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Namibia, the Karakul Industry and the Hudson's Bay Company

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with the support of the United Nations Council for Namibia
Today Namibia produces about one-fifth of the world's supply of karakul, estimated at between fifteen and twenty million pelts on a global scale. Along with Namibia and South Africa, the largest exporters are the USSR, Afghanistan and Iran. Exported primarily to West Germany, other European countries and North America, karakul is the second most important fur skin in the world after mink. (Demiruren ms., van Wyk 1979: 3)

Karakul sheep belong to the species of Ovis Aries which is characterized by a luxurious pelt at birth and an unusually fatty tail. Karakul probably originated in early Mesopotamia and in the eighth century AD was brought by Arabs to Bokhara in Central Asia. Persian traders were the first to bring karakul pelts to medieval European markets. (Krogh 1954: 26-7) With the growth of the fur trade in Europe after 1800, karakul pelts began to be more popular and by the end of the 19th century were purchased direct from Bokhara as well as from intermediate traders. About 30,000 karakul pelts were sold in 1864 in Leipzig, Germany - the centre of the fur trade at that time - but by 1910 this number had reached 1.1 million. (Karakul Board 1970: 3)
In 1924 Namibian-produced karakul pelts were sold in Leipzig for the first time, and in 1936 the Hudson’s Bay Company (hereafter called simply the Bay) held its first karakul auction in London. Today the Bay processes more than 40% of Namibian-produced karakul each year through its London auction house. This paper presents an historical overview of the Bay’s involvement in the karakul industry in Namibia. Special attention is focused on how this involvement benefits the Bay itself, as well as on working conditions for African migrant and non-migrant labourers within the Bay’s sorting warehouse in Windhoek. Information for this latter discussion is mainly derived from interviews conducted in late 1976 with workers at the Bay’s Windhoek-based facility. The paper concludes with a brief summary of international campaigns against the involvement of the Bay in Namibia.

First, however, a brief overview is provided of the development of the karakul industry in Namibia and on working conditions of farm labourers, as this provides the necessary context in which the Bay’s activities must be understood.

I. The Growth of the Karakul Industry in Namibia

In 1903 the first karakul were imported into Germany with the eventual plan of introducing them into Namibia, whose arid climate is similar to that of Bokhara. (Thompson 1938: 7) In 1907 the first karakul were imported into Namibia. (Karakul Board 1970: 3) Eventually a sizable breeding flock was established on a Government stud farm and private breeders also became interested in raising the sheep. In 1913 the last agricultural census of karakul sheep done before the war showed that there were in total 335 purebred rams, 330 purebred ewes and 21,000 crossbred karakul sheep in Namibia. (Spitzner and Schafer 1963: 9)
When the South African Government took over control in Namibia after World War I, Government experimental stud farms continued to be developed and sheep farmers were encouraged to turn to karakul breeding. During 1920 to 1922 only a couple of hundred pelts were exported from Namibia for sale on the European market. In 1924 Namibian-produced karakul pelts entered the Leipzig fur market for the first time, though the 10,000 pelts then sold averaged only 13/- per pelt, a low price at the time. However, as breeding experiments in Namibia led to better quality pelts and curl pattern, Namibian-produced karakul became more and more popular. By 1927 the Leipzig Chamber of Industry and Commerce ruled that along with karakul from Russia and Afghanistan, pelts from Namibia could also be sold as "Persianer." (Krogh 1954: 56-9)

Exports and sales of karakul pelts from Namibia dramatically increased in the early 1930's, and in 1937 the million mark for quantity of pelts exported (1,190,212) and for total value on the market (11,222,529) was reached for the first time. (Report 1937: 25) In 1933, because the total value of pelts exported exceeded the total value of gem diamonds exported, karakul was nicknamed the "black diamonds" of Namibia, and in fact dominated the Namibian economy from the mid-1930's to the mid-1940's. (Murray 1974: 26)

Also during 1933 the fur marketing centre shifted from Leipzig to London because of the effects of the impending war, and then during the war, sales shifted to New York. Karakul auctions were not reestablished in London until 1946, by which time karakul flocks had become so predominant in Namibia that they constituted 71.8% of the total small stock population of 2,370,000. (SWA Agril. Policy Comm. 1950: Table VI) However, though the value of karakul pelts continued to steadily increase - from an average of 10/10 in 1941 to 10/11 in 1943 - production limits have more or less been reached and have not
gone much beyond 4.8 million pelts per year for Namibia and South Africa combined, with Namibia producing a steady 70% (2.7 million in recent years) of the total. Table 1, derived from a variety of sources, shows the growth of the karakul industry from 1924 to 1981. The total pelts exported relate only to Namibia.

Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 1. First, there has been a steady growth of the karakul industry in all areas of production: number of pelts exported, total value of pelts, and average price per pelt. Even during the Depression the industry continued to expand. The declines in production for 1960 and 1974 are due to serious drought for the first period and unnaturally high rainfalls for the second period, both of which affect the industry if sustained over a long enough time. The sharp decline in more recent years and particularly in 1970/1981 is due to the cumulative effect of a major drought cycle which began in the mid-1970's. Second, 1976 has been the peak year to date for the karakul industry, with Namibia and South Africa together exporting pelts worth a grand total of R5.7 million. However, even though production has fallen since this time because of the drought, the overall value of the industry has by and large remained above R45 million annually.

Along with farming (largely cattle and karakul fur production), the Namibian economy is dominated by fishing and mining. It is noteworthy that the production of raw resources in Namibia is geared primarily for export rather than for further processing, manufacture or consumption within the country, and further that this export amounts to approximately two-thirds of the Gross Domestic Product. Whereas by 1946, the value of karakul pelts exported from Namibia represented four-fifths of that country's overseas exports and fifty percent of total exports, today the economy is overwhelmingly dominated by mining (particularly uranium ore and gem
5.
diamonds) which now constitute between 75-80% of total exports.

