leaders, academics, and editors of prominent newspapers, several members of the delegation are associated with Kwazulu.

NEW HOME FOR ANTI-FRELIMO REBELS

Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Mozambique's President Samora Machel met on May 23 to agree on joint military action against guerrillas of the "Mozambique National Resistance," who have harassed the FRELIMO government in recent years from bases inside Zimbabwe. It now appears that they have been forced to transfer their headquarters and radio transmitter, the "Voice of Free Africa," to South Africa.

The guerrilla force is made up of former Portuguese settlers, Africans from the Portuguese colonial army, deserters from FRELIMO, and others discontented with the policies of independent Mozambique. The resistance had received military training and support from the former Rhodesian government, and it succeeded in establishing some units inside Mozambique, particularly in the central provinces of Sofala and Manica.

But last November the main internal base, atop a mountain in Gorongosa game reserve, was captured by FRELIMO in spite of Rhodesian air reinforcements, and the group was barred from Rhodesian territory following the Lancaster House agreement. In late May there were reports from Salisbury of a "fight to the finish" between Mozambican troops and anti-government guerrillas still operating in the border area near Espungabera, in Manica province across from Mt. Selinda in Zimbabwe.

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Four Years After Soweto: Resistance Escalates

In the four years since 1976, a new annual ritual has emerged in South Africa. As the June 16 anniversary of the Soweto uprising approaches, South African blacks and their supporters around the world plan memorial rallies, while the apartheid regime braces for the possibility of a new wave of protests.

This year, though, the government hasn’t had much time to worry about that possibility. Since early April it has been up to its neck in the reality of what the British weekly, the Economist, predicted could become the most comprehensive racial confrontation it has yet experienced.

It all began innocuously enough back in February, when students at a single “colored” high school in Cape Town launched a campaign of protests against the “gutter education” offered in South Africa’s separate and distinctly unequal black, “colored,” and Indian school systems. By the time the Soweto anniversary neared, a school boycott had spread to every corner of the country, involving not only “coloreds” but African and Indian students, and not only high schools but every one of the country’s non-white universities.

Estimates of the number of students who were boycotting classes to take part in all-day political meetings and demonstrations soared past 100,000. And even that didn’t provide an adequate measure of the challenge posed by the months of mounting protests.

The student rebellion wasn’t the only new wave of resistance to apartheid. It coincided with the largest and most militant surge of strikes by black workers since 1973. And in both schools and factories, renewed resistance struck a damaging blow at Prime Minister P.W. Botha’s claims that apartheid reformed can mean apartheid preserved. For the high school and college students and urban factory workers who were marching and picketing represented precisely those sectors of the black population envisioned as a buffer against rebellion in Botha’s “total strategy” (see p. 5).

Compounding the dilemma for Botha, the protests spread to several of the rural black “homelands,” where the apartheid regime has dangled the promise of “independence” as an antidote to dissatisfaction with white supremacist rule.

Botha Policy Vacillating

Botha clearly recognizes a dilemma when he sees one. He proved it by vacillating. From one day to the next, Botha, Police Minister Louis le Grange and Minister of Colored Relations Marais Steyn bounced back and forth between conceding the existence of “justifiable grievances” and blaming the protests on “outside agitators.” But neither threats that protesters were “going to get hurt” nor promises that grievances would be studied and redressed brought an end to the boycott.

For the most part, the police held their fire, leading the Financial Mail to remark with obvious satisfaction that “the lessons of 1976 have not been entirely lost.”

“No bullets were used to quell the largely peaceful protests, though tear gas and
batons were,” South Africa’s leading business magazine declared happily in its May 16 issue. Less than two weeks later, police opened fire with automatic weapons on a crowd of Cape Town teen-agers, killing two and seriously wounding three others. Still, the memory of the carnage in 1976 was apparent. Le Grange rushed to “express my regret that such an incident should have occurred and extend my condolences to all concerned.”

Lessons From Soweto

While the government received praise for having learned certain lessons from the Soweto rebellion, the striking black students and workers were demonstrating that they had learned more. Most of all, they showed their understanding of the decisive importance of unity.

From the start, student boycotters in Cape Town established a collective and clandestine leadership, known as the Committee of 61, which guaranteed both coordination of activities and a degree of protection against wholesale arrest of leaders. And from the start, statements and pamphlets issued by the Committee revealed a clear-sighted analysis of how, as one pamphlet explained, “short term demands are linked up with the political and economic system of this country.”

The students “short-term demands” targeted “the general low standard and poor conditions surrounding colored education.” They called for an end to discriminatory funding that allots white schools three times as much revenue per student as it does “colored” schools and ten times what it does for African schools. They insisted that pay for teachers in “colored” schools be raised to equal that in white schools, that “colored” students receive free text books as white students do, that the “war damage” of 1976 be repaired.

In these areas Botha and Steyn were prepared to concede “legitimate grievances.” They were even prepared to cough up some extra funds to improve a school system described by an official committee just six months earlier as “a mess . . . headed for collapse.”

But the students were not to be bought off with promises of extra funds and study commissions. Referring back to the Soweto rebellion, they vowed “not to be bluff a second time.”

“During 1976 the students revolted against an inferior education system,” their representatives charged in a statement, “and similar promises—as are now being made by Mr. Steyn—were then also made that the situation would be rectified once order had been restored at the schools.

“After four years nothing has been done and the situation has deteriorated instead.” At the same time, the students made it clear that they saw their struggle as inex- tricably bound up with the broader struggle against “apartheid and the economic system it is maintaining.” Rejecting an offer of negotiations from Steyn, the Committee of 61 explained, “We cannot negotiate our principles away. Our interests are opposed to the interests of those whom Mr. Steyn represents.”

In keeping with the black consciousness philosophy that helped inspire Soweto, the “colored” students explicitly rejected their special status, identifying themselves as blacks, workers, and as inescapable foes of apartheid. Ominously for the government, most of their teachers have walked off the job in support of the boycott. In addition, the British Financial Times pointed out, “colored parents appear to be firmly behind their children. Parent support committees have been established in most major centers.” In addition, the protest has spread to most Indian secondary schools and a handful of black schools, suggesting a growing identity of interest across ethnic lines.

Since that assessment was printed in early May, evidence of this “identity of interest” has grown rapidly. Increasing numbers of African students have joined the boycott, defying not only the government but several “homeland” leaders, including KwaZulu chief Gatsha Buthelezi.

The KwaZulu government and Buthelezi’s Inkatha political party distributed thousands of pamphlets in black townships outside Durban in an attempt to end the boycott. But the effort was rejected by boycotting African students. “What we were waiting for was support not swear words,” one student was quoted as saying in The Post, the paper read most widely by South African blacks. The story added that the student received “roars of approval” when he warned Buthelezi that “he must not prevent us. He must move.”

Buthelezi aside, the students are not without friends in the clergy. More than fifty church leaders were arrested and jailed for a day during a demonstration in late May. They had marched in downtown Johannesburg to protest the arrest of a colleague who was accused of supporting the boycott. One of the jailed clergymen, Bishop Desmond Tutu, was accused by Prime Minister Botha of financing the student unrest. Despite Tutu’s denial, such accusations, however groundless, often become the basis for detaining or banning irksome opponents under South Africa’s awesome security laws.

Durban Strikes

The Durban area, known as a center of militant black union activity since a wave of strikes began there in 1973, is living up to its reputation once again. The Frametex textile mills, scene of one of the earliest 1973 strikes, recently fired 6,000 blacks who had gone out on strike. According to the Economist, “demonstrators have been stoning buses; armed police have been called in.

Other strikes have hit a Cape Town clothing factory and meat packing plants. And the strikers have won firm support from the surrounding communities and boycotting students. In townships outside Cape Town, even butcher shops have joined a consumer boycott against red meat. Boycotting “colored” students have raised funds for the strikers and have also invaded white suburban supermarkets, overturning meat coolers and jarring checkout counters with dozens of loaded shopping carts.

Meanwhile, as African National Congress militant Mavis Nhlapo pointed out in an interview published in Southern Africa’s Spring 1980 supplement on women, recent strikes have demonstrated a growing unity among black workers across racial lines.

“On one occasion,” Nhlapo said, “the employers came and told the African workers to stand on one side and the ‘coloured’ workers to stand on the other side. The workers replied, ‘We are all workers. We cannot be divided. We know that we are all fighting for the same thing so you cannot tell us that ‘coloureds’ have their union, Africans have theirs.’”

Much the same analysis has been offered by the boycotting students, both in their actions and in a series of pamphlets emphasizing the ties between their struggles and those of “our parents the workers.”

“We must see how the fail/pass rate in schools are linked up with the labor supply for the capitalist system, how low quality school buildings are linked to the unequal allocation of funds to education for children of the oppressed and children of the oppressor, how inadequate library facilities are linked with the need to confine and limit the thoughts of the oppressed, how distorted history text books are linked with the need to obscure and propagandize against the proud history of resistance of the indigenous people against economic slavery, how, in fact, the whole educational system against which we are rebelling stems from the fact that we are denied basic political rights and thus political power.”

Several weeks and more than 1200 arrests later, the students were still in the streets, demanding both better quality school buildings and basic political rights. And in spite of the widest sweep of detentions the government has attempted since its crackdown on Black Consciousness Movement organizations in October 1977, the wave of protests still appeared to be gathering, rather than losing, momentum.

A.M.
South African Sport: The Games Continue

When the South African Springbook rugby team—white to the last man—arrived in London at the end of 1969, they had no idea that this would be their last tour. They stepped off the plane, proudly sporting their country's colors, hopeful that the contest to come, one of many over previous decades, would send them home victors.

But no sooner had they landed than their enthusiasm began to pall. The tour was regularly greeted by thousands, sometimes tens of thousands, of angry demonstrators. As protests mounted, games had to be cancelled, while others were held behind barbed wire fences, an unintended symbol of the country from which they had come.

British public opinion against apartheid had reached such a pitch, that the Springbocks were never invited back. South African rugby tours of England came to a halt—but only temporarily as it turned out.

Ten years later, at the end of 1979, a South African rugby team was back. This time, stepping off the plane was a carefully chosen team of eight whites, eight Africans, and eight “colored.” South Africa had learnt the power of cosmetics.

Again they were greeted by protests; but this time they were more muted. The show of multi-racialism had succeeded in dampening much of the anger, at least in establishment circles, of the decade earlier. And it was but a few months before the British Lions, a team of British all-stars that competes internationally, returned the favor and arrived in sunny South Africa in May this year to compete once again.

South Africa has often been described as a sports crazy nation. For decades their white teams and individuals had competed in international events with impunity—and with considerable success. But as pressure against apartheid and its discriminatory selection practices gained momentum, they were frozen out of one event after another.

Now the South African propaganda would have us believe that South Africa is integrating sport. But is it really?

According to testimony recently presented before United Nations hearings on apartheid and sport, it certainly is not.

"Ever since South Africa's all-white teams were internationally rejected," M.N. Pather told the UN, "black participation at competitor and administrator levels has become absolutely necessary to veneer the apartheid policy with respectability. All the laws that directly affect the playing of mixed sport are still embedded in the statute books. Blacks must still undergo the humiliation of being treated like second-class citizens for a few sports concessions—and to endorse the passport of the white sportsperson for international participation."

South African Council on Sport

Pather is in a good position to judge. The seven-year-old South African Council on Sport, of which he is honorary secretary, was founded on the principle that sports in South Africa can never be non-racial until the apartheid laws themselves are erased.

Working through national "codes," as affiliates specific to a single sport are known, and through regional sporting councils SACOS bodies often parallel the official or government-sanctioned sporting organizations. By promoting parallel, non-racial bodies, SACOS serves as the major official opposition to apartheid sport.

Over the last years sport in South Africa has increasingly become a focus of international attention. South Africans have seen a steady flow of investigators probing their sports. In late 1979, both the French Olympic Committee and the International Cricket Council visited South Africa, followed in January 1980 by a team of experts convened by the British Sports Council.

By late May, The British Sports Council had called for a review of the status of sport in South Africa, in light of what it called the progress made towards multiracial sport. "No matter how thin the veneer, South Africa's allies seem unable—or unwilling—to see through apartheid's most recent coating. Their sentiments are not echoed inside the country.

One month before the British Lions landed in South Africa, the Transvaal Council of Sport—a regional affiliate of SACOS—issued a statement calling on black schools and training colleges to ostracize the Lions, because the tour had been taken out of the sporting arena and was now a political issue.

Apartheid in sport is not limited to the rugby scrum, however. Pather stressed that despite white South African attempts to “white-wash” apartheid, the press frequently reports incidents which reveal the nature of sport in South Africa. In March 1980, a decision by the Barberton Town Council to allow an Indian to play on a white cricket team was reversed after the town's white population protested. In the same month, black athletes were barred from participating in a major track meet at the town of Oudtshoorn because the ultra-modern stadium there did not have separate toilet facilities.

Apartheid Structure Dominates

Pather stressed emphatically that the issue in South African sport is not simply whether black and white players can play together on the same field. The issue is apartheid. "There is no law against mixed sport," he said, "but there are nearly 300 laws affecting the lives of the black people."

The absurdity of these laws is apparent from recent statements of the Minister of Sports and Recreation Punt Janson.

