Dear Southern Africa Reader,

Yes, this is *Southern Africa* magazine. A different format but the same magazine nonetheless. We have produced this magazine because we want to let you, our readers, know where we stand.

We didn’t want to produce this skinny, twelve page issue. We had no choice. As you have no doubt noticed, *Southern Africa* hasn’t been coming out ten times a year. We produced eight issues in 1980, only five in 1981. The harsh reality of the situation is that the magazine is in real trouble. After sixteen years of covering the unfolding struggle for freedom in southern Africa like no other publication, *Southern Africa* is in real danger of folding.

There is no bluff in this statement. This letter is not part of our annual fund-raising drive. We are not crying wolf. Yes, times have been bad before, but never so bad that we couldn’t struggle through and produce the magazine. Well, we can now no longer produce the magazine. Our financial fortunes have declined so sharply over the past two years, and that situation, coupled with ever-increasing operating and printing costs, now means that only a large infusion of money can assure the survival of the magazine for the next year and for years to come.

Our best estimate puts that figure at $44,000. If we cannot raise at least $25,000 of that amount by May 1 of this year *Southern Africa* will stop publishing, and we will begin to close up shop.

Wait. We are not asking you to put a check in the mail tomorrow, because unless you are very generous and very wealthy, your contribution alone cannot ensure the survival of *Southern Africa* magazine. We are asking that you take the time to read this long letter carefully, because it describes our current predicament, how we got into it, and how we hope to guarantee *Southern Africa’s* survival.

**Where We Stand**

At this point, some basic facts about magazine publishing, particularly progressive magazine publishing, are in order. No magazine is able to cover its operating costs through newsstand and subscription sales alone. Commercial magazines don’t even try, they make their profits through sales of advertising space, and they tailor their news coverage and editorial point of view to suit the requirements of their corporate advertisers. But progressive politics does not sell soap flakes, nor can small magazines claim such a large audience that big advertisers feel compelled to advertise despite our editorial stance. General Motors won’t advertise in *Southern Africa* because they don’t know when our next article exposing their
collaboration with apartheid will appear.

For the vast majority of progressive magazines, *Southern Africa* included, survival is problematical. Yes, the magazine does receive the occasional windfall grant or loan, but mostly the magazine survives on smaller yearly contributions from faithful supporters.

But this was never enough, and each year *Southern Africa* has gotten a little deeper in debt, and it has become harder to find money to meet minimal payrolls or even raise money from issue to issue. This hand-to-mouth existence has taken a heavy toll on the movement press: Liberation News Service last year, *Seven Days* before that, and *International Bulletin* before that.

Why keep going? Publishing a magazine, as you can see from the enclosed budget, takes an enormous amount of time and money. With the movement already desperately short of both is it really worth pouring money into a magazine as specific as *Southern Africa*? Well, when we first saw the budget we weren’t sure. We wondered: does the movement really need it?

We believe the answer is yes, a magazine like *Southern Africa* is needed. The southern Africa support movement is growing, and a growing movement needs to keep up-to-date on events in southern Africa and to learn what others in the support movement are doing.

Still, we had questions. Perhaps we were too close to the magazine, too attached to the idea of keeping it going. If a magazine like this is needed, couldn’t a new group of activists start one up in a year’s time? In any event, don’t other publications adequately cover southern Africa? And given that other southern Africa support organizations are really hurting right now, shouldn’t we consider putting all our energies into those organizations instead of keeping *Southern Africa* going?

We don’t think so. We feel *Southern Africa* magazine is a vital part of the support movement. No magazine that starts up new is going to have fifteen year’s worth of cumulative experience and contacts. No other magazine is going to have a network of supporters both in the US and in southern Africa like we have developed. Furthermore, no other publication covers southern Africa like we do. It is possible, by sorting through reams of other sources, to get a catalogue of events in southern Africa, but even if you have the time to do this there will still be something missing: coverage of the liberation movements. Most press reports on southern Africa rely on the official press and government spokespeople; while we do use these sources we also check with and report on what the liberation movements are doing. No other publication covers the liberation movements like *Southern Africa*. Without it there would be a real gap in your view of events in southern Africa.

The situation in southern Africa has changed drastically since the Southern Africa Committee began publishing a small mimeographed newsletter in 1965. And *Southern Africa* magazine has also changed. The magazine has grown from what was essentially a collection of re-worked news articles from the foreign press that were not available in the US, to a regular up-to-date series of news articles, analyses, book reviews and all that makes up the magazine you now read. We were the first to reveal confidential documents showing the General Motors Corporation’s collaboration with apartheid. It was *Southern Africa*, in late 1979, that first published information on South African nuclear scientists receiving training at US nuclear research facilities and, in 1981, when the Reagan administration was reviving talk about Jonas Savimibi’s South African backed rebel group UNITA, *Southern Africa* had just published a long background article about what UNITA really stood for. We know people like the magazine; our special issues on women and the military are both practically sold out and we continue to receive praise from the liberation movements themselves.

