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The administration's plan for white minority guarantees in Namibia has also run into a solid wall of opposition from SWAPO, Namibia's liberation movement, and African and Third World nations, who view the new plan as an effort to sabotage the internationally accepted UN plan.

**Feds Seize UNITA Arms**

US Customs agents arrested six men and confiscated over $1 million in automatic rifles, grenade launchers, and ammunition destined for South Africa on May 12. The bust, the largest illegal weapons haul in US history, closed an elaborate three-week police scam set to snare British arms dealers John Parks and Peter Towers, along with the four man crew of their chartered Austrian aircraft.

Using a fake Sudanese end-user certificate, Parks and Towers applied to the US Office for Munitions Control for an export license for the arms: 1,150 M-16 automatic rifles, 100 grenade launchers, several hundred pistols and over one million rounds of ammunition.

The smugglers were then contacted by undercover police posing as arms dealers who told Parks and Towers that they could arrange for the purchase of the weapons. Incredibly, Parks and Towers bragged to agents that the weapons were actually destined for Johannesburg, under a contract from Armscor, the South African government owned armaments company. Federal agents received a $1.5 million letter of credit drawn on a Dallas bank, and later captured a purchase order for the weapons from Armscor.

As the London Observer noted on May 17, the South African army has no use for the weapons. South Africa is already self-sufficient in small arms, and uses a different type of ammunition than does the US. But South Africa would have reasons—political reasons—for equipping their UNITA allies in Angola with US arms.

Any evidence of US military involvement against the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO and the Angolan government would almost certainly wreck any prospect for negotiating an internationally accepted formula for Namibian independence. It would also greatly internationalize the war, bringing the US and South Africa into an explicit military and political alliance.

As US customs agent Charles Conroy noted after the arrest: "The arms were destined for Johannesburg, but they could have gone anywhere from there. The UNITA forces in Angola are the obvious place for the final destination."

**Georgetown Was Never Like This**

Chester A. Crocker, Ronald Reagan's nominee for under-secretary of state for African affairs, took to the road in April to sell, or at least explain, the administration's policy toward southern Africa. His mission took him to South Africa, the front line states, and Nigeria among other places. He also stopped in London for a session with the Western Contact Group, still fishing for a negotiated Namibia settlement.

Overall, Crocker's first diplomatic outing was less a triumph than a disaster. He began his trip at a hostile capital, Washington, DC, where arch conservative Senator Jesse Helms is blocking Crocker's official confirmation to the state department post. Helms agreed to postpone his slow roast of the hapless Crocker for the trip, but only on condition that the inquisition resume after his return. This left Crocker in the awkward position of being an "unofficial" of the United States government.

The Zambians met him at the airport with a pick-up truck, and he had a short, nasty conversation with Mozambique Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano ("not pleasant," Chissano put it later).

He was snubbed by the heads of state of Mozambique, Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa, all of whom refused to meet him. He angered South Africa's Black majority by refusing to meet formally with African opposition leaders and he angered South Africa's white minority by declining to characterize SWAPO as a Soviet-controlled terrorist band. He then promptly infuriated SWAPO by refusing to meet with SWAPO representatives while in Angola.

Crocker's attempt to dump the UN independence plan for Namibia in favor of enshrining white political power and property rights in a constitution drawn up prior to national elections was firmly and bluntly rejected by the front line states and Nigeria. He couldn't even sell the idea to his Western allies, who insisted on reaffirming their support for the UN plan at the conclusion of their talks in London.

It was only fitting that Crocker's most enthusiastic welcome should come from some fellow citizens at the airport in Tanzania. Sure enough, they were protesters.

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**Pik Botha Visits US**

South African Foreign Minister Roelof (Pik) Botha spent two days in Washington May 14 and 15, meeting Secretary of State Alexander Haig, and President Ronald Reagan. Botha's invitation is part of the Reagan's administration effort to improve relations with the white minority government. The talks focused on new Western proposals for a negotiated end-to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

Botha spent two hours with Haig and other state department officials on Thursday discussing details of the new plan which calls for written guarantees for the territory's white minority in advance of internationally supervised elections. The present plan, UN resolution 435, calls for the election of a constitutional assembly first, to draft a constitution and install the independent government.

Botha responded favorably to the proposal, saying it offered "a real possibility of moving ahead" on Namibia's independence. Constitutional guarantees would "allay fears and anxieties" among the tiny white populace, he said. Botha also received assurances from Haig that the US has "no deadlines" for Namibian independence.

The South African official did reportedly add one new condition to Pretoria's list of requirements. According to Botha, South Africa is no longer willing to accept a UN military presence, as called for in resolution 435, in Namibia. The Reagan administration has not yet commented on this latest demand.

On Friday, Botha spent 25 minutes with President Reagan in what was described as a "friendly" meeting by a White House press officer. Botha ducked reporters at the White House and the president's office would issue no statement on the content of the discussion.

The foreign minister's visit has raised a storm of protest in the US from Black and liberal groups who oppose Reagan's public overtures to the racist country. (See "Action News and Notes" section in this issue).
For over five years the front line states formed a solid rear base for the liberation struggle in what was then white minority ruled Rhodesia. Zimbabwe's neighbors came together as a single group to both support and at times cajole and pressure the national liberation movements during the crucial years of the liberation struggle.

Front line support was not always consistent and the alliance did suffer some serious divisions. But the fact that a group of states with such widely divergent internal policies could come together to challenge white minority rule is in itself something of a miracle. The lessons to be learned from these struggles have important implications for the coming struggles in Namibia and South Africa. The article below discusses some of these implications and is an attempt at providing a basis for further analysis of the front line states and their past and future role in Southern Africa.

by Carol Thompson

For many years Tanzania, Zambia, and the Mozambique liberation movement FRELIMO provided the Zimbabwean liberation movements with bases within their territories, from which to train soldiers and launch armed attacks against Rhodesia's white minority rulers. But it was not until 1974 that these countries came together to form the “front line states” alliance, a body that would successfully support the Zimbabwean nationalists until independence in 1980.

Economically impoverished and struggling to survive, the independent African states surrounding the white-ruled colony were anxious to discuss the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian situation. South Africa, however, was unyielding in its support of Ian Smith's white minority ruled regime in Salisbury.

Following the April 1974 coup in Portugal and the subsequent independence of Portugal's former African colonies, Pretoria's uncompromising support of Smith began to wane.

"Southern Africa has reached a crossroads where it has to choose between peace or escalation of strife," South African Prime Minister John Vorster declared in October 1974. "The toll of major confrontation would be too high for southern Africa to pay." In what was to become known as his "Voice of Reason" speech, Vorster responded pragmatically to the changed situation. He refused to back the Portuguese settlers in Mozambique who were attempting a coup against FRELIMO in the transitional government and, instead, opened discussions with the nationalist movement.

Front Line Alliance Born

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda replied publicly to Vorster's speech with his own call for reconciliation of the Rhodesian situation. Tanzania, Botswana, and
FRELIMO joined Zambia at that point to form the front line states alliance in October, 1974 (Angola would join in 1976 following its second war of liberation).

The front line states achieved their first victory with the release of the Zimbabwean nationalist leadership after ten years in Rhodesian jails. Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole and others met with the front line leaders in Lusaka, Zambia on December 7, 1974. The release of the nationalists was more a product of negotiations between Kaunda and South African Prime Minister Vorster than of front line state policy as a whole. But that single action did establish the principle of Zimbabwe’s neighbors negotiating as one body.

The initial agreement between the front line states and Ian Smith called for an immediate cease-fire before negotiations could begin. In addition, the front line group asked the divided nationalist forces to unite in order to present a unified front across the negotiating table from Smith. Reluctant to join forces, the Zimbabwean nationalists, under great pressure from the front line states, finally came together in Lusaka under the umbrella African National Council (ANC) with Bishop Abel Muzorewa as their leader.

Conflict with the Liberation Leaders
The imposition of a cease-fire, however, put the front line leaders in conflict with the Zimbabwean African National Union. ZANU had been escalating its guerrilla war and felt that a cease-fire would only allow Smith time to maneuver. More importantly, they opposed an umbrella ANC. In prison, the executive council of ZANU had grown increasingly uneasy with ZANU president Sithole’s vacillating stance on armed struggle and had chosen Robert Mugabe to replace Sithole as ZANU’s president. The front line states, however, fearing that such a decision could lead to more divisions in the liberation movements, continued to recognize Sithole.

It was a full nine months before the disagreement over the cease-fire was resolved and Ian Smith sat down with the nationalist leaders at Victoria Falls. The August 1975 conference lasted only a few hours, breaking down over many issues, but the Victoria Falls conference did teach the front line states one lesson: Smith had indeed used the cease-fire to build up his army. He had had no intention of negotiating seriously.

The front line states never again asked the guerrillas to stop the war for talks. They adopted instead a dual policy of armed struggle with negotiations. And this principle has become front line policy for Namibia.

Attempts to unify the Zimbabwean liberation forces, however, were to become a constant source of tension between the nationalists and their front line supporters. This tension came to a crisis after the assassination of ZANU national chairman Herbert Chitepo. Chitepo was killed in March 1975 by a bomb planted in his car in Lusaka. Zambia formed an international commission to investigate the killing and the commission blamed Chitepo’s death on rivals within the party. Zambian authorities moved quickly, prosecuting and jailing over 1000 ZANU cadres. ZANU officials assert that Kaunda was simply using the commission to weaken the armed struggle in order to promote a compromise with Smith. And the movement’s leaders are convinced that Rhodesian agents planted the bomb.

The leadership crisis within ZANU that was precipitated by Chitepo’s death and the rejection of Sithole’s leadership was not resolved for over a year. The jailed ZANU members were not to be released from Zambian prisons until the Geneva Conference in
October 1976.

After the assassination of Chitepo, ZANU guerrillas in Mozambique and Tanzania formed a third force and accepted Mugabe's claim to the leadership. When the imprisoned ZANU leaders were released from Zambia they too joined Mugabe. The newly united and revitalized party under Mugabe formed a coalition with ZAPU under Nkomo, called the Patriotic Front, in order to present a unified position at the Geneva conference.

Critics say the front line states were too slow in recognizing the legitimacy of Mugabe's claim to leadership of ZANU. Others accuse the front line leaders of abandoning the ANC too quickly, leaving little hope for the nationalists to promote peaceful change.

Antagonism Over Unity

The quest for unity in the leadership of the liberation movements was to become a consistent theme for the front line states. They have shown themselves very intolerant of in-fighting among the liberation forces. The Patriotic Front's inability to unite its military forces was a constant irritant for the front line leaders as the many fruitless attempts to promote joint commands attest.

As the current liberation struggles intensify inside and outside Namibia and South Africa, splits will probably emerge. The front line states will respond by insisting on a united front approach to negotiations.

Unity of the Frontline States

The front line states alliance was not formed solely to promote unity among the liberation forces, however, but also to forge a united policy among themselves. The alliance includes states which are transforming relations of production to build socialism (Angola and Mozambique) and those which are state capitalists (Botswana and Zambia). These basic economic differences often provoke divergent political views of liberation.

Tensions erupted at many levels: preference for one liberation group over another, different degrees of support for continuing the armed struggle, willingness to compromise with minority rights, ability to withstand attacks from Rhodesia and South Africa.

Zambia's role in the front line states alliance illustrates some of these internal contradictions. With its economy dependent on the international copper market, and on Rhodesia and South Africa for transport links to the sea, Zambia is the weakest link in the chain of front line states. Despite these problems, Zambia still closed its border with the white minority regime and offered sanctuaries for ZAPU guerrillas.

This contradiction between economic realities and political goals, however, is reflected in Zambia's vacillating role as a front line state. Kaunda, without informing the other front line states, supported secret talks between Nkomo and Smith (1975 and 1978) in an attempt to find quick compromises and an early end to the conflict.

And in the midst of an intensifying conflict, five years after Zambia closed its border with Rhodesia, Kaunda abruptly opened the border in October 1978.

Zambia was the moderate, the compromiser, yet it did continue support of the armed struggle. Its crucial support for ZAPU would not have been possible without the diplomatic unity forged from the front line differences. More important, it was a unity backed by economic support like the Tazara railroad through Tanzania.

Goals of the Front Line States

The goals of the front line states remained quite limited. In spite of accusations by the West, they were not supporting socialism in Zimbabwe. They were supporting national liberation. The relations of production, they knew, would be decided by the Zimbabwean people both during and after the armed struggle. The front line states' interest included majority rule; the guarantee of sufficient power to the state to take national control of resources; and support for parties not beholden to South Africa for achieving power.

Critics of the front line states, and friends trying to warn of disaster, have amply recorded the limitations of the alliance: weak and dependent economies trying to resolve political antagonisms. From many perspectives it seemed impossible for it to last, but it not only endured but won a major victory in Zimbabwe. How could it succeed? Is there a basis for future success in support of an independent Namibia and South Africa?

Front Line Success: Past and Future

These limited goals were also important for the successful diplomatic isolation of the white minorities and their allies in the international community. Much has been made by the Western press of the diplomatic brilliance of Lord Carrington at the Lancaster House negotiations in late 1979. Much more could be said of the diplomatic brilliance of the front line states over the five years of its support for Zimbabwean liberation.

The front line leaders moved from thwarting Kissinger in his shuttle diplomacy for neocolonialism through the intricacies of the Anglo-American proposals right to Lusaka, where British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher felt the full intent of the front line states' diplomatic isolation at the Commonwealth Conference. Faced with united Commonwealth antagonism, she

South African Prime Minister John Vorster (right) with Rhodesian leader Ian Smith.
West Vetoes Sanctions Vote

by Joan Draper

In late April, African nations frustrated by years of diplomatic maneuvers and mountains of re-written plans for Namibia's independence, mounted a diplomatic offensive at the United Nations. On April 30 that offensive culminated in a series of UN Security Council resolutions calling for trade sanctions against South Africa.

Although these measures were vetoed by the US, Britain and France, the vote laid bare the political protection that South Africa enjoys from the Western powers. The African states displayed impressive political strength as they outmaneuvered Western efforts to forestall the vote and forced the three nations to acknowledge the limits of their support for Namibian independence. Olara Otunnu, Uganda's Ambassador to the UN, boiled the issue down to a matter of simple morality, the morality of helping five million white people oppress more than twenty million Blacks, in Namibia and South Africa.

