THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION

by

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The views expressed are those of the author.

* All material in these notes and documents may be freely reprinted. Acknowledgement, together with a copy of the publication containing the reprint, would be appreciated.
Errata

p. 10, line 18
substitute "first" for "final"

p. 14, line 30
should read "continued to be carried out".
Substitute "Poqo" for "Pogo"

p. 18, line 30
should read "relations with South Africa, failed for lack of a 2/3 majority; 42 in favour, etc."

p. 24, line 2
substitute "$1.67 billion" for "$1.67 million"

p. 31, line 15
should read "sails into one of South Africa's ports and makes a delivery of over 200,000 tons of oil, etc."

p. 32, line 14
substitute "Witlam" for "Wilham"
Introduction

6 January 1981 marked the 70th anniversary of the founding of the African National Congress of South Africa. There could be a no more appropriate time to consider the international impact of the South African struggle for liberation than in this anniversary year. The circumstances on the African continent, and in South Africa itself, are far different today than they were seventy years ago. Yet, the ANC has changed and adapted as necessary, not only to maintain its relevance, but its place of leadership in the struggle for equality and freedom in South Africa. It is well to remember that the founding conference of the ANC (at first called the South Africa Native National Congress) came only two years after the formation of the Union of South Africa. In fact, in his opening address to the conference held in Bloemfontein, its prime mover, Pixley Seme, contrasted the African meeting to that of the whites, who had founded their union in 1910. Now, he said, "we have called you to this conference so that we can together find ways and means of forming our national union for the purpose of creating national unity and defending our rights and privileges".

The movement of justice, independence and equality in South Africa is many faceted. But the ANC has always been central to the struggle for fundamental change. In 1958 Anthony Sampson wrote about the treason trial. What he said is as relevant now as then.

"It is Congress around which African opposition and its allies have centered for the last ten years, and it is Congress which is likely to present the main threat to white supremacy in the future."

How does one measure the impact of a conflict in anyone of the countries sharing a portion of the globe's surface? How does one measure the impact of the South African struggle? South Africa is only a moderately-sized country thousands of miles from Europe, the Americas, and much of Asia. And yet, the impact of the South African struggle has been an increasing one. Its primary impact is on all of the people of South Africa, of course. But over the years it has also affected the lives of people far removed from South Africa.

Why is this? In part, it is because of the considerable wealth of the country. It is also because of its strategic location overlooking the Cape route with its vast oil traffic. In addition, the struggle has within it the seeds for an international confrontation of the major Powers. Yet, an overriding impact of South Africa on the world may be found in the nature of the struggle: a conflict between a white minority trying
desperately to hang on to power and privilege and a black majority trying
to change the situation, to eliminate the political and economic
exploitation and the racial discrimination upon which the policy of apartheid
is based. The struggle in South Africa has intensified at that precise
moment in history when colonialism is being successfully challenged throughout
the world. The South African struggle is pivotal. It is symbolic of the
effort by all exploited people everywhere in the world to achieve equality
and freedom, and therefore has the support of most people the world over.

The South African struggle has had also some impact on movements in
other countries - in India, in Europe, and in the national struggles of other
African countries. It has affected labour, student, religious struggles of
other rights organizations in the United States. It has had a major effect
on debates and actions in the United Nations. And it impacts on world
stability as it affects major world Powers in their relations to one another.

The impact of the South African struggle has not been static. It has
changed as the world situation has altered over seventy years. The differences
have been especially great in the last thirty years since the Defiance
Campaign against Unjust Laws of 1952, which ushered the ANC into the modern
nationalist liberation era. In 1952 there were only four independent
countries in Africa. The Afro-Asian effort to change the direction of the
United Nations on colonial issues was barely beginning. As a continent,
Africa was still under colonial domination. Therefore, important as the
Defiance Campaign was, it had nothing of the impact then that such an effort
would have today.

The impact of South Africa on the rest of the world is due not just to
events inside South Africa, but to what takes place in a wider context.
Consider the context of the South African struggle. The apartheid republic
was once "protected" by a buffer zone of the Portuguese colonies of
Mozambique and Angola, and Southern Rhodesia, which was under white minority
control. The April 1974 coup in Portugal and the independence of Zimbabwe
undermined white South Africa's confidence. The Governments of these
bordering States are now led by movements which for years carried on guerrilla
struggles against their former white and colonial oppressors. The opponents
of apartheid in South Africa now have neighbours to give them support as
they carry on their struggle.

The United Nations has been increasingly brought into the fray. Foreign
policies of countries the world over have had to deal with the reality of
the South African struggle. Issues have been raised in the context of this
struggle that affect the Olympic Games, tourism, cultural, military,
political and economic relations with South Africa. Campaigns for boycotts
and limited sanctions internationally in support of the liberation struggle
inside South Africa have deeply concerned the white minority Government.
They have responded in contradictory ways. New announcements that "changes" will take place in South Africa are juxtaposed to new and draconian measures of repression. They have built up a huge war machine. They have initiated an effort at détente with some African States. They have spent millions of dollars in propaganda schemes in the United States and Western Europe. They have tried in every way to include their country in the Western alliance on the strength of the contention that their struggle is against international communism.

