HEARINGS

Before The

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL

AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Testimony by

Hon. William H. Booth, President, American Committee on Africa

Ms. Jennifer Davis, Research Director, American Committee on Africa

Washington, D.C.

March 22, 1973
Judge Booth:

Mr. Chairman,

We are here today to challenge the myth of concern for the rights of self-determination being built by the United States government in relation to its role in Southern Africa.

It has long been the theme of the United States government that it is in sympathy with the right of self-determination of the black peoples of all Southern Africa, that it abhors apartheid, and that it does not by its actions strengthen in any way the white minority regimes of Southern Africa. In support of that contention, Administration spokesmen repeatedly assure the United States public and its allies that it adheres firmly to an embargo on all arms or equipment of military significance both in relation to South Africa and to Portugal south of the Tropic of Cancer. It is our contention that there is in fact a large gap between stated theory and actual practice in the United States role in Southern Africa today, and that by its behavior on the ground in Africa the U.S. actually gives continual and important support to the minority regimes in a variety of ways, amongst the most important of which are the complex network of military and near-military relationships that have been built between the two areas.

The U.S. is in fact making available a whole complex of militarily important equipment to the minority regimes, although most of this is never officially admitted to be military equipment. The U.S. Administration has not as yet reached the state where it openly admits to seeing the regimes of the South as its allies, and therefore hides its aid behind a low profile and a smoke-screen of verbiage and complicated licensing requirements. The fact remains that allowing the sale of Boeing 747's for troop transport, computers for defense departments, light aircraft for defoliant spraying are actions which indicate quite clearly that the U.S. is taking the wrong side in the struggle that is now being fought throughout Southern Africa.

The significance of this U.S. position can be seen most clearly against the background of the rapidly intensifying struggle for liberation being fought throughout Southern Africa. It is important for us to put the U.S. stance into that context -- because it then becomes clear why the U.S. is gradually being forced to take a more and more open position in support of its badly troubled friends in Southern Africa. The whole white Southern Bloc has been subjected to increasing pressure from the liberation movements in the past two years.
The Portuguese, fighting a war on three fronts, now have over 160,000 soldiers in Africa. In Guinea-Bissau the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) felt itself strong enough by the end of 1972 to actually hold national elections and it has escalated its attacks on the Portuguese-controlled urban centers in the months since the murder of Amilcar Cabral. In Angola new areas have been liberated, and late in 1972 the two major organizations MPLA (Peoples' Movement for the liberation of Angola) and FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) came together in a united front which will put all military efforts under one joint command and must inevitably strengthen their challenge to the Portuguese.

In Mozambique FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) has continued to heighten its attacks on the Portuguese, particularly in the Tete province, the site of the giant Cabora Bassa Dam Project. The Portuguese are now forced to move all equipment needed for the dam in heavily guarded convoys, the roads are under constant attack, and there has been increasing recourse to the use of helicopters wherever possible. FRELIMO has in turn had considerable success in its attacks on aircraft; in an attack on the airfield at Mueda it destroyed nineteen planes. The Portuguese must replace these quickly. FRELIMO opened a new frontier further south than Tete in Manica e Sofala towards the end of 1972, and not only the Portuguese, but also the Rhodesian regime has been quick to recognize the threat posed by this new expansion of the liberation movements strength. Rhodesian troopers have been killed inside Mozambique lately, and in October 1972 Ian Smith flew to Lisbon to hold talks with Prime Minister Caetano (the first top-level talks between the two countries since UDI in 1965). The end of 1972 saw another significant development in the reopening of armed guerilla attacks on various places inside Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), several in the North East, along the Mozambican border, and others near the Zambian border in the West. (It was these latter incidents which led the Smith Government to take reprisals against Zambia, including the closing of the borders.) Most recently has come the announcement of a new united front formed between ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), the two Zimbabwean liberation movements. There have been somewhat less dramatic but equally important developments inside South Africa itself -- the strike of more than 50,000 workers in Durban being indicative of the rising mood of determination of the African people throughout the South to throw off their oppression and begin rebuilding their lives.