Throughout the early years of South African rule in Namibia, not only did the karakul industry dramatically develop but a massive programme of land seizure was instituted with government support. By 1935 one-half of Namibia had been surveyed and designated for approximately 3,000 settler-owned or leased farms whereas one-quarter of the country - the least productive - had become reserves for the almost 200,000 Africans then in the Police Zone. (Jottschalk 1973: 78). Today, of the approximately 32.4 million hectares which comprise the total area of Namibia, Africans have been designated some 32.2 million hectares (96%) for reserves and Europeans have control over some 50.2 million hectares (14%) which includes the overwhelming majority of good agricultural land.

The majority of karakul farms are located in southern Namibia and consist of about 20,000 hectares with flock sizes of between 1,000 and 2,000 animals. Between two and five hectares are needed per head of small stock. (SWAA 1955: 132). In 1973 there were about 6,500 white commercial land units covering 37 million hectares and comprising 5,000 to 6,000 autonomous farming units. Of this total approximately 2,500 or 42% are karakul farms. (Duggal 1973: 26). A 1981 study indicated there were 5,100 farms including 1,700 cattle, 2,000 karakul and 1,400 mixed cattle and sheep. (SWARO 1981: 28). The vast majority of these farms are run by one farmer and his family, most of whom are either German or Afrikaners speaking. A substantial number of these farms are owned by absentee landlords - living in South Africa or in the urban areas of Namibia - and the management falls under a Coloured or African foreman. (Duggal 1973: 26).

Overall profits for karakul farmers vary, depending on size of herd and price of pelts on the market. The average karakul farmer gets almost 90% of
the pelts' selling price on the international market, after deductions are made for commissions paid to the brokerage house, the cooperative, various levies, etc. In 1977 the average annual profit for white farmers ranged between N$10,000 and N$12,000, making farm earnings equivalent to salaries for middle-ranking civil servants and managers. (SWAPO 1981: 28)

II. Working Conditions for Farm Labourers

During the early days of German and South African rule, the working conditions for farm labourers were difficult: long hours, inadequate food and housing, low wages and enforced separation from home and family for migrant labourers. All of this had the backing of the colonial state and the iron hand of indiscriminate "settler justice." Many farm labourers attempted to resist these oppressive work conditions by simply deserting and there is ample documentation of a long history of random, though widespread, desertion of farm labourers from sheep and cattle farms which began in the early days of German colonialism and which continues to the present day. (see Murlich et al.) By the early 1950's, desertion had actually become the most common way that workers, particularly migrant labourers, expressed their grievances over their work conditions. (Gordon 1975: 12)

It is difficult to get accurate statistics for Namibia which show the precise size and composition of the African labour force in general let alone for particular economic sectors such as agriculture. Official information shows contract labour recruited only from the north, and it rarely mentions women. But the category of "migrant" is a deceptive one. Many migrants are actually long-term regular workers at the same place of employment who must regularly return to their reserve to reapply for a new contract. (SWAPO 1981: 327)
In 1977 it was estimated that migrant workers constituted almost 45% of the total African labour force in Namibia of 221,700. This total includes 72,000 women, predominantly domestics on farms and in private urban homes. This same year it was estimated that the entire African labour force employed in white-owned agriculture was 50,000 workers, representing 20.7% of the total African labour force in the country. (Duggal 1978: 63, 57) For the most part a relatively small number of African labourers are employed per farm. Farms over 10,000 hectares employ an average of nine to ten labourers while farms below 10,000 hectares employ five to six. These figures do not include seasonal labourers, women who are domestic servants, children doing light work or the occasional prison labour. (Jebbhardt 1978: 149, 152)

Working conditions for farm labourers today are similar to what they were at the start of this century. The following comments, derived from secondary sources as well as first-hand interviews conducted in late 1976, summarize farm labourer working conditions in the areas of food, housing, wages and employer-employee relations.

a. Food: In 1976 shepherds on the Elfer farm in Outjo reported that they received only twenty cups of mealie meal weekly as the only staple. At the Neumann government agricultural research station, weekly rations for karakul shepherds consisted of five kg. of meat (sometimes the carcasses of karakul lambs), mealie meal and some peanuts. But the point is not so much what particular farms provide, but the overall inadequacy - and unpredictability - of the diet.

Some farmers "supplement" the inadequate diet by keeping small general stores on their property from which they sell, on credit, various foods and manufactured goods. But whereas farmers are able to get their stocks wholesale, workers must
buy them at retail prices which are often above their means. Some farm labourers reported that occasionally they receive no wage at the end of the month because the entire wage has been "eaten" through credit to the local farm store.

b. Housing: Small brick houses for farm labourers are occasionally provided with state subsidization. These have become somewhat more common in the south where wood structures are limited by the relative lack of trees and bushes. Thatch and cow dung huts, however, are still common in the northern central plateau as well as in the south. (1976 fieldwork, Gebhardt 1978: 160, 172)

c. Wages: General wages for shepherds obtained during interviews conducted in 1976 ranged from N12 to N25 per month in the south with a maximum of N30 per month received by one shepherd in Outjo. The labourers who reported these wages said they had to buy their own food.

d. Employer-Employee Relations: For farm labourers there is no legislation which controls the number of hours an employer can make them work. A survey of farm workers conducted in 1972/1973 showed that a labourer could expect to work between eight to ten hours a day with little time off on weekends. (Gebhardt 1978: 113) Discussions with karakul shepherds three to four years later showed the same pattern.

Verbal statements made in October 1976 by two farm labourers from the Jaub farm near Windhoek also show that employer-employee relations have changed little during the past century:

I'm a contract worker and I've been here for eight years. The other shepherd at Jaub is Nama. We each take care of 400 sheep. In April this year our boss killed an Ovambo shepherd. He killed him with a gun because
the shepherd asked for his pay. The boss said "You are stupid to ask for your money. You are black and I am white and you are stupid to ask." The farmer then shot him dead and paid the other workers to bury the dead shepherd somewhere on the farm and to say nothing about this incident.

This same boss also refused to take a sick child of one of the workers to hospital. And though we're supposed to get mealie meal, sugar and tea every Saturday he doesn't give it to us. He is very brutal to us and we sometimes get food from workers at the (nearby) racecourse. Other farms have these same problems.