He "deplored" the prominent role that liquor laws play in sport and asserted that the liquor laws do not discriminate on the grounds of color. They were instituted, Janson said, because "one must have certain rules to control the sale of liquor, otherwise it would create chaos."

Yet the liquor laws enforce apartheid in sport. Liquor licenses issued to white clubs restrict the serving of refreshments—including non-alcoholic drinks—to whites only.

While Pretoria is working overtime to present a new image internationally, authorities continue to assure constituents at home that the present policy, in the words of Janson, "involves no policy change but only a change in procedure aimed at streamlining the present system."

In parliament in 1979 he reconfirmed policy guidelines, originally announced in 1976, which call for different clubs for white, "colored", Indian, and African sportsmen.
New Budget—
Strengthening the Fortress

Let no one say South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha doesn’t put his money where his mouth is. After months of touting his “total strategy” for defense of the apartheid state, Botha’s government has unveiled a budget which reflects most of the key components of that strategic design.

First and foremost, the “total strategy” advocated by Botha and his top general and right hand man Magnus Malan requires the big stick—perpetuation of South Africa’s standing as the paramount military power on the continent. The proposed budget will see to that. While holding the increase in total government spending exactly even with a predicted fourteen percent inflation rate, it dishes out a whopping 46 percent increase to the military. According to Finance Week, that makes defense “probably the only department to show an increase in real expenditure.” And it means that defense spending in South Africa has now doubled in the last five years. Providing for a “total mobilization force” substantially larger than the combined forces of South Africa’s seven northern neighbors—Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe.

The Golden Lure

Having shown those neighbors the stick, the “total strategy” proposes to use the 14-carat glitter of South Africa’s booming economy to lure them into a “constellation” of stability. The 1980-81 budget proposed by Finance Minister Owen Horwood is designed to magnify that glitter and throw the economy into high gear by slashing taxes, import surcharges, and loan levies. All of these moves are made possible by South Africa’s rocketing revenues from gold. The apartheid state produces more than half the world’s supply of the metal whose price has soared from $35 and ounce to around $550 over the last ten years.

The total tax cut will amount to more than $1.5 billion—or as one economist told the Financial Mail, a solid rap from “a 15 pound hammer” after the rather cautious stimulatory tapping of the past few years. Needless to say, the prime beneficiaries of this effort to boost consumption will be rich and white. “For it is the rich who pay the most taxes and, in this country, they are white,” the Financial Mail conceives.

Not that Blacks don’t have a place in the “total strategy.” They may well ask what the budget does for them, but the budget makes it clear what they can do for the economy. They can work. In fact, they will be needed to work in increasing numbers at jobs previously reserved for whites if the economy is to meet the desired five percent annual growth rate without bogging down in a shortage of skilled labor and a tidal wave of unemployed Blacks. Recent studies have warned that the economy could be hamstrung by a shortage of more than 750,000 skilled white workers by 1990. Other studies projecting as many as 6 million unemployed Blacks by the turn of the century unless growth can be sustained at over five percent for at least the next ten years.

Designing Privilege

The proposed budget includes several items designed to funnel a favored few Black workers into the ranks of skilled labor. Secondary and advanced technical education for Blacks living in the white areas will receive a 55 percent hike and Black adult education expenditures have been almost tripled. In addition, taxes for the minority of Blacks who earn enough to pay them have been significantly reduced and Black housing in white areas will get twice as large a share of the housing loan finance it received last year.

The strategy as Black critics have insisted since it was concocted, evidently doesn’t envision addressing the needs and demands of the vast majority of Blacks. For them, the budget contains only a jump in the price of bread. As a report in the British Guardian noted, this tends to bolster the interpretation of the “total strategy” offered by critics on the left. “In their eyes this involves an unholy alliance between government and business to create an urban black middle class and labour aristocracy and then to co-opt it to the defence of capitalism against the unemployed and dispossessed in the rural areas. They see it as a sophisticated plan to enlist selected black allies to help perpetuate white hegemony.”

Opening Safety Valves

That interpretation is echoed in a commentary by Guardian writer Stanley Uys, who contends, “Their aim is still white hegemony, but the method is no longer to batter down the hatches, but to open safety valves.” That approach can only succeed, however, if Black activists fail to forge ideological and organizational bulwarks against it. And for the moment, indications are that pressures for change will not be relieved by opening a few safety valves.

Even as the budget was being prepared more than 100,000 “coloured” and Indian schoolchildren were boycotting classes (see separate article). Yet by race and schooling these same students would appear on paper to be prime candidates for the proposed “labor aristocracy.”

Similarly, fierce resistance has again forced the government to cancel announced rent increases in Soweto . . . even as plans were being unveiled for construction of 3,500 “better type” dwellings in Soweto for middle and higher income groups.

A.M.

Coercion and Control

Yet, in order to quiet international demands, Pretoria has been relying increasingly on less overt forms of coercion, such as the combination of permits and “consultants” or “cooperations” that are required before almost any racially mixed event can take place.

Most particularly, South Africa has been including at least one black in many of the international teams travelling abroad. Thus, for white South Africa, apparent black participation has become absolutely necessary. To ensure such participation, Pather reported, employers of mining combines, government agencies, and multinational corporations have instructed their black employees to participate. Very few blacks dare opt out of this system because they are bound by the prescribed conditions of labor. Blacks can lose jobs if they show dissent,” Pather stated. “Having co-opted a few blacks, South Africa’s white sports administrators feel confident that they can break out of isolation.”

The message from Pather was clear. “SACOS continually appeals to the world for a total and complete severing of sports links with white South Africa. It urges overseas sports organizations and individuals to refrain from participating with South Africa as that only boosts apartheid sport which then maintains that it still has friends who wish to play with it. This is only delaying the eradication of apartheid in sport.”

J.C.
The new green, yellow, black, and red flag of Zimbabwe was raised for the first time over a Salisbury soccer stadium at midnight on April 17, and Zimbabwe became Africa’s newest independent nation.

Millions watched the ceremonies on television as Prince Charles, heir to the British throne, handed independence documents, signed by Queen Elizabeth, to Reverend Canaan Banana, Zimbabwe’s new president. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, and Lord Soames, the British governor in Salisbury, looked on.

Forty thousand invited guests—mostly black Zimbabweans—sang “God Bless Africa,” the black nationalist anthem, and “God Save the Queen,” as the Union Jack was lowered and the new Zimbabwe flag raised.

In a speech broadcast to the nation just before independence, Mugabe underlined the theme of reconciliation that he had been emphasizing since his landslide election in late February.

“If yesterday I fought you as an enemy,” he told the white minority, “today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interests, loyalty, rights, and duties as myself. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you.”

“It is not folly, therefore, that in these circumstances anybody should seek to revive the wounds and grievances of the past? The wrongs of the past must now be forgiven and forgotten.”

“If ever we look to the past, let us do so for the lesson the past has taught us, namely that oppression and racism are inequities that must never again find scope in our political and social system. It could never be a correct justification that because the whites oppressed us yesterday when they had power that blacks must oppress them today because they have power.”

Military Merger Begun

Mugabe is likely to continue to emphasize this point but black-white relations are still sensitive. And nowhere are they more sensitive than in the military. Integration of the three armed forces—Mugabe’s army, ZANLA, Joshua Nkomo’s army, ZIPRA, and the Rhodesian security force—begun hesitatingly shortly before the recent election. Just before independence, Mugabe appointed as commander of the new army, General Peter Walls, who had previously commanded the Rhodesian combined forces and was thus, until the ceasefire one of Mugabe’s most bitter enemies.

Despite Wall’s apparently sincere effort to match Mugabe’s conciliatory stance, many of his soldiers—including some middle level officers—have rejected him as a traitor to the white cause. He was greeted angrily when he paid a surprise visit to the Selous Scouts camp several weeks before independence.

Tension and suspicion between the two wings of the army—liberation-based as against Rhodesian—was certainly not relieved when British officials acknowledged that before the election Rhodesian generals had drawn up a plan for the massacre of the 22,000 Patriotic Front guerrillas who had gathered in assembly camps after the ceasefire went into effect in January. Southern Africa reported at the time the likelihood that such a plan had been considered while British officials in Salisbury denied all knowledge of the plan.

White Exodus Slow

The anticipated white exodus to South Africa has begun, but it is more like a trickle than the flood which followed on the decolonization of Mozambique and Angola. Reports say that more than a thousand white soldiers and civil servants have declined to serve under Mugabe’s government, and it is widely believed that by the end of April most of them had departed for South Africa.

Observers on the scene have estimated that Zimbabwe’s white population of about 230,000 will shrink to 100,000 by next April. Where they will go and what they will do is a topic that worries many in Mugabe’s government, both because of immediate economic problems that may arise and for security reasons. Thus, rather ironically, Kenneth Flower, the white former head of Rhodesian intelligence who for the moment is continuing in his post under Mugabe, is said to be preoccupied with what has been called the “unreconstructed attitude” of South Africa toward the new government in Salisbury. Flower and other intelligence officials have been upset by Pretoria’s efforts to coax former Rhodesian soldiers to South Africa, where it is believed, Pretoria is creating an intervention force that could be used in the event that fighting breaks out among rival factions inside Zimbabwe.

Intra-party Disputes

This possibility has not been completely eliminated, and in fact political violence seems to be on the increase since the independence ceremonies. According to widespread reports, dozens of assaults and abductions each night forced Mugabe to deploy in late April at least a thousand police in the black townships around Salisbury. Mugabe himself issued a warning that his government would take the “sternest possible measures” to end the violence. The principle targets of the violence appear to be supporters of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and former member’s of Muzorewa’s auxiliary force, who have been disbanded as a military unit.

There also appears to be growing tension between Mugabe’s supporters and supporters of Joshua Nkomo. According to recent reports, several hundred well-armed guerrillas loyal to Nkomo are at large in areas of western Zimbabwe. Government officials have been upset by Pretoria’s efforts to coax former Rhodesian soldiers to South Africa.
from a Special Correspondent / Salisbury—Zimbabwe is coming into its independence precariously balanced between two worlds—the world of African hope and aspiration and that of persisting white power in every area. The controversy over the large white triangle on the new national flag (which was interpreted as representing the white population) illustrates the nervousness of many Zimbabweans. Travelling in Zimbabwe in mid-April I often heard the fear expressed that independence might bring little fundamental change.

Richard Hove, minister of public works, sought to calm Africans in a public statement on the symbolism of the flag. The white triangle, said Hove, stands for peace, and not the white population. This explanation helped, but people continued to grumble.

The new government is confronting an uncertain and volatile population. Both whites and blacks are anxious about the future. The initial white relief over the moderate tone of Prime Minister Mugabe and euphoric black reaction to his victory are settling into a wait-and-see attitude. The pace of change set by the government to eliminate the injustices and inequities that have accumulated over decades of white rule will be watched vigilantly by the whole population.

Land

The Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Dr. Sydney Sekeramayi, said that the people will have a choice on collective farming: “There is no question of forcing the people into collective farms if they do not wish to go. We have a rough idea of what is good for the people, and the people have a rough idea of what is good for them. What we have to do is synchronize our ideas and come up with a plan which will make these people self-sufficient...Co-operatives are essentially a product of group initiative, where resources are pooled for the common good of the people. It is very difficult to do something individually in life today and it is the group interest that is beginning to play a bigger role in the social and economic activities of the people.”

The ministry estimated that there are at least ten million acres of unoccupied and under-utilized land in the white areas (about 40 percent of the total). Relocation and resettlement, in theory, thus present no great problems: and will not materially af-fect the entrenched position of the 6,000 white farmers. But resettlement will be expensive. The cost of purchasing land could be as high as $180 million and with another $60 million needed to help the peasants get started. An additional $120 million will be needed for development in the current African land areas, the tribal trust lands, which were badly neglected by the Smith regime. As an initial step, the government is reported to have bought a number of farms, in most cases bordering or partly surrounded by Tribal Trust Lands, for the settlement of war refugees and people in protected villages.

Education

A commitment was made in the ZANU (PF) Government would work towards the abolition of school fees. One week after independence Dzingai Mutumbuka, minister of education and culture, announced that school fees would not be abolished until a government inquiry has produced its findings. Many parents, students, and educators wanted the government’s position clarified as to when such a policy of free education was to be introduced.

On the eve of independence, Prime Minister Mugabe reiterated his Government’s determination to provide free education and medical services, but told the Zimbabwean people that such profound changes would take time.

At the moment over 1,400 primary schools and 43 secondary schools are still closed. The ministry does not have a timetable for reopening all of these schools, but the goal is to open them all before the end of the year. Some schools are being opened every day. Mutumbuka listed three main problems the government is facing in trying to reopen the schools: rebuilding the physical structures of the schools that have been destroyed, providing adequate staff and ensuring that basic health requirements are met. According to Mutumbuka, the ministry will also look into the two-tier education system—which effectively separates white and black children. More than half the population is illiterate, he said, and a uniform system of education needs to be implemented in order to develop the nation. Anticipating white resistance, he commented that many white parents confuse educational excellence with privilege and privilege with development.

Education is likely to be an early area of conflict, and there are already indications that the wealthy white population will seek to use “private schools” as a tactic for avoiding integrated education.

Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement:

The Government estimates that more than one million people have been uprooted and displaced by the war. There are still 145,000 Zimbabwean refugees in Mozambique, about 50,000 in Zambia and some 6,000 in Botswana.