In the face of this the three white regimes - Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian, have sought to strengthen their own links with one another -- and to streamline their unity of action. The Rhodesian Army, severely strained by lack of men and money according to the 1971 annual report of the Chief of General Staff Lt. General K.R. Coster, is incapable of meeting the joint threat on two borders.

Once the struggle comes home its days are numbered, and there are few amongst today's white South African rulers who do not recognize that fact. But South Africa is going to be hard-pressed to supply all the assistance demanded of it, and it dare not spread itself too thin. Particularly important in this context is the shortage of white labor-power, for at this point the South Africans rely almost entirely on the white population for armed troops and there would be very great risks for it in changing that policy. Ground forces
under arms at any one time comprise a 10,000 man professional force, a
current intake of about 22,000 draftees, and a 33,000 police force. That
could be reinforced within a few hours by the 15,000 man police reserve, the
roughly 60,000 commandos and a citizen reserve force; but if that happens
the whole country would be in a state of total emergency. So the South
Africans need to rely heavily on labor saving defense and war-making techniques.
By 1972 South Africa had completed an extensive radio communications coastal
network which enables it to keep track of aircraft and ships both along...
its immediate borders and all the way from South Africa to Antarctica; it
had created a network of frontier-control checkpoints, all linked to a central
computerized nerve center in the Eastern Transvaal; it had increased border
patrols, and built many bush landing fields. South African aircraft carry
out constant searches along the northern air-space, Rhodesian planes make
observation flights farther east.

Mr. Chairman, war is a reality in Southern Africa today, and the United States,
despite its protestations to the contrary is increasingly helping to arm one
side.

It should not have to be the task of the citizens of the United States of
America to act out the melodramatic role of intelligence experts in order
to ensure that the United States adheres to its stated position of denying
military support to the white regimes of Southern Africa. But that unfortunately
is exactly the position into which we are constantly thrust. There appear
to be consistent attempts to circumvent the official position; semantic games
are played to define things in such a way that they fall outside the boundaries
of control; secrecy is another weapon used to shield the flow of aid. It is
difficult then, for concerned groups to do more than expose the very tip of
an iceberg whose dimensions we can only guess at from our knowledge of a
similar series of events in recent years in South East Asia. What follows
is an attempt to share with this Committee a few of the increasing indications
we have of extensive U.S. military-type assistance to Southern Africa.

Mrs. Jennifer Davis

Aircraft

The last time I testified before this Committee attention was focused on the
important role of light aircraft in anti-guerilla type operations, and on
the consequent implications of allowing the sale of several thousand of such
aircraft to South Africa, even for ostensibly private use. These sales con-
tinue. Since 1971 the U.S. government has also allowed the sale of such
aircraft to various purchasers in Mozambique. It has also continued to
allow the sale of Boeings of various classes, some financed by Export-Import
credits, to agencies of the Portuguese government - for example the airline
companies of T.A.P. in Portugal and D.E.T.A. in Mozambique - despite the
announced use of such aircraft for the transport of troops. Mozambique's
imports of aircraft have increased more than fifteenfold since 1969 (Appendix 5)
three-quarters of the imports coming from the United States. In the words
of David Newsom, in a letter to Professor John Marcum dated October 8, 1972
"Though these air and freight services can obviously carry military as well as civilian passengers, the sale of passenger transport planes to Portugal has not been deemed to come within the terms of our 1961 arms embargo." This despite the statements from official Portuguese army sources, such as that quoted both in the South African Star and in the conservative British Daily Telegraph of June 21, 1971, that such planes would be used to ferry troops to Portugal's three war fronts. (This referred specifically to the two 707's sold late in 1970). On the twenty-second of September a Portuguese newspaper announced that T.A.P. had bought two further 747's for use as troop carriers. In addition to the Boeing sales to the airlines in Portugal, the U.S. government has allowed Boeing sales to D.E.T.A., the state-owned commercial airline in Mozambique. D.E.T.A. and the E.M.A.C., the other Mozambican commercial airline company, have in turn signed a contract with the military to perform services for the army. A copy of the report of this contract carried in the official Boletim is attached (Appendix 3). I quote briefly:

"Coordination - that is what we call the result of the signing of the contract between the Military Forces in the Province and the Civil Entities at the beginning of March this year.