For fifteen years South Africa and the West have successfully blocked enforcement of every UN Security Council resolution demanding an end to the apartheid regime's illegal occupation of the mineral rich territory. For the past five years the UN has worked with SWAPO and South Africa to resolve virtually all substantive differences to a settlement plan (originally proposed by the Western powers). But the fundamental question remains whether South Africa will opt for an internal settlement that excludes SWAPO and continues the war in Namibia and Angola, or pursue an international solution based on UN supervised elections.

Since the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 in 1978 which still forms the basis for an internationally accepted independence, the African states have been pressing unsuccessfully for a fixed timetable for the territory's independence. The African group has pushed the West to flex their economic muscles and put more pressure on Pretoria for a settlement. The failure by the international community to impose total economic sanctions, the Africans argue, has permitted the continuation of apartheid and delayed Namibia's independence.

After the breakdown of the Geneva talks on Namibia's independence plan, in early 1981, the African diplomatic offensive went into high gear. Working through the OAU Liberation Committee, they quickly got the endorsement of the Non-Aligned Ministerial Summit and the Organization of African Unity's Ministerial Council.

In March, the General Assembly went into session to consider sanctions. Ten days later 114 countries condemned South Africa for blocking the Namibian settlement and asked the Security Council to implement trade sanctions. No country voted against the resolution, although 22, including most Western countries abstained.

When the Security Council finally opened on April 21, there were twenty foreign ministers seated around the table, including Zimbabwe's Witness Mangwende, Angola's Paolo Jorge, and Tanzania's Salim Salim. At the same time, US Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker was meeting in London with the Western powers. Crocker was arguing that the Western five should back constitutional guarantees for the white minority in Namibia in advance of elections and independence.

Back in New York, the US proposed a delay in the Security Council vote until the Western foreign Ministers could meet in Rome on May 4 to consider, among other things, Crocker's constitutional proposals. When African states pressed Western powers to spell out just exactly how they expected Africa's fast colony to achieve its independence, Contact Group representatives began to speak in vague terms of the UN plan as a "solid basis for transition" to a free Namibia that might require "strengthening." "Strengthening," however, was never spelled out clearly by US Ambassador to the UN Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick. Kirkpatrick would only say the plan called for "a continuing search by way of negotiations, for an internationally acceptable agreement that will bring independence, stability, and democracy to Namibia."

The idea wasn't rejected out of hand by African delegates, but they were skeptical of the proposed delay, especially given the Reagan Administration's warm words for South Africa and its ambiguous attitude toward the UN plan. The Africa group also argued that the idea of a "Lancaster House" solution for Namibia was something Pretoria adopted when they realized that the South African backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance would not win in free and fair UN elections, and that SWAPO had overwhelming support among the people of Namibia.

When nothing more specific was put forward by the West, African delegates pressed for the sanctions vote. A last minute compromise that would have delayed the confrontation another month was put forward by council president Noel Door of Ireland, but rejected by Third World delegates, suspicious of the US commitment to early independence for Namibia.

Nine nations, including China, East Germany, Mexico, Niger, Panama, Soviet Union, and Tunisia voted for all four Security Council resolutions, requiring United Nations members to stop all trade, including oil and arms deals, with South Africa, to end travel to that country, and break diplomatic ties. Ireland and Spain voted to cut off oil and arms, but abstained on the attempt to halt economic and diplomatic relations. Japan voted only for the weapons embargo, abstaining on other measures.

But it was the vetoes of Britain, France and the United States that drew the most criticism. When US Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who alternately dozed and glared at the delegates during the debate, explained her vote on the basis that "sanctions are an ineffective means of influencing policy," Uganda's ambassador Otunnu asked, "If sanctions do not work, why would three permanent members of this Council cast the heavy weight of their vote against measures which do not work?"
CIA: The Company Gets the Boot

by Jeanne Raissler

Maputo—Mozambican security forces exposed a CIA spy ring operating out of the US Embassy in the capital city of Maputo and expelled six CIA agents on March 4. Goals of the operation were to collect information on, among other things, President Samora Machel, the army, the military, and economic cooperation between Mozambique and other countries. The aim, according to the Mozambicans, was to weaken and destabilize the young socialist government.

The CIA also passed the information on to the South African security forces and intelligence agencies. This information directly aided South Africa in carrying out the commando raid into Mozambique on January 30, in which thirteen refugee members of the African National Congress (ANC) were killed.

CIA officials in Mozambique cultivated a sociable image, feigning an eagerness to learn about the country and its people. This image was augmented with liquor, gifts, and money.

According to the Mozambique Information Agency and additional information supplied by the US based magazine CovertAction, the six CIA agents expelled on March 4 were:
- Frederick Boyce Lundahl was deputy chief of station for the CIA in Lusaka, Zambia, prior to his posting to Maputo in June 1980. Although formerly listed as embassy secondary secretary, he was the CIA chief of station.
- Louis Leon Ollivier, deputy chief of station; also listed as second secretary. Ollivier was known to have participated in a CIA officer's course in Washington in 1975.
- Arthur F. Russell, telecommunications specialist at the Maputo station.
- Patricia Russell, wife of Arthur Russell and a secretary in the CIA station who is listed as secretary of the embassy's political section.
- Karen Lundahl, wife of Frederick Lundahl and Ginger Lee Ollivier, wife of Louis Ollivier, though not official embassy personnel, were also ordered to leave the country because "they took part in support operations," according to AIM.

The US State Department in Washington responded to the charges by claiming that two senior members of Cuban counterintelligence had instigated the expulsions after having "forcibly detained" one of the six diplomats, Ollivier. A State Department spokesperson also pointed the finger at the staff of the CovertAction Information Bulletin, who he charged, were in Mozambique at the time of the expulsions and had identified the six agents. The CovertAction staff, however, have confirmed that they were not in Mozambique when the expulsions occurred.

The State Department attack comes at the same time that congress is attempting to enact legislation specifically designed to close down CovertAction and other publications that identify, through public documents, the names of American CIA agents operating in foreign countries.

The pending legislation, according to many lawyers, is a direct attack on the First Amendment rights of US citizens to publish information obtained from public sources.

Mozambique has been aware of the CIA's activities since 1978, thanks to citizens like Captain Canheiro Goncalves who informed the security forces when agents approached them. Goncalves, an air force officer and FRELIMO militant, was "recruited" in 1976 by CIA special agent Walter de Andrade. In reality, Goncalves worked as a counterspy for Mozambique for three years, feeding the CIA worthless information while keeping tabs on their operation.

Among the Mozambicans who were befriended by CIA agents in the course of diplomatic functions and social encounters, were some who became informers for the agency. In several cases, these were longtime FRELIMO militants who occupied high-security military posts.

The exposure of the spy ring provided fresh evidence of the close relationship between the US and South African security forces. In the month before the attack on the ANC houses in Matola, the Mozambicans noted that the CIA was working feverishly to gather information on the organization in Mozambique.

Although this particular spy ring was exposed, US policy aimed at support of Pretoria and subversion of southern Africa's socialist states gives every reason to believe that other agents remain undiscovered, and that more will arrive. When Minister Cabeco was asked whether the CIA has been totally destroyed in Mozambique, he smiled grimly and acknowledged, "A luta continua!"
The New Life in Mozambique

This hand-driven water pump, in the Motanje communal village, Zambezia province, is an improvement over hauling water from the river—a distance of up to fifteen miles for some.

Stephanie Urdang spent four months in Mozambique investigating the role of women in the new society. She traveled extensively throughout the country with members of the Organization of Mozambican Women. In her first two articles, Urdang looked specifically at women’s lives in the new society and how their lives had changed since independence. Below we continue this series with an article about communal villages.

by Stephanie Urdang

Maputo—"By the end of the decade against underdevelopment," the young district responsibility for communal villages told me, "all the people of our district will be living in communal villages." The young responsible was referring to the government’s recently declared national development plan.

We were sitting on a high plateau overlooking a spectacular vista of rolling hills and open bush country in the district of Mossuril, Nampula province in the north of Mozambique. Rows of neat mud-brick houses lined a wide thoroughfare to the side of our group, marking the center of Vida Nova (The New Life) communal village.

I asked my companion how many people lived in the district’s villages? About 5,200 people now live in eight communal villages, and another eight villages are under construction, he said. And the total population of the district is 66,155. The population of Vida Nova alone had been given to me earlier in the day as 2,300. This meant that close to half the communal village population lived here, with the balance distributed among seven villages.

Yes, my informant said, noting the surprise on my face, the population of the other villages is very small, between 300 and 500 in each. In other words, nine percent of the district’s population had been mobilized in five years. Could the remaining 91 percent possibly be mobilized in the coming ten? I thought it unlikely, but it is a process, begun shortly after independence, that is earnestly underway in Mozambique.
Mixed Results

The call to move into communal villages is a major focus of the political mobilization carried out among the peasants—some ninety percent of the population.

The emphasis is on encouraging the peasants to move of their own free will after they see for themselves the benefits of communal living.

Once the decision to build a communal village is made, the state provides various forms of assistance to clear the land and build houses. It provides pumps for water; health and education facilities; and district resource officers to assist in the organization of the new villages through the election of people's assemblies, village tribunals, structures for the party, and for the women's and youth organizations.

My travels through five provinces of Mozambique—Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambezia in the north, and Gaza and Maputo in the south—took me to a number of communal villages. I assumed that the villages the Mozambicans chose for my visits were the more successful, but even here the results varied considerably, not only from one province to the next but from one district to another.

The differences between the villages were often related to physical conditions, the organization of social life before independence, the level of political commitment of residents and district political workers, and the dynamism and skill of local FRELIMO mobilizers. Agricultural potential as well as such natural phenomena as floods and drought also seemed to be a factor.

Cabo Delgado and Gaza

The two provinces with the highest concentrations of communal villages are Cabo Delgado and Gaza.

Cabo Delgado in particular had been extensively liberated during the war, and the people there were strong supporters of FRELIMO.

The village of Litamanda where I spent two days and two nights is one example. Many villagers had been active during the war, as soldiers, ammunition carriers and cooks for the guerrillas. To escape reprisals from the Portuguese, they had moved into a village under cover of the forest.

For the first time in their lives, they had begun to elect their own political representatives, and to benefit from schools and from elementary medical services. To move to new and improved physical and material conditions once the war finally ended was not a major step for people already mobilized.

For the two-thirds of the country not liberated, however, the call to move to communal villages was met with a range of responses, from excitement and joy to skepticism and mistrust. The people wanted to know how communal villages would make concrete improvements in their lives. But until people moved into the villages, it was difficult to show such concrete improvements.

In Gaza, the initial move to communal villages was slow and driving through the drought-stricken Limpopo valley, it was surprising to see so many communal villages and easy to forget the reason for their rapid growth. But the residents of the villages have not forgotten the reason. And in song and story they keep alive the memory of the great devastating flood of 1977.

A Mobilization of Water

"It was a mobilization of water," one resident told me laughingly. "The water didn't wait to ask if we wanted to leave or if we wanted to stay. We just had to run out of our homes." Fast action by the new government, with the help of international disaster relief aid, saved many lives as helicopters plucked people from the roofs of their huts and out of trees. Taken to higher ground, they were encouraged to re-establish their lives in communal villages.

The people living along the Limpopo are no strangers to flooding. The oldest could still remember a flood from their childhoods and the callous indifference of the Portuguese authorities who left thousands to die, and then refused to allow the survivors to move to safer homes. "We were going to turn into fish," one person chuckled, "We lived in so much water."

The humane response of the Mozambican government in 1977 had the side effect of showing the people that FRELIMO's victory was bringing a transformation of their society.

In contrast, in the northern provinces—such as Nampula and Zambezia—many people still lived isolated lives. One hut here, another a kilometer away, the next may be eight kilometers away. The closest relative might live eight or ten kilometers distance, and the closest source of water is often twenty kilometers away. There is little cohesive community life, and family links, while felt to be important, are diminished by distance. Before independence, eking out a living as well as paying taxes was a constant battle. A battle that was compounded by the constant round-ups for chibala—forced labor—to work on roads or Portuguese owned plantations.

Those who have moved to communal villages speak warmly about the improvement in their lives now that they live in a close community. But people still remain isolated and especially those who know no other form of social life still find it hard to make the move. The distances and the isolation hamper political mobilization.

Despite the many problems still dogging the communal village ideal, the villages themselves are the best form of encouragement for those still hesitating. Many of the improvements promised by FRELIMO and the state are visible, and provide a stark contrast with their former lives.

What is the new life—the vida novo? Coaxing letters from calloused hands. A rural literacy class in Mozambique.
what—that is promised those who heed the call to communal living? It is too early to equate the “new” life with the “good” life. In relative terms, certainly people’s lives have improved. But the people’s Republic of Mozambique is too young, its people too poor, its development problems too vast for all its people’s needs to be met. My visits to communal villages enabled me to appreciate that in many important respects, however, life is decidedly better for the Mozambican peasant.

Three areas given particular attention in the development program of the new government are education, health, and agriculture. (For a discussion of some of the changes experienced by one village, particularly the impact on women, see Stephanie Urdang’s article in Southern Africa, January/February 1981.)

**Fighting Illiteracy**

My visit to Gaza coincided with the yearly examinations for the literacy and adult education classes. Walking through one large village on a quest for photographs, I came across two classes, sitting under adjacent trees, each with about forty students. Their ages ranged from twenty to over sixty, and women outnumbered the men.

Buried in their own concentration, they sat on the ground or on horizontal tree trunks—generally the women on the ground, the men on the trunks. Except for the infants and young children that gurgled and cried, or crawled over their mothers’ laps grabbing at pencils, the class was silent. All their energies were directed towards the problem they had to solve. On a faded blackboard was written 378 minus 49.

Over 90 percent of Mozambicans cannot read or write. Education was simply not provided by the Portuguese colonial administration, except for the privileged few that could afford the fees. A major emphasis of the new government is in education at all levels. And so in the new villages there are schools for the young and literacy classes for the old.

