The future of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) is in doubt. That is the one certainty as the Pearce Commission moves to conclude the test of public opinion which has resulted in the emphatic rejection of the proposed British-Rhodesian settlement by the African majority whose potential rule would have been deferred at least into the next century.

Whether the Commission finishes its schedule or cuts short because of protests; whether or not it can find any basis for justifying the "yes" vote that was anticipated; regardless of what it reports about Smith's adherence to agreement procedure, the situation has changed beyond recall. It has been as clear in the tribal areas as in the cities that Africans reject Smith and any proposals that leave him in control. They know that the immediate future will be worse - increased repression and apartheid. Sanctions, particularly hard hit by the U.S. decision to allow importation of strategic materials, will probably wither. But they have refused to sell their birthright for British-financed but Smith-controlled educational and economic assistance.

Britain and the U.S. as well as the rest of the United Nations must face the fact that no solution short of majority rule is acceptable to the African majority, with whom Britain has persistently refused to negotiate. And they must also acknowledge that white outsiders can no longer make agreements about Africans. The struggle may be long and will be arduous, but it is, and will remain, in African hands.
The 1971 British-Rhodesian Agreement in Brief

Essence of the Agreement. New complicated provisions for higher and lower African voting rolls remove the absolute impossibility of Africans ever achieving majority rule (prime goal of the 1969 constitution) but postpone that possibility for a time estimated from 65 to 84 years. It is probable that the majority of Africans could never qualify as voters under the income/education standards set. Only gestures are made in the direction of the other four principles on which the British once conditioned independence: 1) acceptability; 2) immediate improvement in political status of Africans; 3) progress towards ending racial discrimination; 4) guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution.

Key Failure. Implementation of the settlement is left in the hands of the Ian Smith government and its successors elected by essentially the present restricted electorate. The African majority (96%) were not party to the negotiations and the agreement. They have made their opposition clear. Africans have organized a united front, the African National Council, specifically to reject the settlement. It includes the major political parties, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), and independents, with a committee member from every district in the country.

The U.S. Role. Action, while talks were under way, by the U.S. Congress to restore the possibility of chrome shipments violated the U.N. embargo and substantially weakened the British hand in negotiations. Nixon's confirmation, and clarification that other strategic materials, especially asbestos, were included, came during the test of acceptability and put the United States openly on the Smith-Heath side.

Scheduled Procedure. The agreement negotiated late in November between the British Foreign Secretary and the Rhodesian "Prime Minister" has been accepted by the British Parliament (and the Smith regime) but still has a long way to go. It must meet "the test of acceptability" by the people of Rhodesia as a whole; this is being determined by a British-appointed Commission. The Rhodesian Government must then introduce legislation to modify its constitution and electoral legislation in line with the agreement, to be effective from the date on which independence is conferred. When the British Government is satisfied that the legislation has been introduced and that steps have been taken towards a study of discriminatory legislation and towards review of cases of detainees and restrictive, it will introduce legislation into the British Parliament to confer independence on Rhodesia. When this legislation is effective Britain will terminate economic and other sanctions. (Britain cannot unilaterally terminate U.N. sanctions, of course.) This will probably take into 1973.

I. Why Settlement Now

The survival of Smith's regime against world opprobrium for six years, with its claim of peace and prosperity, raises a question as to why he would offer any compromise, however slight, to legitimize his government now. The facts are considerably less rosy than the image that has been projected:

1) Sanctions have become increasingly effective. Sabotage of the U.N. embargo by neighboring South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique meant that Rhodesia faced no immediate crisis at UDI and kept up a considerable amount of international trade. But the embargo did impose limitations that resulted in a steady erosion of Rhodesia's economic capacity. In particular, it could not replace spare parts or acquire up-to-date equipment. Transport suffered most. Elimination of gasoline rationing a few months ago was presented as a victory against sanctions. In reality it meant that the shortage of rolling stock and repair capability had reached so grave a point on the railroads that trucks had to be
substituted sometimes even for heavy ore loads; that increased pressures towards a general breakdown of transport. Shortage of combine harvesters resulted in a crop loss of approximately $3 million last year in the major agricultural scheme, the Sabi-Limpopo Authority. The air force is short of spares for combat craft. General equipment for the infrastructure, which should be growing, is lacking. (Even the announcement of settlement has stimulated the economy and foreign salesmen have been arriving in Salisbury since November.)

