The Mozambique National Resistance:

South Africa's Terrorist Army

Tanzania 8 shs. Mozambique 35 Meticais. UK 60p.
Act In Solidarity With Black South Africans:
The following entertainers have performed in South Africa. We must not let them perform in our communities.

- America
- Bob Anderson
- Paul Anka
- David Baca
- Josephine Baker
- Cliff Barnes
- Shirley Bassey
- George Benson
- Brook Benton
- C.L. Blast
- Ernest Bourgine
- Beach Boys
- Gwen Brisco
- Shirley Brown
- Nina Burrell
- Glen Campbell
- Colin Carr
- Clarence Carter
- Monk Channing
- Ray Charles
- Cher
- Jimmy Cliff
- Cher
- Billy Cobham
- Pete & Conte Condoli
- Rita Coolidge
- Chick Corea
- Andrew Crouch
- Henry "Manolito" Darrow
- Joe Dolan
- Lou Donaldson
- Lamont Dozier
- The Drifters
- Jack duPree
- Ecstasy Passion & Pain
- Carla Fontana
- George Forest
- Midel Fox
- Buddy de Franco
- Aretha Franklin
- Gloria Gaynor
- Terry Gibbs
- Nikki Giovanni
- Francis Grier
- Richard Hatch
- Goldie Hawn
- Isaac Hayes
- Joe Henderson
- Howard Hesseman
- "Dr. Johnny Fever"
- Jimmy Bo Horne
- Susan Howard
- Janis Ian
- David Jackson
- Millie Jackson
- Willis "Gator Tail" Jackson
- Jack Jones
- Tom Jones
- Fern Kinney
- Eartha Kitt
- Louis Lane
- Jiame Laredo
- Mary Larkin
- Jerry Loren
- Main Ingredient
- Peter Mancier Dancers & Reborn
- Ann Margaret
- Johnny Mathis
- Mattison Brothers
- Curtis Mayfield
- George McCrae
- Mighty Clouds of Joy
- Stephanie Mills
- Liza Minnelli
- Monk Montgomery
- James Moody
- Olivia Newton-John
- Linda Oliphant
- Osmonds
- Charles Pace
- Wilson Pickett
- The Platters
- Barbara Ray
- Helen Reddy
- Della Reese
- Tim Reid "Venus Flytrap"
- Richard Roundtree
- Telly Savalas
- Leo Sayer
- Shirley Scott
- George Shearing
- Sha Na Na
- Frank Sinatra
- Percy Sledge
- Jimmy Smith
- Diane Solomon
- The Staple Singers
- Edwin Starr
- Candi Staton
- Dakota Staton
- The Supremes
- Brian Tariff
- The Temptations
- Rufus Thomas
- Timmy Thomas
- Bross Townsend
- Tina Turner
- Stanley Turrentine
- Two Tons of Fun
- The Variations
- Village People
- Lovelace Watkins
- Al Wilson
- Jimmy Witherspoon
- Betty Wright
- Robert Wright
- The Younghearts
- Effrem Zimbalist, Jr.

This list is based on a list compiled by two New York City based organizations, the Patrice Lumumba Coalition and AJASS, based on research done by Michael C. Beau-bien. For further information see article in this issue.
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Bushed

United States Vice President George Bush visited seven African countries last month as part of an administration effort to polish Washington's tarnished image on the continent.

African leaders are unhappy with the Reagan administration's policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa. Despite America's public accommodation, with Pretoria, they note, apartheid is alive and well in South Africa and, to date, Pretoria has shown no measurable interest in relinquishing control over Namibia.

Before his trip, which included stops in Cape Verde, Senegal, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Zaire as well as Kenya, the vice president said his tour would focus on US economic relations with Black Africa. But, except for defending US backing for the recent $1.1 billion International Monetary Fund loan to South Africa, economics were way down on the list when Bush gave what was described as a major address on US-African relations in Nairobi, Kenya, on November 19.

"The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola in a parallel framework with South Africa's departure from Namibia is the key to the settlement we all desire," said Bush. "My government is not ashamed to state the US interest in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola."

Before he left on his trip, Bush had billed the tour as a chance to "learn what key African leaders are thinking." But Bush apparently wasn't interested in learning. In October, the Angolan government had reaffirmed its rejection of the Cuban linkage, noting that with South African forces openly operating inside Angola a withdrawal of Cuban troops would be tantamount to national suicide.

And at a press conference in Nigeria while Bush was visiting, Nigerian Vice President Alex Ekwueze also openly opposed the American policy towards the Cubans in Angola. Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe told the American vice-president that Black Africa did not support the linking of Cuban troops with Namibian independence and appealed to the Reagan administration to "side with Africa" on the issue of Namibian independence.

Prisoner Swap

After two years and four false starts, a complicated prisoner swap has brought the release of 94 Angolan soldiers from South African prison camps. The soldiers, captured over the course of South Africa's six-year war of aggression against Angola, were freed in exchange for two American mercenaries captured by MPLA forces during the CIA effort to overthrow the Angolan government in 1975, and a suspected CIA agent captured in Angola in 1981.

Two Soviet airmen held by South African-backed UNITA guerrillas, as well as a Soviet technician and a Cuban soldier held by South Africa were also released. Pretoria's return of the bodies of four Soviets killed during its massive "Operation Protea" invasion of Angola in 1981, and the release of the bodies of three South African troops killed in Angola completed the intricate deal.

Commenting on the US role in the swap, a State Department source told Southern Africa that US officials seeking the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola had raised the issue of a trade for the Americans, mercenaries Gary Acker and Gustavo Grillo, and former Globe Aero pilot Geoffrey Tyler, with MPLA officials in August 1981. The same source said the US was particularly active in persuading UNITA to participate.

He attributed the success of the exchange, which also involved the International Red Cross, to "progress" in the intractable Namibia negotiations. He also noted that the deal offered something for everybody, ranging from propaganda value for UNITA, to an opportunity to make points in the Western press for both South Africa and Angola.