III. Farmers' Cooperatives and the Brokerage Houses

In the early 1920's karakul farmers began to form cooperatives which sent consignments of pelts out of the country for auction. (SWAA 1958: 139-40) Farmers found that the price they got for pelts was higher by exporting direct via their own cooperatives than by going through intermediary firms. But both before and during the war the primary way that farmers disposed of pelts was to sell them for cash or on commission to representatives of export firms or to buyers who then sold them to export firms. Another method, which was not as popular at this time, was to hand the pelts in on commission to the local representative of an overseas broker. In 1936 the Hudson's Bay Company had a brokerage house in Windhoek and later another was established by Eastwood and Holt of London. (Krogh 1954: 70-2)

However, the number of farmers' cooperatives continued to expand and in 1946 the Farmers' Cooperative Wool and Produce Union - called for short the Farmers' Cooperative Union or simply the FCU - was established. The FCU quickly took on the function of becoming an outlet through which a farmer could send his pelts to be sold on his account by auction through an overseas broker. In 1947, one year after it was formed, the FCU had a membership of 1,600 karakul farmers in Namibia and shipped some 350,000 pelts to London and New York. (SWAA 1947: 120)
In 1951 the FCU and the Bay made a formal agreement whereby the FCU would collect, classify, grade, pack and despatch karakul pelts both for itself and for the Bay while the Bay would arrange and hold auctions overseas. (SWAA 1951: 25) Similar marketing agreements were also made between other farmers' cooperatives and brokerage houses.

By 1969 cooperatives in Namibia were handling 98% of karakul pelts which were being exported. (PM 28/3/69) In 1975 the FCU and two other large wool cooperatives amalgamated into a single cooperative, the Boeremakelaars Kooperatief Eperk or BK3. (RDM 16/4/75, 11/7/75) Up to this time, whereas formal agreements had been made between farmers' cooperatives and brokerage houses, the distinction between them of producers' cooperatives on the one hand and local agents of international auction houses on the other hand was clear. But in July 1976 the BK3 and one other cooperative acquired total control of Eastwood and Holt's operations in Namibia. This was seen as one way for producers (the farmers) to have more direct control over marketing.

This closer relationship between the farmers' cooperatives and the brokerage houses was carried a step further in 1982, when a new scheme for marketing of pelts was proposed whereby the Hudson's Bay and Amnings (about which more will be said below) would acquire a 34.3% interest in Eastwood and Holt with several large cooperatives - among them the BK3 - holding the remainder. The plan is for all pelts to be marketed through Eastwood and Holt with the bulk of handling being done by Hudson's Bay and Amnings. Further, Eastwood and Holt would acquire the Bay's sorting centre in Windhoek. The first sale of this joint marketing arrangement was scheduled for September 1982. (WO 26/9/82)
IV. Government Support for the Karakul Industry

In 1939 the Karakul Industry Advisory Board was established as a semi-official organization to regulate the marketing of karakul pelts and stimulate international demand for their production. In 1969 it was replaced by the Karakul Board which had the same functions. That same year the Board ruled that from then on, all Caribbean and South African karakul would be marketed under the registered trade name of SWAKARA, for South West African KARAKUL. (Karakul Board 1970: 6) In the late 1970s the International Karakul Secretariat was created to coordinate international marketing of swakara and undertake research into products. (WA 9/12/77)

From 1953 on, 25% of funds collected from export levies on exported pelts were allocated by the Administration to publicity campaigns for swakara to be administered by the Karakul Industry Advisory Board. (Karakul Board 1970: 5) By 1974 the Karakul Board was conducting publicity campaigns in 17 countries in North America, Western Europe and the Far East.

Today the South African Government receives about R3 million per year from the karakul industry which includes a standard income tax rate of 35% plus a 4% levy on the average price per pelt sold on the London auctions.

V. The Role of the Hudson's Bay Company in the Karakul Industry

The Hudson's Bay Company was the first to establish regular karakul auctions in London in January 1956. Another London firm - Eastwood and Holt - was quick to follow suit, and held their first all-karakul auction in July 1936. As more and more of the fur trade shifted from Leipzig to London during the years before the war, the Bay and Eastwood and Holt came to dominate the marketing of virtually
the entire karakul industry in Namibia. A third British firm which became involved later was Anning, Chadwick and River. (SWA 1949: 119, 1959: 139-40, 1971: 133, Spitzner and Schafte 1963: 26)

One of the Bay's first actions in Namibia was to establish an enterprise to collect, sort and sell pelts for farmers on a commission basis. (SWA 1971: 132) The result was the formation of the Hudson's Bay Company (Pty.) Ltd. which represented two fur auction companies: the Hudson's Bay Company in London and Lampson, Frazer and Ruth in New York. (SWA 1940: 26) Eastwood and Holt established a similar enterprise in Windhoek in 1947.

Just one year after the Bay and Eastwood and Holt set up operations in Namibia, the total number and value of karakul pelts exported topped the one million mark for the first time. Just six years later the two million mark was surpassed for both quantity and total value. (Report 1937: 25) From 1937 through 1939 England and Germany together imported between 36 and 97% of the total value of pelts from Namibia, with two-thirds of this amount going to England. (SWA April Policy Comm.: 1940: Table XVI) Yet on the London fur market, karakul constituted only 3% of the annual quota of all furs handled before World War II. (Sundry 1945: 313)

When the Second World War broke out, London was cut off from its traditional fur suppliers. In addition the British government declared that since furs were a luxury, little shipping space would be allocated to them. (FTUC 1943:20:1: 35) Thus the fur trade shifted to New York. When in late 1942 the American government ruled that fur coats were utility garments supplementing the scarcity of cloth rather than luxuries, the New York fur trade got an even bigger boost. (FTUC 1942:20:3: 56) Table 2, covering the period 1937 to 1946, shows the number of
pelts sold by the Bay in London and New York, and again in London when the first
post war sale took place on February 25, 1946 at the Bay.

