THE TRANSKEI, BANTUSTANS AND THE HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES

by

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Ten years after the Nationalist electoral victory of 1948 it was apparent enough that "apartheid" had not measured up to the grand expectations of the Afrikaner electorate of South Africa. Instead, the flow of Africans into the towns had increased while African discontent, encouraged by nationalist sentiment elsewhere on the continent, was threatening to overflow into violent resistance. In addition to these internal threats to the established order, pressures in the United Nations and from traditionally friendly countries were becoming more insistent in their demands that South Africa get in step with the times. It was now clear that either the foundations of a multi-racial society must be laid at once or else color separation had to be made respectable and placed on a permanent basis. Only a strong plan of action could save the Government from impending disaster.

The man selected for this task was Dr. H.F. Verwoerd who took over the office of Prime Minister in 1958. As one of the Afrikaner intellectuals who co-founded the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, Verwoerd was instrumental in bringing pressure upon the Nationalist Government in 1950 to adopt territorial apartheid; a policy already repudiated as impracticable by the then Prime Minister, Dr. D.F. Malan. During his eight years as Minister of Native Affairs Verwoerd had also built up a reputation as a leader who could draw up a bold, logical policy and enforce it ruthlessly.

Dr. Verwoerd immediately fell to work "to give a more positive, liberal appearance to the doctrine of apartheid, both to placate overseas opinion, and to satisfy the critics within his own party, who had become restive over the moral contradictions of the doctrine." He spelled out his policy in Parliament:

"... I have said it repeatedly and I want to say it again: The policy of apartheid moves consistently in the direction of more and more separate development with the ideal of total separation in all spheres. Everyone realizes that it is not practicable at the present moment, that it cannot be attained in a few years, but everyone realizes at the same time that if you have a clear and definite ideal in view -- whether you have one moving towards separate development even territorially -- it can be advanced even in these times." The "New Deal" which Verwoerd thus proposed to launch, was also hailed by its author as a move to ensure that South Africa would keep in pace with developments in the rest of Africa; an observation which at least had the merit of recognizing that Black Africa was there to stay. For the more tender-hearted Nationalists, the theoretic possibility of all people achieving full citizenship rights on a basis of geographic partition, enabled people of moral standing "to give support to it as an idea ... As an election platform, it was a brilliant success, for the white voter could support it in order to protect his own sectional interests, and at the same time assuage his conscience by believing that he was giving the non-white a chance of real development in the future." Henceforth, even such hated words as "liberal" were capable of rehabilitation in the context of acceptance "multinationalism."
Specifically, Verwoerd's master plan for separation was revealed in terms of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government which was hurried through Parliament in 1959. The Government's philosophy in these matters officially rested on three pillars: (1) God has given every nation a divine task and a divine calling; (2) Every nation has an inherent right of self-preservation; (3) The personal and national ideals of every individual and of every population group can be developed within its own political community. Only then would other groups feel that they were not endangered.

Basic to the Government's thinking was the assumption that the Bantu (Verwoerd strictly forbade the use of the word "African" among his Ministers and in official documents) were not a homogeneous people and therefore constituted a number of separate national units based on language and culture. The three to four million urbanized Africans, equal to the total European population, were dismissed as "an unattached mass of Bantu individuals," not part of European civilization and capable of exercising their rights only in some Reserve (Bantustan) area. Accordingly, eight main national homelands were to be established in which the Bantu would theoretically develop to their full capacity as independent communities. It followed that those Bantu resident in "white areas" could never be permanent residents of such areas even though they might be three or four generations removed from tribal life. Always they would remain "citizens" of the Bantu areas and would be interchangeable with the dwellers of those areas according to the fluctuations of the labor market.

