THE ALGERIAN SITUATION: A SUCCESSFUL COMPROMISE

On Friday, February 15, the UN General Assembly managed astonishingly -- and hopefully -- to deal with the "Algerian situation" in a manner that reasonably satisfied both French and Algerians and most observers.

As indicated in the Bulletin of February 8, the Algerian question was raised for the second successive year by Asian-African bloc countries, who charged France with violent repression of legitimate Algerian aspirations for independence, leading to global unrest, and even with genocide. Unlike last year, the French did not walk out to protest the mere placing of the item on the Assembly's agenda, but sent a "first team" to answer "alumnies" against France and to countercharge that Egypt and others were interfering in France's internal affairs. In hearing in the First (political) Committee, Foreign Minister Pineau recited advances under French rule and offered: (1) an unconditional cease-fire; (2) democratically supervised elections; and (3) reforms worked out jointly with elected representatives of Algeria with adequate safeguards for the minority Christian community, followed by a vague Eurafrican grouping for France and Algerian and former French spheres of influence in North (and possibly all) Africa. He refused, however, to recognize the leaders of the National Liberation Front or Algerian Nationalist Movement as representing the Algerians. After debate which covered Algerian history and national aspirations, the failures of French policy in Algeria, and the competence of the UN, the French delegation withdrew from further discussion, stating that it could not admit the competence of the UN to deal with France's domestic affairs and that it would not recognize any UN resolutions on the subject.

Three resolutions were introduced: The strongest, introduced by 18 Asian and African nations, called for recognition of the Algerians' right of self-determination and for negotiations between the Algerian people and the French; it was opposed by the United States as interfering in the domestic jurisdiction of France. The mildest, introduced by six powers (Italy and five Latin American countries) and supported by the United States, merely expressed hope for a satisfactory settlement. The third, introduced by Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, called on the French and Algerians to settle their problems "through appropriate negotiations"; the United States opposed the resolution also, indicating that France ought to be given the opportunity to work out the future status of Algeria without external interference. The 13-power resolution was defeated by a vote of 34-33, and after considerable jockeying for procedural advantage, the two other resolutions were both passed and sent to the General Assembly. The General Assembly requires a two-thirds vote to approve a resolution instead of the mere majority necessary in the Committee. Since it was not clear that either resolution could obtain a two-thirds vote, a nine-power compromise was introduced, which expressed the hope that a solution could be found "in a spirit of cooperation . . . through appropriate means." The resolution passed unanimously (the United Kingdom's sole abstention was changed to an affirmative vote at the end of the roll call).

The table following compares paraphrases of the four resolutions to show their similarities and differences:
18-Power Resolution

preamble

a-situation of strife in Algeria causes suffering and international discord

b-recognizing rights of Algerians to self-determination in accordance with Charter
d-invites France and Algerian people to start immediate negotiations for cease-fire and settlement
e-requests Secy-Gen to assist negotiations and report to next Assembly

6-Power Resolution

preamble

a-having heard statements of French and other delegates and discussed question of Algeria

b-believing situation soluble by joint French-Algerian efforts following Charter
c-hopes peaceful and democratic solution will be found

d-invites France and Algerian people to try by appropriate negotiations to end bloodshed and reach peaceful settlement
e-requests Secy-Gen to assist negotiations and report to next Assembly

3-Power Resolution

preamble

a-like (1)(a), omitting reference to international discord

b-having regard to Algerian situation which is causing suffering and loss of life
c-hopes France and Algerian people will try by appropriate negotiations to end bloodshed and reach peaceful settlement

d-invites France and Algerian people to try by appropriate negotiations to end bloodshed and reach peaceful settlement
e-requests Secy-Gen to assist negotiations and report to next Assembly

Final Compromise

preamble

a-like (2)(a) but omits specific reference to French

b-having regard to Algerian situation which is causing suffering and loss of life
c-hopes that, in cooperative spirit, a solution will be found, by appropriate means under UN Charter
d-invites France and Algerian people to try by appropriate negotiations to end bloodshed and reach peaceful settlement
e-requests Secy-Gen to assist negotiations and report to next Assembly

The French claim to be pleased with the final resolution on the grounds that it did not condemn France's "wise" policy in Algeria nor substantiate the accusations made by several of the more vehement Arab spokesmen; Robert LaCoste, French Resident Minister in Algiers, claims that it will slow down the "rebellion" by destroying rebel morale and encouraging natives who support France. But the leaders of the Algerians appeared satisfied that the final resolution implicitly recognized the UN's competence as to Algeria despite a possible parliamentary defeat in which the three powers were induced to support a weaker resolution than their original draft when many observers think that the original would have passed by a two-thirds vote. Impartial observers feel that the French could not help being influenced by the discussion of the shortcomings of their Algerian policy in the debates of the First Committee -- despite their statements, they did feel compelled to participate in the discussions to defend themselves. The form of the final resolution, which does not require any specific action which France could refuse in accordance with its expressed intentions to ignore the UN's resolutions on Algeria, is considered very successful drafting; France will nevertheless be under pressure to respond to the spirit of the resolution in the days ahead.