Namibia Talks

When asked in late October to comment on US reports of an imminent conclusion to the drawn out negotiations over Namibian independence, SWAPO UN observer Theo Ben-Gurirab non-
dryly, "Yes, we have finally reached an agreement over Namibia. We all agree that the current negotiations are completely, unconditionally and unilaterally deadlocked—on all issues." And at press time, nearly all parties to the talks were pronouncing them stalled over US and South African demands for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and the rejection of those demands by virtually everybody else—including some members of the Western "Contact Group" negotiating team.

Everybody, that is, except Washington's top Africa adviser, Dr. Chester Crocker. Following a November 1 meeting with South African officials in Pretoria, Crocker denied that the talks were in trouble. "The negotiations are continuing," he said, "and none of the parties have indicated that they wish the effort to halt."

But perhaps he should have asked South Africa's defense minister, General Magnus Malan, for a second opinion.

In late October, Malan told a group of Cape Town businessmen that South Africa would not accept any settlement leading to a victory by SWAPO, the Namibian liberation movement. Referring to SWAPO, Malan said, "If there is a free election in South West Africa, I am certain which party will win."

Appealing to Cold War anxieties, Pretoria and Washington, Malan called SWAPO "a communist organisation that would raise a "red flag" in the capital of Windhoek. Namibia's "fear" Malan argued, would doom Botswana and Zimbabwe. South Africa was not prepared to withdraw from Namibia, he concluded, because the "operational area," which currently includes northern Namibia and southern Angola, would simply move south to South Africa's own borders.

Malan's remarks, added to the continuing American and South African opposition over the Cuban presence in Angola, tend to corroborate views that South Africa, with Washington's blessing, is stalling until conditions in Namibia become favorable enough to push through an apartheid-sponsored independence. Recently, South Africa conceded the failure of attempts to replace the current white-led internal government with a Black coalition headed by South African-appointed Ovambo chief Peter Kalangula.
US Entertainers: In Step With Apartheid

Over 200 angry demonstrators turned out in front of the Beacon Theater in New York to protest a recent Ray Charles concert.

Music giant Ray Charles always draws a crowd, but they're usually there with tickets—not pickets. Yet that's what happened on October 23 when 200 angry demonstrators picketed a Ray Charles concert at New York's Beacon Theater to protest the singer's 1980 tour of South Africa. Organized by two Black community organizations in New York, the Patrice Lumumba Coalition and the Black United Front (BUF), the October action is only the latest example of the international effort to enforce a boycott of entertainers, athletes and other cultural figures who perform in apartheid South Africa.

As the list on the inside front cover suggests, a growing number of American entertainers, both Black and white, are making the trek to South Africa in pursuit of the lucrative contracts apartheid promoters are prepared to offer.

Legitimacy From Tours

What do South Africa's whites get for their money—besides relief from Beverly Hillbillies reruns on the single state-run television channel? The answer would appear to be legitimacy. As the web of international boycotts, condemnations and expulsions steadily isolates the regime, the political importance of sports and cultural contacts grows apace. Regular tours by popular American entertainers—particularly Black American entertainers—are used by South Africa's apologists to polish its image abroad and lend credence to South Africa's claim to political and cultural membership in the Western camp. And most performers, ignorant of or indifferent to the political ramifications of their tours, are happy to oblige.

Defending his presence in South Africa in 1980, Ray Charles told a Cape Town reporter, "I don't live here. I know that every country I have been in has some kind of problem, so what's the big deal?"

The same year, when soul singer Millie Jackson was asked if she planned to perform in Soweto, the Johannesburg Black township whose name became an international symbol of resistance to apartheid after bloody street battles between unarmed students and the apartheid army, she replied: "Soweto? Where is that place? I've never heard of it... I'm not going to mix my career with politics. All I want is the money."

Such public demonstrations of insensitivity have gone a long way toward mobilizing Black opposition inside South Africa. The combined efforts of two national Black political organizations, the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), and a cultural group, MDALI, forced the cancellation of two Ray Charles concerts—including a concert scheduled for Soweto on October 19, 1980, a day of mourning for Black South Africans in memory of a brutal government crack-down in 1977. Charles' entourage was later attacked by students in the Black township of Welkom.

The O'Jays also ran afoul of the AZAPO boycott. Their April 1981 tour of South Africa collapsed after political pressure prompted low attendance at their concerts. Their manager was briefly held by the government until their bills were paid. The O'Jays, under pressure at home, have apologized for breaking the boycott and pledged never to return (See Southern Africa, October 1982).

In a formal appeal to foreign artists, AZAPO asked for "total support and commitment in our move to have South Africa completely isolated in sports, culture and foreign investments... in order to pressurize the racist minority regime into implementing fundamental changes inside the country."

"Artists who come to South Africa are insensitive to our feelings and are im-
bued with capitalistic greed," AZAPO continued. "Granted, many of them are talented in the field of music and are regarded as heroes by our people, but must they stoop so low by siding with the enemy of humanity?"

Impact on Black Population

Even more disturbing, local organizers point out, is the impact of visiting Blacks on the Black population. They come "to give us a song so that we should feel all is well in an obviously abnormal society," said one MDALI organizer. AZAPO, in a nationally circulated position paper, denounced foreign performances because "for a while Black people can feel equal to whites, sitting side by side...while the law regards them as unequals. After the show, Blacks are faced by the terrible laws that are laid down for them—curfew laws, [and] influx control, to mention a few."

MDALI Secretary General Zakes Mozokeng singled out Jackson for special criticism: "MDALI once admired Millie Jackson as an artist, but now she has shrunk to the size of apartheid. We no longer care for her...and that goes for all the other artists who come here to enhance the system of apartheid."

Some artists have even enlisted in South African government efforts to discredit its internal opposition and sell its apartheid policies abroad. Lee Variety, head of the Black American singing group The Temptations, described AZAPO as "opportunists without a body," echoing government claims that South African Blacks would be happy with the status quo were it not for a few isolated "communist agitators."