But the growth of the magazine also meant it was no longer possible to operate with the entirely volunteer staff we started with in 1965. In 1977, when the magazine made a major expansion, money was raised to pay a part-time editor and one person who was a combination office manager, promotion organizer and fundraiser. The salaries were low—very low—but they permitted the dedicated staff to devote their time to the arduous task of running a monthly magazine.

Over the past five years we have managed to produce a quite high-quality magazine, but always at a price. The magazine never quite was able to pay the bills. Gradually, the plans for a larger staff were shelved away, and we tried to make do with a tiny staff and a large volunteer collective.

In the past two years these troubles have gotten worse. There is nothing more frustrating than having a magazine all ready to go, and then having to wait because we had no money to pay the printer. In order to
### PROJECTED EXPENSES FOR 1982
(based on figures for 1979 to 1981)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit Cost (per issue)</th>
<th>Annual Cost (10 issues/yr)</th>
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<td>* Includes all other office expenses: supplies, postage, duplicating, etc.</td>
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<td>** Approximate take-home pay of $145 per week.</td>
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<td>*** Promotion is planned to mailing lists from which we have gotten a good response in the past. Costs are based on past costs with additions for postage rate increases.</td>
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JANUARY 1982/SOUTHERN AFRICA 3
pay for postage to mail the magazine, or to pay the next rent check, the staff was often forced to put off paychecks. As money became tighter and tighter, we missed more and more paychecks. At the same time Southern Africa was becoming a more ambitious project: more time was required to produce the magazine. A number of collective members began working half time at other jobs so they could devote more time to the magazine, while our “paid” staff kept missing paychecks. Finally what little paid staff was left dwindled away to zero as it became obvious that the magazine, at its present level of operations, just could not keep its commitment to pay people.

Although paid staff alone will not publish Southern Africa, the lack of a paid staff has made for problems. As you, our readers have seen, the time between issues has grown longer and longer. In 1981 we did keep publishing, but we produced only five issues, and the last issue was two months late. The magazine can, quite simply, no longer function at this level. There is still much important work to be done in support of the fragile independence recently gained by some African nations and the struggle still being fought by others. Now is not the time to pour time, money and energy into ventures that cannot produce. Either Southern Africa has to be published on a regular basis and become again a regular source activists and others can rely on, or we will simply close it down. The present level of operations is clearly unacceptable.

Is there a Solution?

We think Southern Africa magazine can be transformed into a working, productive magazine.

We have come up with what we think is a minimum budget for ensuring that the magazine can publish on a reasonable schedule and serve the support movement in the US. Enclosed is what we feel is a minimum budget. There is not an ounce of fat that can be trimmed (some of us expect that, with the effects of inflation the budget may even have cut some bone). In essence, this budget allows for what we calculate is the barest minimum below which the magazine cannot survive.

First, in order to survive and to publish regularly, Southern Africa must be able to pay subsistence wages to a skeleton staff, and must be able to pay the printers. This means the staff must be freed from the day-to-day worry of where the money to mail out the next letter will come from. Note here please, we are not saying free from worry, simply free from day-to-day worry—even with this budget there will be a great deal of frustration and hard fundraising still to be done.

Second, we have concluded that more of our limited resources must be devoted to fund-raising and promotion (promotion is not a luxury for publications, but an absolute essential to maintain, let alone expand, our subscriber base).

Finally, we have realized that our commitment alone is not enough to ensure the success and continued growth of Southern Africa and the movement it serves. We are calling upon you, our readers, as well as our institutional supporters, to assume a greater part of the burden of producing Southern Africa. The magazine is only a useful vehicle if you see it as such. We call on our readers, wherever they are, to actively promote the magazine among their friends and within their organizations. If you are doing southern Africa support work, send us a blurb describing what you are doing so we can run it in the magazine and, if you live in New York, come down to our office and help us out with the chores.

All of this support is important, but most important of all we call on you to participate in our pledge drive to raise enough money for Southern Africa to survive.

The Pledge Concept: A Risk-Free Contribution

Earlier we urged you not to send money right away. This letter is not an effort to suck your money into another losing endeavor. Too much money has already been lost on good projects that never quite made it. You have a right to be sure that your contribution will ensure Southern Africa’s survival over the next year. And we are not asking for your money until we have enough pledges to guarantee Southern Africa’s survival.

Here is how it works. If you promise $20, $50, or even $100 and we do not receive the entire $25,000 in pledges, you do not pay one cent. If by April 1 we have only $10,000 or $15,000 in pledges, we will make one final effort to reach the full goal. When our May 1, 1982 deadline comes, we will either announce the end of Southern Africa magazine, or call in our pledges. You can pay your pledges in one lump sum, or in three installments, whichever is better for you. We just have to know that we can count on your support.
Please do not believe that this is some kind of fund-raising gimmick, it is not. We have decided that we will continue to publish Southern Africa if the resources are available. If they are not, we will stop. The question of whether Southern Africa continues to cover the African liberation struggle from the point of view of the people is in your hands. It is your decision.