THIOPIAN-SOMALI BOUNDARY DISPUTES: CONTINUED NEGOTIATION URGED

Last December Ethiopian representatives and Italian representatives of Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland, now an Italian Trust Territory which is scheduled to become independent in 1960) submitted to the Fourth Committee statements on the
The dispute arises immediately from the fact that the boundary has never been delimited, i.e., physically laid out at the site. More remotely, it may be attributed to (1) the historical lack of effective political control in the disputed regions, (2) the failures of past Italian colonial policy, and (3) physical and geographical considerations which are not co-extensive with national boundaries. The dispute itself can be understood only by examining first, the legal and historical arguments of the opposing negotiators and, second, the non-legal considerations.

As set forth in the Italian and Ethiopian briefs submitted to the Fourth Committee, the legal issue on which boundary negotiations turn is whether the boundary should run parallel to the coast 140 miles (as Ethiopia claims) or 180 miles (as Italy claims) from the Indian Ocean. (See map.) This depends on the meaning of the Italian-Ethiopian Convention of 1908 (which concluded an unsuccessful Italian attempt to conquer Ethiopia), since the boundary established by it in general terms was never delimited. The 1908 Convention in turn incorporated (subject to changes not here relevant) the provisions of the boundary Agreement of 1897 between Italy and Ethiopia.

According to accepted history, the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in 1897 proposed a boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia by drawing a line on a German (Habenicht) map of the area. The Ethiopians claim that this was the "140 mile line" running from the intersection of the 48th meridian with the 8th parallel at the British Somaliland border on the north to Bardera on the Juba River in the south. The Italian government subsequently accepted the proposed boundary, but the negotiator and an Italian press account claimed that Menelik's proposed line ran 180 miles from the sea, starting at the intersection of the 47th meridian and the 8th parallel on the north. (There seems to be tacit agreement that the southern terminus was near Bardera at the von-der-Decken Rapids.) The Italians claim they can not locate the only copy of the map, which was taken by the Italian representative to Rome.

In the absence of the map as "best evidence," the Ethiopians argue as follows: (1) by the Convention of 1908 the Italian government bought from Ethiopia a tract of land south of the Webi Shebeli, which was stated in Parliament to comprise 50,000 square kilometres, in order to rectify the disadvantageous line accepted in 1897; a tract of that size can be accounted for only if the 140 mile line was the boundary or if Italy repurchased its own territory; (2) a publication of the Italian Ministry of Colonies, written by a former governor of Somaliland, as well as nine maps published by the Italian government between 1908 and 1935, confirms the Ethiopian position as to
current collapse of negotiations to settle the boundary between the two countries.

The dispute arises immediately from the fact that the boundary has never been delimited, i.e., physically laid out at the site. More remotely, it may be attributed to (1) the historical lack of effective political control in the disputed regions, (2) the failures of past Italian colonial policy, and (3) physical and geographical considerations which are not co-extensive with national boundaries. The dispute itself can be understood only by examining first, the legal and historical arguments of the opposing negotiators and, second, the non-legal considerations.

As set forth in the Italian and Ethiopian briefs submitted to the Fourth Committee, the legal issue on which boundary negotiations turn is whether the boundary should run parallel to the coast 110 miles (as Ethiopia claims) or 180 miles (as Italy claims) from the Indian Ocean. (See map.) This depends on the meaning of the Italian-Ethiopian Convention of 1908 (which concluded an unsuccessful Italian attempt to conquer Ethiopia), since the boundary established by it in general terms was never delimited. The 1908 Convention in turn incorporated (subject to changes not here relevant) the provisions of the boundary Agreement of 1897 between Italy and Ethiopia. According to accepted history, the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in 1897 proposed a boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia by drawing a line on a German (Habenicht) map of the area. The Ethiopians claim that this was the "140 mile line" running from the intersection of the 18th meridian with the 8th parallel at the British Somaliland border on the north to Bardera on the Juba River in the south. The Italian government subsequently accepted the proposed boundary, but the negotiator and an Italian press account claimed that Menelik's proposed line ran 180 miles from the sea, starting at the intersection of the 17th meridian and the 8th parallel on the north. (There seems to be tacit agreement that the southern terminus was near Bardera at the von-der-Decken Rapids.) The only copy of the map, which was taken by the Italian representative to Rome.

