Realizing Workers’ Control in Mozambique

Zimbabwe Faces the Future

Mugabe in the U.S.
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**Zimbabweans Address Social Services**

While inspiring confidence in potential foreign investors and their governments has been a major focus of Zimbabwe's foreign policy, some recent less publicized actions may be of crucial importance in persuading the average citizen that there are substantial benefits to be gained from independence.

Take for example the provision of free primary education for 1,200,000 children attending government primary schools, which began September 1. Free medical care will now be provided by the government to those with incomes less than $215 a month. The education decision will cost the government $22.2 million and had been postponed from an earlier April deadline until officials could figure out a way to pay for it.

The new budget adopted in July also contained proposals that should have similar results. While a nineteen percent drop in defense expenditures was announced, expenditures on education and health went up 54 percent. Some $36 million was also set aside for rural resettlement.

The Minister of Health Herbert Ushewokunze, announced the free medical care decision on August 7, as part of the campaign to eliminate racial discrimination in hospitals and other medical facilities. Medical services under the previous regime were marked by racial discrimination within individual hospitals, as well as between the level of health services available in the white areas and the most neglected rural Black reserves. The new government also plans increased emphasis on the role of rural health clinics.

In another area, in an effort to stop evasion of the minimum wage law passed earlier this year, a new law has been adopted providing for a $1400 fine or three months imprisonment, or both for "unfair dismissal" of workers protected by the law. Labor Minister Kumbirai Kangai announced in early September that under the new law, charges had been brought against the British firm LONRHO, and he warned other large employers against arbitrary dismissal of workers.

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**"It's Up To South Africa"**

—Donald McHenry

South Africa has been given private assurances that should satisfy its stated reasons for refusing the United Nations-Namibian independence plan, the US House of Representatives Africa Subcommittee was told in early September by Donald McHenry, the US ambassador to the UN.

When McHenry declined to disclose the assurances in public, the committee went into executive session to hear his report. Chairman Stephen Solarz later said that the ambassador's testimony left the committee convinced that South Africa has no justification for further delay.

Pretoria's latest objections to the settlement proposal, contained in an eleven page letter sent to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on August 29, have centered on what South African officials charge is a "pro-SWAPO" bias on the part of the UN. Consequently, the steps to be taken upon acceptance by South Africa of the UN plan, are believed to include an immediate end to UN funding for the Namibian liberation movement, for SWAPO's observer mission in New York, and for the Council for Namibia. In addition, the South Africans have apparently been advised that Waldheim will appoint an assistant secretary-general to handle the Namibian issue (in place of the commissioner now selected by the UN General Assembly) and that he will be sensitive to South Africa's concerns in selecting the appointee.

McHenry, who has coordinated the three-year long diplomatic initiative on Namibia by the Five Western powers, blamed South Africa for stalling the agreement and he termed South Africa's attacks on Namibian refugee camps in Angola "excessive" and "outrageous."

"The key to an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia lies with South Africa," he declared. "I hope that the South African government will display the political wisdom and political will which is now all that is required for the attainment of peace in Namibia."

The course of the negotiations have seen successive concessions to South African objections by the Western negotiating team. Concessions which have been subsequently accepted without qualification by SWAPO and its backers the front line states. But it just may be that South Africa will back off once again and continue with its plans for an internal settlement rather than risk a probable SWAPO election victory.

A detailed report prepared by South Africa's National Intelligence Service (formerly BOSS), in April 1980, and revealed by a BOSS deserter last month, predicted that in a democratic election, SWAPO would probably win as much as 83 percent of the vote.

Even if South Africa does decide to go along with the latest version of the UN plan, any final agreement would likely be preceded by intensified efforts to entrench the "internal" parties, and inflict military damage on SWAPO and Angola.

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**Mozambique Airline Flying High**

Mozambique's national airline, once notoriously undependable and inefficient, has been totally revamped as part of Mozambique's continuing government offensiva against corruption and inefficiency. The airline, formerly known as DETA, will now be called Linea Aerea de Mocambique (LAM), just one of the changes following a grueling fourteen hour meeting in May between airline staff and Marcelino dos Santos, FRELIMO's secretary for economic policy.

The changes since then, report journalist Joseph Hanlon from Maputo, have been impressive. "Mozambique's national airline," he said, "has undergone a remarkable transformation in the last three months." As a first step, the former director was dismissed and his deputy arrested for corruption. Since then, says Hanlon, the changes at LAM have been among the most dramatic of the entire offensiva.

The new director of LAM, Jose Batelar, asserts that the workers had always had the will to do a good job, but were demoralized by the lack of management support and facilities to carry out their assignments.

When LAM was created in May, only one of Mozambique's four Boeing 737s was flying, and there was no fixed schedule. Since then, fifteen British technicians have been hired, and all four of the aircraft are flying generally on schedule. Ticket sales procedures have also been simplified, and Swedish aid is helping to reorganize the commercial and financial sections of the airline.

Production councils, the key mechanism for worker participation in the workplace, were never set up within DETA, but are already fully active in LAM. The councils are focusing on eliminating corruption and incompetence on the job, and helping to coordinate day-to-day activity.

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Forging the New Society: Steel Making in Mozambique

In this issue we feature extracts from a personal account of the experiences of Peter Sketchley, who in March 1977 went to work for two and a half years at a steel mill in newly independent Mozambique. Sketchley had been a trade union and Labour Party activist in the UK, and among his major concerns in his writing about Mozambique, is the degree to which actual social relations of production have been transformed. This, he says, "can be boiled down to the simple question of who in society owns and controls the means of production and distribution, and in the objective interest of whom? As we have seen with British experiences, nationalisation as such changes little, so we should be looking for the direct and dynamic role of the workers in the executive and administrative functions of the enterprise."

by Peter Sketchley

When I arrived at the steel rolling mill and foundry (CIFEL) on the edge of Maputo in March 1977, it was under the direct control of 24 manual workers, the majority of whom could neither read nor write. Nearly all of the management and technicians in this plant, as in most undertakings, had disappeared with the coming of independence.

As at CIFEL, so, all over Mozambique, the crisis provoked by the exodus of skilled personnel was met by young Mozambicans trying to cope with a situation for which they were almost totally unprepared. Before discussing how the workers came to play an increasingly active role in the running of their factory, it is important to recall the legacy of colonialism and how it affected the workers' confidence in their ability to act for themselves.

Problems of Class Consciousness

Class consciousness is not an automatic thing that springs from a worker's day to day experience of oppression. Rather it is the product of a shared experience of struggle of workers against oppression.

In Mozambique the workers never had any experience of their own independent organisation. That is not to say that there was not struggle. Strikes of black stevedores in the Port of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in 1933 and 1963 were bloodily put down by the state thugs of the Salazar fascist regime. In the last years under the Portuguese dictator Caetano, 'unions' did exist, but these were fascist trade unions like those of Hitler and Mussolini, structured as part of the state apparatus.

Every worker in the factory had his own tale to tell of how the bosses planted agents of PIDE (Portuguese Secret Police) amongst them. Within a few days of arrival he would be saying "Aren't the bosses awful here?"
What do you think of so and so?” Anyone who made a gesture of defiance was caught and the Portuguese army would arrive in force and the workers would be lined up to watch the offender being dragged off, never to return to the factory.

Because of this absolute control, any sense of unity and struggle among the Mozambican workers—virtually all of them of the first generation in from the villages—was incredibly deformed.

Without independent organizations, workers had not had a chance to develop organizing skills; they had no experience of running meetings, drawing agendas, setting priorities, nor had they been able to acquire any technical background.

Technical Vacuum
Yet those 24 workers of the production council kept the factory open and producing. That was a staggering feat, for although they had all been working in the plant, these men had been totally excluded from gaining any technical consciousness. They had inherited a sophisticated modern factory with only a handful of technicians, most of whom had little interest in anything but pay day and no interest at all in training Mozambicans.

I remember once we were faced with a crisis in the foundry where over 80 percent of the street plough shares (the blades) for animal traction ploughs were coming out spoiled and scrapped.

An investigation revealed that the section preparing the sand to make the molds into which the molten steel would be poured had to add one measure of white powder to bind the sand and one measure of another kind of white powder to prevent the molten steel from burning the sand.

When the former ran out (through poor stock control) they simply substituted for this by doubling the quantity of other powder. As a result when the steel was poured the sand collapsed.

When confronted by the workers’ council and surrounded by a mountain of scrap metal the worker concerned turned to us movingly and said “Don’t be angry comrades, remember in the colonial days, the fascists never explained to us what these were for. As far as I am concerned they are just two white powders”.

And now someone had to identify the powder. Find its English name and companies in South Africa who had supplied it. Calculate the usage per month. Write a telex in English. (No one spoke English). Get approval from the Ministry of Industry, and get a letter of credit through the bank. This process could and often did take months to complete, and during that time production was halted or switched to something else.

There were also other problems that the production council had to face. It was in CIFEL that I first became interested in the idea of appropriate technology.

Two aspects fundamental to the quality of castings in the foundry are the wetness of the sand in the mould and the temperature of the molten steel.

So once we set out to study this. Yes, we were answered, the humidity of the sand is controlled in the laboratory. Each batch of sand was sampled and the readings duly recorded throughout the day. But it turned out that no one knew what the limits should be—2 percent? 10 percent? 20? or what.

Similarly we found that the sophisticated pen recorder thermometer on the furnace had burnt out in 1976 and had not been repaired.

As a consequence much of our finished work had pock marks, and holes.

I was thinking the other day looking at giant castings made in Sheffield 150 years ago that they couldn’t have had transistorised pen recorders or hygrometers to measure moisture.

But what they did have were simpler but very adequate techniques. For example, they would pour a little molten metal into a clay pot and count the number of seconds until an oxide film appeared on the surface. Experience would tell them how many seconds corresponded to the temperature they needed for this particular piece.

Similarly, a test ball of sand was rolled in the hands and then broken in half. The break should be clean and the ball able to take the print of a thumbnail.

What furnacemen of the industrial revolution lacked in electronics they made up for with long and rich hundreds of years old craft culture.

The difference in Mozambique is that none of the workers at CIFEL had any historic roots in the iron and steel smelting which was going on around the Zimbabwean ruins and out through the port of Sofala before Vasco da Gama was thought of. Those cultural roots were lost in the bleak years of colonialism, and now history demanded that overnight they must close the gap.

Phase One
From what I have said already you will have guessed that by March ’77 when I arrived, the factory was in a pretty bad shape. The rolling mill and consequently the wire drawing section were stopped and only part of the foundry was producing. Bearings were seizing on motors and burning them out because of the lack of basic maintenance and greasing. Stock records had

CIFEL: Preparing a mould for the foundry
mostly fallen into disuse and stores were becoming disorderly dumping grounds. Problems of lack of basic raw materials and an endless cycle of breakdown followed by botched repairs followed by another breakdown was the order of the day. The scrap rate in the mill, which should have been about 3 percent was over 30 percent.

The last of a long line of post-independence opportunistic administrators (this last one slightly different) who entered the factory with a fanfare and those now immortal words “Now at last you have a true Patriot and Democrat to lead you” had just packed up his principles (and anything else of value he could carry) and gone off to neighbouring Swaziland with “toothache.” There is a joke in the factory about these terrible dentists in Swaziland!

The production council—only a few months old and barely clear what its functions were or what sub-committees it should have, had complete responsibility for the plant with an overworked official of the Ministry of Industry visiting once a fortnight to give them encouragement and sign a few checks.

The council, conducting most of its meetings in Shangaan, the local African dialect, seemed overwhelmed with the enormity of the tasks it faced. And one felt any suggestion like organizing a stock taking or drawing together the priority orders so that a rational program could be drawn up for the mill to reduce the enormous amount of time wasted retooling the mill after short runs of the most urgent sizes only seemed to increase the burden on them.

All this exploded one of my myths about the transformation of the social relations of production. Gone was the idea that it was all simply a question of the revolutionary spontaneity of the masses freed from the shackles of capitalist exploitation.

Yet despite all these problems the production council did manage to keep the factory open and producing, and that was a historic victory. If the factory had closed, the machines fallen into disuse and the work-force scattered, it might never have opened again.

Phase Two—The New Administrator

A few months after I arrived at the factory, the Ministry of Industry announced that it had appointed an administrator to help raise production at the rolling mill. (At this time the Rhodesian air force was blowing up refugee camps, bridges and dams deep into Mozambique, and steel was urgently needed for repairs).

Within a few weeks, production showed a flash in the pan improvement. Some of the bureaucratic bottlenecks between the factory, the Ministry, and the head and the docks, were cleared. Vital spare parts and raw materials arrived, and steel poured out of the gates.

On the face of it, things were picking up at the factory. But under the surface, this administrator, who still owned a couple of small factories himself, was busy consolidating a pyramidal power structure with himself at the apex, and the six remaining Portuguese technicians as departmental heads at the base. The production council, which had committees in each section, such as the furnacemen, the molding section, and so on, was gradually, and perhaps with some relief, slipping into a passive state. It was constantly being reminded that it was “first things first,” and that for now the council should play a policing role against absenteeism, drunkenness and indiscipline.

The steel mill in Maputo was becoming like any nationalized British Steel Corporation mill—capitalism in practice without shareholders.

This sorry state continued on for nearly a year. Tensions mounted. But no open conflict broke out, for after all the administrator had been appointed by the state, by the workers’ government.

Phase Three—Towards New Relations of Production

Then one day, early in 1978, a special brigade from the provincial headquarters of FRELIMO arrived at the factory. These young comrades with their clipboards and sharp pencils were soon into everything, taking notes, gathering opinions. They were there as part of a national campaign to transform FRELIMO, the liberation movement into a party, able to lead the task of national reorganization and construction involved in transforming an exploiting society into a socialist one. The aim was to organize ‘cells’ or nuclei of party members in every workplace.

At CIFEL, by the end of the week the brigade called a mass meeting of all the workers to discuss the problems of the factory. Nothing was too big or too small. There were complaints about the tea and bread allowance, lack of protective clothing, etc. After a couple of hours, the leader of the brigade again asked for more—nothing too big and nothing too small. Finally an old man from the scrap yard came forward and stood at the front of all the workers in his bare feet and endlessly patched clothes.

For more information on this topic see: Casting New Molds: First Steps Towards Worker Control in a Mozambique Steel Factory. A conversation with Peter Sketchley and Frances Moore Lappe. Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1980. 60p. $2.45. Available from: The Institute for Food and Development Policy, 2588 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA 94110

Suddenly he cleared his throat and in a loud voice cracking with emotion he said “Imperialism is still here in the factory.” He went on to denounce the administrator for having nothing but contempt for the workers and behaving just as the others had done before. He sat down to a roar from every throat in the room. It was as if this ordinary, bare-foot worker had pulled the cork out of the bottle and all of the frustration and anger came pouring out.

The brigade promised that all would be reported to the national headquarters of the party and from there to the Ministry of Industry, and within weeks the administrator was replaced by two new young Black Mozambicans.

Six of the twelve candidates proposed for the party were finally accepted by the brigade, and formed a provisional cell. But this happened only after each had stood before countless meetings of his fellow workers in his section and the factory, in which every aspect of his life and attitudes were critically examined. The brigade also checked with his neighborhood committee that he was a fitting person to serve the people with integrity and would not just feather his own nest.

We were reminded again, in a very angry meeting called three weeks later to give a hearing to a senior member of the workers’ council, accused of pocketing the council funds, that the only privilege a workers’ leader has is the privilege to serve the people he represents. The party chairman (his job was cleaning up castings on a grinding stone) brought a gasp of surprise and approval from the meeting when he said that from now on anyone could be called to account for himself to the workers and that included himself and the administrator!

Consolidation

Many things now changed. The first thing the party cell and the new administrator did was to tour each section in turn, sounding out problems, making criticisms and calling for self criticism to solve the problems. Sometimes joint meetings were held (like a very heated one between the electricians in the rolling mill). At the end of each meeting the administrator would draw together the concrete conclusions and give them priorities and end with an emphasis on unity and cooperation.

The annual planning process was transformed from the rubber stamping exercise of the old administrator to something involving all of the workers in each section. We also formed a planning section of six young manual and clerical workers. Initially they found it very difficult to draw even simple bar chart graphs, but by the end they were giving each section weekly graphs of production, scrap, and lost time, which

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Borrowing in Times of Plenty

by Beate Klein

The cursory media coverage of recent developments in South Africa is particularly conspicuous in contrast to the extensive write-ups granted South Africa earlier this year when gold prices rocketed to record highs. At that time, no secret was made of the fact that South Africa, as the source of more than 70 percent of the West's annual gold output, was reaping a golden harvest. With 1979 gold sales of R6 billion (US$7.2b*) South Africa's balance of payments surplus more than doubled from the preceding year to R3.1 billion (US$3.7b) in 1979. The Pretoria regime was quick to exploit the propagandistic value of this bonanza. Word was out that South Africa, afloat with gold revenue and foreign exchange, could declare financial independence from foreign banks and bring to an end the heavy borrowing which had characterized the 1970's.