Implementation of this program of "political autonomy," as it was dubbed, demanded that all factors likely to retard such development be systematically removed. Consequently, the Government deprived the African population of its last vestiges of representation in the national Parliament on the grounds that it failed "to stimulate the development of Bantu institutions ... and fostered expectations of greater participation in political institutions and promoted the desertion of trained human material from service within its own community." Hundreds of other enactments designed to implement total apartheid, but with the direct consequences for human values and elementary decency, followed in rapid procession. In the words of Mr. F.E. Jones, Q.C., M.P., speaking on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, their effect was such that "... twelve years of Nationalist rule will have finally deprived all non-whites of almost all the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms set out in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms set out in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights; and the whites of South Africa will have suffered the grievous impairment of those same Rights and Freedoms. South Africa will then be a Police State."6 But while the substance of racial legislation became more harsh, the style was more sophisticated. Each new piece of legislation was accompanied by an unprecedented public relations campaign abroad which focused upon the "positive" efforts of the Government to promote self-government.7

Dr. Verwoerd was particularly eager to advertise his program as one which was actually leading the world in conferring freedom and full opportunities for development upon backward peoples. Indeed, he professed to see
no difference between his policy and British policy in the High Commission Territories except that his would not only confer self-rule but would prevent exploitation by whites. Should these territories be transferred to South Africa, their peoples, he said, would enjoy an even greater measure of self-government. In any event, the final goal would be a kind of South African commonwealth composed of South Africa and a number of Bantu states between which there would be the closest cooperation. Although South Africa would handle such troublesome matters as defence and foreign affairs, the Prime Minister conceded that eventually the Bantu units might become entirely independent states.

Despite vague and contradictory statements on the meaning of "independence" and "autonomy," and the inescapable fact that the creation of Bantustans was fundamentally designed to preserve white supremacy, the fact remained that South Africa was revealing a new sensitivity to world opinion and events in the rest of Africa. "It should be clear by this time," said the Nationalist newspaper Die Transvaler, "that the flood of Native nationalism cannot be stopped ... To lead the Natives to self-government in their own territories before they demand it and of necessity take it -- this is the challenge of the moment. It is fervently to be hoped that this realization will penetrate and thereby the realization that it is a policy in which all must cooperate." The plan, according to Dr. Donges, "takes Black nationalism into account and at the same time retains the powers of Government in the hands of the White Man." and in the words of Dr. Verwoerd, "we tell the people of South Africa that we cannot govern without taking into account the tendencies in the world and in Africa. We must have regard to them ... And we can only take them into account and safeguard the White man's control over our country if we move in the direction of separation -- separation in the political sphere at any rate."

Critics of Verwoerd's Bantustan concept hastened to point out that implementation of total apartheid could only lead to eventual partition of the entire country. Dr. Jan Steytler, leader of the Progressive Party, argued that no man or party had the right to carve up South Africa to appease one section of the community. The leaders of the United Party, while not rejecting South Africa's traditional pattern of racial segregation, professed to see in territorial apartheid an ultimate betrayal of the State through partition. They thereby struck a particularly sensitive chord within the rural Afrikaner community, and a potentially dangerous one for the Government since the disproportionate weight given to rural communities had enabled the Nationalist Government to come to power with 140,000 fewer votes than their combined opponents.8 Although the Afrikaner farmers, as ardent Nationalist supporters, were long accustomed to the double jargon employed by the Government both for internal and external consumption, they had accepted the Bantustan concept as a convenient slogan to ensure the old way of life. The slightest suggestion that they might be expendable in preserving apartheid brought out serious resentment. This is admitted by a party apologist, S. Pienaar, who ironically states that apartheid appears to some Nationalists as "negrophile, as a granting of rights to people who ... can only abuse the them."9
If indeed there was any fear that Africans might abuse powers conferred upon them the proclamations of Bantu Authorities should have set them quickly to rest. Not only did the Government retain powers in the Bantustans to choose, depose and veto, but instead of freely elected leaders, chiefs appointed or at least sustained by. Pretoria were given such rights of local government as did exist. Even the area set aside for African occupation, 13.7 percent of the country's total, could scarcely be viewed as a threat, especially since these Reserves were generally devoid of good soil and exploitable mineral resources. It was, of course, inconceivable that four-fifths of the country's entire population could survive under such conditions. Even the Tomlinson Report of 1955, which supposedly provided the master-plan for the implementation of the "New Deal," pointed out that over a ten year period, 37 million would be required for soil reclamation, 31 million for establishing industries, and 30 million for the Bantu Development Corporation would be required to meet minimal needs. If carried out, it was expected that by the end of the century the Reserves could carry a population of 14,000,000 Africans out of an estimated 21,000,000. This plan, showing seven proposed African territories, included the High Commission Territories governed by Britain. But the Government rejected these estimates as too costly and voted a total of 3.5 for developing all the declared Reserves. The Commission's Report did in fact explode the idea that the existing Reserves, or even a considerable extension of them, could produce total separation. Unfortunately, since it upheld the idea of "separate development" and rejected integration as "race suicide," the Government could ignore the economic implications of the Report and advertise it as proof for the practicability of apartheid.