In the absence of the map as "best evidence," the Ethiopians argue as follows: (1) by the Convention of 1908 the Italian government bought from Ethiopia a tract of land south of the Webi Shebéli, which was stated in Parliament to comprise 50,000 square kilometres, in order to rectify the disadvantageous line accepted in 1897; a tract of that size can be accounted for only if the 110 mile line was the boundary or if Italy repurchased its own territory; (2) a publication of the Italian Ministry of Colonies, written by a former governor of Somaliland, as well as nine maps published by the Italian government between 1908 and 1935, confirm the Ethiopian position as to
the boundary. The Italians deny that any of the publications referred to present more than approximations of a line which could not be accurately drawn since it had not been physically delimited, or that the Italian Cartographic Service did more than "cooperate" with private authors on unofficial publications (they scorn to offer any comparable "evidence") and argue: (1) that the text of the Convention of 1908 specifically stated that the boundary north of the Webi Shebeli should be the line "accepted in 1897 by the Italian government," which the Ethiopians must have known referred to the "180 mile line" claimed by the Italian negotiator and press (the Ethiopians deny they were aware of such claim or that such a claim could in any case change the actual line); and (2) the memos submitted by Ethiopia to the League of Nations in 1934 relating to the "Walwal incident" referred to the frontier as 180 miles from the coast. The Ethiopian rebuttal alleges that the Italians have taken quotations from the 1934 memo out of context, that the memo indicated that a dispute existed as to the border but was designed to show that Walwal was well inside even a 180 mile line, and that the memo was after all written under the threat and fear of war and was designed to avoid further exacerbation of feelings by de-emphasizing the disputed boundary question at that time.

The legal arguments are complicated by the Somali claim that they are not bound by any agreement entered into by the Italians before Somali became a trust territory, although some of their representatives did agree to Italian negotiations based on the 1908 Convention -- as interpreted by the Italians.

II The main arguments of the Somalis hinge, however, on tradition and necessity. Somali tribesmen have traditionally entered the Ogaden territory of northeastern Ethiopia at certain seasons of the year to obtain necessary water and grazing land for the cattle which constitute their main means of sustenance, source of wealth, and way of life. Even the provisional administrative boundary established in 1950, which the Ethiopians claim they are willing to use as the basis of a compromise settlement, does not provide sufficient grazing lands for the Somalis within their own country; two UN Visiting Missions to the area have detailed the privation and suffering resulting from enforcement of the current provisional boundary; there appears to be no known way to create a viable society within the present limits of Somalia.

Somali resentment at Ethiopian insistence on an arbitrary boundary line drawn on the map of an area which was probably virtually unknown to both Menelik and the Italians has resulted in increased political agitation for united (British and Italian) Somali control of the whole area -- and in increased raids across the border. Ethiopian reaction is founded on these bases: (1) the Coptic Christians who rule Ethiopia feel dangerously isolated since their own country is nearly half Mohammedan, it is surrounded by other Moslem or pagan countries, and the Somalis are zealous Moslem proselytizers; (2) Somali representatives imply that the allegiance of Somalis settled in Ethiopia runs to their Somali brethren, not to the Ethiopian government; (3) the Somalis are alleged to be sympathetic to the ambitions of Egypt, a traditional enemy of Ethiopia; (4) the Somalis are represented by the Italians who twice invaded Ethiopia and were the only people ever to conquer it -- in current negotiations the Italians did not soothe Ethiopian fears by arguing that de facto conditions in the boundary dating to the Italian-Ethiopian War should be the basis for settlement; and (5) British Somalis have won Italian Somali support in protesting the return (required by a treaty) to Ethiopian administration of the Haud, north of Ogaden, where by an 1897 agreement British Somalis have been allowed to enter and graze their herds under British administration although technically on Ethiopian territory.