In reality, however, the apartheid regime is actively and openly courting international bankers who, so far, are responding positively to the approaches of this wealthy client. In June of this year, the South African government publicly placed a bond offer on the international bond market, for the first time since 1976. The 120 million Deutschemark (US$ 65 million) bond carried favorable terms of seven years at nine percent. Among the 94 banks which participated in underwriting the issue are included many of the regime's traditional financial partners. Pretoria claimed that the bond issue was largely a political move meant to re-establish South Africa's presence on the international capital markets, but the financial implications of such an action cannot be denied. This seeming paradox of borrowing in times of plenty is one indication of South Africa's continued dependence on foreign sources of capital. The ready availability of foreign credit is a critical factor in the success of South Africa's economic development plans for the 1980's.

The ready availability of foreign credit is a critical factor in the success of South Africa's economic development plans for the 1980's.

Capital Needs

The extensive borrowings of the 1970's were attributed to a $20 billion program of state investment in and expansion of infrastructural and strategic projects, as well as massive increases in defense and oil import costs. These factors will continue to operate in the coming decade, as will South Africa's ongoing need for foreign credit.

South Africa's overriding economic aim at this point is the attainment of a high and steady rate of growth. Aside from the omnipresent threat of partial or total sanctions which has prompted a long-term campaign for economic self-sufficiency, the apartheid state is suffering a major political and economic crisis in the form of massive unemployment among the African labor force. South African government officials state that a growth rate of 5.5 percent will be required in future years to absorb the estimated 360,000 workers coming into the labor market each year. Official unemployment statistics severely underestimate the problem by omitting, for example, reference to the homelands where unemployment and poverty are endemic, but reliable observers estimate an unemployment level of more than 25 percent of the African work force.

A recently released report of the government's Economic Development Corporation states that South Africa will need R2.5 billion (US$3b) annually to finance the creation of the 6.2 million new jobs needed over the next twenty years. Much of this capital will come from foreign sources.

To meet the demand for increased fixed investment, South Africa has devised a 1980's investment program far in excess of the $20 billion slated for the previous decade. Different sources project major new capital projects in the public and private sector costing between $30 to $35.5 billion in the 1980's. The largest investments are being made in energy related projects such as the Sasol coal-to-oil program and the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom), both of which are needed to meet South Africa's energy requirements and lessen its dependence on foreign energy imports.

Total public and private sector borrowing requirements to the end of June 1981 amount to R790 million (US$948m), with the government being the largest borrower. Finance Minister Owen Horwood believes that the key to increased economic growth lies in the private sector and, contrary to the state-dominated investment scheme of the previous decade, is promoting a policy of

*The Rand conversion rate fluctuated between 1.2 and 1.3 over the period in which these figures were released. We have decided to standardize our dollar conversion figure at an exchange rate of R1 = US$1.25.
private sector investment. One indication of this new plan was the successful issuing of Sasol shares to the South African public for the first time in 1979. One of the ramifications of this switch in policy may be increased difficulty in monitoring capital flows due to the greater degree of privacy accompanying financial relations in the private sector.

In addition to fixed investment demands, South Africa's military needs continue to occupy a significant portion of the total budget. The government increased the defense budget 46 percent in 1974 and continued to expand it at an average rate of 25 percent each year for the three succeeding years. The South African Defense Force's 1980-81 budget stands at $2.86 billion, accounting for 18 percent of total budget expenditures. These defense expenditures drain capital from other sectors of the economy which are then frequently forced to seek financing from foreign sources.

Imports of oil to South Africa remain a critical and increasingly expensive factor in the regime's survival. So sensitive an issue is oil to the South African state security that the government does not release oil import cost figures and it is illegal to publish anything relating to supply sources. Calculations based on Customs and Excise Department figures, however, indicate an increase in South Africa's oil bill of between R800 million to R1,000 million in 1979, a near doubling in price from the preceding year. Oil import costs have grown from R190 million in 1972 to about R2.5 billion in 1979, despite an actual decline in the volume of fuel consumption during that period. Oil costs, then, also remain a major national expenditure for South Africa and procurement is a constant problem.

Repaying Old Loans
Infrastructural and strategic development, defense, and oil expenditures which justified South Africa's borrowings in the 1970's will prevail to an even greater extent in the coming decade. In addition, South Africa has a sizable debt burden and is committed to repaying much of its earlier borrowings in the next few years. Government guaranteed public-sector long-term foreign debt rose to R6.6 billion (US$7.92b) at the end of 1979, with R1.5 billion (US$1.8b) due in 1980 alone. Based on the Treasury's estimates that public-sector debt is two thirds of foreign debt, South Africa's total 1980 long-term debt repayment stands at more than R2.25 billion (US$2.7b). Since approximately 50 percent of South Africa's liabilities at overseas banks have redemption periods of less than one year and therefore would not be accounted for in long-term debt figures, South Africa could face debt repayments of R4.5 billion (US$5.4b) in this year alone. One of the reasons given for floating the recent Deutschmark bond issue was to take advantage of the currently favorable market to borrow at a lower rate which would then be used to repay earlier loans which had been raised at a higher rate. The pattern of foreign lending to South Africa in 1979 and the first half of this year has been consistent with that of recent years, in that most of the identifiable loans have been private bonds for relatively small amounts and short terms, placed on the German and Swiss bond markets. Although 1979 borrowings of $295.7 million are less than during any other year in the decade, they are notable for the type of loans which were solicited. Nine of the thirteen identifiable loans were made to the Strategic Oil Fund and Escom, again underscoring the paramount importance placed by South Africa on the development of alternative energy sources.

Borrowing in the first half of 1980 was similar to 1979, with a couple of notable exceptions. The previously mentioned South African government bond was the largest single issue in the last two years. Furthermore, by publicly placing and advertising the issue, foreign banks, which in recent years had been reluctant to be openly associated with South Africa, indicated they are now willing to be more open about their financial relations with apartheid. Many of the major US investment houses, including Bache Halsey, Merrill Lynch, Dean Witter, and Dillon Read, are among the underwriters of that bond.

The second loan of note is a $550 million credit syndicate headed by the British bank, Hill Samuel & Co. This enormous and highly secretive loan agreement will be used to finance British and West German contracts for Eskom's new power station at Tutuka, and is therefore technically considered a trade credit. This is an excellent example of the vital, but often overlooked, role played by foreign banks in financing trade with South Africa. The maintenance and growth of foreign trade, which accounts for almost 50 percent of South Africa's gross domestic product, is critical to the economic survival of the apartheid regime. Trade financing also constitutes a major portion of the overseas servicing of foreign banks. Sixty percent of US bank claims on South Africa in the second half of 1979 were terms of less than one year, most of which is for trade financing. Foreign financing of trade with South Africa has increased since the introduction of incentives by the South African government to make foreign financing of trade more attractive than domestic financing. South Africa's demand for foreign goods is also expected to rise sharply in the near future to fill the gap left by domestic production which will be unable to keep pace with domestic demand.

While the recent spurt in lending activity gives the South African government much to boast about, the euphoria surrounding South Africa's gold-based wealth may be short lived. Events in June, including the bombing of the Sasol plants, unnerved many foreign investors and the June government bond issue is not selling nearly as well on the secondary market as was predicted. At least one foreign precious metals dealer who formerly encouraged the buying of South African bullion and gold mining stocks has changed his tune and is urging his customers to sell off all their South African securities at the end of 1980. In an investors' newsletter, he writes, "In our view, the potential difficulty that South Africa is experiencing isn't a minor or localized affair."
Zimbabwe, after five months of independence, is the world's youngest nation, and the conditions surrounding its birth have been extremely turbulent. Since its overwhelming victory at the April polls, ZANU, and its governing partner PF-ZAPU, have had to confront a staggering array of problems as they set about dismantling the entrenched remnants of the colonial state and rebuilding the country along non-racial socialist lines.

For the majority of Zimbabweans, the most important and visible political accomplishment of the new government has been the ending of the war. Peace has brought dramatic change. In the countryside, the hated "protected villages" have been abandoned and dismantled, as some 500,000 people return to their homes and fields. The armored convoy, a common sight only last year, has vanished from the road and social life, an early casualty of the war, is reappearing with a flourish.

Schools and clinics in the rural areas, hardest hit during the war, are being rapidly reopened. On September 1, the first free primary education system in the nation's history opened its doors to an estimated 1,200,000 students, and almost all of the 160 health centers closed during the war have resumed operations.

The government has established a minimum monthly wage in commerce, industry and mining of Z$70 ($105) that is scheduled to rise to Z$85 ($127.50) in January. On July 1, it became illegal to dismiss anyone because of the government mandated pay increases. Low wage-earners will also benefit from the health care program guaranteed to those earning less than $150 per month. Prices of basic foodstuffs have been frozen, and taxes on them eliminated.

Returning Refugees

The end of the war has also meant the return of nearly 300,000 refugees from neighboring Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. For many, the return home marked a happy end to years of bleak camp life under constant threat of Rhodesian attack. But for the Mugabe government, the massive influx of homeless, jobless people with their urgent need of food, medical attention and land poses a serious challenge. Virtually all US economic aid, about $20 million this year, has been targeted for refugee resettlement projects. The US has also extended an additional $50 million loan guarantee for housing.

This aid level, some $100 million over the two year period ending in 1981, is a far cry from the $1 billion plus package contemplated by the Kissinger proposal in 1976, and is woefully insufficient to meet even the most short term needs.

Land Hunger

Settlement of the land question is a core issue confronting the new government. The Africans were driven off their lands by the original white settlers during the colonial wars of the late 1890's. The return of conquered African land was a key issue during the liberation struggle, and a central plank in ZANU-PF's election platform. Nevertheless, Mugabe has had to move cautiously on the redistribution of white-owned farm lands. To date, only about ninety farms, already on the auction block at independence, have been purchased for redistribution to landless African peasants and former guerrillas. An additional $40 million has been budgeted for land acquisition over the coming year. This figure, less than two percent of the $2.15 billion national budget, cannot hope to meet popular expectations of massive land redistribution.

Zimbabwe's vast commercial farms encompass excellent agricultural land, but the management and technical skills of their white owners play an important part in maintaining high output, and may be irreplaceable in the short-term. After two years of drought and a decade of war, with about 400,000 people already dependent on feeding programs for survival—a four-fold increase since January—the new government is taking urgent steps to maximize food production in the next harvest. Producer prices for maize, the staple African diet, have been increased 41 percent to encourage increased planting. Consumer prices will be held stable.

Thus Mugabe must balance the need to maintain and improve agricultural output with the demands of millions of his supporters who, like Zondai Katsatsa, have returned from the Mozambican refugee camps with one expectation: "Land, I want nothing more, I'll settle for nothing less."

The new government continues to command the support of the estimated 25,000 armed guerrillas still deployed at their pre-election assembly points. But the slow pace of creating a single integrated national army remains one of Zimbabwe's most serious and pressing problems. The original schedule, which called for the creation of a single army by December 1980 and the demobilization of about 20,000 troops, has been scrapped. The government has now pledged that every guerrilla who chooses a military career can remain, although many will be deployed in reserve units engaged in agriculture and reconstruction in the rural areas.

Slowly-A National Army

The standing army will number about 15,000, made up of retrained units of ZANLA, ZIPRA, and Rhodesian Security Force personnel. After a great deal of conflict and a fresh infusion of fifty additional British instructors, the first two retrained battalions of the new Zimbabwean army, about 2,000 soldiers were commissioned in July; additional battalions should follow at the rate of one every two weeks.

The surprise resignation of former Rhodesian Army commander General Peter Walls from the Joint Military Command on July 29 appears not to have slowed the process of creating the national army. Walls' stated motive for resigning was simply that "it was long overdue."

He was known to be unhappy over the slow pace of integration exercise, and over continued squabbling between the three army commanders, Lookout Masuku for ZIPRA, Rex Nhongo for ZANLA, and "Sandy" McLean for the Rhodesian Security Forces. Sources close to the Prime Minister also reported that Walls had demanded and been refused, overall command of the new Zimbabwean military.

As Walls and Mugabe had managed to develop a good working relationship, the government, and many white Zimbabweans listened with shock when Walls, on vacation in England, launched into a blistering public tirade against Mugabe's government. He predicted growing internal disorder and revealed that he had attempted to persuade the British to annul ZANU's election victory. Walls also confirmed that plans for a military coup against Mugabe, (codenamed "i'll hold for nothing less."
Continuing Violence

Although the country is generally at peace, longstanding political differences between liberation movement supporters and those who collaborated with the Smith/Muzorewa regime, as well as tensions between ZANU and ZAPU have sometimes exploded into small pitched battles. The situation is exacerbated by the continuing presence of about 25,000 armed guerrillas confined to scattered and isolated assembly points. After eight long months of bored and frustrating existence, a few former guerrillas from both parties have returned to the bush to live by banditry and pursue personal fueds.

The situation has been particularly serious in western Zimbabwe, where former guerrillas, mostly deserters from ZIPRA, created what Prime Minister Mugabe described in June as an "open rebellion." Joint ZANLA-ZIPRA military patrols deployed against the dissidents appear to have had some success in the area. ZANLA renegades in the Midlands and eastern Zimbabwe have also been disturbing the peace, murdering a number of farmers and policemen.

Soneni Mdlalose, a ZIPRA commander engaged in the round-up exercise noted, "Not everybody was satisfied with the Lancaster House agreement. Some cannot be reconciled."

The government views such activities as "terrorism," and in late July Home

Minister Joshua Nkomo, reluctantly extended the draconian Internal Security Act—a holdover from the Smith regime—for six months, giving the police wide powers of search and detention.

For the government, by far the most sensational and embarrassing instance of continuing violence was the shooting death of 68 year old white farmer, Gerald Adams on his farm near Salisbury. According to police, his assailants included ZANU Secretary-General and Manpower Minister Edgar Z. Tekere. Details of the attack, and of Tekere’s alleged involvement are sketchy, but Tekere apparently attended a party on the Adams farm property on the night of Sunday, August 3. The party was disrupted by soldiers of the former Rhodesian Security Forces stationed on the farm. The next day, the party-goers, allegedly including Tekere, returned to the farm, made a “military-style” attack on the now vacant building housing the former soldiers, and then attacked the farmhouse, killing Adams. Witnesses reported seeing Tekere’s car, a light blue Jaguar sedan, speeding from the scene, followed by Tekere’s bodyguards in a black Mercedes.

Despite considerable Western speculation, the incident never constituted a serious crisis for the Mugabe administration. US press efforts to portray Tekere as an ultraradical opponent of Mugabe’s policies, with strong personal support among the ZANLA guerrillas are simply wrong. Tekere’s rise to influence within ZANU has always been intimately associated with that of Mugabe. Assertions that the guerrillas resented Tekere’s arrest were contradicted by guerrillas at the Goromonzi assembly point near Salisbury. Said one soldier “A crime is a crime. There must be no killing of innocent people when the war is over.” Another noted “There are no important individuals in ZANU or ZANLA. We are all at the same level, Edgar Tekere too.”

ZANU-ZAPU Relations

Relations between Zimbabwe’s two principal political parties, Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, and the Patriotic Front-ZAPU headed by Nkomo, have always been characterized by intense rivalry. Unity between the two parties, a sometimes elusive quality during the long period in exile, is important for Zimbabwean independence.

Nkomo was openly disappointed that his party won only twenty parliamentary seats, as against ZANU’s 57. He resented ZAPU’s failure to be assigned any cabinet positions, and many ZANU leaders argued for ZAPU’s exclusion from the cabinet entirely. By far the most serious clash between the parties developed over the widespread outbreak of dissident violence in western Zimbabwe in late June. In a statement on the “rebellion” in the strongly pro-ZAPU area, Mugabe asserted that dissidents were acting on orders “from their local leaders” in a “political pattern” of anti-government activity. Although Mugabe acknowledged that there were “no links” between the dissidents and the top ZAPU leadership, Nkomo angrily termed his remarks “a slap in the face.”

