INTRODUCTION

Dr. John Marcum (Professor of Political Science and Director of the Africa Program at Lincoln University) and I have just returned from a trip through the rebel-held territory of northern Angola. This is a brief and somewhat hurried report about this trip as I saw it.

Our reasons for undertaking such an adventure were varied. We went, first of all, because of our long-standing interest in the Angolan situation. I personally have known a number of the Angolan leaders for many years. I had the opportunity of visiting Angola once before, when I entered through regular official channels in 1954. I wanted to get facts about what was actually happening in northern Angola since the time of the revolt last March. I wanted to be able to assess for myself the truth of the Portuguese claim that the revolt had ended and that they were entirely in control of all parts of Angola.

Secondly, our mission was to assess the critical medical situation of the Angolan people and to deliver medical supplies.

Thirdly, we were anxious to get facts on the educational problems confronting the Angolan people and to see if any approach could be devised toward filling the educational vacuum, particularly in the northern part of Angola and among the Angolan refugees now in the Congo.

Fourthly, we wanted to learn more about the 150,000 Angolan refugees in the Congo.

Though I feel we accomplished our various missions, I am not going to discuss each topic separately in the paper.

BACKGROUND TO THE REVOLT

Though no definitive analysis has been made of the March 15 revolt the major contributing factors have already been outlined elsewhere. In the field, we found so very much bitterness that I should like to summarize these major factors before presenting new information.
Bitterness towards the Portuguese was not created in a day. It grew out of long-standing grievances, complete political repression by the Portuguese administration, economic exploitation and deprivation of the great mass of Angolan people, physical maltreatment and a forced labor system from which the only escape was either to leave the country or to find some kind of a job in an urban area. Along with all of this, educational opportunity was exceedingly limited. Among the several hundred people whom we met during the days that we visited the villages of northern Angola, only a handful of persons had even had four years of rudimentary education open to the unassimilated African in Angola. In one village, when we were having a discussion with seventy-five or a hundred young people who now lived there under wartime conditions, we asked how many of them had been involved in the forced labor, or contract labor, system. About 90% of the hands went up. Those few with whom we talked subsequently in order to get more details told one incident after another of beatings with the palmatorio, of being struck, of being imprisoned, of being spirited away in the middle of the night from their villages in order to work under the contract labor system, either for the government or some private employer who had made his arrangement with the government. When we asked questions about the non-racial policy the Portuguese claim exists in their territories, the response was invariably one of derisive laughter. Some 99% of the Angolan people were never numbered among the assimilado with their special privileges, for the Portuguese made it exceedingly difficult for an African to gain this special status under their law.

Portuguese authoritarianism always dealt most harshly with any signs of political organization or protest and it is thus not surprising that political organizations had to be subversive in character. It is also not surprising that political expression took a violent turn. It is partly coincidental, I believe, that Galvão's capture of the Santa Maria for a few days in January 1961, the raid on the prison in Luanda on February 4, and the revolt which began on March 15 all happened to come within only a few weeks of one another. From discussions with a great number of people close to events inside Angola, there seems to be no evidence of collusion among the parties or the organizations involved in these separate actions. To some extent they fed upon one another, but were not connected in any over-all master plan. It is doubtful, for instance, the Union of the Populations of Angola (UPA) had any hand in the prison raid of February 4. And yet the UPA was principally involved in the revolt of March 15 and what has transpired since that time.