Although numerous statistics could be marshalled proving the contradictions between Government theory and practice, "the principal fallacy behind the policy of Bantustans is not the misconception (deliberate or otherwise) regarding the potential wealth of the reserves, nor the illusion that Bantu Authorities will grant a form of self-government; nor the false parallel with the autonomy of the British Commonwealth, but rather the total lack of understanding of the nature of the African majority which these proposals, even if sincere, are designed to placate." Unfortunately for the Nationalist Government, their definition of African nationalism -- which Dr. Verwoerd hopes to contain within the context of white domination -- does not conform to the realities of the situation. It is unlikely that the Government has either the resources or the power to conjure up a new African nationalism in keeping with its preconceived ideas. The best it can hope for is a working coalition of tribal chiefs and moderate, business-minded Africans, but it is doubtful that in the long run it would be possible to maintain a system so contrary to western economy.

The Transkei

In line with the principle of "Bantu control over Bantu areas," as enunciated in the Bantu Authority Act of 1951 and the Bantu Self-Government Bill of 1959, the Transkei became the first formally constituted Bantustan in 1959. Although a semi-elected government (Bunga) had existed in this 16,000 sq. mile territory for over sixty years, henceforth it would be based on the authority of tribal chiefs. In place of the twenty-six district
councils, each composed of six members, four elected and two nominated, with a magistrate as chairman, the members of the new Authority were no longer elected. Whereas the former system deliberately aimed, in fact, at destroying the power of the chiefs and sought to introduce local government on an elected basis, under the new Authority the appointment of members was strictly controlled by the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Since chiefs throughout the Reserves held office at the pleasure of the Minister, control over the composition of the Authority was a simple matter.

Shortly after the creation of the Territorial Authority, the Government, as expected, was requested "to declare the Transkeian Territories as a whole and self-governing state under the control of the Bantu people [and] that arrangements for the drawing up of the relative constitution be made by the authorities in consultation with the leaders of the Bantu people in the Transkeian Territories." Obligingly, the Prime Minister announced that out of consideration for this request the Government had decided to grant self-government to the Transkei. All negotiations leading up to the enactment of the constitution indicated a fundamental absence of true consultation, and objections posed by Chief Sabata and others opposed to apartheid were dismissed in a cavalier manner. Even if this procedure were not necessarily a sign of ill will, "it is at least as much an indication of an old-fashioned habit of mind in the conduct of 'Native Affairs', for it is difficult in South Africa for officials to accept in their hearts the idea of negotiation with, rather than regulation of, Africans."