When Nkomo left Zimbabwe on an unannounced “private” trip to London and Libya, the journey triggered speculation that he might also visit Moscow, and that he was seeking support among his long-time allies for an open break with Mugabe, and financial help in meeting his military payroll. Nkomo dismissed reports of an imminent break with Mugabe as unfounded, reiterated his commitment to the coalition government and attributed recent attacks on him as the work of “madmen.”

Intra-party incidents, like the recent fighting in a Salisbury township that claimed one life and injured ten are worrisome, but are viewed as the work of isolated criminal elements, not as an indicator of widespread political polarization between the mass supporters of the parties.

A Nation’s Leader

Mugabe has been at pains to reinforce his image as the leader of a government of national unity, not the head of a particular party.

The first state visit to Zimbabwe of Mozambique’s President Samora Machel, a highly respected figure throughout Zimbabwe, was another occasion for Mugabe to demonstrate his commitment to national unity. Hundreds of thousands of cheering Zimbabweans turned out to greet the Mozambican president, whose support was crucial to the success of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Machel attended an enormous rally in Bulawayo, a PF-ZANU stronghold, where he appeared on the podium with Nkomo and Mugabe singing freedom songs and stressing the importance of unity.

The return to Zimbabwe of two fallen leaders of the struggle for independence on Zimbabwe Heroes Day, August 12, was symbolic of the increasingly successful quest for unity. Jason Moyo of ZAPU, who died in 1977, and Josiah Tongogara of ZANU, who died in 1976, were the principle architects of the Patriotic Front alliance in 1976, and unfailing advocates of unity.

Mugabe acknowledged their contribution to Zimbabwe in a moving graveside tribute, saying in part: “To the two of them, both our heroes, let us remember to always sing songs of praise and chant:: well done Tongo, well done Jason. You fought a hard and arduous struggle. You won it not for yourselves but for the people. You won it for here, for the whole of Zimbabwe, your names shall be writ in the skies of Zimbabwe, on the trees of Zimbabwe. Go, and rest in peace.”

M.F.
Operation Turkey Comes Home to Roost

By Kevin Danaher

The first-time visitor to Salisbury cannot help but be impressed by the exceptionally clean and modern downtown area. The well-kept parks and spotless boulevards put any US city to shame. Supermarket shelves are well stocked and the stores do a brisk business with passing shoppers. If one stays inside the downtown area and its rich suburbs, it is easy to miss the ugly truth that millions of people in this relatively affluent nation are suffering from malnutrition and that whole communities have been destroyed by starvation.

A fall 1979 study by the International Red Cross found that malnutrition rates ranged from 13 percent to 29 percent depending on the area. Rene Kosirnik, the head of the Red Cross delegation, estimated that roughly one fourth of the entire population is suffering from malnutrition. Those in low-wage sectors suffer the most. A study of farmworkers' children conducted by the University of Rhodesia in 1976 found that fully 90 percent of the children under five years of age were malnourished, some severely.

This picture was confirmed to me last April by British doctors working in the Zimbabwean countryside under the sponsorship of the relief agency Oxfam. They found significant levels of malnutrition among children aged six to nine years, which is often an indicator of long-term undernourishment and can result in permanent physical and mental retardation.

In addition to the nagging pains of hunger, malnutrition can turn an ordinary disease which we would consider inconsequential into a terrifying ordeal. A former Rhodesian Secretary of Health admitted that "when measles is associated with malnutrition, the effect is disastrous." Dr. Alan Pugh, the provincial medical officer of health for Matabeleland, reported in the summer of 1979 that "children are going blind from measles and vitamin deficiencies." In the countryside I often saw ragged little kids with bloated stomachs, abnormally lethargic for their age, typical signs of malnutrition.

How this situation could have arisen in a country which has traditionally exported large amounts of agricultural produce was made shockingly clear to me during interviews with officials in the Ministry of Health. These holdovers from the former white-supremacist government displayed a startling callousness toward the welfare of the African people. Constantly referring to ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas as "terrorists," more than one medical doctor in a position of authority blandly told me that "malnutrition is a normal condition among our Africans."

One high level white health official explained that there simply were no statistics to prove that malnutrition was a serious problem in the countryside. When I made reference to the Red Cross study she countered smugly, "Oh that, well they did find high levels of malnutrition but they probably used overfed Swedish children as a standard." In fact the study was based on arm circumference and Quac Stick measurements which are universally accepted, and the group conducting the survey has had decades of experience with malnutrition.

Asked about relief efforts for people made homeless by the recent war, another health official told me, "they mustn't get too much help. It will make them dependent," he explained, "if left to themselves they'd manage—a few would die but they'd manage." This callousness was surpassed by the ignorance and/or deceit these civil servants displayed when asked about the former government's wartime strategy, Operation Turkey, which systematically deprived the rural areas of food supplies.

Replanting Crops. Colonial policy left thousands hungry.

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ficials referred to Operation Turkey as a "rural food rationing program" and a doctor in the Ministry of Health stated flatly, "that program is over." But in reality the effects of Operation Turkey are far from over, and referring to it as a rationing program is like smothering someone and calling it oxygen rationing.

Operation Turkey was set up by Ian Smith's regime in the last two years of the war to systematically destroy rural food supplies and prevent people from taking food from the cities to the countryside. The goal was to deprive the guerrillas and their civilian supporters of the physical strength and willpower needed to prosecute a grueling bush-war.

Taking full advantage of its martial law powers, the Rhodesian military destroyed or confiscated massive amounts of food in the rural areas. A 1979 report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia stated: "According to government regulations, rural blacks are not allowed to own or carry food beyond the immediate requirements of their families. Quantities of food have been confiscated from granaries and from people travelling so that the overall food shortage in the tribal areas has been made even more acute."

The white-led military was constitutionally empowered to destroy crops, livestock, huts and personal property of any civilian merely suspected of supporting the guerrillas. People living in areas considered to be guerrilla strongholds were shown particularly abusive treatment under this regimen. Even a former member of parliament under Bishop Muzorewa's government denounced "the burning down of kraals and granaries, the shooting of cattle, the closure of shops and grinding mills, the denial to tribesmen of the right to buy mealie [corn] meal, the forced labor of tribesmen on the upkeep of roads, committed by members of the security forces stationed at Keyara base camp in the Belingwe district."

I talked with several rural people who reported occasions when buses on which they were travelling were stopped by military personnel who then proceeded to check the amount of food being carried by each person. "They let us keep a few kilos each and then what we couldn't eat on the spot was destroyed," one elderly woman told me.

The 250,000 peasants herded into the so-called protected villages confronted a special set of food problems. People I interviewed, including some such rural dwellers, said that often when villagers were moved to the armed enclosures they were forced to sell off their livestock or were given insufficient time to collect all their personal property.

Standard practice in the "protected" villages was for government troops to allow people outside the compound only during the daylight hours to tend their crops. But maize, the main staple for the Africans, often requires night supervision to protect it from widespread crop destruction by wild pigs, and to a lesser extent hippos and elephants.

**Impoverishment As Policy**

The protected villages, the search and seizure missions, the destruction of food and livestock, all came on top of nearly a century of white policies specifically designed to keep the African population in an impoverished state. The total land area was divided roughly in half; the least productive half going to the seven million Africans and the resource-rich half reserved for the few hundred thousand Europeans. A study by Roger Riddell for the Catholic Institute for International Relations found that as recently as 1976, "there were approximately 680,000 African farmers and 6,682 European farmers, so that on average every European had access to one hundred times as much land as every African."

Land policy was always closely related to labor policy. By crowding the Africans onto poor quality farmland and limiting their access to credit, irrigation, roads and other infrastructure, the settler regime sought to guarantee a steady supply of labor to white farms and industry at very low prices. As in South Africa, the goal was to allow the Africans a standard of living sufficient to reproduce the workforce but not so high as to allow them to escape dependence on wage labor.

The combination of a high birth rate among the Africans (estimated at 3.6 percent, one of the highest in the world) and strict government limits on urban migration has produced severe overcrowding in many rural areas. In 1978, a Rhodesian government study admitted that the sections of the country reserved for Africans (Tribal Trust Lands) were supporting 2.5 million people in excess of their "safe carrying capacity."

Continued on page 28
Zimbabwe Announces New Budget

The announcement of Zimbabwe's first budget since independence late in July held few surprises. Military spending would be down, spending on health, education, and other social programs would be up, and total government spending would rise by 24 percent in fiscal year 1981. The new budget clearly reflects the shifting priorities of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government, but it also reflects the constraints—international and domestic—within which the administration will continue to operate. "The government's political philosophy is socialism," Finance Minister Enos Nkala said in his budget speech to parliament on July 24. "But we are also pragmatists. We have seen—and we have learned from—the mistakes of others. The application of our socialism will be pragmatic and mild."

As was evident in Senator Nkala's long and detailed remarks, the new budget has been computed meticulously on the basis of several assumptions: Imports for the current calendar year will rise by 55 percent, with exports gaining by 40 percent, leaving a Z$97 million deficit in the current account of the balance of payments. Total government spending the budget year will be Z$1.44 billion, with defense taking Z$233 million, or one-fifth of total spending, down from Z$1.2 million, daily last year, or about 40 percent of total spending. Inflation, which has broken into double digits for the first time, is expected to be managed adequately, so that there will only a gradual upward movement of prices. All this is to take place in the context of a growth in gross domestic product of six to seven percent.

Healthy Economy

In the atmosphere of world recession and inflation rates that will be much higher than that predicted for the Zimbabwe dollar, Senator Nkala described an extremely healthy economy. As a measure of growth in specific areas, he broke down exports into these categories: agricultural exports will grow by about Z$90 million, minerals by about Z$140 million, and manufactured goods, a sector that will adjust more slowly to the end of the war and trade sanctions, by about Z$60 million.

Senator Nkala mentioned a number of factors that have already hobbled the government's attempts at economic reconstruction or may do so in the future. While singling out some aid donors for their contributions, he said, "I should be less than honest if I did not say that the government is disappointed at the extent of the aid for development forthcoming so far." Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, urging more generous US aid in a late-August interview, estimated that rebuilding the damage wrought by the war, resettling a million displaced persons, and acquiring white-owned land to relieve pressures among impoverished rural Africans, could cost up to $1 billion over three to five years. So far the largest aid contribution has come from Britain—an amount of $172 million.

Two other critical and related factors are inflation and wage pressure. It is clear that these two areas will have to be balanced carefully in order to insure both maximum growth and maximum redistribution of income. There is also the prospect of deepening recession in the industrialized countries—a development that could adversely affect demand for Zimbabwean exports.

Senator Nkala also announced favorable terms with regard to the repatriation of profits for foreign companies operating in Zimbabwe, and he affirmed his government's intention of becoming a fully active member of the Western financial community—with membership in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and as a participant in the world capital markets.

Such decisions, of course, reflect the economic realities inherent in the administrative and commercial structures the government has inherited. But while doing so, they do not diminish another reality: the government's plans to rebuild the structure of the economy within a socialist framework. Heavy spending on infrastructure, land reclamation and education, for instance, will accompany agricultural subsidies that are primarily aimed at white farmers. The housing budget will increased from Z$32 million to Z$49 million, but the government's program for taxing higher income brackets is by Senator Nkala's own admission rather toothless. Beneath the figures, however, the minister's message seemed to be that "the realities of the present time," as he called them, should not be mistaken for "our political, our social, and our economic objectives."
Mugabe Visits US

by Joan Draper

The first prime minister of newly independent Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, came to the United States in late August to address the United Nations on the occasion of his country's admission to that body. During his visit to the US Mugabe took advantage of the forums offered him to set out the new Zimbabwe's foreign policy following the struggle for liberation, his perspective on private investment within socialism, and to press for increased US aid for his war-torn country. In his address to the General Assembly, Mugabe made it clear that Zimbabwe's foreign policy was for Zimbabwe to decide saying, “We will not let our friends choose for us who should be our other friends.”

He also stressed the value of the condemnations and calls for sanctions against Rhodesia that had been voted in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council during the last fifteen years. International forums, Mugabe said, had played a “vital role.” In this context, he spoke of achieving majority rule in Namibia through the kind of diplomatic process that finally clinched the Zimbabwe settlement. But, he warned the member states in the General Assembly, this should not discourage efforts to increase aid to SWAPO, as “the war fought in Zimbabwe emerged from our perception that racism could only be dislodged by the armed violence of liberation.”

In a meeting with reporters following the session, Mugabe said he thought South Africa would yield to a call for Namibia's independence if the United States and Britain withdraw their threat to veto any UN move for a trade embargo against Pretoria.

Enemies Into Friends

Later, at a gathering of potential investors at New York's Plaza Hotel (including, among others, Exxon, Citibank, and Union Carbide, under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association, Mugabe pleaded that “we see each other as one regardless of our ideological differences. We seek to transform our society after achieving our independence,” he said. “So we have asked ourselves, why can’t we turn our enemies into our allies?”

He then went on to reiterate the particular focus of capitalist enterprise within the socialism that his party is promoting. “Having achieved our victory in Zimbabwe, we examined the situation of our country. The Zimbabwe African National Union felt when it came to power that the time required a spirit of pragmatism and reconciliation. Within our socialist principles we recognize the individual effort and therefore we are inviting Union Carbide and other transnational corporations to invest their capital in our country. And we give our assurances that their investments are safe.”

“But,” the Prime Minister continued, “they [corporations] should undertake to develop the position of the worker in industry, to ensure his wages, trade union participation and expansion of skills.” Though a certain percentage of capital could be remitted abroad, a substantial portion of the profit of corporations must be ploughed back into Zimbabwe's development, he declared.

“If these requirements are fulfilled, we don’t see why we should take issue with private investment.”

Mugabe’s visit was also a time for the prime minister to thank the US liberation support movement. On Sunday, August 24, he acknowledged the special role of Black America when he appeared in Harlem before thousands of enthusiastic supporters. “Long live our oneness, long live our struggle,” he told the crowd. “The African people, you and I, refused to submit” he said. As the crowd chanted “Muge-be, Mu-ga-be,” he added “As you know we won, we won, we won.”

Mugabe’s speech in Harlem, easily the most emotional public appearance of his visit, was followed on Tuesday by a brief and more formal appearance before the representatives of many solidarity groups at a packed reception sponsored by the American Committee on Africa. He also spoke at Howard University in Washington, D.C.—a stop that included, in addition, several private meetings with Zimbabwean students in the US.

Travel to Washington

Mugabe then traveled to the capital to meet with US President Jimmy Carter, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

“My message” Mugabe said to a packed reception in the East Room of the White House that included former UN ambassador Andrew Young and his successor Donald McHenry, “is that we now need the friendship and solidarity of the United States just as we needed it during the struggle.” But just as US “friendship” during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle consisted largely of empty phrases, its friendship since independence has been characterized by empty pockets.

To date, the Carter administration has provided only $7 million in aid. An additional $25 million is committed this year, with between $25 to $30 million projected for the next. Washington also plans to provide $50 million in commercial loan guarantees for low cost housing. But the total two year aid package, at less than $110 million is woefully short of earlier US promises, and inadequate to meet even minimal needs.

Mugabe presented Carter with a request for $350 million in reconstruction aid over the next three years, but took home only good wishes. Washington’s response to his plea may well determine how long—and how far—Mugabe will continue looking West.
Black Consciousness Groups Meet

When a wave of strikes, demonstrations and boycotts first swept across South Africa at the turn of the year, newspaper reports promptly dubbed them "the worst outbreak of unrest since the Soweto rebellion of 1976." Now, more than eight months later, that description is clearly inadequate. The "outbreak of unrest" has not resulted in clashes as dramatic or as bloody as those that pitted unarmed school children against troops wielding automatic weapons in 1976. But this proves only that both the white supremacist regime and the Black resistance have decided, for very different reasons, that such confrontations exact too high a price—a price measured on the one side in lives, on the other in international outrage and economic repercussions. In most other respects, the recent protests undeniably mark a new level in the generalization of Black resistance to apartheid.

More than ever before, worker strikes have overlapped with student demonstrations, well-organized guerrilla sabotage with consumer boycotts, transforming South Africa, in the words of BBC correspondent John Humphrys, into "a country not yet at war, but no longer at peace."

As could be expected, this crescendo of activity and conflict has been reflected in a period of intense ideological and organizational ferment, evident both within the ruling white minority and in the ranks of the Black population.

News reports have made much of the internal disputes that have shaken the government and the Nationalist Party, of proposed reform and angry backlash. But while South Africa's white rulers flounder for a strategy to deflect and defeat growing resistance, the Black movement has also experienced significant shifts in the strengths and direction of different elements.