From my discussions with many people, both at the headquarters of the UPA in Leopoldville and those who were affiliated with the organization in Angola and involved in the outbreak of March 15, I have come to the conclusion that the revolt on that day partly took place as a result of planning, and partly developed spontaneously. It was planned to the extent that the UPA had encouraged a strike by laborers on many coffee plantations in northern Angola on that day. According to many reports, the immediate grievance that led to the strike plan arose at a plantation at Primavera, owned by a man named Reis. Reis had not paid his workers for about six months. In spite of the fact that representatives of the workers had protested several times, they received no pay and no satisfaction. The UPA therefore had proposed a strike, not only on this one plantation, but on others as well. March 15 was chosen as the day.
The action of March 15 was unplanned to the extent that it took on a character that was not prophesied and extended farther than could have been known. With the Reis plantation as apparently the focal point, March 15 opened with the bulk of the plantation workers going to the Reis home and demanding pay before they would work. Reis appeared with a gun and demanded that they disperse and return to work. When the laborers refused to disperse, Reis fired his gun into the air, but when some of the workers advanced towards him, he shot one. He was then killed by the aroused workers and other Europeans on the farm were attacked and killed. Word of this spread rapidly and violence broke out over a large area. There is no question about the fact that the bitterness of the workers led to many excesses. Perhaps as many as a thousand Portuguese were killed on March 15 and the days that followed.

Organized groups such as the UPA and the MPLA were not quite prepared for the large-scale support which the revolt had received. To some extent, or so it seems to me, the UPA which has been taking the lead in the revolt, adopted a conscious war strategy, not before, but after the events of March 15. The temper of the people was such that if one of the existing organizations did not take the lead, a new organization would do so.

As the whole world knows, the Portuguese responded with swiftness and wholesale brutality following the events of March 15. It is impossible to have accurate statistics of how many Angolans were killed by Portuguese bombs and organized troop action in the weeks following the middle of March. Maybe it was as few as 25,000 and maybe it went up to 50 or 60,000. But one cannot talk with anybody, certainly in northern Angola, who either was not involved in the events of March 15, or whose families, friends were not drastically affected by the coming of the war.

OUR JOURNEY

John Marcum and I entered Angola on January 5th and left on the 17th. We covered approximately 200 miles on foot, through high grass and forest. Our southernmost point was parallel to San Salvador.

During our eleven days' hike we visited 12 villages and met hundreds of people. Although we were always in the company of Angolans (sometimes as few as five or as many as 20 joined us as we marched), only one person was our constant companion throughout our trip. He is the liaison man between UPA headquarters in Leopoldville and the organization in Angola. He makes constant trips back and forth. He speaks French, Portuguese and Kikongo. We met no one during our travels who spoke English. A few persons we met spoke French. Considerably more spoke Portuguese. The large bulk of people in northern Angola speak Kikongo although the wartime situation has brought in Angolans from farther south who speak other Angolan languages and they have to communicate in Portuguese to those from the north.

I was very curious to know how the border between the Congo and Angola would be guarded. Would we have to slip at night through Portuguese guards? What would be the risk of being spotted and detained by the Congolese, or even worse, arrested by the Portuguese authorities? Originally, our plan had been to slip across the border in the dark of night, not so much, we found out later, to avoid..
being detected by the Portuguese who were nowhere in evidence, but so that reports
would get back neither to the Portuguese authorities nor to the Congolese authori-
ties that Europeans were going illegally into Angola. However, as fate would have
it, we had car trouble as we went southward from Leopoldville towards the Angola
border, and finally had to abandon our vehicle some five miles from the Angola
border and walk across in the early morning well after the sun had risen. We were
told by UPA soldiers on the Angolan side of the border that there probably were no
Portuguese troops within 30 miles of the spot.

We entered Angola during the rainy season; the growth was green and lush.
The terrain is hilly. The narrow paths wind up and down hills and through valleys,
across streams bridged usually by a narrow log, or sometimes, by several logs fast-
ened together and suspended high in the air by jungle vines. The further south we
carried more numerous and larger became the forests. The lasting impression
I will have of this nearly two weeks of hiking is one of narrow paths through high
grass, sometimes 15 or 20 feet high, that scratch one's arms as one walks through
it, deep forests whose paths are criss-crossed with roots and in which the going is
rather precarious because of the constant dampness brought on by the rain and which
cannot be dried by the sun.