Reception centers have been set up with the assistance of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, to facilitate the return of the refugees. The UNHCR has announced the establishment of a $140 million aid program to be used in collaboration with the Zimbabwean government for refugee resettlement. By May, the UNHCR estimated that 85,000 refugees had been repatriated from neighboring countries.

Reception centers are 24-hour transit places where refugees are provided transportation and food for the onward journey into their respective tribal trust land or townships. There do not yet appear to be detailed plans for helping the refugees start the complex process of reconstruction once they are home. Building materials, seeds, and tools will be early essentials, and government spokesmen have referred to the need for international assistance with this program.

Although the tribal trust lands are far from an ideal basis on which to build the new nation, the new government must deal with the enormous overcrowding and unemployment problems which plague the cities. On one trip to Salisbury this reporter found single room apartments housing ten to twelve people. These condition have led to a government policy of, where possible, directing returning refugees back to their homes in the countryside.

Labor

At least three strikes by factory workers, in addition to other industrial disputes, erupted just after the election and continued into the week of before independence. Workers at Rodia Chemical Industries in Msasa demanded overtime pay, some of which was alleged to date back to 1975. Striking workers at Umtali’s British Leyland factory demanded a fair wage increase, and strikers in Gwelo wanted to air their long-suffered grievances. In over...
The Economy

For the new Zimbabwe government, land and who will have the right to farm it, is a crucial issue.

New private investment slowed down in the months prior to independence, adversely affecting the economic growth of the country. Many businessmen are wary about the long-term future of private business. They are looking for some sort of assurance from Mugabe that he is not a Marxist and that there will be no nationalization of the private sector.

Besides the decline in economic growth, the country is saddled with an external debt of about $500 million, of which some $300 million is owed to South Africa for support during the war. (The government is debating currently whether to honor that amount owed to South Africa for purchases of war materials and loans for the war effort of the Smith-Muzorewa regime.)

Aid has so far been slow in coming. Many countries have offered to help, but as yet, few have given anything substantial. Britain has pledged $165 million over three years and the United States is extending $15 million for reconstruction and rehabilitation in rural areas. The US has also donated $5 million to the $140 million UNHCR fund for refugee rehabilitation.

Zimbabwe has applied for membership in the European Economic Community's privileged economic club—the Lome Trade and Aid convention. It has also joined in discussions with eight other black southern African states in an effort to develop areas of economic co-operation. The pact signed by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe is designed to encourage regional trade and economic development and reduce dependence on South Africa.

Nearly 70% of the country's capital stock is owned or controlled by foreign corporations, according to a recent study by economist Duncan Clarke. There are close to 300 subsidiaries of foreign companies in Zimbabwe—most of them British. Giants like South Africa's Anglo-American, England's Lonrho, and Rio Rinto Zinc top the list, but US, Canadian, and other South African corporations are also heavily represented.

Certain members of Mugabe's cabinet, led by Edgar Tekere, the Minister for Manpower, Planning, and Development, will be pressing for nationalization of the private sector and greater curbs on the power of the foreign multinationals.

Prime Minister Mugabe told the people of Zimbabwe before independence that "Socialism would be the byword of my government." And to criticize the government at this stage for the failure to bring about an overnight transformation to socialism is unrealistic. It must be remembered that the new government did not come to power via an overwhelming military victory. Zimbabwe became independent through a negotiated political settlement. Tactical compromises appear inevitable at this time.

Nevertheless, the decisions being made now are of considerable importance for the future—both for Zimbabwe and for all the peoples of southern Africa. Western aid and investment will not be offered to help Zimbabwe become a prosperous and independent socialist nation, but to further ensnare the country in the web of economic dependency and neo-colonialism. For Robert Mugabe, the need for foreign aid and capital will be balanced against the dangers posed by the inevitable western strings attached to such assistance. Many difficult decisions lie ahead.
Western Theft of Namibian Uranium

by Patrick Lawrence

New and extraordinary information about the collusion between a multinational corporation and state agencies in Britain, France, and West Germany in the illegal exploitation and clandestine purchase of Namibian uranium has come to light over the past several months. The revelations raise serious questions about the current Western involvement in negotiations to end South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory and establish Namibian independence.

In reports appearing in Liberation, the French daily, and The Sunday Times, of London, illegal contracts for the supply of Namibian uranium to a number of countries have been exposed. The articles also uncover the complex network by which the uranium was bought, sold, transported and processed.

The exploitation of Namibia's very considerable wealth in natural resources has been illegal under United Nations statutes since 1966. That was the year the United Nations revoked South Africa's mandate over Namibia and established the United Nations Council for Namibia as the legal administering authority, pending independence. Subsequently, in 1971 the International Court of Justice and the Security Council called on all UN Member States to uphold their obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and to engage in no acts which would in any way imply recognition or support of the South African administration.

Many corporations continued business as usual, in defiance of the UN, but the recent revelations of uranium contracts are far more serious in their implications than the private-sector activity documented in the past. Western governments have always chosen to turn a blind eye to the illegal commercial activity of multi-nationals under their respective jurisdiction; now, however, several of these governments are directly implicated in the exploitation of Namibian uranium; what is more, three of them—in France, Britain, and West Germany—are members of the five-nation "contact group" that has been attempting a settlement of the Namibian issue of several years. Those governments currently hold contracts for delivery of Namibian uranium for use in their domestic nuclear power programs.

The other members of the "group," which is expected to restart negotiations in the wake of Zimbabwe's independence, are the US and Canada; they too are indirectly involved in the Rossing affair. The recent reports, then, place in serious doubt the disinterested, nonpartisan role the "contact-group" members have claimed for themselves in negotiations between South Africa and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

Uranium prospecting in Namibia was begun in the mid-1960s by the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation (RTZ), a London-based mining conglomerate with holdings in Europe, North America, Australia, and South Africa. In 1966, RTZ obtained mining rights to the future site of the Rossing mine, located near Swakopmund on the Atlantic coast, from G.P. Louw Ltd., a local company.

RTZ discovered a deposit of 100,000 metric tons at Rossing, and in 1970 the mining giant formed Rossing Uranium, a subsidiary. Its partners for the $356 million capitalization were South Africa, which owns the largest share of voting stock in Rossing Uranium, and some of the potential buyers of the mine's production. These latter, under the laws covering South Africa's nuclear energy program, have remained secret until recently.

Contacts and Contracts

RTZ's links to the British government, apparently very extensive, have played a major role in the contracts the company subsequently secured for the "yellowcake" (uranium oxide, or raw ore) produced at Rossing. According to company documents cited in The Rossing File, published by the London-based Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contracts late last year, the company has forged such links purposefully over the years in order to minimize its political risks in such locations as Namibia, South Africa and the former British colony of Rhodesia.

Two types of contracts are significant. First, RTZ developed close ties with cabinet-level officials in successive Labor and Conservative governments. These are perhaps best symbolized by the directorship held by Lord Carrington, the present foreign secretary, who resigned his RTZ post only when the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to power over
One of the trucks used to haul uranium from
in 1979. It was through such ties that uranium contracts were eventually negotiated and signed.

The other important ties developed by RTZ are with Britain's Atomic Energy Authority, the government agency responsible for the development of the UK's nuclear power program.

In 1968, RTZ signed its first contract with the British government, for the supply of 6,600 metric tons of uranium for delivery between 1976 and 1982. The figure was later increased to its current 7,500 tons. Negotiations were carried out between senior civil servants and the company, and it seems clear that at least they were always aware that the uranium to be delivered would come from Namibia. Cabinet officials are said to have believed that the source would be Canada.

Although Rossing started production in 1976, technical problems and the remote location of the site delayed delivery until the late 1970s. The mine, which is the largest open-cast pit in southern Africa and one of the largest in the world, reached its annual output of 5,000 tons in 1979.

Britain was the first government to sign a contract with RTZ, and as implied by the reports published in the London Sunday Times, it was not until the UK, then under a Labor government, moved ahead that other nations, sensitive to the political considerations of such deals, would sign contracts. All the contracts were made with a so-called "letter box company" that RTZ had set up in Switzerland.

According to the news accounts, the UK gets 42 percent of its civilian uranium from Namibia; Japan fills ten percent of its uranium needs from the Rossing site; Iran, in contracts signed under the Shah, has a previously secret 15% equity share in Rossing and had contracted for some 1,800 tons of processed ore for delivery in 1975-76; West Germany and France also hold contracts with RTZ for deliveries of undisclosed size. Germany’s deal was made through Kraftwerk Union, one of the country's largest industrial corporations; France's was through the state-controlled energy company, Total.

A Remarkable Ignorance

According to British officials and members of the government under which the contracts were originally signed in 1968 and later renegotiated through the early 1970s, the issues of source and availability of alternative supplies at low prices were in question at the time contracts were signed. Officials now say—and RTZ at least in part denies—that, at Cabinet level, the government was deceived as to the origins of the uranium for which it had contracted; it also claims that the prospect of alternative supplies, once the Rossing mine became known as the source, were underplayed by the company.

The uranium in the British contract, officials have said, was supposed to have come from RTZ's Canadian subsidiary, Rio Algom. When Canadian supplies were thrown into some doubt and the prospect of South African supplies came up, former government officials who operated under Anthony Wedgwood Benn, the left Labor leader and then-Energy Secretary, say they requested to be notified of any involvement of South Africa; the possibility of Namibian supplies is said to have been mentioned.

RTZ now claims that the cabinet and its Ministry of Technology (Min Tech), were informed at the time about changes in the contract to allow for uranium from Namibia; Min Tech and the Cabinet insist they were not. Whatever the truth, by 1970 internal dissent about the contracts had led to the initiation of a secret inquiry by the Labor government, but the outcome of the inquiry remained secret, and by the end of the year Labor had been replaced by a Conservative government which had no problems at all accepting the uranium deal.

In a not untypical pattern, the Labor party, while out of power for the next four years, pledged itself to revoke the contracts, but did nothing of the sort when back in authority.

Thatcher government officials have said, since the Rossing disclosures, that the contracts will not be canceled because of their contribution to the British economy.

A Tortuous Path

The news accounts also trace the remarkable path by which the uranium was secretly smuggled from Rossing to processing plants and on to consumers once production began. Beginning in 1977, drums of yellowcake were flown twice a week to destinations in France by France's UTA airlines and South African Airways. The cargoes were not adequately marked and great care was taken to avoid overflying certain African countries such as Algeria, which might attempt to enforce international law by seizing the illegal cargo. From France it was trucked to Britain, in heavy vans disguised as furniture and kitchen equipment trucks. The uranium concentrate then undergoes the first stage of processing at the British Nuclear Fuels plant near Manchester. Some then remained in Britain for final processing; some was processed in Holland, and the bulk was transported by rail to the Soviet Union, where it was processed into reactor-grade uranium. In the last stage of processing, the rods used in reactors are produced in West Germany.

Japan's allotment was processed in the US. It is not clear if the Soviet Union was aware of the origins of the uranium it was processing.

Iran's supply, which involved a secret contract between the Shah and Moscow, was presumably delayed from its original delivery date but it is not clear in the news accounts whether the 1,800 tons for which the Shah contracted has all been delivered. The current government in Iran, however, is said to be severing all connections with the Rossing contracts, presumably including the 15% equity position it inherited.

SWAPO has condemned the continued flouting of UN Decree One which is designed to protect Namibia's natural resources from despoilation until independence has been achieved. In a strongly worded January communiqué the liberation movement pointed out that it regarded the exportation of Namibian uranium as theft, and would, as provided for in Decree One, "claim compensation for it as the Government of an independent Namibia, with the full authority of international law behind it."
Namibia Negotiations:

Pretoria Presents More Obstacles

"The talking marathon is over," declared one high level UN official when he returned in early April from Pretoria and a tour of the front-line African states. A senior UN team had just spent several weeks in Africa talking about the two-year-old plan for the decolonization of Namibia. After that last round of discussions—the latest in more than three years of negotiations on Namibia—the UN team seemed to have lost patience with Pretoria. "There comes a moment when you exhaust the process of 'clarifying,'" the official said, "It's quite clear that you can discuss till the cows come home, and the more questions you discuss, the more questions are asked." At that time, the UN expected South Africa to make its intentions known by mid-April.

The South Africans took their time, as they always have, and did not communicate to the UN until mid-May. And as expected, old questions begat new questions. The South Africans didn't say yes to the UN plan, and they didn't say no. "The letter from the South African foreign minister is being studied carefully," said a UN spokesperson, referring to the South African "answer" dated May 13. Careful study will almost certainly conclude that the letter is much more no than it is yes.

Pretoria has said yes, almost, to the proposal for a demilitarized zone on Namibia's northern border with Angola and Zambia. This has been the main negotiating detail since last summer when the DMZ was proposed by the late Angolan president Agostinho Neto. But after almost eight months of talk, there is yet a hitch. South Africa is still implying that its acceptance of the DMZ proposal hinges on the elimination from the present decolonization plan of the provision for SWAPO bases inside Namibia. Those bases are supposed to be established at the time a ceasefire goes into effect.

In fact, Pretoria is acting as if the UN has already agreed to eliminate those bases. "The South Africa government wishes to be informed," wrote Foreign Minister Roelof Botha to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, "whether the introduction of the DMZ would mean that the claim by SWAPO to bases inside the territory would not be revived."