On the one hand, the protests have both revealed and contributed to growing internal support for the long-banned and externally led African National Congress (ANC). While staging increasingly bold guerrilla attacks, capped by the bombing of two top security coal-to-oil conversion plants, the ANC has also won broad support for campaigns to free its imprisoned leader Nelson Mandela and endorse the Freedom Charter drafted 25 years ago.

"There are many signs that the ANC today enjoys growing support," Reed Kramer wrote in *Africa* News after traveling for several weeks in South Africa last spring. "Even though membership in the organization or avowed support for its aims are illegal, many blacks are fairly openly declaring their allegiance to the ANC." Among those cited by Kramer as examples of this trend were a number of long-time activists from Black Consciousness organizations, including several associates of murdered Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko.

At the same time, the months of militant actions have marked the maturation of a new generation of organizations and leaders which identify themselves with the politics of Black Consciousness. In fact, the pattern of resistance has reflected many of the characteristics that have defined Black Consciousness since its emergence in the late '60s. Central to these has been an organizational looseness. The Black Consciousness movement included many organizations, such as the Black People's Convention (BPC), the South African Students' Organization (SASO), the Union of Black Journalists, and other workers' cultural and welfare organizations which were informally linked by common ideas, but had no formal overall structural ties, although adherents frequently refer to the BCM (Black Consciousness movement) in describing the organizational network. Common themes have always been found in the commitment to mobilize mass action through a network of constituency organizations rather than a single, unitary structure, and maintaining a stance of total non-cooperation with the government and complete autonomy for the Black movement.

**ANC Strength**

Within South Africa, where the heat of conflict has helped forge unity in action, differences between the ANC and Black Consciousness organizations frequently become blurred. Some activists may criticize the ANC for its brief flirtation with controversial KwaZulu bantustan leader Gatsha Buthelezi last winter (see separate article). They may charge that language in the Freedom Charter buries the demand for Black liberation under appeals for multiracial unity. But they may also throw themselves into the Free Mandela campaign, work inside community organizations and also maintain ANC loyalty, and acknowledge the value of the ANC's status as an internationally recognized liberation movement. When forced into exile, many have chosen to join the ANC, the most prominent recent example being Thozamile Botha, a leader of the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organization (PEBCO) (see story in *Southern Africa*, February 1980).

**Surviving Exile**

Many others seem certain to follow in Botha's footsteps, into exile if not into the ANC, as the continuing resistance yields its inevitable aftermath—bannings, jailings, and flight across the borders of a new generation of militants. Like those who preceded them, they face a difficult transition from the politics of daily confrontation to the polemics and factions of exile politics, even if this is only looked on as a brief step on the road back home. They also face a new contender for their organizational allegiance—the recently constituted Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (External Wing).

Even though Black Consciousness thinking provided the moving spirit of the Soweto uprising and Black Consciousness groupings its organizational backbone, the Black Consciousness movement itself had few resources outside the country to offer the thousands of young people who fled the government crackdown that followed. The ANC and (to a lesser extent) the Pan Africanist Congress did. Forced into exile following the Sharpeville Massacre more than a decade earlier, those movements had set about rebuilding networks, and had established international ties that opened the doors to universities and guerrilla training camps. Many Black Consciousness activists of the Soweto generation gravitated toward one or the other, while others watched their dreams of unifying even those long-feuding liberation movements dissolve into factional bickering in refugee camps in Botswana. The non-unitary structure that had contributed to the movement's rapid growth and resilience inside South Africa today
made the task of regrouping outside the borders all the more difficult.

Nor did the ANC look favorably upon BCM efforts to build an external organization. Summarizing three years of sporadic negotiations between exiled BCM leaders and the ANC, one unaffiliated Black South African stated simply, "They go nowhere."

"The ANC insists that BCM not regroup and that its people come into the ANC as individuals," he explained. "BCM insists, 'We are an organization in our own right' and argues for formation of a united front."

In a series of meetings in London during June and July, Black Consciousness adherents took some steps aimed at strengthening their existence as "an organization in our own right" and argues for formation of a united front.

While declaring the necessary existence of a multiplicity of autonomous organizations within the Black Consciousness stream inside South Africa, the program document argues that, "the existence abroad of many organizations professing an allegiance to the Black Consciousness Movement opens the way to divided loyalty, sectarianism... and all forms of opportunism and corruption." It thus calls on all such "entities and collectives abroad [to] reconstitute... into a unitary centralized structure." Whether the various groups will oblige remains to be seen.

A Difficult Road

Reports from inside South Africa tend to support the new Interim Committee's claim that "the movement is flourishing and gaining momentum daily." But serious questions about the organizational coherence of the movement remain and the effort to translate that internal vitality into external organization will face formidable obstacles.

For one thing, it will mean starting more or less from scratch at something the ANC and PAC have been doing for years. That task will involve simultaneously convincing other nations and organizations of BCM's legitimacy and, even more important, convincing present and future South African exiles of its necessity. Even among former BCM militants, reports suggest differences on that score.

"People are saying we haven't got time to form third parties or fight over organizational affiliations," one former officer of the Black Peoples Convention told Reed Kramer. "We have to perform a marriage of those forces which have been divided for many years, or we will buy time for the system. The ANC is there, it has international support and it is known at home. We just have to get inside and make it our organization."

Those who met in London to form a unitary external wing of BCM disagree, they insist that they do not want to follow the modus of the ANC or PAC, which, in their view, have an external leadership too isolated from the movement inside South Africa.

Certainly, one of BCM's greatest strengths has been its involvement in the day-to-day resistance in the schools, factories and townships of South Africa. And one of its strongest criticisms of the liberation movements has been aimed at their claim to lead that resistance from abroad, a claim Interim Committee member Andrew Lukele branded as "immodest, wrong and not in accord with the facts," in a recent interview with Southern Africa.

"That was shown up at the time of the eruptions in June of 1976," Lukele explained. "Those groups were just as nonplussed as everyone else. Yet that eruption was the result of things that had been building up inside the country for the last ten years."

Contending that "it is all too easy abroad to form some kind of fantasy of becoming a revolutionary directorate, a government in exile," Lukele stated that BCM's external wing would function more as "a support committee abroad," taking its direction from forces inside the country. In keeping with that stance, one of the organization's first actions following its July meeting was an "urgent appeal for solidarity and financial support" for striking Black municipal workers in Johannesburg. In that instance, Lukele said, "the Black Municipal Workers Union approached AZAPO, the Azanian Peoples Organization (formed after the 1977 banning of original Black Consciousness organizations), and asked, 'Is it possible to obtain any funds?' AZAPO got in touch with us."

A Sufficient Structure

Lukele cited this process as a rebuttal to charges that the needs of the South African resistance had outgrown BCM's loose "network of organizations focusing on the different aspects of the life of Black people under apartheid."

"There is already a structure for coordination through AZAPO," he contended. "But the existence of separate entities is something we have to foster not fear. In practice, it is actually the means by which we can work together. People react to something that touches them immediately. They don't start off with an idea. Workers form unions, others come together as students, teachers, farmers, civic organizations."

If "people react to something that touches them immediately," Blacks in South Africa react principally to the daily experience of racial oppression. And Lukele and BCM leaders inside South Africa object strenuously to a kind of analysis they claim negates that experience by submerging it under talk of working-class solidarity and multi-racial harmony.

During a recent exchange of polemics in the South African Press, AZAPO national organizer Letsatsi Mosala stated the case for maintaining exclusively Black organizations. "In a situation where the 'white settler group' is seen to be oppressing and exploiting the Black nation because the Black nation belongs to a race different to that of the 'white settler group,'" Mosala wrote, "it is logical and inevitable that the exploited Black nation would and should seek redress from such a situation as a nation..."
and all its activities are bound to be organized along such lines."

Speaking in his New York apartment, Andrew Lukele stressed the same points. "The issue that is posed is Black unity versus multi-racialism," he stated. "The ANC and the CP (South African Communist Party) are conceived as proponents of multi-racialism, little different from the out-and-out liberals. What BCM is saying is simply this; that we must have unity of Black people. The question of national oppression hits them and that is what they will rally on. Don't confuse things with a call for multi-racialism."

Lukele denied that this approach conflicts with one rooted in a class analysis of South African society. "To regard this as backwardness in thought is to me not consistent with a class analysis at all," he said. "The scientific approach is not to counterpose national oppression against class oppression but to see how they are intertwined, how they meet."

"In South Africa, you don't have a grassroots movement of the white working class. In fact, the white working class supports the structure of privilege. The section of whites that speaks of tolerance is in fact petty bourgeois. It has no roots within the working class, Black or white. We think leadership has of course to be working class oriented. But it has to be Black working class oriented."

No Collaboration

In discussing their political role, BCM leaders also emphasize the importance and distinctiveness of their movement's strategic thrust. One key element of BCM strategy since the founding of the South African Student Organization (SASO) in 1968, has been the categorical rejection of any dialogue with the white supremacist regime or with bantustan leaders and other Blacks who owe their prominence to structures created by apartheid. They define this intransigence as essential in arming Blacks with the understanding and confidence to resist white domination. Even when talking about the need to unite "all patriotic forces," they rule out any accommodation with "Gatsha Buthelezi and the likes."

"These people are actually part of the system," Lukele explained. "There is no way in which people have any measure of democratic rights within these bantustans. Buthelezi and the other leaders are very autocratic and very overbearing. They take the worst out of old tribal customs, using the guise of tradition in the service of the system of oppression."

Answering Critics

This insistence on militant non-cooperation coupled with the determination to push constantly against the narrow limits of political activity permitted under apartheid have placed Black Consciousness activists in the center of much of the mass resistance taking place inside South Africa. But critics have charged that militancy and courage must at some point be harnessed to a more coherent strategy and organizational structure. To the complaint that BCM doesn't offer the strategic and organizational tools to topple apartheid, Lukele answered with a question of his own: "What does?"

"Our detractors who charge us with lack of a strategy have what to offer?" he continued. "We have heard a whole lot of talk in the last twenty years about armed struggle. And all the talk would lead you to believe that what is envisioned is an armed struggle as in Mozambique." That vision, in Lukele's view, ignores the crucial "difference in terrain" between an essentially undeveloped colony and an industrialized nation with a substantial and heavily armed white population. In South Africa, he insists, "armed struggle has to grow out of these insurrections. That is the difference between armed struggle in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa—the development of the mass struggle and massive political action growing into armed insurrection."

Admitting that BCM does not have a blueprint for reaching this situation, its leaders nevertheless contend that their emphasis on mass mobilization deals more to bring both the strategy and the reality closer than can acts of sabotage, however spectacular.

Thus, they argue, they must remain prepared to pay the necessary consequences of "above-board operations in the clear light of day"—constant surveillance by the system and vulnerability to arrest, banning and forced exile. "We have got to find ways to operate so that we can avoid being paralyzed by arrests and bannings," said Lukele. That is a job for the movement inside the country. It is a question Lukele was reluctant to discuss in detail, although it clearly lies at the core of the movement's future viability. He spoke more extensively about the role of people committed to building BCM's external wing defining their task as assisting those struggling inside. This includes both providing material support and taking advantage of their access to information and thinking unavailable inside South Africa.

"We recognize the severe limitation of being outside the actual arena of battle," Lukele explained. "The battle is always a corrective. And when you are abroad, without that corrective, a person can easily take up ideas which as ideas look very attractive even before they have been put to the test of practice in your country."

By keeping exiled activists in close contact with the movement at home, BCM's external wing hopes to help them keep testing their ideas against concrete conditions. It also hopes to check "the process of continual decapitation" of the movement.

"Each new wave of resistance throws up more active leadership," Lukele said. "And then after it shows itself up this leadership is pruned and thrown outside the country. We have to arrest that kind of heads being thrown out of the country and provide a place where the cadres can continue their revolutionary function."

Of course, this is not a problem unique to Black Consciousness leaders. Protecting its internal leadership, or preserving the links between a leadership forced into exile and the South African masses have posed serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC. Recent developments indicate some ANC leaders are very serious difficulties for the ANC and PAC.
Drought Hits South Africa

by Catherine Macdonald

Severe drought has hit much of South Africa and threatens to become the worst in more than thirty years. While the whites control the abundant agricultural sectors, the effect upon them is likely to be minimal: it is the Africans who are facing the reality of widespread famine.

Since January, the total rainfall has been about 58 percent below normal, with even less rain in some areas. Many regions such as the northwestern and eastern Cape province, and the southwestern section of Orange Free State, have had no significant rainfall since 1977.

Perhaps the most critically affected area is KwaZulu, a fragmented bantustan dotted throughout eastern Natal. Those living in the area have long been affected by widespread malnutrition, which the drought has exacerbated to famine proportions. In keeping with the government's policy of reporting statistics on the health of the African population, none are now available that indicate the degree of malnutrition and related deaths. A white Kwazulu Medical Service's doctor, however, stated that the number of deaths from starvation is already above that for last year, and is expected to increase, with the worst months yet to come.

With the rainfall well below normal—as low as 15 percent of the average for one recent month—water is extremely scarce. Much of the water that is available is stagnant and/or contaminated, due to the lowering of the river levels. This has in turn increased the incidence of water-borne diseases such as bilharzia, enteric fever and typhoid.

The Pretoria regime has not as yet responded to the situation, although when criticized by the London Times for not providing aid, the government asserted defensively that it assisted KwaZulu in obtaining water trucks and sinking wells. The regime maintained in addition, that as KwaZulu's own relief efforts utilized funds from the general budget that came from Pretoria in the first place, the government has, in fact, contributed to drought relief.

The drought is not by itself creating a new situation. Malnutrition and starvation have been chronic in the reserves for many years. With the drought, the people's already fragile defenses against disease and extensive famine have been demolished.
New Constitution Meets Strong Resistance

Pretoria's new constitutional reforms are a non-starter even in the eyes of South Africa's conservative Black leaders. This was the message Prime Minister P.W. Botha received when he met in early August with leaders of the South African Council of Churches, the government sponsored bantustans, and the "Colored" Labor Party.

In the meeting with bantustan leaders Botha was told that the separate Blacks-only council, slated as an advisory body to the State presidents council (see Southern Africa, July/August 1980), was not acceptable. The presidents council is, among other things, designed to develop ideas about possible future constitutional changes in South Africa—purely in an advisory capacity. In turn, the separate Blacks-only council is an advisory body to the presidents council—that is, an advisor to an advisory body.

The realization that even government appointed Black leaders could not afford to accept the presidents council, coupled with strong opposition by the Indian, "colored," and Asian communities to the exclusion of Blacks, led Botha to attempt a minor alteration to his framework. The separate Blacks-only advisory council was scrapped. But Botha was not prepared to offer an alternative route for Black participation: "Blacks are not going to serve on the presidents council," he said in a later statement.

In meetings with representatives of the South African Council of Churches and the representatives of the "Colored" Labor Party, Botha heard a similar complaint. The rejection of Blacks from the council invalidates the process, even in the eyes of leaders who have traditionally been willing to work within the system.

The issue for many other Black leaders, however, remains one of working within the framework of apartheid. The presidents council is essentially a body designed to work out a constitution based on dividing up South Africa in the bantustan framework. "Instead of one man, one vote or a federal system," Botha said following his meeting with Black leaders, "I am suggesting for South Africa a confederation, of states."

For many Blacks this is the crux. The presidents council is unacceptable regardless of who is included because the framework is still apartheid. Participation in discussion of constitutional changes is, in the words of one Soweto organization, to contribute to carrying out the "final solution" of apartheid.

"Buthelezi . . . Joining the Enemy's Forces"

—Alfred Nzo, ANC

by Catherine Macdonald

The African National Congress of South Africa strongly attacked KwaZulu Bantustan leader Chief Gatsha Buthelezi in early July, just eight months after the ANC came under fire from some other Black activists for entering into discussions with the controversial bantustan leader.

"Chief Buthelezi," ANC Secretary General Alfred Nzo told a UN conference in Geneva, "has placed himself in the position of interlocutor between the oppressed and the oppressor in favor of the oppressor. To organize bands of armed men to terrorize the striking school children back to school and to an inferior and racist system of education as Buthelezi has done, is openly to join the enemy's forces of repression."

Nzo's charge referred to Buthelezi's response when students boycotted classes in KwaMashu, a Black township outside Durban which lies within the borders of the KwaZulu bantustan. Buthelezi sent club-wielding members of his Inkatha political organization to attack students and stop the boycott. He explained that he "would not tolerate continued boycotts or the destruction of schools."

In the past, Buthelezi has regularly asserted that there is "one South Africa," and denies that his acceptance of the position as KwaZulu leader amounted to collaboration with the apartheid scheme of creating separate tribal "homelands" for Blacks. But in this case, his actions indicated that he would not tolerate protests against apartheid spreading onto territory nominally under his control.