These desperate efforts by the racist régime in South America have at best had limited and temporary success. But they reflect the fear of the minority régime. They point to the escalation of the South American struggle in its domestic and international dimensions. They indicate that the South African struggle indeed has an international impact.

The purpose of this paper is to give selective attention to the international impact of the South African struggle. This paper will not give detailed attention to critical events inside South Africa which are the cause of international reaction and impact. That task has been and will continue to be done in other studies. Here the approach will be one of summarizing the context of the struggle and then discussing the impact of the events outlined. In spite of the limitations of this approach, perhaps this paper can convey something of the tremendous international impact of the South African struggle.

I. Impact on struggles in other countries

For the most part, the impact of the South African struggle is reflected in international reaction to critical events in South Africa. The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, and the student uprising of 1976, for example, very clearly triggered responses at the United Nations, or led to efforts in many countries to boycott South African goods. Yet, there is another dimension by which the South African impact might be measured, and that is the way in which the struggle against racism there has influenced other struggles elsewhere. Only brief consideration can be given to this dimension here. Perhaps a prime example is India, especially through the person of Mohandas K. Gandhi.

Gandhi spent about twenty years of his life in South Africa from 1893 to 1914. These years, in the perspective of the struggle for India's independence, were a period of preparation for the leadership he gave later to the Indian National Congress.

Indians were first brought to Natal in 1860 as indentured workers in the sugar cane fields. By 1891 there were about 100,000 Indians in South Africa, mostly in Natal and the Transvaal.
Gandhi went to Natal as a young lawyer to handle a lawsuit for a client. What was to be a temporary sojourn became a stay of about two decades. He was impelled to organize his first campaign of satyagraha (non-violence) to oppose discriminatory treatment of his fellow Indians.

In 1893 a tax of $15.00 was imposed by the Government of Natal on every indentured Indian worker who had finished his term of employment. The purpose of this tax was to force Indians to return to India. In the Transvaal, three discriminatory laws were put into effect. One levied a tax similar to that of Natal on Indians. A second decreed that only Christian marriages were legal. A third required every Asian who wished to live in the Transvaal to register and carry a certificate of registration at all times. Thus the pass law system, already applied to Africans, now affected Indians as well.

These laws, in addition to personal acts of discrimination and violence against Gandhi, led to his organizing efforts. The Natal Indian Congress was formed in 1894. The first mass passive resistance campaign began in 1906 against the Transvaal pass law. At a huge meeting held in a Johannesburg theatre, a satyagraha oath was taken committing the participants not to cooperate with the law and to resist it non-violently. Large numbers were arrested. Only 500 out of some 13,000 Indians in the Transvaal registered. At a mass meeting in Johannesburg in August 1908, passes were defiantly burned. The Government responded by deportations to India and the people of India reacted angrily. Gandhi himself was arrested on several occasions for disobeying the pass laws and spent considerable time in prison.

When Gandhi returned to India, he already had a national, if not an international, reputation growing out of the campaigns in South Africa. His South African experience had helped prepare him for his leadership in India's national struggle. Furthermore, his organizing efforts among the Indians of South Africa had helped lay the ground work for later co-operation of Africans and Indians in their struggle against the unjust laws of South Africa.

Another example of a way in which the South African struggle has had influence elsewhere is seen in the campaigns against discrimination in the United States. This is a subject for a much longer study. There has been a mutual influence of these struggles on one another over the years. Many African leaders have profited by their contacts with and information about campaigns against racism in the United States. But also leaders and movements in the United States have drawn inspiration from the concerted efforts to oppose injustice on the African continent and in South Africa in particular. Dr. W.E.B. Dubois, an American, was one such leader. He
was a proponent of Pan Africanism. Whether the struggle was in the United States, South Africa, the Caribbean, or elsewhere, it was all one. He wrote that the problem of the 20th century was the problem of colour. In a meeting honouring Du Bois held by the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid in February 1978, Andrew Young, then the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations rightly said:

"... as we attempt to put an end to apartheid in Africa, we are also putting an end to apartheid in America. We are putting a lie to the theory and philosophy of racist domination everywhere in the world as we join in a fulfillment of the prophecy and teaching of W.E.B. Du Bois."

Paul Robeson was another such leader. In July 1952, he wrote an article entitled "We Can Learn From the Struggle in South Africa". The article was about the Defiance Campaign. Robeson wrote:

"Just imagine if you started something like that in the South - or even in New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Indianapolis Louisville and Los Angeles."

Then, referring to the NAACP, to millions of church and fraternal organizations, he said if they

"could unite long enough to confront the nation's leaders... we wouldn't have to worry about the forthcoming political campaigns... we'd have our civil rights. This is the challenge I see in the South African militant protest."