Bantustans Option

But with the heat on artists who perform in South Africa's urban areas, more and more entertainers are latching onto a new expedient—the bantustans. South Africa's policy of "separate development" for these impoverished and overcrowded fragments of land is at the heart of the apartheid system. Covering only thirteen percent of the land, these tribal "homelands" have been designated by the whites as the only place where the 72 percent of South Africa's citizens who are Black will ever be allowed to exercise any political rights.

As each of the ten bantustans is forced to accept a powerless paper "independence," the people assigned to be its citizens by the white minority are automatically stripped of their South African citizenship, even though many of them have never set foot in their so-called "homeland." When the last bantustan is declared independent, there will, in theory, be no more Black South Africans at all, only "foreign workers" in the 87 percent of South Africa served for the whites. Since 1960, more than three million Blacks have been forced from their homes in the white areas and dumped in barren resettlement camps in the bantustans.

The apartheid regime has spent millions of dollars trying to convince the world of the legitimacy of its bantustan policy, but without success. No other country has recognized the bantustans as truly independent. As recently as October, the Reagan administration, chose Pretoria over any US government official, affirmed that the bantustans are an integral part of South Africa.

But Frank Sinatra knows better. Sinatra's press agent, Lee Solters, tried to argue that Sinatra's $1.79 million gig at the posh, white-owned Sun City gambling and resort casino in "independent" Bophuthatswana bantustan, was a positive contribution to racial justice. Sinatra's tour, Solters boasted, was "an effort to make known to the world, especially those concerned with civil rights, the importance of South Africa's independence of Bophuthatswana."

Bophuthatswana as an independent country is the right step for their future development, Solters added that he "couldn't give a shit" about the views of the Africans at position, including those of the South African liberation movements and the Organization of African Unity.

Attracted by the money, and sheltered by Bophuthatswana's fictional independence, Liza Minnelli and, as of December 2, Dolly Parton, are among the top US performers to have appeared at Sun City. Sun City promoters are careful to integrate the audiences—even if that means busing in Blacks to fill the empty seats. Their tickets are free, since the price may be double the average Black Bophuthatswana's monthly wage.

However, there are indications the entertainers are beginning to feel sensitive to being tied to South Africa. In November, Parton's press agent, Beverly Magid told Southern Africa Porky's "would never go to South Africa. She's going to an independent country in southern Africa." When challenged, Magid insisted that Bophuthatswana was not part of South Africa, and said she was unaware of a boycott.
The activities of the so-called Mozambique National Resistance have begun to receive considerable attention in the Western press during the last year. There are increasing reports of MNR attacks on communal villages, trains, rail lines, power lines, buses, harbor installations and foreign aid projects. There remains, however, a great deal of confusion about what the MNR is and whom, if anyone, it represents.

To understand the MNR, one must look at the situation which is now developing throughout southern Africa. In the following articles, Sean Gervasi and Barbara and Allen Isaacman look at the MNR in the context of the larger crisis which now grips that region.

by Sean Gervasi

The internal crisis in the Republic of South Africa today dominates the politics of the whole of southern Africa. Pressures for change in South Africa are becoming irresistible, threatening to sweep away the whole system of apartheid. Awareness of these pressures, and of the successes of the African National Congress in mounting military and diplomatic opposition to the apartheid regime, have badly frightened South Africa’s white rulers. Like other minorities seeking desperately to maintain a hold on power, they increasingly see the threat to apartheid as an external one.

Thus the Afrikaner state is now projecting its own internal crisis outwards. Pretoria appears convinced that internal pressure for change depends largely on external support. The problem, in the Afrikaner view, is not the oppressive character of apartheid, but rather is that "subversive forces" are mounting an assault from outside the country—where they have friends, money, and secure bases. The best way to preserve apartheid, in this view, is to persuade—or force—South Africa’s neighbors to cease their support for the liberation struggle. South Africa recognizes persuasion alone will not end the frontline states’ determination to bring an end to apartheid. So South Africa has turned to making war.

The apartheid state is today engaged in a war across the whole of the subcontinent, mounting overt and covert attacks on all its neighbors; from the south Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, it has turned to waging a new kind of warfare, which might be called "permanent limited war." This kind of warfare does not necessarily involve the full use of overwhelming military power or permanent occupations of territory. Rather it uses military power "economically"—in limited amounts against important objectives. Often that power is used invisibly. Its main objective is to destroy the economic system of an opposing country, thereby creating serious internal political troubles.

This "permanent limited war" may seem less dangerous than all-out aggression. It is nonetheless all-out war aimed at bringing South Africa's adversaries to their knees.

South Africa, encouraged by the support of some Western countries, may actually be hoping to overthrow the governments of certain of its neighbors in order to install more submissive regimes in their place.

Origins of the MNR

The Western press tends to describe the MNR as a "guerrilla" organization, an "insurgent" group, and as the leaders of a "rebellion" against the present government of Mozambique. These descriptions are misleading for they ignore the key issue—that the MNR is actually a South African creature, directed, supplied, trained and assisted in the field by

Mozambican troops surveying weapons captured after FRELIMO overran a major MNR base at Garagua in December 1981.
South African military intelligence. As a political movement, it is an illusion created by propaganda. In reality, it is nothing more than an extension of the South African army, a "second army" which is being used to attack the government and people of Mozambique.

Gordon Winter, a former South African intelligence agent, makes it clear that the MNR was a foreign creation from the beginning, although former Rhodesian and South African intelligence agents differ on which agency was originally responsible for the idea. In his book, *Inside BOSS*, Winter says that the MNR was created by South African Military Intelligence and Rhodesian Intelligence in 1976. Created as a "fake Black liberation movement in Mozambique," it was intended, according to Winter, to wage war against ZANU's army, ZANLA, inside Mozambique during the war for the liberation of Zimbabwe.