We recognize the difficulty that this letter may put you in. There are a multitude of efforts against oppression worthy of your support, and in these days of Reagan, it becomes a difficult choice. We ask only that you consider the issues.

And it is precisely because the demands on the financial resources of all of us are so great that we have put our appeal on a “conditional” basis. If you are asked to give your money, it is because—and only because—we have all saved Southern Africa magazine.

A Luta Continua,

Steve Vech
Jim Casan
Richard Knight
Andrew Marx
Rebecca Reiss
Peter Mark

P.S. As of press time we have already raised over $1,000 in pledges. One supporter in Brooklyn went around and collected a total of $70 from his friends to help support the magazine. Please help save Southern Africa.

Fill Out the Special Pledge Coupon on the Back Cover
South Africa: Resistance in New Crack-down

Peace through terror seems to be the operational slogan of the forces charged with maintaining security in South Africa today.

In the face of mounting resistance—more strikes, a nationwide political boycott of the puppet Indian Council elections, open rejection of phony independence for the Ciskei bantustan—the authorities have turned to renewed arrests and detention without trial. By the end of 1981, reported Joseph Lelyveld of the New York Times, 620 people had been detained for political reasons. At least 180 were still being held without charge, some since mid-year, and all totally cut off from the outside world without access to lawyers, family, or medical attention.

Even more sinister is the wave of mysterious deaths that has hit militant political and union leaders and their families. In Durban last November, the body of Griffiths Mxenge, a leading Black defense attorney and prominent political figure who had served a long term in jail for his support of African National Congress activities, was discovered dead and horribly mutilated in a public stadium. Declaring that the struggle would go on despite her husband’s death, Nonyamezelo Mxenge told reporters that their two dogs had been found poisoned the morning before Mxenge was killed. He himself had been brutally killed, she told reporters. “His throat was slashed, his stomach ripped open and his ears almost cut off. The rest of the body was covered with stab wounds.” The police, still “investigating” the murder, appeared to be trying to pass it off as the work of muggers, but Mxenge’s declared openly: “This is the work of right-wing forces.” Within days, two members of Griffith’s law firm, Patrick Maquela and Phulelane Ngcuka were detained in a further act of harassment.

In the Eastern Cape, union leader Thozamile Gqweta has been subjected to similar tactics in the last few months. Gqweta, President of the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), one of South Africa’s fastest growing and most militant unions, has also been playing a leading role in focusing popular rejection of the fraudulent independence foisted on the Ciskei bantustan last December 4. He has thus won the intense enmity both of the leaders of the new “state,” whom he has characterized as sell-outs to South Africa, and South African security forces.

In March someone set fire to Gqweta’s house in the ghetto which serves East London after wiring the door shut from the outside. He escaped through a window. In October his mother and uncle were burned to death when their tiny house in the Ciskel was engulfed in a flash fire.

At their funeral the following Sunday, among the three thousand mourners was Diliswa Roxisa, a twenty-year-old activist and close friend of Gqweta’s. She was shot dead by a “stray” police bullet while on the outskirts of the crowd.

In early December Gqweta himself was detained, for the fifth time in a year, by South African security police. Detained with Gqweta was the vice president of SAAWU, Sisas Npkelanaver.

The detentions have hit a broad spectrum of those demanding change in South Africa. Whites and blacks are included in the ranks of the detainees, and although there appears to be a special focus on trade union, church and student leaders, many community activists, journalists, media workers and others have also been caught in the net. Periods of detention vary, but several people, including Zwelakhe Sisulu, president of the Media Worker’s Association of South Africa (MWASA) have now been in detention, without charge or any access to the outside world, for more than six months.

Some unexpected names have surfaced in recent lists of detainees, including that of Hanchen Koornhof, niece of the cabinet minister most responsible for controlling Black lives via his euphemistically named Department of Cooperation and Development. Parents of many of the young student detainees have formed a small organization known as the Parents Support Committee to monitor and protest the detentions. Although white detainees appear to have been granted more concessions in terms of receiving reading matter, food and clothing from the outside, it is clear that all detainees are basically vulnerable to the vicious whims of the security police, and have no protection under the law.

Ironically, while the hit squads and detention units were moving into top gear, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker told a congressional sub-committee December 10: “While the basic structure of apartheid remains intact, there was improvement in practice on some human rights fronts through non-enforcement of some existing racial laws.”

Crocker’s statement is another sign that, in its quest for closer ties with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration will accept Pretoria’s rhetoric without question while ignoring the vicious suppression of human rights that is an everyday reality in South Africa.