A secondary crisis is under way in the import substitute industries which were responsible for the initial UDI economic boom. After first growth stabilized, they reached the point for expansion and can't for lack of raw materials, lack of capital, and sometimes lack of skilled labor, expand further. The initial construction boom also is over.

Internal borrowing, necessitated mainly by payments made to farmers, especially to buy up the tobacco crop which was formerly a leading export, has created such a debt that funds needed for development will not be available for the foreseeable future.

2) Again despite official reports to the contrary, the white minority is concerned about the African opposition. (The limited white opposition comes from leading businessmen, professionals and academics, and religious leaders, the natural leadership group, which may also concern concern.) Even the moderate African minority in the present assembly votes steadily and ineffectively against government policy. African opposition to removal from declared white areas has been strong and persistent despite the use of force and imprisonment. Students have led opposition to discriminatory faculty wage scales when the faculty themselves feared to risk their jobs. Above all, that underground and guerrilla activities of the banned African political parties continue is revealed by the capture and trial of some so-called infiltrators from abroad who have lived for months sheltered by the people and training them. The best route to the coast (Mozambique) is mined and unsafe.

Thus the Rhodesians did have reason to settle and might even have been forced to some concessions; the question is rather, why did the British yield? The Conservative Party had "face" at stake. It had promised to try and was under pressure from the right; it had shifted British orientation to the continent and was in a mood to cut losses elsewhere. Douglas-Home, according to the British press, wished to retire after a great accomplishment, and the Party felt he was entitled to. Economic gain was involved for individual Conservatives as well as for Britain. (Around $311 million is due in accumulated interest and payments.) British investment in Rhodesia is considerable and to again become the major trading partner of Rhodesia would aid the economy. It is reported that half the Cabinet hold directorates in companies with Rhodesian investments and/or subsidiaries; 20 per cent of them are reportedly Rhodesian land owners. These Cabinet members settled with themselves.

II. Rhodesia Today (Why the Africans Said "No")

1) Since Settlement. Essentially, the Africans rejected the settlement as a way of rejecting Smith. It had not been clear what leaving the Smith regime in control meant to the whole proposal before the arrival of the Pearce Commission, this was soon clarified. "Normal political activity" was to be permitted, but

a) Permission for the formation meeting (December 16) of the opposition African National Council was withdrawn so that time and place had to be changed at the last moment. Only 1,000 attended, as a result.
b) All members of the ANC executive council were banned from entering Tribal Trust lands.

c) All requests for meetings (around 200) in the Tribal Trust lands were refused, as were many in towns. Meetings of the critical but pro-settlement Centre Party as well as of the ANC were banned.

d) While the Commission was at work at least 100 opponents of settlement were arrested and detained, and it was three weeks before the Commission even questioned the Smith regime about this. ANC also reported a procedure of rounding up its spokesmen before the Commission moved into an area and releasing them when it left. Among those arrested were former Prime Minister Garfield Todd and his daughter Judith, Mr. and Mrs. Josiah Chinamano, and three other members of the ANC executive.

e) A member of Parliament suggested a campaign by employers to persuade employees to vote "yes." The ANC had reported the dismissal of some of its adherents.

f) By the end of January, 13 Africans had been killed and about 50 wounded by gunfire - all Africans injured by the police.

g) Despite this evidence of government suppression, the charge by whites has been loud and continuous that Africans are being intimidated (although press articles have also admitted that this cannot account for the overwhelming evidence that Africans do not accept this settlement).

2) The Opposition. The African National Council is led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia. Speaking for the Council, the Bishop denounced the settlement proposals as "constitutional rape of Africans by the Rhodesian and British governments," and said that "responsibility and patriotism have challengingly compelled us to organize into a body that represents the voice and will of the silent African majority." Executive members include Edson Sithole, Josiah Chinamano, Edson Zvobgo, Michael Mawema, Arthur Chadzingwa, Simon Moyo, and the Rev. Canon Banana, the Bishop's deputy.

