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Many of our readers have sent in donations with their subscriptions for 1976. As $6.00 does not cover the cost of the production of the magazine, we really do appreciate these donations. We recognize that all contributions—whether large or small—represent a commitment to our work in support of the liberation of southern Africa. Thank you.

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The victory of the MPLA has now been clearly established, so that even many Western countries are scrambling to extend recognition to the People's Republic of Angola. While that is happening there are also continuing attempts to place in question the legitimacy of that victory, thus laying the basis for future destabilization efforts. A favorite ploy of the Western press is the constant assertion that the MPLA only survived in Angola because of a military victory won by the Cuban troops armed with Soviet guns.

There can be, no question about the important role that Cuba's revolutionary solidarity, expressed in the presence of several thousand young Cuban soldiers, played in repelling the South African invasion of Angola. But to acknowledge that is a very different thing from alleging that MPLA owes its continued existence to such assistance, and is thus little more than a tool of "foreign powers".

When the South Africans laid their major battle plans in September/October 1975 they seem to have operated on several assumptions:
1. that the MPLA, despite its record of ability as a guerrilla movement, would not be able to activate a force trained or equipped to counter a heavily armored regular strike force
2. that speed and weight of the strike were essential—the MPLA must be given no time to retrain or re-equip
3. that the MPLA would not be able to mobilize its allies rapidly or on a large scale
4. that the South Africans would receive unlimited "back-up" from the United States.

The South African strategy failed—it was based on too many miscalculations. It underestimated the popular base of the MPLA, the ability of its soldiers to fight hard and learn quickly, and its ability to mobilize powerful allies quickly. Finally the South Africans had not calculated on the wave of protest in the US that would cut off the supply of unlimited aid.

But fundamentally it is important to remember that the most important struggle in Angola was not simply for territory, but for "hearts and minds". All reports, including those from the less than sympathetic Western press indicate that on this issue the MPLA was always the only winner.

Even when looting and raping did not devastate the areas occupied by UNITA, FNLA and their South African and Zairean allies, these forces displayed a total lack of concern for the population, an inability to establish an administration that could re-connect water supplies, ensure food-flows, or provide minimal health and education services.

In contrast, under very difficult circumstances, MPLA mobilised the people as quickly as possible, organising local action committees and providing what help it could, so that the population was enabled to begin to take control of its life, instead of just suffering as the helpless victim of contending armies.

The long struggle and victory of the people of Vietnam against the US has shown that in the end superior technology, more guns, more bombs, more tanks are not enough to defeat a movement that the people recognise as truly their own. MPLA has proved that it has and deserves the confidence of the people, because they see it as the genuine instrument and representative of their determination to build a new life.

The tasks that lie ahead are formidable. Surrounded by unfriendly States, with a mobilised South African army, battle ready, on the southern border, the people of Angola will also have to struggle to reshape an economy battered by war and entirely oriented to dependency on South African and Western capital, markets and technology. The scars of war will have to be healed, and the MPLA will have to face the task of integrating the population into a living national unity. We believe that some of the first steps have already been taken, even in the midst of war; that the MPLA's constant determination to involve the people in the shaping of their future will enable it to find ways of winning this battle too.

We salute the victory of the Angolan people.
We salute the victory of the MPLA.
The Struggle Continues.
Dear Friends:

I am in receipt of your communication and subscription renewal to Southern Africa. I have seriously noted your fine article on Angola entitled Neo-Colonialism Or Socialism. I deem your article most illuminating and forthright on the direction proper for the people of Angola. In truth the MPLA under Dr. Agostinho Neto, a revolutionary poet, medical doctor and Marxist is pointing in the right direction for Angola’s future and destiny. God grant the revolutionary movement of the MPLA continued success and victories throughout all of Angola against the renegade, neocolonialist, traitorous forces backed by US imperialists, Western European interests, China and South African mercenaries and their Fascist Government of South Africa.

Unlike the regrettable tragedy of the Congo a decade and a half ago and US machinations via the CIA against Patrice Lumumba and his progressive forces, the international scene has brightened more than ever as a result of the people’s heroic victories in Southeast Asia and the strengthening of the anti-imperialist forces world wide. To be sure, the US Government must be deterred from any full scale intervention into Angola. The CIA’s activities for great wrong doings have been subjected to broad scrutiny and condemnation by the US Congress and enlightened forces.

Thus I am submitting a money order of ten dollars to cover my subscription renewal and to cover the progressive work of the Committee. May great success by yours in acquiring more subscriptions and wider readership.

—Abu Bakr  
New York City

Dear Sirs,

Will you please cancel my subscription to Southern Africa as of now. I do not wish to receive any more copies of a magazine that comes out firmly and strongly on the side of MPLA in Angola. The article in the November 1975 issue on Angola with a so-called analysis of the three groups, MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, or rather an article that purports to analyze them, is misleading, includes a good many untruths about UNITA and its leader, whom I know very well, Dr. Jonas Savimbi and the aims and hopes of that group. To call them neo-colonial is ridiculous and shows an ignorance of what they are now trying to do and have been trying to do for Angola, where I spent 30 years in the Umbundu area, the UNITA area. My first-hand knowledge of what is going on there now makes it impossible for me to tolerate such an article.

It is ironic too, that after announcing your unconditional support of MPLA, you should splurge all over the back cover the words, “Stop U.S. intervention in Angola”. What, may I ask, about Soviet intervention in Angola, and Cuban. What about Cuba announcing that no matter what is decided they will not stop sending troops to Angola? (The News today) The choice is NOT between Neo-Colonialism and Socialism, it is between a socialism for the people of Angola, and Communism for Russia... as it now becomes very clear, and an end to the work of the church in that country.

If your statement on page 9 “Southern Africa stands firmly on the side of the MPLA in Angola”, still holds true even in the light of recent developments, I can no longer support your committee nor your magazine.

Jean Collins  
Ottawa, Canada

Erratum

We gave the wrong street number for the Namibia Packet in our January issue. It should have read as follows:

Namibia Packet: a collection of material detailing many aspects of the situation in Namibia; including history, economic conditions, US involvement, and recent events. $1.25 from Bay Area Namibia Action Group, 611 Frederick Street, San Francisco, CA 94117. The Bay Area Namibia Action Group is a collective working in the San Francisco area to increase awareness of and support for the Namibian struggle for freedom.
Most of the photos presented here were taken in 1975 in the Crossroads and Muizenberg areas of greater Cape Town by a friend of the Southern Africa Committee. They can only show the surface manifestation of a way of life—and of death—that is inflicted upon hundreds of thousands of powerless people each year.

In the Cape Peninsula alone, official figures put the number of squatters living at places like Vrygrand, Crossroads, Werkgenot, Michell's Plain and Lourdes Farm at 200,000. The actual number may be twice as great, since the figure 200,000 is only an estimate of Coloured squatters and does not include at all the ever-increasing African squatter population.

Squatting has been a forced phenomenon of African life in South Africa since the first white settlers dispossessed the Khoisan population in the 17th century. Squatter settlements today are the miserable products of apartheid's political, economic and social requirements, at the core of which lies the maintenance of white supremacy.

Whether “endorsed out” of traditionally occupied urban areas now designated “white” by white planners or “erased” from “black spots” in predominately white rural areas, African and Coloured squatters live on the fringes of human existence, both literally and figuratively, in shacks of cardboard and tin, sacking and bits of wood. Most squatters are people with no legal right to be where they are, close to places where they can find work. Given the complex network of South African law—the Pass laws, Group Areas Act, etc, such people often have no legal right to be anywhere at all, precisely because they are the helpless victims of apartheid “planning” and strategy for migrant labor manipulation and racial separation. (Apartheid planners estimate, for example, that it is perfectly acceptable for Africans and Coloured to travel up to 70 miles daily, or 400 miles weekly to work in the white economy.) Malnutrition, violent crime, disease, constant uncertainty and insecurity are the sine qua non of squatter camps. Toilets, water taps, schools, shops, medical care and adequate shelter are not.
In order to implement its apartheid policies the South African Government has already forcibly removed over 2 million Africans from their homes. Men and women have been driven out of towns; have been forced out of so-called “Black-spots” in White areas—land occupied by Africans which stands in the way of territorial separation; have been thrown off white farms as machines replace human-beings, who are not allowed to seek work freely. Most of these people have been thrown into “resettlement camps” in the desperately overcrowded Bantustans. The people have given vivid names to these deportation camps—Mshayezafe (they beat us until we die) in KwaZulu; Stinkwater; Morsgat (waste-hole).

There is no work in the Bantustans, and not enough land to grow food for survival. So people must escape to survive—seeking work they go to the towns—but there they are “illegal” immigrants and there is no legal place to live.

Although the vast majority of squatters want decent and secure housing in a stable community more than anything, squatter camps are not simply—as some white South African officials argue—the unfortunate result of a severe housing shortage. Nor will the squatter children be saved by bright-eyed white South African educators who see “nonformal education” as the answer to the “problem” of education—or the lack of it—in squatter camps.

Sociologists have noted a lack of leadership in squatter settlements, the more perceptive tracing this absence to fear, insecurity and the unwillingness of members of an oppressed and harassed group to single themselves out for “special treatment.” When you don’t know whether your shack will be bulldozed into nothingness tomorrow, you don’t do anything to invite such attention, especially if you are an “illegal” squatter.

Yet despite constant harassment and intimidation there are always some people who continue to resist.
DEPORTATIONS "EXPLAINED"

In the House of Assembly Debates, on the 4th Feb. 1969 Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, Dr. P. G. J. Koornhof, explained the tidy logic of this system of mass deportation.

"We have labour peace and stability amongst the Bantu who are performing essential work in our white areas. We are also affording our industrialists that stability in order to enable them to use Bantu labour for the performance of essential work. Things are going well in the Republic of South Africa in respect of the Bantu in our white areas. But at the same time we say that those Bantu in our white areas who are not economically active and are not engaged in the performance of normal or good work, should be channelled back to their own homelands.

"I want to ask how much progress we have made in respect of the implementation of that aspect of our policy, i.e. the elimination of the redundant, non-economically active Bantu in our white areas. In this regard I want to mention the following figures.

Approximately 900,000 Bantu have been settled elsewhere under the National Party regime over the past few years, since 1959.

"Surely this is no mean achievement; on the contrary, it is a tremendous achievement. Over the same period at least 216,000 have been resettled under the National Party regime in terms of the Group Areas Act in Johannesburg alone. Approximately 75,000 have been removed from the so-called black spots..."

Vrygrond near Capetown, an estimated 500 families are being constantly harrassed and threatened: if they do not break down their shanties and move further into the bush, the dreaded bull-dozer will be sent to do the job for them.

Residents, most of whom have been forced to move as much as three and four times in one year, have banded together, and a 'We Will Not Move Again' campaign has started. Rangers in the area, in an attempt to break the movement, started a campaign of harrassment. A spokesman for the City Engineers Department, which is ostensibly responsible for the squatter camp, has said in an interview that the people could not be forced to move further into the bush, but 'that we would like them to'. Now they have adopted more direct methods of persuasion. Like cutting the water supply to that particular area. And removing the toilets. And thinly veiled threats of 'official action'. Women leaders of the movement who approached a Cape Town weekly newspaper for help, have been threatened. Still the people refuse to move. (South African Outlook; August 1975.)
Squatters were interviewed recently at Kraaifontein (near Capetown). A woman commented, 'I would like to stay here, my seven day eviction notice expired long ago and now I live from day to day wondering what will happen.' A man said, 'I fear to seek work as perhaps my children are not here when I come back.' At Lourdes Farm, a squatter who had moved there was told to remove the shack after one week to another part of the Farm. His reaction was predictably angry, 'We're not going to move; we're going to stick like Bostik. We'll fight the inspectors if they come to pull down my house.' Others are past that reaction, 'I don't want to live anymore, I just want to sleep forever.' (South African Outlook, August 1975)

Pang, who has been living at Lotus Farm for four years, says that no leaders have emerged there yet. 'How could you do that? You can't go to the council and say you come from Lotus Farm and the people there want this or that. The council knows what the people want. If you go there they'll say you're a rebel and you cause trouble—then you'll never get a council house.' (South African Outlook, August 1975)
special

FIDEL CASTRO SPEAKS OUT ON ANGOLA

Following are the concluding remarks of the Commander-in-Chief, Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba, and Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government, made at the closing session of the First Party Congress in Havana, December 22, 1975. Immediately after the closing of the Congress, Prime Minister Fidel went outside and spoke spontaneously to the more than 2 million Cubans assembled in the José Martí Revolutionary Plaza.

We have excerpted portions of both speeches which relate directly to Cuba’s commitment in Angola because we feel they comprise the most concrete expression of the reasons for Cuba’s support to the People’s Republic of Angola led by the MPLA government. To both the Party Congress and the Cuban people in the Plaza, the Prime Minister stresses that Cuba is supporting the Angolan people on the basis of revolutionary, international and fraternal solidarity, a fundamental principle on which the Cuban government is founded and has always operated since the triumph of their own revolution on January 1, 1959. In this sense Cuba is only carrying out its revolutionary duty.

(The following is an unofficial translation from the Spanish by a friend of the Committee.)

Fidel Speaking to the First Party Congress

From the very beginning of the triumph of our revolution, Cuba has supported the progressive governments and movements in Africa. And we will continue to support them!

The help we have extended has taken different forms: sometimes we sent arms, sometimes we sent men, sometimes we sent military advisers, sometimes doctors, sometimes builders; other times we sent builders, doctors, and advisers as well, all three at once. We build the Revolution on the basis of this principle, which, faithful to the policy of internationalism, is to help where we can be of help, where we can be of use, and where we are asked to. Therefore, it only follows that we are now supporting the MPLA and the Angolan people, with whom we have had relations and with whom we have collaborated from the inception of their struggle for independence from Portuguese colonialism. There are many Angolan cadres who have studied in Cuba.

But what is happening now? Doubtless these recent statements by Ford, on relations with Cuba, spring from the fact that the imperialists are angry with us. And why are they angry? Because they had everything planned to take over Angola before the 11th of November [1975].

Angola is a territory rich in natural resources: Cabinda, one of its provinces, has tremendous petroleum deposits. The country is rich in minerals—diamonds, copper, iron—and this is one of the reasons why the imperialists want to take over Angola.