According to Winter, in its early stages, the MNR "existed in name only" and was used by South African propagandists to mislead international opinion and disguise actions carried out by South African "Reconnaissance Commandos." Twenty or thirty Mozambicans were eventually recruited and sent into Mozambique to show that the MNR "really existed." But Pretoria continued to ferry large amounts of arms and ammunition into Mozambique, and "white advisers were sent regularly to brief new recruits," according to Winter.

This account is essentially corroborated by Ken Flower, the former head of Rhodesian Intelligence, although Flower claims the MNR was really a Rhodesian creation. According to him, the South African role, in the early stages, was relatively minor. In a recent interview he described the formation of the MNR as the Rhodesian reply to Mozambican support for the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front. Mozambican officials believe that the Flower account is the more accurate one.

Flower and Winter agree that, at the time of Zimbabwe's independence, South African military intelligence took control of the MNR. According to Flower, after the 1979 Lancaster House agreement ended the Zimbabwean independence struggle, the British forced Rhodesia to cease its support for the MNR and ordered that MNR forces be sent out of Rhodesia. There were then believed to be approximately 1,000 men in the MNR, and hundreds left for South Africa in 1980. MNR groups inside Mozambique were ordered to the south near Espungabera, where they built a large base at remote Sitatonga mountain. By the early spring of 1980, most of the MNR had left Zimbabwe for South Africa or had gone to the new base at Sitatonga.

Confronting the "Second Army"

In the months which followed Zimbabwe's independence, the government of Mozambique, aware that South Africa had taken control of the operation, made a concerted effort to push the MNR out of the country. The MNR radio, *Voz da Africa Livre*, began broadcasting from the northern Transvaal in June 1980. South Africa began to re-supply the main base at Sitatonga at the same time. It was clear that the MNR presented a potential threat to Mozambique's security.

In June 1980, the Mozambican army, FPLM, captured the new MNR base at Sitatonga, after considerable fighting. According to the FPLM, nearly 600 MNR men were killed or captured in the battle there. Large quantities of South African arms and equipment were seized. Only three or four hundred MNR cadres were left inside Mozambique and the organization was crippled and without leaders.

During 1981, South Africa made another major effort to build up the MNR. New recruits were found among the former colonial troops of Portugal and Rhodesia. Young Mozambicans from the central and rural areas were kidnapped and impressed into service. "Recruits" who sought to escape were shot. The families of those who were kidnapped were threatened and forced to provide food and other supplies.

With expanding numbers, the MNR was able to step up its activities. In mid-1981, its main areas of operation were in Manica and Sofala provinces, which lie astride the road and rail links from Beira to Malawi and Zimbabwe. Most actions at the time were small-scale. They involved laying mines on rural roads, minor ambushes, the burning of country stores and schools, and threats against peasants.

Towards the end of 1981, however, MNR attacks became more serious. Major bridges were dynamited. Harvesting installations at Beira were blown up. The MNR was also infiltrating outlying rural areas, including Inhambane, Sofala and Sofala, Tete and Zambezia provinces, to the north of Manica and Sofala.

The main area in which the MNR was then operating, in the center of the country, was a vast and underpopulated region. It contained less than 25 percent of Mozambique's twelve million people. But MNR activity was beginning to cause concern. The government therefore launched a major offensive against the MNR during the latter part of 1981.

This culminated in an important battle at Garagua, in Manica province, in the first week of December, when the Mozambican army captured the operational headquarters of the MNR, a large base more than one mile in diameter with cabins and supplies for more than 1,000 men.

MNR Regroups

Despite the Garagua defeat, the MNR continued to expand its activities in 1982. By the beginning of this year, it was carrying out attacks in Gaza province, to the west of Inhambane along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border. Most of these were aimed at sowing fear among peasants and at reducing road traffic. The infiltration of Gaza presented a threat to the railroad from Zimbabwe to Maputo and the agricultural production in the Limpopo valley. MNR activity in Tete and Zambezia also began to increase.

In June, MNR ambushes of road traffic in Tete had become so frequent that transport companies stopped using secondary roads. Other MNR actions in 1982 include attacking trains, raiding communal villages and destroying residents and stores. Power lines from Mozambique's hydro-electric power station were also cut.

MNR attacks are not random. They are calculated to disrupt the economy and terrorize the population.

It is clear from these examples that the MNR has two objectives: to disrupt the economy and to terrorize the population.

Attacks on the transport system have created serious problems in moving traffic to and from Malawi and Zimbabwe, as well as landlocked countries which are dependent on rail and road outlets to the

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Terrorist Army

Indian Ocean. They have also affected the distribution of food and the availability of spare parts in several areas. Such attacks threaten Mozambique's earnings of foreign exchange from export crops. They inhibit foreign investment and aid, and they frighten cooperatives—foreign aid workers who are needed to run important development projects.

The terror practiced against rural communities has been particularly ugly. MNR forces have cut off lips, ears and breasts to terrorize peasants. They have killed people indiscriminately. They have stuffed dead bodies in wells to poison supplies of water. Such actions heighten the fear and anxiety already created by economic disruption. And they sometimes weaken the confidence of the people in the government.

The MNR's actions are military rather than political. They are aimed at creating havoc in the country—not at mobilizing political support. In fact, the MNR has no discernible political program. An organization which wages war against a people, disrupting transport, creating shortages and killing at random, can scarcely hope to gather much popular support. It may force people in some remote areas to provide it with food or intelligence. But it cannot build a political movement, much less mount a challenge to FRELIMO, which, after all, led the Mozambican people to independence. The aim of the MNR is simply terror and destruction. And this fact clearly points to the South African hand behind it all.

When the Mozambicans captured the MNR base at Garagua, evidence there showed clearly that the base was manned by South African instructors, supplied from South Africa and in constant communication with MNR units in various parts of Mozambique. The large quantities of arms and equipment captured there were primarily South African and Portuguese in origin. The base contained a helicopter pad, with many 200-gallon drums of helicopter fuel. Among the captured documents were the passports of South African combat instructors. Other documents contained extensive information on South African military support for the MNR.