Everywhere we went, we were met with amazing warmth. Invariably when we
met people along the paths, frequently refugees who were traveling north towards the
Congo, we had to go through a sort of reception line. One shook hands with every-
one and exchanged words of greeting. On the first day, we met an old woman with a
small child along a path deep in a forest. Even before being introduced, she
stopped in front of us, danced around us, then with us, all the time expressing
rapidly in Kikongo how glad she was that we had come. This episode ended as the
woman knelt down before us and uttered a prayer of thanksgiving that we had come.
I had no way of knowing what our presence there may have meant to her, or what she
thought we had come to accomplish. But she was clearly moved. If there was any
hostility towards us as white persons we never had any indication of it. The bit-
terness towards the Portuguese did not seem to carry over to white people of other
nationalities. In the villages the people shared their grass and mud huts and their
food with us. Occasionally we had chicken, twice we had wild buffalo, once wild
pig, once we shared a fish and an eel which was caught in a nearby river. More
usually our diet consisted of luscious fruits such as bananas, mangos, pineapple
and papaya along with generous supplies of manioc (the staple of their diet), and
peanuts.

Our medical project

One of the principal reasons for our trip into rebel Angola was to deliver
a supply of medicine. Neither John Marcum nor I is a student of medicine. However,
we knew from reports that a critical health problem confronted the people in the
revolt area. The people are cut off from medical supplies and from hospital care.
Missionaries who formerly worked in northern Angola are no longer there. The people
living in the forests do not journey to the areas where the Portuguese are still in
control for fear of being captured. Thus they are dependent on help they can re-
cieve from outside for their medical assistance. Through the aid of some agencies
in the United States, we took in about 250 pounds of medicines. With the assistance
of doctors in Leopoldville, these medicines were divided into forty-three packets and distributed to approximately this many villages in Angola. In each of these villages there was a small dispensary under the supervision of an Angolan with either nurse's training or experience in hospital work. In one village, for example, we looked at the record of the number of people who received treatment and it amounted to between three and four hundred in each of the last five months. We saw the distribution of most of these supplies to representatives of the villages who had gathered to receive the material at a central place. We personally delivered seven of the packets to villages we visited. The medical supplies consisted of antibiotics, anti-malarials, aspirin, and anti-diarrheals.

In spite of the fact that we were not doctors, in every village we visited, people lined up for whatever treatment we could offer. This usually consisted of our dressing open sores, and giving what pills we had on hand. We saw only a few wounds from the war because the Angolans have learned in recent months to protect themselves from bombing attacks.

The medicines we took in were for the use of all the people, whether civilian or military, without distinction.

Because of living conditions in the forests, particularly during the rainy season, new ailments are occurring, such as rheumatism, and bronchitis. We hope to expand this medical project.

Life under wartime conditions

Guerilla warfare conditions make it difficult to draw a distinction between civilian and military life. Everyone's existence is affected by the conflict. Although some older people still live in the villages now located under the cover of the forest trees, most of them have fled either to the far north or across the border into the Congo. Younger men and women are everywhere in evidence. And undoubtedly there is much more contact between people coming from various parts of Angola than would be the case under more normal conditions. The commander of the UPA forces, for instance, comes from the extreme southern part of Angola. He is an escapee from the Portuguese army as are many others who now make up the Angolan forces. To our surprise, it was not unusual to find someone from another part of Angola who has a high leadership position either in the civil or the military organization of the UPA. As one would expect, the war has had a unifying effect upon the Angolan people. The question might be asked: "Why don't the Portuguese attack and wipe out by bombs the villages in which thousands of people are now living in the revolt area?" The answer is that the Portuguese don't know where the villages are. These villages don't show on the map. Forest villages frequently have adopted the name of a village that one can find on the map located along one of the Portuguese-constructed roads. But in the weeks after the outbreak of the revolt, the Angolan people moved away from these open villages that were subject either to attacks by planes, or by Portuguese soldiers who would rather travel the roads in their mechanized equipment. Some villages are brand new; others are built on previously abandoned ancestral locations or are greatly enlarged villages already in existence. The villages along the road, to which the Portuguese had forced the African people to move so that their labor would be easily accessible, now are
empty. Every day one can hear the Portuguese planes flying over the forest areas looking for some sign of life or for the tell-tale roof of a grass hut. But by now the Africans have learned to hide themselves successfully.