South African law does not compel the police to reveal the names of anyone detained by them, thus there is no complete list of detainees. We list below the names, date of detention where known, and a brief description of a few of the men and women still being held at press time as compiled by the Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa.

Zwelakhe Sisulu, president, Media Workers Association of South Africa (June 19)

Thabo Ndabeni, national organizer, Azanian Peoples Organization

Emma Mashinini, general secretary, Commercial Catering & Allied Workers Union (Nov. 27)

Sampson Ndou, president, General & Allied Workers Union (Nov. 27)

Nicholas Haysom, research officer, Center for Applied Legal Studies; former president, National Union of South African Students (Nov. 27)

Neil Aggett, secretary, Transvaal branch, African Food & Canning Workers Union (Nov. 27)

Merle Favis, editor, South African Labour Bulletin (Nov. 27)

Cedric Mayson, former editor of Pro Veritate (Nov. 27)

Thozamile Gqweta, president, South African Allied Workers Union (Dec. 9)

Hanchen Koornhof, high school English teacher (Nov. 27)

Clive van Heerden, journalist with South African students Press Union (Oct. 24)

Amanda Kwadi, social worker; member, Federation of South African Women (April)

Alexander Mbathe, field worker, Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (October)

J.D.
The bomb blast on December 18 shattered the top two floors of the headquarters of Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s ruling party, killing six people, wounding 125 others, and showering broken glass and concrete on streets crowded with Christmas shoppers. The physical damage was horrifying. But in a nation trying to rebuild from its prolonged war for independence, plagued by economic dislocations exploited and manipulated by neighboring South Africa, the horror itself may be the most devastating blow—a harsh reminder that the struggle for independence was part of a larger, regional war against white minority rule and colonial domination. And that war is not over. Zimbabwe remains on the front lines.

Although no group claimed responsibility for the bombing, Zimbabweans were not alone in suspecting South African involvement, just as they had in an August 16 blast that destroyed a Zambabwean munitions dump and in the July 31 assassination of Joe Gqabi, an African National Congress leader posted in Salisbury. A veteran ANC member who served twelve years in prison on Robben Island, Gqabi was shot down by “agents of the racist South African regime,” according to Zimbabwe’s Information Minister Nathan Shamuyarira.
In that case, at least, the US government apparently shares Zimbabwe’s suspicions. Classified Pentagon intelligence reports obtained in August by Randall Robinson of the Washington-based organization Transafrica report that ANC officials living in exile are now the target of assassination plots hatched in Pretoria. Furthermore, Robinson charged, the US government knew of such plans long before Gqabi’s death, “yet the United States did nothing to dissuade its newly allied from pursuing its plans.”

Other signs of the continuing regional war have become increasingly evident in Zimbabwe during recent months. In Salisbury, long lines of motorists wait at gasoline stations, hoping that despite a worsening fuel shortage some supplies might be available for civilian use. On the Mozambican border one hundred miles away, hundreds of undernourished Mozambican refugees arrive to be treated for injuries received at the hands of South African-soldiery during recent months. In Salisbury, long lines of motorists wait at gasoline stations, hoping that despite a worsening fuel shortage some supplies might be available for civilian use. On the Mozambican border one hundred miles away, hundreds of malnourished Mozambican refugees arrive to be treated for injuries received at the hands of South African-supported ANC troops.

The tactics are different—direct military intervention to spread chaos in southern Angola (Southern Africa, Sept.–Oct. 1981), covert support for anti-FRELIMO rebels in Mozambique, primarily economic pressures against Zimbabwe. But the message to all three countries is essentially the same, emphasizing the vulnerability to Pretoria’s strength of these newly independent nations by ensuring that they face constant difficulties in rebuilding after years of war. And the South African campaign appears to have intensified recently on all three fronts. Coinciding with the front line states’ resistance to US/South African-supported Namibia settlement proposals which diverge from UN Resolution 435, the recent escalation bolsters the view that South Africa, with tacit US support, is maintaining such pressures at least in part to force front line approval of a Namibia pact written in Pretoria and Washington.

Detailing Zimbabwe’s Economy

South Africa’s first punitive moves against the Zimbabwean economy came on March 24 of last year when the preferential trade agreement between Pretoria and Salisbury, routinely reaffirmed since its signing in 1964, was abruptly and unilaterally terminated. Cancellation of the agreement by Zimbabwe’s most important trading partner means that Zimbabwe will pay millions of dollars in previously unlevied tariffs on all goods exported to South Africa. Last year these goods represented 24 percent of the nation’s total exports.

Continuing its tough line, South Africa announced two weeks later that as of June 1 it intended to withdraw 200 railroad cars it had on loan to Zimbabwe. The removal of these cars, coupled with the withdrawal in May of 26 locomotives, exacerbated an already serious shortage of working railroad equipment caused by emigration of many white maintenance personnel. The railway transport bottleneck has caused a grave fuel crisis and slowed the export of Zimbabwe’s record maize crop, as well as of other economically important farm products.