History has proven again and again that the imperialists, when they realized that these colonies would one day free themselves, immediately began to organize their [the imperialists’] own movement. So they organized the FNLA, with the help of the CIA. It is not only us who say this, it has just been published in the New York Times, with all the details.

So when they saw that the people of Angola were on the verge of gaining independence—just as the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde and others, in earlier times,—the imperialists planned a way to liquidate the revolutionary movement in Angola. They plotted to take over Cabinda, with its oil, before the 11th of November, and to capture Luanda before the same date. And to bring this scheme to fruition, the U.S. government launched South African troops against Angola. While Angola was threatened from the north by FNLA, they attacked with regular troops organized into armoured columns. All this they had ready before November 11. It was a sure-fire plan, except the plan worked out badly. They didn’t count on international solidarity, on the support extended to the heroic Angolan people by the socialist countries, in the first place, and by the revolutionary and progressive governments of Africa, and on the support which, along with the progressive governments of the world, the Cuban people extended to Angola.

The result? On the 8th of November they began the offensive against Cabinda, and were completely repulsed. What they suffered at Cabinda was another Bay of Pigs: in three days, only 72 hours, the invaders of Cabinda were wiped out. On November 10, they were 25 kilometers from the capital, Luanda, attacking with armored columns; and today they are pushed back to more than 100 kilometers away. The armor of South Africa, which had been unleashed on October 23, in less than 20 days had penetrated almost 700 km from Luanda, where it ground to a complete halt.

In short, the heroic struggle of the Angolan people, supported by the international revolutionary movement, has smashed the imperialist design.

And this is why the imperialists are angry with, among others, we Cubans. Some imperialists ask themselves why we support the Angolans, what possible interests can we have there. They are accustomed to thinking that when a country does something it is because it is seeking oil, or copper, or diamonds or some other natural resources. But no, that’s not it! We seek no material interest, although it is logical that the imperialists don’t understand, because they
are guided exclusively by chauvinist, nationalist, self-serving criteria. For ourselves, we are merely carrying out an elemental internationalist duty in supporting the Angolan people. We seek no oil, no copper, no iron; we seek absolutely nothing. We are simply applying a policy of principle. We do not stand by and watch when we see a brother African people suddenly about to be drowned by imperialism and brutally overrun by South Africa. We do not stand by, and we will not stand by.

So whenever the imperialists ask what is our interest, we will have to tell them: listen, go and read a manual on proletarian internationalism and then you will understand why we support Angola.

This is the reason for the anger and the threats, and nothing else. Can you conceive of a future for Cuba in which the price for relations and commerce with the U.S. would be that we revert to what we were in the past? That this country would cease to express its solidarity with its revolutionary brothers in the rest of the world? That we would cease expressing our solidarity with the Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians, Africans, Yemenites, Arabs, with Syria, Algeria, Guinea, and all these countries together?

Our solidarity policy is no secret. And one of the facts, one of the most beautiful elements of this Congress is the international presence in our midst. On the one hand, we have here representatives of the countries which aid us, and among them the Soviet delegation, which has given us great support and great lessons in internationalism. Because, from across great distances, they have refused to allow imperialism to strangle us, to swallow us up, and to destroy us.

... So what does imperialism want of us? That we break from our world revolutionary family? That we cease to be a people in solidarity with all those brother peoples who struggle against imperialism? ... If that is the price they want us to pay, then there will never be any relations with the United States. We reiterate that the policy of our Revolution is one of peaceful relations and coexistence with regimes of different ideologies and different social systems. But it is they who do not live up to this, not us. To do as they do would be tantamount to our telling them that they had to implement agrarian reforms or nationalize their electrical giants in order to establish relations with us. So what kind of conditions does imperialism want to establish in our country?

We will carry out our policy of solidarity with Angola; we are now aiding Angola, and we will continue to aid the Angolan people. ... (All the Delegates rise to their feet and with prolonged applause exclaimed 'Angola, Angola, Angola!')

So now the imperialists know just what it our policy and what is the political line of our country. On the other hand, however, we cannot conceive of a policy more stupid that the one which the imperialists are pursuing in Angola. It is stupid, because, hardly having extricated themselves from their Vietnam adventure, they go right out and sink themselves in another as serious as the first. Why? Why? We will have to give them some of the reasons.

South Africa, that is to say, the racists and fascists of South Africa, is utterly hated by all the peoples of Africa. To say South Africa in Africa is like saying Israel in the midst of the Arab countries. The policy of the U.S. supporting and instigating the South African aggression against Angola, has isolated it [the US] from, and irretrievably made enemies of, all the peoples of Africa.

But something else, something more. Cabinda province remains solidly in the hands of the MPLA. ... And despite the war, production of oil has not been held up one day. And while there are North American firms that are installed there, it is the MPLA fighters who guard the installations and who guarantee the safety of the North American citizens working in Cabinda to exploit the oil. Even though the United States arms mercenaries, even though the United States unleashes South African regulars against Angola, it is the MPLA soldiers who provide security for the installations and safety for the North American citizens who operate in Cabinda.

To us, this policy appears totally correct. It is proof of the very serenity, the sobriety and the maturity of the African movement. ... This also demonstrates the united spirit of the Angolans and the intelligent way in which they conduct their policy. It demonstrates that the revolutionary African movement is in a position to negotiate on all matters pertaining to any natural resources, whenever it suits them to do so.

What they will never negotiate with is with racism, with Apartheid. What they will never negotiate with is with the occupation of Angola by South Africa. Because the occupation of Angola by South African racists creates danger for Zambia, for Mozambique, for Zaïre, for the People's Republic of the Congo, for all of Africa. And Africa is determined to support the MPLA movement, and its struggle as well. As time goes by, more and more African governments and nations will come to the point where they send arms and men to fight against the South African racists. Africa is not about to let itself be swallowed up by South Africa, and together with the peoples of Africa in this struggle, will be the people of Cuba.

South Africa, taking the path it has, and in seeking to conquer Angola, will now have to engage in battle against all of Black Africa.

I do not believe that the countries of Europe would commit to the folly of associating themselves with South Africa and its fascist and racist crusade. And it is undeniably stupid for the U.S. government to associate itself with this campaign, especially in light of the fact that the Angolans themselves are showing to the world a policy that is correct and serene in the extreme—and I repeat "extreme" because it is the MPLA troops who are protecting the oil installations and North American citizens located in Cabinda.

We are unable to fathom how the Ford Administration can justify this to the U.S. public and what pretext they can dredge up that would explain their policy of aggression against Angola, in concert with the racists of Africa.

This is the crucial point of foreign policy that we wish to put forth; to the imperialists we say that we seek nothing over there in Angola, that we are practicing our traditional internationalist policy; that we are aiding the people of Angola and that we are firmly determined to [continue to] aid them. And that, after all this, we regret very much that Mr. Ford feels bound to "cancel" and to "embargo" hopes for improvement [of relations with us]. For we do know that these hopes, in the context of such policy on the part of the U.S., have no real basis.

Fidel Addressing the Cuban People in the Plaza of the Revolution

At the closing session of our Party Congress, we were commenting on a statement by the President of the United States, in which he said that the help Cuba has provided to the Angolan people cancels out all possibilities of improvement of our relations with the U.S. It's a funny way of putting it, because he wishes to cancel something which, in our eyes, imperialism has already cancelled by its own actions.

... It [imperialism] would like to isolate us from the
rest of the world; but we are joining with the world, with
the socialist camp, with the underdeveloped countries, with
Asia, and with Africa.

And now the eye of the storm is Angola. Imperialism
would like to prevent us from aiding our Angolan brothers.
But we have to tell the Yankees not to forget that we are
not only a Latin American country, but also a Latino-
African one.

The blood of Africa flows abundantly in our veins. And
it was from Africa that many of our ancestors came as
slaves to this land. And those slaves fought mightily and
were important soldiers in the Liberation Army of our
country. We are brothers of the Africans, and we are ready
to fight at their side!

Discrimination was a fact of life in our country. Who
doesn't know that? Who doesn't remember it? In many
of our public parks, it was Whites over here, and Blacks over
there. Who doesn't remember that in study and
work, in all aspects of the society, discrimination was an
everyday affair? And who today are the representatives, the
symbols of the most odious and inhuman kind of discrimi-
nation? They are the fascists and racists of South Africa.
And now Yankee imperialism, without the
slightest hint of
scruples, has unleashed mercenary troops from South
Africa to crush Angolan independence. And they are upset
because we support Angola, because we support Africa,
because we defend Africa. It is out of a sense of duty, a sense
of duty flowing from our principles, our ideology, our con-
victions, and our own blood, that we defend Angola, that
we defend Africa! And when we say we defend, we mean it,
and when we say fight, we mean it!

Let South Africa racists and Yankee imperialists know
this: we are part of the world revolutionary movement, and
in this struggle, which pits Africa against the racists and
imperialists, we are, unwaveringly, one with the peoples of
Africa.

It is an exercise of the greatest cynicism for the U.S. to
condemn our support for Angola when it marches arm in
arm with the South African fascists over these heroic
people.

South Africa! An area of the world in which 3 million
Whites oppress 14 million Blacks, a country which would
impose this policy on Rhodesia, and is doing it, and would
impose it on all of Black Africa, if only it could. But Black
Africa won't tolerate this, will not endure this. And such is
the arrogance of the imperialists and the reactionaries to-
wards these peoples; it is the old habit of mercenaries to do
whatever they can get away with, to march with their tanks
and guns against defenseless peoples. They already tried to
do this here, at the Bay of Pigs, and now they are trying
again in Angola. But the Angolans will not be defenseless!

... If imperialism cannot improve relations with Cuba, it
is because capitalism is incapable of adhering to internation-
al norms. If capitalism is incapable of respecting the liberty
and sovereignty of other peoples, that is their problem. Let
them renounce capitalism and the problem will be solved.
But for now, don't come to us and ask that we renounce
socialism, that we renounce proletarian internationalism,
that we renounce our ideology.

It is not we who are intransigently opposed to normal
relations. But if capitalism—powerful and dominant—wants
nothing, neither to speak nor to look upon this small coun-
dry, then we will wait until capitalism disappears from the
United States. We support the principles of peaceful co-
existence and normal relations. If they don't want to, so be
it, because, fortunately, we don't need them for anything.
U.S. INTERVENTION CONTINUES

As the political and military situation in Angola changes, the United States pursues new tactics in its policy of intervention. January was a month of diplomatic activity—in Africa, the Soviet Union and Congress. There were also more revelations about the extent of active covert US participation in the Angolan war.

The US made a major effort to influence the outcome of the special meeting of the Organization of African Unity on Angola, held in mid-January. The first step was the Administration's articulation of its own Angola policy to match the OAU position adopted last July. On January 13 White House press secretary Nessen said “The President still feels that the best solution is a ceasefire, withdrawal of all foreign elements and a government of national unity.” The Administration spent the week before the OAU meeting lobbying the OAU nations to adopt this policy again. It sought to avert OAU recognition of the MPLA, so that the US could claim that its Angola policy was support for an African solution, not an outside intervention.

To this end, Ford sent a letter to several African heads of state before the meeting stating that “we see the MPLA as one of the three legitimate factions in Angola. We seek neither the destruction nor the defeat of the MPLA. But we do believe that it should not be allowed to assume total power by force of Soviet and Cuban arms.” On the question of South Africa, the letter said that the US “did not initiate any consultation” with South Africa on Angola but that “we would do our utmost to bring their withdrawal” if all foreign forces agree to leave. (This denial of US collaboration with South Africa came after the disclosure that the United States originally urged the South African entry into Angola Washington Post, Jan. 6) Nigerian reaction to the Ford letter was anger. The major government-owned newspapers said that the letter insulted “the intelligence of Africans and the dignity of the black man”, and carried headlines of “Shut Up” and “To Hell with America” superimposed on a picture of President Ford.

Simultaneously, the US expressed its diplomatic goals less directly, but in very concrete terms, how far it was prepared to go to achieve its diplomatic goals. Just before the OAU meeting, the Administration announced the establishment of a new State Department office for “multilateral affairs” to better co-ordinate the “carrots and sticks” of US international policy. The purpose of the new office is “to create a more coherent pattern” in showing other nations where US interests are at stake in United Nations voting or in other international forums.” (Washington Post, Jan. 10)

Of course, the Administration continues to have little success in its diplomacy with Congress, although it has “softened” because of their UN votes on Zionism and Korea. It seemed more than coincidental that the Administration announced its attempt to “better inform foreign nations well in advance what votes are vital to US interests and what votes are not” while it was trying to manipulate the outcome of the OAU’s deliberation on Angola.

The Administration tried to chalk up the OAU stalemate on Angola as a victory for the US. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele came back from Africa saying that “Congress should know that 22 African countries do support our policy.” Press reports described the White House as quietly pleased about the meeting. The Administration's interpretation, however, completely distorts the fact that the trend in Africa is away from the US position. Last July, the entire OAU agreed that there should be a coalition government in Angola; by the time of the January OAU meeting, 22 African countries had recognized the Peoples Republic of Angola led by the MPLA.

Secretary of State Kissinger then attempted to bring the Angola issue to the SALT talks in Moscow. However, it appears that the issue was not even seriously discussed. Brezhnev reportedly quipped that if Kissinger wanted to talk with someone about Angola he could “discuss it with Sonnenfeldt”, a State Department counselor on Europe. The Soviets maintained that their participation in Angola was based on a policy of support for a national liberation movement, and was not a subject for discussions of detente with the United States.

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its position on Angola. After the OAU meeting, Secretary Schauffele said that the United States was not taking the position that the Soviet Union would dominate an MPLA-led Angola. "I certainly believe that in the long run Angolan nationalism will assert itself, but I am concerned that the run will be too long," he said. *(Washington Post, Jan. 14)*

On January 27th, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 323-99 to ban all covert US aid to the UNITA-FNLA (and South African) forces in Angola. The vote, which approved a defense appropriations bill amendment introduced in the Senate last month, came after less than an hour of discussion in contrast to four long days of Senate debate in December. The Administration, apparently aware that it would lose the House vote, had not carried out extensive lobbying efforts. Considerable lobbying had however been done by two representatives of the FNLA who were active in Washington for a week before the vote, asking for open aid to their movement.