That "claim"—accepted by SWAPO, the five Western powers that negotiated the UN plan, and the Security Council—has never been formally re-negotiated. On its part, SWAPO says it is sticking to the original plan. But this is not the only obstacle to South African agreement. "Your excellency will be aware of the extreme concern which exists regarding the impartiality of the UN," Botha wrote to Waldheim. "There is no justification for the General Assembly to declare one party the sole representative of the territory. The parties are entitled to equal consideration of their views."

What Botha is referring to is the General Assembly's long-held view that SWAPO is the sole representative of the Namibian people. "The South African government deems it imperative," Botha proclaimed, "that all participants in the political process must now be placed on an equal footing."

Botha wrote to demand whether Waldheim will refrain from giving effect to the recognition by the General Assembly of SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, and whether Waldheim will withhold funds which the General Assembly and the UN Council for Namibia have budgeted for SWAPO. Botha writes that as soon as these issues are resolved South Africa will cooperate in implementing the UN plan.

And if that is not enough, Botha includes as an appendix, a telegram from Jonas Savimbi, leader of the anti-MPLA movement UNITA, which demands that he be included as a party to the talks over the DMZ.

So the talking marathon is clearly not over. There are probably more obstacles in the way of a settlement to the Namibian conflict now than there was earlier. So far there is no indication of what the UN will do.

Moves Towards an Internal Settlement

But South Africa has been active inside Namibia as well. All indications are that Pretoria is moving the territory closer and closer to an "internal settlement"—style solution.

Continued on page 21
Nine Independent States of Southern Africa
Adopt a Declaration Toward Economic Liberation

South Africa's superior industrial development, its wealth, and its economic infrastructure have long dominated the region of southern Africa. The independent states in the region have realized for some time that only through unity among themselves could they break South Africa's stranglehold on their economies. The five front-line African states took an important first step toward that unity several years ago, when they began meeting regularly to coordinate policy on Zimbabwe. But their formal cooperation remained strictly diplomatic, not economic.

The independence of Zimbabwe, with its key geographic position in southern Africa and its extensive road and railroad systems, filled in a crucial piece in the jigsaw of southern African economic cooperation. Thus it was not coincidental that the first-ever southern African economic summit was held in Lusaka, Zambia on April 1, the month after Robert Mugabe's stunning victory in the Rhodesian election.

The one-day summit brought together the presidents of the front-line states—Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana—with Mugabe and representatives of Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho. Their meeting heralds perhaps the most ambitious economic cooperation plan ever to be attempted on the African continent. Southern Africa believes that more people should have a chance to read the statement adopted by the nine states in Lusaka. So we are reprinting below the text of their "Declaration toward Economic Liberation."

Lusaka, Zambia—The Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government of the nine independent southern African nations which was held in the Zambian capital on April 1, this year, adopted a declaration toward economic liberation.

The Heads of State and Government also accepted a programme of action in southern Africa as contained in a joint declaration signed at the end of Summit.

The following is the declaration by the Governments of independent states of southern Africa.

We, the undersigned, as the Heads of Government of majority-ruled states in southern Africa, offer this declaration to our own peoples, to the peoples and governments of the many countries who are interested in promoting popular welfare, justice and peace in southern Africa and to state our commitment to pursue policies aimed at the economic liberation and integrated development of our national economies and we call on all concerned to assist us in this high endeavor.

Dependence in Context
Southern Africa is dependent on the Republic of South Africa as a focus of transport and communications, an exporter of goods and services and as an importer of goods and cheap labour. This dependence is not a natural phenomenon nor is it simply the result of a free market economy. The nine states and once occupied territories of southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) were, in varying degrees, deliberately incorporated—by metropolitan powers, colonial rulers and large corporations—into the colonial and sub-colonial structures centering in general on the Republic of South Africa. The development of national economies as balanced units, let alone the welfare of the people of southern Africa, played no part in the economic integration strategy. Not surprisingly, therefore, southern Africa is fragmented, grossly exploited and subject to economic manipulation by outsiders. Future development must aim at the reduction of economic dependence not only on the Republic of South Africa, but also on any single external state or group of states.

Liberation: Political and Economic
While the struggle for genuine political independence has advanced and continues to advance, it is not yet complete. We, the majority-ruled states of southern Africa, recognize our responsibilities, both as separate nation states and as a group of neighbouring majority-ruled African countries, to assist in achieving a successful culmination of our struggle.

Our Urgent Task Now is to Include Economic Liberation in our Programmes and Priorities.
In the interest of the people of our countries, it is necessary to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation and to coordinate our efforts toward regional and national economic development. This will be as great for Namibia as it is for all the independent states of the region.

Southern Africa is a focal point of conflict. How can it be otherwise when a racist regime holds Namibia under military occupation, grossly exploits the people and the economies of the independent states and is a major barrier to our national development? It is not the quest for liberation, but the entrenched racism, exploitation and oppression which is the cause of conflict in southern Africa. The power behind this is in large measure economic. Economic liberation is, therefore, as vital as political freedom.

We, the majority-ruled states of southern Africa, do not envisage this regional economic co-ordination as exclusive. The initiative toward economic liberation has followed from our experience of joint action for political liberation. We envisage regional co-ordination as open to all genuinely independent southern African states.

In this spirit we call on governments, international institutions and voluntary agencies to give priority to increasing financial resources to support southern African efforts toward economic liberation and independent economic development. This we believe is the route to genuine interdependence and represents the best hope for a just and co-operative future for the region as a whole.

Development Objectives
The development objectives which we will pursue through coordinated action are:

1. The reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa.
2. The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration.
3. The mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies.
4. Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation.

Strategies and Priorities
We will identify areas in which, working in harmony, we can gear national development to provide goods and services presently coming from the Republic of South Africa and weave a fabric of regional cooperation and development.

Key to this Strategy is Transport and Communications
The dominance of the Republic of South Africa has been reinforced and strengthened by its transport system. Without the establishment of an adequate regional transport and communications system, other areas of cooperation become impractical. The economic liberation of Namibia, following its attainment of genuine political independence, will require the creation and operation of adequate transport and communication links with its natural partners to replace the artificial ones which currently bind it.
to the Republic of South Africa.

We will therefore, create a southern African Transport and Communications Commission to coordinate the use of existing systems and the planning and financing of additional regional facilities. The ports of Mozambique serve four states in the region and with the genuine independence of Zimbabwe can be developed to serve two more. Zambia uses transport facilities in five regional states. The development of Mozambican, Tanzanian and Angolan ports and the coordination of facilities more effectively to meet requirements of the land-locked states are necessarily of regional concern. Transport and communications will be a major focus of regional action. The coordination of transport facilities to meet the needs of land-locked states is crucial.

With the attainment of genuine independence in Zimbabwe, it is urgent to restore transport routes linking it to the Indian Ocean through Mozambique. Additional areas in which co-ordinated action will be needed include major new projects such as a possible railway for Botswana through Namibia to the Atlantic Ocean, thereby creating an alternative route to the sea for Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The co-ordination of airline schedules so that movement within the region is practicable; The study of existing and proposed micro-wave and ground satellite facilities to identify how they can be interlinked, possibly through the rift valley station. The existing and proposed micro-wave and ground satellite facilities to identify how they can be interlinked, possibly through the rift valley station. The commission will be located in Maputo and serviced by a small technical unit. It will coordinate transport and communication links among participating states. The commission will seek participation of all genuinely independent states in the southern Africa region. In addition, in many fields notably in transport, observer status will be open to liberal movements wishing to participate in anticipation of genuine independence. Similarly, in manpower development and research, the involvement of liberation movements is essential to amass the knowledge and train the personnel necessary once political liberation is achieved.

Regional co-ordination must be operational; it must result in concrete programmes and projects. This will require both domestic and external finance. Present estimates, for example, show that in excess of U.S. dollars 1.5 billion will be needed to finance urgent transport and communications projects over the next decade.

We emphasize importance of additional resources being made available to assist efforts to coordinate regional economic development projects. In the first instance, we intend to use the Regional Transport and Communications Commission to mobilise finance for urgent projects in priority sectors by holding Ad Hoc pledging sessions with existing bilateral and multilateral funding agencies. As economic co-operation develops, a Southern African Development Fund will be created and research to this end is being initiated. Its scope would be subsequently broadened and it might prove desirable to create a separate regional development bank. We therefore, urge the friends of southern Africa to pledge financial support to this fund.

Concerted Actions

Regional co-operation in the field of transport and communications is seen as crucial to economic liberation and has therefore been given the greatest attention. In other sectors, similar programmes of concerted action are envisaged.

For trade development, we recognise that many of us have existing bilateral and multilateral trade and customs arrangements. But even within these constraints we believe that there is room for substantial increases in trade among ourselves. To this end existing payment systems and customs instruments will be studied in order to build up a regional trade system based on bilaterally negotiated annual trade targets and product lists.

A majority of the people of southern Africa are dependent on farming and animal husbandry, their future livelihood is threatened by environmental degradation and in particular by desert encroachment as well as recurrent drought cycles. Even today few of the states of the region are self-sufficient in staple foods. Both environmental protection and food security are major challenges both nationally and regionally. We, therefore, urge that the international centre for research on agriculture in the semi-arid tropics (ICRASAT) set up a southern Africa regional centre in Botswana.

We further urge the development of the existing facilities in Botswana for production of foot and mouth disease vaccine to provide for the needs of all the majority-ruled countries in southern Africa. The spread of this disease currently threatens Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique. A co-ordinated approach to its control and elimination is urgently needed.

Likewise, we will undertake concerted projects in order to exploit natural

resources, in particular those of common hydrological basins. It is a matter of urgency to identify ways in which the co-ordination of research and training as well as the exchange of information can strengthen programmes to protect our environment and to increase food production. In the field of food security the possibility of the co-ordination of national reserve policies and the facilitation of interstate exchanges will receive priority attention.

We have decided to give special attention to the sharing of training and research facilities. We have further decided to stimulate the exchange of information aimed at achieving a concerted policy in the fields of mining, industry, energy and agriculture. In particular, consultations among those states requiring petroleum products and electricity on the one hand and those with petroleum refining capacity and electricity surpluses on the other must be undertaken to achieve regional solutions. The effort for economic development is an essential condition to free the southern African states from the exploitative migrant labour system.

External Cooperation

We are committed to a strategy of economic liberation. It is a strategy which we believe both needs and deserves international support. Southern African Regional Development must be designed and implemented by southern Africans. It will, however, be achieved more rapidly and will be more effective if development takes place within the context of global co-operation.

International bodies and states outside southern Africa are therefore invited to co-operate in implementing programmes toward economic liberation and development in the region.

This preliminary identification of aims, strategies and sectors illustrates both the magnitude of the task facing us and some of the broad areas within which outside assistance will be welcomed.

It is envisaged that southern African development co-ordination meetings of member southern African states and other invited participants should be held annually. This will provide a mechanism for surveying results, evaluating performance, identifying strengths and weaknesses and agreeing on future plans. Economic liberation and development in southern Africa cannot be attained either easily or speedily. What is therefore needed is sustained co-operation.

We view this declaration as a statement of commitment and strategy. Under-development, exploitation, crisis and conflict in southern Africa will be overcome through economic liberation. The welfare of the peoples of southern Africa and the development of its economies requires co-ordinated regional action. It is our belief that in the interest of popular welfare, justice and peace, we in southern Africa have the right to and expect to receive practical international co-operation in our struggle for reconstruction, development and genuine interdependence. However, as with the struggle for political liberation, the fight for economic liberation is neither a mere slogan to prompt external assistance nor a course of action from which we can be deflected by external indifference. The dignity and welfare of the peoples of southern Africa demand economic liberation and we will struggle toward that goal.

Jose Eduardo Dos Santos,
President of the People's Republic of Angola

Seresse Khama,
President of the Republic of Botswana

Samora Moises Machel,
President of the People's Republic of Mozambique

Julius K. Nyerere,
President of the United Republic of Tanzania

Kenneth D. Kaunda,
President of the Republic of Zambia

Mabandla F.N. Dlamini,
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland

Robert Gabriel Mugabe,
Prime Minister of Zimbabwe

Mooki V. Molapo,
Minister of Commerce, Industry, Tourism and Labour

The Kingdom of Lesotho

Dick Tennyson Matenje,
Minister of Education, Republic of Malawi

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Overview

Mozambique has been independent for only five years, a period which has wrought significant changes in the lives of most Mozambicans. Millions of people have learned to read and write, have had their first innoculations and lessons in nutrition; hundreds of thousands of peasants have joined in establishing over 1000 communal villages, in which rural isolation has given way to a more collective life, with water, schools, clinics, telephone and postal services as well as cooperative production. Grass roots political mobilization has involved millions in decision making at various levels.

But life is still very hard. The massive exodus of Portuguese immediately after independence depleted the pool of people with skills to critical levels—seriously affecting industry, commerce and agriculture. At every level workers and peasants tried to carry on, but the damage was often devastating. Even the traditional small-trader network for collecting crops from peasant farmers fell apart, and with many rural stores closed, or in incompetent hands, there were few goods offered to motivate peasants into producing enough to give them money to spend. Many peasants reverted to subsistence farming, growing only enough for themselves, creating shortages in towns and curtailing export crops.

There has been little or no economic progress anywhere, and in many areas the weight of the past seems to crush the movement towards building socialism.