Use of Inkatha members to enforce Buthelezi's authority reflects recent moves to build up the organization along military lines. Originally a Zulu cultural movement, Inkatha has been shaped into a political party with a claimed membership of 300,000. Male Inkatha members are already required to undergo some military training. Plans are also afoot to enroll women and youths for similar programs in a Women's Brigade and Youth Service Corps. The new Inkatha will seek recognition from independent African states and attempt to establish a diplomatic mission either in the US or in Europe.

In Nzo's Geneva address, Buthelezi also came under attack for opposing divestment. "Economic and other collaboration does not 'liberalize' but strengthens the apartheid economy and its military power," the ANC leader stated.

When speaking recently to two visiting US congressmen, Stephen Solarz and Benjamin Rosenthal, Buthelezi indicated he has not altered his longstanding opposition to disinvestment by US corporations in South Africa. He has argued that the day for "protest politics" is over in favor of the politics of power."

Nzo also denounced Buthelezi for urging the people of South Africa to "desist from struggling for the release of imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela."

"Those who place themselves in the path of the struggling masses," Nzo continued, "shall inevitably be swept away along with the racist master whom they serve."

Brigadier Johan Coetzee, head of the South African police, immediately seized the opportunity to indulge in a "mischief making ploy" to discredit the ANC, as one source close to the ANC described it to the South African Rand Daily Mail. Coetzee claimed the Sunday following Nzo's speech that the ANC had issued death threats against Buthelezi. A day later Coetzee denied he had made this statement and said in more general terms that an ANC attempt on Buthelezi's life would not be unexpected and that the police would, always be ready to protect Buthelezi against such a possibility.

Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, responded to Coetzee's original claims with a statement reiterating the substance of Nzo's message. "Our preoccupation is the struggle of our people," Tambo said. "The only reason we are bringing this matter up is because Gatsha Buthelezi is now being used for something which could be very dangerous unless we warn our people."

"We do not spend our time and energies on individuals," Tambo added, explaining that the ANC will make criticisms "more to show them the direction than merely to indulge in polemics."

But the polemics seem certain to continue, particularly if Buthelezi follows through on efforts to establish ties with African states. As a liberation movement officially recognized by the Organization of African Unity, the ANC has enjoyed the support of most of the continent. It is not likely to tolerate an attempt to swing international support behind an organization that has announced its intention to mobilize vigilantes against ANC guerrillas. □
Botha Consolidates Power

In a move that many observers feel is an attempt to consolidate his power, South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha appointed seven new members to his Cabinet in late August. As part of this major reshuffling, five ministers will be removed from the Cabinet, four of them to serve on Botha's controversial president council. Several other ministers will remain on the Cabinet, but with different duties.

The new ministers will assume office in October, when a special session of Parliament will rubber stamp the appointment.

Gerrit Viljoen, Administrator-General of Namibia, and leader of the powerful secret Afrikaner society, the Broederbond, will now head the Ministry of (white) Education and Sport. Some press speculation has suggested that Botha is planning on using Viljoen's popularity to challenge Andries Treurnicht, the outspoken leader of the conservative National Party. Treurnicht, who has been a leading opponent to any suggestion of reform or relaxation of apartheid, has been demoted from his present post as Minister of Public Works to the lesser political Ministry of State Administration and Statistics.

General Magnus Malan, former commander of the South African Defense Force (SADF), will become the Minister of Defense, a position heretofore held by the Prime Minister himself. Lieutenant-General Constand Viljoen, Chief of the Army, is considered to be the most likely candidate for promotion to the vacant SADF command.

Marais Steyn, the unpopular and intratable Minister of Community Development, "Colored" Relations, and Indian Affairs, is to be replaced and sent to England as the new Ambassador. Turning Steyn's place will be Pen Kotze, formerly a deputy minister in that department. Dawie de Villiers, will return from his position as ambassador to England, to become the Minister of Industries, Commerce and Development.

Kobie Coetzee has been promoted from Deputy Minister of Defense and National Intelligence to become the new Minister of Justice.

Pieter Du Plessis is to head the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, and Nok van der Merwe will become head of the Ministry of Water Affairs, Forestry, and Environmental Conservation.

Alwyn Schlebusch will no longer be in the Cabinet and instead will become the first Vice-President, and, most likely, chairman of the advisory presidents council.

The appointment of a number of new ministers who have been closely associated with Botha—particularly Malan and Viljoen—is seen by many observers as a sign that the Prime Minister is building a power base within his own National Party in order to fend off his right-wing opponents while revamping some of the outdated mechanisms of white control.

Many of the new appointees believe, with Botha, that South Africa needs to be more flexible in implementing some of the more overt apartheid laws, while still retaining control over the Black population by tightening influx control and establishing legal, but carefully controlled, Black trade unions.

Nevertheless, Botha's "reforms" amount to nothing more than the fine-tuning of a system overtaken by events. His new appointees remain firmly committed to the separate development scheme. One white opposition leader described the shake-up as no more that "a rearrangement of the political furniture." And as Nhato Molotana chairman of Soweto's Committee of Ten noted, the cabinet changes are "meaningless" to South Africa's Black majority.

Strike Wave Continues

The recent strike by Black municipal workers in Johannesburg coupled with the harsh government response have dealt a stunning blow to the centerpiece of Pretoria's much-lauded liberalization program, the Wiehahn commission reforms. At its peak, the strike brought out over 10,000 workers, making it "the biggest single employer strike in South African history," according to the Economist, Britain's weekly news magazine. Armed police in camouflage uniforms put an abrupt halt to the action in early August, rounding up strikers who refused to return to work and trucking them back to the bantustans.

Classified as "migrants" under the South African separate development framework, municipal workers are particularly susceptible to tactics such as these. But the City Council action did not stop there. The leader of the striking Black Municipal Worker Union (BMWU), Joseph Mavi, went to court seeking an injunction to prevent the police action. While in the corridors of the Rand Supreme Court, he was arrested and detained without charge.

Those workers who agreed to return to work did not fare much better. The city council refused to recognize the BMWU and those workers who were reinstated were fired back at the old wage, without any consideration given to demands for a new minimum wage.

The strike originally broke out when six hundred workers at a Soweto power plant struck in a protest over low wages. When the City Council fired the strikers, eight hundred other electrical workers laid down their tools. Within a few days, over 10,000 municipal workers followed their example.

The initial reaction of the City Council showed little interest in using the Wiehahn guidelines to adopt a flexible approach and no interest whatsoever in dealing with the Black Municipal Workers Union. Instead, it offered to negotiate with a competing company-supported union, even though that union had been recognized only two weeks earlier and boasted only forty members compared to the 10,000 who had followed the BMWU out on strike. At the same time, the City Council asked the Witwatersrand regional labor commissioner for permission to import about four hundred workers from the bantustans to take the place of the striking workers.

As the replacement workers began pouring into Johannesburg, the City Council called in the police to help ship dissident strikers back to the bantustans.

By the time they were finished, some 2,000 workers had been forcibly removed from Johannesburg. At that point, the City Council simply announced that the strike was over on August 2.

Strike one, Strike two, Strike . . .

But strikes and protests have continued. Over 50,000 workers have already been involved in strikes this year and, in late September, Pretoria announced that school boycotts have closed seventy-seven schools indefinitely.

As the resistance continues, so too the use of government force has been on the upswing. Eight hundred Cape Town meat factory workers who had been striking for three months, demanding the reinstatement of fired workers and recognition of their workers committees were forced back to work in early August. The workers called off the strike and a meat boycott called in support, following the arrest and banning of their union leadership.

South Africa's secret oil-to-gas SASOL plants were also rocked by protests. In July and again in August, construction workers at the site walked off the job, first in protest over the death of a Black worker who they
Namibia Edges Closer to UDI

It was all celebration and gaiety among many of Namibia’s white population. The cause for their joy was the swearing in of a new Namibian internal executive, the so-called council of ministers, at the beginning of July, just days after South Africa announced the formal end of its almost month-long invasion of Angola in June.

But few Blacks attended the elaborate ceremony, presided over by South African Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen. SWAPO, of course, was not in attendance, and even such accommodating internal African parties as the Namibia National Front and the SWAPO Democrats boycotted the occasion, indicating the lack of the most nominal support for the new council chaired by Dirk Mudge, head of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). He is now, in effect, Namibia’s prime minister.

The council of ministers is composed of twelve members selected from the DTA-dominated national assembly. It will control more than twenty government departments previously administered by the South African government.

These are all among the steps that South Africa is taking inside Namibia, moving the territory ever closer to a unilateral declaration of independence.

The most recent steps in that direction came on August 1, when South African Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen announced that elections would be held in the territory in the first week of November. Those elections will be used to select various internal representatives for the increasingly complex government that South Africa is setting in place in Namibia. SWAPO, of course, will be prohibited from participating.

Also on August 1, it was announced that Major General Charles J. Lloyd would replace Major General Jannie Geldenhuys as the new commander of South Africa’s military forces in Namibia.

Gerrit Viljoen, the administrator general, will also be leaving Namibia, and he has been appointed minister of education in Prime Minister P.W. Botha’s recently shuffled cabinet. According to sources quoted in the South African press, Viljoen was sent to Namibia with a specific task: to establish self-rule. With Mudge and the DTA implanted as an internal government, Viljoen is no longer needed in Windhoek. At this point decisions relating to the international status of the territory, constitutional changes, and foreign affairs still remain the responsibility of the South African administrator general.

But Pretoria has begun the transfer of military power, previously the domain of South Africa, to the new internal government. The council of ministers has taken over control of an independent defense department of Namibia, known as the South-West Africa Territory Force. Officially though, it is still part of the South African military.

What is South Africa doing with all these quiet but effective transfers of power? Few people can avoid the conclusion that it is setting up a friendly government inside the territory. This has been the conclusion not only of SWAPO and its supporters, but of many mainstream observers inside Namibia as well.

“The situation always was and still is that South Africa wished to install a sympathetic government in the form of the DTA on her borders,” writes Gwen Lister, a political columnist for the Windhoek Observer. “No matter the lip service which she has paid for over three years to the possibility of a UN election.”

Lister writes that July 1, with the installation of the council of ministers, will likely go down in history as the date on which Pretoria rejected the UN plan.

South Africa has not officially replied to the UN’s most recent communication on Namibia, which was delivered in late June.

In that letter, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim stated that the UN, the front line African states, and SWAPO were ready to make the concessions that Pretoria had demanded for its agreement to the UN peace plan.

Just as he was about to become Namibia’s internal leader, Dirk Mudge rejected the UN concessions as “meaningless.” Most believe that Mudge’s position is unlikely to differ significantly from Pretoria’s.

In effect, then, both South Africa and the DTA have rejected the implementation of the UN plan “at least for the next few years,” columnist Lister concludes. “By that stage, the situation will be difficult if not impossible to retrieve.”

Internal forces in Namibia are not agreed on the wisdom of this course. “That South Africa was prepared to work towards an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibia question,” notes Lister, “is an untruth, as recent events have adequately demonstrated.

“That the DTA was prepared to be accommodating while SWAPO was the retarding factor in the negotiations towards a settlement is an outright lie.”

The South African attacks on Angola in June had to have been carried out with the upcoming establishment of the council of ministers in mind. South Africa knew it was taking further steps toward UDI, and by in-

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UN Hearings Target Uranium Mining

by Anita Pfouts

In the fast-fading light of late afternoon, an unmarked Boeing 707 cargo plane taxies to a remote corner in the freight area of Orly Airport. A group of men, under tight security guard, swiftly unload the cargo and rush it to another area where it is transferred to trucks labeled “kitchen equipment.” The small “radioactive” sticker on the side of each vehicle is the only clue to the real cargo. Soon two trucks, hauling heavy trailers, head north around the Paris ring road and on to Calais. The cargo is taken by night ferry across the English Channel to Dover, where it is once again loaded into trucks. Final destination is Springfields, a nuclear fuel plant on the Ribble River in Lancashire, about twenty miles north of Liverpool.

This sounds like the setting for a novel of international intrigue and adventure. In reality, the British government is taking delivery of another load of uranium worth half a million pounds. The plane is South African Airways Flight 290 which has just completed a 6000-mile journey from Namibia. The uranium is being delivered in defiance of international law, hence the secrecy. Almost half of Britain’s uranium, the raw fuel for nuclear power, is being imported via two clandestine routes: the one described above, the other via the French airline UTA.

The two airlines made these costly, secret journeys once or twice a week until last December when the French newspaper Liberation printed a story detailing the flights. Since that time shipments have continued by other routes, and by 1984, one recipient, British Nuclear Fuels, hopes to have taken delivery of 7,500 tons of uranium from the Rossing uranium mine, the largest uranium mine in the world, located near Swakopmund, Namibia.

The story of these clandestine shipments is documented in “Follow the Yellow Cake Road,” a film produced by Ian MacBride, a journalist for the British television company Grenada. The film, with testimony by MacBride following, formed part of five days of hearings before the United Nations Council for Namibia on the plunder of Namibian uranium. Held in early July 1980, the hearings brought together expert witnesses from England, France, Japan, the Netherlands, West Germany, and the United States, and from several intergovernmental agencies including the International Atomic Energy Agency. A report documenting the exploitation of, and trade in, Namibian uranium by foreign interests will be made to the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1980.

The hearings, and the circuitous route by which Britain receives its Namibian uranium imports, both follow from a decree protecting Namibian natural resources issued by the Council on Namibia in 1974. The Council on Namibia has the power to take such steps because it was appointed the legal governing authority of Namibia by the United Nations in 1967, a decision subsequently endorsed by the International Court of Justice in 1971.

The 1974 Council Decree Number 1 covers all natural resources, animal and mineral. Its key provisions prohibit exploitation—prospecting for, mining, processing, exporting, etc.—of any Namibian natural resource without the permission of the council and specifically invalidate any permission, license or concession purporting to allow or to authorize exploitation or exportation of Namibian resources which was or is granted by the Republic of South Africa or by the territorial “administration.” The decree provides for the seizure of any Namibian natural resource taken in violation of this decree and appoints the council as trustee of any material so seized. It also authorizes seizure of the carrier in which any illegally exported resources are transported and provides that anyone contravening the decree may be held liable for damages by the future government of an independent Namibia.

This United Nations action has driven the South African and transnational corporations doing business in Namibia underground. A veil of secrecy shrouds all economic—essentially mining—activity. Thus Great Britain, which has refused to recognize Decree Number 1, obtains Namibian uranium in a clandestine manner to avoid possible seizure of the uranium by a country willing to uphold the UN Decree. In addition to the Rossing-British Nuclear Fuels contract, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United States have imported Namibian uranium.

The South African Interest

Control over Namibian uranium is important to South Africa. The republic is itself a major source of the Western world’s uranium. By adding control over a second major source, Namibia, South Africa obviously hopes to strengthen its bargaining position.

Western strategists frequently refer to the importance of preserving a stable South Africa because of that country’s importance as a provider of critical minerals. An expanding uranium capacity would reinforce this tendency, and encourage Western acceptance of a continuing South African presence in Namibia.

Anita Pfouts, a long-time southern Africa liberation supporter, was a research assistant with the American Committee on Africa this past summer and attended the UN hearings on Namibia in July.
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**South Africa** is in fact believed to control the largest single block of voting shares in the Rossing mine operation, although the giant British corporation, Rio Tinto Zinc, is apparently the largest single investor in the mine. South Africa's interests in Rossing are held by General Mining and the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). French, West German, Japanese, and Iranian corporations also have substantial investments in the mine, but details of exact holdings are obscure. The South African Atomic Energy Act, which extends to Namibia, bans the disclosure of any information about South Africa's energy program, and thus permits RTZ to operate Rossing without revealing a variety of information, including to whom and on what terms uranium is being sold.

Testimony given by Steven Ritterbush, a consultant on international resource issues, who is currently working for the Arthur D. Little Co., revealed that an excess of supply over demand is excuted until the mid-1980s. At that point demand will begin to exceed supply and "there will be at least a 25 percent short-fall on world markets given the level of existing uranium producers and planned production."

"Together," Ritterbush said, "it is estimated that South Africa and Namibia could account for as much as 50 percent of the total [uranium] that could be available for net export."

Ritterbush concluded: "Given the degree of influence it is able indirectly to exert over Rossing's operations through the IDC and General Mining Corporation, Pretoria is able to control a sizable proportion of the world's uranium production and reserves available for export. I should contend, although it is difficult to document, that the control gives Pretoria a degree of political and economic leverage not only as regards the formulation of [Western] foreign policy towards South Africa itself, but the formulation of foreign policy towards South Africa's present position in Namibia."