Robeson fervently believed that the movement for racial justice in the United States was strengthened by support for the South African struggle. In 1946 he addressed a rally in Madison Square Garden:

"In that process of helping others (in South Africa) we add to our own strength and bring nearer full freedom for ourselves."

It is not by accident that Martin Luther King was very conscious of not only the anti-colonial struggles throughout the African continent, but of the campaigns being carried on against racism in South Africa. En route to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964, he made a speech in London. In it, he referred to Nelson Mandela and Robert Sobukwe, "among the hundreds wasting away in Robben Island prison." He said "in our struggle for freedom and justice in the United States, which has also been long and arduous, we feel a powerful sense of identification with those in the far more deadly struggle for freedom in South Africa."
King spoke at a mass rally organized by the American Committee on Africa on Human Rights Day (December 10) in 1965 at Hunter College auditorium in New York. He said:

"The civil rights movement in the United States has derived immense inspiration from the successful struggles of those Africans who have obtained freedom in their own nations."

The struggle in South Africa he saw as a critical part of not only the African struggle, but of that on a world-wide basis. King noted that in the United States and Britain "through our investments, through our Government's failure to act decisively, we are guilty of bolstering up the South African tyranny."

Other black American leaders recognized the indivisibility of the campaigns to end racial discrimination and segregation in the United States with the struggle in Africa and South Africa. Jackie Robinson took a leading role in the effort to boycott the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City if South Africa was allowed to participate. A. Philip Randolph was a strong voice supporting a boycott of banks loaning funds to South Africa in 1966. The NAACP played a particularly critical role in demonstrating against the United States – South African tennis matches in the Davis Cup on 1978 in Nashville, Tennessee (USA).

The liberation struggle in South Africa, and the wider struggle in Africa against colonial domination, has had a deep effect on the leadership of the anti-racist movement in the United States.

The impact of South Africa's struggle on the international scene has grown as the crisis in South Africa has deepened. This paper covers the last thirty five years, from 1946 to 1981, as the reference period for examining South Africa's impact. It should not be inferred from this that nothing of critical importance in South Africa happened before mid-century. This would obviously be incorrect. Nor should the inference be made that international responses to South African developments did not exist until about the time the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948. Passive resistance campaigns were organized at the turn of the century, as discussed above. The League of Nations had to deal with the issue of South Africa's mandate over Southwest Africa (Namibia), which the United Nations inherited, dating to 1920. But accepting this, international response and reaction to the South African crisis has grown tremendously over the last three decades.
II. The late 1940s through the 1950s

A. The Context

The pressures which were to make South Africa, and indeed the continent of Africa as a whole, an area of world attention and concern, were just taking shape in the 1950s. At the beginning of the decade there were only three independent States on the continent. By the end, there were only nine. At the first meeting of the United Nations in 1946, there were only 14 African and Asian members out of a total of 54 members. Pan Africanism achieved a new reality in the 1950s. The first conference of African independent States was held in Accra in April 1958, with only eight countries present. This was only a year after Ghana's independence, which had been achieved by a nationalist struggle inspired by Kwame Nkrumah. The first All African People's Conference (AAPC) was held in Accra in December 1958, gathering together the leadership of the movements from all parts of the continent struggling for freedom, from Algeria to South Africa. Three hundred delegates representing sixty-five organizations from twenty-eight African countries gathered in Accra to strengthen each other in their common struggle.

The Afro-Asian group at the United Nations was formed in 1955 after the landmark Bandung Conference. A specifically African group was not set up until after the first conference of independent African States in 1958 with, of course, only eight members.

On the whole the struggle in Africa was carried on non-violently in the 1950s with the notable exceptions of the F.L.N. (National Liberation Front) in Algeria and the Mau Mau in Kenya.

Inside South Africa, two events dominated the 1950s. One was the Defiance Campaign against the Unjust Laws of 1952, and its aftermath, the Congress of the People, and the Freedom Charter of 1955. The second was the arrest on the charge of treason of 156 leaders toward the end of 1956. Most were members of the ANC.

The Nationalist Party came to power with its programme of apartheid in 1948. Legislation was passed affecting all areas of life for the Africans and included the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Education Act, the Suppression of Communism Act, the Riotous Assemblies Act, the Separate Reservation of Amenities Act, the Immorality Act, etc. The pass laws had long been in existence. The practice of apartheid was not new, but its extension and the brutal thoroughness with which it was implemented was.
A new militancy appeared within the ANC led by younger members who had formed the Youth League in 1944. In only a few years, the Youth League was to dominate the whole organization. The first concrete expression of this leadership was the Defiance Campaign. This non-violent civil disobedience campaign began on 26 June 1952 with the aim of challenging key apartheid laws – the pass laws, the Group Areas Act, the Voters Act, the Suppression of Communism Act and the Bantu Authorities Act, and stock limitation laws. Prime Minister Malan rejected the demand of the ANC for abolition of these laws and stated the essence of the apartheid position: "You will realize, I think, that it is self-contradictory to claim as an inherent right of the Bantu, who differ in many ways from the Europeans, that they should be regarded as not different, especially when it is borne in mind that these differences are permanent and not man-made."