We cannot but stress the unusual event. The celebration of the contract by D.E.T.A. Mozambique Airlines and Empress Mocambicana de Aviacao Comercial (E.M.A.C.) , who will give the Military Region of Mozambique regular air transport on a charter basis.

At the ceremony which took place in the Library of the Regional Military General, there were present the Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces of Mozambique...and other high ranking armed forces officials.

The Provincial Secretary of Communications and General Kaulza de Arriaga spoke of the act, emphasizing the great importance of this coordination.

The wonderful example of cooperation between the civil and military elements for the best use of certain resources at their disposal, will result, as is obvious, in unquestionable economic benefits."

In October 1972 an article appeared in Marches Tropicaux which reported the sale of some light aircraft, one of which was equipped for photo-reconnaissance, and a helicopter to a private airline company based in Northern Mozambique. Intensive inquiries eventually resulted in our discovering that the story in Marches Tropicaux is basically correct but that the sale was of three Shrike Commanders and one Aero Commander - all produced by North American Rockwell. The first three are the latest model piston-driven aircraft. The twin engines deliver 285 h.p. They are eight-seater private transports. The
Aero Commander is the turbo-prop version. It is pressurized and can fly normally at 25,000 to 30,000 feet. It can readily be converted to use for aerial camera work and any competent air frame company can make the modifications. North American actually supplies a kit to do it so that the plexi-glass window can be inserted into the skin of the plane at the proper place.

The company said that the sale had been to Transportas Aeros Commercias, a Mozambican private company. This is a company of which no previous trace can be found, and given the nature of Northern Mozambique, it is most likely that the company's best customer will be the Portuguese military. The company has confirmed that it is hoping to sell more planes to the same customer - but would not disclose how many.

Mr. Chairman, as will be seen from the attached newspaper report from the Sunday Times of London (Appendix 2), South African owned and operated U.S. built light planes have already been used in herbicide attacks in Northern Mozambique. Now it seems likely that the attacks will be made more directly from planes permanently based in the North. This is a likelihood which makes a mockery of current definitions of military versus non-military equipment.

The use of chemical defoliants

There have been increasing reports from the liberation movements in all three Portuguese territories of the use of chemical defoliants by the Portuguese in the last few years. In July 1972 a South African paper, the Sunday Tribune carried a long report of an interview with six mercenaries from South Africa who had taken part in the chemical warfare raids against Frelimo in Northern Mozambique, and who had cut short their contract with the Portuguese Air Force because they decided they were on a suicide mission, particularly after one of their aircraft was hit by guerilla fire. Of the six aircraft used four were Piper Pawnees and one a Cessna. Thus there were five U.S. built aircraft owned by the civilian South African company Flink Lugspruit en Boerdery Edms of Bethal (the title suggests that the company works primarily spraying chemical insecticides, etc. for farmers.) all being used in a military attack. The Tribune reports that the arrangements had been handled by a Mr. E. Jardim, Honorary Malawian Consul in Mozambique, and his son, who had set up the contract with the Portuguese Air Force. The men described their mission in considerable detail, reporting that they were met in Lourenco Marques by Jardim, then flew on to Beira, Quelimane and finally Nacala, in the North. "At Nacala, a Portuguese military base, the aircraft registrations were removed by air force personnel. They put washable paint over the registration. When we arrived at Nangololo we made a very steep approach to avoid being shot by terrorists," Mr. Hammer, one of the mercenaries, said. Later in the day they discussed their tactics with two air force colonels and a major. They were shown a large stockpile of water and chemicals stored in drums. They mixed them together - a mixture of 24D and Tordon -
which Mr. Hammer said would destroy crops but not harm people. On April 8 they started their first spraying mission. "The Harvards flew ahead of us strafing the area to deter snipers. The Fiat jets bombed and strafed as well. We flew in formation of three, triangle-shaped, and went as low as we could over crops ranging from a quarter hectare to 10 hectares." They returned by a similar route to the one they had used to get to Nangololo and their registration numbers were restored on the way. They arrived back in South Africa on April 21. For "dicing with death" they received an average of R1,000 each.