The rapid passage of the amendment reflected the belief among most Congresspeople that what the Administration was asking for in Angola was too little too late; that continued intervention in the Angolan war was a no-win proposition; and that the Administration had failed to adequately justify its military aid requests. Congresspeople had also questioned whether secret US intervention was an appropriate response to concerns about Soviet influence. In passing the amendment the House sharply rebuffed a last-minute appeal by President Ford who expressed "grave concern over the international consequences of the situation in Angola." Reflecting the prevailing mood in Congress, House Speaker Carl Albert called Ford's plea, "a typical Ford operation—wave your hand, make a gesture, and that's the end of it. . . . One thing about foreign aid, military aid, or war itself, you either do enough or you're better off not doing anything." *(New York Times, Jan. 28)*

Specifically, the amendment cuts funds in the Defense Appropriations Bill for Angola, except for CIA intelligence gathering, which could be a substantial loophole. The passage of this amendment by no means ensures that no more US aid will be given to the enemy of the MPLA. It allows for the following hidden means of continuing aid: firstly, by dealing only with aid authorized by the Defense Appropriations Bill, it does not prevent such aid from being absorbed into other bills; secondly, it deals only with covert aid, leaving open the opportunity for the Administration to request such aid directly and overtly; thirdly, it does not prevent the CIA from using private contractors such as corporations for such operations as the recruiting, hiring, and training of mercenaries; fourthly, and finally, this amendment skirts the issue of the US government funneling aid to other foreign countries.

In an apparent attempt to use the last of these loopholes for funneling aid, the State Department is now considering a $10 million "emergency loan" to Zaire. Officials of the State Department's Africa Bureau contend that the $10 million in industrial credits is urgently needed to bolster Zaire's deteriorating economy, now at a crisis level. Congressional leaders, concerned that the $10 million aid package would allow Zaire to give a comparable amount in aid to the UNITA-FNLA forces in Angola *(New York Times, Jan. 21)*, have strongly objected to the loan. Technically, the State Department is entitled to go ahead with the loan, but it seems to be making efforts to win Congressional approval as not to breach a special two-year working arrangement with Congress.

Another tactic used to conceal the extent of U.S. involvement in Angola is the systematic "undervaluing" of military equipment supplied to MPLA's enemies. That the CIA has been understating the prices by as much as one half was revealed in the final report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, portions of which were reported in the *New York Times* of January 20.

The U.S. is also involved in indirect recruitment and training of mercenaries to fight in Angola. A January 2nd *Christian Science Monitor* article by David Anable, citing sources close to the CIA, stated that 300 American mercenaries are already serving in Angola and that 150 others have just finished training at Ft. Benning, Georgia. The article said that the men are serving as "B teams" working half-and-half on combat and training. There is one B team with the FNLA in the North and another with UNITA forces in the South, each costing about $1 million for six months, including salaries, munitions and helicopters. Anable said that the additional 150 men were waiting to go to Angola pending more funds "perhaps including loans from Western concerns with interests in Angola."

Administration response to the mercenary allegations was a weak denial. It denied that it was training or funding American mercenaries, but President Ford said in a television interview that "we are working with other governments that feel they have an interest." Administration statements did not deny that the CIA could be recruiting non-Americans or that the CIA was funding recruitment by private firms or by foreign governments.

With numerous reports that South Africa has decided to pull its forces out of Angola, it now appears that the U.S. is faced with the choice of either going in in a bigger way or accepting the military and political dominance of the MPLA. UNITA spokesman Chitacumbi was quoted in the January 26 *Washington Post* as saying, "We want the U.S. to get involved. Only a big power can provide us with the war material we need." The Administration's response has been to step up its involvement in mercenary recruiting and to announce that its involvement in mercenary recruiting and to announce that it is seriously considering
edged asking Congress for open financial aid to MPLA's enemies in an amount "considerably larger" than the acknowledged $32 million already spent. (New York Times, January 30)

While it is clear that Congress does not want any more secret aid to Angola, the test of sentiment on the actual question of US involvement is still to come. The next bill to come before Congress will be the Military Aid Bill, to which several amendments on Angola are already being considered. The strongest of these requires that Congress specifically authorize any overt or covert aid to Angola. Given the current mood in Congress, an amendment to that bill specifically authorizing aid to Angola would be defeated by the Administration's position. The Administration seems determined to go ahead with its efforts to support MPLA, doing so in violation of the letter of the law. However, even with these strictures imposed by Congress, the Administration seems determined to go ahead with its intervention in Angola, and is likely to find covert ways of doing so.

In addition to using military means to counter the MPLA, the US is continuing to employ actual and threatened economic sabotage to force its position in Angola. Gulf Oil suspended all Angola operations under State Department pressure, and the U.S. Department of Commerce revoked the export licenses for two Boeing 737-200 aircraft promised to the Angolan government in Luanda over a year ago.

A recent five-point memo which was read to an MPLA representative in Washington in December by a Boeing official and is said to represent the views of Ford and the State Department, reveals the arrogance of the US Administration's attitude towards an independent Angola. The memo stated in part:

"The MPLA would do well to heed advice that no government can plan reconstruction in post-war Angola without American and Western help. No government can obtain the technological and financial resources to stimulate economic development without official American consent. As anyone should be aware, access to sophisticated technology is a privilege. The case of Boeing is just one, but a good example of the advantages of having access to American technology." (Washington Post, Jan. 27)

U.S. MERCENARY RECRUITMENT TO FIGHT THE MPLA

To counter the advances during January of the People's Republic of Angola military forces, US recruitment efforts to hire mercenaries to bolster the crumbling FNLA-UNITA forces have increased dramatically. American soldiers with special training at the Fort Bragg base in North Carolina have been offered $20,000 for a year of fighting in Angola. According to reports from soldiers there, recruiters solicited openly on the base. Some soldiers have already taken up the offer and left for Angola. However, the "official" position of the military is that such a procedure is illegal. (Africa News, Jan. 28, 1976)

At the same time, reports from the Zairean capital of Kinshasa disclosed that hundreds of European and US mercenaries were being brought in by UNITA to replace withdrawing South African troops in the front lines of fighting. (Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1976)

In Washington D.C., Vietnam war combat veterans have also been organized to fight with the FNLA and UNITA. One recruiter in this operation reported that his efforts were expanded considerably in the last two weeks of January after CORE (Congress on Racial Equality) committed itself to providing transportation for the mercenaries. CORE Chairman Roy Innis is reported to have recently promised UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi American troops. (Washington Post, Jan. 28) Where CORE is getting the money to finance this operation has not been disclosed, but there is much speculation, vigorously denied by Innis, that it is possibly the CIA.

ON THE ANGOLAN FRONT

During the month of January, the military forces of the People's Republic of Angola made striking advances in the north, the FNLA backed by Zaire and the US was all but eliminated. Only a sliver of territory inside Angola remained under its control, including Sao Salvador capital of the ancient Bakongo kingdom.

Moving south from Luanda, the capital, MPLA forces reclaimed the major centers of Nova Redondo and Cela from the UNITA-South African forces, and by the end of the month were poised outside Alta Hama, 100 miles north of Nova Lisboa (called Huambo by UNITA and FNLA who declared it their capital just after independence and the establishment of the PRA government in Luanda). During the last week of January western correspondents travelling with the anti-MPLA forces in the south reported that the military command and government of the FNLA-UNITA was being evacuated from Nova Lisboa to Silva Porto, 100 miles to the east.

Internal fighting also increased this month between UNITA and FNLA forces, the alliance of which has long been considered a union of expediency in a desperate situation and perhaps even forced upon them by their outside backers, the US, South Africa and Zaire. In southern Angola, UNITA ousted FNLA from Sa da Bandeira. Extensive fighting between the two shakily-aligned forces in Mocamedes caused heavy casualties and shipments of Angolan civilians to be evacuated to Namibia. (Reuters, Jan. 17) In Nova Lisboa itself, open warfare broke out between FNLA and UNITA at the airport on January 27. FNLA troops, who had already been accused of looting and robbing, refused to return to the front causing a UNITA commander to order his own troops to open fire. (Africa News, Jan. 28, 1976)

The behavior of retreating FNLA troops in the north reveals not only a lack of morale and discipline but the more important element of national purpose. Local population reports claim that people have been fleeing their communities and villages to get away from their presumed "defenders", the FNLA. Angolan refugees arriving in Zaire also reported a mock attack on one town by Zaire troops pretending to be MPLA soldiers in order to force the local population to leave so they could steal their belongings. (New York Times, Jan. 30, 1976)

The desperate position of FNLA's military and political situation was reflected in a public threat made by Paulo Tuba, a high ranking member of FNLA's Political Bureau. Tuba warned that unless additional foreign assistance could be found to bolster his organization's crumbling forces, FNLA would hire foreign commanders to
engage in terrorist activities against airlines and embassies of countries supporting the People's Republic as well as sabotage of public places in Luanda. (New York Times, Jan. 15, 1976)

Zaire has been the home of FNLA since the early 1960s and the primary conduit for financing its military and political operations. However, by the end of January, Zairean president Mobutu publicly suggested that given the changed situation of the FNLA he might be forced to withdraw his support from that organization. (New York Times, Jan. 27) If this happens, it most likely means the death knell for the FNLA as a military and political force.

By the end of January the weaknesses of UNITA as both a military and political organization have also been exposed. In its diminishing areas of control, economic production and governmental administration have become virtually non-existent. Fuel and food were in increasingly short supply. The threat of famine has grown daily. (New York Times, Jan. 23, 1976) However, UNITA leader, Savimbi, continues to insist that he would never surrender to the MPLA-led People's Republic of Angola and urged his supporters to engage in guerrilla warfare from the countryside if all else failed. (UPI, Jan. 29, 1976)

Reports from Angola seem to indicate it is but a question of time before the MPLA forces will take control of all the major centers held by the western-backed groups. (Angola Comite, Holland)

The military victories of the forces of the People's Republic of Angola have led to renewed calls for some form of coalition government. The MPLA has long supported a coalition government of progressive forces, but not one including "reactionary and "traitorous" elements, such as the leadership of both UNITA and the FNLA.

**SOUTH AFRICA'S INVASION**

"I have on various occasions stated that South Africa's involvement in Angola is part of the involvement of the free world. But I also stated that South Africa is not prepared to fight on behalf of the free world alone. Furthermore, South Africa will defend with determination its own borders and those interests and borders which we are responsible for."


South Africa appears to have pulled back in Angola—but not out. A January 26 dispatch from Cape Town stated: "South Africa said today that its forces would remain in Angola's southern border region until it receives guarantees for the safety of neighboring Namibia (Southwest Africa)." (Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1976)

"But Defense Minister Pieter Botha surprised Parliament by studiously avoiding any mention of a reported troop withdrawal from the Angolan front lines, saying only that they had accomplished their 'limited objective' with 29 casualties in six months of fighting. He implied that the South African contingent on the Namibia-Angola border might be expanded to retaliate against possible attacks." Botha's statement occurred during a no-confidence debate over the Pretoria regime's intervention in Angola. At the same time, a Defense Amendment bill was introduced which expands the definition of defense of the South Africa to include "the prevention or support of any armed conflict outside the Republic, which in the opinion of the

State President, is or may be a threat to the security of the Republic".

The present Defence Act (number 44 of 1957) contains some questionable definitions (Cape Times, Cape Town, Jan. 1, 1976): the meaning of "South Africa", a region which has variously been argued unsuccessfully to include all territories below the Equator or south of the Zambezi River; what is "a time of war"; and, whether a member of the Defence Force under 21 may serve without the "assistance of his guardian". There have been many complaints from parents of minors engaged in the "operational area", an official term used to cover South Africa's military activities in Angola and Namibia. Finally, the Defence Act defines the "Republic" to include "South West Africa".

A Washington Post story from Pretoria of January 30 reported South Africa's view of its intervention in Angola: "The South African government insists that its Angolan adventure has turned out to be a sizeable diplomatic and political success that will strengthen the country against black guerrillas." The Vorster regime's argument is that it accomplished two goals: prevention of a "take-over" by the MPLA and a strengthening of "detente" with neighboring black states. Officials speak of a "tactful live-and-let-live arrangement with the new government in Mozambique" and "believe that a similar deal with Angola can be promoted by hanging on to a piece of the country's southern border region—all in the name of protecting the big South African dam and power stations on the Cunene River. Its dimensions are kept secret although some sources indicate the bulge is as much as 40 miles deep—considerably more than is necessary to protect the dam and power installations."

South African authorities hail the Organization of African Unity split over Angola as a victory, and insist, as Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller said, that "South Africa has shown its black neighbors what a reliable ally Pretoria can be."

Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster said "that South African troops had penetrated 'a very long way' into Angola in recent months but said they had not been a party to the civil war there". (New York Times, Jan. 31,
South African armored car destroyed by MPLA

1976) He addressed Parliament at the end of a week-long debate on a no-confidence motion which accused the Government of not taking the public into its confidence and demanding an explanation for its actions and objective in Angola. The motion was defeated by a vote of 127 to 45 in favor of Vorster.

A *Washington Post* report (January 24, 1976) stated that “informed sources in Lusaka said that the South Africans had decided to withdraw from an active role in the Angolan conflict because they had failed to get support from Western countries. But there has been speculation that the United States may have encouraged the South Africans to leave in a deal also involving a pullout by Cuban and Soviet sources”. This report continues with the speculation stemming from a Zambian television statement, quoting “informed sources in Johannesburg”, that the South Africa decision to withdraw “had been reached on the international level”. However the reality of this statement was put into question by the subsequent comment, “while there are clear indications that the South African withdrawal from Angola is under way, fresh troops were seen leaving from South African departure points towards Angola.”

During a January 14 press conference, Secretary of State Kissinger said that the United States would be “amenable to discussing a phased withdrawal, with South African troops departing first and Cuban troops later.” Asked whether this meant that the United States had been coordinating policy with South Africa, he said no.

That intervention in Angola has been potentially disastrous for the South African regime is becoming more evident. Three captured white infantrymen were presented at a press conference during the OAU summit conference in Addis Ababa (*Washington Post*, Jan. 13, 1976). The “extremely young-looking soldiers” had been taken less than 250 miles south of Luanda. One said “they were flown by the South African Air Force into Cela directly from Grootfontein” a military base in Namibia which South Africa has illegally established there. A UN Security Council resolution of January 30 condemns South Africa's military build-up in Namibia and use of the territory for mounting attacks “on neighboring countries” (See Namibia section).