Opponents also include the National African Federation of Unions and African Trades Union Congress, representing more than 100,000 workers. The Christian Council of Rhodesia has rejected the settlement as "the people have had no voice in shaping the settlement," and the Catholic Church joined the opposition after it had become widespread. The Centre Party, first in favor, is now divided; one of its MP's resigned in protest and six have asked for withdrawal of the Commission. The eight tribal representatives in Parliament registered unanimous opposition. Asbestos workers in Shebani struck and demonstrations have been held in Gwelo, Salisbury, Port Victoria, Umtali, and Que Que.

Unqualified opposition has been expressed by both Joshua Nkomo, head of ZAPU, and Ndabaningi Sithole, head of ZANU. Sithole wrote to Douglas-Home that without majority rule no terms of settlement were satisfactory. Nkomo told a British correspondent, "Tell my people the time for majority rule in our country is NOW!"

3) The Reasons.

a) The population "problem" is the unsolved dilemma of UDI, unaffected by the 1971 settlement. According to 1969 census figures, the population of Rhodesia is more than 5,200,000, with less than 230,000 white. The African birthrate is higher than the white so the disproportion increases annually. Of the whites, only 41 per cent (including children) were born in Rhodesia and 44,000 have lived there less than 10 years. Although the government encourages immigration it cannot stop emigration.
Zimbabwe -- 5

About 88,000 whites have left since 1964 (UDI was 1965) while 82,000 have come in -
more than one third of the Europeans. Almost half the Europeans who have taken out
Rhodesian citizenship are also citizens of other countries. Thus the minority ruling
whites are a transient settler caste. (Smith has a farm in Cape Province, South
Africa.)

One result of the population disparity is that despite the current attempts to enforce
geographic separation of the races, the number of Africans in areas reserved for whites
continues to increase. The number of Europeans in Bulawayo (Rhodesia's second largest
city) decreased between 1963 and 1969 while the number of Africans rose from 210,620
to 245,590; the total number of Africans in European areas rose by more than 200,000.

b) The progression from discrimination to apartheid is well under way in Smith's
Rhodesia. All urban areas are zoned for Europeans, with Africans permitted only if
they are employed. They can stay in the reserves only if they have been allotted
land under the tribal system; many Africans are not entitled to live anywhere.
Rents in African townships have been increased to help force them out of urban areas
and domestic servants have been moved out. "The Residential Property Owners'
Protection Bill" provides for eviction of nonwhites living in white areas. Public
amenities, once nondiscriminatory, are increasingly for whites only. The number of
Africans in school fell in 1970 for the first time since World War II.

Since UDI the rate of increase of African incomes has been lower than that for
Europeans, a reversal in trend and policy. Last year average white income from
agriculture and forestry was RH $2,437, average African income $153. In manufacturing
the figures were $3,606 and $478; in construction, $3,273 and $428; in finance,
insurance and real estate, $3,280 and $714. Good jobs are reserved for whites
either by law or by custom. White high school graduates get civil service jobs
denied to black college graduates; black nurses (trained in England) cannot find
jobs while the government tries to persuade older white women to train to meet the
scarcity. By official statistics the total number of jobs for Africans is increasing
less than 1 per cent a year while the population increase is estimated at 2 1/2 to 3 1/2
per cent.

Emergency legislation has been renewed repeatedly since UDI, reducing or destroying
the individual rights that theoretically remain. The major African political parties
are banned as is their press; their leaders are imprisoned or detained. The white
press is censored and threatened. Meetings can be held only with a permit.