Source of the Herbicides

Mr. Chairman, I am an economist, not a chemist, so that is is difficult for me to sort out the complexities of the various herbicides now being exported by the U.S. to South Africa, Portugal and Mozambique, the exact chemical nature of each, which of the chemicals ought to be on the Munitions List because it has been used in other theatres of war such as Vietnam, and finally which chemicals are actually reported as used by the movements or by the pilots who have sprayed them. It would, I think, be useful to call for a more serious reply to our questions than has been given by the administration to date.

MPLA has indicated that the Portuguese are using 2,4 dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (LNA) and 2,4,5 trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (LNB) in Angola, primarily for destruction of food crops. Both of these commodities were used in Vietnam by the United States. LNA is specific to grassy plants and LNB is specific to woody plants such as trees and vines. It is possible that both could be used on broad-leaved plants (such as cassava) but that they are actually more powerful than necessary.

These two herbicides were on the United States Munitions List until 1970. At that time there were three herbicides on the Munitions List, the third being butyl-2-chloro-4-phenoxyacetic acid (LNF). The difference between this herbicide and LNA and LNB is the inclusion of the fluorine molecule, which increases the toxicity of the herbicide. Herbicides with fluorine are, I am told, more toxic than those with only chlorine, but LNA and LNB containing only chlorine are longer lasting than the LNF.

In December, 1970, LNA and LNB were taken off the Munitions List and put under the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department rather than the State Department where they still require licensing. Only LNF, containing fluorine, remains on the list today.

MPLA also lists cacodylic acid and picolinic acid as being used by the Portuguese. The United States does export these commodities, although they require licensing only if they are destined for Eastern European countries. In Commerce Department statistics they are incorporated into the classification "Herbicides NEC - Not Elsewhere Classified."
The main differences in Commerce classifications apparently relate not to toxicity but to the extent of preparations. 512 listings (2,4-D sodium salt herbicides, mercury herbicides, and Herbicides Not Elsewhere Classified) are in a concentrated form. 590 listings (Herbicidal preparations) are in solution so they are close to being ready for use.

Below is a chart of U.S. exports of Herbicides to African countries and to Portugal, as listed in the Bureau of Census public document "U.S. Exports: Schedule B, Commodity by Country." It shows that U.S. exports of various kinds of herbicides to Portugal and South Africa appear to have jumped recently; the export to Mozambique appears to be new.

### U.S. EXPORTS OF HERBICIDES TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND PORTUGAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>January to June 1972</th>
<th>January to June 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Value (US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5120620: Herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T, including salts and esters thereof, used as Parent Acids.</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>281,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5120625: Herbicides of Pentachlorophenate and of Mercury</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>23,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5120629:</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>45,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5992080: Herbicidal Preparations</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>533,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>239,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item 5147045: Herbicides and Defoliants, inorganic, except formulations and chemicals put up for retail sale.</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>18,203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"Grey Area" Items

I have been dealing with areas in which the military use of the commodity concerned is obvious. There are innumerable areas in which U.S. supply of equipment might be interpreted more innocently, but which might just as well, and probably more accurately, be seen as contributing towards strengthening military capabilities in southern Africa. Let me cite three such examples.

The role of computers in the technology of modern counter-insurgency needs no stressing. Various U.S. corporations have been heavily involved in supplying computers to the minority white regimes. I.B.M. has supplied at least four computers to the South African Department of Defense, has also supplied equipment to the military in Portugal. Honeywell has reportedly equipped the Portuguese Airforce and the Portuguese General Aeronautical Workshops with computers. I.T.T. operating both in South Africa and in Portuguese-controlled Africa, and in Portugal, has provided both equipment and expert knowledge for the stabilization of complex sophisticated communications systems essential for the maintenance of the white states.