Only within very strict limits can the constitution of 1963 be said to confer genuine power upon the Transkeian Government. A cabinet presiding over five ministries together with a Legislative Assembly were given very limited administrative and legislative powers over Transkei citizens whether living within or outside the Territory. A flag, national anthem and other trappings of government gave some semblance of statehood. But all legislation required the approval of the State President through the Commissioner-General and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. Pretoria's grip was reinforced by the provision that all drawings on the Transkeian Revenue Fund must be countersigned by the Controller and Auditor-General of the Republic. All senior servants must be whites and these posts can be Africanised only from the bottom upwards. The Transkeian Government has no jurisdiction over the settled white population of the Territory which numbers about 17,000. The Legislative Assembly, consisting of 64 chiefs customarily appointed and paid by the Government of South Africa and 45 elected members, may be dissolved at any time by the President of the Republic. The powers reserved to the central Government effectively ruled out the possibility that the Transkei could act against the Republic, namely, military matters; control of factories, manufacturing arms, ammunition or explosives; foreign affairs; police (except such units as may be transferred); posts and telegraphs; radio and television; railways; harbors; national roads; civil aviation; entry of non-Transkeian citizens; currency; public roads; banking and other financial institutions; customs and excise; and the repeal, amendment or substitution of the Transkei Constitution Act.
Meanwhile, as the Government set about devising a constitution and preparing for elections, opposition to some of the measures being enforced by Bantu Authorities in the Transkei brought serious unrest. Huts were burned, men murdered, white traders were boycotted in some towns and a State of Emergency was proclaimed in some areas. The Emergency Proclamations, introduced in 1960, gave the authorities and the chiefs tight control over the Transkei. Proclamation 400, for example, prohibited all unauthorized meetings of more than ten Africans without specific authorization. The same Proclamation proscribed under heavy penalty any "subversive statements;" a subversive statement was defined as any statement, "verbally or in writing ... which is intended or is likely to have the effect of subverting or interfering with the authority of the State, the Chief Native Commissioner, a Native Commissioner or any other officer in the employ of the State, or of any chief or headman." Battalions of the Mobile Watch, a part of the army specially trained to deal with riots were moved in. It was in this atmosphere of repression and fear, punctuated by the appearance in Umtata of armed Saracens, that the constitution was received and preparations for elections got under way.

With one minor exception political parties played no public role in the nominations. Moreover, the electoral regulations included no provision for the appearance of party designations on the ballot. Although there was no explicit legal proscription against the creation of parties or party activities, various pressures were exerted to preclude the Liberal and Progressive parties. In the absence of political parties, a certain political polarization developed between the two announced candidates for the position of Chief Minister -- Senior Tribal Chief Kaiser Matanzima of Emigrant Tembuland and Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Western Pondoland -- each campaigned for the support of the 52 chiefs who would hold "ex-officio" membership in the Legislative Assembly.

The South African Government clearly favored Matanzima for the post of Chief Minister. The Minister of Bantu Development announced that even should Poto be elected, he would not be permitted to apply his policy of multiracialism in the Territory. For years Matanzima was groomed for power by the Government. Generally unpopular in the Transkei not only for his previous close cooperation with unpopular governmental measures but for his harsh chiefly rule, Matanzima was for many years a strong supporter of the government's policy of apartheid. Chief Poto, on the other hand, had rejected apartheid as a solution for the problems of South Africa and instead affirmed the common right of all South Africans to live and work where they chose. Of the 45 elected members to the Assembly, at least 33 supported Poto for Chief Minister. However, in the closed Assembly meeting following the general election, Matanzima was able to win over 42 chiefs and 12 elected members and was thus elected Chief Minister by a vote of 54 to 49, there being two spoiled papers. Although it was not clear how Matanzima effected this victory, Government support was probably the deciding factor in his election. Matanzima immediately announced his firm intention of carrying through with the policy of separation of the white race in the Transkei and with "the important task of liberating my people to independence."
Whatever the motivating force behind the Government's decision to press on with territorial apartheid in the Transkei, the Bantustan policy now seems so inextricably bound up with the maintenance of white supremacy that the Transkei Government may indeed have more leverage in Pretoria than anticipated. To the extent that separate development will stand or fall with the Transkei "experiment," the territory becomes a new and unpredictable factor in South African domestic politics. Whether it will have a chance to succeed will be determined not only by Pretoria but by the resentful, landless Africans for whom "the Bantu philosophy may well serve as a vehicle for their purposes," success will obviously be measured by different yardsticks. Despite the distaste which the Government must feel for Matanzima's declared territorial ambitions, his hatred of Bantu education, and his desire to achieve full independence rapidly, it is likely to allow him more rope than would have been afforded to Pato. At the moment, however, there is no evidence to indicate that Dr. Verwoerd, let alone the Nationalist Party as a whole, would actually concede full political independence for the Transkei.