**US Imports**

Although Britain, Western Europe, and Japan are the main buyers of Namibian uranium, Wolf Geisler, a West German anti-apartheid activist, has shown that some Namibian uranium has also been imported to the US, been enriched, and then shipped to Japan. In a letter earlier this year Paul J. Hare, Director of the State Department Office of Southern African Affairs made this statement: "The United States imports only very small amounts of uranium from any country. US import statistics on uranium therefore are not broken down by country of origin. It is quite possible that very small amounts have been imported from Namibia for re-export to Japan, especially since such imports would not violate American law."

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**Dutch Opposition**

The US Department of Energy has conceded that a small amount of Namibian uranium—less than 500 tons of U3O8—has been imported to the US since 1974."

Testimony by representatives from the Netherlands and Japan further illustrates widespread violations of Decree Number 1.

The Uranium Enrichment Corporation (URENCO) is a joint venture involving a British state company, a Dutch state company, and a West German private company. URENCO accepts uranium from clients, enriches it, and returns it to the client. Uranium from the Rossing mine in Namibia, noted Ruurd Huisman, a Dutch activist, is supplied to the British Nuclear Fuels Company and to the West German company, Urangesellschaft. These companies in turn supply electricity producers in Britain and West Germany with uranium, which is then enriched in URENCO plants in the Netherlands.

Huisman also pointed out that Namibian uranium is delivered to West European electrical utilities through the European Economic Community Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM). The potential for Dutch government action in support of Decree Number 1, Huisman said, is evident in the EURATOM charter which stipulates that "the agency can in fact determine what shall be the geographical origin of the goods to be delivered." The agency has never refused permission with regard to the Rossing contracts, and is required by law to be co-signatory to them.

Huisman pointed out that the Dutch government has already recognized Decree Number 1. If the Dutch government could be persuaded to stick by Decree Number 1 and would refuse to allow either its state-owned enrichment company, UCN, or any other Netherlands company to contract through EURATOM for uranium from Namibia, EURATOM might be placed in a position of reconsidering its policy with regard to Namibian uranium.

Ineke Lambers-Hacquebard, a member of the Dutch parliament, testified on how the issue of Namibian uranium fits into the Dutch political scene. As an example of a pattern for possible future Dutch parliamentary action on Namibian uranium, she discussed the Dutch opposition attempts to enact oil sanctions against South Africa—an attempt which almost caused the fall of the present government. Both Lambers-Hacquebard and David de Beer, a Dutch political activist working with the church, testified on the possibilities for action aimed towards eventual Dutch government involvement in halting the use of Namibian uranium in Western Europe.

The testimony of Yoko Kitazawa regarding the Japanese contract for 8,200 short tons of uranium from the Rossing Mine—to be delivered between 1974 and 1982—revealed that it isn't just the Europeans who are involved in the rape of Namibia's natural resources. The Japanese government was supposed to re-evaluate its positions on the sovereignty of the Council for Namibia and Decree Number 1 in 1974-75. But the contract with Rossing has not been canceled.

**Health Hazards**

The export of uranium is only part of the story of the damage being done to Namibians by the illegal trading in their country's resources. The other part is the effect that uncontrolled open-pit uranium mining has on its workers:

Testimony by the representatives from the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Theo Ben-Gurirab, indicates that there are no safeguards for the workers at the Rossing mine. By looking at maps of the mine and its surroundings, it is possible to see how close housing compounds are to the actual mine, to the uncovered tailings, and to the river used in the processing. Miners wear the contaminated clothes in which they work in their housing compounds. For the period of their contracts, miners are exposed to above-safe levels of radiation 24 hours a day, seven days a week. There are no adequate medical checkups or facilities.

Again and again, testimony hammered home the brutal theft of Namibia's natural resources by the very countries that are supposed to be currently involved in bringing that country to independence. Great Britain, France, West Germany, and the United States are actively involved in mining, transporting or enriching Namibian uranium and have been responsible in the past for providing South Africa with support at many levels: economic, political, and military. Thus several witnesses described the ways in which nuclear technology and equipment had been given to South Africa by these countries, and it was also suggested that South Africa might use its control over uranium supplies important to the West to bargain for further technology. In this context, few witnesses felt confident that Western intervention in the region would be aimed at tearing Namibia away from South Africa and ensuring its genuine independence.

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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1980/SOUTHERN AFRICA 21
SWAPO Refugee Camps: Lingering Problems

The memory of the South African air attack on Namibian refugees and SWAPO settlements at Cassinga, southern Angola, still lingers. Since that attack on May 4, 1978, in which 600 people (mostly women and children) were killed and many more wounded, the South Africans continued with regular reconnaissance flights and bombing attacks over Angola. As a result, SWAPO and the Angolans have been forced to move those refugees who survived the attacks three times in the last two years.

The repeated movement of refugees has made establishing a functioning infrastructure in the camp difficult. In addition, the current settlement is divided into separate units for children, women with babies, the elderly, those refugees requiring medical attention, and those in educational programs. For security reasons these units have to be placed a good distance apart from each other, which means that communication and transport between them is difficult and expensive.

Two of the most severe problems in the camp are water and housing. Oxfam-Canada reported in May that the camp they visited had no adequate water supply and the closest permanent river was four kilometers away. Oxfam has been providing aid for SWAPO refugees and recently sent an inspection team to Angola. The few water pumps they saw were broken or not functioning due to lack of pipes or parts. As a result the camp must rely on water that is hauled in on trucks or tractored from the river when vehicles are available.

While there is enough water for cooking, the shortage means that little, if any, bathing is possible. This both increases the chance of spreading infectious disease and decreases the refugees' resistance to outbreaks of cholera or typhus.

Housing is also in short supply and the majority of the people live in tents. What few cement buildings are left from the Portuguese colonial days have been taken over for use by administrators, teachers and hospital staff. More than half of the tents, which were erected in March 1979, are so threadbare and torn that it is unlikely they will last through another rainy season. SWAPO however does not have the materials to replace the tents with permanent structures.

Most importantly, transporting food, water, and medical supplies to the settlement and between the various sections of the settlement is extremely difficult because of a shortage of available vehicles. Some aid agencies, such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), who have given relief aid for other projects, refuse to fund the transportation project saying that the vehicles can be diverted for military use. Without transportation to move goods to the refugees, however, other aid projects cannot function.

SWAPO is placing a strong emphasis on the need for medical supplies for war casualties, diseases, sanitation, and new births. Doctor Libertine Amathila, SWAPO deputy secretary of health, recently appealed for support to raise money for a maternity and child care clinic. To provide care for high risk pregnancies, childbirth, infant and post-natal care, family planning and community health education, a clinic like this is essential.

Help Needed

SWAPO urgently needs material aid for refugees in Angola. There are many groups working on this task.

One organization, the Namibia Support Committee's health collective in Britain, is coordinating a Maternity and Child Care clinic project in cooperation with SWAPO. SWAPO hopes to raise $14,400 to buy items such as stethoscopes, cribs, cots, scales, antibiotics, etc.

Donations for this project and other projects can be sent to:

Africa Fund/SWAPO Refugee Program
198 Broadway, Rm. 402
New York, NY 10038

SWAPO Dissidents Expelled

The Central Committee of SWAPO, meeting in extraordinary session in Angola during July, expelled its acting vice-president and eight other members of the organization. The nine were charged with "advocating and organizing for the breaking away of our Eastern region—Caprivi—from the rest of the country." The Caprivi strip is a small section of Namibian territory that juts between Angola and Zambia to the north and Botswana to the south.

Having reviewed "concrete and documentary evidence," the Central Committee charged that the expelled individuals had "engaged themselves in activities aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of our country, at disrupting the unity of our organization and at retarding the progress of the liberation struggle of the Namibia people."

In addition to Acting Vice-President Mishake Albert Muyongo, those expelled are: Lemmy Matengu, Jackson Mazazi, Ignatius Matengu, David Mutubalul, Denis Kachilombwa, Ernest Likando, Ben Mabuk, and Calvin Songa.

Immediately following the expulsions, Muyongo announced the re-forming of the Caprivi National Union, a Caprivi based organization that had merged with SWAPO sixteen years ago. Muyongo's charges that fighting was taking place between Caprivi secessionists and SWAPO members at refugee camps in Zambia, were sharply denied by SWAPO, the Zambian government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Zambian denial came after a government investigation into the situation in the camps.

The last major expulsion of leadership members occurred in 1976 when SWAPO Information Secretary Andreas Shipanga was expelled, and later formed a small political grouping inside Namibia, the SWAPO-Democrats.

South African Administrator General Gerrit Viljoen immediately attempted to portray the expulsions as a split in the SWAPO leadership based on "tribal" conflicts. Theo Ben Gurirab, SWAPO representative to the UN said in response, "The South Africans are greatly mistaken if they think that SWAPO has split. We are dealing with the actions of one man who abused his position. He bribed certain people of the Eastern Caprivi, and he used these poor people for his own ends."

"I am in SWAPO because it is the only movement with a nationalistic base," Ben Gurirab continued. He pointed out that a number of top SWAPO officials are of Caprivian origin.
Since the establishment of the first liberated zones, health care in Mozambique has posed an enormous challenge for FRELIMO. Under colonialism, health care was a privilege reserved for the rich and virtually unavailable to Africans.

Within six months after independence in 1975, when FRELIMO announced its decision to nationalize medicine and abolish private medical practice, 90 percent of the doctors emigrated. Mozambique was left with less than 50 doctors to serve its population of 9 million.

But by 1976 FRELIMO had recruited several hundred medical workers from different countries, and began to create a truly national health care program. A resolution of the FRELIMO Third Party Congress held in February 1977 declared that “The long tradition of FRELIMO at the health front during the popular liberation war is the principal source of inspiration for the present stage of our development. The principle behind the Party’s activity is that of making each citizen a medical agent.”

Emphasizing preventive, rather than costly curative medicine, FRELIMO sought to develop a rural health care delivery system and to restructure hospitals so that for the first time they were accessible, and responsive to the needs of the people.

The law on socialization of medicine was passed in November 1977. It provided for free emergency and preventive care, and introduced fixed minimal charges for non-emergency, out-patient consultations which covered the treatment prescribed by the nurse, doctor or medical aid. The law also dealt with a referral system whereby people must, except in the case of emergency, be seen at their local health post, then referred to a hospital if necessary.

Now, five years after independence, Southern Africa reviews health care developments with Andy and Paul Epstein, health care professionals who worked in the Mozambican port city of Beira for two years from April 1978 to 1980.

At this stage, is the emphasis for health care on curative or preventive medicine?

Due to the very bad health situation, a legacy of colonialism, our work was mainly curative. We found this frustrating at times because most of the diseases we treated result from the social environment. Most of them have a cure, but in order to break the cycle, the underlying cause—namely poverty—has to be dealt with. This takes time.

One thing that became very clear to us after working with so many horrible diseases and parasites, was that the people who are well nourished could tolerate them when infected. But those who are malnourished get tuberculosis (TB), and the children that are malnourished die from measles. Even the hook worm—a worm that attaches itself to the intestine and sucks blood—can be tolerated by someone who is well nourished. But when there is insufficient iron and proteins to develop antibodies, the body cannot defend itself and it gets very sick.

It is not simply a problem of shortage of food. In our area people were suffering from vitamin deficiencies because they did not eat green vegetables—even though they

Patient at a health clinic
were available in the markets. But this was not part of the local diet, a result of a cultural tradition which had evolved over hundreds of years. In order to try and change this, our health team began to do nutritional education with the patients at the hospital, and students gave talks in the local languages in the wards about the importance of a balanced diet. Nutrition agents are also now being trained in Maputo and will be distributed around the country.

And so it is not necessary to totally rid the country of disease. Food is the most important element. In a way this is hopeful, because it is a concrete situation that can be worked on to produce positive results in the future.

In the meantime, preventive medicine is emphasized in principle, and more is being done to implement it each year. While we were working there, for instance, preventive medicine was emphasized at a big district meeting. Medical workers were encouraged to take time off from their curative work to focus on preventive medicine. This meant going to work places, giving vaccines, screening workers for TB, and educating them about preventive medicine.

In our area there were between fifty and sixty factories, offices and textile mills with an average of between 100 to 150 workers in each. During visits our health care team inspected the working conditions, vaccinated the workers against tetanus, and started anti-malaria programs.

At the same time we would do an educational presentation, comment on inadequate work conditions we found—such as poor ventilation—and answer questions. The workers would choose a “responsible” for health in the factory. Later, members of our team would make return visits to see if any improvements had been made.

These were some of the preventive medicine projects that were being implemented.

Another project was related to pre-natal care. One of my [Andy] tasks was to start a pre-natal clinic in our area. There was virtually no such care under the Portuguese, and people just do not realize how important it is. Much of this care was straight forward because basically all that was needed was to check a pregnant woman’s blood pressure, and give her iron and tetanus shots. Tetanus is a major cause of infant mortality and it is easily avoidable if the mother is given tetanus shots during pregnancy.

Many babies were brought into the hospital with lock-jaw. A significant number of these—about half—died. For instance, a seven-day old baby would be brought in unable to breast feed. A policy was introduced to have women with tetanus stay in the hospital. There they could feed children through tubes who were unable to use their mouths.

In addition, there was the problem of comprehensive follow-up. This was particularly difficult for TB patients. They would feel better after a few months and not return to the clinic, even though it takes a year to cure TB. So, the dynamizing groups should be provided with lists of where the patients live and return them to the clinic.

But for Mozambique the living reality is that long lines of sick patients wait every day for treatment. With the shortage of trained people and facilities, it is they who have to be attended first. The urgent need is for curative medicine.

What are some of the efforts being made to improve the planning of the health care system?

About half way through our stay, for instance, questionnaires were sent from Maputo to teach people to think about the need for better public health. They included questions such as: Do you have a market in your area? How many vendors operate there? What is the water source? Have you tested it? Have children attending school been given chloroquine? Most people had not considered these issues before. It got them asking: “What does it matter where the water comes from?” It was a good beginning.

What role do organizations such as the Organization of Mozambican Women (OMM) and the Dynamizing Groups play in promoting health care?

At the health post we worked with OMM. Before the actual clinic sessions began we would do health education on the various causes of illnesses. This worked out very well. Party committees are now replacing the dynamizing groups, so in the hospital, for instance, the party will be responsible for work previously carried out by the dynamizing groups. When these committees mobilize the people they are very effective. For instance, the World Health Organization provided the supplies and technicians for a vaccination campaign. But it was the dynamizing groups alerted by Ministry of Health representatives, that mobilized the population to make it a successful campaign.

Day to day the achievements of the dynamizing groups may not be all that spectacular, but they have strong roots. They are particularly effective in mobilizing the people, whether it’s an education campaign, a clean-up campaign, a census or a vaccination campaign.

What input did both patient and health care workers have into the health care system?

There is a povo-hospital, hospital-povo program (people-hospital, hospital-people).

Every week we would have meetings in a different neighborhood to, talk about the work of the hospital and give the people a chance to voice their criticism. Although many people turned out for the meetings, they did not talk very much. They were shy, mainly because they do not have the knowledge to be able to criticize medical practices. But they did criticize aspects that affected their daily lives—such as the hours of the maternity clinic.

The workers were more ready to talk than the patients. But there were problems here too. People were used to functioning under the whip for hundreds and hundreds of years, and change cannot come about overnight. It was not that people were not working hard, they did not have the experience in planning or follow-up. They have not worked in this way before. So when things went wrong, there was a tendency to blame an individual rather than trying to understand what the system was and how it could be changed so that people could work better.

Were there adequate supplies of medicine?

Most of the time we had sufficient supplies. Prescriptions were free and provided to out-patients when they came for a consultation, which was seven and a half escudos (US 25c). The prescription was prepared at the time of the visit, and we made sure that the patient took the first dose immediately so he or she understood how it should be taken.

But sometimes the problems relating to drugs were more complex than shortages—resulting rather from workers not being able to adapt to the new system. For instance, on one occasion, a patient suffering from meningitis died because the hospital had run out of penicillin, the drug the doctor had prescribed. No one would say anything, so the doctor presumed the patient was getting the penicillin. If he had been told, he could have switched to an alternative drug.

Did people in rural areas have access to health care?

Yes, definitely. Inevitably once every day or two, a truck load of the sickest people you can imagine would be brought to the hospital, having been referred by a rural health post. The plan to set up a network of regional health posts throughout the country was becoming a reality. These health posts provided primary level health care and meant that problems such as diarrhea and malaria could be treated right there instead of rushing patients to the hospital. The health workers would refer those patients too ill for them to treat to the hospital.