General Electric South Africa, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Electric of America now makes about 95% of the diesel electric locomotives used for South African Railways. The South Africans, keenly aware of the need to establish and maintain an extensive road and rail network have been modernizing the railways and building impressive new roads; most recently they have reported planning to build a heavy duty road right up to the extreme edge of the Caprivi strip to link the whole of Northern Namibia (increasingly vulnerable since MPLA opened anew from near the Namibian border and SWAPO began to re-establish its activities in the area.) All these activities could have peaceful purposes, but they are also basic to the conduct of a successful defense against an external or an internal enemy. The supply of equipment, essential for communication and transport, falls into a nebulous area in the sense that the equipment can be interpreted as having a war or peace time use, depending on whether in fact the society is in a state of war or not. It is our contention that the whole of Southern Africa must be seen as a society in the process of war and therefore the supply of these kinds of equipment strengthens the side to which the material is given.

There is a long list of other examples of similar collaboration which I might quote. Many of them have already been raised before this committee and I will not repeat them. There is the important question of the training of the troops. I would comment only that despite the figures supplied by the administration to this Committee in hearings at the end of 1971 it is still not clear that we are being told the full story. Snippets of information come our way which cast doubt on the likelihood of this being the full truth. For instance I recently came across a report that the newly appointed Comptroller of the South African army had been given intensive technical training at the Pentagon a year or two ago. No doubt this will be defended on the basis that teaching a man accounting is not a military exercise. But teaching a man to run an army efficiently should surely qualify as military aid.

There are other areas of co-operation, ranging from the Cactus missile, to spacetracking and various forms of technical and scientific collaboration.
General Electric in a letter to the South African Financial Gazette early this year said "G.E. is proud of having the opportunity of increasing... its services to South African industry and to customers. The basic thrust of bringing advanced technology from the General Electric Company in the U.S. is expected to continue and grow."

There is also continuous contact between the U.S. and Portugal at a military level -- in the shape of visits, meetings, conferences. I have attached an appendix of brief reports from the Portuguese press which indicate the extent of this kind of relationship. (Appendix 1).

Both South Africa and Portugal are extremely aware of the importance not only of regional alliances, but of increasingly close international alliances which will link them to the interests of the Western powers ever more tightly.

Portugal already has such a relationship to some extent with NATO. It is, however, extremely significant that Portugal and Brazil have been involved in intensive contact building in the recent past. It appears to be a logical outcome of this, and an interesting first step towards building a new regional Southern Atlantic alliance, that Portugal has just applied for membership in the Organization of American States. The application was considered on Feb. 21st by the Council, and has been referred to a political committee for consideration. Whatever the outcome it is clear that Portugal is seeking to strengthen her ties with the Americas. It would be interesting to know what the U.S. attitude to that application was.

South Africa, in its turn, has for a long time hoped to increase its association with NATO, whether by itself, or in association with Portugal as an African power. Recent NATO trends indicate that this may not be as wild a hope as it appears on the surface. The last year has seen a NATO mission visit South Africa, charged with exploring the communist threat on NATO's southern flank and the possibility of using South Africa as a reliable base in the strategy against such penetration.

In the autumn of 1972 the NATO parliamentarians meeting in Bonn approved a report emphasizing the need to protect "the shipping lanes between the Indian Ocean and the Southern Atlantic, vital to the European NATO countries." The report stated that "Portugal, as a member of NATO, should be in a position to make available its facilities on the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and Sao Tome, and to contribute on the African continent to the protection of the Cape route, if NATO should request it." This assumes particular significance in the light of the P.A.I.G.C.'s struggle to achieve self-determination and independence from the Portuguese for a united country consisting of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. The South Africans are working hard to emphasize the importance of including them inside the Western military strategy as is vividly illustrated by the attached report of the statement by Admiral Biermann, Chief of the General Staff of the Defense Force. He drew up a long report on the strategic implications of the ending of the Vietnam war,
the escalating struggle in Africa and increasing Soviet and U.S. interest in the Indian Ocean. In his interpretation the West has been somewhat reluctant to enter into open alliances with South Africa because of its internal politics. At the same time he sees South Africa as the key territory in a region which he is convinced is going to be the next arena for 'communist aggression'. He likens the current geo-political situation in Mozambique to that in Vietnam... with Tanzania being equated to North Vietnam, Malawi to Laos and Zambia to Cambodia. In his view "the only effective deterrent is...the establishment of a counter prior presence."