The campaign lasted for the remainder of the year. Almost 9,000 volunteers were arrested for publicly and non-violently disobeying various apartheid laws. Toward the end of the campaign, Chief Lutuli, as president of the ANC had issued a call to whites to participate. Some did, such as Patrick Juncan, son of a former Governor General of South Africa, and Albie Sachs, a young lawyer and son of a trade union leader.

A significant aspect of the campaign was that it represented a joint effort by the ANC, the South African Indian Congress, and an organization of Coloured people. A Joint Planning Council had been named that acted as the Steering Committee. This coordinated action of Africans and Indians was seen as an implementation of the so-called Doctors Pact of 1947, by which Dr. Xuma, then president of the ANC, Dr. Naicker, president of Natal Indian Congress had committed themselves to work jointly for full franchise rights and equal economic and industrial rights of all the people of South Africa.

The campaign effectively ended in December 1952, when the South African Government passed legislation to deal in severe ways with those who broke the apartheid laws. The Public Safety Act and the Criminal Laws Amendment Act empowered the Government to suspend virtually all laws, and established penalties of three to five years imprisonment of fines up to $500 with ten lashes for violation of the law.

As Chief Lutuli pointed out in his book, Let My People Go, perhaps a main contribution of the Defiance Campaign was that it created "among a very large number of Africans the spirit of militant defiance." Lutuli looked upon the Campaign as "a turning point in the struggle." Two organizations that were essentially white in membership, were spawned by the campaign – The Congress of Democrats, which became a key part of the later Congress alliance, and the Liberal Party, led by Alan Paton.
The working alliance of Africans, Indians, Coloured and whites which began with the Defiance Campaign, matured with the holding of the Congress of the People and the adoption of the Freedom Charter on 26 June 1955. The Charter, originally conceived by Prof. Z.K. Matthews, became, in effect, the platform for the ANC. It was prepared for and approved by the Congress of the People at a gathering of about 3,000 adherents at Kliptown, Johannesburg. The theme is laid out in the opening sentences:

"We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people."

The holding of the Congress of the People and the adoption of the Freedom Charter was in effect a continuation of the act of defiance.

In September 1955 the Government began organizing police raids on the houses of any South Africans suspected of sedition, treason or of offences under the Suppression of Communism Act. The press reported almost 1,000 raids on houses and offices over a period of months. Finally this led up to the infamous arrest on the charge of treason of 156 leaders. One hundred and three were African, twenty-two Indian, twenty-three white, and four Coloured. The arrests were given world-wide attention not only because of the way they were conducted (police raiding houses from 2:00 to 4:00 a.m.), but also because those arrested were from a distinguished group including professors, doctors, lawyers and clergymen.

Thousands of people demonstrated in support of their leaders outside the Drill Hall, where the trial went on. The Treason Trial was to continue for several years until finally in 1961, the Government was not able to make its case and the charges were dropped.

Lutuli wrote of the treason arrests:

"I do not hesitate to say that out of the mingling of the government's opponents of all races...a new sense of solidarity and a new sense of direction were born."

A legal defence fund was established under the leadership of Ambrose Reeves, the Anglican Bishop in Johannesburg. There was broad-based support for legal defense coming from such people as Alan Paton, Alex Hepple, a labour M.P., and Ellen Hellman of the South African Institute of Race Relations.
These developments in Africa and South Africa provided the backdrop for the impact internationally in the 1950s.

B. The Impact

The international impact to South African developments built up gradually. An editorial in the *New York Times* of 12 August 1952 was typical and set the framework for reaction to the Defiance Campaign:

"Who among us can keep reading day after day the little news-items from South Africa without a feeling of dismay? There is something degrading to humanity about these stories of Negroes being arrested - thirty, fifty, a hundred at a time - fined, jailed and now flogged... outsiders are watching the whole proceedings with a growing sense of dread, as well as disgust... a solution (to the problem of South Africa) that is based on pure racism, on the theory of perennial and innate superiority of one race over another, is false, immoral and repugnant."

Both the Defiance Campaign and the treason arrests had occurred before the final All African People's Conference (AAPC) was held in Accra at the end of 1958. A small delegation from the ANC was present, consisting of some members who were outside the country. As Lutuli pointed out, conditions in South Africa that representatives could not go directly from inside. The AAPC discussed the South African situation at length. The Conference called for an international boycott of South African goods and advocated breaking relations with any country of Africa practicing race discrimination. Lutuli wrote that the action advocating a boycott "heartened us to see that it made sense to liberatory forces outside our own country". The resolution at Accra was only the beginning of African support for the liberation struggle.