An American reporter writes of English journalists seeing the wreckage of a South African-marked Cessna plane shot down deep in Angola. (*Times*, New York, Jan. 23, 1976). They were told of a second South African aircraft downed at Catete, in which a Bloemfontein brigadier and three others were killed, an incident claimed by Pretoria to have occurred at the southern border, some 500 miles below Catete.

Pretoria has made an enormous blunder with its invasion of Angola. Even the *New York Times* columnist, Anthony Lewis, writes “The withdrawal, however disguised, will be a defeat for white South Africa—and will be seen as such by her non-white majority. The psychological effects of that will be great.” (Jan. 15, 1976)

**OAU SUMMIT FAILS**

“It is not the OAU that will solve the Angolan problem, it will be the Angolan people,” said Luis Almeida, Director of Information of the MPLA, after the OAU summit meeting in Addis Ababa ended in failure last January 13. As feared, the meeting split almost evenly between countries which support the People's Republic of Angola led by the MPLA, and countries which—while not officially recognizing the FNLA/UNITA government—have taken a pro-West stand.

President Samora Machel of Mozambique opened the meeting with a strong speech in support of the People's Republic of Angola, urging the OAU to “provide all necessary support to the Popular Movement in order to drive out the invaders.” He condemned “those traitors who had
opened the door to South Africa” and called the FNLA and UNITA “puppet forces that paved the way for the South African aggressors.” The opposing line was represented by President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, who insisted that the OAU should stick to its previously agreed policy of calling for an end to all foreign intervention and a government of national reconciliation. (That policy, of course, was made obsolete by the South African invasion, which necessitated the calling of the emergency summit.)

The two speakers represented a division that remained throughout the meeting, threatening to tear the OAU apart. Twenty-two countries (Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania) supported recognition of the People’s Republic of Angola. Twenty-two countries (Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia) took the “reconciliation” position. Ethiopia and Uganda took no official position. Finally, in the early hours of January 13, it became apparent, that no compromise could be reached, and the meeting was adjourned. [Ed’s Note: Since the OAU meeting Ethiopia and Sierra Leone have both recognized the People’s Republic of Angola.]

The summit thus failed to take action on any of the measures proposed by the supporters of the People’s Republic, namely, condemnation of South Africa’s invasion, denunciation of FNLA and UNITA for collaborating with South Africa, and admission of the People’s Republic to the OAU. Instead, it merely requested the nine-nation executive board to “follow the problem closely.”

For the first time in its 12-year history, the OAU was threatened with disintegration over the Angolan conflict. In an unprecedented display of dissention, accusations and counter-accusations were launched at the meeting. Just before the opening of the summit, President Sekou Toure of Guinea announced that his Government would withdraw from the OAU if it failed to recognize the People’s Republic, and that he would encourage other countries to do the same. The Guinean Foreign Minister strongly denounced Zaire, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast as “traitors to Africa” for consulting with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, William E. Schaufele, prior to the summit. He accused these countries of taking instructions from the US on how to defend the imperialist position at the summit. Guinea’s speech led to an angry confrontation with President Mobutu of Zaire, followed by a Tanzanian motion for adjournment.

Idi Amin’s leadership has proved particularly detrimental at a time of conflict and has led to additional controversy. Congo and Guinea have called for Amin’s resignation, accusing him of “treason” towards Africa, and a movement has reportedly been building up among various African countries and even the OAU Secretariat for his removal. MPLA Information Director Luis Almeida accused Amin of “mental instability” for first promising full backing to the MPLA and then reversing his stand. Amin’s vacillations were also one of the causes of the various delays which caused the OAU summit to be postponed from a late November meeting in Kampala to the final January meeting in Addis. Amin had initially opposed Somalia’s and Tanzania’s call for a summit, calling instead for an African peace-keeping force under his own command. He then changed his mind and accepted that the meeting should take place in Kampala, only to reverse his stand again, urging African leaders not to meet on Angola because this “would split Africa”. Later, following a trip to Zaire, Amin declared that both he and Mobutu (whom he had called a “reactionary” and blamed for the impasse in Angola only a few months earlier) would like to see a government of national unity in Angola.

Regardless of OAU ineffectiveness and division on the question of Angola, however, one should not lend credence to claims by United States officials and Western newspapers that the OAU split represented a victory for the West. The earlier OAU meeting at the beginning of November had called for a government of national reconciliation in Angola and for no individual bilateral recognition of any of the movements. However, by the time of the January summit, 22 African countries, including such an influential country as Nigeria, had recognized the People’s Republic of Angola under MPLA leadership. Disclosures of CIA intervention on the side of the FNLA and UNITA, and South Africa’s invasion in their support, had totally discredited these movements and embarrassed many of their backers. The fact that 22 African countries stood firmly for recognition of the People’s Republic, despite tremendous pressures from the United States, is significant; also important is that support for the MPLA was seen by these countries as taking priority over a united African position, which, under the circumstances, would have been artificial and compromising to the interests of the Angolan people. (Tanzanian Daily News, January 7-12, 1976; Times of Zambia, November 28, 30, 1975; The Guardian, London, January 10, 1976; International Herald Tribune, November 25, 1975; Agence France Presse, November 18, 1975; Washington Post, December 1, 1975; Associated Press, December 14, 1975)

**SOUTH AFRICA CALLS FOR UN INQUIRY IN ANGOLA**

The South African Ambassador Roelof F. Botha made a surprise appearance in the Security Council during the debate on Namibia. Barred from the General Assembly in 1974, the South African delegation had not participated in the last session of the Assembly for fear of further anti-South Africa action. Botha had the effrontery to call for a UN on-the-spot investigation in Angola “to determine whether a threat to peace there was caused by South Africa or by Soviet intervention.” Blatantly contradicting the statements of his own government, Botha sought to portray South African intervention in Angola as being limited to the protection of the Kunene river dam along the southern border with Namibia. Botha’s theatrical move was clearly aimed at taking advantage of world attention on Angola to detract from the issue of continued South African occupation of Namibia. South Africa, of course, has never allowed a UN investigation of Namibia or of the situation in South Africa itself, and has boycotted Security Council debates on Namibia since 1971.

Botha’s attempt was angrily denounced by several speakers. The SWAPO representative, Moses Garoeb, appealed to the Council not to be “hijacked” into irrelevant matters by South African “play-acting”. Ambassador
South African Ambassador to the UN addressing the Security Council on January 27 during the debate on Namibia

Salim of Tanzania protested the South African delegate was trying to rationalize South Africa’s actions in Angola, and that it had absolutely no business to be there. The Soviet representative called the South African statement a collection of falsehoods made to divert the Council from South Africa’s plundering of Namibia and enslavement of its people. He declared that the USSR has no need for Angolan land, wealth or strategic position and that it only seeks to help Angolans in determining their own future.

The issue of South African intervention in Angola was pursued by several other speakers who brought the attention of the Council to the fact that South Africa has been using the international territory of Namibia to launch attacks on the Angolan people. South Africa is known to have been engaged in building a military base in Namibia recently. *(New York Times, January 28, 1976)*

**UN CALLS FOR “RECONCILIATION” IN ANGOLA**

The UN Secretariat, although maintaining a detached attitude from the Angola question, has supported the official OAU position in favor of a coalition Government of all three movements. In November 1975, Secretary-General Waldheim appealed to the three groups to reach an agreement to end the conflict. Waldheim expressed support for OAU efforts to achieve a cease-fire and a government of national unity. He appealed to the international community to support these efforts and to avoid any measures which might intensify the conflict. This position was reiterated by Waldheim in a press conference held on January 9, in which he called for an ending to “all foreign intervention” in Angola, an immediate cease-fire and national reconciliation. Following the OAU meeting, a spokesman for the Secretary-General said that Waldheim “shared the disappointment that no agreement had been reached” but “was confident that efforts would continue to find a satisfactory solution to stop the bloodshed and to achieve national reconciliation.”

In light of the stalemate in the OAU and the growing polarization on Angola, the Secretary-General’s statements appear—despite their studied neutrality—to be supportive of the Western position. *(UN press release WS/745)*

**INSIDE ANGOLA: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES—PRODUCE & RESIST**

“A Luta Continual—Produzir e Resistir!” “The Struggle continues—produce and resist”, this is the call of the MPLA to the people of the People’s Republic of Angola. The resistance is against the FNLA-UNITA-South African aggression and the production is of food for territories ravaged by war in the overall effort to reconstruct the Angolan economy interrupted by the continuing war for independence. The meaning of “produce and resist” is explained to the Angolan people in the MPLA organ *Vitoria Certa* (Luanda, Dec. 20, 1975) stating that success in the liberation war will be won on two fronts. On the military and on the economic, where the Angolan working class will take the lead in winning the battle on the latter front.

The MPLA Government of the People’s Republic of Angola envisions a society based on egalitarian principles free of human exploitation, which is in stark contrast to the total lack of any such social transformation program in either the FNLA or UNITA. With the imminent victory in the war, the MPLA looks forward to the building of a multi-racial state devoted to the development of the country’s rich natural resource base for the entire population as opposed to a small elite.

At the end of January, the military situation is extremely favorable to the MPLA. With FNLA troops pushed back to the Zaire border and its power base almost totally eliminated, followed by the successful MPLA counter-offensive in the central and southern regions in forcing the retreat of South African regular and mercenary forces allied with UNITA troops, the definitive military victory of the MPLA is in sight.

In some ways, the more difficult “war” is that of getting the Angolan economy on its feet under non-colonized conditions. Food is the first priority. Shortages of various food commodities has led to initiatives by the PRA Government to prevent speculative pricing of food. In Luanda, control of the food supply is being handled by people’s ward committees, part of the “poder popular” (people’s power) mass political mobilization by the MPLA. *(Radio Luanda, Dec. 27, 1975)* In the north, people are asking the government for food and guns to defend themselves against further FNLA pillaging. *Africa News*, reported that Jane Bergerol, BBC correspondent, has been travelling through the newly liberated areas in north-west Angola with Prime Minister Lopo De Nascimento of the MPLA. “Bergerol says the major complaint of people she met was the lack of food, after the FNLA army passed through, feeding off the land and killing the livestock. Villagers also wanted transportation to take them to homes they fled during heavy fighting in the area. Another request the Prime Minister heard was for weapons to defend themselves should the FNLA try to return.”

In response to the critical food situation in Angola, the workers of Tanganyika Packers Ltd. in Tanzania have donated large quantities of canned meat to the PRA Government. *(Daily News, Dar es Salaam, Nov. 24, 1975)*
Agostinho Neto, president of the People’s Republic of Angola

Currently, the national economy of Angola is suffering not only from the war but from the mounting boycott by the west, particularly the United States. Cabinda Gulf operations have reportedly been shut down although the Cabindan enclave remains militarily secure under MPLA control. The Cassinga iron mines, Angola’s third largest export earner after oil and coffee, have ceased production and diamond prospecting by the Anglo-American-owned CONDIAMA in southern Angola has also been stopped. The Benguela Railroad, vital to the export of Angolan, Zairean and Zambian copper, is not operating. The area surrounding the railway, formerly a UNITA stronghold, has recently been successfully liberated by MPLA forces. Other Angolan industries have been hit hard by shortages of essential raw materials and the evacuation or fleeing of both African and Portuguese workers. (Guardian, London, Dec. 14, 1975). The government has indicated that firms which have abandoned by their owners shall be managed by the workers employed in such firms. Workers’ management committees are to be set up within 17 days of the first day of the absence of the owner. (Radio Luanda, Nov. 28, 1975) It appears that similar examples of worker control of firms and communal control of farms are spreading in areas not affected by the war.

Another problem is that the overwhelming majority of Angola’s professional class, particularly doctors, have fled the country. Just prior to independence in November, not a single dentist remained in Luanda and similar reports came from Angola’s other major cities.

The task of economic reconstruction is paramount; its success means that one of Africa’s richest countries will have its economy under progressive and autonomous Angolan control. The MPLA is in political control of Angola; it is rapidly taking military control, and what remains is the crucial struggle of economic transformation.

South Africa

Politics

BPC Supports MPLA and Condemns Transkei “Independence”

The Black People’s Convention (BPC) came out in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) at its fourth annual congress in December. The BPC’s resolution states that the MPLA is the movement with the greatest support from the Angolan people and that its victory would have the greatest significance for change inside South Africa itself.

“We are a political organization catering for the needs of all oppressed people in South Africa,” said Kenneth Rachidi, the new president, describing the BPC. “The organization will strive to free Black people and fulfill their needs, aspirations and ideals. Because of the position in which Blacks find themselves, there need to be dramatic changes until they can operate on an equal footing with everyone.”

The BPC also passed a resolution stating that the Transkei “homeland,” scheduled for “independence” in October 1976 as part of the Government’s policy of apartheid was really still a part of South Africa and condemned the “independence” as fraudulent.

In addition, the BPC congress resolved that such bodies as the Coloured People’s Representative Council (CRC) and the South African Indian Council, which were created by the Government, should be condemned. Labour Party leader Sonny Leon, who was fired last year from his position as chairman of the CRC for refusing to pass the budget, was condemned for “working in the wrong camp,” i.e. participating in an apartheid institution. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 22, 1975)

The Angolan situation is having an effect on the internal politics of South Africa which is hardly one that can be welcomed by the Government. Just over a year ago the police were arresting those demonstrating in support of the new FRELIMO Government, although it had been officially recognized by the South African state. Now the regime is faced with growing open support for the MPLA, at the same time that South African troops are fighting against it.

Even “moderate” Black leaders are opposing South African involvement in Angola.

Hudson Ntsanwisi, Chief Minister of the Gazankulu Bantustan said recently “South Africa should put right its internal situation so that blacks have a stake and are ready to defend the country against the enemy. Now the restless youth are espousing the cause of the Popular Movement.”

Father Leo Rakale, a black Anglican priest, recently asked, “If the government is so preoccupied with communism, why does it not eliminate the racism, job limita-
tion and pass laws, which make South Africa a breeding ground for communism?"

Coloured Labour Party leader Sonny Leon has made his position clear. "I will never tell my people to fight for the perpetuation of white Baasskap [domination]. It would be totally unfair to expect coloured soldiers to risk their lives for their country when they are still being treated as second class citizens," he said recently.