Indeed, if the Government is eventually forced to bring about actual partition, only a partition which would vastly increase the area presently allotted for Bantustans could even remotely meet African approval. It would require the inclusion of Natal as well as the northern Transvaal together with parts of the Orange Free State so that all the scattered Reserve areas would form a solid state. Such a division, hypothetical as it obviously remains, would also have the merit in some Nationalist eyes of removing much of the English-speaking electorate. However, such a division of South Africa appears not only impractical, but is unacceptable and unjust. Still, only such a massive division of the country would give any substance to the Government's claim that the "Black nations of South African can become free even as Ghana is today." It is impossible to conceive that the Transkei, let alone the other projected Bantustans, can become truly free and economically viable under the Government formula of maintaining white supremacy. According to such a prestigious South African apologist as Prof. Charles Manning, even raising the question of ultimate independence may very well be meaningless, this can hardly be attributed to the "autonomous" character of Bantustans which lack the capacity for decision making. On the contrary, Dr. Verwoerd's whole career does not encourage skeptics to think that such a step would be permitted except under duress. Considering his emotional slant, and the fact that the eight Bantustans are scattered hit or miss over the Republic, the chances of meaningful independence are chimerical. Close examination of the present administration and development of the Reserves and of the facts of economic life in South Africa, as Leo Marquand points out, leads to one of two conclusions: "either the new policy is a fantasy or those who advocate it are setting about things in a manner least calculated to achieve their object. In effect, the government is proposing to create
'colonies' so that it can withdraw from them. But what sort of colonies? And what preparations are there for withdrawal? Bantu self-government turns out to be in practice, the restoration of a decaying and outworn tribalism in which the selective principle is noticeably absent and the main characteristic is authoritarianism exercised by the white government ... In short, it is hard to avoid the further conclusion that the traditional policy of regarding the Reserves as reservoirs of labour is being streamlined to make them less of a financial burden on South African revenue.\textsuperscript{17}

The High Commission Territories: Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland

A fixed goal of South African policy from the 1909 Act of Union down to the present has been the Republic's persistent demand for the incorporation of the High Commission Territories. If these demands have recently taken on the character of altruistic offers to promote the development of the territories, they are no less dangerous for their disguise. South African interest in acquiring the Protectorates is evidenced in lengthy correspondence stretching over many decades and well antedating the present Nationalist regime. In 1913 General Botha reminded the High Commission that "there is of course, no question that it was contemplated at the time of Union that all the Protectorates, sooner or later, would be transferred to the Union.\textsuperscript{18} A Schedule to the South Africa Act of 1909 had in fact provided in detail for such a transfer.\textsuperscript{19} However, as South Africa's own "Native policy" was hardening in the mid-1930's, British public opinion reacted less favorably to the idea of handing over the territories. As a result, the House of Commons extracted a promise from the government, frequently repeated over the years, that no such step would be taken without consulting with the inhabitants of these areas. The fact that the British Government never spelled out what "consultation" might involve, had a retarding effect on development.\textsuperscript{20} In 1952 Dr. Malan threatened that if no step were taken towards transfer, the Union might regard the Protectorates as "foreign territory" and thus deny the Protectorates basic facilities or at least make their administration difficult. In 1954 the Union Parliament adopted a resolution declaring that it "resolved" that the transfer "should take place as soon as possible" and that negotiations should be resumed.\textsuperscript{21}