And the parents were also learning: Hands that for years had wielded hoes and machetes and pestles, were stiff and calloused from heavy manual labor, were now clutching pencils and being coaxed in the delicate task of forming letters and numbers.

Progress is slow. Literacy is taught in Portuguese the only possible choice and for most of the rural population, Portuguese is a foreign tongue. Classes are held after many hours in the fields, and students arrive tired and hot, with little time to prepare their lessons. Those who do persevere, and an impressive number do, wear proud smiles when they talk about their new skills.

An old woman came up to me in one village and carefully showed me that she could write her name. For her it was a miracle.

[A brighter future for this young resident of a Mozambican communal village.](image)

**Building the Health Services**

Western press reports soon after independence in 1975 seemed to take delight in projecting disorder in the country and imminent failure of the “marxist” regime. One oft-cited indicator of disaster was the collapse of the medical system.

What the critics failed to point out was that virtually all the Portuguese doctors who had provided such excellent medical care for the whites during the colonial period had fled the country. Nor did they explain that the medical resources that were available were being spread throughout the country so that people in the rural areas were receiving medical exams for the first time in their lives.

This reorientation of the health services is very evident now and while the shortage of doctors and nurses persists providing medical care to every Mozambican is a government priority.

Each communal village has a health post, with one or two health workers trained in the basics of preventive medicine, first-aid, and mid-wifery. While they cannot treat the really sick, they can recognize the need to arrange for a resident to go to a clinic or hospital when necessary. A foreign doctor in Zambezia told me that he had trained a number of mid-wives from communal villages, and that in these villages the number of mothers or children who died during birth had dropped significantly. The mid-wives can only handle straightforward deliveries, but they are able to spot complications and get the mother to the hospital immediately.

The newly completed “hospital” of a village I visited in Zambezia was the pride and joy of the villagers. It was a simple and well-constructed cement and brick structure, with two rooms and a large covered veranda. The only permanent building in the village, the hospital, was built with the help of the district’s department of public works. Next, I was told they are planning a maternity clinic of similar size where the women of the village will come to give birth to their babies. This, more than any of the other new facilities—the water pump, or the consumer co-operative—evoked for the residents a sense of real progress. The availability of health care, and the cement and brick construction materials were an important symbol.

**Feeding the People**

Agricultural co-operatives within the communal villages are visualized by the government.

continued on page 30
What Oil Embargo?

by Tony Cavin

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' embargo on oil shipments to South Africa has led to attempts by multinational corporations to hide their oil shipments to South Africa, but has been ineffective in ending those deliveries. A report released in early March by a Netherlands-based research organization goes a long way towards explaining why the Republic has been able to continue to receive these vital oil shipments.

According to the report, South Africa—which relies on oil imports for over 75 percent of its petroleum requirements—can obtain all the oil it can use, provided it is willing to pay a premium price.

The Shipping Research Bureau, which issued the report, was established in 1980 by two Dutch organizations—the Holland Committee on Southern Africa and the Working Group Kairos. Both organizations have been active in anti-apartheid work for over ten years and they have both been involved in a campaign to force the Netherlands government to enact an oil embargo against South Africa. The Bureau was established to help monitor how oil was reaching South Africa after all the members of OPEC had signed the oil embargo in early 1979.

Unable to obtain reliable data on exports of oil to South Africa, the Shipping Research Bureau instead monitored the travels of oil tankers. Researchers found that between January 1979 and March 1980, 150 tankers called at South African ports. This period was chosen because prior to January 1979 South Africa received most of its oil from pre-revolutionary Iran (one of the first acts of the new Islamic republic was to cut off those shipments). While acknowledging that some of the 150 tankers may have visited South Africa simply for repairs or to take on bunker fuel, the authors identify 23 tankers which visited under “particularly suspicious circumstances.” The particularly suspicious circumstances indicate that while records are not available, those tankers were most likely to have delivered oil to South Africa.

At least 25 percent of Oil Needs

Twenty of the 23 “particularly suspicious” tankers had a capacity greater than 200,000 tons and thus, the report points out, “if these 23 tankers did all deliver a full cargo of oil to South Africa they would have delivered nearly five million tons or 25 percent of South Africa’s oil needs during the fifteen months in question.” South Africa’s total oil imports for 1979 are estimated by the report to have been about 15 million tons.

Perhaps as interesting is the report’s conclusion that fifteen of the most suspicious tankers came from countries which do participate in the oil embargo against South Africa.

Ten of those fifteen departed from OPEC countries, the other five from Oman. The report is careful, however, to note that governments are not always aware of the apparent oil deliveries to South Africa.

Of the remaining eight ships, five sailed from Brunei, and three from the Netherlands Antilles. Both are territories which have semi-autonomous colonial status and are controlled by Britain and the Netherlands respectively. It is not clear where the oil that was shipped from the Netherlands Antilles originated. The colony is the location of a major crude oil transshipment facility owned by Shell and other international oil companies.

The Shell Oil Company either owned or chartered over half of the 23 tankers.

In addition to the 23 prime suspects, the bureau identifies another 127 tankers that sailed to South Africa during the period in question. While acknowledging that some may not have been making deliveries of oil, the Shipping Research Bureau states, “The fact remains that any one of these 150 tankers could have been delivering oil to South Africa and quite a number of them—in addition to the 23 highlighted—have done so.”

Possible Sanctions

In compiling this report the authors have attempted to present information in a way that could help organizations interested in implementing oil sanctions against South Africa. The Bureau points out that 38 of the 150 tankers that went to South Africa...
Clark Amendment Vote

The legislative debate over repeal of the Clark Amendment reached the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees May 12 and 13. The measures adopted by both committees, however, fell short of the Reagan administration's desire for the total repeal of the amendment.

Members of the Senate body who supported retention of the amendment, which prohibits covert US activity in Angola, held sufficient votes to block repeal within their committee. The prospect of a certain defeat on the Senate floor, however, moved the group to press those Senators supporting repeal to accept a compromise amendment sponsored by Senator Paul Tsongas (D. Mass.).

The Tsongas amendment removes restrictions on aid to UNITA forces opposing the Angolan government, but prohibits aid unless the president reports to the committee why such actions are in the US's national interest. The amendment also requires evidence of "substantial progress" toward an "internationally accepted settlement" on Namibia. Supported by committee Chairman Charles Percy (R. Ill.), the amendment passed 10—2; Nancy Kassebaum (R. Kan), head of the Senate subcommittee on Africa, opposed the measure, following the White House position advocating total repeal.

The House Foreign Relations Committee acted on the Clark Amendment without debate, voting 19—5 to retaia the amendment. If the House and Senate committee votes are supported by the full House and Senate respectively then a House-Senate conference committee will have to reach a compromise between no repeal and repeal with stringent conditions. Observers expect congressional supporters of the current ban on military assistance to South Africa to gain encouragement from the Administration's setback in the Senate committee.

- Under the sponsorship of the Institute of American Relations and three other foundations, a "non-governmental" conference will be held May 26 in Buenos Aires to explore the possibility of a South Atlantic alliance between the US, South Africa and several South American countries. The conference, a revival of the idea of an alliance of right-wing nations in South America and southern Africa, will be attended by General Vernon Walters who is a close friend of US Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

- Andre Holland, a former leader in Ian Smith's racist white Rhodesian Front party is challenging that party's monopoly over the guaranteed white seats in Zimbabwe's parliament. He is forming a "Democratic Party" as an alternative for white Zimbabweans who want to "offer back the hand of genuine friendship extended by Mr. Mugabe."

- Mayor of Soweto David Thebehali narrowly escaped assassination May 6 when a hand grenade placed under his car exploded just after he drove off. Many residents of the Black township view Thebehali as co-opted by his leadership of the government-approved Soweto Community Council.

- SWAPO leaflets containing the SWAPO constitution, distributed in the Tsumeb area 120 miles south of the Angola-Namibia border, have provoked a South African Army order banning all vehicle movement in the Ovambo-speaking region near the border where SWAPO commonly operates.

- Adopting recommendations of the South Africa Federated Chamber of Industries, Reinald Hofmeyer, executive director of Barlow Rand, one of South Africa's largest industrial conglomerates, announced a policy of recognizing all unions, whether registered or not, as long as the union is representative and possesses an "acceptable" constitution.

- During 1980, designated the "Year of the Worker" by the ANC, membership in South Africa's Black trade unions rose from 68,000 to 184,000 by the year's end. Reflecting the rise in labor activity, industrial unrest reached its greatest intensity to date; 207 strikes or work stoppages occurred, up over 100 percent from the previous year. The number of worker-days lost increased from 67,000 in 1979 to 175,000 in 1980.

- Residents of Tembisa, Evaton and other Black townships who joined mass meetings to protest rent increases of 33 percent by the South African Administration Board were attacked by police. The police attacks sparked off riots in other townships in the Johannesburg area over the weekend of April 5. Hours after the meetings were broken up, police detained several leaders of community organizations and AZAPO under the wide-ranging Criminal Procedures Act.

- G. B. Helman, US Ambassador at Geneva to United Nations agencies, has called for South Africa's return to the International Labor Organization. South Africa withdrew from the ILO in 1964 to avoid expulsion by that body.

- The resignation of Alec Erwin, the white secretary general of Fosatu (Federation of South African Trade Unions) was announced in early April as the labor organization underwent a basic "reorganization of [the] head office."
Regional breadbasket. Zimbabwe's record maize harvest bodes well for the cautious economic policies pursued by the government since independence.

by Jim Khatami

Salisbury, Zimbabwe—Buoyed by the onset of peace and the end of international sanctions, Zimbabwe experienced a remarkable economic turnaround in its first year of independence. The economy rebounded from a zero rate of growth in 1979 to an eight percent growth rate in 1980. A similar expansion is expected in 1981. At the same time, Prime Minister Mugabe's conciliatory approach to the country's white minority has ensured that only a minimum of economic disruption has accompanied Zimbabwe's transition to majority rule. Zimbabwe's year of economic recovery, fueled by record commercial agricultural production and booming mining industry profits, was crowned by a surprisingly successful conference of donor nations held in Salisbury during the last week of March.

Manufacturing, already the single largest contributor to the national economy, grew 15 percent last year. And despite the nearly 44 percent increase in imports since independence, the new nation has maintained a strong international trade surplus of about $100 million.

The minimum wage law enacted in January 1981 has helped bring about a six percent increase in real wages for the lowest paid urban workers. And the recently completed Riddell Commission study on wages and incomes is expected to bring further pay hikes for African workers in every sector.

Jim Khatami is a free-lance journalist who recently returned from Zimbabwe.
**Donor Conference Success**

The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) held in Salisbury from March 23-27, raised about $1.45 billion in economic aid from 31 nations and 26 international agencies. That sum, half of which comes in the form of soft loans, and half in outright grants, represents aid Zimbabwe will receive over the next three years. It brings the total amount of foreign aid committed to Zimbabwe since independence to about $2 billion.

The ZIMCORD conference was the fulfillment of Western promises of aid made to the Patriotic Front alliance during the settlement talks in 1979. At that time the United States and Great Britain agreed to finance the purchase of white owned farmland for redistribution to African farmers in exchange for constitutional guarantees against nationalization.

The largest contributors to the ZIMCORD conference included the World Bank, which announced a $100 million loan for machinery and raw material imports, and Great Britain which added $55 million to the $252 million previously committed.

**US Aid, US Pressure**

The Reagan administration, after considerable internal debate, pledged $75 million in aid to Zimbabwe for 1981—the same figure that had been proposed by the outgoing Carter administration. Peter McPherson, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, also committed the Reagan administration to seek $75 million in aid for Zimbabwe over the next two years, thus bringing the entire U.S. aid package—including earlier commitments—to $225 million. United States aid, however, will depend on annual congressional approval.

Foreign capital, mostly British and South African, controls at least 66 percent of the Zimbabwean economy. And foreign capital controls an even larger percentage of the new country's productive sectors: mining, industry, and commercial farming.

Thus, while the new government is inheriting a relatively developed economy, it is also taking charge of an economy with strong ties to the Western economic orbit. The new nation has already joined those two pillars of the Western world economy, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and has signed the European Economic Community's Lome II agreement.

**Marxism or “New Deal?”**

Despite Zimbabwe's close economic ties to the West, Mugabe has continued to define himself as a Marxist and Zimbabwe's development path as socialist.

**Oilig the Economy**

The inability of investments of the donor nations of France, Zimbabwe's oil refineries to turn the petroleum facility have prompted some to characterize Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe and certain elements of the government as either Marxist or “New Deal” socialism that emphasizes expanded social welfare payments to the country's long-neglected African majority while leaving the basic capitalist structure of the economy essentially intact.

Taken as a whole, the economic policy of the Mugabe government appears to be a pragmatic strategy of quickly moving to extend some control over the most important sectors of Zimbabwe's economy—through existing governmental and quasi-governmental institutions wherever possible, without precipitating a damaging flight of international capital and skills. The government is also concentrating on heightening Zimbabwe's self-sufficiency by channeling and encouraging further private investment in the country's relatively advanced and largely white-owned commercial farming and manufacturing sectors.

At the same time, the government is making massive investments in rural infrastructure, establishing Zimbabwe's first free compulsory education system for nearly one million students (a figure expected to double by 1990) and free health care for Zimbabweans earning under $375 per year, virtually the entire African population. These changes, coupled with government mandated minimum wage laws and training programs in management and labor skills, are prerequisites for any successful challenge to white settler and foreign capital domination of Zimbabwe's relatively advanced economy.

The total cost of the program is expected to be $6.4 billion with the bulk of international assistance to be invested in the first three areas.

Part of Zimbabwe's post-war recovery program has already been completed. About 250,000 external refugees have returned to their homes from Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. Moreover, many of the estimated one million internal refugees who were forced into protected villages or driven into the cities have also returned to their homes. An emergency food distribution program for 600,000 people is scheduled to be phased out this month when food from Zimbabwe's record maize harvest starts to become available.