Developments in the 1950s in South Africa resulted in only the beginnings of responses by new non-governmental bodies in Europe and the United States. Clause 29 of the Native Laws Amendment Act, the so-called Church Clause, gave the South African Government the power to prohibit Africans from attending white churches. Some prominent churchmen in South Africa, led by the Bishop of Johannesburg and the Archbishop of Capetown, spoke out for civil disobedience, an act for which they could have suffered imprisonment and lashes. This led to an involvement of churches outside South Africa. The convocation of Canterbury of the Anglicans in Britain, for example, opposed as a body the apartheid policies of South Africa, and supported the South African bishops in their defiance.
In Britain, Canon L. John Collins of St. Paul's Cathedral, set up a Race Relations Fund in his organization, Christian Action, which raised thousands of pounds for purposes of aid to the dependents of these arrested in the Defiance Campaign.

In New York, the Council on African Affairs raised funds for legal defense. And a new organization calling itself Americans for South African Resistance was formed to give support financially for legal defence and relief to dependents of jailed Defiance Campaign volunteers.

This bare beginning was extended as the treason arrests occurred. Christian Action set up a Treason Trial Fund which later was to become the Defence And Aid Fund. In the United States the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) set up its South African Defense Fund. Close liaison was established with Bishop Reeves, the head of the defence fund in South Africa. Lord Gardiner, a distinguished jurist, was sent as an observer to the trial from Britain. Erwin Griswold, the dean of the law school at Harvard University, went from the United States. The British fund contributed about $350,000 to the treason trial defence, the American fund about $75,000.

South African events had an impact at the United Nations. From the first session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 until the time of the Sharpeville Massacre, March 1960, the General Assembly had adopted 21 resolutions on the racial policies of the South African Government.

The first debates in the General Assembly revolved around the treatment of people of Indian origin. Dr. A.B. Xuma, the president of the ANC, attended the session to lobby and worked closely with H.A. Naidoo of the Indian Congress. They used their influence to protest the so-called "Ghetto Bill" (the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill). The joint effort was a beginning of political collaboration of Africans and Indians to oppose the Government, and was a concrete expression of the agreement written in the Doctor's Pact of 1947.

At this same session, Dr. Xuma delivered the first petition from the Africans of Southwest Africa, protesting the South African Government's objective of incorporating the mandated territory into the Union. At this time, when there were only 54 members in the United Nations and the African Asian members were only slightly more than one fourth of the total, a French-Mexican resolution was passed by 32 votes to 15 advocating a settlement of the dispute over the treatment of the Indian community in South Africa; and by a vote of 36 to 0 rejected Smuts move to incorporate South West Africa. India's activity at the United Nations on these issues was critical. It led Lutuli to comment:
"the way in which India has taken up the cudgels on behalf of the oppressed South African majority, dragged the whole scandal of apartheid into the open, has heartened us immeasurably..."

The General Assembly first took up the racial situation in South Africa in September 1952 after the Defiance Campaign started. That year Prof. Z.K. Matthews, who had been president of the Cape Branch of the ANC, and was the leading figure of University College of Fort Hare during the 52-53 academic year was the visiting professor on World Christianity at Union Theological Seminary in New York. He attempted to appear as a petitioner before the Special Political Committee considering the agenda item. He was denied this opportunity. Up to this point in United Nations history, petitioners were permitted to appear only from trust territories. Matthews had an effect on the debate only as he lobbied among delegations in the hallways of the United Nations. By resolution 616A (VII), adopted by a vote of 35 to 1 with 23 abstentions, a commission of three was created to study the racial situation in South Africa. In 1953 and 1954, the life of the Commission was extended. On December 14, 1954, the resolution of the General Assembly expressed the profound conviction that apartheid was a grave threat to peaceful relations between ethnic groups in the world. The following year the Commission was discontinued because a two-thirds majority was lacking. The vote was 33 in favour 17 against with 9 abstentions.

In 1956 again the representatives of the Government of South Africa charged that the United Nations was violating Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter by taking up a matter within the domestic jurisdiction. The announcement was made that South Africa would maintain only token representation at the United Nations until the Charter was honoured... In 1958, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eric Louw attended the United Nations General Assembly, but absented himself from debates relating to South African policies.

As the decade ended, the South African struggle was beginning to have a growing effect on the international scene by becoming a focus of concern in Pan African politics, by responses from non-governmental organizations particularly in Britain and the United States, and by the place given to South African issues at the United Nations.

III. The 1960s

A. The Context

The decade of the 60s marked a great leap forward in the world's consciousness of Africa and South Africa. In the year 1960 alone, seventeen African countries became independent. One of these countries was the Belgian
Congo, where the ensuing disorder and the struggle for power, initially between forces backing Patrice Lumumba and those backing Joseph Kasavubu and later Moise Tshombe, led to limited confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United Nations passed resolution 1514 (XV), the so-called de-colonization resolution in December 1960, with opposition from the colonial Powers and an abstention by the United States. Two more All-African Peoples Conferences were held - in Tunis in January 1960, and in Cairo, in March 1961 bringing together the liberation movements of most of the countries of Africa not yet under majority rule.

The Organization of African Unity was founded in May 1963. The historic summit conference of 32 leaders, mostly presidents or prime ministers, was held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). An All-African charter was adopted. The OAU Committee for the liberation of Africa was set up in Dar es Salaam to administer a fund to aid liberation movements throughout the continent. A delegation was sent to inform the Security Council in New York of the explosive situation in South Africa.