Several observations can be drawn from Table 2. First, even during the war
years the karakul industry in Namibia was maintaining a high level of production
and in fact growing. Second, even though there were still many pelts being sold
on an outright sales basis during the years under consideration, there was a
steadily increasing number of pelts being channelled through the brokerage houses
beginning with only 15% in 1937 and averaging 46% during the war years. (Krogh
1954: 73) By 1947 over 72% of Namibia's total pelt exports went through brokerage
houses and from the early 1950's up to the present time the percentage has remained
steady at well over 90-95%. (Sunday Times 4/10/70 and official statistics)

Third, the table shows that the Bay has received a consistently high percentage
of Namibian (and South African) karakul. During the 1937 to 1946 period the annual
average was 47%. From 1947 to 1972, when the Bay merged with Annings, Chadwick and
Hiver, the annual average was 48%. After the 1972 amalgamation - leading to the
formation of Hudson's Bay and Annings, a development discussed in more detail
below - there were only two London auction houses involved in karakul. Between
1972 and 1979 the average annual percentage of Namibian and South African karakul
sold on auction going through the Bay has dropped slightly to 43%, with Eastwood
and Holt getting the remainder. (Information derived from statistics given in
the SWAA 1947-77 and Fur Review 1975-79)

In early 1946 the Bay held the first post-war auction of Namibian karakul in
London - which quickly reasserted its central position in the fur trade - though
sales continued in New York via Eastwood and Holt up to 1957 when they ceased
entirely due to the dwindling American demand. (SWAA 1959: 11.0) From the early
1950's on the continental market - specifically Germany, France and Italy - began to reestablish itself and there was a growing demand for Karakul by these countries. (SWA 1952: 91) During this period the Bay continued to play a dominant role in the Karakul market, auctioning off an average of 52.3% of Namibia's consigned pelts for the period 1952 to 1954. (SWA 1953: 73, 1954: 97, 1956: 111) Significantly, these were the first three years following the 1951 marketing agreement between the Bay and the FCU.

From 1960 on, West Germany has been the largest purchaser of pelts, consuming annually about 60% of Namibia's exports. Then comes Italy (15-20%), other European countries such as Switzerland, France and Austria (10-14%) and North America (7-10%). (Karakul Board 1970: 19, Sunday Times 1/10/70)

On May 17, 1972 the Bay and Annings, Chadwick and River merged their fur auction subsidiaries to form a new company - the Hudson's Bay and Annings (SHA) Pty. Ltd., referred to below as HSA - owned 59% by the Bay and 41% by Wood Hall Trust, a subsidiary of the British Paterson Ewart Group. (HSA Ltd. 1974) The first auction of Namibian Karakul by the HSA took place in September 1972. (JMC 1972:50:7: l) Table 3, derived from information given in various SHA Annuals as well as in the London Fur Review, shows the combined value of Namibian and South African swakara pelts which have gone through the auction house of HSA from 1972 to 1979. For purposes of comparison several totals are shown for earlier periods of sales via the Bay before amalgamation. The HSA totals shown for 1975 to 1979 are based on the average price per pelt for black skins, which constitute about 92% of current production. (N 30/3/74) The final column shows what percentage of the year's total consigned pelts from Namibia went through the Bay/HSA.
To put these swakara sales into even better perspective for the HBA, they must be seen against total fur sales going through the company. In 1975 it was estimated that over $112.97 million CAD worth of raw fur went through the auction rooms of HBA each year. (Swakara-maus 1975: 3) For the same year some $31.26 million CAD worth of swakara was sold by HBA, constituting 27.5% of total fur sales. This means that about one-quarter of the annual business of HBA is tied up with swakara.

It is also useful to see what this particular fur business means to the Bay as a whole. This is shown in Table 4, which must be read with several considerations in mind. First, the Bay as well as the HBA get commissions on the furs they sell. For swakara this commission is 3% (compared to 6% for mink), and this constitutes the actual profit the company gets. Since HBA is owned 59% by the Bay, only 59% of the total commission - minus the same percentage of operating expenses - accrues to the Bay as clear profit, with Wood Hall Trust getting the rest. Second, it is difficult to obtain official figures of how much in commissions the HBA actually gets because it is a holding company of Hudson's Bay and Annings (SWA) (Pty.) Ltd., and consequently issues no public annual reports. Therefore, commissions which appear in the table are computed from information given in various SWA Annuals and Fur Review publications. No operating expenses are deducted as these can not be obtained, but it is assumed these are not so high as to throw the table off. The table attempts to do several things: to show what percentage of total Bay fur consignment sales the swakara sales constitute, and to show what percentage of the Bay's overall fur profits come from swakara commissions. Where two figures appear in the table under commissions, the second represents the 59% which accrues only to the Bay.

Several brief conclusions can be drawn from Table 4. One, even though swakara has been declining steadily as a percentage of total fur consignments, its absolute
overall value has been increasing. The same trend exists for the value of commissions, which have been slowly increasing even though their overall importance in the Bay's fur business has been decreasing. Two, considering only the 52% of the swakara commission alone, it is clear that the Bay makes attractive profits from this trade.

The main use of swakara is for coats, which average between 20 and 30 pelts per garment. (Krogh 1954: 3, MTJ 1974:52-12: 14) In 1975 prices of swakara coats at nine Toronto furriers ranged between $700 CAD and $1,500 CAD. In 1987 a possibly record price of $7,428 CAD ($11,000) was paid in January for a swakara broadtail coat made from 56 top quality skins. (Fur Bulletin 2/2/77) By 1981 similar prices were being reported from England.

The point is clear - the cost of swakara coats is high and very profitable to manufacturers. Except for the African labourers in Namibia, all others involved in the karakul industry - farmers, cooperatives, brokerage and auction houses, the South African Government, and international furriers as well as local retailers - find it a lucrative business. This point becomes even more clear when working conditions in the KBA's installation in Windhoek are examined.