Arguments for the incorporation of these territories have always stressed that geographically, ethnographically and economically they form part of South Africa. But these arguments are hardly convincing unless they are spelled out in greater detail. The territories are obviously not self-supporting and even with considerable investment of capital, economic viability might well be impossible. It seems unlikely that South Africa would simply like to incur additional financial burdens without adequate compensation. On purely historic grounds it might be asserted that inasmuch as Britain prevented the Afrikaners from acquiring these territories, their take-over would provide handsome redress for Boer defeat. As a people obsessed with their "lace in history," such a motive would be sufficient for many. The strong contrast between South Africans and British "Native policy" is also unsettling, for, despite the shortcomings of the latter, it left the Africans of the Protectorates possessing "a sense of sovereignty and
strength ... /not respecting/ the white man (and woman) in the manner of
the serf with his master."\textsuperscript{22} Added to this traditional grievance is the fact
that over the past few years a continuous stream of political refugees have
found sanctuary in the territories. In brief, British policy is considered
by many South Africans as a positive danger to their security and conclude
that the more areas under their control, the safer they will be.

Fundamentally, however, the Protectorates are important for South
Africa inasmuch as they seem absolutely essential to the whole concept of
the Bantustan system. Without them, it remains a painfully unconvincing
project and with the exception of the Transkei, it can hardly advance beyond
the drawing board. "To plan territorial apartheid with only the present
South African Reserves would be a monumental task.../requiring/ a scale of
investment which is wholly prohibitive ... The Reserves cannot provide a
living for even half the Africans of the country. To add the High Commission
Territories would change the picture, at least on paper."\textsuperscript{23}

Although the incorporation of the Protectorates appeared essential for
the realization of the Bantustan project as well as a condition for its
acceptance abroad (with the Protectorates the area set aside for Africans
could be said to approximate 50% of the country,) the Nationalist victory in
1948 ruled out the possibility of negotiated transfer. The failure of the
South African Government to develop along liberal British lines made it
impossible for Whitehall to accept any assurances that the paramount interests
of the Protectorates would be maintained. As an opposition member of Parlia-
ment recently observed, "If it had not been for the tragedy of 1948 ... and
if the United Party had remained in power, the three territories would have
become part of South Africa."\textsuperscript{24} The departure of South Africa from the Com-
monwealth sealed the impossibility of any arrangement with Great Britain
and Dr. Verwoerd found it expedient to announce that the incorporation of the
territories was "neither possible nor wise."\textsuperscript{25}

Despite this official change of heart, it would be short-sighted to
conclude that South Africa has suddenly abandoned its oft-repeated designs
on the Protectorates. Even the Prime Minister's timely offer, in September
1963, to lead the territories more quickly and with more financial assistance
to full self-government than could be done by Britain was an obvious proof
that the effort had not been abandoned. Crude methods calculated to effect
transfer had indeed been rejected as undiplomatic and untimely. Now the
peoples of these territories were to be won over by the offers designed to
appeal to their natural desire for economic betterment.

Without going into detail on each of these territories, suffice to
say that the danger of acquiescence on the part of the indigenous population
is greatest in Swaziland, the most backward traditional society in southern
Africa. Thanks to the entrenched position of the king and his inner circle
of aristocrats, together with a powerful white community owning almost half
the country, South Africa is able to find natural allies who fear the "sub-
versive" ideas of Pan Africanism. At the moment this group totally dominates
the Legislative Council and seeks British permission for an early vote on the
question of independence. Ironically, such a step, if taken in the near future, in all probability would mean that Swaziland would, for all intents and purposes, become the projected heartland of the Swazi bantustan as envisaged in the Tomlinson Report.

In Basutoland, totally surrounded by South Africa, there is less possibility that either the supporters of chieftainship or any other substantial group would be party to a direct "deal" with Dr. Verwoerd. Still, the fact that approximately one third of the male population finds employment in South Africa strengthens the hand of those who claim that their good relations with South Africa makes them more capable guardians of the nation's interests. Even the Pan-Africanist inclined Basutoland Congress Party must affirm its desire to maintain formally correct relations with South Africa. A saving factor in the balance is the absence of a white land-owning class.