Some of the difficulties have come from strains imposed by the cost of Mozambique’s support for the Zimbabwe freedom struggle—an estimated $550 million in lost income and $50 million in property damage. Nature has also been unkind—in the five years of independence there have been two years of flood and two years of drought. Despite these harsh realities, however, FRELIMO’s leaders have in recent months been stressing that the inabiility to overcome stagnation in industry and agriculture must be sought inside Mozambique’s social fabric.

President Machel told Mozambicans that they had won their first war, against the foreign enemy—Portuguese colonialism; now they must declare war on the internal enemy. “This is a decisive battle, a battle in the class struggle” he told them. “The state apparatus is corrupted. It is sick, full of parasites, some clinging to the skin, others internal.” We are going to take radical measures to cut the feet from under the counter-revolution.

“We are going to define tasks for everyone to carry out. We will be ruthless with the undisciplined, the incompetent, the lazy, the negligent, the corrupt, those who go in for red tape, those who cultivate a spirit of routine, those who despise the people.”

This new offensiva, as it is called, seeks to confront head-on some of the barriers to socialism still deeply entrenched within the structure of Mozambique society.

Beginning with an attack on widespread corruption it soon led to a shake up throughout the administrative structure, and in a major reshuffle many senior officials lost posts or were shifted to new positions.

Several of the new ministers appointed, have not been prominent in the party, but have apparently shown themselves efficient administrators in previous positions. Mario Machungo, who replaced Agriculture Minister de Carvalho in August 1978 has now also taken on the Planning Ministry.

Some of the shifts seem to reflect an increased emphasis on technical competence over the criteria of long political experience or extended participation in the armed struggle. But Western eagerness to see this as a triumph of pragmatism and an indication of a “softening on socialism” appear to have misjudged the importance of a parallel set of cabinet shifts. Top party leaders Marcelino dos Santos and Jorge Rebelo, who have been withdrawn from cabinet positions in Planning and Information, have been assigned to core tasks within the Party, in a move that seems designed to strengthen FRELIMO’s ability to give clear direction in the coming period.

Apart from its attack on corruption, bureaucracy and inefficiency, the offensive to overcome underdevelopment broke some new ground in its attitudes to private and foreign investment. Because of the acute shortage of internal resources, the government has launched a drive to enlist the resources of both domestic and foreign private capital. In February, Mozambique played host to forty representatives of major multinationals, including Coca-Cola, General Motors, FLUOR, Mitsubishi and FIAT, who were told by President Machel that Mozambique is anxious to attract foreign investment, on terms of mutual benefit.

Thus, five years after launching its struggle to build a socialist society, Mozambique is now in the throes of a period of profound reassessment and readjustment. Even among sympathetic observers there have been questions about aspects of the new policies. Fears have been voiced about a drift towards capitalism. Some express shock at the demand that workers should act in a disciplined fashion, at the hierarchy implied in the insistence that the job of a manager should be to manage. Yet at the same time Mozambican leaders have continued to stress the basic commitment to socialism and to popular participation in determining the direction the society will take.

No one can deny the serious problems confronting Mozambique; in the attempt to grapple with and overcome these problems some incorrect and some contradictory policies will probably be adopted. But as the reports that follow from our correspondents in Mozambique indicate, this is a society in which change is being deliberately fostered and encouraged despite the risks involved in such a process.

“When there are floods in the Limpopo,” President Machel exclaimed to a gathering in Maputo, “the river rises sharply and the water becomes muddy . . . But when the flood subsides, the dirt is deposited on the banks, the water again becomes crystal clear. The flood fertilizes the land and the rice grows vigorously. Our revolution is also like this.”

Jennifer Davis
Mozambique Reorganizes:
The Political and Organizational Offensive

by Paul and Andy Epstein

Beira—An important development is occurring in Mozambique. With the halting of the war in Zimbabwe and its burden on Mozambique, the country has turned its sights inward and begun a major attack on the state apparatus and system of bureaucracy. It has begun an offensive against the work habits developed, including negligence, irresponsibility, incompetence, apathy and passivity, disorganization, lack of direction, privileges, abuses of power, corruption and overt sabotage.

Appearing in public for the first time in 1980 on January 17, President Samora Machel spoke to the people of Beira, under a strong midday sun. In fatigue, relaxed and spirited, he presented a history of this city. He discussed its reactionary past as a British (Rhodesian) concession in which even the Portuguese were kept out of the top positions, best hotels and clubs. When FRELIMO members arrived in Beira in 1975 they were wined and wooed by members of the colonial secret police and other members of colonial organizations.

During the transition government dynamizing groups were formed, but, said Machel, they "had many difficulties in Beira, especially because of racism manifesting itself in the hotels, buses, restaurants, beaches, all over. Initiative was destroyed, organization and self-discipline faltered, programming and direction was lost and consciousness was poor." The former colonialist profited by this and infiltrated into the structures of government, companies and factories. "Up to today many have still not been dislodged."

The president talked in the everyday language and style of the people, using traditional parables to bring home his points. Occasionally his speech went into a popular Mozambican song, "We will not forget the time that is past." At one point he whistled the tune.

The people listened and laughed as he described the way reactionaries have camouflaged themselves. "We all know the story of the animals who met to choose their leader. They chose the leopard who took the chair and dressed himself in fine clothes. But at night, with his court, he went out to hunt the other animals. The parents came to complain and the leopard responded: 'Observe well the characteristics of the animal that ate your child.' The compliant responded: 'The only characteristic we've noticed is the animal has a tail.' But the chief had his tail inside his pants and was always seated. Because of this it was not possible to identify him." The speech was honest and very critical. "Even some of the police leaders in Beira are the same people who oppressed us under the Portuguese," said Machel.

This event in Beira turned out to be the initiation of a major campaign against the ills impeding Mozambique's development. Beira, said Machel, must be the taking off point for an organizational, ideological and cultural offensive against the generalized lack of productivity and against malpractices in the state apparatus and the productive and commercial sectors.

Back in Maputo several days later, the President jumped into his car and went to the port, beginning a series of visits to factories, state agencies, warehouses and offices, which revealed the extent of the incompetence, inefficiency and corruption now being challenged.

The State Apparatus

With independence in 1975, members of FRELIMO took positions in the ministries (e.g. housing, education, health, agriculture, industry). But they were presented with the same institutionalized ministerial apparatus that existed in colonial times.

This is not a problem unique to 'post-revolution' Mozambique. In his in-depth analysis of the Soviet Union (The Class Struggle in the USSR, 1919-1923), Charles Bettelheim argues that, from the beginning, the Czarist state apparatus was never dismantled. There were small numbers of cadres to be dispersed in a large area. The pressure of civil and external war put production "for the front" above the process of working together to develop new kinds of governing bodies with real workers' control. Instead of the Party and its ideology controlling the government, the Party members got slowly integrated into the bureaucracy. Leadership in all areas—in government, in the army, in the cities, in the country and in the Party itself—became centralized, hierarchical and formalistic.

In China, there was an attempt to break this pattern, and a Cultural Revolution attacking the systems of privilege was carried out with mass mobilization and organization of red guards. But recent events in...
dicate that there has been a reversal of this trend.

Cuba is also now, at a more advanced level of development, opening an offensive against its bureaucracy. Mozambique has entered this phase just five years after independence, with a direct attack against abuses of power and the system of privileges.

FRELIMO Tradition

The roots of this emphasis, go back as far as Eduardo Mondlane, first president of FRELIMO, who, analyzing events in the newly independent African states of the sixties, observed that independence did not bring about alteration of the state machinery. The state, instead of being dismantled, expanded. The organs of the state, army, police and civil service remained essentially the same. Party leaders and members moved into positions in these agencies. But this was deadly for the party as it became absorbed into the very state machinery that was designed to oppress the people for the colonialists. The party would reappear only at election time to renew its ties. Wrote Mondlane, “The party thus lost its roots in the people and began to serve the interest of the indigenous bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, and became the base for power abuse as well as accumulation of capital.”

The Bureaucracy

Portuguese bureaucracy, both at home in Portugal and in its exported colonial version in Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique, is particularly labyrinthian. To do anything—obtain a driver’s license, enter a school, take a trip—one must first submit a request, on special blue paper, phrased and spaced correctly, on which one affixes various stamps which must then be signed, notarized and stamped with a particular insignia or “carimba.” Each step occurs in a different part of town. One frequently waits in lines for hours, only to be turned away for absence of one stamp or carimba. It is exhausting, days go by, initiative is sapped. And this has deadly ramifications for the economy. On the morning of Machel’s Beira speech, the newspaper carried an article exposing the discovery of 15 tons of beans that had rotted in a warehouse.

Machel asked the ‘responsible’ “You were waiting for what?” “All this while people spend hours waiting in lines to buy food. Sabotage? Crimes against the people? It can be the bureaucracy itself which leads to lack of personal accountability. (‘This is not with me, go to such and such a place.’) Irresponsibility, negligence, disorganization, lack of direction, disinterest, inertia, and laziness, as well as outright sabotage are evils now constantly under attack by the President, as prevalent characteristics of a destructive bureaucracy.

Positive Results

The campaign has resulted in changes. Warehouses are being cleared out. Trucks have suddenly been arranged to transport goods. Papers have somehow been completed and stamped and some goods are appearing in stores. Post offices have been cleaned and books put in order. Visiting the package receiving warehouse of the Beira post office, formerly a dusty mess, one witnesses a remarkable clean-up with organization of package registration. In an office in Nampula a group of waiting people confronted a nasty bureaucrat in a calm and positive way, showing an increased general consciousness of the values and behavior necessary to build a cohesive socialist society. The entire campaign is one of mass political education and consciousness raising.

In February Machel told an all-minister conference: “We have not broken with the colonial methods of work. We live in our offices, inundated with piles of paper, do not know our own secretaries, do not visit hospitals, schools, farms, etc., do not listen to popular opinion, knowing reality only through memorandums and dispatches. We lose direction and focus only on small, daily, routine problems. . . . We don’t punish saboteurs, we coexist with them and even pay their salaries. Courtesy, serving the public with delicacy, with good presentation are not integrated into the behavior of the workers of the state apparatus.”

Good solutions for restructuring the state apparatus will take time and collective thought. The solutions being tried are quite varied. But there is optimism here where before there was discouragement. Mozambique has entered a new phase in its continuing revolution.

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Getting Hold of the Lions Tail:
The Campaign Against Bureaucracy

by Roberta Washington

Maputo—When Mozambique’s President Samora Machel visited the docks and two state-owned warehouses here in early January, the conditions he found set the scene for the initiation of the biggest campaign yet against the internal ill which are responsible, to some degree, for the shortages, long lines, and poor service often experienced these days in Mozambique.

Machel and his delegation found thousands of cans of powdered milk, boxes of children’s clothing, photographic film, cases of soap, and light bulbs stacked in random disorder. All of these items are in very short supply or haven’t been available in any store here for months. They were all imported products, which because of neglect or bureaucracy never made it out of the warehouse. Some of the items in these and other warehouses visited had been there since 1974.

In the weeks that followed Machel and other senior government officials made dozens of visits to the country’s ports and airports, factories, state and privately owned shops, and warehouses. In Sofala, large quantities of beans and cornmeal, which are in short supply in Maputo, were found rott ing in warehouses. Badly needed cotton seeds and fertilizer were discovered in a warehouse in Zambézia. Hundreds of blankets and boxes of clothes that were intended for re-education centers were found in another province.

The presidential delegations have included local members of the government and the party as well as local journalists. Often as many as four or five locations were visited in a day and the central theme of the visits has been to stress that the waste and poor service which results from bureaucracy, indifference, and indiscipline will no longer be tolerated. Very clear orders were given about what was to be done to correct the situations encountered. In most cases the products, when in good condition, were ordered sold or shipped immediately. In other cases, Machel ordered that poorly organized warehouses be straightened out; he sent in soldiers to help. Machel sometimes revisited a site to make sure that problems had actually been corrected.

Health centers also came in for their share of criticism. In mid-February, Machel visited two health centers located in Maputo. Health services are now virtually free and because of the shortage of doctors and other trained technicians—a legacy of the colonial period—there are often many
more people waiting to be seen than can properly be attended to in a day. The first health center that Machel visited was located in a heavily populated area where patients often start arriving as early as 5:00 a.m. The center opens at 7:30. Machel arrived at 6:45 and was on hand to greet some very startled workers, many of whom were arriving late.

Workers' Role

"It is necessary that everyone be conscious of the fact that the salary he gains corresponds to the work done," Machel told workers at one visit he made to the airport. "We know that there are difficulties, but it is necessary to fight to overcome them. If we aren't organized, how can we correctly develop our work? The 'chief' is not just in charge of distributing salaries. He must demand planning, hygiene, and accountability."

In visits made to factories, Machel talked to those in charge and to the employees about production problems. He listened attentively as officials in one factory told how the import administration bureaucracy had prevented them from getting badly needed parts for their machines. Other factories, those that produce tires and aluminum ware for example, were praised for their high production level and worker discipline.

At Mozambique's largest beer factory, which has both machinery and raw materials, Machel criticized the workers for their laziness, which he characterized as the chief reason for low production. He noted that there were the same number of workers as before independence, that salaries had risen, but that production had fallen off.