The South African newspaper which reported his statement commented "Even the Americans - who only a year back were airily dismissing the Indian Ocean as being at the bottom of their priorities - are changing their tune, to no small degree.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, and the only top-ranking U.S. naval officer to emerge with his reputation enhanced in the woeful American showing in Vietnam, has urged a very much stronger U.S. naval presence in these waters." It is likely that there will be in fact a coalescence of interests between the white powers of Southern Africa and the Western powers still looking over their shoulder at the Soviet Union. The United States' stance on this is not at all clear; the Azores Agreement made last year with Portugal on grounds that were quite insufficient, unless Portugal's continued stable presence in Africa was seen as worth paying a high price for, seems to indicate that the U.S. will in fact support such Southern strategies, thus involving itself in ever greater commitments to the reactionary minority regimes of Southern Africa.

I would like to conclude with Judge Booth's summation.

Judge Booth:

Mr. Chairman, just a resume of what we of the American Committee on Africa would ask the committee to support both in the full Foreign Affairs Committee and in Congress and generally to the American public.

First, we believe that the committee should move forcefully to see to it that the Administration supports and moves to enforce United Nations resolutions calling for an embargo of Southern African nations that practice apartheid.

Secondly, we believe that this committee should move the Foreign Affairs Committee and Congress to see to it that our Government and the people of our country do not provide military patents and other military knowledge to these Southern African apartheid nations; that foreign capital which goes into South Africa's arms industry should be cut off; that skilled technicians should be discouraged from emigrating to Southern Africa; that special training should not be offered to military and police officers from Portugal and South Africa; cooperation in the nuclear and space field should be ended, and this would include removal of the United States tracking stations from South Africa; spare parts and repairs should not be supplied to maintain equipment sent prior
to the embargo; all items suitable for both military and civilian use should be embargoed, and in particular motor vehicles and light aircraft should be included.

Finally, we believe that it would be the proper function of this committee to urge the Foreign Affairs Committee and to urge Congress to make widely known to our United States citizens all the facts that you have determined through your hearings in the many months you have been working. We believe that this is necessary because the pressure of public opinion is all that we believe can move this Administration to tell the truth about its relations with Southern African countries.
APPENDIX I

In an article entitled "The Africa Dossier", carried in the normally conservative Telegraph, E.H. Cookridge, wartime intelligence agent claims that the CIA has strong links with PIDE, the Portuguese secret police, some of whose officers are training in America, and that CIA "Special Forces" instructors are with units of General Kaulza de Arriaga, fighting FRELIMO in Mozambique. The CIA has also allegedly infiltrated FRELIMO Headquarters in Dar, and keeps the Portuguese informed.

- Weekend Telegraph (U.K.), 1/1/72

In a report by Mr. Boavida Quidado, a "Canadian journalist who spent two months in the liberated areas of Angola", it is claimed that Green Beret officers are training Portuguese troops in the United States to "defeat African freedom fighters" in Angola.

- Times (Zambia), January, 1972

Two unidentified Boeing 707-3F5C's were delivered September 9 and December 14, 1971 to the Portuguese Air Force.

- Aviation Letter (Sw.), January, 1972

On January 27, the Bell helicopter 212 was demonstrated for invitees at Alverca, at the Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico (state aircraft factory.)

- Mais Alto (Port.), February, 1972

Two U.S. torpedo boat destroyers, the Cecil and the Fox, paid a routine visit to Luanda (Angola) and Lourenco Marques (Mozambique). They carried 508 members of the crew in all.

- Diario de Noticias (Port.), 2/8/72

Two U.S. destroyers visited Luanda - USS Richard E. Krauss with a crew of 256, and USS Vesole with a crew of 266. They were on their way back from the Indian Ocean to the United States.

- Diario de Noticias (Port.), 2/23/72

In March, 1972, the United States Export-Import Bank granted a loan of $US 1.8 million to the Benguela Railway (Angola) for the purchase of ten U.S. made locomotives and spare parts. The Bank will also stand security for an identical loan from the Chase Manhattan Bank, thus providing 90 per cent of the total purchase price.