In contrast to South African Defense Minister Piet Botha's recent warning that a MPLA victory in Angola could lead to the "enslavement (sic) of the whole of southern Africa," Bishop Desmond Tutu, African Dean of the Anglican Cathedral in Johannesburg, pointed out that "Many blacks do not see themselves threatened, as they are victims of other ideologies." (Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1975)

DETENTIONS IN NATAL

Some twenty-five Africans have been detained in Natal Province for allegedly recruiting people for "subversive" training in Botswana and other African states. Among those detained are Ephraim Mthalane, a 56 year old newspaper deliveryman, and Gerald Mdladloise, a studio assistant in the Fine Arts Department of Natal University. The names of the others are unknown to Southern Africa at this time.

According to the head of the Security Branch J.G. Dreyer, the investigations are continuing and more arrests are likely. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 13, 1975; AP, Dec. 14, 1975.)

Since that report at least two other men have been detained. They are Matthews Meyiwa, who is married with two children, and Joshua Zulu. All are being held under the Terrorism Act and, according to Colonel Dreyer, will probably face trial in Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court. Conviction carries a minimum sentence of five years in jail; the maximum is death. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 27, 1975.)

In what may be a related incident, David Hemson, a former member of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) is thought to have escaped from South Africa to Botswana. Hemson was serving a five year banning order under which he was not allowed to leave his home in Durban between 6 pm and 8 am. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 27, 1975.)

TRANSKEI AND "INDEPENDENCE"

Whites who live within the Transkei territory are preparing for the transition to "independence" in October 1976. In addition to the poverty stricken areas where most Africans live, the rich white area of Port St Johns will become part of the Transkei after October. Although many whites have moved, a large number have stayed.

Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima, who will be the Prime Minister, wants the Whites to stay. "The [whites only] signs at hotel entrances will have to come down and Africans must be allowed into bars but private schools can remain white," Matanzima said late last year.

With such an attitude on the part of Matanzima it is understandable that whites show little alarm. "Chief Matanzima seems a reasonable man," said one white farmer from the Port St Johns area. As one member of the Transkei opposition Democratic Party put it, "If there's any threat to his [Matanzima's] administration the South Africans are bound to come in to prop him up."

The process of granting "independence" to the "homelands" is part of the South African Government's policy of apartheid. This policy of deliberate fragmentation by the creation of artificial political entities with puppet governments is an attempt to give the exploitation of Blacks an international legal framework. The decision to break up the country has been made only by the white minority Government, not the whole population. The "independent" homelands will not be able to provide enough jobs for the African population which will still spend most of its time working in white areas for the profit of others. None of the South African liberation movements recognize the Government's "independence" scheme. (Times of Zambia, Nov. 28, 1975.)

JAILED POLITICAL LEADERS ILL

Govan Mbeki, who was convicted in the 1964 Rivonia trial, is reportedly seriously ill with hypertension. Mbeki was sentenced along with Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and five other African National Congress leaders to life imprisonment for abandoning non-violent tactics and forming an underground arm of the ANC called Umkonto we Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation).

Two other political prisoners, Kulisile Rox and Simon Branders, are also known to be very ill; both with terminal cancer. South African authorities have refused to comment, although Rox and Branders have reportedly been moved from Robben Island prison to Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town. (Anti-Apartheid News, London, Dec. 1975.)

SACTU INTERVIEW

The following are excerpts from an interview with James Stuart and Kay Moonsamy of the South African Congress of Trade Unions, a federation of non-racial trade unions linked with the African National Congress. SACTU policy is based on the belief that there can be no separation between the struggle for higher wages and the fight for political rights. The interview appeared in Third World Forum, Vol. 1 No. 6, published in Montreal.

TWF: Let's begin by establishing the nature of the politi-
Stuart: Within the South African system white people, because they have in their hands control of the economic system, are the only people with political rights. They control the army, police force and other segments of the armed forces. They are able to control every aspect of the lives of South African Black people. This, briefly, is the system.

TWF: Does the regime permit the existence of trade unions? If so, what types of unions are permitted?

Moonsamy: The racist Vorster regime permits trade unions, which are recognized by law, only for white, coloured and Indian workers. African workers are not recognized and meetings by Blacks and oppressed workers to organize and propagate unions are banned. Trade union leaders, especially in SACTU, are detained and imprisoned for long periods. SACTU, the only democratic and multi-racial trade union in South Africa, thus works illegally. Ever since 1953, when the government passed the Native Settlement of Disputes Act, it has been trying to destroy African trade unions. But despite these harsh and difficult conditions, SACTU has not stopped organizing the masses of African workers.

TWF: Could you discuss the relationship between the national liberation movement in South Africa and SACTU.

Stuart: SACTU is closely linked with the African National Congress (ANC), a broadly-based national liberation movement which unites the population in the fight against racism and apartheid.

There are two reasons for this link. First, we both accept the Freedom Charter as our programme of struggle. We both believe in a democratic society where all people have the right to political representation on all bodies within the country, and where the land, wealth, mines, factories and everything above and under the ground belongs to and is used for the benefit of the people of South Africa.

We both believe that all people in South Africa, black and white alike, should enjoy full rights, including those to happiness, peace and friendship.

Second, since it is the working people who are the main organized social force in our country, we have the duty to represent them within the liberation movement itself.

Thus, SACTU and the ANC joined forces.

BLACK WOMEN'S FEDERATION FORMED

Over 200 black women from all over South Africa met in December in Durban and formed a new organization, the South African Black Women's Federation. While not much is known about the new organization, its aims include establishing solidarity and co-operation among black women's organizations and individuals.

Speakers at the conference stressed the legal oppression of women, who are minors under South African law, and the problem of poverty. "We need legal aid and advice bureaus for our sisters who could not afford the luxury of travelling to and learning from this conference," said Zubie Seedat, one of the speakers.

Another speaker pointed out that of the 1 million blacks who live in the township of Soweto, 300,000 were living there illegally. Since there are only 96,000 homes in the township, an average of 10 people live in each home.

One of the resolutions passed by the conference called for black women to "strive for their rights as full citizens of the country," and "not to be left out of the decision making on the future of South Africa." (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 13, 20, 1975.)
The following is the result of a telephone poll done by a Cape Town newspaper reporter of 100 Van der Merwe's (a South African surname as common as Smith) on their attitudes to TV. This is what some of them said:

A Mailand Van der Merwe: “No man, not for me. I've watched these little boxes and it's just like looking at a bioscope in the rain.”

A Wynberg Van der Merwe: “The salesman told me you could see everything, but I saw the match between England and Scotland in a Long Street shop and you couldn't even see the ball go into the scrum.”

A Tievlie Van der Merwe: “The Domi says it's against the will of God. We will not have such a thing in our house.”

A Bellville Van der Merwe: “Don't you speak to me like that, don't mention that thing. My husband and I won't have it. It's an ongin (a monster).”

A Mrs Van der Merwe, of Woodstock: “We are devout Christians. We believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and Christ will not approve. It will breed nothing but evil.”

A Mrs van der Merwe, of Parow: “Excuse my language but it's just a gomers (mess-up). It is bad for the health especially the eyes and we haven't got enough eye specialists in this country to cure the damage. It will stop our people from seeing straight.”

TELEVISION COMES TO SOUTH AFRICA

Television has come to South Africa. The government, which reluctantly introduced the service, still takes a dim view of the fact. The major fear is the impact it will have on the thinking of the South African population. The tremendous programming demand of TV makes it necessary for smaller countries, like South Africa, to import programs from the US and Britain. The government is afraid of the effect such programs may have on the Afrikaner population (whites of Dutch descent), implanting ideas about race relations which, while hardly radical, are none the less different from those which form the ideological basis for apartheid.

The black population is theoretically included in the future of TV in South Africa. Extreme poverty, extensive lack of electricity and the large black population in the reserves is expected to push to a minimum TV viewing by Blacks and thus the Government appears not to fear any significant effect on the black population.

Television, like radio, will be highly censored, although it is officially “autonomous” from the government. As the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Related to Television, which recommended TV's introduction, reported:

[Government restrictions will] “guard against the service degenerating into a medium propagating the ‘provocative’ behavior of discontented and frustrated individuals as an example worthy of emulation by other like-minded persons. Moreover a good community service should never debase itself to become the mouthpiece of immature so-called ‘reformers’ who do not know what is at issue or what they want to achieve.”

(Guardian, UK, Jan. 5, 1975; Africa Today, Spring 1974.)

BLACKS CLOSED OUT OF SCHOOL

Senator Johann van der Spuy, Minister of National Education, has told the University at Natal that it may no longer admit first year African medical students. Second year medical students will be admitted until 1978. Further, the Minister for National Education let it be known that the Government had also decided to phase out Indian and Coloured medical students.

The new instructions directly affect some 40 to 60 black medical students who would normally be admitted.

Black students will still be allowed at the Medical University of South Africa at Garankuwa hospital near Pretoria. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975.)

ECONOMICS

US BANK LOOKS FOR LOAN TO SOUTH AFRICA

Manufacturers Hanover is trying to find R87 million ($100 million) in medium term credit on the Eurocurrency market on behalf of the South African Government Electrical Supply Commission (ESCOM). There has been some difficulty in obtaining ready credit because South African parastatals have floated a higher percentage of total international notes and bonds than in the past, thus reducing up to the limit which the Eurocurrency market can afford. Some feel that South Africa should seek bilateral financing at the government level and not “open market” funding. It looks as if the US banking system is still deeply-embedded in aiding South Africa's economic expansion. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975.)

GENERAL ELECTRIC PUTS OUT BID ON SA NUCLEAR REACTOR

General Electric, the US multinational, is one of a consortium of companies (including Brown Boveri [W. German] and Rotterdam Drydock) which has submitted a contractor bid for work on ESCOM's nuclear reactors being built at Koeberg north of Cape Town. The contract is worth R630 million ($724 million), one of the largest ESCOM's projects to date. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975.)

In another field of energy supply, the US oil rig Sedco K has been hired by South Africa's state-owned oil-exploration company, SOEKOR, to begin drilling offshore South Africa last January. More and more funds are being sunk into the search for oil with a budget of R50 million ($57.5 million) for 1976 and 1977. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 3, 1976)

KWAZULU LABOR OUTLOOK BLEAK

The Government Bureau for Economic Research on Bantu Development has been producing economic surveys of various Bantustans, most recently coming out with one about KwaZulu. (For similar information on Bophuthat-
KwaZulu consists of 48 separate pieces of land (there are plans to reduce this to 10 pieces) upon which a little more than half of the slightly more than four million Zulus live. Only one ninth of the income earned by the Zulu people is earned in KwaZulu itself, and thus most of the spending by Zulus takes place in the white areas. Sixty two percent of the economically active Zulu men work in white areas, and to stop this migratory flow to jobs outside Zululand it would be necessary to create some 50,400 jobs a year. The Industrial Development Corporation, a South African Government agency, and private firms have invested some R233 million ($256 million) over the last 15 years in KwaZulu "border areas" (locations in white areas bordering the Bantustan) and have created only 19,204 jobs. This means that R11,600 ($13,340) was spent to create each job. Only 963 jobs were set up in KwaZulu itself.

Economic planning includes the establishment of many towns of which 20 have already been built. The population growth of KwaZulu due to the expulsion of people from urban and "white" areas has affected statistics concerning housing and education. In 1970 there were 6.3 persons per dwelling, but now there are 7.3. The student-teacher ratio has grown. Of the school population 93 per cent of the children are in primary school and six per cent on the secondary level.

The Bantu Mining Corporation is investigating mineral possibilities in the Bantustan including coal, copper and nickel, and there are a number of projects for irrigation. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975)

Because the "homelands" were not designed to really meet the needs of their populations, it is not surprising that even in KwaZulu the economic picture remains bleak. And this despite the considerable time that its leader, Gatsha Buthelezi spends in western countries, seeking investments and support. White South Africa needs the Zulu workers on its own sugar plantations, in the factories which abound in Natal, and in public service.

BLACK UNIONISM NEWS

The General Secretary for the International Union of Food and Allied Workers, Dan Gallin, recently visited South Africa and came away with two dominant impressions. The first was that South Africa's substitutes for true Black unions (i.e., works or liaison committees) are not acceptable to the Black workers of South Africa nor to the international trade union movement; and the second was that the employers to whom he spoke were not opposed to having Black unions. In addition, he felt that the committees were managed controlled and the labor laws continually repressive. His international union hopes to increase the number of its multiracial affiliates in South Africa from six to 18. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975)

Members of the African Metal and Allied Workers' Union have appealed to the British Trade Union Council to pressure Leyland Motor Company to stop its anti-union activities in South Africa. In the past workers have testified that the company has fired shop stewards and used the Security Branch to harass them. Leyland management says it has not obstructed union recruitment, but believes that liaison committees are more meaningful, and that it will not negotiate with Black unions until the South African Government recognizes them. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 3, 10, 1976)

White union members in the building industry have been assured half pay if they become unemployed as part of an agreement which allowed Blacks to do jobs allocated to white and colored workers if there were a skilled labor shortage. The unemployment plan, which has not yet involved many white workers, is an obvious ploy to placate fears of mass reduction of skilled Whites in favor of cheaper skilled Blacks. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 3, 1976)

The employment of black women in South Africa has grown some 230 per cent from 1951-70, while black men's employment has grown by 48 per cent. Only ten percent of South African companies pay equal wages to women high school and university graduates as to their male counterparts. Economists predict that by 1980 of the 10.4 million workers in South Africa only 1.7 million of them will be Whites. (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 3, 1976)

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WORLD

A Natal firm will supply tunnel equipment and technology for a huge Peruvian irrigation scheme. The same firm has supplied aid in the past to Zambia, Zaire, and Guatemala. (Safato Exporter, Sept. 1975)

Zambia imported 185,000 tons of fertilizer from South Africa during the first half of 1975 via Zambian government agencies. (Star, Sept. 9, 1975 in Safato Exporter, Sept., 1975)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES

The South African regime seems to feel confident that its friends within the western governments will continue to defend the Apartheid regime's interests through future crises in the southern region of Africa. Commenting on French-South African relations, the Star's (Johannesburg, Jan. 10, 1976) Paris correspondent noted that although "the long-standing official French view ... condemning apartheid, this stand has up to now had no effect on relations between the two countries... Relations are good at present and expected... to remain so," particularly in "business, finance, and trade" areas. (Italics added) A number of members of the French Parliament, who attended a reception held by the newly appointed South African Ambassador to France, have been making very "enthusiastic" comments about the situation in South Africa after returning from a visit to the Apartheid Republic. Thus, the Star's owners and other South African politicians consider the present alliance between the Apartheid regime and the conservative government of Valery Giscard d'Estaing to be highly stable.