Nevertheless, much reconstruction remains to be completed. Approximately 2,000 of the 2,500 primary schools in African reserve areas of the country were either
seriously damaged or totally destroyed. Many of these schools have yet to be reopened. Similarly, the war resulted in the loss of over one million cattle, or one-third of the national herd, the destruction of roads, bridges, water holes, cattle dips, government buildings and vehicles, hospitals, and clinics. With prompt delivery of the promised international aid, the Mugabe government hopes to complete most of the reconstruction effort in 1983.

Land
The bulk of the money raised at the donors conference—about $1.2 billion—will be used to finance a land settlement and rural development program. Land is a particularly emotional issue in Zimbabwe because the grossly inequitable distribution of land along racial lines was the central feature of the British colonial system in Zimbabwe. Under British rule, Zimbabwe’s land was divided roughly in half. The areas of the country with the best soil, adequate rainfall and easy access to roads, railroads, and urban markets were cleared of their African population and set aside for European settlers. The rest of the land was largely set aside as African reserves or Tribal Trust Lands. Over four million of the 7.5 million Black Zimbabweans are crowded on the TTL’s which are characterized by poor soil, low rainfall, inadequate roads, and a lack of services. Average per capita income in the TTL’s is still only about $40 a year, compared to a white urban worker’s average income of nearly $18,000.

At present there are about 4,300 white farmers in the European or commercial farm sector. In 1979, these farms accounted for about 75 percent of Zimbabwe’s agricultural output and about 95 percent of crop and stock sales. But even these figures are deceptive as most of the commercial farm output is produced by a relatively small number of large farms, many of which are controlled by transnational corporations. The remaining farms, a handful of large corporations hold a strong position.

Under the land resettlement program, the Mugabe government has made it clear that the basic land ownership pattern in Zimbabwe will be left intact, and that productive commercial farms will not be touched. The plan calls for the resettlement of 18,000 families from the TTL’s on about 1.1 million hectares of abandoned commercial farm land purchased by the government. About 15,000 families were resettled last year under this program.

Although a few model cooperative farms have been established, the ongoing settlement program is based on individual arable allocations with communal grazing rights on non-arable land.

Caution Pays Off
The government’s cautious approach to Zimbabwe’s commercial farm sectors paid a handsome dividend in 1981 as Zimbabwe harvested a record maize crop of over two million tons, up from 680,000 tons the year before. One reason for the successful maize crop was the government’s use of the sophisticated marketing structure inherited from the previous white-minority regime. Soon after independence, the government’s Grain Marketing Board raised the producer price of maize from $136 to $192. As a result, about one-third of the country’s 1,500 tobacco farmers switched over to maize production, and overall, white commercial farmers raised their acreage in corn by 50 percent.

Like commercial agriculture, the mining industry also experienced a good year in 1980. While actual mining production increased little in the first year of Zimbabwe’s independence, mining earnings rose dramatically, largely due to the increase in international gold prices. The value of Zimbabwe’s gold production in 1981, for instance, is estimated at over $250 million—more than double the earnings from 1980. Overall, the mining industry accounts for well over half of Zimbabwe’s foreign exchange earnings, and some economists expect that proportion to increase in the future.

Meanwhile, the country’s leading mining companies—Anglo-American, Lonrho, Rio Tinto Zinc and Union Carbide—have all recently announced plans to expand their investments in Zimbabwe. Although government officials welcome the investments by the mining giants, they also express concern that the unwillingness of transnational corporations to invest in other areas of the economy will accentuate Zimbabwe’s uneven development. As Ann Seidman, the acting head of the University of Zimbabwe’s Economics Department, has pointed out, the pattern of international investment in Zimbabwe focuses on the export-oriented, capital-intensive, mineral
enclave which employs only about 6 percent of Zimbabwe's wage labor and remains relatively insulated from the rest of the country's economy.

A further problem, Seidman notes, is that all the major transnationals have their regional headquarters as well as processing and manufacturing plants in South Africa. Seidman questions whether a company like Anglo-American will invest in industry to process minerals in Zimbabwe when it already has plants in South Africa.

Sanctions Paradox

Despite its historical development as an extension of the South African economy, Zimbabwe at independence inherited a remarkably advanced industrial sector of its own—the second largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Paradoxically, much of the country's industrial growth was due to measures taken by Ian Smith's UDI government to promote import substitution and self-sufficiency. Consequently, under UDI, manufacturing output tripled in dollar terms from 16 percent to 25 percent of the country's GNP.

The Mugabe government has recently declared that it intends to extend the state marketing and regulatory apparatus that exists in agriculture and manufacturing to the mining industry. According to the minister of mines, Maurice Nyagumbo, Zimbabwe will soon establish a minerals marketing board to oversee the sale of the country's minerals.

Problems Ahead

So far, Zimbabwe's economic policies have been implemented with an unusual degree of efficiency and success. But there remains a number of problems which may stall or even set back Zimbabwe's economic progress.

The end of the liberation struggle has not brought the expected savings in military expenditure. A year after the war, the cost of maintaining Zimbabwe's various armies is absorbing an unhealthy 25 percent of the national budget. As a result, the new government has run up a spending deficit on the order of $700 million.

The deficit, which also reflects the increase in the consumer subsidy for maize and the removal of taxes on other staple foods like milk and cooking oil, has pushed the annual inflation rate up to about 15 percent.

Unemployment poses another serious challenge to Zimbabwe's economic development. Despite the phenomenal economic growth enjoyed during the past year, the economy absorbed only about half of those entering the job market for the first time. Government planners estimate that an 8 percent growth rate in the economy next year will provide 85,000 new jobs, but government figures also put the number of job seekers at 150,000. At the same time, the government reported that of 2,612 skilled white workers trained in Zimbabwe since 1976, over 2,000 have emigrated since independence—many to South Africa.

Labor relations have also been a problem. In the heady months after independence, Black workers organized scores of strikes against their white employers, rightly charging low wages, poor working conditions, and racist hiring and pay practices. The government, desperate to maintain production to meet the vastly expanded demand for consumer and export production, intervened rapidly to settle the disputes. Labor Minister Kirumbirai Kangai often met with striking workers, counseling patience and a return to work.

But appeals to patriotism are likely to wear thin in the absence of solid progress to redress workers' grievances. The government has moved to enforce minimum wage laws and promote workers' councils to mediate labor/management disputes. It has also created an umbrella national trade union organization to replace the colonial system. But government actions are complicated by the close historical ties between African labor and Mugabe's principal political rival and coalition government partner, Joshua Nkomo.

The most serious threat to Zimbabwe's economy, however, comes from the growing danger of conflict with South Africa. South Africa recently announced the unilateral abrogation of a long standing preferential trade agreement with Zimbabwe, a serious step considering that South Africa currently takes twenty percent of Zimbabwe's exports and supplies 35 percent of its imports.

The South Africans followed up that announcement by withdrawing several hundred desperately needed railroad cars and locomotives on loan to Zimbabwe Railways, and denied Zimbabwe access to the port at Durban, its principal outlet to the sea.

With 95 percent of its export and import trade already going through South Africa, Zimbabwe knows that it cannot afford to engage in economic warfare against Pretoria. Indeed, should the political situation worsen inside South Africa, Pretoria may be tempted to strike out against Zimbabwe, where the very success of Black majority rule is a constant reminder to the South African people of the bankruptcy of Pretoria's racialist outlook.
Key Dates

Health care becomes a basic right. On August 7, 1980, Health Minister Ushewokunze announces free medical services for most Zimbabweans.

On April 18, 1980, Zimbabwe proclaimed itself an independent nation, the final act of a freedom struggle spanning more than twenty-five years. Early political and labor actions under British rule in the 1950s led to fifteen years of armed conflict against the Rhodesian regime before the Lancaster Accords resulted in the election of Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister. Proclamation of Zimbabwe's independence came only hours before it was to go into effect.

May 2nd—Four thousand Black miners strike at the Wankie coal fields. The walkout is only one in a series of labor actions sweeping the African workforce in mining, industry, and commercial agriculture. The strikes, like those following independence in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, stem from the desperately low wages, poor working conditions, and state repression that marked labor relations under white minority rule. The new government, sympathetic to workers' demands, but anxious to maintain production, brings labor legislation and minimum wage laws to the fore in parliament. Minister of Labor Kirumbira Kangai often intervenes personally to persuade striking workers to return to work pending government changes.

July 7th—Minimum wage legislation goes into effect setting monthly wages for industrial workers at $108, and $46 for domestics. In response to the new laws, white employers dismissed more than 5000 workers. The government introduces legislation to stop these dismissals, threatening employers who dismiss workers without reason with $1000 fines or 3 months in prison.

July 24th—Finance Minister Enos Nkala presents independent Zimbabwe's first national budget, estimated at $2.2 billion. He reports a 19 percent drop in defense spending and a 54 percent increase in health and education expenditure for the country's African majority. In line with the new priorities created by independence, the budget contains large price subsidies on essential food products, and higher taxes on luxury items. Nevertheless, Nkala projects a $450 million deficit for the fiscal year.

July 25th—Former white Rhodesian army leader General Peter Walls is fired from his position as Commander in Chief of the joint military council. He was in charge of integrating the two guerrilla armies-ZANLA and ZIPRA-with elements of the former Rhodesian security forces. In an interview on British television, Walls revealed that he had tried to persuade the British to annul Mugabe's February election victory. He also revealed the existence of a coup plot among the white Rhodesian military that was called off only hours before it was to go into effect.

August 5th—Mozambique President Samora Machel is given a hero's welcome in Zimbabwe when he pays the first official visit of any foreign head of state to the former colony. At mass rallies in Bulawayo and Salisbury, Machel urges reconciliation and national unity on his audience including ZANU President Mugabe and ZAPU head, Joshua Nkomo. Zimbabwean independence came only at a heavy loss of Mozambican lives and property destroyed by the marauding Rhodesian army. Machel's visit was marred however, by a shooting incident involving high ranking ZANU leader and manpower minister Edward Tekere. Tekere and his bodyguards killed a white farmer after a disturbance at a party the previous night. The next day after a tense standoff with heavily armed police, Tekere surrendered.

August 7th—Health minister Dr. Herbert Ushewokunze announces free medical care for Zimbabweans earning less than $215 per month, virtually the entire African population. The government moves quickly to upgrade health care for the masses of people excluded from the colonial health system. Many rural clinics are reopened and the emphasis shifts from costly and inaccessible curative medicine to preventive methods. Ushewokunze aggressive...
desegregates the nation’s clinics and hospitals, publicly berating racist health officials and staff during whirlwind inspection tours.

August 25th—Zimbabwe joins the United Nations. Mugabe, in New York for the ceremony, pays an emotional visit to Harlem, where he thanks an overwhelmingly Black audience for Afro-American support during Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. Mugabe also meets with private investors and with then-President Carter in Washington in a bid for greater US involvement in Zimbabwe’s economic recovery. But he receives no firm commitments from government or corporate sources.

September 1st—Free compulsory education for over one million African children in Zimbabwe begins. The education bill originally proposed for July was postponed due to lack of funds to meet the $22 million cost of the program. Education Minister Mutumbuka announces the government’s intention to build 1500 schools over the next three years and to upgrade the training of thousands of teachers to staff them.

September 3rd—Zimbabwe severs diplomatic relations with South Africa.

September 25th—Police move to evict squatters from commercial farms in eastern Zimbabwe. The action underscores the intense pressure placed on the government by its supporters to increase the pace and scope of the land redistribution program. Western promises of funds to buy out white farmers have not been honored, forcing the government to threaten the expropriation of land in violation of the independence constitution.

November 4th—Zimbabwe becomes a favored trading partner of the European Economic Community as the most recent signatory to the Lome Convention, which regulates commerce between the EEC and 59 other African, Pacific and Caribbean nations. Outreach to international financing and trading organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which admitted Zimbabwe in late September, plays an important part in the new country’s economic planning for the future.

November 8th—Public statements denigrating PF-ZAPU and advocating the creation of a one-party state issued by Finance Minister Enos Nkala are the reported provocation that leads to a bloody clash between ex-ZIPRA guerrillas and former ZANLA fighters in a Black township near Bulawayo. The conflict, which leaves 58 dead and hundreds wounded, far surpasses the scattered violence committed by small numbers of ex-guerrillas in the months following independence. Notably, neither the former Rhodesian units nor the new members of the Zimbabwean national army yield to past loyalties as they quell fighting between the rival groups.

December 1st—Zimbabwe joins with eight other southern African nations at the second Southern African Development Coordination Conference in planning regional cooperation to develop transportation, communication and port facilities. The “southern nine” countries, who now depend on South African railroads and ports, receive pledges of $650 million in development aid from international donors, but fall short of the $2 billion goal.

December 8th—Manpower Minister and ZANU secretary-general Edgar Tekere is acquitted of murder charges stemming from the shooting death of a white farmer. The verdict by two Black magistrates overrules a white judge during the politically sensitive trial, highlighted by the defense’s use of a widely condemned Rhodesian act, since repealed, that protects those “suspicious terrorism.”

January 3rd, 1981—Information Minister Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira announces the government’s purchase from the South African/Argus Company of a 45 percent interest in Zimbabwe’s major newspapers, to be run by a non-partisan Mass Media Trust. The trust is part of the government’s program to create new media services, like the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, that accurately reflect Zimbabwean and African affairs.

January 10th—The first cabinet changes since independence see Nkomo dropped from his powerful position as Minister of Home Affairs and Edgar Tekere removed from the government. Nkomo creates speculation over the future of the coalition government, however, by refusing to accept a lesser post.

January 27th—Discussions over cabinet changes between PF-ZANU leader Nkomo and Prime Minister Mugabe reach a compromise. Nkomo agrees to role as Minister without portfolio but retains a voice in defense and public security. Within the cabinet the minority ZAPU party increases its number of seats to nine, thereby maintaining the two-party coalition government.

January 30th—South African commandos strike ANC offices in side Mozambique, Mugabe denounces the attack as “naked aggression.” The attack raises regional political tensions and threatens to embroil Zimbabwe, a military ally of Mozambique, in a direct confrontation with South Africa.