The danger of attack does not come primarily from Portuguese foot soldiers. There is no way to reach the villages in which the people are living now, apart from being dropped from the air, or of walking on the narrow paths. In either case, it would be a very dangerous and almost suicidal mission for a soldier unfamiliar with the terrain. A paratrooper dropped from the sky would land in unfamiliar territory out of formation. He would be easy prey for the guerrillas as he dropped from the sky, and would be open to ambush after starting to walk the paths.

It is always possible that some African may become an informer and thus give away a village's location, opening the way for a possible air attack. For this reason there is constant fear that even a village in the deepest forest may be subjected to attack from the air. Precautions are taken. The food supply is not kept in the village, but in secreted places further out in the jungle. Medical supplies are also stored outside villages, at least during the day. One nurse told me that only in emergencies did people come to him in daylight hours. More normally sick call was toward dusk when air attacks were a more remote possibility.

We witnessed one such attack only once. It was on Sunday, January 14. Planes were dive bombing and dropping both rockets and incendiary bombs upon two villages we had visited the day before. We could hear and see the planes, we could clearly hear the concussion of the bombs, and we saw the fires that resulted from the attack. This came toward the middle of the afternoon. By the next morning, we received reports on the amount of damage. Fragments of the bombs were brought to us. I can see them as I write now, on top of a filing cabinet. How deadly they were...how peaceful they now seem!

On another occasion while walking through a forest, we heard a plane diving. We could not see the sky though because of the vegetation. Later we met some people along the path who had come from the direction where the plane had been. They were carrying copies of the leaflets which the plane had been dropping. The writing was in both Portuguese and Kikongo. The leaflet called upon the Angolan people to end the revolt, to come back to the safety of Portuguese protection, to take their old jobs on the coffee plantations where the Portuguese would promise to protect them from the UPA. As we heard the leaflet read aloud, there was a mixture of laughter and anger from the people who heard the message.

Everything we saw indicated that the morale of the people was exceedingly high. It is true that the UPA troops had virtually no training in military tactics, but there were learning with enthusiasm. Training comes in the process of the struggle itself since we saw no sign of target practice. Ammunition is too valuable to waste this way. It has been publicly announced, of course, that Angolan rebels are being trained by the FLN in Tunisia and Algeria. Twenty-five to forty are due back in Angola in February, and then another group will go to North Africa for several months' training. The combination of a few trained military leaders plus military equipment coming into the country means, as far as we could tell from our observation, that the conflict will become intensified in the days ahead.
By coincidence, John Marcum and I went into Angola just about the same time as the largest arms shipment that the rebels had yet received. We were amazed when we crossed the border into Angola to find a large stockpile of arms and munitions within a hundred yards of the frontier. The materiel consisted of hand grenades of German make, small machine guns of American manufacture, Bren guns from Britain, land mines, also of British manufacture, large as well as small machine guns and a large supply of ammunition. Most of this materiel, we were told, had come from Algerian and Tunisian sources. We saw no indication whatsoever of any involvement from any Eastern European country, contrary to the propaganda claims of the Portuguese. All of this heavy equipment was carried south of the border on the arms and the heads of the militant Angolans. Somewhere between one hundred and two hundred UPA militants had been waiting at a village not too far south of the border for weeks for the supply of materiel to arrive. Between forty and fifty military sectors were represented there, some of them from as far south as an area adjacent with Luanda. We witnessed the dividing up of the arms shipment the second day we were in Angola. And as a group of six to eight UPA troops from various military sectors got their supply, they headed off down the path towards their locations. We were told that it would take some of them two to three weeks in order to carry this equipment back to their home bases.