III. Specific Terms of the Agreement

1) The test of acceptability. The selection of three British noblemen (Lord Pearce,
former Appeals Court Judge; Lord Harlech, former Ambassador to Washington; and Sir
Maurice Dorman, former Governor-General of Malta) as the commission to test Rhodesian
opinion on the agreement met with such opposition that two members were added (but
one of them withdrew when his Rhodesian interests were pointed out); the other is
Sir Glynn Jones, former Governor-General of Malawi. Lord Pearce, the chairman, was
the only dissenter from the 1968 Privy Council ruling that the Smith regime's emergency
regulations were illegal. Under them 20 commissioners, all white on the grounds that
no impartial black could be found, are working. The promised conditions of immunity
and normal political activity have been discussed above.
2) The question of representation. The present constitution bars a black majority and allows African representation to increase only when Africans pay more than 24 per cent of the income tax (the next century, or forestalled by changes in tax rates). In the Assembly now, less than 250,000 whites have 50 members; more than five million Africans have 16, eight elected and eight chosen by tribal councils. The Senate consists of ten Europeans elected by European members of the Assembly, ten chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs, and three members appointed by the Head of State.

The new settlement has two African voters' rolls based on differing economic and educational qualifications, but the functional difference is obscure. The higher roll has the same electoral qualifications as the European roll: income of $2,700 or property worth $3,600. The lower roll has a series of possible types of qualification: income of $600 for two previous years or immovable property valued at $1,000; income of $300 for two years or property valued at $600 plus two years' secondary education; income of $300 for two years or property valued at $600 plus primary education for people thirty years and older; or income of $430 for two years or property valued at $800 for people over 30 or older without educational qualification; or all Kraal Heads with a following of thirty or more heads of families.

If, as provided, the present regime continues to control education and access to jobs, most Africans are unlikely to meet such qualifications. A common role and representation are never ensured.

3) The procedure towards majority rule. When the number of voters on the African higher roll equals 6 per cent of the number on the European roll, two African seats will be added; when it reaches 12 per cent, two more, and so on until 34 are added and parity is reached. (This is what may take 65 to 84 years). The first two seats will be filled by direct election by voters on the higher roll, the next two by an indirect tribal council vote as at present, and the alternate procedures will continue.

Within a year after parity is reached, a referendum of African voters will be taken on whether or not to change the indirectly filled seats to directly elected. (New seats will all be higher roll unless the legislature votes to make up to one fourth of them lower roll seats; it may also specify rural constituencies. No difference in function is indicated so presumably the idea is that poor or rural voters may be more readily influenced.) If the change is made by referendum, an election to implement it will be held within a year. This is the point at which an African majority becomes theoretically possible.

Within six months of this election (or of the referendum if indirect seats are retained), an independent Commission will be appointed to ascertain whether creation of ten common roll seats is acceptable to the people, and if not, what alternate might be. (Its composition is to be a government-appointed equal number of Africans and Europeans, plus a chairman who holds or has held high court office, presumably another white.) The procedure in filling the Common Roll seats is direct election by a single roll of voters registered on European and African higher rolls, with each voter having ten votes to distribute. Thus a majority of Africans might be elected and so result in a majority in the Assembly.

The Senate continues as at present, though with loss of power to the courts.
4) Entrenched provisions of the Constitution and Electoral Act, and the New Declaration of Rights. The new Declaration of Rights will be enforceable by the courts but it has not yet been written and who will write it and when are not specified.

The entrenched provisions include implementation of the new Assembly composition; the Declaration of Rights including its enforcement by the courts; limitation of the state of emergency to nine months. The electoral act provisions included are: qualifications and disqualifications for European and African voters, both rolls, and for Assembly candidates; changes in income qualifications related to changes in prices; the composition of the tribal electoral colleges (now chiefs, headmen, and Tribal Trust Land Councillors).

The entrenched provisions are not to be changed until the first two additional African seats are filled or three years after the changes are in effect, whichever is sooner. Until the post-parity Commission reports, changes require a majority vote of both European and African members of the Assembly. With control firmly in white elitist hands, these provisions present few problems for them.