The development of these health posts Continued on page 28
A-Bomb or Not A-Bomb?

by a Special Scientific Correspondent

On September 22, 1979, a United States Vela satellite flying high over the South Atlantic Ocean recorded a twin flash of light on two special sensors known as bhangmeters. On the 41 previous occasions when satellites of this type have recorded similar flashes, they have all been traced to the explosion of a nuclear weapon. Once information concerning the satellite observation was leaked to the press, South Africa and Israel became the leading candidates on the list of countries which could have been responsible for the explosion.

In late October, an embarrassed Carter Administration began to fumble with its latest hot potato. Clearly if a bomb had been exploded and the US could not verify the explosion, then there was a deficiency in the present monitoring system. If there are holes in the monitoring system, the Soviet Union might find them and conduct unseen tests. The non-proliferation treaty would be seriously undermined if it was demonstrated that a nuclear weapon test could escape detection. Worse still, if a bomb had been exploded by South Africa or Israel, or both acting together, then future US military, technical, and economic support would be embarrassing at the least.

President Carter's Science Adviser, Frank Press, convened an illustrious panel—headed by Jack Ruina of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—to make an independent review of the government’s data. Meanwhile more data was coming in. In mid-November a report from the Institute for Nuclear Science in Wellington, New Zealand, claimed to have found fallout in rainwater samples which could be associated with an August explosion. This claim was withdrawn later. Two observers, Richard Behnke and Lewis Duncan at the radio observatory at Arecibo, Puerto Rico, added more data. They saw a wave travelling in the ionosphere from the southeast at a speed that suggested it was caused by an explosion which should have been seen by the Vela satellite. Overwhelmingly, ripples in the ionosphere in the northern hemisphere travel from north to south. This was not the first time a satellite had seen something suspicious in the vicinity of South Africa. On August 6, 1977, the Soviet Union informed the United States that a Soviet satellite had observed what looked like a nuclear weapon's test site in the Kalahari Desert near South Africa’s border. An alarmed United States changed the orbit of two of its satellites to take a closer look and confirmed the Soviet report. Immediately the United States and its major European allies warned the South Africans not to conduct a nuclear test. Apparently, the structures were then disassembled and South African's Prime Minister gave assurances to President Carter that South Africa would not develop a nuclear weapon.

In January, 1980, Frank Press was planning to release a report stating that the Vela data was "technically indeterminate." This was the finding of Ruina's panel of nine scientists. After this judgement was reported, the panel continued its work and on July 15, 1980, a sanitized version of their report was released. The report concluded that Vela probably did not see a nuclear explosion and that the flashes of light probably arose when the satellite was hit by a meteoroid.

However, on June 30, 1980, the Naval Research Laboratory had submitted a 300 page study to the White House claiming that Velas did see a bomb. Seventy-five people had been working for months on the report. The strongest evidence in this report came from hydro-acoustic signals received at the right time and from the right direction. Nothing like it was seen in the thirty days prior to September 22, nor in the following thirty days. The only comparable signals were received during recent French nuclear tests in the Pacific.

"The crux of the matter," said one analyst who believes the Vela data, "is that the White House is afraid that if this [Vela report] is true, its nuclear non-proliferation policy would be shot to hell. So they said, let's convene a panel and ask them to find a technically feasible explanation other than this, because we don't want to have to face it."

But it looks as if they do.
Botswana After the Death of Sir Seretse

The death of Botswana's President Sir Seretse Khama in July removed from the political scene the man who had been president throughout Botswana's fourteen years of independence. His political shrewdness was demonstrated in his ability to maintain a stance opposed to apartheid while his landlocked country's economy was heavily dependent on South Africa transporting almost all its imports and exports.

Khama allowed thousands of political refugees from apartheid to live in his country, while, at the same time, up to sixty thousand Batswana work in South Africa. Botswana also supported the Zimbabwe liberation struggle as a member of the front line states and was active in advancing the concept of economic union between Black southern African states. In short, Khama followed a cautious, conservative approach to opposing South Africa and Rhodesian minority rule, but he did indeed oppose it and this is to his credit.

Overall, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), with Seretse Khama as president of the party's government and Quett Masire as secretary general of the party, followed policies aimed at building a non-racial society, thus strengthening a private enterprise economy and preserving Western-style parliamentary democracy. Littly policy change is expected now that Masire is president.

Long time friends and political confidants, Masire and Khama had more than age in common. Both were wealthy farmers with overseas educations. Together they founded the BDP in 1962 and led the country to independence in 1966. But Khama, who was the hereditary leader of the Bamangwato—some eighty percent of Botswana's 700,000 population—commanded great rank and file loyalty, while Masire has no political base of its own. He has always filled one of the four appointed seats in parliament, having never won an election.

Masire faced no strong contenders for his position when Khama died and the next election is four years away. There was speculation, however, that the transition would not have been as smooth had Ian Khama, the former president's 27-year old son, been three years older. Thirty is the minimum age for holding presidential office. The younger Khama is a commander of the fledgling army, the Botswana Defense Force, and chief of the Bamangwato people.

Conservative Economics

As Minister of Finance and Development, Masire has played a key role in shaping the Botswana economy since independence. Attempts have been made to diversify the economy by encouraging investment—much of it foreign—in export sectors such as beef production and copper, nickel and diamond mining. These have paid off by producing comfortable foreign exchange earnings, but with little benefit to the general population. Copper, nickel and cattle exports have all declined recently, with only diamond sales expanding—to reach a total of $143 million in 1979, comprising 51 percent of that year's earnings. The development plan now in effect and the 1981-86 plan both call for channeling a larger portion of mining-generated funds into agriculture and industry, but to date results are minimal. While cattle-related investment has been made, half of the cattle are owned by only five percent of the people, and a third own no cattle at all. A severe drought has further devastated rural subsistence farmers, making them dependent on food and water distribution from the government.

The structure of the economy is still heavily agricultural and fundamentally distorted by its traditional role as a labor reserve for South Africa's gold mines. Four-fifths of Botswana are engaged in agriculture, but no more than ten percent of all rural households grow enough food to subsist. As a result most families still depend on migrant labor income to supplement farm earnings. An estimated 25 percent of adult males are normally away working in South Africa at any one time.

While South Africa draws labor from Botswana, it has also begun to intervene in the economy in other ways. Much of the recent development originates from South African capital, which holds substantial financial interests, for instance, in all of the large mining ventures in Botswana. The South African firm De Beers has invested $31 million in the diamond mine at Orapa—what amounts to an 85 percent share, De Beers is also reported to be negotiating a stake in a new larger diamond mine at Jwaneng. These investments are in addition to the substantial interest which the South African firm, Anglo-American, holds in copper and coal mines in Botswana.

In general, government control over these major economic projects is often only in the form of a minority shareholder, with little government control or government benefits from these resources.

A 1976 study by the Botswana govern-

Paddy Colligan is a long time supporter of African liberation.
ment estimates that 59 percent of the Gross Domestic Product goes to non-civilians.

Finally, it is important to remember that Botswana is totally landlocked, and has, until recently, been surrounded by white-minority controlled states—Namibia, South Africa, and Rhodesia. All goods, both imports and exports, had to transmit one of these territories. As a result, ninety percent of Botswana’s trade is with South Africa. For instance, despite its abundant agriculture, Botswana only produces sixty percent of its grain needs and imports the rest from South Africa.

Peace in Zimbabwe

Masire may be fortunate in this respect: he takes over the job of president at a time when the effects of Zimbabwean independence are just being felt. The war in Zimbabwe spilled over into Botswana on many occasions and its end is doubly welcome. Budget surpluses projected for 1978 and 1979 as well as funds earmarked for development were all diverted to pay the increased cost of security and to help assure basic requirements of life for the millions of refugees flowing into Botswana from Rhodesia and South Africa. By the end of the war some 25,000 Zimbabweans were living in tremendously overcrowded refugee camps in Botswana.

Most of the refugees have now gone home leaving the Botswana government breathing easier. Although the Rhodesians never bombed the Botswana camps as the did in Zambia and Mozambique, they dropped leaflets on the camps towards the end of the conflict threatening punishment if the refugees did not return to Rhodesian control. Botswana sought to protect itself from attack by a policy which restricted action to the provision of humanitarian aid to those fleeing its racist neighbors, while carefully avoiding interference in the liberation struggles themselves. The government required the same neutrality of action from those to whom it offered a haven. Refugees have been prosecuted for violating the prohibitions against political activities and carrying arms. Such prosecutions were not much more popular among the Botswana public than among the refugee community itself, but were seen as essential by the state.

The greatest significance the victory in Zimbabwe holds for Botswana is the possibility it presents for weakening South Africa’s grip on the region. Front line state leaders have already begun meeting to map out a strategy for lessening the dependence of the free nations of southern Africa on the Republic of South Africa. (see Southern Africa, June 1980). It will be up to Quett Masire to take advantage of these new possibilities.

Problems Ahead

Despite its relatively stable record to date, Botswana will have some serious problems to confront in the near future. Only nine percent of the population are wage earners, with another thirteen percent living on the money sent them by relatives working in South Africa. The future for young people looks grim, with a high birthrate, South Africa cutting back on the workers it is recruiting in Botswana, and conditions in the countryside are so bad that thousands are leaving it yearly to seek work in the towns. Ironically, several of the new development projects are capital intensive and will do little to meet the work needs of the mass of the people.

Political Opposition

The left in Botswana is weak but the persistent economic problems and frustrations affecting the people have tended to increase its potential constituency. The Botswana National Front, which considers itself Marxist, has called for a harder line against South Africa, for economic disengagement from the Republic, diversification of investments, and more jobs. Its appeal has primarily come from among students and workers, and although its strength may be greater than its two seats in parliament would suggest, it is not likely to offer a serious challenge to the BDP in the electoral arena in the near future. Masire, speaking for the government before last year’s elections, issued a warning that if the opposition forces resort to violence, they will be outlawed.

The government has already used surprising force to put down the occasional demonstrations and strikes of the last decade. While such heavy-handedness cannot solve the fundamental problems, the Botswana government appears convinced that at least it will keep additional ones from emerging.

Crystal-ball gazing is a dangerous occupation, but it seems most likely that policy makers in Botswana will continue to attempt a gradual loosening of the most obvious dependency bonds to South Africa, without turning away from South African capital, or Western models of development.

OAU Calls for Sanctions

The seventeenth summit session of the Organization of African Unity was held in early July in Freetown, Sierra Leone. A major goal of the conference was to strengthen and implement previous resolutions for complete sanctions against South Africa.

Among resolutions that were unanimously accepted was a plan for closer coordination with OPEC in attempts to prevent oil from reaching South Africa. Edem Kodjo, secretary-general of the OAU, said,“Oil sanctions probably represent the most effective form of external pressure that could be exerted.”

An OAU delegation, with representatives from Algeria, Angola, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, will be sent in September to a United Nations Security Council meeting in New York to press for an oil embargo and for other sanctions. OAU representatives also registered an appeal for complete Western corporate withdrawal from South Africa, pointing out that among other considerations, much of the corporate technology and equipment available to Pretoria is also used for military purposes.

South Africa, for admission to the OAU. Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, addressed the summit, and called for total mandatory sanctions as well as for African support of Western anti-apartheid groups.

The summit renewed its pressure for Namibian independence, and condemned South African invasions into Angola.

Again this year, the delegates were unable to approve a request by the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic—(Western Sahara), for admission to the OAU. Although a majority of OAU countries recognize the Republic, the organization as a whole stopped short of granting recognition. Instead the organization established a committee to study the question in the hopes of beginning a dialogue between Morocco and the POLISARIO—(The Saharan People’s Independence Movement).

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Operation Turkey
Continued from page 10

In search of employment opportunities, many rural men migrate to urban areas or go to work on contract in South African or domestic mines. On average roughly half of the adult male tend to be absent from their homes in the countryside at any one time. This leaves mostly women, children and old people to work the peasant holdings.

Poor land quality, over-crowding, the lack of infrastructure, and the absence of agricultural and nutritional education have all contributed to the precarious nutritional state of the rural population. Added to these difficulties, the local climate is subject to regular periods of drought. For the last two years the country has received insufficient rainfall, which of course has had its greatest impact on the poorest farmers who are often unable to survive the losses sustained from such disasters.

It was into this already bleak context that the minority government interjected its infamous Operation Turkey. And the program of food destruction was not limited solely to the population of Zimbabwe. The settler regime also mounted systematic military assaults on the food supplies and transport networks of neighboring countries.

In the week before the opening of the Lancaster House conference last fall, Rhodesian troops subjected Mozambique’s main food-producing area, the fertile Limpopo Valley, to an intensive three day attack. This area is the country’s main producer of rice, a staple in Mozambique, as well as tomatoes, yams and other vegetables. The Rhodesians damaged the Aldeia De Barragem dam which controls the irrigation system for the Limpopo agro-industrial complex, killed many civilians, and destroyed major food storage areas (the attack was timed to coincide with the harvest). The invaders also inflicted heavy damage to the Chokwe-Maputo road which is a main artery for transporting food to the rest of the country.

The country most severely crippled by the white-minority’s food denial strategy, however, was Zambia. The Rhodesians had made periodic raids into Zambia in the past but during the Lancaster House talks their aggression was stepped up considerably. On October 12, Rhodesian commandos demolished three bridges, among them the Chambeshi river bridge of the Tanzania railway linking Zambia to Dar es Salaam. This railroad is a main artery for Zambia’s crucial copper exports as well as general imports including food. During the month of November a total of ten more bridges were either destroyed or severely damaged. This not only crippled the imports and exports of other neighboring countries to and from Zambia, it also left the Zambians with only one source of vital maize imports, namely the 150 tons being transported daily through Rhodesia and then across the Victoria Falls railway bridge into Zambia. The Muzorewa government later halted this traffic completely.

The Rhodesians were trying to force the front line states to pressure the Patriotic Front into making greater concessions at the peace conference. They were assisted in this effort by South Africa, Britain and the United States who helped to tighten the vice on the front line states by: 1) providing assistance to UNITA rebels in Angola who keep the Benguela railroad from operating at maximum capacity; 2) holding up food shipments or purposefully delivering them to ports which were known to be congested; and 3) making false promises for large amounts of future reconstruction aid. This was in addition to the West’s long-standing policy of providing the white-minority regime with weapons and financing.

With the war over and ZANU having shown its overwhelming popularity at the polls, the glare of Western media attention has subsided. But the damage wrought by the white supremacists and their international backers will linger for many years to come.

Prime Minister Mugabe and several of his top ministers have repeatedly stated that development of the rural areas, so long neglected, will now receive top priority. One of the first very acts of the new government was to make across-the-board cuts in the sales tax and eliminate it entirely on basic food stuffs like margarine, cooking oil, tea and sugar. In order to offset these reductions in government revenues, taxes on alcohol and cigarettes were increased substantially and a more progressive income tax was implemented. Measures like these, however, can only put a small dent in the general food problem plaguing Zimbabwe and neighboring states.

The war-torn areas of southern Africa are in need of billions of dollars in development aid for irrigation projects, rural electrification, machinery, technical training, livestock and fertilizer. When the United States government was intent on getting a settlement from the contending parties at the Lancaster House talks, US officials were promising amounts of aid hundreds of times greater than what has actually been forthcoming. But even billions of dollars in assistance would not necessarily alter the fact that multinational corporations and white farmers have life and death power over millions of people in southern Africa.

Throughout the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe the political and material assistance of progressive forces around the world played a significant role. The Zimbabweans are the first to point this out. Some of the political activists I spoke with in Zimbabwe, however, expressed doubts as to whether or not Western solidarity groups would maintain previous levels of support now that the ‘exciting’ part of the struggle is over and the nitty-gritty process of reconstruction has begun.

In order to rebuild their economy, to care for the wounded and hungry, to get out from under the multinationals, and reduce their inherited economic links with South Africa, the Zimbabweans will need more international solidarity than ever before. Whether the necessary support will be forthcoming remains to be seen.

Mozambique Health
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has been uneven, but each year more classes were training people to work in the posts. We found teaching health workers one of the more exciting things we did.

What is the government attitude toward traditional healers?

There is a strong attempt by the government to organize the correnderos—traditional healers—and to try to analyse their herbs to understand what drugs are in them and which are really effective. Some herbs have medical value, others only psychological. Even though it is FRELIMO policy to incorporate the correnderos as much as possible, people are confused. Those who are being trained in modern medicine, such as nurses, feel they should dissociate themselves from traditional healers. Other people will often use both, and in some instances this can be helpful. Some of our patients suffering from asthma get a lot of relief from different herbs the correnderos provided. But others died because they had first gone to correnderos and did not get penicillin in time. The correnderos charge a lot—200 to 300 escudos per visit—compared to the seven and one half escudos for a hospital visit.