The armed struggle against Portuguese colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique began and increased in intensity throughout the decade. Also the armed struggle to overthrow white minority domination began in Southern Rhodesia and in Southwest Africa. All of this was to have an effect on the South African struggle.

The event which was to dominate developments in South Africa was the Sharpeville massacre of 21 March 1960, and its aftermath. This event also was to set the tone for international responses to the South African struggle. Sharpeville, established in 1949, was the name given to the African township for the municipality of Vereeniging. Early on the morning of 21 March, according to an account by Bishop Ambrose Reeves, a crowd of 5,000 to 7,000 Africans peacefully marched to the municipal offices of the township. They were responding to a call from the Pan Africanist Congress to a demonstration to protest the pass system. Robert Sobukwe, president of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), said that those participating in the Sharpeville demonstration, as well as at other places in South Africa would "observe absolute non-violence". A force of 300 armed reinforcements were called to control the demonstrators. Five Saracen armored vehicles were on hand. At a given point, seemingly without a clear order, police fired into the midst of the crowd. Sixty-nine were killed including eight women and ten children, and 180 were wounded including thirty-one women and nineteen children.

Although the Government was shaken by the intensity of the reaction both domestically and internationally, this had the effect of tightening the State's repression and control. On 24 March the Government banned all
public meetings in 24 magisterial districts. A state of emergency was put into effect on 30 March lasting until 31 August. On 18 April, the ANC and the PAC were declared unlawful organizations. Some 20,000 Africans were detained for questioning. Bishop Reeves wrote:

"It is my personal belief that history will recognize that Sharpeville marked a watershed in South African affairs. Until Sharpeville, violence for the most part had been used in South Africa by those who were committed to the maintenance... of the white minority... The fact is that (after Sharpeville) for the first time both sides in the racial struggle in South Africa are now committed to violence; the white minority to preserve the status quo; the non-white majority to change..."

The banning of the liberation movement simply drove the leadership underground, or to political activity in exile. Three to four hundred members of the banned organizations left South Africa to widen their activities internationally. Offices of the Liberation movement were first established in Algeria, Ghana, Egypt, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Lagos, Moscow, etc.

The Rivonia trial, which began in October 1963 and lasted through June 1964, was evidence of the new status of the struggle in South Africa. Six Africans, three whites and one Indian were arrested in the Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia on 11 July 1963. They were accused of committing 193 acts of sabotage and of recruiting men for training in acts of violence to overthrow the State. Among the accused were Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, Secretary General of ANC. The accused were careful to make the distinction between the ANC and Umkhonto We Sizwe (established in November 1961), the smaller unit set up to commit acts of sabotage, but with care not to endanger life. On 11 June 1964 the defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment.

While the Government took drastic action to arrest and imprison the leadership of the liberation movements, acts of sabotage and violence continued to be out. Pogo, associated with the PAC, was responsible for some actions. Umkhonto for others. What was clear was that a new stage in the struggle had been reached. Along with other top leaders, Robert Sobukwe, president of PAC, was jailed in 1960 for 3 years in Robben Island on charges of incitement and destruction of pass books. He was refused permission to take an exit permit to leave South Africa.

The issue of apartheid in sports began to rise as an international concern in the 1960s, although the South African Government established policy clearly in the 1950s. Under the apartheid régime, strict racial separation applied in sports as well as in all other aspects of life. In June 1956, T.E. Donges, the Minister of the Interior said that "legitimate non-European sporting activities" must accord with the policy of "separate development"; This meant that whites and blacks would have separate sports
events and would not engage in competition with one another. Donges pointed out that any effort on the part of non-whites to engage in international competition at the expense of South African white participation would be looked upon as subversive.

The difficulty facing the South African Government was that sports transcended domestic policy. The attempt to enforce the external apartheid policy internationally had wide repercussions. The campaign for the right of blacks to participate in the Olympics gained momentum with the organization of the South African sports Association in 1959. The aim of the Association was to open the way for black South Africans to participate in international sports recognized as Olympic Sports. Under the apartheid system, black sports associations could affiliate with white bodies and a black athlete could be chosen through the white-controlled system to participate in an international event as an individual, but not as a representative of South Africa. In January 1963 the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) was set up specifically for the purpose of achieving recognition from the International Olympic Committee to represent South Africa in Olympic competition in place of the white South African Olympic Games Association.

Some bending of the South African Government sports policy took place in the 1960s. The policy of apartheid was reinterpreted to mean that white and black could compete against one another if the club facilities to be used were not designated closed to the race. When Sewsunker (Papwa) Sewgolum, a South African of an Indian extraction, won the South African Open golf tournament in 1963, he was not permitted to use the club house facilities although he did play the golf course. He was forced to receive his prize outside the clubhouse in a heavy rain.