VI. Working Conditions in the Bay's Warehouse in Windhoek

Since 1936 the Bay has been sorting pelts into a specified series of grades depending on their colour, curl pattern and overall quality before shipping them out to London via Walvis Bay. This is still the service provided today, though pelts are now also railed (or sent by private company transport trucks) to Cape Town as well as Walvis Bay for shipment or airfreighted from Windhoek and Johannesburg. (SNAA 1955: 33, WA 13/5/77, 1976 fieldnotes)
The present site of the HBA sorting warehouse is in the southern industrial zone of Windhoek, where since 1969 the HBA has rented a warehouse. This facility is today the largest sorting centre in the world (4,000 m² of floor space) and the only one dealing in karakul pelts. The HBA sorts pelts not only for its own auctions, but also for its competitor Eastwood and Holt. It has been estimated that the HBA sorting centre has handled about two million pelts a year since 1969. Both the HBA and Eastwood and Holt get their pelts mainly through the HKB, and then they compete on the London auctioning market for top price. (1976 fieldnotes, WA 22/9/81)

In 1976 there was a warehouse and sorting staff of 25 people at HBA, consisting of 17 African and 3 white workers. The African staff consisted of 6 migrant labourers from Ovamboland and 9 permanent employees from the Police Zone. (1976 fieldnotes) These numbers have not significantly changed over the years. For instance, in 1980 the total warehouse staff had increased to only 35, consisting of 7 administrative and office staff and 28 warehouse and sorting staff composed mainly of African migrant and non-migrant labourers. In addition the HBA now has 7 representatives located throughout Namibia who represent the firm to local farmers. (Letter dated 2/12/80 from Hugh M. Dwar, Managing Director HBA, London to A. A. Sunand, Vice-President, Hudson's Bay Company, Toronto)

The following pages describe the working conditions for migrant labourers in the HBA warehouse. Using information derived from interviews conducted in late 1976 as well as from the December 2, 1980 letter referred to at the end of the previous paragraph, the discussion is divided into several different subsections: the work day and responsibilities of the HBA labourer, wages, health care and other benefits, living conditions in the compounds and employer-employee
relations. The parallels between working conditions in the HSA warehouse and working conditions for farm labourers are all too clear.

a. The Work Day and Responsibilities of the HSA Labourers: The work day begins at 8 a.m. and goes until 5 p.m. There is also an 8-12 a.m. shift on Saturdays making the typical work week five and a half days. For African labourers at HSA the work throughout the year consists of labelling and numbering the skins and putting them into bales. African labourers also do the heavier work such as loading and off-loading sacks of pelts from company and other transport vehicles. Workers says they are warned to handle the pelts very carefully because they are valuable. If a pelt is damaged, the wages of the worker responsible may be reduced. One worker said: "I know of four workers who were kicked out for tearing pelts and only one was able to come back. If you're lucky, they deduct money from your pay. If you're unlucky, they kick you out." (1976 fieldnotes)

The December 2, 1980 letter from HSA-London to the Bay-Toronto talks about yearly reviews and staff up-gradings based on aptitude and experience. There is also now an aptitude training programme conducted every two years "...to ascertain to what extent they are able to progress." The company policy is to promote from within, and indeed this represents a more liberal approach than one finds in many other companies in Namibia. But as the next sub-section makes clear, African workers are still at the lower rung of trained workers at the HSA.

b. Wages: The four migrant labourers interviewed in 1976 gave the following rates for minimum and maximum wages paid per week by the HSA for that year:

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<td>contract labourers</td>
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<td>non-contract labourers</td>
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As with other forms of work in Namibia, there is a discrepancy between wages paid contract labourers and those paid non-contract workers, the former being always lower. Within each category the rate depends on how long a worker has been at the warehouse. In comparison, the HBA technical manager said that the eight whites who actually sorted the peels in 1976 got salaries ranging between R50 and R175 per week. (1976 fieldnotes)

In December 1980, according to the managing director of the HBA in London, there were two categories of workers at the Windhoek sorting centre: warehouse staff and technical staff, the latter including the manager. The minimum wage for a "permanent employee" (presumably this means a non-contract labourer) is listed as R50.57 per week, an increase of just over 20% from 1976. For warehouse staff the annual salary scale ranges between R2,219 and R3,540 maximum per year, for a weekly wage of between R43 and R60. According to staff statistics in the letter there were 15 employees in this category in 1980 divided into four grades depending on experience and skill. The bottom three categories (grades II to IV) show a weekly wage of between R43 and R60, with one employee getting R52 because of length of service. Only in the top grade of the warehouse staff (grade I) does the wage approach the minimum for a permanent employee. This means that migrant labourers occupy only the lowest paid jobs at the HBA and they hardly ever qualify as technical staff where the starting wage is R65 per week.

The HBA-Bay letter does not indicate how many workers are in each category of the warehouse staff, though six Africans are shown as employed among the technical staff, with salaries ranging between R68 and R101 per week maximum. In comparison, though two whites of the seven working at the sorting centre were employed at the lowest-paid end of the technical staff (R 34-63 per week), the other five included the manager, two technical assistants and two grade I sorters (no Africans were
employed at this level) with salaries ranging between R160 and R242 per week - for an annual salary of R8,160 to R12,600. (letter dated 2/12/30 from HBA-London to Jay-Toronto)

The issue, of course, is not the actual wage, nor the fact that HBA does tend to pay a rate towards the higher end of what African workers receive (in July 1976 the weekly wage for African workers in the state electrical industry ranged between R10 and R25, on the railways it was R8 to R25 and in the hotel industry it went from R10 to R20 (Cronje 1979: 17)) The issue is what these wages mean in the larger context of the Namibian situation, i.e., what can a worker do with what he or she gets paid for his or her labour.

In 1976 migrant workers at the HBA, in discussing their wages, also indicated the expenses they had to meet. Keep in mind that their weekly wage ranged between R12 and R16, that the HBA does not withhold any part of this wage, and that the cost of living in Windhoek is estimated to be 30% higher than in any urban area in South Africa. (JM 17/3/79)

First, workers pay anywhere from R2 to R5 per week for food to compensate for an inadequate diet provided them in the single workers' quarters where, as migrant labourers, they must live. Second, workers must buy clothing, and the prices are high because of importation. Workers at the HBA said that a pair of trousers cost between R15 and R30, a shirt R4-5, and shoes from R8 to R30. These prices were confirmed by personal visits made to stores where Africans normally do their shopping. Third, while the HBA provided a transport allowance in 1976 (and still does today) from Katutura to the warehouse - a distance of about five kilometres - workers must cover all other transportation costs themselves. This includes the approximately R24 needed to travel from Windhoek to
21.