The clean-up campaign has already led to a number of expulsions from jobs and arrests in agencies such as the APIE, the huge state-run housing authority, which came into being after the nationalization of housing in early 1976. Irregularities there included employees who paid little or no rent, others who rented only to family and friends with total disregard for the public, and department heads who illegally used furniture that belonged to the state.

President Machel has frequently taken to the streets after a day of visits, to talk with some of the hundreds of people who gather when they see the presidential motorcade about their ideas on some of Mozambique's current problems. Often the conversations are very frank.

At one such encounter, Machel asked the crowd how they saw the current political situation. One man responded that he used to think that the government was not very worried about their problems.

"We at times were very upset," commented an old man in the crowd, "with looking for things and not finding them, and we even at times cursed you."

"It was this," he continued, "that those who don't like our government want. But now we see that in the end it is not you, Mr. President, who is at fault. It is those who studied..."

"We placed those who studied in charge to use their knowledge for your good," Machel interrupted. "But some of them are using it against you. They can shout, 'Samora brought hunger.' But I didn't bring hunger, I brought independence.

"They say this to say that our government is no good. It is because of this that they hide the food. We know this. But the maneuver is old. In Cuba, in Chile, they did this to say that socialism is bad."

Many people are beginning to ask just how long President Machel, working in Maputo, and the ministers sent out to the provinces can keep up the intensity of their intervention. Machel does not intend to end the current offensive until bureaucracy, indifference towards the public, incomptenen...
OMM—
Charting the Course Ahead

By Barbara Isaacman and June Stephen

Maputo—Some two hundred women met in Maputo at the end of March when the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) held its third national conference. The delegates were chosen at ten provincial conferences which have been held since the end of 1979, each of which had devoted much time to analyzing the provincial functions of the OMM during the past three years. The delegates were from all walks of life, the majority of whom were peasants and workers. Many had never before travelled in an airplane or visited the nation's capital.

About forty foreign guests represented women's organizations from many African countries including Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Lesotho, as well as Cuba, Vietnam, Brazil, Portugal, Sweden, and several east European socialist states. SWAPO and the ANC were also represented.

The conference set itself the tasks of assessing the extent to which the OMM had carried out the program it had outlined for itself, and of determining areas in which its activities needed to be strengthened. Also on the agenda was the discussion and approval of a proposed program to guide its activities over the next five years until the fourth national conference and the election of a new national coordinating council and national secretariat.

Since its formation in 1973 the OMM has undergone a series of changes which reflect the various phases of Mozambique's revolution. In 1973 FRELIMO was waging an armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism, and the OMM at its first conference defined its strategy as integrating women into the armed struggle and FRELIMO. After independence the focus of the struggle shifted to securing economic gains so that social progress could be guaranteed. The second OMM conference therefore defined its task as involving women in the drive for increased production so that they could participate in the process of national reconstruction. The third conference, being held on the threshold of the 1980s, which FRELIMO

Barbara Isaacman and June Stephen attended the OMM conference in Maputo in March. They worked in Mozambique as co-operantes, and in cooperation with the OMM, recently completed a study on women in Mozambique for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

has labeled the Decade of the Struggle to Eradicate Underdevelopment, sought to focus the activities of the organization on involving women throughout the country in this newest phase of the revolutionary process.

Ending Passivity

Involving women in the struggle against underdevelopment was a theme reiterated constantly throughout the five-day conference. In his opening address Mariano Matsinha, a member of the permanent political committee of FRELIMO and minister of the interior, stressed the role women ought to play against the internal enemy, against underdevelopment, against illiteracy and ignorance. Too often, he noted, women at work are passive when faced with corruption and economic sabotage among their co-workers. Too often, women at home respond passively to the incorrect behavior of their husbands and children.

Matsinha called on the OMM to do more than merely encourage women to participate physically in production in factories, agricultural cooperatives, and state farms. Its primary task, he said, was to help women reject the traditional and capitalist values which keep them passive so that they can actively participate in all sectors of the struggle against underdevelopment.

On the second day of the conference, the national coordinating committee debated collective and individual prizes to those who best represented the ideals of the organization. The provincial secretariats of Niassa, Maputo, Nampula, and Gaza all received recognition, as did the voluntary brigade which worked in the Maputo Central Hospital and in Jose Macamo Hospital, the OMM's first sewing cooperative in Manica, and the first production cooperative. Individual prizes were also given in recognition of individual commitment to the struggle for the emancipation of women. OMM members received these prizes for a range of activities such as the completion of the equivalent of primary school in three years, the organization of literacy classes and cooperative forms of production, and the fight against traditional values. The OMM also honored two young men who had worked as teachers in the OMM's literacy center since 1977 and had shown themselves dedicated to transmitting their experiences to the people.

Conference Work

The outgoing national coordinating com-

mission had prepared three documents to help focus conference work—a report on the OMM's activities since the second conference, proposed new statutes, and a proposed program for the next five years. As at most political meetings in Mozambique, these documents were first formally introduced to all the delegates in a plenary session, after which the delegates divided into work groups to study, analyze, and enrich with their own experiences a particular document or portion of a document. The work groups were characterized by intense discussion in which all delegates participated, using Portuguese as the medium of expression in almost all instances. Although many OMM members have been attending literacy classes, their knowledge of Portuguese is still minimal, and their attempts to communicate in the "language of unity" itself represents an important OMM victory. The conclusions of the work groups were presented to the entire group in plenary session, and the amended documents were unanimously accepted by the conference.

In summing up the conference Grace Machel, minister of education and a member of the national secretariat of the OMM, said that OMM's great achievement during the last three years had been its success in organizing OMM groups throughout the country. Women had come to use the organization to help them resolve their problems, she said and many had achieved

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Zimbabwe Aid Contentious

The Carter Administration has begun a search for money that can be sent as aid to Zimbabwe, but so far the amount has been meager. Immediately after ZANU's election victory, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose told the House Subcommittee on Africa that the US was planning "a modest but highly visible assistance program." The purpose, according to Moose, was to take advantage of a foreign policy opportunity "that is almost unparalleled." Specifically, a chance to deny "our adversaries"—the Soviet Union—"a chance to gain influence over the Mugabe government.

The Agency for International Development has allocated twenty million dollars in immediate aid to Zimbabwe. Five million dollars has already been spent for the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. Another fifteen million dollars is to be used primarily for reconstruction projects to repair damage done by the war. US representatives to the independence celebrations, Andrew Young and Averill Harriman, signed an agreement with the Ministry of Health for the rebuilding of rural health clinics.

The Administration did not include any money for Zimbabwe in its January request for fiscal year 1981. But the House and Senate foreign affairs committees urged respectively that $20 million or $30 million be allocated to Zimbabwe. This will not be an increase but simply a specific designation of funds out of $39 million already requested for a Southern Africa Regional Support Fund.

The Zimbabwe aid package is not expected to meet strong resistance in Congress. Mugabe's conciliatory statements towards the white citizens of Zimbabwe and on the subject of nationalization have pleased the State Department and mollified congressional conservatives at least temporarily.

Zimbabwean government officials are angry that the US aid level is so low. Forty to fifty million dollars is a far cry from the one billion or so which is needed for reconstruction and land redistribution. The US and Britain hinted during the Lancaster House negotiations that substantial aid would be forthcoming if the Patriotic Front agreed to constitutional guarantees for compensation for property. But the aid which has been forthcoming addresses only reconstruction aims and not any programs aimed at substantially restructuring the economy, such as land reform.

According to a diplomatic source, the Zimbabwe government has also requested the US government provide US military personnel as civilian advisors in a rehabilitation and retraining program for the 26,000 auxiliaries who were recruited by the former Muzorewa government to operate as a political police force. Under the proposed program, the auxiliaries would remain under military discipline and under their own officers, but would be engaged in civilian reconstruction work rebuilding the roads and agricultural infrastructure—such as cattle dips. This proposal appears to have cleared any legal barriers imposed as a result of the Vietnam war prohibition against "civilian advisors" engaging in military operations. But it seems likely that the US will require that the program be expanded to include elements of the ZANU and ZAPU armies in order to be more "even-handed."

Aid to Mozambique is again under attack this year. Representative Millicent Fenwick, a Republican member of the House Africa Subcommittee, argued for a cut from $9 million to $3 million in the Foreign Affairs Committee, citing alleged human rights violations and Mozambique's vote at the United Nations in favor of the Soviet position on Afghanistan. The Foreign Affairs Committee compromised on a level of $6 million. It is likely that more conservative Republicans will move on the House floor to prohibit aid to Mozambique, Angola and Tanzania completely and to cut funds to Zambia substantially.

Hearings Target South Africa

The House Subcommittee on Africa held hearings in May on current developments in South Africa and US corporate involvement there. Chairman Stephen Solarz's aim in holding the hearings appeared to be primarily to lay the ground work for the introduction of legislation that would compel American companies to implement a fair employment code similar to the Sullivan principles now being voluntarily implemented by some 130 US corporations.

From an investigative point of view, the hearings were a disappointment. In the last set of hearings on South Africa, held two years ago under Charles Diggs' chairmanship, expert witnesses were brought in to discuss the full scope of US relations with South Africa, from corporate issues to the arms embargo to agriculture department financing. In the recent hearings, only the State Department and the Defense Department were asked to testify, and their testimony came first, before any public witnesses could give subcommittee members ammunition for provocative questions.

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose had nothing new to say about US policy, in spite of the dramatically changed geopolitical picture in southern Africa following the Patriotic Front victory in Zimbabwe. Questioned on US pressure on the apartheid regime under the Carter administration, Moose could cite only US support for the 1977 mandatory UN arms embargo, and the 1978 Commerce Department guidelines prohibiting sales of US-origin goods to the South African police and military.

Representative Howard Wolpe directed some tough questions to administration officials on the subject of Space Research Corporation's sale of artillery shells and technology to South Africa. The Justice Department had been asked by the subcommittee to testify on this case, but refused on the grounds that the Space Research case was still under investigation by a grand jury. Wolpe persisted, saying that the subcommittee should consider subpoenaing witnesses, particularly from the State Department's Office of Munitions Control which had licensed Space Research to export steel forgings to Israel with only 4 days lead time, steel forgings that ultimately became 155 mm shells sent to South Africa in violation of the UN arms embargo.

Corporate representatives from Mobil, Ford, General Motors, Coca Cola and Citibank testified about their compliance with the Sullivan Code and participation in community programs. But under close questioning by Congressman Gray, Ford admitted it was still selling 500 vehicles annually to the South African military and police, an activity the company said was not contrary to the arms embargo law since it did not involve goods of US origin.

In a subsequent hearing corporate critics presented evidence on the critical support being provided by corporations to South Africa's military and police, and to its energy self-sufficiency and computer technology capacity.

Tim Smith of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), quoted Mobil Oil as saying, "Total denial of supplies to the police and military forces of a host country is hardly consistent with an image of good citizenship in that country. The great bulk of the work of both police and the military forces in every country, including South Africa, is for the benefit of all of its inhabitants."

Representative Solarz pressured these witnesses to say that their organizations would support his approach of "legalizing the Sullivan principles," but all of them declined. Ray Dennison, an AFL-CIO...
South Africa—The White Laager
Unifilm, Peter Davis, 1978
58 minutes, color.

Generations of Resistance
Unifilm, Peter Davis, 1979
52 minutes, color.

South Africa—The Nuclear File
Unifilm, Peter Davis, 1979
58 minutes, color.

"Seeing is believing" according to an old saying, but until recently most films about South Africa were not to be believed, falling into two main categories—government propaganda or Hollywood fiction—with nothing to say about the realities of black and white life.

There are a few notable exceptions, like Last Grave at Dimbaza, but the list is short. Since the Soweto uprising, though, several political film-makers have turned their cameras on South Africa, bringing alive for audiences in America both the horror of apartheid and the determined courage of the black struggle for liberation.

Peter Davis has made a valuable contribution in this field, with three films which focus on widely varying aspects of the nature and consequences of apartheid in South Africa.

The White Laager seeks to examine and understand the Afrikaner in South Africa. The film opens with the camera panning a crowd of Afrikaners cheering their team on to victory at a soccer game. As the film unfolds, Davis records many interviews with Afrikaners who see themselves as a team that must stick together in order to survive.

Davis shows the "struggle for survival" as a central theme in the Afrikaner self-image. Thus the laager, a circle of covered wagons forming an armed camp surrounded by enemies, both British and African, is a central image in the Afrikaner view of history.

There are film clips of Jan Smuts, John Vorster, and P.W. Botha declaring that the Afrikaner will not be broken. There is footage of the 1950s pilgrimage to the Voortrekker monument where 250,000 gathered to rededicate themselves to the idea of a "pure folk." There are interviews with Afrikaner settlers sitting in their backyards with dogs, frolicking children, and home-made pie and lemonade. All this reflects a way of life that many Afrikaners are determined to defend against what they regard as the dangers of communism and the African majority in South Africa.

Davis gives us glimpses of some of the results of this thinking as he looks at the structures of apartheid—repressive legislation, bantustans, forced black migration, and the policy of banning dissidents. There are some interesting interviews with dissident Afrikaners such as Beyers Naude and Andre Brink who represent a new trend away from the old racist isolationism. But the dominant thrust of the film is the Afrikaner feeling of self-justification.