A strange combination of ordinary village pursuits together with military practices growing out of the exigencies of war dominates the life of the people. We could always tell when we were approaching a village because quite suddenly we would come upon two or more armed sentries standing out of sight until we were almost upon them. We would stop and they would present arms. Sometimes they would ask to see our passports, for no one can travel through this territory without carrying a bona fide UPA document. A little further down the path beyond the guards there frequently was a gate obstructing our progress. Here another guard would be on duty who would take our passports from us, open the gate and then give the passport to others who subsequently would sign it and return it to us. Word was invariably sent ahead that Europeans (or white people) were coming to the village. This partly, I suppose, was to permit the village to be prepared for the coming of visitors, and partly to protect us from being taken for Portuguese. In either event, we felt that it was a good practice. Usually, almost immediately upon our arrival in a village, there was a military drill put on for our benefit. Sometimes there would be as few as fifteen or twenty participating in the drill and sometimes it would range up to a hundred or a hundred and fifty. I saw some young boys, not older than seven years of age who were participating in the drill, using wooden guns that they had carved out of branches of a tree. Women as well as men participated in the drilling, again mostly using wooden rifles. The fascinating part of this review was always the singing of the UPA songs, some of them using clearly recognizable hymns as their tunes.

The people live in huts, sometimes made almost completely out of grass, but sometimes mud and sticks are also used in the construction. Frequently there would be some larger huts where the young men and young women, in separate dwellings, would be living dormitory style. Frequently there was a common kitchen with the girls doing the cooking and the food being eaten at a common table. I was frequently reminded of summer camp experiences as I observed the life of the young people in this forest-living in Angola.
There is no need for money in this village existence. One lives on a subsistence basis. In the open approaches to the villages, gardens have been planted and this is the source of all the food. In many of the centers the day's routine begins with a flag raising ceremony, frequently a lecture on civic duties or national goals by the village president or military chief, and a presentation of arms by the local constabulary. Older people tend the fields, soldiers mount guard, plan and execute military missions, and the large numbers of teenagers spend their time drilling, learning patriotic songs and, in larger centers, studying from a tattered school syllabus or Bible. We were amazed again and again by the evidence of religious influence in the life of the people. The commander of the UPA forces, who was with us for about a week of our trip, carried two Bibles with him which he read regularly every morning and every evening. At some of the evening gatherings and song fests the meetings closed with a prayer. Many of the songs are sung to hymn tunes. As we left one village, all the people joined together in singing "God Be With You 'Til We Meet Again" in Kikongo words, of course. In the discussions which were held with various leaders and with the ordinary citizens in the villages, again and again there was reference to God and to the Christian life. But even more striking was the consciousness that, before all, they were Africans: "We love our country; we are not interested in communism."

The villages are organized to meet the danger of aerial attack. At the first sound of an approaching aircraft, a whistle is blown and there is an immediate scurrying of everyone to a specific task. The older people and the children are taken out into the forests, some of the supplies are stored in a safer location, and the men with rifles and machine guns go to their appointed places to see if they can bring the plane down if it comes within reach. They claim to have shot down between 20 and 30 Portuguese planes in northern Angola in recent weeks.

Nationalist-held territory is in a very real, if rudimentary sense, already self-governing. In addition to the UPA-issued passports, there are customs posts, a communications and information system, village councils, a party, a trade union and youth organizations. In sum, there exist the beginnings of a political state. I could not judge how far south this relatively tight organizational control extends. But I do know that at the arms distribution we witnessed, representatives from villages several hundred miles further south than we reached were present. When the commander of the UPA forces left us, he had a week's march ahead of him to a location where he has his headquarters. I am in no position to make a final judgement on whether any other nationalist organizations in Angola control an area similar to that held by the UPA. As yet there has not been any objective way of assessing either how far the UPA organization extends, or whether other troops have a foothold on certain sections of Angola. What is known is that the revolt is extending to various parts of the country and that word filters through of nationalist attacks upon the Portuguese from time to time.