Ondangwa in Ovamboland when migrant labourers want to visit their families.

Fourth, there is the money which a migrant labourer tries to send home to his family in Ovamboland. One worker described the problem in the following terms:

We don't send money each month. We first save up to R40 or R50 and then you send that amount. It takes long to save this amount of money because when you get money sometimes you buy trousers and the next month a jacket so it takes long to save that money. Meanwhile the woman you are leaving behind is the one who struggles to do all the work growing crops, fetching wood, etc. But when you have earned some money, you can send it to her and she can use it to hire people - neighbours or friends - to help her with the work. (1976 fieldnotes)

c. Health Care and other Benefits: In 1976 if a worker got sick he had to pay for his own medical care, e.g., medicines and so forth. If hospital care was required, the WEA provided a note identifying the worker as one of its employees. If the employer was notified in time that work would be missed due to illness, the wage would still be paid. But one worker said that there is actually no sick leave, and that a worker who simply does not show up because of an immediate illness loses wages for the time gone. "No work, no pay" was how he put it. (1976 fieldnotes)

By December 1980 the above situation had somewhat changed, though with interesting details. Whereas up to 1977 a medical aid scheme covered only white staff with "the company pick(ing) up virtually all the bill," after this date a staff medical insurance scheme was implemented covering equally both white and black staff and their families (though it is not specified if this covers the families of migrant labourers). There is also a pension scheme which is applied equally to all staff members. With the new scheme, the company covered 50% of the cost with the employee covering the other 50%. The letter goes on to explain that "...these terms were, of course, worse than those which had been
enjoyed previously by the white staff." It is significant, though, that as of December 1960 "...none of the non-white staff has joined the scheme...because they are entitled to free medical treatment from the government and are therefore unwilling to contribute to a voluntary scheme." More to the point, though, is the fact that few African labourers can probably afford to pay even 50% of a medical coverage plan.

In 1975 migrant labourers at R3A, who were predominantly on twelve-month contracts which had to be renewed back in Ovamboland at the end of each year, said that there were no provisions for paid vacations. When they took time off during the contract period - usually totalling two to three weeks and including a couple of visits to Ovamboland - they received only half their wages.

And if there is too much work to be done, they are told they cannot go. (1976 fieldnotes)

d. Living Conditions in the Compound: The single quarters for migrant labourers in Katutura is similar to singles quarters elsewhere in the country: the conditions are crowded and the food is inadequate. This is as true in the new compound - built in 1976/1977 for 110 million and intended to accommodate 5,200 by 1978 (WA 3/12/76) - as it was in the old. Two different workers made the following comments:

In the new compound we are four in a room and it's about 15 feet by 20 feet in size. There are not single beds but bunk beds. The rows of people have only one bathroom but I don't know how many people are in a row. We have only cold water. In the new compound the beds are made of a cement frame with wood on top that opens up so you can store things inside. You buy an old mattress or just sleep on blankets. One joke we have is that when you die, they can just open up the bed and put you in like a coffin!

The old compound isn't very different. The rooms are 12 feet by 15 feet and sometimes more than eight stay in one room. There are only four water taps
for a section of the compound. There are seven sections in the compound. There used to be between 5-6,000 people here before the new compound was built so this gives you an idea of the conditions. (1976 fieldnotes)

e. Employer-Employee Relations: Three of the four migrant labourers interviewed at the JFA warehouse in 1976 had worked there for five to six years and one had been there for only several months. All reported that employer-employee relations were difficult, though some white foremen were better than others. When asked to give examples of good and bad treatment, one long-time worker said:

Since I've been in the warehouse my foreman and his assistants don't talk bad to us. But the manager of the company is a problem. He said if you were late to work no matter what the reason your pay was docked. But some of his assistants don't do this.

But other foremen might fire you if you don't come when called. This happened in 1975 when four Guioncoos were fired. They were working outside the warehouse and then the boss said they had to work inside. When they asked why, they were fired. Only one has been rehired. If the employer doesn't like you or if there are too many workers and not enough work, he'll fire some of you. And he has a lot of clever ways to do this. He might tell you to come here or there and you don't know why. If you ask of if you don't come, you get fired. This is part of the colonialism system. (1976 fieldnotes)

Another worker said:

Black and white relations are like it is in the countryside. A foreman might just force you to do something... There is no peace between white and black. The black is waiting to be kicked out at anytime, and it's like dog and cat. And no matter how and what, you have to do it. You can't refuse because you have no choice. (1976 fieldnotes)

The December 1970 letter from JFA to the Hay notes that there is no trade union, either for white or black, which exists at the warehouse or which is appropriate to the kind of work done. Nor are any of the workers members of any
other union. The letter concludes by saying it has

...no position in respect of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance except that the DTA is the current authority in the country and in so far as it lays down legislation the company must operate within such laws locally...They (the DTA) are the de facto authority and we must recognise that within their own country they can and do lay down legislation which we must observe locally. The fact that we do operate in this way in no way implies support or, for that matter, opposition to the political principles of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance.

In other words, for the HBA sorting centre as well as for the karakul industry as a whole, it is business as usual.