As a contribution to the anti-apartheid movement, Davis' film can be of great use for educating and activating others. But this is not a film to be shown in isolation, particularly for uninformed white audiences, because it is not unthinkable in America that such an audience might easily get caught up in identification with the Afrikaner. The whites on the screen who feel threatened with the loss of home, land, and everything they worked for to the "communists" and black majority may well evoke a sympathetic response in the heart of middle America. The film does not deal with the issue of what black liberation would mean to whites, so that the basic Afrikaner assumptions, "blood bath" and all, are never challenged.

Because the film lacks a strong presentation of the horrifying impact of apartheid on black life and does not deal with the freedom struggle of the black African in South Africa, White Laager should be shown alongside a film that does present this picture, Generations of Resistance. It provides a powerful picture of the African struggle, first against British colonial domination and then against the racist apartheid regime.

The film uses some valuable archival clips of African resistance and white police brutality, and includes several important interviews with liberation movement leaders. Some of the individuals, events, and movements shown include Chief Bambata, leader of the 1906 rebellion, and Steve Biko and the 1976 uprising, which began in Soweto and spread across all of South Africa.

A useful feature of the film is its examination of the prolonged attempts at peaceful change by Africans and the total refusal of the regime to respond to such tactics.

Another strength of the film is its emphasis on the role of women in African resistance. The film deals with the 1956 Women's Campaign against passes and has substantial interviews with two leaders, Elizabeth Mafeking and Winnie Mandela.

The film presents a vivid and positive view of African resistance in South Africa and is a valuable asset in understanding the history and nature of the struggle against apartheid.

The Nuclear File is, perhaps, Davis' finest film to date. It is a thorough film, tracing the history of South Africa's quest for nuclear power and leaving no stones unturned as it seeks out evidence exposing the role played by Western nations, most specifically the United States and West Germany, in creating a nuclear South Africa.

Already greatly in demand, particularly with US groups involved in the anti-nuclear movement, the film should prove to be a valuable tool in bringing together the anti-apartheid and anti-nuclear movements.

Based in part on the information gathered in the book, The Nuclear Axis, by Cervenka and Rogers, the film interviews both authors extensively. There is also a revealing interview with Donald Sole, a nuclear expert and now South African Ambassador in Washington.

The first half of the film focuses on US nuclear connections with South Africa, detailing the activities of specific US corporations that have openly provided South Africa with nuclear materials and technology.

The second half of the film deals with West German collaboration, which has been particularly critical in providing the technology for South Africa's development of a uranium enrichment technique. Much of the information has come from secret documents obtained and released by the African National Congress of South Africa.

West German nuclear collaboration with South Africa not only violates international agreements against cooperation with the apartheid state but raises serious questions about West German adherence to the post World War II agreement that it would never develop nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that the West German government has been extremely hostile to the release of the film.

Although The Nuclear File was made before the recent reports of nuclear tests in the Indian Ocean off the coast of South Africa, the film provides a useful review of the available evidence about Pretoria's nuclear weapons testing. The film also makes another important point—South Africa's ability to produce nuclear weapons is only part of the danger posed by apartheid's nuclear capacity. South Africa's control of its vast uranium reserves and those in Namibia, and its developing

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OMM Conference
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Higher levels of political consciousness. This was noticeable among those in responsible positions at all levels of the organizational structure. Now the OMM must be consolidated—each OMM member must be given concrete tasks, and the OMM at the lower levels must learn to develop meaningful programs and carry them out. Because the OMM has still not accomplished large parts of the program drawn up at the second conference, that will continue to be its focus, but it was important for women to understand the difference between such tasks and the fundamental objectives of their organization. OMM's three basic objectives are to involve all women in the revolution and disseminate among them the basic tenets of FRELIMO ideology, to involve women in the struggle for their emancipation, and to involve women in the international struggle for women's liberation.

Access to work, to education, to social benefits are important aspects of improving women's lives, she said, but they are not ends in themselves. Mozambique's women already participate in all political organs—the people's assemblies, the people's tribunals, the party—but the quality of women's participation must be raised so that they become decisive in the decision-making process.

She cautioned that women can have advanced degrees and many material goods without being emancipated, and she urged the OMM to realize that its task is not to promote women but to emancipate them by involving them in all aspects of social, political, and economic life so that they can become true citizens of Mozambique and of the world.

Before closing, the conference elected a 45-member national coordinating council, composed of at least three members from each province plus all provincial secretaries, to guide OMM for the next five years. Also elected was an 11-member national secretariat which Salome Moiane will continue to direct as secretary general.

Then, in a joyous mood, the conference ended, as it had begun, with a rousing singing tribute to FRELIMO. Children brought all of us, delegates and guests, roses and posters carrying Mozambique's declaration of the Rights of Children. It seemed a fitting way of illustrating another of the conference themes—the important role women can play in ensuring that their children enjoy all the rights to which they are entitled and grow up to be true militants in the ongoing revolutionary struggle.

Zimbabwe
Continued from page 6

Sources in Salisbury say that Mugabe is considering using the army to handle the situation if those guerrillas fail to report to guerrilla camps. ZANU officials have also accused Nkomo's ZAPU of bringing guns into urban areas, and allegations have been made that ZAPU loyalists might be plotting a coup.

This appears unlikely, but it is certainly true that there is still much distrust and hard feeling between the two rival nationalist groups. Some of Mugabe's close advisors appear to be hardening their position with regard to cooperation with ZAPU. Many of Nkomo's supporters are angry at the results of the election, and they want Nkomo to withdraw from the government coalition.

Thus, for both parties it appears to be an extremely delicate time. With South Africa still hostile to the new Zimbabwe government, the last thing Mugabe needs is an outbreak of sectarian violence with his erstwhile ally.

Pretoria Obstacles
Continued from page 11

On May 1 South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha told the South African parliament that his government was prepared to hand over a large portion of the administration of Namibia, including elements of the military, to "a body that could govern the territory." Pretoria denies that such a move would bring Namibia closer to a unilateral declaration of independence.

At the same time, stories have appeared in the Namibian press that Windhoek was planning to introduce a new Namibian currency into circulation. Sources at a London currency printing house named Dalarue refused to confirm or deny to the Windhoek Observer a rumor that Delarue had received an order to print a new currency. But the rumors persist in both Pretoria and Windhoek, and observers on the scene believe that if the story is true, it is definite evidence that an internal settlement is in the planning stages.

Such hints are certainly being taken seriously abroad. "Since taking over last year," writes the London-based publication African Business, the new Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen "has taken steps to create an autonomous administrative and fiscal structure in the territory, last May establishing one central revenue fund for Namibia in Windhoek."

That revenue policy is bearing fruit. Recently, Windhoek negotiated its first international loan ever. The five-year $6 million loan is from a Swiss subsidiary of the Rothschild Bank AG of Switzerland. Its annual interest rate is only 5.5 percent, and it was arranged through a Cape Town finance house, guaranteed by the South African Reserve Bank. Swiss banks are renowned for their caution when it comes to extending credit in unstable areas of the world, but according to African Business, Rothschild "appears to be confident of the prospects for political stability in Namibia."

SWAPO Targets Power Lines

But stability in Namibia appears to be a long-abandoned dream. According to various reports in Namibian newspapers, South African and local soldiers fighting in the "operational area" of northern Namibia are returning with the almost universal opinion that the situation is deteriorating rapidly. Certainly the South Africans must have been shocked in early April when SWAPO guerrillas blew up key power lines leading from the Ruacana hydro-electric station on the Namibian border. Almost the whole country was blacked out.

The local administration repaired the damage, but only two weeks later on April 20, SWAPO guerrillas blew the lines up again, and the country was without electricity for the second time in less than a month.

In assessing Namibia as "stable," the Rothschild bank was probably also unaware of an informal survey carried out by the Windhoek Observer in April on what black people in Namibia think of the present administration.

Among the conclusions of the people polled:

* The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance is carrying out a deliberate policy of divide and rule, and is stalling in transferring power from the white minority to the black majority.

* The Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen spends too much time looking after the interests of the rest of the population, he refuses to recognize the reality of black nationalism, and he never talks to the people.

* It is common for whites to beat up blacks for seemingly no reason at all, and there is maltreatment of blacks by members of the South African police and military.

The survey also concluded that blacks in Namibia clearly perceive discrimination in employment opportunities, education, health, and all areas of social welfare.
SHAREHOLDERS OPPOSE SOUTH AFRICAN INVESTMENTS . . . Concerned shareholders in Europe and the United States have filed a series of resolutions opposing multinational corporate investment policies in South Africa.

In the US, 32 resolutions have been filed with 29 corporations and banks, in the tenth consecutive year that US churches have raised the issue of South African investments at annual company meetings. The campaign is being coordinated by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, an organization affiliated with the National Council of Churches.

One of these 1980 resolutions has already won a pledge from American Express to "prohibit any further loans through its bank to the South African government and its agencies."

Resolutions filed with Ford and General Motors were both withdrawn on the condition that the auto manufacturers publish reports on any sales made to the South African police or military. In addition, Ford has published a report on last December's labor dispute, which resulted in the firing and partial rehiring of 700 black workers at its Port Elizabeth plant.

Other resolutions asked Citicorp, Eastman Kodak, and Union Carbide to cease all operations in South Africa until the regime commits itself to ending apartheid and promoting full rights for the black majority. Mobil, Exxon, Allegheny-Ludlum, Borg-Warner, and Fluor were asked to make no further investments until the same commitment has been made.

In Europe, the Shell Oil corporation was challenged at meetings in Great Britain and Holland for its role in supplying oil to the white minority regimes in southern Africa. Leaders of churches and relief agencies in both countries demanded that the company pay ten percent of its 1979 profit to the new Zimbabwe government as an initial token payment in reparation for its sanctions-breaking activities prior to independence. A letter to Shell management said: "Shell's key role in supplying oil to the illegal Ian Smith regime played an important role in sustaining UDI. As the Bingham report [in Great Britain] showed, Shell was the sole supplier of oil to the Rhodesian armed forces and as such should bear some responsibility for prolonging the war, which led to the death of over 20,000 people in Zimbabwe."

Shell shareholders in both Britain and Holland also pressed the company to withdraw from South Africa. In Holland a massive campaign has been mounted in support of the demands. More than 1.5 million homes have been canvassed and every Shell gasoline station has been leafleted.

Also in Britain, End Loans to Southern Africa (ELTSA) demanded that Barclays bank relinquish shares it holds in Sasol, the South African coal-to-oil conversion project. This focus is part of a growing campaign that has been mounting over the past ten years against Barclays involvement in South Africa.

DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGNS CONTINUE . . . At the end of March the Nebraska Legislature adopted a resolution condemning apartheid and calling on state officials to stop the investment of state funds in corporations and banks investing in South Africa. The resolution, which involves about $25 million in state investments, was adopted by a vote of 28 to 0. Anti-apartheid groups hailed the victory, but the response was not as positive from other quarters. Chuck Bonza, a Hewlett-Packard executive, said simply "I'd much rather lose business with Nebraska than with South Africa."

In early May the Massachusetts state senate adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of state funds from companies and banks that are involved in South Africa. The resolution was an expansion of an earlier act that had been adopted which called for the end to all future investments of public pension funds in any firm doing business in South Africa. The bill must be ratified by the state House of Representatives, however, before it becomes law.

Church bodies are also continuing to call for divestment from South Africa. Significant changes in Lutheran church policies on investments in South Africa may take place as a result of recent actions at synod and district conventions of the Lutheran Church in America (LCA) and the American Lutheran Church (ALC).

Resolutions were overwhelmingly passed by four synods (LCA) and five districts (ALC), which call on their respective national churches to divest from corporations involved in South Africa. The Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa has been heading the drive for divestment and other synods and district conventions, held later this spring, are expected to pass similar resolutions.

In addition to calling for divestment from corporations, the three synod resolutions asked the LCA "to withdraw funds and investments from banks making loans to the South African government, parastatal organizations, or industry in South Africa."

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL GROUP MOUNTS CAMPAIGN FOR SOUTH AFRICAN CHURCHMAN . . . Members of a Garden City, NJ Amnesty International group are mounting a letter-writing campaign directed toward obtaining the release of the prominent South African churchman, Beyers Naude, from banning orders.

Naude, a pastor of the Dutch Reformed Church until 1964, served as Director of the Christian Institute until both he and that organization were banned by the South African government in October 1977. No specific reasons were given for the orders, nor can they be challenged in a court of law.

The Garden City Amnesty group asks that letters of protest be written to the South African Minister of Justice: The Hon. A. Schlebusch, Minister of Justice and the Interior, Union Buildings, Pretoria, South Africa.

TURNING OFF THE TAP . . . "Stop Oil to South Africa" was the theme of a mid-March international seminar in Holland that brought together government, liberation movement and solidarity group representatives to discuss oil sanctions.

The meeting was co-sponsored by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid and two Dutch groups, Working Group Karios, and the Holland Committee on Southern Africa. These groups have already mounted a campaign against Royal Dutch Shell for its continuing South African operations, and have successfully lobbied members of the powerful Dutch Labor Party to commit themselves to support for an embargo.

Experts at the conference said that the revolution in Iran had created a situation in which sanctions were now feasible. Both OPEC and OAPEC (the main oil producing and exporting country organizations) have long banned oil sales to South Africa. Until the Shah's overthrow, however, Iran supplied ninety percent of the apartheid state's needs. Now this flow has been stopped by the new government.