February 8th—ZIPRA elements of the national army fire on former ZANLA troops, initiating several days of fighting at army bases around Bulawayo and Entumbane, leaving 300 people dead. The collapse of unity in the two recently formed army battalions forces Prime Minister Mugabe to rely on the old Rhodesian security forces to separate the rival factions. Nkomo and Mugabe cooperate in solving the crisis, but the Initial causes of the violence—ZAPU fears of domination by ZANU, and the broader problem of integrating thousands of ex-guerrillas into the army—still remain.

February 17th—Minister of State Emmerson Mnangagwa announces that all of the 22,000 former guerrillas awaiting integration into the national army will be disarmed.

February 19th—Zimbabwe and the USSR initial an agreement establishing formal diplomatic relations. The ten month delay is widely attributed to lingering unhappiness within the ruling ZANU party over Soviet support for Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU.

March 13th—Parliament passes bill outlawing a private school system for whites created to circumvent desegregation of educational facilities by the government after independence.

March 23rd—Over seventy nations and international development organizations pledge $1.4 billion in economic aid during a three day international donor conference in Salisbury. The conference comes as major donor nations who caution Western nations that failure to live up to promised aid commitments could lead to nationalization and redistribution of white-owned land. The conference brings to over $2 billion the total aid received by Zimbabwe for reconstruction, land purchases, and refugee settlement.

March 24th—South Africa unilaterally terminates trade agreement with Zimbabwe under which Zimbabwean exports entered South Africa under preferential conditions. The decision, announced the day after the beginning of the Zimcord conference seems timed to remind Salisbury of its extreme economic dependence on South Africa.

March 28th—Local elections held in Salisbury and Chitungwiza township. The elections, already postponed for fear of provoking partisan political violence, result in a clean sweep for ZANU. Municipal elections in Bulawayo, ZAPU’s traditional stronghold and the scene of February’s intense fighting are again postponed.

April 8th—South Africa fires another salvo in its widening economic war with Zimbabwe by announcing that 200 railroad cars on loan to Zimbabwe Railways will be withdrawn. June 1. South Africa had previously announced that the South African port of Durban, through which many of Zimbabwe’s exports pass, would now be closed to Zimbabwean exporters.

April 18th, 1981—Zimbabwe’s first anniversary independence celebrations.
Prospects for Unity

by Charlie Cobb

Even during Zimbabwe's war of liberation, supporters of that struggle often floundered in confusion over the abrasive relations between the two competing liberation movements, ZANU and ZAPU. "Was it tribal?" they would ask. "Personal animosity? Ideological?" These questions were never resolved even though the formation of the Patriotic Front during the final years of the war made it possible to set them aside for a while. The tensions persisted, but at least as far as international diplomacy and support were concerned the front provided a common face for the guerrilla movement. Still, even then, looking ahead to victory by the guerrillas, there was the nagging fear—civil war.

No single explanation can be given for Zimbabwe's current difficulties. Some perspective and context, however, is possible. Let us begin by acknowledging that tribe, personality, and organizational differences are important elements in the political makeup of Zimbabwe today. All of these have different, entangled roots. Shona and Matabele did war with each other, though not nearly so bitterly or as often as some historians would have us believe. There are, in fact, important cultural and political unities between the two tribes. The spiritual importance of the Matopos—or spirit mediums—to both the Shona and Matabele, and the Shona/Matabele uprising of the 1890's are just two examples.

The ZAPU/ZANU split of 1962-63 was traumatic and, at least in this view, harmful to the nationalist movement. Yet, although personality conflict overlaid some of the rift, the reasons for the break were essentially political. On the surface it seemed that ZAPU became a Matabele party and ZANU a Shona party, but this certainly was not true at the leadership level of the two groups. Although debate will go on for some time as to where real power lay, both central committees were fairly well balanced tribally. Even at the rank and file level, ZAPU/ZANU antagonism expresses itself in political and organizational terms more often than in tribal terms.

There is some truth in both positions and these are threads woven into the political fabric of Zimbabwe today. But the question still remains: What is fundamental to Zimbabwe's current difficulties? Further, how significant to security and national unity is the lingering effect of the complex history of ZAPU/ZANU antagonism?

Forge For Revolution

Lessons from Zimbabwe's recent struggle for independence suggest some of the answers. Disunities slowed, but could not halt, the movement for liberation in Zimbabwe. Its core idea—ending white minority rule and placing the future shape of the nation in the hands and minds of the Black majority—transcended organizational and political divisions. The men and women of ZAPU and ZANU consciously chose to pick up the gun and fight, not only against the Rhodesian Security Forces, but for a new society. Military victories did not sustain the movement any more than military losses halted it. The idea of a free Zimbabwe sustained it.
If this seems an overly simple approach, devoid of nuance and ignorant of contradictory political detail, it is stressed here because the view of the struggle in Zimbabwe as a struggle for ideals, as well as the seizure of political mechanisms, has been almost totally ignored by most media. At the very best the war was defined in racial terms, of Africans fighting whites and, at worst, as Africans terrorizing Africans.

Visitors to Zimbabwe who managed to get out of Salisbury hotels and “briefings” at the Combined Operations headquarters and talked to rural Blacks in the tribal trust lands noted that the guerrillas were referred to as “our boys” or “the boys in the bush.” In those areas most affected by the war, the distinctions between ZAPU and ZANU were less important than the distinction between those who supported the struggle and those who did not.

In April, 1980, Blacks voted in a guerrilla government. ZAPU and ZANU did put up separate slates instead of running jointly as the Patriotic Front; but the fact is that fully 80 percent of the people, against the diligent and not-so-subtle efforts of both Britain and the outgoing Rhodesian regime, voted for the guerrillas. The election, while not completely free and fair, was reasonably so. And the result can be read as an affirmation by Zimbabwe’s Black population of the ideas and goals forged by a decade of guerrilla struggle.

Radical social change was fought for and sanctioned by popular vote. But radical change is not necessarily rapid (nor, it should be added, is rapid change necessarily radical). Socialism was the underpinning of many of the ideas of social change expressed by both parties during the war. Although that ideology sometimes lacked clarity and caused clashes both between and within ZAPU and ZANU, socialism gave heft and force to the nationalist motivations that brought men and women into the struggle as guerrillas. The guerrillas were transformed, not only by their decision to pick up the gun, but also by their search for a coherent body of ideas to express the kind of society for which they were fighting.

Independence—And Frustrations

However, electoral victory has brought other factors to play in the implementation of the ideas shaped by the struggle. In truth, Zimbabwe’s new government does not have complete freedom of choice. It will suffice here to simply list some of these factors: the constraints written into the Lancaster House agreement; white minority control over agricultural production, the economy and the state bureaucracy; the dependent nature of the economy, particularly on South Africa and large multinational companies; and, given three distinct armies, the uncertainty of the security situation.

Zimbabwe’s government has chosen a cautious approach to radical change, emphasizing “pragmatic” foreign assistance; foreign investment, incentives to white commercial farmers, and an expansion of social services to the Black population. Spokesmen like Kumbirai Kangai and Eddison Zvobgo insist that the revolution is not being sold out. But there are many questions among the guerrillas who fought for a government that they now do not completely understand. “Honestly, I thought this war would go on and we would march right into Salisbury,” Soneni Mdlalosse, a commander in ZAPU’s military wing ZAPRA, told me. Soneni was commanding a unit searching out ZAPRA dissidents terrorizing the rural district of Gokwe, about 150 miles south of Salisbury. I wanted to know why men who fought for independence would turn to violence now that independence was won. “Our boys came from many walks of life—peasant, some from the cities, some surely were infiltrated by Rhodesian Security forces. Some find it difficult to lose the habit of the gun. Some were once clear, but now they are confused.”

At the conclusion of the London talks some 35,000 guerrillas were grouped in assembly points to await the elections and integration into a new national army. Most are still there; and while ZAPRA and ZANLA guerrillas do not share the same assembly points, they do share many of the same troubling uncertainties about where they fit in the new order.

“Honestly,” Soneni exploded one night. “I never thought Walls would be my commander! We have our own Walls!” (When a Joint Military Command was set up to supervise the integration of ZAPRA and ZANLA with units of the former Rhodesian Security Forces into a new national army, Peter Walls, former head of the Rhodesian army, was placed at its head. British military units actually supervise the six week retraining process.)

The decision was understandable in some respects. With his election as Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe began to moderate the militant positions with which he and his party had been identified. He stressed reconciliation.

Underneath this change in tone was concern at the possibility of a rebellion led by white military officers who were dismayed and angered at Mugabe’s clear cut majority in the April elections. It was a legitimate concern as General Walls was later to reveal, for immediately after Mugabe’s victory Walls asked British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to declare the vote null and void.

More dangerously, such conflict would have sabotaged the April electoral mandate and would have opened the way for Britain, South Africa, and the West to interfere in the name of establishing what they certainly would have called a “more stable” solution to the Rhodesian conflict.

“We have political position, but not physical security,” a ranking ZANU official said during the early months of independence, “and without that physical security we have a very vulnerable independence.”

Assembly Points

But, if these concerns could be clearly seen from Salisbury, in the assembly points they were hardly understood. “They fought, they died, they thought it would be milk and honey now. They cannot understand why they are where they are,” ZAPU spokesman Willie Musururwa commented.

Over half of Zimbabwe’s population is under sixteen, and the guerrilla ranks reflect this. Waiting for the “fruits of victory” in
remote rural camps is difficult for them at best. There is not much contact between the men in the assembly points and the politicians in the city. Such communication as there is is, pretty much left to ZAPU or ZANU representatives on the Joint High Command, and the main feature of that contact is its irregularity. The relationship between the guerrillas and the government is puzzling but some of the reasons seem to lie in the historical turmoil inside ZANU and among its younger members. Zimbabwe's nationalist movements have always suffered from tensions between their military and political wings. Some of these problems were being resolved in the later stages of the war, but progress was set back with the untimely deaths of ZANU military commander Josiah Tongagara and ZAPU military commander Lucius Mangena.

The mix of youth and disconnection from the political process can sometimes explode. While violence reflects a political problem, it cannot in a strict sense be called political violence. What would normally be called small things can trigger an outbreak. At X-Ray assembly point outside of the town of Mtoko, a hotel bar frequented by the guerrillas was closed by a health inspector. The inspector was seized, taken to X-Ray camp and beaten. Police efforts to have the men responsible for the action arrested resulted in three days of clashes between police and ZANLA guerrillas in the camp. A police convoy was attacked on the main highway. The local police station was attacked; and in the end, three policemen were killed.

At Luveve Reception Center outside of Bulawayo, ZIPRA guerrillas refused to leave to make room for incoming refugee children, protesting that they needed to know where they would be taken and when they would be paid.

The fact that the fighting originated from within the ranks of the newly formed national army raises a critically important political question, that of the loyalty and cohesiveness of the new army. But that question is not based upon tribal or organizational rivalry. The real issue is whether a government established by revolution is revolutionary enough to hold the commitment of the men who fought for it.

It is a question only raised, not answered by the conflict. Mugabe has acknowledged that the process of integrating the guerrillas into the army has been much too slow, and promises to accelerate the effort. New barracks are under construction. At the same time, Emmerson Mnangagwa, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's office, has announced a nationwide disarmament of both ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas. Ironically, the Mugabe government was forced to use the Air Force and Army of the former Rhodesian Security Forces to quell the Bulawayo outbreak.

Such a response provides only a short term solution—it has effectively ended a riot. Answers to the deeper problems that led to it are still being formed. If tribal and political rivalry complicates the frustrations within the guerrilla ranks, it must also be said that certain external factors also add to the difficulties. None are more difficult and threatening to Zimbabwe's new government than provocations from some whites.

These incidents, and many others like them reflect impatience and frustration more than conflicts between tribe and party. Inevitably, however, they do take on a political coloring. At X-Ray, what the police have been associated with in the past, the brutal enforcement of white minority rule, had a great deal to do with the kind of violence ZANLA guerrillas unleashed against them. So perhaps did the fact that Joshua Nkomo was then the minister in charge of the police.

Frustration also lay at the core of the violence that broke out around Bulawayo in February leaving some 400 persons dead. Like the smaller November outbreak, a beer hall quarrel triggered the conflict. The most striking and significant political aspect of the fighting was the refusal of ZIPRA guerrillas to obey their own commanders' orders to stop.

One of the mysterious, virtually unreported causes of the Bulawayo outbreak was the assassination of Nelson Marembo, the ZAPU Secretary for Commerce and a member of the party's central committee. He was killed by a landmine planted in his driveway just days before the violence in the south. ZAPU officials are not charging that he was killed by ZANU. One theory that is taken seriously by many is that this murder was aimed at setting ZAPU and ZANU at each other's throats in the hope of encouraging chaos and causing the collapse of the government, thus opening the door for some-as-yet-identified third party to step in and take over.

There are white terrorists in Zimbabwe, and it can never be forgotten that South Africa remains a threat. Encouraged by the new Reagan administration, South Africa seems determined to embark upon a course leading to ever widening regional conflict. Zimbabwe may find that it has within its own borders some groups willing to back South Africa's efforts to prevent the thrust for liberation in Namibia and South Africa itself.

For now, there are more questions than answers to its real security problems; but the two poles of Zimbabwe's future seem clearly to be the issues of the pace of radical change and the prospects of regional conflict.
Building the People's Army

—An Interview with Emmerson Mnangagwa

Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa is a little known name outside of his native Zimbabwe. But as minister of state, Mnangagwa now occupies one of the most important and sensitive posts in the government of the newly independent country. His principal task is to supervise the integration of Zimbabwe's three heavily armed and mutually suspicious armies into a single national force.

At least it is an imposing challenge. His predecessor, former white Rhodesian army chief General Peter Walls, was fired in disgrace in 1980, and the integration process has been slowed by periodic clashes between the various armed camps.

At age 39, Mnangagwa brings impressive credentials as a nationalist leader and military expert to his position. In 1963 he was among the first Zimbabweans to leave the country for military training, and he led the first group of ZANU militants enroute to China for guerrilla training.

He returned to Zimbabwe in 1964 to found the "Crocodile Group," ZANU's first guerrilla unit. Captured in 1965, Mnangagwa was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. In 1977 he was elected to ZANU's central committee and served under ZANU president Robert Mugabe in Mozambique until independence in 1980.