VII. International Campaigns against the Bay's Involvement in the Karakul Industry

Beginning in September 1972 there have been public demonstrations in England, Denmark and Canada calling attention to the role of the Hudson's Bay Company in supporting an economic activity in Namibia which is exploitative of the Namibian workers. By March 1975 the Copenhagen Fur Centre - which held its first karakul auction in December 1972 - had ceased holding such auctions. This was partially the result of the efforts of protestors in Denmark, who had organized enough public opposition to the sales that the auction house was forced to stop. (AdH 3/75: 9) It was also partly the result of other international developments, such as the "Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia" adopted by the U.N. Council for Namibia in September 1974 and approved by the General Assembly the following December. In short the Decree states that no person or company may export any animal, mineral or other resource from Namibia without prior approval of the Council. Further, that any such export can be seized by or on behalf of the Council and held in trust for the eventual benefit of the Namibian people.
Significantly, the response of the British government was to abstain when the Decree was voted on in the General Assembly. The reason was given in a September 25, 1975 letter from the British Department of Trade to the Managing Director of HLA, which said:

...we cannot accept that the Council is the lawful administration of the territory. We do not agree that the General Assembly was competent to confer this status on the Council. Consequently, we do not regard this Decree as having any legal effect...The proper organ to authorise mandatory sanctions is the Security Council, which has (in our view rightly) declined to do so.

Similarly, Canada also abstained, and outlined its own position in a letter dated February 11, 1977 from then Secretary of State for External Affairs Don Janieson to John Zimmerman, Executive Secretary of the Lutheran Church in Canada:

As for the Decree No. 1 of the Council for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, the Canadian government has reserved its position on the Decree's effectiveness and status, particularly on legal grounds...it is a general principle of the government's policy not to interfere in the operations of Canadian companies abroad...As no such decision had been taken by the Security Council with respect to the situation in Namibia, the Canadian government has not taken steps to interrupt the activities of Canadian companies operating there. However, the Canadian government has clearly stated that Canadian companies investing in Namibia do so at their own risk and initiative.

The above comments are interesting for several reasons. First, whereas the Bay is the ultimate holding company of the KBA, in 1970 the Bay changed its domicile from England to Canada. (PT 11/6/73) While the public reason given was that this move made sense because Canada, with 95% of the company's business and 98% of its employees at that time, was the main sphere of the Bay's operations, there are hints of other reasons which relate to the official carte blanche which both the Canadian and British governments have given to the Hudson's Bay Company and to its subsidiary Hudson’s Bay and Aumings to pursue their own interests in Namibia without restriction.
Writing in a regular column for the UK Guardian, Manish Kola noted on June 11, 1976 that many British companies had been shifting their domiciles out of England in the early 1970's, particularly companies whose main business was overseas. The main reason was to transfer into a dollar premium area so that windfall profits could be made. Since the mid-1960's sterling areas had been shrinking, and in addition British currency matters have certain restrictions. For instance foreign currency can not be held freely within the country nor can bank balances be freely owned abroad. There is also no free export of national currency from Britain. In contrast Canada is not only in the U.S. dollar area, but also allows free ownership of both foreign currency within the country and bank balances abroad, as well as permitting the free export of national currency. (Picks 1975/76: 21, 23-4)

While a full examination of these currency matters is beyond the scope of this paper, they do suggest some of the more serious considerations behind the change of domicile of the Bay. More to the point, and a second related feature of the official statements by Britain and Canada on Decree No. 1, is that the Bay plays political football over the actual location of its real (and not simply domiciled) control. For instance, the Bay's response to public demonstrations against its role in Namibia was succinctly put forth in a CBC interview on November 25, 1981 when Ralph Suband - Vice-President and Secretary of the Bay - said that since it was a British subsidiary and not the parent company which is active in Namibia, it is not appropriate for the Canadian-based company to exert any pressure over the HDA! ("Cape Edition" CBC Winnipeg, 1520 GMT)

The company has made its position even clearer in other statements. At the May 25, 1976 Annual General Meeting of the Bay held in Winnipeg, a resolution was put forth from the floor calling for the company to withdraw from participation
in the swakara industry until the country was independent. The resolution was overwhelmingly rejected, and at the meeting the Day's Governor George Richardson said:

It would be wrong to deny the people of Namibia the help and assistance to sell their only product on world markets. If anything our mission is assisting these people, who desperately need help, in marketing their product. We are acting as commission agents, not principals. We are, in my view, rendering a service to those people who certainly need assistance. (Winnipeg Free Press 22/5/76)

In May 1977 there were similar objections raised at the Day's Annual General Meeting, again in Winnipeg. In his address to the shareholders, Day President Donald S. McGiverin made the following comments:

Our activity in Namibian furs is and always has been, entirely legal. Our position is that, as a Canadian company engaged in international fur trade, it is not our business to pass judgment on the political system of foreign countries whose goods we handle, or to become politically involved in these countries whose goods we handle; nor do we believe that we should refuse to handle merchandise for political reasons. (Winnipeg Tribune 21/5/77)

It is difficult, however, to see how any company is not politically involved locally, especially when one considers that in the words of the MIA itself, "...they (the MIA) are the de facto authority and we must recognise that within their own country they can and do lay down legislation which we must observe locally." One can not at the same time act in accordance with local legislation and simultaneously claim to be politically uninvolved locally:

At the same time, white commercial farmers in Namibia try to hedge their bets in other ways. In 1973 the Karakul Producers Association was formed. At its Annual Congress in 1980 a motion was passed calling for the creation of a
contingency fund - based on a special levy paid by members per pelt sold - to help stabilize the karekul industry in "special circumstances." The creation of this fund is interesting for several reasons and particularly for the reason given in the Windhoek Advertiser of August 22, 1980 which said, "the possibility of overseas sanctions against the export of swakara pelts appears to have played a significant role in the motivation for such a fund." This fund indicates, perhaps more than anything else, the extent to which the farming community intends to carry on with "business as usual" regardless of international pressures for change.

* * * * *
Footnotes

1. This paper has been derived from a much longer manuscript (some 400 pages) which I have prepared on the socioeconomic history of the development of the agricultural/karakul sector in Namibia, the role of farm labour within this sector, and the involvement of the Hudson's Bay Company. The manuscript has already been submitted for publication and hopefully will be more widely available soon.