Evidence from the documents and other sources indicated that:

* The MNR has at least one and possibly two rear bases in South Africa.
* One rear base is integrated with the facilities of the Voz da Africa Livre in northern Transvaal.
* MNR receives significant aid from South African military intelligence.
* A South African brigadier is in charge of the MNR radio.
* A South African colonel is the liaison to the MNR leadership and may be in command of the rear base.

- MNR bases in Mozambique, or at least some of them, are supplied by air from South Africa.
- South African military intelligence supplies technical specialists and combat instructors to the MNR.

There is plenty of other evidence of South African involvement in the MNR. Many South African helicopters and supply planes have been sighted in areas of Mozambique where the MNR is

continued on page 10
Ode to aunt Mary

For seventeen years
she had to live in isolation
among her community

For seventeen years
she had to stay in the prison
that was the Transvaal

For seventeen years
she had to wear the heavy shawl
of a banned person

A banned woman
A banned wife
A banned black-mother

Up to her dying day
shown no mercy
up to her dying day

And some claim
this is a Christian country
and others claim
this is a Christian government

But we know it is not
and so does Aunt Mary Moodley*
and all those restricted
and listed persons
hundreds and more
who wear the claw-marks
scratched crimson on their lives
by a "Christian law"!

Anonymous

*Mary Moodley... on 23rd October, 1979, Aunt Mary Moodley passed away, leaving a rich history of struggle emanating from her deep warmth and love for people and an even deeper hatred of the system that wrecked, then discarded humans. Grass-root organiser, arrests, banning order after another did not stop her.
No more words now

I get your point precise lady, gentleman of the world
you say you know
apartheid is a crime against
humanity
and you are part of it

I realise your argument
that it is certainly indefensible
to give approximately 87% of our country
to about 13% of the population
that originally came from
where
you unfortunately are part of

I read but scorn your logic though
that violence begets violence
when you supply guns and money
to those who had them, have had them and have them,
that two wrongs don't make a right
when countless times
you veto my freedom
at the United Nations
that diplomacy works wonders
when you fatten on the blood of my people
in that part of the
world
you unfortunately are part of

But my point argument and logic come
from piles of dead bodies
and the necks struggling under the yoke
ask them what they think of me
"a nice girl like you" as you put it
when I shoulder with pride
this AK 47
ask what they think of you
and your cocktail party wisdom
"a nice person like you"

No more words now
till our Nurenberg trials
judge the rallies
and weigh Munich

Lerato Kumalo

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Malibongwe
ANC Women:
Poetry Is Also Their Weapon
Edited by Sono Molefe
African National Congress
Malibongwe is available for $6.00 from
the ANC Mission to the UN: 801 Second
Ave. Suite #401 N.Y., N.Y. 10017
active. South African helicopters have actually been seen landing near MNR bases in the area near the Zimbabwe border.

A white mercenary was killed at Deroi in the autumn of 1981, just before the demolition of the bridges over the Pungue. Documents in his possession indicate that he spoke English.

The demolitions carried out at the Pungue bridges and in Beira harbor at the end of last year were the work of highly trained specialists. The men who carried out the Beira demolition appear to have landed from the sea rather than from the harbor. Western diplomats in Maputo believe that these demolitions were carried out by South Africans.

The Western media has been pressing the view that Mozambique is going through some kind of internal upheaval, and that the MNR is leading some kind of “rebellion” against FRELIMO’s policies and against socialism. This notion ignores all evidence of South Africa’s role in maintaining the MNR. In fact, reporting has been bad and systematically biased. There is evidence that some reports in the press have come from South African military sources without editors or reporters questioning their accuracy, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that much of what is reported about Mozambique is the result of a deliberate effort to deceive Western public opinion.

MNR “activity” in Mozambique today is nothing less than South African military aggression. South Africa is waging a covert war against Mozambique, and the MNR is the instrument it is using to wage it. Without South Africa, there would be no “insurgency” at all. This is not to say that the country would be free of problems or that there would not be some discontent with the policies of the government. But there would be no widespread military action of the kind which is now taking place.

by Barbara and Allen Isaacman

Maputo—“We are in a decisive battle in which the real enemy is South Africa.” This is how Mozambique Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano explained the current situation in a recent interview. Evidence of the extent of this undeclared war is growing daily, and the Mozambicans believe worse is yet to come, pointing to the recent warning by South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan that his country might find it necessary to initiate a “Lebanese-type invasion” of Mozambique.

At the moment, Pretoria’s main weapon in this war is the Mozambique National Resistance. Over the past year, the MNR has intensified its military activity in the southern half of Mozambique, attacking bridges, railroad lines, communal villages and development projects. But paralyzing key sectors of the rural economy and destabilizing Mozambique are not its only objectives. It also seeks to sabotage SADCC (the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference), the integrated regional alliance of Zimbabwe, Angola, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique forged in 1980 to break South Africa’s economic dominance. Assistance to the MNR cannot be separated from South Africa’s heightened economic and military pressure against Zimbabwe, its increased attacks on Angola, and its efforts to seduce Swaziland with the Kangwane bastiutan and the Ingwathuma strip.

MNR Origins

South Africa’s ties to the MNR date back to its formation in 1976, although the most active agents in its initial creation were ex-Portuguese secret agents and Rhodesian intelligence officers. Initial MNR recruiting groups were primarily among the secret police agents and African members of the former Portuguese special forces who had fled to Rhodesia after Mozambican independence.

White Controlled

From 1976, the Rhodesian government provided the MNR with logistical support, arms and bases along the Mozambican border. MNR bands were sent marauding into Mozambique in retaliation for Mozambique’s imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia and support to ZANU forces.