In an exclusive interview with Southern Africa, Mnangagwa assesses the delicate security situation inside the country and outside the region. And we are most happy to introduce one of Zimbabwe's least heralded but most important leaders to our Western readers.

How much progress has been made in the year since independence towards creating a new national army?

A lot of progress has been achieved. Last year we were able to form nine battalions of 1000 soldiers each and in the first three months of this year we have already produced six battalions.

We started slowly because no machinery had been set up to produce the kind of integration we are having, where ZIPRA, ZANLA, and the former army are being integrated. We had to find facilities to train the instructors first. With the assistance of the British military advisers, who were requested by our government to come and assist in the training, we have since produced our own instructors who are still supported by more than 120 British instructors.

Once the instructors qualified, we had to find accommodation for the battalions because the former regime didn't have an army of the size we have now. The existing facilities were only suited to the former army.

By late last year we were sufficiently organized and geared to produce up to two battalions a month. We realize, however, that if we continued at that speed it would take up to two years to complete the integration of the forces we had in our hands. We therefore set up an expanded scheme where we are now able to produce up to three battalions a month. We are happy to say that this year alone, by the first week of April, we have already produced nine battalions which took us ten months last year.

We are hopeful that by the middle of this year we will have produced up to 24 battalions.

Sister Janice McLaughlin is an American nun who worked inside Rhodesia until she was expelled by Rhodesian authorities in 1978. She later went to work in ZANU refugee camps in Mozambique and returned to independent Zimbabwe following the elections last year.
tions and perhaps by September we will have formed 36.

What are some of the problems you've encountered in trying to integrate these three armies?

The initial problems were that of approach and adjustment. ZIPRA and ZANLA are trained differently and we had to find a common ground where both have to adjust to being a national army geared for national objectives—removed from partisan objectives or party politics. The program they go through adjusts them into being soldiers of the state, rather than soldiers of a party.

We now have fifteen new battalions and only three of these have given us problems. The other twelve are intact and working well. We believe that three out of fifteen is not bad at all and we are proud of the achievements that have been made.

Are female comrades being admitted into the new army?

Yes, we are not male chauvinists. We had female comrades in the war so there is no reason why we shouldn't have them in peacetime. We wouldn't call upon our female comrades to fight and when there is peace chase them out. So we have the female's wing in the Zimbabwe national army. Although the integration of the women's wing battalions hasn't begun, there is a women's wing in Zimbabwe's national army.

It appears that some of the comrades who left the country to join the struggle and gave up their education are now being left out because they don't have the necessary educational qualifications. What is being done to remedy this?

That question I think is exaggerated. We didn't get this independence through Ph.D.s and M.A.s or speaking English like a Londoner. We are now independent because comrades, whatever level—some without having gone to school, some having gone up to university level—came to join the struggle. First and foremost in their minds was the liberation of their country, the dignity of our people.

In the army today we don't ask somebody whether he has education. Anybody who wants to be in the army who has been in the liberation movement is allowed to come into the army.

And we have evolved a special program within the army so that those who would want to benefit from education can get it, where people are taught from the lowest classes up to the higher classes.

What preparation is being given to comrades who choose to re-enter civilian life?

Last year there was a demobilization scheme which saw up to 8500 comrades being demobilized. Unfortunately that scheme had no program into which those to be demobilized went, so we stopped this scheme.

We are now working on a demobilization scheme where those who would like to go to the civilian sector from the army are processed. Those who have no skills will be helped to find employment. There is a program for each one. No one who leaves the army will be put out on the street.

Recently the prime minister gave an address to the nation explaining the role of the army. What was the significance of this address?

The prime minister's address is meant to inform the nation that the image of the army, the relationship between the army and the public, should change. In the past the army was feared by the public but the prime minister wants the army to be a people's army. The people should regard the army as its own. The soldiers should regard themselves as servants of the people, not the other way round. This is a new socialist approach to the view the public should have of the army.

The army should be able to engage in projects which formerly were done by the civilian side. The whole army should be able to assist in building schools, roads, bridges, in working in factories. We don't envisage that we should have an army that will continue to stay in barracks waiting for a war. Our army is productive and it identifies itself with the public but the army should change. The public, should change. In the past the army was feared by the public but the prime minister wants the army to be a people's army. The people should regard the army as its own. The soldiers should regard themselves as servants of the people, not the other way round. This is a new socialist approach to the view the public should have of the army.

Is there a danger of destabilization from South Africa? It seems that they are stepping up their attacks on Mozambique and Angola. Do you anticipate similar activities here?

There is a defense security arrangement between this country and Mozambique. An attack on Mozambique is an attack on Zimbabwe. We don't ignore the aggression on Mozambique by South Africa because we regard such aggression as an aggression on Zimbabwe. It is for the same reason that our prime minister and our minister of foreign affairs have made statements condemning these acts of unprovoked aggression on Mozambique.

How is the morale of the comrades who have been in assembly points for more than a year and still haven't been integrated into the army?

There is not a single original assembly point in existence. All the original Lancaster House assembly points have been closed down as the prime minister stated last week. All that is remaining now are comrades at agricultural sites like Middle Sabi, Selabakwe, and Mashubi Pools where comrades are engaged in production. There are also some comrades at Chitungwiza here in Salisbury and perhaps at Gwaii in Lupane where comrades have better accommodation than in the assembly points. The morale of the comrades is high because they see each month a bigger proportion of their number becoming integrated. So everybody is very hopeful that any time it may be his turn.

Isn't the cost of maintaining such a big army too high for the economy to absorb?

The cost of maintaining the army is high. But under our circumstances the prime minister felt that everybody who served in ZANLA and ZIPRA who wanted to be in the army was entitled to be. The prime minister is honoring this pledge.

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MAY-JUNE 1981/SOUTHERN AFRICA 24
by Cross Damien

Salisbury, Zimbabwe—Upon arriving in Salisbury, many of us participating in Oxfam-America’s press tour found it hard to believe we were in the heart of southern Africa. We suspected that by accident we had arrived in a medium-sized American city, not surprising, since Salisbury was designed by an American.

The fast-food shops and shopping malls crowded with well-dressed shoppers can be disconcerting, but no more so than the white suburbs of Highfield— which rival Beverly Hills and Palm Beach for opulence. The contrast between the skyscrapers and sterile cleanliness downtown and the over-crowded clutter of Black townships found on the “dark side of town” was very familiar.

White attitudes range from liberal protestsations of a commitment to the “new order” to open contempt. A group of Afro-American journalists dining at Meikle’s Hotel, a popular spot among visiting reporters, was made to feel at home by a rendition of “Dixie” from the house band.

A white American journalist’s open display of affection for his Black dancing partner at a fashionable downtown disco led to accusations of being a “nanny-lover” and a near assault by a group of former white Rhodesian soldiers.

Colonial Symbols Remain

The symbols of colonialism are still very much in evidence. Parliamentary officials and magistrates still wear the white powdered wigs of another era. The children of both the emerging Black and established white elite still wear English school-boy uniforms consisting of knee socks, flannel blazers, and straw hats. Even the waiters’ uniforms in the city’s hotels and restaurants are a gaudy reminder of Zimbabwe’s colonial past.

The traditional clothing and colorful marketplace scenes of West Africa are nowhere to be found. Most Black Zimbabweans wear European clothing, even in the rural areas. The camouflage fatigues of wartime Rhodesia have given way to three-piece suits and briefcases, with handbags supplanting the assault rifle and backpack so common a year ago.

White Zimbabweans are said to resent the use of the term “comrade” in reference to government officials by the media, but there is little else to offend them. Black Zimbabweans are treated to episodes of “The Jeffersons,” and “Good Times” on the television with “The Wiz,” “Blues Brothers,” and other Black exploitative films in the theatres. Only Afro-American jazz, the songs of Stevie Wonder and reggae hits on the radio represent the progressive contributions of Black culture in the West.

The disparity between our expectations and the reality of Salisbury left many of us unsettled. Our first briefing from a government official focused largely on his effort to obtain a new car, and was a real disappointment.

It soon became apparent to most of us on the tour that it was crucial we get out of Salisbury as soon as possible. During early trips into the areas surrounding Salisbury, we had begun to touch the true pulse of the Zimbabwean revolution.

Revolutionary Changes Underway

One of our earliest forays into the area surrounding Salisbury included a visit to the Simbaredenga Women’s Cooperative, home of Ted and Irene Chikaka. Irene Chikaka is an Afro-American sister married to a Zimbabwean. Her experience contradicts much that has been written about the problems of Afro-American expatriates in Africa.

Since the Chikakas’ return to Zimbabwe, Irene has been instrumental in the establishment of a primary school, a cooperative store, and the development of a cooperative among the women of the neighboring township.

Another particularly rewarding trip involved visits to the Simba Youth Project, located near Mt. Darwin, about eight miles north of Salisbury. The Simba Youth Farm is a cooperative that was conceived by a group of political detainees while they were in prison. Having drawn up a constitution, the group of 44 men and 11 women hope to develop a model cooperative among the women of the neighboring township.

Not far from the Simba Youth Farm, located the “Camp Haven” project, one of the largest of the camps founded for returning refugee children. Camp Haven was

continued on page...
Resources on Zimbabwe

Books & Pamphlets

Black Women in Zimbabwe. Salisbury: Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau (available from Campaign Against World Poverty, 467 Caledonian Rd., London N6 6BD; 1980. 47pp. £2.50, plus p&h. This important pamphlet outlines the status of Black women in Zimbabwe from the point of view of the Zimbabwe Women’s Bureau. Definitely worth sending for.

Duncan G. Clarke, Foreign Companies and International Investment in Zimbabwe. Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press (available from Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL), 1980. 273pp. £4.00, plus p&h. While by its nature a fairly technical account, this book contains a lot of valuable information on foreign economic involvement in Zimbabwe on the eve of independence. One of the most difficult problems facing an independent Zimbabwe has been and will continue to be the extensive involvement of foreign corporations and banks in the economy.


1. Roger RIDDELL, Alternatives to Poverty. 22pp.

This is a series of pamphlets published between 1977 and 1980 which detail important economic, political, and social problems which the independent government has to face. While all of the pamphlets were written prior to independence, their relevance is understored.


A detailed account of the liberation war (focusing on the 1970s), from journalists sympathetic to ZANU’s perspective. The authors use Rhodesian intelligence documents (obtained after independence), interviews with top liberation movement leaders, and their own information from having lived in southern Africa for much of the war to present a detailed account of the war; the struggles within and between the liberation movements; and the role of international forces in the conflict. The exhaustive details about individual incidents and participants at times make the book difficult to follow for those not familiar with the names of people and places involved. A must for those who want a detailed account of ZANU’s role in the liberation struggle.


Nyagumbo has been a party official in ZANU since its formation and, after spending most of the last twenty years in prison, became minister of mines in the new government. His autobiography begins with Nyagumbo’s school years, chronicles his years as a migrant laborer in South Africa, and provides a vivid personal account of the liberation struggles—primarily as seen from the author’s prison cell. The manuscript was completed in late 1974 and—after twice being confiscated by Rhodesian authorities—the third draft was smuggled out of prison. Good editorial notes and a chronology make this personal view of the struggle a little easier to place in perspective. While by no means an overview of the struggle, this fast-paced book makes enjoyable reading.

Periodicals

Africa News (PO Box 3851, Durham, NC 27702). Subscription rates: Individuals—$25/yr. (pre-paid one month trial, $5); Non-profit—$45/yr. (pre-paid one month trial, $5); Profit—$75/yr. (pre-paid trial, $8); Overseas—add $35 for Air Mail, $14 for Surface Mail. A weekly survey of news and information that regularly features articles on Zimbabwe. A must for keeping up to date on a weekly basis.

Southern Africa. (18 West 17th St., 8th Fl., New York, NY 10011). Subscription rates: Individuals—$10/yr., $18/2 yrs.; Institutions—$30/yr. or $55/2 yrs.; Overseas Air Mail—add $12.50 per year in Africa, Asia and Europe; add $30 in South and Central America. This monthly publication features news articles, economic and political analysis, book reviews and on-the-spot reporting. Absolutely essential!

Zimbabwe Project News Bulletin (1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL). Subscription rates: write for details. This publication is the monthly newsletter of the Zimbabwe Project, a non-governmental development and relief agency based in London. Consisting largely of reprints from the Zimbabwean and British press, the bulletin is a good source of factual information—especially statistics—about what the new government is doing. The monthly chronology on the inside front cover is particularly handy.

Zimbabwe Information Group Bulletin (1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL). Subscription rates: Individuals—UK: £2.50; Europe/Overseas surface—£3.50; Overseas airmail—£6.50. Institutions: UK—£4.00; Europe/Overseas surface—£7.00; Overseas airmail—£8.00. The ZIG Bulletin is published about five times per year. The bulletin consists of analytical articles focusing on internal Zimbabwean developments and Western involvement in the region. The contents are tailored to an activist audience. During the liberation struggle ZIG adopted a stance of critical support of both liberation movements. Since independence ZIG has maintained a critical stance towards the new government. Occasionally, ZIG is still relevant and in-depth. Must reading for serious observers of independent Zimbabwe.

(This list is intended to be only an introduction and is in no way intended to be complete.)
Michener: Re-writing History

by James A. Michener
Random House
New York, 1980

James Michener’s The Covenant has been number one on the New York Times best seller list for months. Its 875 pages cover fifteen thousand years of South African history. The author insists that it is a novel: that the settings, characters and most incidents are fictional. Nevertheless, the story follows the path of South African history, and Michener himself believes that the narrative prepares the reader for the events which are taking place today in South Africa. Because of its claims and popularity, this book must be taken seriously.

The Covenant is the story of a people who came to believe they had a special relationship—or covenant—with God and with the land. Because of Michener’s inclusive style, many readers will think they are getting a full account of South African history. It is for this reason that the book is disturbing. It will be read as history, as if it is objective, yet in its very form The Covenant celebrates the supremacy of whites.

One gets the impression that Michener has made an effort to write a balanced account. Three families—the Black Nxumalo, the Dutch Van Doorn, and the English Saltwood—are traced through successive generations.