2. As of 1971 these five countries possessed 30.5 million karakul sheep between them, equalling 95% of the 32.1 million karakul then in the world. The remaining 5% was spread over 26 other countries in Asia, Africa (Zambia and Angola), Europe (Portugal among others), South America (including Argentina and Chile), and North America (both the U.S. and Canada). (Verdurex rs.) Attempts to establish a viable karakul industry in these countries, however, have not met with much success. In Canada, for instance, experimentation with karakul sheep raising in 1913/14 on Prince Edward Island had to be halted because of the wet and foggy climate. (Jtsc 1952:291:12: 12)

3. This figure excludes 23,000 unemployed African workers. The percentage of migrant labourers in Namibia is comparable to South Africa, where in 1978 African migrants (including foreign migrants) constituted just over 42% of the total African work force. (Weinberg 1981: 2)

4. The actual names of farms are not used in this paper to protect the identity of those farm labourers interviewed, as the majority identified themselves as being members and supporters of SWAPO.

5. During World War II and for several years thereafter, Canada was one of the major markets for Namibian karakul along with the United States and Argentina. For the five years ending in 1944, the U.S. and Canada together received 2,822,000 pelts, or 93.4% of the over 10.5 million exported during this time. (Haverly 1945: 318)
### Karakul Pelt Exports 1924-1981

(CURRENT PRICES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Pelts Exported</th>
<th>£ 1924-37</th>
<th>R 1939-81</th>
<th>Average Price per Felt</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td></td>
<td>sh 12/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td></td>
<td>18/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>63,700</td>
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<td>14/-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td>67,900</td>
<td></td>
<td>14/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>224,021</td>
<td>140,849</td>
<td></td>
<td>12/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>441,754</td>
<td>433,345</td>
<td></td>
<td>19/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>814,561</td>
<td>753,546</td>
<td></td>
<td>18/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,190,212</td>
<td>1,222,629</td>
<td></td>
<td>20/6</td>
</tr>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>1,583,448</td>
<td>2,515,150</td>
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<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,273,743</td>
<td>4,524,709</td>
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<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2,392,657</td>
<td>7,656,502</td>
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<td>3.20</td>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>2,607,327</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>2,864,246</td>
<td>11,456,934</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>1,975,683</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>3,420,729</td>
<td>19,087,667</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>3,428,683</td>
<td>27,738,045</td>
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<td>8.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2,935,090</td>
<td>35,522,571</td>
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<td>11.90</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>2,677,512</td>
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<td>17.52</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>2,786,560</td>
<td>47,422,320</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>2,700,200</td>
<td>47,567,541</td>
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<td>17.72</td>
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### Sources:
- Administrators' Reports 1928, 1933, 1937, 1939, 1946
- Gundry 1945
- 1946 Agricultural Policy Commission
- SWAA 1958, 1966
- Ondendaal Report 1962-1964
- SVA Karakul Breeders Association 1965 Yearbook
- Fur Trade Journal of Canada April 1966
- SVA Handbook 1971-1972
- WA 28/8/01
- Star 28/6/90
- The Economist 17/10/81
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total pelts exported from Namibia</th>
<th>Total pelts auctioned</th>
<th>Pelts auctioned at HBC (% of total auction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
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<td>184,645</td>
<td>93,517 (50.6)</td>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>1,292,053</td>
<td>836,424</td>
<td>378,699 (45.3)</td>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>1,583,448</td>
<td>225,903</td>
<td>121,762 (53.9)</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>1,669,450</td>
<td>649,504</td>
<td>277,295 (42.7)</td>
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<td>1941</td>
<td>2,273,743</td>
<td>937,625</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,718,697</td>
<td>1,162,488</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2,327,653</td>
<td>1,045,178</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>2,529,327</td>
<td>800,854</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2,223,524</td>
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</table>

Sources: Gundry 1945, SWA Handbook 1971/1972, SWAA 1946

1. Incomplete, as does not include October sales
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL SALES LONDON AUCTIONS</th>
<th>HBC/HBA SALES LONDON AUCTIONS</th>
<th>%AGE MONEY HBA</th>
<th>%AGE PELTS HBA</th>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>$14,085,119</td>
<td>$6,749,204</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>19,321,315</td>
<td>8,997,508</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38,055,195</td>
<td>15,599,084</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>30,493,399</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>67,285,843</td>
<td>30,036,145</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>79,136,705</td>
<td>31,262,007</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>91,135,324</td>
<td>35,038,369</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>38.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>67,489,372</td>
<td>29,354,102</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>66,092,256</td>
<td>28,259,354</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>99,307,854</td>
<td>39,957,593</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4

**Swarara Consignments and Commissions as a Percentage of the Hudson's Bay Company's for Business 1954-1979**

*(Current Prices, Canadian Dollars)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>HBC Total for Consignment Sales</th>
<th>HBC/HBA Swarara Consignment Sales</th>
<th>Swarara as % of Total HBC for Consignment Sales</th>
<th>HBC Total for Profit Before Taxes (including commission sales)</th>
<th>Swarara Commission as % of Total HBC for Profit Before Taxes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>40,200,400</td>
<td>6,349,204</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>816,000</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>55,319,200</td>
<td>8,935,891</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1,638,000</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>59,998,000</td>
<td>8,649,389</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2,145,800</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>66,050,400</td>
<td>6,997,508</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>2,510,000</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>70,389,200</td>
<td>5,179,750</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>3,077,200</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>79,181,300</td>
<td>15,699,084</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>2,083,200</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>137,668,000</td>
<td>30,499,319</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>2,993,000</td>
<td>30.6 / 18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>167,250,000</td>
<td>50,786,145</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>4,762,000</td>
<td>30.6 / 18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>185,252,000</td>
<td>31,282,047</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>4,137,000</td>
<td>30.6 / 18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>244,349,800</td>
<td>35,058,369</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>6,286,000</td>
<td>30.6 / 18.0</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>283,300,000</td>
<td>24,559,102</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>7,364,000</td>
<td>30.6 / 18.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>329,300,000</td>
<td>22,549,154</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11,072,000</td>
<td>30.6 / 18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>365,300,000</td>
<td>37,958,593</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>26,500,000</td>
<td>30.6 / 18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Sales without deducting expenses
2. minus operating costs, expenses, reimbursements to producer on consignments
3. before operating expenses are deducted

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