As a result, although Zimbabwe has export orders for 100,000 tons of maize, the government has been unable to provide speedy delivery to Zimbabwe’s drought-stricken neighbors. Lack of transport has also led to a serious shortage of working railroad equipment caused by emigration of many white maintenance personnel. The railway transport bottleneck has caused a grave fuel crisis and slowed the export of Zimbabwe’s record maize crop, as well as of other economically important farm products.

The government has launched efforts to break South Africa’s economic stranglehold. Eighty-seven skilled railroad equipment mechanics from India have begun repairing disabled locomotives under recent contracts with Zimbabwe Railways. Negotiations are underway to hire an additional 90 Pakistani technicians. Aid from Kuwait has enabled the government to purchase 60 new locomotives from Canada and the United States for delivery in 1982, to diminish further the dependency on South African engines.

In an apparent demonstration of how Mugabe’s government intends to gain by greater cooperation with South Africa, Pretoria re-loaned Zimbabwe 26 locomotives in early November. But Zimbabwe’s oil supply route, which passes through South Africa, is still under pressure. “The South Africans are keeping Zimbabwe on about a 5-day fuel supply as a deliberate policy,” a Zimbabwean official recently told the New York Times.

A new oil refinery, fed by a pipeline connecting with the Mozambican port of Beira, was scheduled to open around the turn of the year, eliminating Zimbabwe’s current dependence on South African oil sources for 95 percent of its needs. But vulnerability to South African-sponsored sabotage is certain to plague Zimbabwe’s future. The Beira pipeline itself has come under attack in Mozambique by the Pretoria-backed Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). In October, a 200-yard section of the pipe was blown up, in an attack which US State Department officials confirm “had to have had South African help.”

Proxy War in Mozambique

The pipeline bombing highlighted an escalating campaign of sabotage and terror by the MNR that has forced the FRELIMO government to return the country to a war footing and dilute its efforts at economic development.

Until January of ‘81, South Africa seemed generally willing to follow a policy of semi-peaceful coexistence with Maputo, allowing Mozambique to direct major resources toward resolving its colonial legacy of chronic underdevelopment. This policy was shattered January 30, when South African commandos raided ANC residences outside the Mozambican capital, killing thirteen people. The raid was followed by an attack on Ponta do Ouro on March 17, involving more than 100 South African troops. In the last year, South African helicopters, fighter-bombers and other aircraft have invaded Mozambican airspace dozens of times, carrying out reconnaissance flights and supplying anti-government rebels.

The Mozambicans were clearly stung by the ease with which the South Africans invaded their country. In a speech following the raid on ANC, President Samora Machel called for tighter vigilance and acknowledged that there were South African spies in Mozambique. “South Africa now appears in direct confrontation with us,” Machel stated. “The Boers are the enemy.”

Since the Ponta do Ouro attack, some observers believe South Africa has revised its strategies and is now concentrating less on confrontational operations and more on internal destabilization of Mozambique. As a result, the MNR has become increasingly active in the last months, claiming responsibility for attacks on navigational buoys, an oil refinery and a power station near the Beira port and for the deaths of several foreign technicians working for the FRELIMO government.

The MNR appears to be composed primarily of Mozambican Africans who supported the Portuguese colonial government rather than FRELIMO nationalists in Mozambique’s war for independence. It was set up in 1976 by the Special Branch, a section of Rhodesia’s security forces, after Portugal had
been driven out of its colonies. The original nominal head of the MNR was Dr. Domingos Arouca, a Black Mozambican whose early goals supported South Africa’s aspirations to play the leading role in a southern Africa “constellation of states.”

Operating from bases near the Rhodesian town of Umtali with Rhodesian-supplied equipment, the MNR waged a low-level campaign of harassment against independent Mozambique that was largely overshadowed by the massive destruction inflicted by Rhodesian Army attacks across the border. As Zimbabwean independence approached after the signing of the Lancaster House accords in 1980, South Africa took over. MNR recruits were outfitted and trained at bases in the Eastern Transvaal in South Africa, with help from mercenaries and Portuguese colonial army veterans.

Under South African patronage, MNR activities had intensified and become a more serious threat to internal stability in Mozambique’s central region. Power lines, bridges and communication facilities have been sabotaged repeatedly in recent months. Broadcasts of the MNR’s “Voice of Free Africa” radio station, formerly beamed from Gwelo in Rhodesia, are now transmitted from the Transvaal, spreading the organization’s dual objective of “extermination of the communist system” and formation of a government of “national reconciliation.”