ANGOLAN ORGANIZATIONS

It is not my purpose in this report to include a lengthy analysis of the African organizations in Angola. So far my remarks have related almost exclusively to the UPA. The reason is that the work of the UPA is most discernible and the area of Angola which it controls is most accessible. However, before concluding
this report it may be worthwhile to say a few words about the possibility of creating a united front among nationalist organizations in Angola since there has been a great deal of speculation about this. The only three organizations among whom a united front might be created are the UPA, the MPLA and Alliazo. Each of these three organizations accepts the fact that they are at war with Portugal and that independence must be brought about as soon as possible by military resistance. Alliazo has been looked upon, probably rightfully, as a group with only a localized following in the area of the Zombo people near the town of Maquela do Zombo. Alliazo is changing its name to the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA) very soon in order to attempt expanding out of the tribal base which is usually assigned to it.

In addition to these three organizations, there are several others, such as the Movement for the Defense of Angolan Interests (MDIA), NTO-Abako, and Ngwizako, all of which are opposed to the tactic of violent resistance for one reason or another, and in various ways accommodate themselves to the Portuguese. Our information is that to some extent these groups are not only receiving financial assistance from the Portuguese, but also promises of preferred positions in the governmental machinery of Angola. We received no evidence that they had a significant following across the country. One of the groups, Ngwizako, is dedicated to the re-establishment of the ancient kingdom of the Congo. It directs its "nationalism" toward the unity of the Bakongo people in northern Angola, the western reaches of the former Belgian Congo and French territory north of this that once comprised the ancient kingdom of the Congo.

I came to the conclusion following my investigations on this trip, that a common front including the UPA, Alliazo and MPLA was not likely in the immediate future. This conclusion is not based on a value judgement of right or wrong, but only on what seems to be possible. Both the MPLA and Alliazo want a united front. But at the moment a successful front could not be created without the participation of the UPA. From talking with many UPA leaders I am convinced that in their mind conditions do not exist for UPA participation.

I have not seen a detailed outline of the form a united front would take. However, the proposal as it has been discussed is not for an amalgamation of the three groups organizationally nor for a political union, but rather a front to carry on the military campaign. Presumably therefore, under such a proposal, each of the three groups would be free to engage in its own political activities, but would aid the others militarily.

Among the reasons why the UPA seems to oppose participation in a common front are the following: (1) the UPA leadership feels they have the initiative, that they are carrying on the active struggle, and that they have the arms with which to challenge the Portuguese effectively. They do not feel the other organizations are actively engaged in the military struggle. Therefore they think they would gain very little by joining a front with the other two groups which have few resources to aid in the common struggle. (2) The UPA apparently looks upon MPLA leadership as being "Portuguese-like." A great deal of this leadership is of racially mixed stock and, the UPA says, has had the advantages of a Portuguese education and has not had to suffer under a system of forced labor. The Portuguese themselves have created a racial, an educational and an economic chasm so deep between the mass of African people and the Angolans of racially mixed ancestry, that it will be exceedingly difficult for this to be breached. Since I had no contact with MPLA people
inside Angola, it is impossible for me to measure in depth the assertions UPA people make about those who compose the MPLA. (3) I suspect that there is apprehension among UPA leaders that if there was a union with MPLA some of the better-trained and better-educated MPLA people might challenge the UPA effectively for top leadership. UPA leaders are not interested in abdicating their positions especially while they are convinced they are operating from superior strength. (4) It is difficult to assess ideological differences between MPLA and UPA. Both claim to be neutralist. A commonly held view is that one is neutralist with an eastern and the other with a western exposure. Whatever the objective fact may be, the impression that this is descriptive of the situation militates against the creation of a common front.