B. The impact

On 3 February 1960 Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, visited Capetown and spoke to the South African Parliament. He said "the winds of change" were sweeping Africa, in a speech which reflected a response to the fervor for independence and equality on the African continent. The Johannesburg Sunday Times headed its editorial on February 7, "Mac Changed Political Face of Africa". It called this speech "the gravest international setback the Nationalist Government has suffered since it came to power in 1948... To add insult to injury, the heresy came from a distinguished Conservative rather that a "hopeless" Labour leader."

Less than a month and a half later, the events at Sharpeville and elsewhere in South Africa protesting apartheid pass laws took place. It
was clear the "winds of change" were sweeping South Africa also. The reaction internationally was immediate and took the South African Government by surprise. Within 48 hours the United States Department condemned South African police action for the first time. Members of all parties in the British parliament deplored the police violence. The Security Council at the United Nations took up the question of apartheid for the first time and on April 1 decided that the situation in South Africa had led to international friction and could endanger peace and security. The resolution was passed with no dissenting voice, but with France and Britain abstaining.

The Sharpeville Massacre gave impetus to efforts to punish South Africa economically. For a brief period, out of fear for stability, overseas investments in South Africa practically ceased. The value of shares on the Johannesburg stock exchange plunged by £501,000,000 below the January 1 level. The boycott movement was extended. It had begun in the late 1950s with the ANC resolution, which was adopted by the All Africa People's Conference held in December 1958. Already the boycott tactic had been adopted by the Jamaican Government, by the Ghana Trades Union Congress, the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, the Northern Rhodesia Trades Union Congress, and the 6th World Congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). On 11 January the Malayan Trades Union Congress decided to launch a boycott. On 20 February 1960, the Cyprus Workers Federation began a month-long boycott and pledged not to handle South African goods.

After 21 November 1960, the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions began a two-month consumers' boycott in a decision taken jointly by union federations in other Nordic countries. The West German trade union federation, the DGB, called for a consumers' boycott during April. The month-long boycott movement started on March 1 in Britain was continued indefinitely as a permanent effort of the newly-formed Anti-Apartheid Movement. The Nigerian Federal Ministries were instructed to refrain from buying South African goods. AFL-CIO president George Meany, wrote the United States Secretary of State asking for a halt to United States purchases of gold to demonstrate disapproval of "inhuman and callous" racial policies of South Africa. The merchant ship African Lightning, returned to Durban, which it had left two months earlier when Trinidad dock workers refused to unload its cargo from South Africa.

Undoubtedly the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize to Chief Albert J. Lutuli (awarded on 10 December 1961) was not unconnected with the Sharpeville killings. Sven Skovmand, a member of the Danish Parliament wrote: "The Sharpeville Massacre came as a shock to the Scandinavian people... Shortly afterwards Chief Lutuli was given the Nobel Prize mainly because of the influence of the anti-apartheid movements in Norway and Sweden."
The Rand Daily Mail commented that "Lutuli was now the most famous South African and that the attention of the world was now directed to the problem of South Africa in a new way."

The Sharpeville Massacre probably did more to help spawn anti-apartheid organizations in other countries of the world than any development up to that time. Most important of these was the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM). Its first efforts were geared to a boycott of South African produce. An early leaflet of the Movement stated: "We buy nearly one-third of South Africa's total exports.". It called for supporting "the campaign to isolate and ostracize apartheid... housewives, don't buy South African goods; cooperatives, boycott South African goods; sportsmen, don't play in South Africa; artists, don't perform in South Africa; trade unionists, don't support apartheid unions... No arms traffic with South Africa, no trade relations with South Africa.". Thus the terms were enunciated which were to be the agenda for action for the years ahead. The first Honourable President of the AAM was Mrs. Barbara Castle, a distinguished Labour M.P. Local anti-apartheid groups were organized around Britain making for an effective network for action on critical issues relating to South Africa. The Anti-Apartheid News bulletin was started in 1965 to provide a regular source of information on developments in South Africa and activities to oppose apartheid throughout the world.

Anti-apartheid groups sprang up in other parts of Western Europe. The Swedish South Africa Committee was organized after Sharpeville. It had been preceded by the Fund for the victims of Racial Oppression in Southern Africa a year earlier. Similar groups were set up in Denmark and Norway. Active movements were formed in the Netherlands (Comite Zuid Afrika), France (Comité Français contre l'Apartheid), Finland (Sydafeikakommitteu), Belgium (Comité contre le Colonialisme et l'Apartheid), Switzerland (Mouvement anti-Apartheid de Suisse).

Although these various organizations have established their own programmes and projects, they have directed their efforts toward opposing racism specifically in South Africa, and in supporting the liberation struggle. The effectiveness of their efforts have varied. They have been most effective as initiators of campaigns which have won wider support through established organizations such as trade unions, churches, and community-wide organizations. In this way they have often been able to have real influence on government policy.