One correndero in our area was a tubercular-looking man. He looked so sick that we couldn’t believe that anyone would have gone to see him. But there were always long lines of people waiting to see him. At the same time, he himself would get his anti-TB medicine from the hospital!

What is your view on the future of the Mozambican health care system?

We feel very optimistic. For the first time it is slowly moving out of the cities to the majority of the people in the rural areas. But the problems are grave. The health problems are tied up with the lack of availability of food, and now the entire area from the bottom of Mozambique to Ethiopia is suffering from drought. This makes Zimbabwe so crucial at this point because it can produce food. With the development of Zimbabwe’s economy so that food production and industry expand, it is possible to create a regional economic structure that is not dependent on South Africa.
Namibia Edges

Continued from page 19

vading Angola and hitting hard at SWAPO positions, Pretoria hoped, as it had hoped two years ago after its attack on Cassinga, to provoke SWAPO to withdraw its support for the UN plan.

But SWAPO did not reject the plan. In fact Walheim's conciliatory letter of late June, while South African troops were still fighting SWAPO guerrillas inside Angola, was as good as any indication that SWAPO was committed to the UN plan.

Of course, South Africa had other reasons for invading Angola. Even if SWAPO did not reject the settlement, South African military officials could reason that an all-out attack on SWAPO positions would cripple SWAPO activities in northern Namibia for some time.

France's underlying need for Namibia's Ovamboland, thus giving the French more time to establish itself in that SWAPO-dominated region.

But even observers inside Namibia have their doubts that such a strategy will work. Certainly it hasn't given Pretoria enough confidence to permit the elections it's planning for November to be extended to Ovamboland.

After those raids into southern Angola, South African military officials claimed that they had knocked out SWAPO's headquarters in the area. "South Africa's claim is completely untrue," replied SWAPO in a sharply worded statement issued in London.

"South Africa's gross exaggerations regarding SWAPO's losses are reminiscent of the claim in 1978 to have destroyed SWAPO militarily," the state said, referring to the 1978 South African attack on Cassinga in southern Angola. Several months after that attack SWAPO escalated its own attacks into northern Namibia.

"The regime's pretentious statements are indicative of its need to make its own losses of men and armaments acceptable to its supporters and to boost the waning morale of its armed forces illegally occupying Namibia," the statement said.

In support of its statement, SWAPO unleashed in the last days of July another major attacks on the Namibia border town of Rucanana. In a letter of protest that could hardly be taken seriously, the South African foreign minister complained that the attacks were "violent and unprovoked" and said that they came at a time when serious discussions were taking place for a peaceful settlement.

And while all these recent events have been unfolding, as if to further illustrate South Africa's underlying need for
To assert that sexism is the cause of weakness in St. Martin's Press, New York.

Does "development" make things worse for Third World Women? It is a pertinent question for those concerned about southern Africa, where each newly liberated country has to grapple with the mixed blessing of aid for development. And the question which Barbara Rogers suggests a strong affirmative answer, at least for the vast majority of women, who are engaged in subsistence agriculture.

Assistance projects generally, she concludes, have directly or indirectly deprived women of their traditional rights in land; forced them to work longer and harder in order, even so, to live less well; excluded them from opportunities to break out of their increasing poverty; and deprived them of traditional male support and cooperation and even, in many cases, subjected them to new forms of male domination.

Rogers' conclusions are based on her own academic studies and inspections of assistance projects in Africa, supplemented by reports on similar projects elsewhere. Her conclusions are supported by an impressive array of data and examples and have been independently confirmed—indeed, enlarged upon—by the observations of scholars and others living in Third World countries.

To what does Rogers attribute these unfortunate effects of "development"? Primarily to sexism on the part of the development "planners." She uses this term to include all the experts and officials, at headquarters and in the field, of international, multinational, and national aid programs.

This is her strongest point, which is argued thoroughly. It is also the source of weakness in The Domestication of Women. To assert that sexism is the cause of "development's" negative effect on women is to infer that all one must do to make "development" positive is to remove sexism.

But institutionalized sexism is not the only functioning "ism." Development is taking place within a world economic order and it is an analysis of the complex interconnections between sexism on the one hand and political and economic systems on the other that is missing. One wishes therefore that the author had devoted early and clearly what planners mean when they use the term "development," how development varies under different national schemes, and how sexism functions in different schemes. Nor is it clear what the author understands genuine development to be.

Nevertheless, the data collected and lucidly described is indeed impressive. Virtually all these planners are men, the author hardly needs to remind her readers. (But she does have a section explaining why they are men—and the reasons, too, are sexist.) More specifically, they are Western men. These men carry their own discriminatory concepts and attitudes into the programs they devise or administer. They also project their vision of women’s "natural" role in their own society onto the societies they intend to assist.

To the extent that national and local officials of developing countries also have a say in designing or implementing projects for their countries or communities—thus falling within Rogers’ definition of planners—they tend to be Westernized men, adopting the aid givers’ attitudes or delighted to profit through furthering them.

The numerous ways in which planners differentiate between men and women, always to the detriment of the latter, are spelled out by Rogers in the substantial second part of her book. The planners start with such obvious conduct as the failure to consult women as to their needs and wishes in designing and carrying out assistance programs. Given the preference of Western planners to proceed solely on the basis of their own "expertise," without consulting any of the objects of their beneficence, this is perhaps not so surprising. Anti-female discrimination becomes unmistakable, however, when the planners disregard the women who will be affected by projects and, instead, seek the opinions of husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers about women’s interests. They consider it natural and sufficient to consult male relatives only, even when the men do different work (e.g., weaving or smithing rather than farming) or live away from home most of the time as migrant laborers.

Equally obvious is the restriction of women to education and training for typical "women’s work"—childcare, nutrition, sewing, etc.—and their exclusion from courses in science, mathematics, economics, and administration. When such blatant discrimination has been exposed, the response of planners has frequently been to institute special course for women only. At the same time, however, planners, lest they be accused of doing too much for women, tend to continue to exclude women from courses originally set up for men.

Along with these—and many other—forms of discrimination, the author devotes a chapter to the less well known discrimination employed in "quantitative techniques." Included are such practices as: classifying women statistically as "farmers' wives" even when they are engaged in farming and their husbands do other work; treating labor done by women as less valuable than that done by men (e.g., an hour of work done by women deemed a fraction of an hour of work done by men); ignoring subsistence farming (largely carried on by women) in computing national income; and automatically classifying a man as "head of household."

"While these kinds of discrimination may sound formal rather than substantial, Rogers points out that they may have extremely serious consequences for the affected women: Thus classification of a subsistence farmer as a farmer's wife may make her ineligible for agricultural training, credit, or machinery. When cost-benefit analyses affect decisions about projects, programs, and policies (as they do increasingly), data which undervalue or ignore women's work necessarily lead to inadequate planning and poor projects. And when Western land registry officials list land as belonging to the head of the household, a woman may be deprived of her traditional rights in land because a male was classified as head of the family.

Indeed, a primary and almost universal problem stressed by Rogers is women’s loss of land use rights and other rights in land as a result of the planners’ attempts to force Third World societies into Western molds. Another is the need for projects designed to make subsistence farming easier and less time consuming for women rather than creating additional chores for them to do in their "spare time." (They already spend more time working outside the home than men do.) By contrast, income producing projects from which the women could keep the profits would give them an alternative to subsistence farming or enable them to purchase simple machinery to lighten the burdens of farming.

The Domestication of Women is feminist literature, and it is correctly read as an attack on discrimination by Western men against women. It is also, however, a serious study of assistance programs for developing countries. It should also be read by everyone interested in the latter aspect of its dual nature.
"Everything Is Taken Away"

To understand apartheid it is not sufficient to speak of segregation and discrimination. At its core, apartheid has economic origins and serves economic purposes. In the film we see the removal of people to the "homelands" from land their families have lived on for generations. The elaborate rationalization for this forced removal is illustrated by actual footage of the "independence ceremonies" for Bophuthatswana. But why is this sham promoted?

The economy of South Africa needs skilled workers in greater numbers than are now available, and it needs a vast reservoir of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Rare shots of the Black bourgeoisie illustrate the effort to create a Black labor aristocracy which will be allied with whites and share a common interest in moving the Black unemployed to the rural sector and keeping those already there from joining the pool of unemployed now in urban areas.

The vast majority of Blacks are thus forced to live in poverty. Says one victim of the removals, "We were poor before, but never this poor." Poverty makes for a docile labor force that will accept almost any job at any wage. This desperate need for work to feed hungry families forces men to accept contract labor, and children to work on white farms for no remuneration except food.

"Everything is taken away by force"

The force necessary to police this system is formidable. The film shows scenes of urban workers fleeing the police. A pass raid at the squatter town of Crossroads shows police with attack dogs scattering a crowd. Footage from a South African Defence Force film demonstrates the extent of the apartheid regime's power and why opposition to the regime is so difficult.
NEW LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA SPARKS INTERNATIONAL PROTEST

News that South Africa is planning to borrow $250 million from a consortium of international banks, including the New York based Citibank, is sparking fresh protests from anti-apartheid groups in the US and Britain. The consortium is headed by the Dresdner Bank of Germany, and includes Citibank, Barclays Bank, and The Union Bank of Switzerland.

The loan follows closely on the heels of a $66 million bond issue floated by the South African government in June, the first since the Soweto uprising in 1976 (see related special report in this issue). Taken together, the two transactions represent an aggressive return by South Africa to the international credit market. They also reflect efforts by the South African government and international financiers to “rehabilitate” South Africa’s status as a loan market after years of protest by anti-apartheid groups. As part of that effort, South Africa has announced that the new loan will finance housing and education projects for the country’s twenty million Blacks.

In London, Terry Shott, on behalf of End Loans to South Africa (ELTSA) dismissed the claim as “utter nonsense.”

“This money,” he said, “is being raised because of the vast expenditure on strategic projects like/military hardware and energy projects.” ELTSA will protest the loan to Barclays Chairman Anthony Tuke.

In the US, George Houser, executive director of the American Committee on Africa, formally protested Citibank’s involvement in the loan group. In a letter to Citibank Chairman Walter Wriston, Houser noted that Citibanks participation in the loan marked the end of the bank’s decision in 1978 not to loan money to the white minority regime. He stated "We have difficulty not seeing this 1980 loan as one more effort on the part of your bank to uphold the white minority government of South Africa.”

The National Council of Churches has already telegraphed the heads of eleven major US banks urging them not to participate in the loan. Council President William Howard predicted “A chorus of opposition to this loan from churches, universities, unions, the Black community, and congressional leaders, and many institutional investors.”

SOUTH AFRICAN GOLF TEAM TARGET FOR OCTOBER DEMONSTRATION . . . A South African golf team has been invited to participate in the Eisenhower Cup Golf Tournament at Pinehurst North Carolina on October 3 through 6. In response, a coalition of groups, including the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society (ACCESS), has called for a national protest.

The invitation takes on special significance in light of the decision by the International Golf Association in July to drop its insistence that South African teams be included in the World Cup golf tournament, thereby virtually guaranteeing South Africa’s exclusion from the prestigious tournament.

Dennis Brutus, a leading figure in the campaign to isolate South African sports teams from international competition, termed the Pinehurst invitation “a violation of human rights,” and joined in the protest call. ACCESS reports that only one golf course in South Africa permits racial play, while there are two reserved for Blacks only.

UCLA STUDENTS DIVEST . . . The Board of Control of the Associated Students of the University of California at Los Angeles, voted on July 18 to transfer more than $25 million in student funds from banks with operations or investments in South Africa. The affected banks are the Bank of America and the Security Pacific Bank. All six student members of the ten member board voted for the divestment motion, while all four non-student members voted against the measure which will cost the student fund about $40,000.

According to the student members of the board, “the passage of the resolution established the priority of social responsibility over monetary gain. [We] perceive this action as part of a statewide and ultimately worldwide campaign to break United States links with South Africa.”

DETROIT GROUP ASSAILS RACISM IN MEDIA . . . A local Detroit television station, WKBD, has come under fire from a Black activist organization for showing old “Tarzan” movies. The group, the All-African Liberation Committee, charges that the films “project unrealistic and negative images of Africa and African people, resulting in the destruction of the self-concept of thousands of Black youth.” A meeting with station manager George Williams and the AALC produced only a letter from the station stating that they considered Tarzan “suitable programming” and that the films would continue being broadcast.

SWAPO TO TOUR US . . . Final arrangements have been set for SWAPO’S upcoming tour of the US. Co-sponsored by SAMRAF, the South African war resisters group, the tour will feature Ellen Musiala, a member of the central committee of the SWAPO Women’s Council. Accompanying her will be SAMRAF member Michael Morgan, a deserter from the South African army.

The documentary film “Generations of Resistance,” a chronicle of resistance to apartheid in South Africa, will also be available for viewing as part of the tour’s presentation.

The schedule for the tour is as follows:

- Oct. 5—Oct. 9 Boston, Mass.
- Oct. 20—Oct. 21 St. Louis, Missouri.
- Oct. 27—Oct. 28 Minneapolis, Minn.
- Nov. 1—Dec. 1 West Coast, including Washington, Oregon and California.
- Dec. 1—Dec. 6 New York City, NY.

MANGE SENTENCE COMMUTED . . . Faced with growing domestic and international pressure over the death sentence given to captured African National Congress guerrilla James Mange, the South African government has, on appeal, reduced his sentence to twenty years. Mange was convicted of treason in November last year and sentenced to death, although he was not accused of causing any injury, or even of firing a single shot.

In New York, a spokesperson for the ANC reiterated their demand that captured guerrillas be treated as prisoners of war under international law. The ANC attributed the reduced sentence to effective international pressure, a desire on the part of South Africa to appear “reformist” and official embarrassment over the “completely illegal” way in which the trial was conducted.

Correction

In our July/August 1980 issue, on the Action News and Notes page, we inadvertently implied that the National Black Agenda was a single organization. In fact, the National Black Agenda is a coalition of Black organizations.
ZIMBABWE'S CONSIDERABLE mineral deposits will constitute a major source of foreign exchange for the new nation. Booming prices and the promise of increased production guarantee mining's key role in the reconstruction efforts of the country.

Recently released production figures confirm that the export of minerals, in violation of United Nations imposed sanctions, provided the mainstay of the Rhodesian economy. The goal for the upcoming year is to increase mineral output by one-third over the 1979 sanctions breaking figures.

Gold was Zimbabwe's leading export, accounting for twelve percent of total exports in 1979. Production rose to 386,000 ounces last year, up from a low of 335,000 ounces in the mid-seventies, but still below the pre-UDI average of 550,000 ounces a year.

Asbestos was the second-highest earner among minerals, bringing in $98.9 million last year compared to gold's $121 million in sales.

Nickel and chrome production was also a vital support for the Rhodesian regime during the sanctions period, securing badly-needed foreign exchange. Zimbabwe's chrome exports are of special concern to Western governments, since the Soviet Union and South Africa are the only other significant producers. During the first two months of this year alone, chrome sales exceeded 1979's total of 542,000; whether this is a reflection of production per se or the liquidation of stockpiles is uncertain. Continued performance at this level would make chrome the third-leading export.

Nickel production soared during the sanctions period and the metal now numbers among the top ten exports. The outlook for silver and cobalt is also bright. Like other minerals, with the exception of coal, they are produced largely for export.

The United States has successfully concluded agreements granting US forces permission to use military facilities in three east African nations—Oman, Kenya and Somalia. The move illustrates the growing strategic importance that US government planners are placing on the Indian Ocean. The agreements, the last of which was concluded with Somalia in late August, are part of American efforts to provide forward support facilities for the new 'Rapid Deployment Force.'

In exchange for the use of military facilities, the US is providing military and economic aid. For Somalia, the State Department has proposed $20 million in military sales credits this year and larger amounts for next year. Kenya is reported to be receiving about $65 million in return for an as yet unspecified "additional access" to Kenya's ports. The US also signed an economic cooperation agreement with Oman in August.

The precise nature of the agreements is complicated by host country hesitancy to become too closely identified with the US. And the hosts are not the only ones hesitating. The agreement with Somalia is also facing some opposition in the US Congress.

THE MOZAMBIQUE INFORMATION Agency reports that the country's second set of elections since independence were held between April 7 and June 4 of this year.

Speaking at the sixth session of Mozambi-