Whatever the motives may be that dictate the attitudes of the leaders of the UPA and the MPLA towards one another, the fact is that there are deep suspicions which divide them. This perhaps gives some insight into problems which lie ahead in Angola itself. Keen suspicions arising from differences of race, of economic station, of educational opportunity, will make future problems difficult of solution. Perhaps present organizational disunity opens the way for a future East-West struggle in Angola. At any rate, I came to the conclusion on the basis of my observations that there are tremendous dynamics involved in the relationships of the groups within Angola to one another and it is naive for people outside to think that simple discussions will create unity.

CONCLUSIONS

The following are a summary of my conclusions:

1. Portuguese propaganda that the revolt has been brought to an end is obviously false. The Portuguese are unable to control large areas of northern Angola; this may be true farther south as well.

2. Portuguese propaganda that the revolt in Angola was inspired by communists and by external forces is false. The revolt was as indigenous as is forced labor in Angola itself. There was absolutely no indication of communist infiltration or influence in the revolt area I covered in the north. Even African governments elsewhere on the continent have had very little direct influence on the course of the revolt. One can expect that in the days ahead there will be increased aid from other African countries, but there was no indication that the power of the UPA in its areas of the north at least was dependent upon any outside force for direction.

3. The UPA has established the beginnings of civil and military administration in large sections of northern Angola. Whether a provisional government is formally set up in the months ahead remains to be seen. But de facto control is in the hands of the UPA in a significant area now.

4. The conflict could be brought to an end if the Portuguese would recognize the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and would begin discussions leading to independence. The tragic struggle will continue until the right of independence is recognized. It is most unlikely that the Portuguese will find the power to crush the revolt. Negotiations could be opened if only the Portuguese would recognize the real situation in which they find themselves.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The medical relief program we started with the initial shipment of drugs and medicines we took in, must be greatly expanded. The need is tremendous. No agency exists at the moment to continue it within Angola. It must be organized from the outside. The Africa Defense and Aid Fund of the American Committee on Africa will do all in its power to further this program.

2. Some way should be found to send large amounts of clothing into Angola. Large numbers of people are wearing only rags. Others have only a single dress or pair of trousers they wear week in and week out. Getting supplies into Angola is no problem once the material reaches the border.

3. Practical means should be explored for setting up primary and secondary educational classes among the Angolan refugees in the Congo. According to Red Cross statistics there are still over 150,000 refugees in the Congo. This does not include those who have gone to the larger cities such as Leopoldville, but only those who, up to the end of January, were being fed through the Red Cross and the Catholic and Protestant relief agencies. These people are now settling in the Congo. They have planted their own gardens, and since food relief is being cut off, at least temporarily, at the end of January, they will rely upon what they themselves can grow for their sustenance. It is agreed by virtually all observers on the scene that these refugees are not flowing back into Angola, as the Portuguese claim is the case. As long as the war goes on, these refugees will not go back to Angola. And yet among the refugees are those who will have responsibilities in an eventually independent Angola. Virtually no facilities exist for education of these Angolan people, and yet there is an opportunity for service here that should not be lost.

4. United States policy should become even more vigorous in urging Portugal to end the conflict and to agree to negotiate with the Angolan nationalists for independence. The United States should strengthen its demand that no NATO supplies be used by the Portuguese in carrying on the war. In our trip we saw some evidence of NATO supplies being used, and took photographs of American bombs which had been dropped from Portuguese planes. On the whole the Angolans reflected a friendly attitude towards Americans. But if the Portuguese continue to use American equipment from the NATO supplies in their terrorist bombings, this friendly attitude cannot be maintained. American policy should obviously be based upon the assumption that Portuguese rule in Angola, and indeed in other parts of Portuguese territory in Africa, cannot last long, and therefore everything should be done to strengthen the ultimate forces of independence. These forces are the ones that will represent either stability or instability in the future.

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ADDENDUM: The Reis incident was more the symbolic than the actual cause of the events of March 15. Missionaries have reported road blocks and uprisings taking place earlier and in various localities during the night of March 14.