- Casa de Portugal, Noticias e Factos, New York, March 16, 1972, and Africa (AFP), March 17, 1972
APPENDIX I continued

U.S. Naval visit of USS Ruch and USS Roan, U.S. navy frigates, to Luanda for two days.

- Provincia, Angola, 4/26/72

Marine Captain J. Frizza is heading a 31-man delegation from the National War College of America which arrived in Lourenco Marques for a short visit to Mozambique. They will attend lectures on the political and military situation in Mozambique and will meet the Commander in Chief of the armed forces as well as local officials.

- Diario de Noticias, 4/26/72

Yesterday evening the governor-general of Mozambique gave a dinner in honor of the U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania, Claud Gordon Ross, who is visiting Mozambique.

- Diario de Noticias, 5/18/72

Congoese troops shot down Portuguese army helicopter over their territory at Banga, Army Headquarters in Congo-Brazzaville announced today. The army communique said a large quantity of arms and ammunition had been seized, including NATO automatic rifles.

- AFP, 6/6/72

The Azores Fixed Acoustic Range (AFAR) was officially inaugurated on the island of Santa Maria, in the Azores archipelago, by the Portuguese Minister of National Defence, General Horacio de Sa Viana Rebelo on May 19, 1972, in the presence of more than one hundred high-ranking civilian and military representatives of NATO nations.

- NATO Review (Nato Info. Service), July/August, 1972

Arrival noted of American ship 'LaSalle' in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique; with crew of 20 officers and 350 naval troops.

- Diario de Noticias, August 9, 1972

DETA's fourth Boeing 737 will be delivered early in 1973; the line is planning to operate a weekly service to Tananarive, Malagasy.

- Noticias, Mozambique, 3/24/72

Nineteen aircraft were destroyed by Frelimo guerrillas in their attack on the Portuguese post of Mueda last week: two jet fighters, 7 helicopters, 5 Harvard bombers, and 4 reconnaissance planes.

- Daily News, Tanzania, 9/29/72
APPENDIX I continued

Two U.S. Navy destroyers, the USS Sellars and the USS Charles R. Ware made a routine visit to port of Luanda, Angola.

- Provincia, Angola, 10/17/72

At the Air Force base Monsanto in Portugal a meeting was held of teachers from the commando school from the American Air Force and from the Escola Superior da Forca Aerea Portuguesa. Information was exchanged about the experience of both schools.

- Diario de Noticias, Port. 10/3/72

Nangado, the main Portuguese town on the Tanzanian border, was yesterday toured by the Lourenco Marques-based consuls-general of the United States, France, West Germany, Italy, South Africa, and Rhodesia, who are visiting the Northern district of Cabo-Delgado at the invitation of Commander-in-Chief Kaulza da Arriaga. Nangado, which lies within sight of the Tanzanian side of the Rovuma river, is the center point of an ambitious plan of General de Arriaga for social and economic progress of the border population, known as 'Operation Frontier'. The plan envisages a string of modern towns and villages linked by a tarred road which will run from Nangado to the coastal port town of Palma. At Nangado, which three years ago was a cluster of African huts, water and power have been laid on and the nucleus of a modern town has been built. The main new constructions in operation are two primary schools, a school of arts and crafts, a hospital and cooperative warehouses to store farming produce. These will be followed by housing blocks to be built by the Africans themselves with the help of Army engineers. Farming and fishing experts have been posted to Nangado to teach modern methods of exploiting the natural resources of the area. Plans for the setting up of a television network - the first in Mozambique - have been completed by Army electronics engineers and the Nangado T.V. station is expected to be in operation soon.

-AFP, 10/24/72

Two American warships made a short visit to the harbor of Lourenco Marques.

- Diario de Noticias, Port., 11/8/72

Prime Minister Caetano has "as an admirer and a friend" congratulated President Nixon with his reelection "in order that the relations between our two countries remain as cordial as they have during the last few years."

- Diario de Noticias, Port., 11/10/72

APPENDIX 5

Mozambique: Imports of Airplanes 1969-1971

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<tr>
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<th>1969</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Million Escudos</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>18.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>346.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>273.4</td>
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Portugal wages chemical war to starve rebels

By Cal McCrystal

SOUTH AFRICAN mercenaries have been helping the Portuguese Air Force to wage chemical warfare against nationalist guerrillas in the jungles of northern Mozambique. Secret missions by heavily armed aircraft escorting defoliant-spraying planes have gone into action in an attempt to wipe out rebel food supplies.