Although the article pinpoints French-South African ties, a similar situation prevails with each of South Africa's main allies—US, UK, West Germany, and Japan. Each of these governments periodically issues pro-forma criticisms of Apartheid. But these criticisms are actually propaganda covers concealing their true connections with the Apartheid system. Their trade (military and civilian), financial, and business links with the Apartheid establishment have been growing continually. Western politicians visit South Africa—often on trips fully paid by various South African propaganda agencies—and return praising the policies of the Apartheid regime. In other words, they praise policies of political oppression and economic exploitation which ensure enormous profits for the Western multinational corporations. Thus, these Western governments consider it in their interests to ensure the continued existence of the Apartheid system.
Meanwhile, the South African regime will soon be increasing the flow of propaganda specifically directed at the American public in an attempt to undermine growing opposition in the United States to the political-military alliance between the US Government and the Apartheid regime. The South African Information Department is doubling its staff at the Washington Embassy. Besides the general staff increase, the Department will include “Information” Officers from the “Bantustans” on a rotating basis, with the first two being from the Transkei. Once this expansion is completed, the “information” section at the Washington Embassy may be even larger than the diplomatic section.

While the South African Information department is busy producing propaganda which whitewashes the situation under the Apartheid system, it also misses no opportunity to prevent truth about the political and economic oppression of Black South Africans from being publicized. A BBC commentator, Mr. Graham Mytton, while visiting South Africa had taped interviews with several black leaders, including Winnie Mandela—the wife of Nelson Mandela who is serving a life sentence on Robben Island for his leadership in the armed resistance of the African National Congress. These tapes were to be aired on the BBC. However, the South African regime wanted to prevent the world from hearing these tapes. Mysteriously, a sealed box containing the tapes was ripped open and the tapes which contained the interviews were wiped clean by an electronic eraser. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 20, 1975, Jan. 10, 1976) Thus, the public should be very wary of anything emanating from any of South Africa’s propaganda agents—be they Black or White.

CLOSER LINKS WITH ISRAEL

Israeli-South African diplomatic ties have been finally established at the Embassy level in both countries. In the January 1976 issue of Southern Africa it was noted that South Africa had opened its Embassy in Tel Aviv in December 1975. However, there was a delay and the actual opening did not take place until January 1976. Ironically the Israeli Government seemed even more anxious than the South Africans to have the Embassy opened, and was annoyed about the delay. Israeli Governmental attitudes towards the South African regime are accurately summarized by an editorial in Ha’aretz (a newspaper affiliated with the Mapai, the major government party) which stated that “criticism [by Israelis] of South Africa and the Government is not always based on a full understanding of the local situation. . . . Close ties . . . have existed between the two states and South Africa was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Israel. . . . Jan Smuts [former Prime Minister of South Africa] had been one of the original supporters of the Zionist movement.” (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 27, 1975, Jan. 1, 1976)

namibia

Terrorism Trial

The trial of six SWAPO members charged under the South African regime’s Terrorism Act (see, Southern African, Feb. 1976) has been transferred from Windhoek 200 miles away to the seaside town of Swakopmund. The judge claimed fear of “the emotionally charged atmosphere” (Southern African News Agency, Jan. 1976), a reference to the orderly but spirited demonstration by 150 relatives and friends on opening day last December 1 at the Supreme Court in Windhoek.

SANA reports that it has been “unofficially, though reliably, rumoured that the State will attempt to secure a death sentence” for Mr. Hendrik Shikongo, alleged to have assisted the assassins of Bantustan Chief Filemon Elifas last August. The prosecution announced it would call 31 witnesses to give evidence against the accused—the youngest a 14% year-old child.

It has been alleged that the accused were tortured and maltreated while in detention, including “being suspended by the wrists—bound together with wire—for lengthy periods, “being made to stand for many hours during interrogation and being left out in the sun without water; scars on wrists and backs are still visible. Results of a medical examination are not yet known. Fears have been voiced that other SWAPO detainees held for months incommunicado in jails in northern Namibia have been similarly mistreated.

The six who will appear in Swakopmund court on February 16 are: Ms Rauna Nambinga, Ms Naimi Nombowa and Ms Anna Ngahondjwa—all nurses at a Lutheran hospital; Mr. Aaron Mushimba, Mr. Andreas Nangolo and Mr. Shikongo.

"SECURITY"

A conference “aimed at securing Ovamboland against further infiltration by armed insurgents and terrorists” took place at Oshakati, capital of the Ovambo Bantustan (Advertiser, Windhoek, Jan. 15/16, 1976). Bantustan officials, South African military and police officers and the “Commissioner General for the Indigenous Peoples” discussed methods to offset attacks by troops of the SWAPO Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia. The Advertiser says “authentic sources estimate” that 3,500 South African soldiers are guarding “South Africa’s backdoor”—the 1,600 km line from the Atlantic ocean to the eastern Caprivi strip, a region referred to by the military as the “operational” zone.

There was no announcement of the long-threatened mass removal of the population in the heavily-inhabited strip 10 km deep and 400 km long at the Angola-Namibia border.

The Churches

The Anglican Church in Namibia intends to open a multi-racial school in Windhoek (Guardian, Manchester, Jan. 3, 1976). Church authorities have applied for permission and are proceeding to plan for an initial class of 30 students. A building and teachers are already lined up, and a campaign for funds is underway.

Lutheran pastor John V. Gronli from Montana has been denied a visa by the South African government to enter the Territory and teach Biblical studies at the Paulinus Theological College of which the Rev. Zephania Kamea is principal (see, Southern Africa, Jan. 1976). No reason was given by Pretoria. The Rev. Morris A. Sorensen
of the American Lutheran Church declared: "A tiny group of officials has prevented two and a half million American Lutherans from expressing their partnership with 340,000 Namibian Lutherans."

Refugees
A flotilla of small vessels brought several thousand refugees fleeing from fighting in Angola between forces of the uneasy-allied FNLA and UNITA down the west African coast to the Namibian port of Walvis Bay. The South African Government refused to allow Angolans to enter, but did permit about 1,000 Portuguese citizens to proceed to Windhoek where they were airlifted to Lisbon (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 24, 1976). South African ambassador Roelof F. Botha "delivered a letter to the Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, in which South Africa seeks help for 13,000 refugees from Angola who had fled through South West Africa" (Advertiser, Windhoek, Jan. 23, 1976), a reference to swarms of people who passed through Namibia last fall.

THE DAKAR CONFERENCE
Over 300 delegates representing governments, the UN, liberation movements, the churches, non-governmental agencies and the international legal profession met in Dakar, Senegal, January 5 to 8, 1976, at a conference on Namibia and Human Rights. The conference Declaration condemned South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory and its system of rule as constituting "a crime against humanity". It stated South Africa "will never willingly end" its occupation, and that it "must be compelled to do so by all means available to the international community". The statement by the participants was "convinced that the armed struggle of the people of Namibia ... will inevitably triumph". It supported UN resolutions and actions and the Council for Namibia and that body's Decree number 1 for protection of the Territory's natural resources. The Declaration called for recognition of SWAPO as the only authentic representative of the people of Namibia.

zimbabwe

NKOMO-SMITH NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN
The talks between Joshua Nkomo heading a 12 person delegation and rebel Prime Minister Ian Smith began with an 80 minute meeting in Salisbury on December 15th, 1975. Smith said in a speech before the meeting that he would not accept demands for immediate black majority rule, and if freedom fighters started a full scale war against the whites "they will be killed by the thousand." (Zambia Daily Mail, Dec. 11, 1975)

At the meeting, which Smith described as having been "conducted in a congenial atmosphere", committees were set up, reportedly to examine constitutional details. (Guardian, London, Dec. 16, 1975) Nkomo has among his team of close advisers several lawyers, including Leo Baron, Deputy Chief Justice of Zambia and a former Rhodesian barrister opposed to the Smith regime, Robert White, a British lawyer and Roland Brown, legal adviser to President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. (Zambia Daily Mail, Dec. 11, 1975)

After the meeting Nkomo flew to Kampala, Uganda, to
report to President Idi Amin, the current OAU Chairman. Nkomo told reporters in Uganda that he was rejecting any OAU involvement in the talks. (Zambia Daily Mail, Dec. 18, 1975)

On January 6, 1976 a further 90 minute meeting between the Nkomo group and Smith took place. Smith took five Cabinet Ministers with him to the meeting, which was held under tight security.

The ANC, under the leadership of Bishop Muzorewa, has repudiated the talks, and Dr Gordon Chayuduka, the Secretary-General, is reported to have said that any agreement reached between Nkomo and Smith would not be binding on the Zimbabwean African population. (Guardian, London, Jan. 7, 1976)

The Zambian newspaper, the Zambia Daily Mail published a strong attack on Dr Elliot Gabellah, Publicity Secretary of the ANC, for "an outburst against Zambia." (Zambia Daily Mail, Dec. 17, 1975) There has been growing tension between the ANC and the Zambian Government over the latter's backing of the Nkomo negotiations.

PRISONERS TORTURED

The Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists published a report in its December 1975 Monthly Review stating that there was abundant evidence that people suspected by Rhodesian soldiers of failing to inform on freedom fighters are subject to interrogation "accompanied by torture and maltreatment." (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 27, 1975)

The new Indemnity and Compensation Act which became law in October has been used for the first time to protect a black Rhodesian Senator, Chief Jeremiah Chirau, who is also president of the Government-appointed Council of Chiefs. The Act was passed to indemnify the regime's employees, including members of the security forces, against prosecution for acts done in "good faith" in connection with "the suppression of terrorism." It appears that Chief Chirau instigated a brutal assault on two brothers, Cyril and Francis Makunda, because of their membership of the ANC. He himself participated in the beating, kicking and punching of the two men, who were so badly injured that they had to go to hospital. The two men instituted a civil action for damages against the Chief, as well as laying a complaint before the police. Under the direction of the Minister of Law and Order, Lardner Burke, using the powers given him under the new act, the civil proceedings were stopped. The criminal charges had never been pressed by the police—apparently also at the instruction of the Minister of Law and Order. (Guardian, London, Dec. 24, 1975)

the struggle continues

MOZAMBIQUE

PEOPLE'S NEWSPAPERS RESTRUCTURED

During the fifth session of the First National Conference of Frelimo's Department of Information and Propaganda held at Macomia, Cabo Delgado from November 26 to the 30 of 1975, it was decided that information posted on walls mainly in urban areas will take on a new importance. First of all, the name—Wall Newspapers (Jornal de Parede) will be changed to People's Newspaper (Jornal do Povo). It was felt that the name "Wall Newspaper" did not evoke any revolutionary spirit in the people. In addition, many "Wall" Newspapers were in fact sold on stands in the streets.

The production of the "People's Newspapers" will be supervised by the Grupos Dinazadores—political workers and peasants in various institutions who work through groups forming a national network. The purpose of the newspaper is to inform and educate the masses at a national level to support and take an active part in national reconstruction activities. The Jornal do Povo will mirror the real problems of the people and reinforce unity and militant internationalism. Articles will be changed every week and will appear where people gather, at hospitals, schools, markets etc.

The Tanzania Sunday News (December 28, 1975) pointed out the necessity for such an invention especially for Africa—"a continent whose communication system is about the poorest," and speculates that many other countries in Africa will take on the use of the "Peoples' Newspapers" in the future.

SHORT NOTES

• DETA, the Mozambique airline, has signed a contract worth about R4 million in the first year with Tempair International, a company based near London, that specializes in providing operational services for airlines in developing countries. Now DETA will be able to operate through Beira and Luanda to Lisbon and later to Nairobi, hence becoming an international airline.

A Tempair Boeing 707 with 167 economy seats will operate in DETA's colors with the British company supplying air crews, ground support, engineering staff and cabin service management (Star, Johannesburg, Jan. 10, 1976).

• Zambia and Mozambique are studying the economic feasibility and profitability of a direct rail link from Lusaka through to Beira. (Times of Zambia, Dec. 5, 1975).

• A decree published recently in the Boletim da Republica of Mozambique reported that as a result of industries being established illegally in that country, the Minister of Industry and Commerce has the power to take over all such industries and to decide their destiny. (Tanzania Daily News, Dec. 11, 1975).
THE ZAIREAN ECONOMY

While encountering setbacks on the political-military front in terms of the collapse of the FNLA in Angola, President Mobutu Seko of Zaire has also received some bad economic news. The international consortium which was planning to finance the Tenke-Fungurume project, the world's largest new copper mining venture to be located not far from Zaire's existing copper mines in Shaba (ex-Katanga), has indefinitely postponed its efforts. Maurice Tempelsman, president of the New York firm of Leon Tempelsman and Son, Inc. and an old friend of President Mobutu, had pulled together a number of Western interests in the venture: Charter Consolidated of Britain (a major mining house controlled by South Africa's Harry Oppenheimer), Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco), Mitsui of Japan and two French companies. The construction was to be handled by the Fluor Corporation of Los Angeles. The Zaire-end of the arrangements was managed by Larry Devlin, Tempelsman's representative in Kinshasa since 1973 or 1974. Devlin is a former C.I.A. official who served in the Congo from 1960 to 1963, ostensibly as a political officer at the U.S. Embassy. He then did a two-year stint in Washington overseeing Congo operations before returning to Kinshasa as C.I.A. station chief about five months before Mobutu came to power (end of 1965).

The project may well be revived, however, if copper prices recover and new capital, perhaps from Kuwait, can be found.