In return for its assistance, Rhodesian security got MNR subservience—clear from documents we saw which were stuffed down a latrine when the Mozambican army captured the Maputo Garagua base at the end of 1981. In the words of Alfonso Dhakama, commandant of the MNR, “We were oppressed by the Rhodesians and the leaders of our movement were not allowed to make any decision ... We worked for the English [Rhodesians], neither I nor the deceased Andre could plan any military operations. It was the English who determined the areas to attack and what to recruit ...”

The achievement of Zimbabwean independence did not end MNR activity; it simply shifted the operation’s main backer to South Africa.

Today, with the wisdom of hindsight, it seems true that although the Mozambican government continued to combat the MNR, it seriously underestimated the vigor with which South Africa would promote the continuation of MNR subversion. Thus Mozambique began to turn its energy toward national reconstruction. SADCC programs were crystallized, and several important economic agreements were signed. The popular militias were disbanded in many frontier regions.
Mozambique recently mobilized over 1500 former freedom fighters and beefed up local militias to help in the fight against South Africa's terrorist forces in Mozambique.

The South Africans, on their side, had no intention of winding down the MNR. They saw the roving bands as instruments of havoc. We were shown captured documents of an October 1980 meeting between Dhlakama and a South African colonel, Van Nierok, at a Transvaal military base. Van Nierok ordered the MNR to extend its operations from central to southern Mozambique—to "interdict rail traffic from Malverne-Gwelo, to establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, [and] open a new military front in Maputo province."

Thus South Africa wanted to discourage Zimbabwe and Botswana from exporting their commodities through Maputo, which was drawing substantial traffic away from South African ports. To achieve this, the documents reveal, South African officials promised rockets, mortars, small arms and advisers "who will not only teach, but also participate in attacks."

Mozambican field commanders told us that "Boers" (white Afrikaners) regularly accompanied MNR bands in the central part of the country. A young officer who had fought in Manica province described several dead white soldiers his battalion had discovered when it overran an MNR base at Chidogo. South African passports and other documents have been captured at other MNR bases.

Sara Muchalima, a 26-year-old woman who had been kidnapped by the MNR, said she saw ten European advisers who, along with Dhlakama, were evacuated by helicopter shortly before the base at Garagua fell.

While South African soldiers do participate in attacks, South Africa directs most of its energy to training MNR forces at military bases in the Transvaal and providing supplies and logistical assistance to the insurgents inside Mozambique. Mozambican field commanders in Tete and Manica provinces told us that MNR forces are regularly resupplied at night. FRELIMO forces lack the communication and air support to prevent these airdrops. Mozambique's long coastline is also ideally suited for naval landings, which are becoming more frequent. Captured MNR documents suggest that this is the preferred route—It is much cheaper for South Africa, and Mozambique's fledgling navy cannot patrol effectively. Key to South Africa's war is the sophisticated communications equipment given the MNR, equipment which is far more sophisticated than that available to Mozambican forces. Thus MNR bands can maintain contact with South Africa, whose reconnaissance planes flying inside Mozambique provide valuable information on Mozambican troop movements.

Western diplomats we talked to in Maputo estimate the MNR numbers about 5000—appreciably lower than Dhlakama's claim of 17,000 armed soldiers. Many MNR recruits appear to have been coerced into joining. John Burleson, a British ecologist held prisoner by the MNR for several months, reported seeing hundreds of forced recruits who were kept under armed guard. Once in, especially after they have been involved in an attack of some kind, many recruits are afraid to leave because MNR commanders tell them they will be killed by FRELIMO if they are caught.

"Program" of Terror

Mozambique's serious economic problems make MNR recruitment that much easier. Droughts, which the MNR attributes to alienated ancestors, the Mozambican government's failure to provide sufficient support for the family farming sector, and the lack of consumer goods in parts of Manica, Sofala and Inhambane provide fertile ground for MNR overtures. Further the MNR has resorted to the manipulation of tribal divisions, appeals to Shona chiefs, spirit mediums and "traditional" Shona values to gain support.

Whatever the initial attraction of these appeals, widespread plundering and increasing terrorism quickly evaporate support for the MNR and alienate the
rural population which, above all else, wants to be left alone. Stories of MNR atrocities are now legion, with many reports of rape, beatings and worse. Peasants from Gaza described one such encounter: "At Madura, they came and demanded money and food. They accused some people of being informers for government forces and cut off the nose, lips and ears of a number of people. Then they told them to go and report to FRELIMO."

Reports filtering in from the bush make it clear that these are not isolated acts by a few disaffected MNR members, but rather reflect the underlying strategy of an organization committed to banditry, marauding and terrorism with the ultimate aim of discrediting the government. A high-ranking Western diplomat in Maputo told us that although he was initially skeptical, he now finds "reports of widespread MNR barbarism credible." In one of its bloodiest actions, terrorists stopped a packed train 50 miles north of Beira and raked it with machine gun fire, killing fourteen and wounding fifty others.

These tactics, together with the MNR's reliance on narrow tribal appeals directed exclusively at Shona-speaking peoples, only one of a dozen ethnic and cultural groups in the country, belie its claim that it is a nationalist movement of freedom fighters disillusioned with the FRELIMO Party's Marxist strategy. Apart from its anti-communist rhetoric, it lacks any political program and has made no effort to organize the peasants in the areas in which it operates.

Nevertheless, it has played a significant role in Pretoria's undeclared economic, political and psychological war against Mozambique and its SADCC allies. One of the highest SADCC priorities is strengthening transportation and communication links, so that landlocked Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia can divert their traffic from South African ports. South Africa is determined to block this shift. Thus the railroad lines from Zimbabwe to Maputo and to Beira have been repeatedly sabotaged by the MNR. The July 1982 attack on the Maputo-Zimbabwe line cut service for fifty days. And the strategy works. Beira, historically Zimbabwe's major international outlet, has suffered the most. Last year Zimbabwe exported only 59,000 tons through Beira, a mere fraction of pre-sanctions trade.