Bechuanaland is less precariously situated vis-a-vis South Africa, and even the conservative chiefs of the territory, who will most likely rule the country for some time through the Democratic Party, are not inclined to accept dictation from South Africa. Nor are they prepared, on the other hand, to provoke or overly offend their mighty neighbor. Still, as an escape route to the north, the country must of necessity be particularly troublesome to South Africa. The presence of several thousand Afrikaner farmers, some of whom have quite openly carried on discussions with Pretoria for incorporation of Bechuanaland's "white areas" (two South African Cabinet Ministers possess extensive holdings in Bechuanaland), does not make the possibility of independent action more likely.

Each of the territories is particularly vulnerable to economic pressures from South Africa. These pressures need not take the form of overtly hostile actions. A decision to reduce cattle imports from Basutoland for purely internal reasons would be difficult to counter. The danger of such economic and administrative measures, most of which might be slow and undramatic, is that the Protectorates might be strangled through "legitimate" means. By reasonably "turning on the heat," the inhabitants of the territories can be unnerved and reduced to the pitiable state wherein politicians will feel constrained to have their appeal to the electorate on the intimacy of their relations to Pretoria. Such a process of steady capitulation would take on the character of an extended "Munich." Perhaps the most that can be hoped is that Dr. Verwoerd will not be permitted to use the Protectorates as hostages in his conflict with the rest of the world.

It cannot be assumed, however, despite the obvious dangers inherent in their situation, that these countries can be written off as politically insignificant in the South African context. As countries where the democratic principle is officially endorsed if not always effectively practiced, the peoples of these territories might prove better bargainers, once they have independence, than either Britain or South Africa could admit. The mere possibility that radio, newspapers and other media of communication might wreak considerable confusion in South Africa cannot be underestimated. Even the question of migrant labor is a double-edged sword. Under British rule
economic problems could not be dealt with in terms of practical politics and decision-making was not permitted to operate along normal lines. As Arthur Creech Jones observed, "It is often assumed that the Union Government, if it felt so disposed, could apply severe economic pressure on the territories to force their transfer. There is no doubt that an awkward situation could be created for them. Nonetheless, all the economic weapons are not in the hands of the Union, and the Africans involved are not incapable of either organized opposition or economic sanctions. The United Kingdom Government also through its dependencies contributes to the exploitation of South African natural wealth and itself could apply measures of great inconveniences to the Union." 

Not only can the United Kingdom affect the South African situation through determined policies in the Protectorates. Surely it is within the power of the United States to take significant steps to hasten the development of the territories and without regard to South African sensibilities. Indeed, not only would prosperity, non-racialism and democracy in these areas provide a spectacular contrast with the sham of South Africa's separate development, but it would confront the people of South Africa with the inescapable fact that the expensive and debilitating efforts of their Government to alter the course of history are in vain. Once these illusions are removed, the way to sanity might appear. A cataclysm in South Africa will offer no hope for the survival of human values. A settlement must be reached and enforced from the outside. A strong American policy in the High Commission Territories offers the United States at least one extremely attractive possibility. Half measures, dictated by American Embassy officials in South Africa, would be worse than useless. Throughout Africa the United States exposes itself to the wrath of the people for its refusal to act against South Africa. Without acting directly against South Africa the United States has tremendous possibilities for reestablishing its credit in Africa by positive action in the Protectorates.
Footnotes


7 The extent of these activities by the South African Government in the United States was brought out in the hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. It was revealed that Mr. Hamilton Wright of New York had entered into a formal agreement with the S.A. Department of Information for a sum of $150,000 covering the shooting of films and the handling of films submitted by the S.A. Government. This included one on the Transkei and, as with all such films, bore no indication that they were produced by the S.A. Government or that Hamilton Wright was an agent for said Government. *Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Part 7, March 25, 1963*.


9 S. Pienaar, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

10 Ibid., p. 48


15 S. Pienaar, *op.cit.*, p. 15.


19 Dundas claims that even at this early period, Britain did not really intend to effect a transfer of "territory or possession" but "of Government only," *Problem Territories of Southern Africa*, p. 35.


25 Times of Swaziland, September 14, 1962.