In some remote areas where FRELIMO did not establish roots during the war for independence and where Mozambican central authority has never been strongly established, MNR rebels have been able to install pre-independence “regulos”—village chiefs who helped collect taxes and organize forced labor quotas for the Portuguese. Where the FRELIMO presence is more pervasive, the MNR has concentrated on raiding and burning villagers and driving out the inhabitants. Many of these homeless villagers have fled to Zimbabwe, bringing accounts and examples of MNR atrocities. In July, a medical missionary based in Zimbabwe near the Mozambique border testified, “We had two men with both ears cut off and four with one cut off... It was terrible.”

**Mobilizing Resistance**

Alarmed at the spread of MNR destruction, the Mozambican government last year initiated its own campaign to increase FRELIMO’s presence throughout the country. Mozambican troops have been garrisoned in several towns in areas frequented by the MNR. And FRELIMO has placed new emphasis on organizing villagers for self-defense in popular militia.

Talks between President Machel and Prime Minister Mugabe have also produced an agreement signed in May 1980 to establish joint operations to stop rebel activities. Immediately following the agreement, units of the Zimbabwe National Army began patrolling the border between the two countries. MNR movements in Zimbabwe appear to have been curtailed considerably.

In January 1981, Salisbury and Maputo moved even closer with the signing of a security pact. The Mugabe government has since quietly warned South Africa that planes entering Zimbabwean airspace enroute to MNR bases would risk being shot down. The South African planes now travel exclusively over Mozambique, which has weak air defenses.

The MNR has, nevertheless, been difficult to dislodge completely, due in part, reports the British Guardian’s Joseph Hanlon, to its concentration in areas near re-education camps populated by people who collaborated with the Portuguese or who have fallen afoul of the Mozambican legal system.

After government troops destroyed a major rebel base at Sitatonga Mountain 30 miles from Zimbabwe, another armed band established itself at Chagonjo, cutting it off from the national government for nearly a year. The main focus of Mozambique’s anti-MNR campaign is the security of the Beira-Umtali corridor containing the vital railway, road and oil pipeline that link Zimbabwe with the coast. In this, FRELIMO has been reasonably effective. But sabotage at the huge Cabora Bassa dam in April, inflicting partial damage to its hydroelectric facilities, indicates the rebels’ potential for creating severe dislocations in Mozambique.

**Unity Against Destabilization**

The South African campaign waged against Zimbabwe and Mozambique has intensified the serious economic and social problems confronting these two young nations as they seek to build socialist societies. The octopus-reach of Pretoria’s operations has extended even to more established Black nations like Zambia and Swaziland, which have both experienced guerrilla activity and sabotage linked to South Africa.

But the destabilization campaign may also serve to encourage increased regional opposition and organization against the apartheid regime. “We know that South Africa is intent upon destabilizing the African states in this region and that they are organizing, directing and financing the UNITA bandits in Angola, the ‘mchala’ gang in Zambia and the ... dissidents in Mozambique,” said Prime Minister Mugabe recently. This recognition of South Africa as the common enemy of Black southern Africa has engendered a closer unity among these nations which now form the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference. At the November 19-20 ministerial meeting of SADCC, the South Africans came under heavy verbal fire. All nine governments joined in a communiqué accusing South Africa of trying to destabilize their region, and even more importantly, serious discussion was continued on establishing regional cooperation which will begin to free the nine from their economic dependency on the apartheid state.

S.V.
Namibia: Pretoria Stalls on New Talks

According to sources in Ronald Reagan's administration, 1982 will be the year that peace, elections and independence finally come to Namibia. It will also be the year Cuban troops head home from Angola and Jonas Savimbi's Western-backed guerrillas move out of the bush and into an accommodation with the MPLA government in Luanda. All told, they predict a year of resounding triumph for US diplomacy and a swift kick to those who whine that the Reagan crowd has no real foreign policy beyond talking loudly and pretending to carry a very large stick indeed.

At first glance, the pieces of the administration's game plan actually appear to be falling into place. By catering to South Africa's interests with the promise of constitutional guarantees ensuring "minority" (i.e. white) rights, the US had at least temporarily succeeded in drawing Pretoria back into the Namibia negotiations. The Angolan government, beset by economic difficulties and battered by a series of South African invasions, seemed to be moderating its earlier intransigence on the possibility of talks with Savimbi.

Judging from other factors, however, it might be a mistake to regard an imminent Namibia settlement as a certainty. The optimistic mood in Washington is based primarily on Pretoria's failure, as yet, to reject any aspect of the US proposals.

But there are already signs that this may soon happen. On January 8, David Steward, permanent representative of South Africa's mission to the United Nations, sent a letter to the new Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in which he "stressed and warned" the secretary general of the need for impartiality in any UN-sanctioned Namibia settlement "if the United Nations desires to be involved in a final settlement on the Namibia issue." Throughout the protracted Namibian negotiations the South Africans have maintained that the UN is "biased" in favor of SWAPO and would thus be unable to supervise elections in Namibia as called for by the 1978 independence framework set up by the Western powers in UN resolution 435.