Firm evidence of the raids, aimed at guerrilla units of Frelimo—the Mozambique Liberation Front—reached The Sunday Times last week just as Portugal's Prime Minister, Marcelo Caetano, was denying charges of waging a "colonial war" in Africa. No one, he said, can find populations in revolt or any internal uprising in Angola, Mozambique or Portuguese Guinea.

The guerrillas affected by the chemical warfare are being operated from Tanzania and are seen to control large areas of northern Mozambique. Local Africans, either sympathizing with or fearing Frelimo, have made hundreds of clearings in the jungle, ranging from small patches to fields of several acres. These contained tons of maize, beans, peas, groundnuts and bananas.

One of the chemicals used against these areas is Convivox (a mixture containing 2,4-D), which not only kills broadcasted plants but can also inhibit fertilization. It is manufactured by a South African firm.

Much caution went into planning the raids. On April 3, six small aircraft took off from Rand Airport at Bex, near Johannesburg, for Mozambique's International Airport at Lourenco Marques. The pilots parked in the airport's military section and were greeted by a Lt. Col Silva, of the Portuguese Air Force, and a Beira businessman, Mr. J. J. Fardilha, whose son Carlos, a Portuguese Air Force sergeant in Mozambique, stayed with the South African pilots throughout their trip.

On the next day, the pilots flew their planes to Beira and then on to Nacala, an air base on the coast about 200 miles south of Tanzania. Here their registration numbers were painted over by the Portuguese and each pilot was given a suit of camouflage and a pistol.

On April 6, they arrived at their operating base, Nancala, a bullet-poisoned cluster of buildings and bunkers around an airstrip 40 miles south of Tanzania. The South Africans, who had been assured that the area was clear of guerrillas, were not censured by the thousands of cartridge shells littering the base.

As the South African planes skimmed over the dense jungle at tree-top level, spraying the area with chemical, Portuguese Air Force Harvard aircraft swooped ahead of them firing machine-guns and rockets into the brush.

Overhead, two air force Fiat jet planes dropped 100-kilo and 50-kilo bombs.

Several defoliant missions were abandoned over the next few weeks because of bad weather and ground attacks. On April 17, one South African plane and a Portuguese Harvard—bought from the U.S.—were hit by machine-gun fire and the pilot was cut short. "We didn't like to let the Portuguese down," said one South African pilot. Gerry McDate. "but we didn't want to get written off, either."

The Portuguese pilots also showed signs of relief. Before one of the raids a Harvard aircraft on patrol near the Tanzanian border was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from a village on the Tanzanian side of the Rovuma River. Later, a Portuguese Air Force team flew back to the village and blew it apart, according to one of the South African mercenaries.

Each of the South Africans was paid $100 for a two-hour day, plus $10 an hour for every hour extra. On top of this they got a 20 per cent bonus because of the danger involved.

But the South Africans managed to spray only a fraction of the area outlined by the Portuguese. All were aware of the risk of losing their planes: in Lourenco Marques a Government official told them that if an aircraft was shot down it would have to be destroyed to avoid any possible embarrassment to the South African or Portuguese Governments.

The South African Government's attitude seems clear, however. Even though the firm which supplied the pilots and the planes for the Mozambique mission can be identified as a South African firm, a Government official said that the activities outside South Africa of a person with a valid passport were not the responsibility of the Government, provided he did not break the laws of South Africa or threaten South African security.

Philip Short reports from Kampala: Jorge Rebelo, the Frelimo publicity secretary based in Dar es Salaam, has disclosed that defoliant operations in the Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique have continued since April—with a few weeks' respite in May after a guerrilla group shot a spraying plane.

Rebelo admits that the defoliation, affecting mainly pumpkin and cassava crops, has caused problems for the guerrillas and for the local populations, but he says there is no starvation because the areas affected have been able to get food from places the planes have missed.