But before we meet any of them, in a manner that has become familiar to Michener readers, he attempts to begin at the beginning. He describes the Bushman or San as they lived 15,000 years ago. What this adds to the story is questionable except that the presence of the San and of the Hotentot or Khoi-khoi at the Cape when the Dutch arrive dispels the myth that whites entered an empty land.

Michener seems intent on dispelling myths. He has the first Nxumalo travel to Zimbabwe when it was a thriving city to establish that it was built by Africans and not by the Phoenicians.

We watch the arrival of Dutch settlers—the restraints placed upon them by the Dutch East India Company and the cruelty practiced on those who disobeyed. The mix of Dutch and Huguenot which went to make the Afrikaner is described in detail. The struggle throughout the centuries to survive in a hostile wilderness, to tame the land, and to establish the new Israel is told convincingly. These are not saints, but sinners who transgress the law of God and suffer for it. But their faith in the righteousness of their cause is never doubted.

The English, from the first eccentric missionary who is murdered to the modern liberal member of the Black Sash who is banned, fill the pages as well. Cecil Rhodes is here, as are the mine owners. The family estate back in England is there too, giving the English a link to their past, and thus a security the Afrikaner lacks.

The treatment of Blacks is panoramic. Michener has the Xhosa pushing south for new grazing land. Shaka’s warriors develop into a formidable military force and Shaka’s craziness at the time of his mother’s death wreaks havoc of disastrous proportion. As the story unfolds, we see the Blacks as adjuncts to both Boer and English in the Anglo-Boer War and we see their labor exploited. The African National Congress is founded, and the struggle for political rights in the twentieth century begins. We see how difficult it is for Black people to receive education, how dangerous it is for them to speak out. The English woman who protests is banned for five years; the Black man who protests is jailed for ten.

Despite Michener’s gargantuan effort to achieve balance and fairness, the result is both unbalanced and unfair. What one takes from this book—what one remembers—is not the meticulous detail but the vast sweep of Afrikaner history. This is not a novel of South Africa but of the Boer. Despite changes in the point of view and the inclusive narrative voice, it is the Afrikaner who emerges—strong, stubborn, even heroic—for having overcome formidable odds.

The style in which Michener develops individual characters in the book also contributes to the work’s bias. The Boers as individuals, they are characters we know by name with wives and children, parents and grandparents. Africans on the other hand are nameless masses. When Africans women and children are interned during the Anglo-Boer War, Detlev Van Doorn is a child who has lost his parents, and his remaining loved ones die around him. When he grows up to participate in the construction of apartheid, we know why. There is no equivalent development of a single Black. The fullest treatment of what Blacks feel is expressed in a statement in court. It is verbalized not dramatized. It fails to move readers as deeply as does the suffering of the Boer.

The last person to speak in The Covenant is an American. This is the novel’s greatest flaw. It is an American voice and an American sensibility that predominates. Sympathy is with the white minority. How ironic that in his effort to be fair, Michener has written a work that is more dangerous than one that treated and claimed to treat only part of the story. Michener sees himself as a strong critic of the South African government and its policy of apartheid. The novel moves one to say, “What enemies like this, who needs friends?”

Gail Morland

Correction

Inadvertently the following information was deleted from the book review “The Compleat Divestors’ Guide” in our March/April 1981 issue.

Decoding Corporate Apartheid is available from the Institute for Policy Studies (190 Que Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20006) for $4.95 (pb) plus $1.00 p&h.

US Business in South Africa is available from Indiana University Press (Dept O, Tenth & Morton Streets, Bloomington, IN 47405) for $17.50 (hb) plus $1.50 p&h.


**A Continent Besieged: Foreign Military Activities in Africa since 1975.** By David VOLMAN. Washington: Institute for Policy Studies (901 Que St., N.W., Washington, DC 20009), 1981. 28pp. $2.00, plus $1.00 pbk.


**Angola**


**Jose Luandino VIEIRA,** Luanda: Short Stories of Angola. African Writers Series No. 222. Translated by Tamara L. BENDER with Donna S. HILL. Exeter, NH: Heinemann Educational Books (orders to PO Box 978, Edison, NJ 08817), 1980 (for the first time in English). 188pp. $5.00 pb. Note: Luanda originally appeared in Portuguese in 1964. Vieira is a long-time MPLA activist who was re-elected in 1978 for a second term as the Secretary-General of the Angolan Writers Union.

**Mozambique**

**Attitudes Toward Race and Work in Mozambique:** By Jeanne PENVENNE. Working Papers No. 26. Brookline: African Studies Center, Boston University (address above), 1979. 34pp. $2.00, including pbk.


**Namibia**


**South Africa**


**Andre BRINK,** A Dry White Season. New York: William Morrow (105 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016), 1980. 316pp. $10.95 hb. Note: This novel by the noted African writer was banned prior to its publication in South Africa.

**Darcy DU TOIT,** Capital and Labour in South Africa: Class struggles in the 1970s. Monograph from the African Studies Centre, Leiden, Netherlands. Boston: Kegan Paul (9 Park Street, Boston MA 02108), 1981. 495pp. $55.00 hb (yes—that's really the price!).

**Economic Sanctions Against South Africa:** By Duncan G. CLARKE.

1. **Policy Issues and Economic Sanctions**
   by Duncan G. CLARKE.

2. **Sanctions as a Basic Choice in Southern Africa**
   by Ann SEIDMAN.

3. **South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions on Southern African Economies**
   by Reginald H. GREEN.

4. **Assessing the Impact of Sanctions on Black Welfare in South Africa**
   by Linda FARINA.

5. **Oil Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link**
   by Martin BAILEY.

6. **Financial Aspects of Economic Sanctions on South Africa**
   by Simon CLARKE.

7. **The International Impact and Adjustment to Economic Sanctions on South Africa**
   by Charles ELLIO.

8. **International Institutions and Economic Sanctions on South Africa**
   by Jim MORRELL.

9. **Trade Sanctions and Regional Impact on Southern Africa**
   by Bob J. DAVIES.

10. **Economic Sanctions and the South African Agricultural Sector**
    by Roger RIDDELL.

11. **The South African Manufacturing Sector and Economic Sanctions**
    by Martin FRANSMAN.

12. **Sanctions and the Mineral Industries in South Africa**
    by Roger MURRAY.

13. **Migrant Labour to South Africa: A Sanctions Program?**
    by Ruth FIRST & Robert H. DAVIES.

14. **Economic Sanctions on South Africa: Past Experience and Future Potential**
    by Duncan C. CLARKE.

To the Editor:

I must say that for the first time in some years, while now I was disappointed greatly with one of your articles. I refer to the piece on Zambia in your most recent issue ['"Zambia: The High of Price" March/April 1981.] The present regime in Lusaka has faced with problems most definitely and the responsibility must be laid at their door. But your writer goes on to say, comes perilously close to objectively aligning herself with U.S., South African and British imperialism.

Your writer tends to downplay the external threat but the fact is that Pretoria has shown little respect for the territorial integrity of Zambia; it has repeatedly violated and even occupied Zambian territory. The imperialist powers generally have been quite disturbed about President Kenneth Kaunda's month long tour of eastern Europe last year, where he received generous offers of economic and military assistance. The giants are not happy about the Lusaka regime's persistence in suing them in courts across the globe because of their massive assistance to the illegal Rhodesian administration. The machinations of right-wing figures in the banking sector of Zambia in collaboration with the notorious International Monetary Fund (IMF) is well-known that one is forced to wonder whether the explanation lies in malfeasance or nonfeasance as to why your report has omitted it.

These are perilous times in which we live but we should never forget that our area of work is southern Africa support. The vibrant African Liberation Support Committee, which played a major role in mobilizing for the huge African Liberation Day manifestations of the early 1970's, niggled at and did not support the liberation of Angola by the MPLA. The present government in Lusaka has committed itself to share of errors but to pen an article about these errors while glossing over imperialism's cruel designs is something the we of North America should avoid.

Solidarity,
Gerald C. Horne, Esq.
National Conference of Black Lawyers
New York

Subscribe to Southern Africa


Zambia


Zimbabwe

Maurice NYAGUMBO, With the People: An Autobiography from the Zimbabwe Struggle. London: Allison & Busby (6a -oef St., London W1V 3RB), 1980. 248pp. £3.95 pb. There is no North American distributor for this publication.

(Inclusion in this list does not preclude later review.)
Dear Editor:

We are writing in connection with the article in the January/February issue of Southern Africa, "Lutherans Move Toward Divestment" by Dumisani Kumalo. Thank you for the article and for the commendation given to our church.

We think that it is important for us to make two corrections in the article. First of all, the author speaks of the fact that The American Lutheran Church (ALC) is "the only denomination with five Black bishops" in South Africa. It would be more correct to say that The American Lutheran Church is related in ministry to the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa (ELCSA), a 515,000-member Black church which receives some personnel and financial support from the ALC as well as from four European-based mission agencies.

Secondly, we would like to correct the statement that "the trustees had treated Bishop Dlamini, one of the most conservative Black bishops in South Africa, to an all expense paid trip to the convention to deliver a vaguely defined address "A Black South African Speaks to the Church.""

In late 1979 it was proposed that Bishop Dlamini be invited to visit Lutheran churches in Europe and North America. Subsequently, in a February 1980 meeting, it was agreed that it would be advisable for the bishop to make two separate trips, first to North America and then later to Europe.

Since the ALC was holding its biennial convention in October 1980, it seemed appropriate to coordinate his visit to the ALC with an appearance at the convention. Unfortunately, when the invitation was issued, we did not reflect seriously enough on the possible implications of a visit during the convention in which the divestiture issue might be an important issue for the church. We suppose it is not surprising that a number of persons assumed that Bishop Dlamini had been brought to the United States for participation in the consideration of the divestiture issue. However, to the contrary, the invitation and subsequent visit of the bishop to the ALC and its convention were not intended in any way to relate to the consideration of divestiture.

Our church continues to seek effective strategies which will more effectively support those in South Africa who are struggling for justice and reconciliation.

Sincerely yours,

James L. Knutson, Secretary for Africa
Morrison A. Sorensen Jr., Director
The American Lutheran Church

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THE SHADOW KNOWS... End Loans to South Africa (ELTSA), the British Bank Campaign, has come up with a novel way to focus public attention on Barclays' substantial involvement in South Africa. It established the Barclays' "shadow board," which recently issued its first annual report. According to shadow board chairman Michael Dummett, the report summarizes the bank's support for apartheid through its investments in Soweto, its operations in illegally occupied Namibia, and by making loans. By publishing this information the shadow board hopes to provoke positive responses from shareholders and inform account holders of Barclays' activities in support of the white regime.

CAPITOL OFFENSE... The Washington, D.C. Bank Campaign vigorously denounced a recent decision to allow Riggs National Bank to open two new branches in the nation's capital.

Permission to open the branches has been held up since November, when over 100 representatives of community groups testified against Riggs' neglect of Black and working class neighborhoods' credit needs, and its increased loans to dictatorial governments abroad. Said Campaign spokesperson Karen Root, "We refuse to let human rights and basic human needs take a back seat to the current 'business first' philosophy."

B.U.F. BLASTS BOTHA, RIPS REAGAN... The National Black United Front, a grassroots national political organization, staged demonstrations in several cities across the country to protest the visit of South African foreign minister Roelof P. Botha to the US.

In New York, several hundred demonstrators marched from the United Nations to the South African mission on Wednesday, May 13. A vigil at the mission is scheduled until June 16, the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto uprising, when the BUF will head a coalition of groups organizing a demonstration on Wall Street. The Front was instrumental in pushing for the inclusion of support for African liberation and opposition to domestic racism, as formal demands at the mammoth May 3 demonstration in Washington. BUF Chairperson Rev. Herbert Daughtry accused the Reagan administration of being "now prepared to openly support South Africa's genocide."

SHAREHOLDER ACTION... Over 50 churches and religious groups holding about $29 million in corporate stock have commenced what has become an annual campaign to change the policies of American corporations doing business in South Africa. According to the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), 1981 will mark the eleventh year that church groups have filed resolutions opposing corporate activities in South Africa.

Among the corporations targeted this year are the Republic National Bank of New York and US Steel.

CROCKER KNOCKER... When Chester Crocker, the Reagan administration's resident Africa expert arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania for talks with government officials on April 10, he was undoubtedly prepared for a rough time with his hosts. Ronald Reagan's amicable overtures to the apartheid regime haven't won his administration any friends in the rest of Black Africa.

What Crocker wasn't prepared for was the small but noisy band of fellow Americans who greeted him at the airport with posters protesting the rightward shift in US policy.

The demonstrators demanded US support for sanctions against South Africa, support for genuine independence in Namibia, and no support for South African-backed UNITA guerrillas in Angola. The protesters are among the very few American expatriates in Tanzania who are not employees of the US government, and they take delight in tweaking Uncle Sam's nose whenever possible.

During Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's visit to Washington in 1979, the same group, accompanied by a Tanzanian newspaper photographer, pasted protest banners on the door of the US mission. The front page photo and the resulting uproar ruffled diplomatic feathers for months.
New Life

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erment as the key to economic self-sufficiency for the villagers as well as a method of providing a small wage income for families living there. But at this stage there are many villages that have not begun to organize co-operatives, and those that have, show differing levels of success.

The co-operatives are for cash crops such as produce or cotton and are not expected to replace subsistence agriculture at this stage. For subsistence, each family is allotted their own plot—for the most part worked by women—to provide staple foods such as rice, corn, manioc, peanuts, beans.

When the agricultural co-operatives sell their cash crops, expenses such as seed purchases and the hiring of tractors for ploughing are deducted and the remaining money divided among the cooperative members according to the number of hours and days put into work. The maximum earnings taken home by cooperative members in the villages I visited was $150 for a season's work.

For a peasant family used to no cash income at all under Portuguese rule, this small amount is welcomed and covers necessary extras such as cloth, soap, batteries, and oil. Although this meager amount of money does help supplement the people's subsistence agriculture, in the long run, the cash crop co-operatives will have to produce more surplus if they are to help solve the unemployment problems that many cooperatives face. The government at a national and district level is trying to ensure the economic development of the communal villages, but the obstacles are not easy to overcome.