Some of the anti-SWAPO "internal parties" in Namibia have been much less qualified in their opposition to the new Western initiative. The far-right Akthu party and Prime Minister P.W. Botha's own National Party in Namibia have both gone on record as opposed to the current independence plans.

According to the British journal Africa Confidential, South Africa has hinted that it may raise other objections, "including a bill for the cost of subsidizing railway, port, postal, and other services in Namibia "over the course of the negotiations."

This sequence of raising "objections" early in negotiations while continuing to negotiate and then, at a later date invoking those earlier objections as a pretext for scuttling talks has been played out many times over the past four years. Combined with Pretoria's unwillingness to officially accept the current proposals, these protestations add weight to speculations by SWAPO and others that South Africa—and the West—are once again simply playing for time.

Dangers in a Settlement

These difficulties do not, however, rule out the possibility that a settlement is imminent. As Crocker and others in the Reagan administration are quick to point out, Pretoria is unlikely to ever get a better deal than the one offered by the Reagan administration and so, if they ever want a settlement, they had better take this one. Even those who have viewed Reagan's approach to southern Africa as an unmitigated disaster admit this possibility and stress the dangers that would accompany such a coup for US diplomacy.

The projected Pax Americana in southern Africa would thrust the United States inexorably into the maelstrom of a region ravaged by years of combat—more as a protagonist than as mediator. Moreover, the current US initiative neglects the fundamental connection between apartheid within South Africa and turmoil in the surrounding region (see separate article on South Africa's destabilization campaign).

To the extent that a settlement hinges on even closer US collaboration with South Africa, it may well result in prolonging rather than resolving regional tensions, leaving future US policy hostage to a regime just as unwilling to acknowledge the real cause of conflict.

In the meantime, the US has courted Africa with a barrage of reassurances in its "legitimate security concerns and needs.

To that end, "an untitled non-paper" sent to the front line states in October suggests that "Namibia and its neighbors wish to provide reciprocal assurances of non-interference and non-resort to force," the proposed text of these "voluntary undertakings" would go a long way toward gutting sovereignty of a newly independent Namibia. Among other things, it would force Namibia to "permit organized activity within its territory directed towards the commission of any act of aggression or any other act which involved an unlawful threat or use of force against any other State," thus presumably barring Namibia from joining the other front line states in providing facilitation for South African liberation movements. The "non-paper" also proposes banning "foreign military units" in Namibia, again restricting a norm of prerogative of independent nations and a highly reasonable one for a fledging state whose neighbor to the south has repeatedly invaded Angola and Mozambique, and all but certainly sponsored an attempted coup against the government of the Seychelles.

New US Ambassador to South Africa Named

Herman Nickel has been appointed the new US ambassador to South Africa. A former reporter, he was based in South Africa between 1961-62 for Time. Nickel left that position after the South African government failed to renew his visa. He was appointed to the board of editors of Fortune in 1977, a sister publication of Time. Nickel has written several articles for Fortune including one based on his association with Ernests Lefevre in supporting Nestle's infant formula sales to developing nations and one in support of economics ties with South Africa.
Nor has the US limited its reassurances to verbal pronouncements and diplomatic manipulation. With minimal fanfare, the Reagan administration has moved to relax restrictions on military cooperation with the apartheid regime. During the summer, the US signed an agreement to train officers for a new South African Coast Guard. The first two South African officers, one naval officer and one air force officer, have already completed a training program on Long Island. And in October, two South African police generals were allowed to visit the US, marking a shift in previous policy mandating a “blanket restriction” on visits by high-ranking South African military and police officers.

Yet despite the Reagan administration’s “confidence building” gestures the only indications that a settlement will actually happen this year come from Washington. And as the United States goes into yet another round of negotiations with South Africa in mid-January, the only word from Pretoria has come in the form of objections to certain aspects of the proposals without any public indications that South Africa is actually prepared to accept the proposals. Nor is there any evidence that South Africa has reversed its earlier unconditional opposition to a SWAPO government at the helm of its former colony. What does seem certain is that South Africa will continue to wreak havoc on the people of Angola and Namibia.

A.M.

Coup Leads To Pretoria

The attempted takeover of the Seychelles islands on November 25 by a 52-man mercenary force organized in South Africa was apparently carried out with the knowledge and assistance of several Western intelligence agencies, including the US Central Intelligence Agency. According to the London Daily Telegraph, the United States, Britain and other Western powers were accomplices of South Africa in their covert support and early knowledge of the coup, led by the infamous mercenary, Colonel “Mad Mike” Hoare. The Western-backed overthrow of Seychelles President France Albert Rene was reportedly aimed at ending the increasingly close relations between Rene’s socialist government and the Soviet Union.