Fighting Back
Early this year the Mozambican leadership moved to initiate a new military and political strategy to combat the MNR. Admitting that the replacement of guerrillas with a conventional army and the disbanding of many rural militia units had left the country unprepared for the MNR's resurgence in late 1980, in May 1982, FRELIMO reactivated more than 1500 former guerrillas. Many of these are organized in counter-insurgency forces, whose job is to harass the MNR deep in the bush. The rural militia has also been strengthened, a move aimed at regaining the support and confidence of the peasants. As of August 1982, about 40 percent of the adult rural population in Sofala was armed, and in the capital, the newly formed militia boasted upwards of 30,000 men and women.

FRELIMO's task is not an easy one. For more than five years, many peasants in the affected areas have been subjected to attacks by Rhodesian and then MNR forces against which FPLM (the Mozambican army) could not protect them. Commenting on this, a close advisor to President Machel told us, "FRELIMO used up a lot of its political capital during the Zimbabwean war by assuring peasants that Rhodesia would bring prosperity to Zimbabwe. The peasants have legitimate grievances which the government must now address. Armando Gabinde, former member of FRELIMO's Central Committee, and Resident Minister of war-torn Sofala, stressed this when he told us, "We cannot stand idly by but must attack the economic and social problems, especially the lack of material goods."

There is evidence that this is already taking place. A knowledgeable Western journalist based in Maputo told us: "The army is helping to rebuild villages, dig wells, and so on, as it did in the liberation war." In agriculture, FRELIMO has begun to provide state support for the family sector—which it had ignored in its campaign to promote communal villages and state farms. This year, for the first time, agricultural implements, seeds and basic consumer goods may be available to peasants living in the war zones.

Nevertheless, Mozambican authorities realize that combating the MNR is just the first skirmish in a long struggle with South Africa. That regime has a vital interest in ensuring the continued economic dependency of the SADCC nations. But above all else is Pretoria's need to prevent the consolidation of a non-racial socialist society in Mozambique. Such a state could serve as a beacon of hope and a tower of strength for South Africa's oppressed millions—Pretoria will risk much to destroy it.
Wage Gap Grows

Since 1977 the turning of the leaves and the harvest moon, have been joined by a new indicator that winter's on the way—the annual upbeat report on US corporate activity in South Africa issued by General Motors board member Rev. Leon Sullivan. As expected, this year's report, issued November 1, argues that US corporations in South Africa act as a force for progressive change.

The Sullivan reports are based on data collected from US companies in South Africa who have signed on to Sullivan's corporate code of conduct. And the code itself is based on the argument that US corporations, by continuing to invest in South Africa and instituting progressive labor practices, can help dismantle apartheid. But Sullivan's logic, and his recent cheery findings, stand in stark contrast to the conclusions reached by two independent surveys of Black and white wage levels recently conducted inside South Africa. They found that over a period in which the value of US direct investment in the apartheid state more than tripled, the gap between wages paid Black and white workers has actually grown.

The two studies, one by the South African Institute of Race Relations and the other by a Port Elizabeth consulting group, examined wage rates between 1970 and 1982. Both studies show that although Black monthly wages have increased substantially in percentage terms, the cash difference between wages paid to Black workers and those paid to whites has actually grown.

The Sullivan report, in contrast, notes only that pay increases for Blacks averaged 23 percent in 1982, while average pay increases for whites were 19 percent—without providing any figures for actual wages paid.

When Sullivan, a Black minister and civil rights activist during the 1960s, introduced his six-point code of corporate conduct, it was billed as a measuring stick for private sector behavior in South Africa. Since the first report in 1977, however, it has been used by corporations to justify their continuing investments in apartheid.

The way the Sullivan report presents them, Black wage gains do sound impressive. According to data supplied by Sullivan's researchers, Black wages increased an average of 214 percent between 1970 and 1982, while white workers' pay rose by only 175 percent. And between 1970 and 1980 Black wages increased an average of 400 percent, while white workers' pay increased 250 percent.

But measured almost any other way, the comparison does not look so favorable. Indeed, the South African reports reveal that between 1970 and 1980, the gap in actual wages between Black and white workers more than doubled—from $321 in 1970 to $698 in 1980. By 1982, the average monthly wage for whites stood at $1044, while Black wages averaged only $271, leaving a $773 gap between average Black and white wages.

But how can the gap between white and Black wages be widening when Black wages are being increased at a faster rate than those of whites? The answer to this seeming contradiction lies in an understanding of the fundamental inequality between Blacks and whites, socially, politically and economically in South Africa.

This reality was graphically illustrated by the strikes which hit South African mines last July (see "Black Mineworkers Strike," Southern Africa, September 1982). Black mineworkers walked out after receiving a twelve percent pay increase, worth an additional $26, over the old $216 monthly wage. White miners also received a twelve percent increase, but with white wages averaging $1080 per month already, the actual monthly increases totaled $130. At least ten Black miners died during the labor action, and thousands more were fired.

Nor do wage figures alone tell the whole story. While Black wages increased 400 percent during the 1970s, prices did too, in just the last four years. According to Sowetan, one of the country's few remaining Black-oriented newspapers, the sharpest cost-of-living increases came in housing and consumer goods, items that traditionally absorb nearly all Black workers' income.

"It is not surprising that there have lately been so many strikes in Black factories," the Sowetan commented. "The people cannot manage with the kind of wage they are earning." American-owned factories, particularly in the automotive industry, have been among those hardest hit by Black workers striking for higher wages.

Perhaps the most revealing percentage contained in any of the three studies was published by the Race Relations Institute. They reported that the bare minimum Household Subsistence Level, the minimum amount of money needed for a family of six to simply eat and pay rent, was surpassed by only about thirteen percent of Black South African families.

J.C. □

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Because Black workers start off with a much lower wage than whites, a 100 percent increase for a Black worker means only a $10 increase in real pay for the Black worker, while the white worker, with a 50 percent increases gets an increase in pay of $50.