5) Changes in the Status Quo.

a) Discriminatory legislation. A three-member Commission (satisfactory to Britain, one member an African) will be set up to consider existing legislation and make recommendations to the Rhodesian Government on ways of making progress towards ending racial discrimination; this includes the Land Tenure Act. The Rhodesian Government had given assurance that it will commend to Parliament changes required to implement the legislation, subject only to considerations that any government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character. (Emphasis added.) This is a fraud all the way. If there were any desire to end racial discrimination it could be done in the agreement. Without that desire, the Government is simply seeking ways around the question which will be face saving for Britain. The Centre Party suggested it show good faith by acting against discrimination now, but there was no response.

b) Detainees and restrictees. No criteria were given for recent releases of detainees whereas top African political leadership was not included. All cases (limited to detainees and restrictees; imprisonment is not included) will be reviewed by an existing tribunal, (emphasis added) the only change in present procedure being the presence of a British observer acceptable to the Rhodesian government. And the review will be after the test of acceptability to ensure the inability of the political opposition to participate.

c) Land. Sir Alec Douglas-Home has stated specifically in Parliament that the Land Tenure Act will not be repealed. The concession of the Rhodesian government in postponing two pending evictions of Africans is miniscule. The Land Apportionment Act dates from 1930 but the 1969 constitution raised the 36 million acres (out of 96 million) reserved for whites to 44 million. The theory is an "even split" in land between the 4 per cent whites and the 96 per cent blacks, with the remaining acres as national land (parks and the like) under white control. Ignoring this gross inequity, the agreement speaks of 5 million acres of unoccupied land available for settlement in the African area (3 1/2 million in tribal trust lands and 1 1/2 million in an area yet to be purchased) and possible additional land, as if Africans were benefiting. Actually this furthers the apartheid aim of driving Africans from "white" areas. The proposal for the Commission (above, [a/]) speaks of the possibility of creating an independent land Board for "long-term resolution of problems involved." But the problem is the idea of the reservation of land by race, and the travesty of "equal" shares for 96 per cent and 4 per cent.
Development program. Much is made of the offer of the British to provide up to £5 million (£12 million) a year for ten years to increase educational and job opportunities for Africans (capital aid and technical assistance for purposes and projects agreed upon by both governments) with matching funds from Rhodesia. The funds will specifically stimulate economic growth in the tribal trust lands, and the educational training mentioned is the vocational education white-run counties always propose for blacks. In other words, the development program is built around the present Rhodesian system of discrimination and increasing apartheid. (The Sunday Times felt that realistically whites would benefit most from the funds because a) it would save them from development expense; b) white contractors would pocket construction funds, and similarly in other fields.)

Three miscellaneous matters remain.

a) The Rhodesian government has undertaken to fill vacancies in the civil service according to merit and suitability (addition of the second word questions the first) and to train Africans to compete on equal terms (neither party appears to know of the many qualified unemployed Africans available). If implemented this might be helpful, although the past great expansion of government jobs to meet the contingencies of UDI may mean that the number of employees will drop rather than rise in the near future. Implementation is a point on which African distrust of the Smith regime is clear.

b) Rhodesian citizens who have left the country will be allowed to return without being subject to restrictions because of past activities, but without amnesty in regard to criminal offenses. The value of this is lessened by the broad terms in which repressive and emergency legislation define "criminal."

c) The state of emergency is to be lifted after sanctions have been lifted. That ensured its continuation throughout the test of acceptability so that meetings could be banned and preventive arrests made. And it would continue through the constitutional changes, perhaps a general election (for the legislature and government that will implement the changes; an election might not be held but in a democratic country it would have to be).

IV Conclusion

When the massive rejection of the Home-Smith settlement by Africans became clear, whites who favor it began counter measures. The government increased repression and charged intimidation to the Africans. Financial and industrial leaders set up an oddly named organization, "People Against Racial Discrimination," to persuade Africans to favor settlement. Discussion continued both in Africa and in London on how the Commission might maneuver its way toward a report that the settlement was acceptable. Favorite suggestions appeared to be (1) to report opinion according to "quality," not "quantity," and (2) to judge both sides guilty of intimidation and therefore to render a report relying on analysis rather than undifferentiated evidence.

African opposition cannot be concealed, no matter what type of report comes in. But since Smith still possesses the military and industrial power and South African backing, the future is unclear. Those in the world outside who support majority rule will find two ways left to implement their opinions: to aid the African majority in whatever form it may take to continue the struggle; and to re-impose and enforce the sanctions that were beginning to affect the Smith regime adversely.