The 44 mercenaries who escaped capture on November 26 by hijacking an Air India jet back to Durban were arraigned in a South African court on January 6. The levity of the courtroom proceedings appears to further substantiate Daily Telegraph reports that an arrangement between the Seychelles government and South Africa has been worked out under Western supervision. The Daily Telegraph reports that in return for “heavy compensation” from undisclosed sources the Rene government agreed to the release of all the mercenaries, both those held in Durban and the eight captured in the Seychelles, after a token courtroom procedure in South Africa.

At the initial court hearing, only Hoare and four other “ringleaders” had been “provisionally” charged with kidnapping—a lesser offense under South African law than hijacking—and let out on bail, while the remaining 39 had been released without charges. Only after an international outcry and the threat of a possible cut of air links between the major Western nations and South Africa did Pretoria announce that all 44 would be charged with hijacking. South Africa is a signatory of the 1970 Hague Convention which requires hijackers either to be prosecuted or extradited.

It now appears that the mercenaries, posing as a vacationing rugby team and smuggling arms in false-bottomed suitcases, were to link up with an advance party of eight people that slipped into the country November 21. Arriving at the Mahe airport on a Royal Swazi Airlines Fokker F28, the mercenaries had already boarded a tourist bus when a customs officer discovered an automatic weapon in one of the suitcases. Policewoman Flavienne Pothin alerted police headquarters in the capital city of Victoria seven miles away, but by the time security forces arrived the mercenaries had seized control of the air control tower and other buildings and taken 100 hostages. Both the mercenaries and the security forces began firing with sub machine guns, rockets, and grenades.

Five hours after fighting began, the mercenaries lured an Air India flight with 79 persons aboard to land. Once on the ground, 44 mercenaries hijacked the plane to Durban, taking one dead with them and leaving eight comrades behind as a rearguard. Five of those remaining were captured, with the other three still, as of early January, being sought in the surrounding hills.

Accounts of how the coup was to proceed after arrival at the airport vary, but it seems clear that former president James Manchem, unseated by Rene in a 1977 coup, was to be involved. Some of the captured mercenaries also affirm that a new Seychelles government was to be flown in from Kenya with the active support of the Kenyan government, a report strongly denied by Nairobi.

S.V.

Join The Two Weeks of Action

In the last two months activists around the country have gathered to plan two weeks of action, March 21 to April 4, 1982, in support of the liberation movements of southern Africa. Activists are encouraged to contact local anti-apartheid groups or the American Committee on Africa for further information.

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12 SOUTHERN AFRICA JANUARY 1982
January 1982

Dear Sustainer:

As you can see from the enclosed magazine, Southern Africa is in real trouble. The letter that begins on the front page spells out the magazine's troubles in some detail, but we thought that you, as one of our key supporters, deserved a bit more of an explanation.

First, please read the letter in the enclosed issue. In it, we explain the problem, how we got there and what we propose to do about it. The long and the short of it is that, at our present level of operation, Southern Africa will be forced out of business in May of this year. In the letter we outline a plan to save the magazine by raising $25,000 in new pledges by May 1, and an additional $19,000 by the end of the year. If we cannot raise the full amount by then, we will be forced to shut down permanently.

Because you are a sustainer, we realize that you probably follow events in Africa closely, using a number of different sources, and you are likely to be familiar with most of the information available on southern Africa. And we are assuming that the reason you have supported us over the years is that you recognize Southern Africa's importance as a regular, readable and reliable source of information about the African liberation struggle.

We also assume that you appreciate, as do the liberation movements themselves, that much of Southern Africa's exclusive coverage--interviews, on-the-spot reports (from Africa, Washington and around the world where important actions are taking place) and the analyses that put those events into perspective--are available literally nowhere else.

We are asking you to do two things. First, make a pledge to support us at a level higher than your current sustainer

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subscription. This would certainly be a great help. Second, and every bit as important, make a serious effort to recruit a friend or colleague to become a Southern Africa sustainer. If every sustainer could recruit just two more, a major step would be made towards ensuring the survival of the magazine—now and in the future.

Crying wolf is always a risky business: the danger, of course, is that when the wolf is really at the door, no one will believe you. In our case the wolf is already snapping at our heels. None of us are now being paid for the many hours we must spend in our cramped, two-room office to produce the magazine. Everyone dreads answering the phone because we are continually being hounded by creditors and no one knows where money for next month's rent will come from. We could go on, but we're sure you get the point. The budget on page 3 is an accurate, no frills estimate of our situation: $25,000 is the real minimum that must be raised if we are to resume publication.

We are committed to saving Southern Africa magazine. And Southern Africa can be saved. If we can meet our goal we will resume publication in June and immediately undertake efforts to expand our circulation and further intensify our fundraising efforts. If we fail, we will sadly, reluctantly, close down the office. We are counting on you—our oldest and most loyal supporters—to place a financial vote of confidence in the future of Southern Africa.

In solidarity,

Jim Cason for Southern Africa