Secretary Kissinger and the State Department have substantially increased U.S. aid to the faltering Zairean economy in the past months. The administration is seeking $64.5 million in military and economic assistance, far above the averages of the three previous years which ranged from $8.4 to $15.6 million. Of that $64.5 million, at least $15 million has already gone to Zaire in the form of U.S.-backed commodity credits. Congressional debate now centers around a request for $10 million of industrial credits under the Security Support Assistance category. While the State Department argues that the funds would aid American firms in Zaire, Congressional critics fear the money will be used to support Mobutu's priorities in Angola. (Africa News, Durham, N.C., Jan. 26, 1976)

On the oil front, the news for President Mobutu was more encouraging. In early December he inaugurated the exploitation of his country's first oilfield. At a cost of about 24 million which was obtained from Gulf Oil and Japanese and Belgian firms, the field is located about 15 kilometers offshore from the mouth of the Zaire River and has a potential of about 25,000 barrels a day, roughly one-sixth of what Gulf was taking from Cabinda. Under the agreement for the oil, the Zaire Government receives 20 per cent of the profits, the Gulf subsidiary (Gulf Oil of Zaire) gets 50 per cent and the remainder goes to the Japanese and Belgian partners. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 13, 1975)

ZAMBIAN ECONOMY

President Kaunda continued to express his concern about reports that he agreed to a 'package deal' on Rhodesia in return for a long-term 'soft' loan of several million dollars from South Africa. Zambia's Foreign Minister Rupia Banda visited Kenya at the end of November, and

Kaunda followed him to Nairobi in mid-December for talks with Kenyatta on this subject and on Angola. In a speech on December 2 Kaunda reaffirmed the decision to close the Rhodesian border, despite the economic hardship it has worked on his country.

As for Angola, President Kaunda continued to lament the divisions and bloodshed. In a speech given in Lusaka of November 25, he warned: "While no one will win the war, external forces will depart in the end, leaving behind monuments of shameful tragedy. Angola is a living testimony of the disastrous consequences of division. Such a sad spectacle threatens to repeat itself in Zimbabwe where leaders appear to be preoccupied with fighting each other instead of concentrating their efforts on the common enemy—oppression." At the meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa beginning January 10, he pressed for negotiations between the three contending groups, and an end to "all foreign intervention." He left the meeting early, after the O.A.U. failed to reach any agreement on the issue, and claimed that the "powerlessness" of the organization would leave the decisions on Angola in the hands of the super powers. (Associated Press, Nairobi office, Dec. 12, 1975; Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, Nov. 26 and Dec. 4, 1975; Times of Zambia, Lusaka, Dec. 3, 1975; New York Times, Jan. 13 and 14, 1976)

THE SWAZILAND ECONOMY

Swaziland derives most of its export earnings from three products—asbestos, iron, and sugar—and faces the prospect of depletion of its known iron reserves by 1978. The Government is constantly seeking to strengthen and diversify the economy. Through a World Bank loan of $7 million for 23 years, two major roads are being surfaced. The Government is seeking West German aid for the investigation of the exploitability of some of its mineral resources (tin, kaolin, pyrophyllites and silica) and has
announced an agreement with De Beers Consolidated Diamond Mines for 'exclusive prospective rights' in the Ngomane area. De Beers has been prospecting in Swaziland for several years and has found 'promising occurrences' of industrial stones. Sugar earnings, up substantially in 1975, should continue to increase as Swaziland establishes a third growing area and mill with a projected ultimate output of 110,000 tons a year (putting the national total up to 330,000 tons a year). Tate and Lyle, the British sugar giant, is supplying much of the capital and helping to raise the rest. Almost 20,000 acres in the Umbuluzi basin will be put under irrigated cultivation, providing work for 3,500 persons. South African engineering and contracting companies are likely to win the more than $24 million in contracts for construction. (Star, Johannesburg, Dec. 27, 1975; Africa, November 1975).

at the united nations

IS MOYNIHAN BREAKING UP THE BLOCS?

With his usual exhibitionism Daniel P. Moynihan, US Ambassador at the UN, claimed recently that his tactics of "counterattacking" with threats and tough talk are succeeding in breaking up the anti-US voting bloc in the UN. In a cablegram sent to Kissinger and made available to all US embassies, titled "The Blocs Are Breaking Up," Moynihan complained that his tactics were not receiving enough support from the State Department. State Department officials contacted by the New York Times, to which the cablegram was leaked, charged Moynihan with "personal headline hunting". Their position was that Moynihan's approach only irritates other nations without helping US policy. The Administration hurried to assure the public, however, that "Pat is supported by the President, the Secretary of State and top officials of the State Department."

Moynihan's cablegram confirmed previous leaks to the Times indicating that the Administration has adopted a policy of cutting back on aid to nations that vote against US interests in the UN and of rewarding nations that support the Administration. The US basic goal at the UN, said Moynihan, is "breaking up the massive bloc of nations, mostly new nations, which for so long have been arrayed against us in international forums and in diplomatic encounters generally." Moynihan's strategy is to play on existing differences among non-aligned countries, which, in his words, "are made up of extraordinarily disparate nations, with greatly disparate interests" and whose unity he sees as "artificial" and "bound to break up."

Moynihan claimed that "our new stance is having more or less the effect that was hoped for—that governments are beginning to think that anti-American postures at the UN and elsewhere are not without cost and that the cost has to be calculated."

Whether many Third World governments, however, will humble themselves to the point of submitting to this kind of blatant carrot-and-stick policy, is very much in doubt. Moynihan bragged that the split at the OAU summit and Zaire's role on the Angolan issue at the UN, as well as African abstentions on the anti-Zionism resolution, showed that his tactics are succeeding. One might just as easily argue, however, that no African country has recognized the US puppet FNLA/UNITA regime, while twenty-two African countries have recognized the People's Republic of Angola under MPLA leadership; that Zaire (as well as several other African countries) are ruled by elites heavily dependent on the US and other Western countries; and that the US was defeated in the vote on the anti-Zionism resolution. Moynihan, moreover, had to withdraw his own resolution on political prisoners for complete lack of co-sponsors.

Clearly, the US can apply pressure on its client states to be more supportive of its policies in the UN. This is the only sense in which the US can "break up the blocs" at the UN, with or without Moynihan's empty posturing. The US so far has been ineffective in getting support from even its satellites for its imperialist policies. Moynihan himself may have spelled out the reasons for this when he pointed out that this is a time in which "we have so few allies, and so many of them are slipping into almost irreversible patterns of appeasement based on the assumption that American power is irreversibly declining ..." (New York Times, January 28, 29, 1976)

THE UNITED NATIONS

The UN Security Council on January 30 unanimously demanded that "South Africa urgently make a solemn declaration accepting . . . the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control". The resolution put forward by Benin, Guyana, Libya, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, Sweden and Tanzania, which won the 15 to 0 vote after four days of debate, also
condemned "the South African military build-up in Namibia and any utilization of the Territory as a base for attacks on neighbouring countries". Omission of mention of South Africa's illegal occupation as a threat to international peace and security avoided a repetition of vetoes by the USA, Britain and France. The USA and Britain grumbled over the word "control" but went along in the end. A long and rambling speech by Pretoria's Ambassador Roelof ("Pik") Botha failed to distract the Council from its purpose.

Un Commissioner for Namibia Sean MacBride commented: "For the first time South African diplomats seem to realize that their explanations are no longer accepted even by their friends. Concrete action toward holding elections in Namibia will have to be taken."

Mr. Theo-Ben Gurirab, UN representative of SWAPO, stated: "We have always maintained that Namibians are their own liberators. At this time, we attach great importance to the UN's responsibility for Namibia. In that context, we felt encouraged that the UN at this time calls for national elections under supervision and control of the UN. We sincerely hope that South Africa and South Africa's allies and partners seriously take this opportunity—perhaps the last opportunity—to ensure a peaceful solution."

U.S. and Southern Africa

COMMERCE DEPARTMENT MAY LIFT BAN ON NAMIBIAN SEALSkins

A Commerce Department administrative law judge has ruled that the ban imposed on importation of seal skins from South Africa and Southwest Africa (Namibia) on September 12, 1974 be lifted on the ground that he had no reason to dispute South African claims that their harvesting methods were acceptable under US standards.

In a ruling handed down on December 16th, 1975 Judge James Mast dismissed the arguments of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights who represented a number of anti-apartheid groups and members of the Black Caucus of Congress. The Lawyers Committee contended that international obligations assumed by the United States toward Namibia forbade Commerce Department officials from dealing with South African governmental officials in regard to seals or sealskins taken in Namibian waters.

The State Department has written to Commerce Secretary Rogers Morton complaining that Judge-Mast's decision involves a contravention of US international legal obligations assumed when the US accepted the 1971 International Court of Justice opinion that South Africa's possession of Namibia is illegal. At the same time, a high official of the Commerce Department has responded to Congressman Diggs' complaint about the Mast decision by assuring him that international legal obligations will be attended to and that Commerce will rule on ecological and environmental aspects only.

The decision of the judge will be reviewed by the Director of National Marine Fisheries, whose decision is supposed to be final. If the decision stands, however, the Lawyers' Committee may take an appeal to the courts on the errors of administrative law and procedure which may have been made. The courts are already the forum of a law case brought by Congressman Diggs and others against Commerce Secretary Dent in 1974 testing the legality of Commerce's Namibian dealings.

Meanwhile, the Fouke Company of Greenville, S.C., once the importer of some 50,000 to 70,000 baby seal skins from Namibia annually, has been unable to import since 1972 and may have to shut down its baby seal skin business if Commerce overrules Judge Mast.

MPLA SOLIDARITY ACTIONS GROW

Around the country, literally hundreds of demonstrations, meetings, forums and actions have been taking place around Angola and U.S. intervention.

In New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston and Pittsburgh, a coordinated series of demonstrations took place the weekend after February 4, the 15th anniversary of MPLA's launching the armed struggle for national independence. MPLA support coalitions have been formed in these cities and others.

In New York, 1,000 persons marched and attended a rally January 17 to slogans of "Victory to MPLA; Jobs at Home not Wars Abroad", called by Youth Against War & Fascism and co-sponsored by over 20 other groups. Demonstrations that week were also held in Cleveland, Buffalo, Chicago and other cities. In San Francisco, a large crowd picketed outside the Fairmount Hotel February 3rd, when Secretary Kissinger delivered a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations.

In Washington, January 19th, the day Congress returned to consider the Tunney amendment, 300 people rallied on the Capitol steps calling on the U.S. to get out of Angola. The demonstration was called by a coalition of anti-war, anti-CIA, church and Africa interest groups. Speakers included Congresswoman Bella Abzug, Judge William Booth of the American Committee on Africa, Rev. Sterling Cary of the National Council of Churches, Prof. Ronald Walters of the African Heritage Studies Association, Cora Weiss and Dave Dellinger. A congressional and a "people's" briefing followed, organized by the Washington Office on Africa, and other DC-based groups.

The MPLA Solidarity Committee in New York is asking groups to circulate a petition for recognition of the People's Republic of Angola, led by the MPLA. The group is seeking 50,000 signatures which it hopes to present to representatives of the People's Republic of Angola on May 1, 1976. The Committee is also working to raise $10,000 for an MPLA Solidarity Fund. Petitions, solidarity but-
ions and copies of the Angola Weekly News Summary are available from the Committee at 825 West End Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10025 tel. (212) 222-2892.

The February 4th Coalition, initiated by the Solidarity Committee, is sponsoring an evening of cultural events in solidarity with MPLA February 6th and a demonstration and rally at Gulf Oil offices and South African airlines February 7th.

The U.S. Out of Angola Committee in Chicago is circulating a petition calling on the U.S. to get out of Angola. The Committee is sponsoring an educational evening program on February 6th and a demonstration in the Civic Center on February 7th. The Chicago Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea is issuing a periodic "Angola Alert". Contact the U.S. Out of Angola Committee c/o Dean's office, 2044 West Grenshaw, Chicago, IL 60612 tel. (312) 348-3370.

A forum was sponsored on January 20th by the Philadelphia Coalition for Justice in Angola, featuring the coalition's co-chair Muhammed Kenyatta, recently returned from the OAU session in Addis Ababa. The coalition is organizing a march on Gulf Oil headquarters on February 7th. Another demonstration focusing on Gulf headquarters is planned in Pittsburgh the same day. Contact the coalition at 117 North 40th Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104 tel. (215) EV6-3331.

African Students for Angolan Liberation sponsored a teach-in at Harvard featuring Sean Gervasi, who recently released critical information on U.S. naval maneuvers in preparation for strikes in Angola (for copy of his report, contact ACOA below). The Boston Coalition for Solidarity with the MPLA is sponsoring a demonstration February 7 on the Commons. Its address: 5 Prospect Hill Avenue, Somerville, MA 02143. In Rhode Island, a New England Friends of the People's Republic of Angola has been formed, adopting a statement of solidarity at a meeting of 75 persons in Providence on January 20th.

In Michigan, the Southern Africa Liberation Committee in East Lansing sponsored a two-day conference on the "Angola Crisis" at MSU January 29-30, featuring organizing workshops and speakers. The group is circulating a two page chronology and a petition, which they hope to run as an advertisement. In Ann Arbor, the Michigan Free Press has produced an MPLA Solidarity Poster.

The American Committee on Africa has produced an Angola Information Packet, including background articles and action sheets for $1.50 each. Also available are copies of the quarter-page advertisement "Angola... A New Vietnam" which the Committee and numerous co-sponsors ran in the January 18 New York Times. Contact ACOA, 305 East 46th Street, New York N.Y. 10017 tel. (212) 838-5030.
Books Received/Book Reviews


1975—the year of "detente" in Rhodesia, with "negotiations" between Smith and Zimbabwean nationalists united in the ANC. By the end of the year the ANC was split again, with the Nkomo group still talking of talks, and the main body of ANC talking of intensified armed struggle. But there were still few signs that Zimbabwean nationalists had the ideological clarity and the organizational strength necessary to mobilize the people for a protracted national liberation struggle.

Those in search of some of the background to the present impasse will find these two books helpful. Loney provides a good summary of the development of the Rhodesian system, of white politics and of British policy. He deals with developments through 1973. The book is particularly useful because it is brief, clear, and inexpensive. There is, however, very little in it on the development of the Zimbabwean nationalist movements.