Actions proposed to bring the multinationals into compliance with oil sanctions included government moves like the recent penalizing nationalization of British Petroleum's Nigerian holdings, and also trade union and solidarity work.

The Dutch announcement that they were establishing a center to monitor all tankers to South Africa was hailed as a vital move in the struggle to stop oil reaching South Africa.
SPORTS LINKS TARGETED... An international center to coordinate action against apartheid in sport was established in late March following hearings at the United Nations. The center, to be based in London, will serve as an international clearinghouse for information on apartheid sport and as a coordinating point for international campaigns aimed at ending specific sporting links with the Republic.

The decision to create the center was made following an informal New York meeting of representatives of the South African Council on Sport, international sports bodies, and anti-apartheid groups.

In recent years, calls for an international body to coordinate anti-apartheid sports activity have been increasing. Anti-apartheid groups are especially concerned that there be a single authority to counter South African propaganda.

Activists targeted the May-June British Lions tour as a high priority for organizing work, with a special emphasis on instituting an international boycott of Britain following the tour. The meeting also mentioned the 1981 South African Springbok Rugby tour of New Zealand, up-coming boxing matches, and the scheduled visit of a South African golf team to the US.

In announcing the decision to establish the center, Abraham Ordia, head of the International Commission to End Apartheid in Sport said the center is designed to "facilitate and speed up the final and total isolation of South Africa in international sport in order to halt the racist regime's use of sport contacts for international propaganda."

For more information write: SAN-ROC, 30 Seymour Street, London, W1, England.

CANADIAN UNIONS TARGET GOVERNMENT OVER SPACE RESEARCH ARMS SMUGGLING... The Quebec-Africa Committee of CISO, the Montreal-based International Center for Workers Solidarity, held a press conference in late March to protest the failure of the Canadian government to prosecute the Space Research Corporation for its illegal arms shipments to South Africa. Joining in the demands were the CSN (Confederation of National Trade unions), le Syndicat National des Produits Chimiques Valleyfield (a member union of CSN), the Quebec Teachers Federation, and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).

Zola Zembe, representing SACTU, appealed for action now to "stop the murder that is taking place," adding that the Space Research howitzers are being used as blackmail against the African people.

The participation of workers at Valleyfield Chemicals was especially important, because that company is controlled by Space Research. Valleyfield workers have also demanded that "assurance be given that it will not be the employees of Space Research who pay the price of the company's illegal activities, undertaken by and for the company's management and owner."

A dossier outlining Space Research's role in arms shipments to South Africa, and the complicity of the Pentagon, CIA, and the Canadian government, is available from CISO at 1001, St-Denis, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H2X 3J1. (The dossier is available in French or English.)

ZIMBABWE VICTORY CELEBRATIONS HELD AROUND THE COUNTRY... During the week of April 18, the Zimbabwe Action Campaign (ZAC) held a series of events to call attention to the need for people to support and defend the new Zimbabwe.

A panel discussion on the tasks of reconstruction was held on April 20 in San Francisco. The event featured Bill Sutherland, an AFSC representative who was an observer at the Zimbabwe elections, Leonard Mudavanu, a ZANU representative, and a ZAC representative.

In Fresno on April 20 there was a presentation by journalist Robert Manning and the film "Generations of Resistance."

In Seattle and Boston victory celebrations were held that included cultural and educational programs. In Boston, Ted Lockwood of the Washington Office on Africa, who was also an observer of the Zimbabwe elections, spoke about his experiences followed by a bake sale and a disco dance. The money that was raised at the event was sent to ZANU to help finance the building of women's centers in Zimbabwe.

Letters

23rd April, 1980 - Year of the Charter

Dear Comrades,

Thanks for your letter of February 25, 1980 re: Southern Africa Magazine. We have been receiving the magazine and we will appreciate it if you could continue sending it to us for it is very useful.

Not only does Southern Africa reveal deep understanding and knowledge of the nature of our struggle in South Africa, and correctly analyses political events in southern Africa, but it has fully identified itself with the struggling masses of the region. The character of our struggle is grossly distorted and falsified by reactionary mass media in the USA and other western countries and your magazine can assist in exposing these falsifications and popularize our struggle.

The production of the magazine is an important act of solidarity with the peoples of southern Africa and the continuation of its production is in the interest of all progressive mankind. No doubt it will contribute to the speedy downfall of the already staggering apartheid regime.

Yours fraternally,

J. Jele, Director
International Dept.
African National Congress (S.A.)

Hearings

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representative, pointed to the difficulty in enforcing a mandatory code of conduct, and joined the other witnesses in favoring legislation that would ban new investment and bank loans to South Africa. Ted Lockwood of the Washington Office on Africa pointed out that it would be impossible to monitor and enforce a fair employment code for US companies in South Africa, and that the South African government could prevent the companies from complying at any time. Even if fair employment practices were fully implemented, they would affect only the working conditions of less than one percent of the African workforce and would make no contribution to changing the political power configuration.

Tim Smith pointed out that such a bill would be a compromise first step and that it was the first step down the wrong road, since it would focus attention on the narrow issue of employment practices instead of the overall impact of US companies in shaping up the white-dominated economy.

John Payton of the National Bar Association said passage of such legislation could actually be harmful, since the Congress could then claim it had taken significant action and ignore US complicity with apartheid for the next twenty years.

Still to come, at prestate, was a concluding session on US policy options in South Africa, with Randall Robinson of TransAfrica, Ambassador Clyde Ferguson of Harvard and Chester Crocker of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. Rep. Solarz plans a trip to South Africa in July, and will then make a final decision on legislative action.
MOZAMBIQUE SIGNED ITS first important economic agreement with a major Western country in early February. The pact calls for Italy to receive preferential access to Mozambique's coal, uranium, petroleum, and natural gas resources in exchange for aid grants of about $11 million, and $100 million in credit. Italian firms will undertake several projects in Mozambique, including the construction of an electrical network and a telephone system.

Mozambique's willingness to permit foreign investment was underscored later that month during a tour of foreign businessmen. "There is a place for foreign investment in our country," Machel told the forty visiting delegates from such global corporate giants as GM, Mitsubishi, and Coca-Cola.

A number of private businesses have continued to operate in socialist Mozambique, including some recently established Mozambique-foreign joint ventures. Private investment is encouraged, provided the investment parallels Mozambique's development policies.

President Machel told the delegates that multi-nationals had the technology, experience, and capital required for Mozambique's development. But, he also stressed that giant multi-nationals could manipulate small countries, and threaten economic independence. Nevertheless, he said, Mozambique could control foreign capital because of its planned socialist economy, and because "We have experience with foreign capital, we know what we want, and how we want it."

Only weeks after Zimbabwe's independence, Mozambique is beginning to enjoy the fruits of commerce with its neighbor. During the first week in May, an initial consignment of 1,100 tons of Zimbabwian sugar, and 5,000 tons of steel were exported through Maputo, the first shipment since 1975.

Within weeks of its own independence, FRELIMO cut Mozambique's trade links with the white minority regime in Salisbury, forcing Rhodesia to use costly routes through South Africa.

Officials estimate that Zimbabwe will export 350,000 tons of steel and 160,000 tons of sugar annually through Mozambican ports bringing transit fees and jobs to Mozambique while reducing Zimbabwe's export costs and its dependence on South Africa's transport network.

Mozambique is embarking on an ambitious program to improve and expand its transport and shipping capacity to meet the expanded traffic from Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Zaire. One aspect of that expansion is the long-awaited electrification of the rail line from Zimbabwe to Beira, Mozambique's second largest city, and once its busiest port. The multi-million dollar electrification scheme, to be powered by the hydro-electric complex at Cabora Bassa, is expected to commence later this year.

Mozambique has already purchased twenty locomotives from General Electric's Brazilian subsidiary to use on this line.

SOUTH AFRICA'S MUCH heralded "liberalization" policy has yet to reach the prison system. From June 1978 to June 1979, 148 people died on the gallows, a 40 percent increase from the previous year. Two of the victims were white.

During the same period, over one half million South Africans were imprisoned, giving South Africa a proportional prison population twice that of the United States and ten times that of Nigeria.

Over 100,000 people crowd South Africa's prisons every day, many for pass law violations. According to a recent study, some Africans have been imprisoned under the pass laws as many as nine times.

One might think that the South Africans have enough to worry about at home. With students striking in the Cape, SWAPO on the move in Namibia, and Mugabe the victor in Salisbury, it would have been understandable if a desert war thousands of miles from their borders escaped their attention. But, the South Africans are nothing if not resourceful, and they've managed to become involved in the war. King Hassan of Morocco is waging against the POLISARIO Front guerrillas in the western Sahara.

POLISARIO and Moroccan forces fought a major battle in Quarkziz region of southern Morocco in April. After ten days the Moroccans withdrew, leaving behind their South African made AML-90 MK. 6 tanks.

Actually a modified French Panhard, made under license in South Africa, the captured tanks are readily distinguishable from the French vehicles because of differences in armament and design.

Despite official Moroccan denials of dealings with the apartheid regime, the Moroccans failed to obliterate all the South African markings on the equipment. Some parts were still labeled in both English and Afrikaans. Captured Moroccan tank crews confirmed that the equipment had recently arrived, and told of meeting South African advisors.

South Africa thus joins the US as a major new arms supplier to King Hassan in his sagging effort to annex the Western Sahara.

As in Angola, the US and South Africa have once again joined forces against an African liberation movement. And their efforts seem doomed to the same fate.

A recent study of the Ford Motor Company's South African operations has revealed part of the story behind the strikes in Port Elizabeth last fall. A South African Institute of Race Relations study has found that wages and general working conditions for black employees at Ford's plants are well below even the marginal standards set by the Sullivan principles—of which Ford is a signatory.

"The facts on wages and differentials as presented by the company make a mockery of the aspirations of the Sullivan principles," stated the audit, commissioned by Ford Motor Company. More specifically, the study found that the average wages of more than eighty percent of black and mixed-race workers, many of whom work only part time, varied from $130 to $185 a month.

Such wages are well below the household subsistence level and, the study reports, real earnings for most non-white workers have declined since 1971. The Institute also
reports that during the course of their study many workers complained they were starving. Although completed in September 1979, Ford only decided to release the report in late February, after a series of strikes hit their Port Elizabeth plant. In late November, seven hundred black workers walked out, protesting discrimination in pay and job opportunities and racism by whites. The strike was initially sparked by the forced resignation of the head of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO), Thozamile Botha, who claimed he was fired for his political activities outside the factory.

Actions following the walk-out appear to bear out Botha's claim that Ford management was attempting to stifle political activity. In early January, Ford re-hired most of the striking black workers, but only after 21 PEBCO members had been charged under the Riotous Assembly Act in December and Thozamile Botha, along with journalist Moro Badela and PEBCO secretary Moro Tshume, had been detained. Botha, Badela, and Tshume were subsequently released in late February and immediately served with banning orders. Botha has since fled from South Africa to avoid further harassment.

The Institute of Race Relations study appears to support assertions by black workers at Ford and others in South Africa that codes of conduct such as the Sullivan principles are having little effect on the lives of black workers.

ZAMBIA RECENTLY CONCLUDED an arms deal with the Soviet Union for over $85 million. The arms package is said to include a squadron of sixteen MIG-21 combat aircraft, eight Soviet T-54 tanks, and twenty amphibious scout cars which have already been delivered.

More than two hundred Zambian Air Force pilots and ground crew have been training in the Soviet Union for the past two months and will man the MIG's on their return.

Commissioning of the new squadron will make Zambia's air force one of the most powerful in subequatorial Africa, bringing Zambia's combat strength to more than fifty aircraft, including twelve Chinese MIG 19/F 6's.

The MIG-21, a sophisticated combat plane, is superior to any aircraft currently used by the Rhodesian Air Force and at least equal to the French-type Mirages flown by the South Africans.

This is the largest single arms purchase by Zambia since it became independent fifteen years ago. The Zambian government accepted very tough financial terms on the Soviet arms deal, following rebuffs from the US and China for advanced weapons.

FOR US PUBLISHER JOHN McGOFF, the game is over. Implicated early in South Africa's "Muldergate" scandal as the author of an aborted effort to buy the Washington Post with South African government money, McGooff has strongly denied any wrong-doing despite mounting evidence to the contrary. (See Southern Africa, December, 1978, January, 1980). In May, new light was shed on the issue when a previously suppressed portion of the Erasmus Commission's investigation into the Information Department scandal was released in Pretoria.

Twenty percent of the total cost is due before final delivery and full payment at normal commercial rates must be made within seven years.

According to testimony from Les de Villiers, former deputy secretary of information, John McGooff and his brother Dan had been associated with South Africa's publicity operations since 1968. In 1974, McGooff approached the Department of Information with a proposal to buy the Washington Post for $20 million, half of which, he suggested, to be provided by the South African government. The plan was approved and Gerald Brown, then South Africa's minister of finance, met McGooff in Switzerland to transfer the funds to the American's Swiss bank account.

Observers in South Africa have decried the release of collaborators' names in Parliament, saying it will be more difficult to recruit agents like McGooff in the future. McGooff, meanwhile, has a more immediate problem. He faces criminal prosecution in the US for his role in the take-over bid and subsequent cover-up.

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