For instance, the village of Vida Nova had no surplus to divide up among its 406 cooperative members this past season. The sale of cotton and cashews barely covered the cost of the tractors, and the little left over went into buying urgently needed supplies for the consumer cooperative.

The drought had ruined much of the crop, and the lack of funds for insecticide meant that insects had devoured much of the rest. In discussing the failure with me, the cooperative members seemed remarkably undefeated by this record, and were thinking of ways to make next year a better year, hoping for an end to the drought.

The 193 members of the 25 de Setembro co-operative in the same province have, in contrast, taken home a maximum of $6 each and had banked sufficient funds to begin to pay off the cost of two tractors they were buying. I ate the quality bread that the village's cooperative bakery produced and sold to other villages in the area. Their co-operative had increased to 29 head of cattle from the original nine cows and bulls "borrowed" from the Ministry of Agriculture.

It was difficult to assess why these villages—some 100 kilometers apart—each could achieve a higher level of political mobilization and motivation on the part of the villagers, coupled with more expertise coming at a district level.

The communal villages are an extension of the development work of a socialist society in Mozambique. But if life is far from the villages sober mood because of the difficulties they lie ahead, one also comes away inspired.

For the residents believe that their villages will work and they are prepared to work extraordinarily hard to ensure it. This new mode of life represents a vast change from life under the brutal colonial regime, and it brings such hope for their future and that of their children, that the people's enthusiasm is infectious.

And in their songs they sing with feeling: Kaamambo, FRELIMO! Kaamambo! Thank you, FRELIMO! Thank you Samora Machel.

Oil Embargo

continued from page 11

sold directly from a major oil exporting country. They also note that one-third of the tankers were owned or chartered by either Shell (26), Mobil (13), or Texaco (12), all three of which are companies with major holdings in South Africa.

The report also points out that 45 of the 150 ships were sailing under the Liberian flag of convenience—a procedure in which a ship owned by a company in one country can register the ship in another country and thus avoid countries with heavy taxes on ship registration or control. The second most popular flag was Norway's (27 ships).

The Organization of African Unity is now investigating ways in which countries which grant flags of convenience can get more effective control over these ships.

Over half of the ships were managed by companies in either the Unite...
Kingdom, Norway, or the United States. These three countries also owned a majority of the tankers. While only about a third of the tankers were known to have been chartered, some may have been under charter secretly. Once again, most of the known chartering companies were based in the same three countries.

The Shipping Research Bureau concludes, "There seems little doubt that South Africa is obtaining much of its crude oil from the major oil-exporting countries of the world, most of which have placed an embargo on supplies to South Africa. One oil company—Shell—appears to be particularly involved in supplies to South Africa."

"In a few cases," the report then adds, "it is hard to believe that the government(s) in question are unaware of the situation. In other cases it appears likely that the oil companies... are giving the governments in question false information."

The report was released on March 11, the same day that the chairperson of both the Shipping Research Bureau and the Working Group Karia, Cor Groenendijk, testified before the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid.

**Front Line continued from page 5**

abandoned her campaign pledge to recognize the Muzorewa-Smith government.

This isolation will continue to be important for the struggles in Namibia and South Africa. South Africa's friends will find it more difficult to help the apartheid state. International sanctions are of limited value, especially when neighbors like Mozambique and Zimbabwe cannot afford to enforce them against South Africa.

Sanctions will, however, be turned toward the British and the Americans, as key African states threaten to cut off mineral supplies if Western support for apartheid continues. Nigeria nationalized British Petroleum in a move which undoubtedly helped Prime Minister Thatcher listen at the Commonwealth Conference. President Shagari has hinted he may also be forced to remove British goods from the Nigerian market or cut the oil supply to the US.

Gulf Oil is worried about the same response from Angola if the Reagan administration resumes aid for rebel leader Jonas Savimbi and if South Africa is encouraged in its second Angolan war (see *Southern Africa*, March/April 1981).

Front line strength also derives from the weakness of its opponents. South Africa brags that it is self-sufficient militarily, much more capable than Rhodesia in defending its interests. Certainly the statistics are ominous (See *Southern Africa*, January-February 1981). But statistics measure only the sum of weapons, and Americans do not have to be reminded of the futility of throwing tons of equipment against an organized, mass-based resistance. And this organized resistance does not stop at the South African border. A major strength of the front line states has been the mobilized and organized peoples of Mozambique and Angola.

The isolation of South Africa is already affecting its economy, South Africa definitely dominates the region, but even with a strong gold price the Republic's continued growth depends on larger markets. Pretoria's plan for a "constellation of states" outlines regional coordination to promote this growth. One African journalist calls it "a scheme to bring independent states under the same political, economic and military domination by the apartheid regime as the bantustans."

The front line states, however, have rejected the constellation framework and the states are now transforming their political success into economic coordination. The front line states have formed the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference.

The first priority of this new coordinating body is to build a regional transport and communication infrastructure not dependent on South Africa. The coordination will be comprehensive: agricultural research, food security, industrial development, technical cooperation, energy and manpower. The states poignantly know the difficulty of surviving alone: They know the political success of the front line states and also the history of failure of regional economic cooperation on the African continent. Their immediate goals are therefore modest and tangible, but the agenda for the 1980s is regional cooperation for economic survival.

The front line states have not provided liberation for Zimbabwe, nor for themselves. That struggle is long, lasting years beyond any armed struggle. Zimbabwe is not yet free from colonial economic linkages which impede its development: foreign control of mines, inequitable land distribution, and trade dependence on South Africa. The problems are similar for all of the front line states.

Yet the front line states provided crucial military and logistic support for the armed struggle. Tanzanians and Mozambicans even fought and died with ZANU guerrillas. In addition, these states provided important diplomatic unity to support the Patriotic Front in negotiations for political independence. Zimbabwe is not yet economically free, but it is the Zimbabwean people who are now directing their state toward liberation through coordinated development with the other front line states.
The 31 year old pilot was working for a small Florida-based firm, Globe Aero, and according to the firm was flying a single-engine Piper Cherokee 'Arrow to Cape Town when he disappeared on February 4. Globe Aero describes itself as a ferry service that delivers small aircraft to purchasers abroad.

The Angolan government, however, maintains that Tyler was a veteran CIA officer who worked in Iran as an adviser to the shah's secret police and who also worked in South Korea. Tyler's mother told the Washington Post that Tyler did serve in South Korea and Iran, but she claims he was an Army medical officer. He resigned in 1978 and, after flight training, joined Globe Aero in 1979.

Last year a Globe Aero pilot on a similar flight, was reported to have had oil pressure problems and landed in Angola. That pilot was held by the Angolan authorities for six months and then released. According to Globe Aero, Tyler had already ferried planes to South Africa about 25 times before this flight.

The SOUTH AFRICAN government confiscated Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu's passport shortly after he returned from a five week tour of western Europe and the US in late April. While on the tour, Tutu, an outspoken critic of South Africa's apartheid system, made repeated reference to the need for economic pressure in South Africa and reportedly referred to apartheid as "the most vicious system since Nazism."

Prime Minister P.W. Botha was following up a threat when he revoked the bishop's passport on April 6, seven days after Tutu's return.

During his visit to the US, Tutu spoke with Jeane Kirkpatrick, US ambassador to the UN, gave a sermon at Riverside Church in New York, and met with church leaders in Washington and New York.

Bishop Tutu has been in trouble for his public statements before. He had his passport revoked in 1979 after he urged the Netherlands to boycott South African coal. During his recent trip, however, Tutu stopped short of calling explicitly for sanctions against Pretoria, a statement that would be a criminal offense under the country's sweeping terrorism act.

The Bishop's passport was withdrawn only seven hours after Chester Crocker, the US assistant secretary of state designate, ended his April visit to South Africa.

The Pan-Africanist Congress of Africa (PAC) has a new national chairman. Veteran nationalist John Nyathi Pokela, 58, served thirteen years in South Africa's notorious Robben Island prison before his release last year.

He replaces Vusumzi L. Maki, who headed the organization for two years after the expulsion of acting chairman Potlako Leballo, in 1979 amidst charges of corruption and negligence during his tenure at the helm of the troubled liberation movement.

Pokela assumes the leadership of a seriously divided and weakened organization. The arrest and eventual conviction of eighteen members of the underground PAC in 1978, followed closely by the death of PAC founder Robert Sobukwe hurt the PAC inside South Africa.

Leballo further disabled the PAC by expelling 72 members of the external wing in July 1978. In 1979, the PAC's UN representative David Sibeko, widely regarded as the PAC's most effective spokesperson, was assassinated in Tanzania by members of his own organization. The trial of seven PAC guerrillas for his murder is still continuing.

In an interview shortly after his appointment, Pokela spoke confidently about the prospects for unity, both within the PAC and with the other forces for liberation in South Africa, including the ANC (African National Congress).

Because of his long prison term and stature as a close associate of Sobukwe and founding member of the PAC, Pokela has avoided any identification with the PAC's feuding external factions. He also reported that discussions with jailed ANC leaders during his imprisonment, including Nelson Mandela, has led to an agreement of "unity in principle" between the ANC and PAC.

Significantly, one of Pokela's first official acts as chairman was to reinstate the 72 members expelled in 1978.

The South African army has stepped up its recruitment of !Kung Bushmen in southwestern Botswana and a number of anthropologists estimate that approximately 3000 of these people have joined the army.

The South Africans use the !Kung's "substantial tracking skills" to monitor SWAPO guerrillas movements along a border between Namibia and Botswana.

South Africa's ability to recruit the !Kung can be explained, at least in part,
the Bushmen's social and economic conditions in Botswana. Increasing material scarcity in the !Kung's Kalahari desert homeland in northwest Botswana forced these traditional hunter-gatherer people into nearby job markets where they were met by low wages and discrimination. The transition from desert to town began in the early seventies, and also marked the beginning of the South African army recruitment efforts.

Faced with unemployment and a new hostile environment, the Bushmen were easy prey for recruiters. Originally, the recruits were paid simply to monitor SWAPO troop movements along the Namibia-Angola border. Richard Lee, an anthropologist who spent seventeen years in Botswana, characterized the !Kung as "virtual prisoners of the army, dependent on them for their water, weekly rations, and other supplies."

Botswana government officials have expressed concern about the cooperation of the !Kung with the South African army and, while acknowledging their impoverished conditions in Botswana, are reported to be planning programs to improve the Bushmen's situation. These programs, combined with the dangers of war, may eventually put a damper on the !Kung involvement with the South African army.

Explosives laid by African National Congress guerrillas knocked out two transformers in a power station nine miles south of Durban, South Africa. The bombs exploded at 12:30 a.m. on Tuesday, April 21 at the Durban South substation in the Black township of Lamontville. Eight blasts occurred in all, resulting in damage estimated at over $3 million.

Hundreds of factories around Durban were temporarily shut down the next day until power could be restored. Thousands of residents in the area were also without electricity the following day.

According to South African security police the explosives used were limpet type mines with timing devices attached (similar to the type explosives used in the Sasol blasts last summer).

The ANC acknowledged in a statement released on April 22, that the sabotage operation was carried out by guerrillas from the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe. "This operation reaffirms our commitment to destroy this Republic and replace it with a democratic, non-racial and united republic of all the people of South Africa."

According to United Press International, one week before the explosions at Durban another incident occurred in the Richards Bay area 155 miles north of Durban. An explosion took out a large section of railroad track and derailed five freight cars. According to a railroad spokesman, "We suspect sabotage and are centering our investigations in this area. It appears to be the work of Black nationalists."

No injuries were reported and no arrests have been made in connection with either of the two incidents.

THE MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT has announced plans to make family planning available, free of charge, to any woman who asks for it, the Mozambique Information Agency announced in early 1981. The aim of the move, according to Dr. Teresa Aravjo, the head of family planning for the ministry of health, is to reduce the very high maternal and infant death and disease rates. At the moment as many as one-half of all Mozambican children die before they reach the age of five.

Although Mozambique—a relatively sparsely populated country—has no policy to reduce births as such, the government does hope that through this program they can encourage women to space their pregnancies by about two years.

Doctors report that at present few women ask for contraceptive help; far more ask for fertility advice, particularly when they do not become pregnant soon after a previous childbirth.

As a first step in the family planning program, 150 nurse-midwives will begin their training this year. The government hopes to begin setting up infant health centers by the end of 1984. Because the program is still not fully functioning the goals for the next few years are modest: by 1984 the government hopes to have 45,000 participants out of the 550,000 women who become pregnant every year.

The People's Assembly of Mozambique has made final adjustments on the country's $1.3 billion budget. The government's determination to win the battle against underdevelopment is clearly reflected in the budget allocations. Over half of the 1981 budget is earmarked for infrastructure and capital investments. With additional outside funding, Mozambique expects to invest nearly $900 million in the coming year.

Industry and energy will receive $200 million, the largest allocation of state investment funds to any single sector. Agriculture, defense, transportation, health, and education will also take sizable slices of the pie.

Investment decisions were made with two top priorities in mind, to increase production of key exports (cashews, sugars, cotton, prawns, timber, and tea) and to assure an adequate supply of consumer goods, particularly food, to Mozambique's drought-striken populace.

The economy still suffers from the wholesale flight of skilled Portuguese labor and the destruction of industrial and agricultural equipment by the fleeing settlers.

GUINEA-BISSAU IS FACING a 70,000 ton food deficit this year, according to Agence France Presse. The shortfall, a result of the loss of between 70 and 80 percent of this year's harvest, has caused the country to seek additional international assistance.

Discontent over food production and distribution has been cited as a major cause of the coup which ousted the Luis Cabral government last year (see Southern Africa, March/April, 1981).

The new government seeks to alleviate the food shortage by attempting to revive the languishing rural economy, which was neglected by the Portuguese and disrupted by the liberation struggle. Since independence the rural economy has continued to stagnate and Guinea-Bissau has faced continuing food shortages.

The new government hopes that by emphasizing resource development, Guinea-Bissau's reliance on foreign aid (which accounts for 75 percent of its budget) and its balance of payments deficit (which reached $45 million in 1979) can be substantially reduced.

The International Development Association has granted Guinea-Bissau a $6.8 million loan credit to be used for oil prospecting. Bauxite, phosphates, timber, and fishing are also hoped-for sources of increased revenue.