Maxey's account partly fills in the gap left by Loney. Maxey has done a tremendous amount of work in documenting the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe by ferreting out information from sources such as Salisbury radio broadcasts and Rhodesian newspapers. As such it is a useful corrective to the attempts to downplay African resistance. But his book fails in a number of respects. Maxey admits the limitations of his study, such as his dependence on the white Rhodesian media and his narrow focus on the primarily military aspects of the war for liberation, but these admissions do not help the reader. Perhaps it is the manner in which Maxey writes. Far too often names, places, and publications are cited without any explanation or context so that only the reader already more than familiar with Zimbabwean politics would understand. Or, perhaps, instead of sitting back and trying to summarize and analyze the major trends in the guerrilla struggle since the mid-1960's—the tactics, the strategies, the successes and the failures—Maxey tries to fit every little bit of information into a string along narrative. But the primary fault is that his decision to exclude political and ideological information and analysis about ZAPU and ZANU within the Zimbabwe/Southern African political context means that the book really fails to evoke an understanding of the total liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. It then tends to become confusing and boring, and the lack of readable maps does not help either.

Maxey does have some good summaries of subjects such as the international links of the movements, the Rhodesian government military composition, and the growing repressive nature of the regime necessitated by the war. And he does show that since 1966 there have been a remarkable number of guerrilla actions, escalating and changing in 1972 with the increased politicization and mobilization of people by trained guerrillas led primarily by ZANU. But so much is left unexplained. For example, the nature of Frolizi, which has held a prominent place in the external ANC coalition, despite the fact that Maxey can find only two incidents of Frolizi armed groups in Rhodesia; Zambian political relations with the movements in terms of its own economic and political structures; the composition of the guerrilla forces (mention is made of ZANU, ZAPU, and other groups) and so forth. But all of the faults may not rest on Maxey's shoulders. They possibly indicate not only a lack in the book but also in the movements themselves.

From Maxey's book, as well as from more recent press accounts, one notes a seeming lack of clarity about the objectives and character of people's war in Zimbabwe. Although it is understood that Zimbabwe (like South Africa and Namibia) is vastly different in many respects from the former Portuguese colonies where successful struggles were waged over the last decade, there still seem to be very serious problems. Among the points one might note are: a tendency towards isolated military actions apparently aimed at internal disruption or international response rather than part of a plan for a protracted struggle; a tendency at times to define the enemy in terms of white individuals or the white race as such rather than as a system of exploitation, and a failure to integrate political and military aspects of the struggle, both at the level of mobilization of the masses and at the leadership level.

These observations, perhaps unduly harsh, are based largely on material in print. Hopefully the experiences of the last decade have provoked some transformation within the ranks of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement, the evidence of which has yet to surface to the outside observer. The two books reviewed here trace the past. If the minority regime in Rhodesia is to be defeated, if the national liberation struggle is to be transformed into a revolution, the future must be different.
Samora Machel
Speaks Out on Angola

WE STRUGGLE FOR UNITY BUT WE DO NOT ACCEPT UNITY WITH THE ENEMY

The following is an unofficial translation of Samora Machel, President of People’s Republic of Mozambique’s closing address to the recent Extraordinary Meeting of the Organization of African Unity meeting on Angola in Addis Ababa, delivered on January 13, 1976.

Mr. President, Excellencies:

We are almost at the end of the work of this historic first extraordinary session of our organization. For us this was the meeting in which African dignity would be affirmed, in which all of Africa would rise up without hesitation against the aggression of South Africa, against imperialist intervention in Angola. For us this was the meeting of the African personality, against the pressures and blackmail of imperialism.

Was this the meeting that we expected?

It was with deep anguish that the delegation of the People’s Republic of Mozambique heard some of the interventions made here.

We were not ignorant of the reality of our continent when we came to this meeting, when we participated in the OAU. During the years of armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism, we had occasion to note that sometimes the unanimity of the struggle against Portuguese colonialism was violated by some countries. We know those in our continent who, while voting resolutions of support for our struggle collaborated with Portuguese colonialism and always tried to lead us to positions of capitulation.

Not a few times it was necessary to struggle against the labelling as intransigents which these same countries applied to us.

We find it appropriate at this point to once again thank all those who carried out their duty to support our liberation struggle in a serious way up to our independence.

We are also aware that deep cleavages, political and ideological, exist among our governments.

Nor are we unaware of the particular difficulties which weigh upon many African States because of the heritage of the past, present conditions and geographic positions.

We do not therefore intend to make an abstraction from our continent as it is. But it is no less true that in spite of all the insufficiencies, reservations, hesitations and compromises we always succeeded in presenting a coherent and united voice of Africa with respect to the direct enemy. [We know] that submission to imperialism led some of us to sabotage the liberation struggle of our continent. We suffered it in our own flesh.

What then surprises us in this meeting? What surprises us, what shocks and outrages us is the heat, the vehemence with which the position of the racist regime of South Africa was defended, here, in Addis Ababa, the birthplace of the Organization of African Unity. What distresses us is the shamelessness with which alliances were proclaimed here with the regimes which have always been and continue to be the greatest enemies of our independence, of our dignity, of our personality. What will our peoples think of us? What will the South African people, oppressed by police terror, fettered by the force of arms, humiliated by apartheid, think of us at this moment?

Claims were indirectly made in this Assembly that to be revolutionary one must collaborate with the enemy. It was affirmed that to be African one must receive the enemy fraternally and permit it to occupy and dominate us. It was theorized that the enemy had a right to invade and pillage us.

We want to say that between us and the enemy there can be no compromise, however important the economic or other motives.

We have 1500 km of border with the direct enemies of Africa, we have just finished ten long years of war and we affirm here that under no circumstances will we capitulate to the enemy.

Our duty is to combat the enemy, our duty is to defend the people.

We are Africans, Africans under attack, Africans who refuse to let themselves be intimidated in the defense of the dignity of Africa. Therefore we are with the People’s Republic of Angola.

This meeting which we are now ending was one in which the courage and dignity of all those who resist imperialism was affirmed.

We want to present some final points for reflection.

We won our liberty by sacrifice, we did not receive it from anyone. Our people conquered power and democracy, they did not receive them from anyone.

Therefore we are with the Angolan people, who in blood continue to affirm their right to independence, to territorial integrity, to choose, without any interference, their alliances, the political, economic and social system that corresponds to their interests.

We are with the Angolan people who, arms in hand, affirm their right to support the struggle of Namibia, the liberation struggle of Southern Africa. In all circumstances we are the same, we won this right with our blood.

We refused yesterday, during the war, we refuse today, being independent, to allow anyone to dictate positions to us.

We affirm in this way our independence, our non-alignment.

Because we are independent, because we refuse to ally ourselves with imperialism, we are resolutely with the Angolan people, with the People’s Republic of Angola, which defends its right not to become a new Bantustan or a satellite of imperialism.

We heard with surprise talk of the handover of sovereignty.

The experience of Mozambique, of Angola, of Guinea, of Cape Verde, of Sao Tomé and Principe, is that sovereignty, independence, resulted from our combat, from the
blood volunteered by our people, from the immense sacrifices consented to by African and international solidarity. We have won what we have today in struggle, we have created what we have ourselves. Portugal was forced to recognize our reality because it was defeated. The reality of our countries, the reality of Angola, is that the people assumed their sovereignty when they began the struggle.

This was the principle, the reality that the OAU defended and made the international community accept.

FRELIMO always defended unity. This Assembly knows well our uncompromising struggle for national unity. This Assembly several times paid homage to the unity won by FRELIMO.

We struggle for unity, but we can never accept uniting ourselves with the declared agents of the enemy, we can never accept uniting ourselves with the enemy itself; that would mean capitulating [for the sake of] unity.

Therefore we support the People's Republic of Angola, the efforts of its Government under the leadership of its party, the MPLA to unite all the patriotic forces in the national effort. [We support their] defense of the right of the people to a real independence from imperialism.

There is talk of a cease-fire. A cease-fire should only take place after the aggressor agrees to certain prior conditions which are at the base of the conflict. To propose a cease-fire to the People's Republic of Angola without South Africa and its agents having agreed to evacuate the invading troops and their material, is a reward for aggression. It is necessary that the enemy agreed to leave Angolan territory; it is necessary that the enemy accept the free existence of the People's Republic of Angola; it is necessary that the enemy stop trying to make Angola a new base to attack independent countries, in order that we may discuss a cease-fire.

A cease-fire is only valid when imperialism stops its aggression.

During the liberation struggle we were supported by Africa, we were supported by the socialist countries, we were supported by all of progressive humanity. The socialist countries furnished us substantial aid that increased with the development of the struggle.

In the beginning of the 70's the MPLA, PAIGC and FRELIMO began to receive ground-to-ground rockets, and ground-to-air rockets. We had these arms, we also had the instructors for these arms.

We won the war. To force colonialism to respect the signed agreements, and then to consolidate our sovereignty against foreign threats, we continued to receive arms and instructors.

We have this right to defend ourselves, we have the right to have recourse to our natural allies, to those who always supported us, to reinforce our defense capacity.

For this very reason we support the People's Republic of Angola when it has recourse to its allies to reinforce its capacity to expel the invader.

Therefore we thank, today as yesterday, all those who fulfill their internationalist duty of support for the liberation struggle.


The People's Republic of Mozambique has about 3000 km of coastline on the Indian Ocean.

The People's Republic of Mozambique is one of the countries that should serve as a support base for the struggle of Southern Africa.

We have to know, if the enemy attacks us, if the enemy claims that its right to apartheid is threatened, we have to know, if the enemy arranges for a handful of puppets to invite it to invade us, we have to know, who in Africa will be with us?

We want to know also who will deny us the right to defense, who will tell us that the support of our allies is a foreign intervention. In this meeting we now know each other.

The People's Republic of Mozambique, together with 21 other countries, aware of its duties to the liberty and dignity of Africa, has proposed a resolution.

In essence we propose:

1. The unconditional condemnation, without concessions, without ambiguity, of the aggression by South Africa, a direct enemy of Africa, and demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its forces and materials.

2. The unconditional condemnation, without concessions, without ambiguity, of those principally responsible, being Angolans, being Africans, who openly collaborate with South Africa.

3. The unconditional support, without concessions, without ambiguity, of those who defend the territorial integrity of Angola, against the South African invasion against the aggression, maneuvers and subversions of imperialism.

4. The unconditional support, without concessions, without ambiguity, of those who struggle for national unity, for the unity of all the patriotic forces, those who struggle to rebuild in peace, in unity and in integrity a free Angola. The OAU should support all the efforts of the People's Republic of Angola to unite all patriots in the national effort.

5. Until we are in a situation where we can arrive at a consensus on the basis of [such] just positions, we should postpone our debate, sine die.

The Struggle Continues!

A Luta Continua!

Translated for and reprinted by the

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MERCENARIES WITHDRAW FROM NORTHERN ANGOLA

Scores of European mercenaries boarded flights out of Kinshasa, Zaire in mid-February, leaving behind about 60 dead, out of an original mercenary contingent of nearly 150 who came to fight with the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in northern Angola.

Among the soldiers of fortune leaving Africa was David Bufkin, a California recruiter who is reported to be the only American survivor of a group of six U.S. veterans from the West coast. The others are said to have been killed in heavy fighting in the Sao Salvador area of northern Angola.

Most of the departing mercenaries were British, though a considerable number were Portuguese. Experienced French mercenaries remained to fight in southern Angola with UNITA, in its guerrilla war against the MPLA. Reports from the south say that UNITA forces are using sophisticated anti-tank weapons against the MPLA army. UNITA claims to have destroyed several MPLA tanks in recent fighting, near the old UNITA headquarters of Silva Porto.

WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES RECOGNIZE MPLA

The MPLA government in Angola has received the formal recognition of eight Western European nations, including Italy, Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries, while former colonial power Portugal faces an internal struggle over the recognition issue.

In Africa, Malawi became the 39th member state of the Organization of African Unity to endorse the MPLA government. Notable holdouts at press time were Zambia, Zaire, and Kenya.

WHOSE REFUGEES?

South Africa has renewed its pleas for international aid to help it care for refugees fleeing the fighting in Angola. Interior Minister Hilgard Muller says that since the United Nations has refused to help, the Red Cross should accept responsibility. The camps in question are in southern Angola, and are administered by South African forces. UN Secretary-General Waldheim says that the UN cannot help, because the South Africans are on foreign soil.

South Africa claims that 11,000 refugees are already in the camps, and thousands more are expected, as the MPLA extends its control further south.

Reports from Angola suggest that many of those fleeing are not really refugees, but have been forced to travel south. British journalist Phillip Whitfield reports that many civilians remaining in towns by the MPLA told him that South Africans encouraged residents to come with them when they retreated. He also says that some residents of the towns were ordered to leave by FNLA troops.

ZIMBABWE GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN ON

With the clear backing of the four “front line” African governments, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana, guerrilla incursions have been stepped up against Rhodesia’s white minority regime—a development that government officials admit is perhaps the most serious guerrilla threat they have yet faced.

Talks between moderate ANC leader Joshua Nkomo and Prime Minister Ian Smith have made little progress recently, and they have lost the support of Zambian President Kaunda, who said last month that “there is going to be a bloodbath before Zimbabwe is liberated.”

SOUTH AFRICA FACES SWAPO RESISTANCE

With the MPLA a clear victor in the Angolan war, South Africa’s defense line has moved nearer Namibia’s northern border. And, in fact, guerrilla activity in the area seems to have been stepped up in recent weeks.

On February 13th, Defense Minister Botha said 37 SWAPO soldiers had been apprehended, following the killings of two white farmers and their wives, and the son of one. It was not clear whether the SWAPO people reported captured were being accused of the killings, and SWAPO has not claimed credit for the attacks.

However, SWAPO official Moses Garoeb explained to a BBC interviewer that white settlers in northern Namibia are an outpost of South African rule, and are not immune to attack from the independence movement.

U.S. FIRMS EYE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTRACTS

American business interests—with an eye on forthcoming lucrative South African contracts—are campaigning to remove the ban on US government-backed loans to the white-ruled nation.

The White House and State Department have been barraged in recent weeks with letters from Senators and Congressmen protesting the 12-year old prohibition against direct loans to South Africa from the Export-Import Bank. The campaign is apparently intended to make it easier for US firms to win contracts related to South Africa’s $2.5 billion coal gasification project, known as SASOL II. Procurement contracts worth over half the total value are to be let in a few months. Fluor Corporation of California already has a $1 billion contract to construct and engineer the project.
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