If we take a mythical example of Black and white wages over a two year period, with increases of 100 percent for Blacks and 50 percent for whites, the wage gap increase is clearly shown.
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Armscor Expelled From
Greek Weapons Fair

Responding to pressure from anti-
apartheid activists at home and abroad, the Greek government decided in mid-
October to expel South Africa's state-
owned armaments company, Armscor, from an international arms exhibition 
in Athens, Greece. The socialist government, which says it was unaware of the 
South African presence at the week-long exhibit until the second-to-last day, has 
appointed a general to investigate the matter.

At the same time, the British anti-
apartheid movement and the Nor-
wegian-based World Campaign against 
Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa are claiming credit 
for getting South Africa expelled from the exhibit. Abdul Minty, chairman of 
the campaign, contacted the Greek government on Tuesday, October 12, and on 
Wednesday the government decided to close down the South African display.

According to a Greek government statement, the South Africans gained 
entry to the arms show because a Greek agent for Armscor failed to report the 
proper country of origin for the Armscor display. Observers at the arms fair, how-
ever, said the identity of the South Africans was evident, with South African 
flags flying at their stands. The invitation to the South Africans reportedly 
was made by the exhibit's sponsor, a private firm with ties to the Greek De-
fense Ministry.

The South Africans were apparently 
pleased by their showing, terming it a 
significant break in the international arms embargo imposed by the UN five 
years ago. Armscor chief Piet Maris 
claimed the show "a major break-
through." For four days Armscor repre-
sentatives met with delegates of the 
more than forty nations attending the 
show and reportedly did a substantial, 
but undisclosed, amount of business.

"The biggest interest was shown by 
the Americans," said one Armscor ex-
cutive. "They couldn't believe the 
amount of equipment we had oper-
tional in two years." The Americans 
apparently also lauded the long-range G6 
field gun which coincidentally was de-
veloped with illegally obtained Ameri-
can technology.

Zimbabwe Trade

According to recently released gov-
ernment trade figures, South Africa re-
mains Zimbabwe's principal trading partner. Nineteen percent of Zim-
babwe's total exports, valued at nearly 
$64 million, went to South Africa during 
the first four months of 1982. A third of 
Zimbabwe's imports came from its 
white-ruled neighbor during the same 
period, leaving Zimbabwe with a trade 
deficit with South Africa of about $48 
million. Total exports dropped eight 
percent from the same period last year 
while imports rose slightly.

The figures underscore efforts by the 
Zimbabwean government to reduce its 
economic dependence on its apartheid 
neighbor. At independence in 1980, over 
ninety percent of Zimbabwe's trade 
went to, with, or through South Africa.

Reflecting the general expansion of 
economic activity since independence, 
and petroleum products topped the 
list of Zimbabwe's imports, accounting 
for eighteen percent of the total.

Tobacco remained Zimbabwe's single 
largest export commodity, followed by 
ferrochrome alloys, asbestos, nickel, 
sugar, and coal.

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AFL-CIO Tour To South Africa

A high-level delegation of AFL-CIO officials concluded a two-week "fact-finding" visit to South Africa in mid-September by predicting a "growing relationship" between the American labor federation and the emerging union movement in South Africa. Two months later, however, the shape of that "growing relationship" remains undefined. Its prospects still somewhat clouded by suspicions among South African unionists and press reports linking the AFL-CIO's African American Labor Center with the CIA.

According to Nana Mahomo at the AALC office in Washington, specific programs await the return of the center's executive director, Patrick O'Farrell, who is currently out of the country. In mid-December, he is to submit a report on the September trip to the AFL-CIO's executive board. Until then, Mahomo told *Southern Africa* he could only speculate that the AFL-CIO would most likely provide professional training services for South African unions.

Early in the trip, press reports indicated there might be a permanent, "in-country" training center...provided, of course, that local unions and the South African government approved. Apparently, the government did but the unions didn't. Mahomo told *Southern Africa* that "nobody has requested a training center."

Instead, he indicated, the American federation will probably send training missions in response to requests from specific unions. He declined to mention any possible unions by name, just as he and the delegates themselves refrained from stating which unions had invited the AFL-CIO to make the trip.

A story alleging CIA links to the AALC and its former director Irving Brown hit the front page of the Sunday Tribune the weekend after Brown and the rest of the delegation arrived in South Africa. Noting that 90 percent of the AALC's budget comes from the US government, the report cited "persistent allegations of a CIA link" and of a CIA "union manipulation program in other African countries, Latin America, and Asia." Brown heatedly denied the accusations.

At the end of the trip, tour member Sol Chaikin denied that the CIA charges had hampered the delegation's ability to work with local unions. He conceded, however, that the idea of an AFL-CIO training presence met with "some suspicion" from local unions. Two unions, the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), and the Motor Assemblers and Component Workers Union (MACWUSA), flatly refused to meet the delegation. And Chaikin did not dispute press reports that the delegation had been received "coolly" by those unions and union federations that did meet with them, including FOSATU, CUSA, and TUCSA.

Nevertheless, Chaikin reported that most unions in South Africa had voiced interest in a follow-up visit by AFL-CIO education officers and in receiving audio-visual and other training material. And Mahomo stated that the delegation had returned from the September trip more determined than ever to assist South African unions and oppose apartheid.

Any notions that apartheid is being reformed to eventually accommodate Black demands were laid to rest recently, by a senior South African cabinet official. J. Chris Heunis, the minister in charge of implementing constitutional proposals to give South Africa's "colored" and Indian populations a subordinate role in the cabinet, recently affirmed that Blacks will still be excluded from the political process once the reforms go into effect. He called suggestions to the contrary "purposeful lies" during an address to a political gathering near Pretoria and insisted that the ruling National Party would not deviate from its policy of restricting Black political rights to the newly-developed bantustans.

Heunis went on to rationalize Black exclusion in clearly racist terms. "What would remain of the principle of maintaining civilized standards?" he asked, explaining that Blacks would outnumber whites eighteen to one if brought into the parliament. He also said that Blacks were not being kept out because of race, but because they were people with their own traditions, beliefs, and economic values.

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