The General Assembly has adopted a resolution without opposition which, considering the importance of settling the boundary line before Somalia faces the new and enormous problems of independence in 1960, urges the continuation of negotiations, with a proviso that if substantial progress has not been made by the next session of the General Assembly the disputants shall be obliged to follow the formula for negotiation, mediation, and arbitration provided by an earlier Assembly resolution. It
is to be hoped that if a solution is not found this year, the General Assembly will not pass another hopeful resolution at its next session but will provide positive help, through a good offices committee or other similar device, in effecting an equitable settlement.

INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES: FOURTH COMMITTEE REVERSED

The resolution (aimed particularly at Portugal) to establish an ad hoc committee to study the application of UN Charter provisions on non-self-governing territories to newly admitted members, which passed the Fourth Committee by a bare majority (see the Bulletin of February 8), failed to pass in the General Assembly on February 20. The roll-call vote was 35-35, with five abstentions, but application of the Assembly's two-thirds rules (which does not apply in the Committees) defeated the resolution. Rikhi Jaipal, the Indian delegate, voicing a vigorous protest, claimed that the American delegation, which opposed the resolution, had been largely responsible for the change in the position of several countries which had voted for the resolution in Committee. Six other resolutions on non-self-governing territories were passed by the General Assembly.

TANGANYIKA TRUST TERRITORY: DEVELOPMENT AS SELF-GOVERNING AFRICAN STATE

By a vote of 47-15, with 1 abstention, the General Assembly passed a resolution introduced by Haiti whereby the General Assembly would: (1) draw the attention of Britain as Administering Authority and of the Trusteeship Council to the views expressed by Julius Nyerere, president of the Tanganyika African National Union, who appeared before the Committee to ask that steps be taken toward self-government (see the Bulletin of December 28); (2) recommend that Britain make a statement as to its policy for Tanganyika and include therein the principle of guidance toward self-government in an essentially African democratic state with equal rights for all; (3) recommend that the Trusteeship Council's next Visiting Mission should study in particular the question of Tanganyika's political development; and (4) recommend that the Council should include in its next report a special study of the problems involved.

The United States joined other administering and colonial powers in opposing the resolution.

FRENCH CAMEROONS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF FOURTH COMMITTEE

After hearing the Cameroonian petitioners who were able to reach New York, the General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 46-9 (with 10 abstentions), the following resolution: (1) directing that the statements of the petitioners shall be transmitted to the Trusteeship Council for its further study; (2) hoping that the Administering Authority will take all necessary measures to restore political activity to normal conditions and end tensions in political life; and (3) recommending to the Trusteeship Council that it follow the matters covered by the resolution and report on them to the next session of the General Assembly.

RESOLUTION TO HASTEN SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR TRUST TERRITORIES

On February 16 the Fourth Committee, by a vote of 36-13 (11 abstentions), adopted a resolution recommending that the administering powers of the British and French Cameroons, French Togoland, Tanganyika, and Ruanda-Urundi take the necessary measures to ensure self-government for these trust territories at the earliest possible date. As originally proposed by the Soviet Union, the resolution called for the establishment of independence dates for the named territories and for Australian-administered New Guinea within three to five years. New Guinea was dropped from the resolution with the agreement of the Russian delegation; and the phrase "at an early date" was substituted for the specific time limits by an amendment proposed by the Syrian
delegate, who stated that while he approved of the general purposes of the Russian resolution, he felt that it was somewhat unrealistic in its original form. The discussion of the resolution was interesting primarily for the wry British statement that non-self-governing territories of the type being considered were always ready for independence before the date anticipated by the administering power (therefore, the British delegate argued, "target dates" for independence were meaningless until it was virtually won!).

The General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 45-14, with 16 abstentions, after deleting the paragraph which stated that the Assembly was convinced that most trust territories are fully capable of achieving self-government or independence "in the near future." The United States joined Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and ten Western European countries in opposition to the resolution.

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NOTE:

The March-April issue of Africa Today, the bi-monthly publication of the American Committee on Africa, commemorates the Gold Coast as it became the free nation of Ghana on March 6 and took its place as the first Dominion within the British Commonwealth to be governed by Africans.

We of the American Committee on Africa wish to bring the importance of this event to the attention of the American public, because Independence Day for five million Africans is a day that not only changes the history of a continent, but affects the entire community of free nations.

The original press run of Africa Today has been sold out -- this despite the fact that twice the usual number of copies were printed -- and an additional run of several thousand copies is planned.

Single copies of the special Ghana issue of Africa Today are 35 cents; a one-year subscription, $1.50. For bulk orders the following rates apply: 10-24 copies, 25 cents each; 25 or more, 20 cents each.

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