In the spring of 1963 the Scandinavian youth movements combined their efforts in a boycott of South African goods. Although there was not a great deal of trade with South Africa, there was enough to have an impact.
Sven Skovmand reported that "the import from South Africa of wines, canned fruit and oranges was dramatically reduced and has never really recovered." A main thrust of the youth movement efforts was to influence the Scandinavian Governments to contribute funds for support to the victims of apartheid. This was very successful. The Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations has always served as chairman of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa ever since it was established in 1965.

After the events of March 21, international fundraising efforts to oppose apartheid and to support its victims increased dramatically. A Defence and Aid Fund had been established in South Africa. In Britain, Christian Action had set up its Defence and Aid Fund. Canon Collins wrote: "The Sharpeville incident marked a turning point, not only in the whole struggle against apartheid, but in particular, for the Defence and Aid Fund and my own work in this field."

A United Nations resolution of 1963 called on member States to assist the victims of apartheid. In response to this appeal eleven Governments announced contributions of $300,000 to Defence and Aid, the World Council of Churches and Amnesty International. In 1964, the British Defence and Aid Fund was expanded to become the International Defence and Aid Fund with six affiliated national committees. Government contributions became available to the international body. In 1964, Sweden gave £40,000. The Netherlands gave £10,000 in 1965. Other governmental contributions came from India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the Philippines, Iran and Jamaica.

At the United Nations, much greater urgency was reflected in the resolutions adopted. Only a few days after the Sharpeville massacre, on April 1, the Security Council took up the question of South Africa for the first time as has been noted above. In April of 1961 a resolution of the General Assembly calling for closing ports to South African shipping, refusing landing rights for South African aircraft, the breaking of diplomatic relations with South Africa, was adopted by a vote of 42 in favour, 34 against with 21 abstentions. But the next year, on 6 November 1962, a similar resolution was adopted by 67 - 16 - 23. The Security Council was requested to take appropriate action, including sanctions if necessary, and to consider the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations. This resolution, 1761 (XVII), also created the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa which was to take a leading role from that time in initiating international action against South Africa's apartheid. The Security Council, on 7 August 1963, called on all States to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. The United States, in a new move, joined eight other members of the Security Council in voting for the resolution with only Britain and France abstaining.
By the early 1960s, the pattern was set for United Nations actions on apartheid. The General Assembly with a growing number of African member States, adopted increasingly tough resolutions on South Africa, calling for measures which would isolate South Africa economically, militarily, politically, and culturally as long as the policy of apartheid continued. But the Security Council, by virtue of the veto power of Britain, France and the United States stopped effective action by the combined force of the United Nations with the exception of the voluntary arms embargo.

The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa was established by the General Assembly action on 15 December 1965. This effectively increased funds available for legal defence, financial assistance to the victims of apartheid and assistance to alleviate the plight of political prisoners. Over a six year span beginning in 1966, sixty-six nations contributed over $2 million to this Fund.

In 1967 the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa (UNETPSA) was established to provide scholarship assistance for students from Namibia, the Territories under Portuguese administration and Southern Rhodesia. The assistance was given primarily to students who were politically exiled. It was designed to help prepare students to play a full part in the development of their own countries when the way was open to them to return home. In a two year period from 1968-70, thirty countries contributed a little over $1,200,000 to this programme. Both in the case of the Trust Fund and UNETPSA, the Scandinavian countries were consistently the most generous contributors.

The critical events in South Africa and the growing international reaction triggered some responses that were significantly new. In 1962 the major civil rights organizations in the United States, having become more conscious of the liberation struggle in Africa, formed a coalition called the American Negro Leadership Conference in Africa. The organization involved included the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), the Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National Council of Negro Women and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) at the outset. It held three national conferences that brought pressure to bear on United States policy toward Africa. One concrete and perhaps the most successful example of this was a campaign to stop United States naval vessels from visiting South African ports. Instances of racial incidents discriminating against black American sailors had received considerable publicity in the United States. A campaign led by the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa entering attention on Congress and the White House was successful in achieving a new policy forbidding such visits.
In 1965 a "We Say No To Apartheid" campaign was initiated in the United States to encourage artists, writers, and entertainers not to visit South Africa nor to allow their works to be distributed there "until the day when all its people - black and white - shall equally enjoy the educational and cultural advantages of this rich and lovely land." A large number of outstanding personalities of stage, screen and literature pledged to cooperate with this effort, including Tallulah Bankhead, Leonard Bernstein, Harry Belafonte, Victor Borge, Diahann Carroll, Sammy Davis, Jr., Henry Fonda, Julie Harris, Langston Hughes, Burgess Meredith, Arthur Miller, Sidney Poitier, Ed Sullivan, and Eli Wallach.

In the 1960s the first serious efforts were made to oppose economic ties between South Africa and particularly the United States and Britain. In 1964 an international conference on sanctions against South Africa was held in London. About 250 delegates and observers attended this conference. Official delegations came from thirty countries, and unofficial representations from fourteen others. The report of the conference found "that a policy of total economic sanctions against South Africa is feasible and practical and can be effective."

But the practical campaigns initiated in various countries were not so much agreed to a policy of overall sanctions as they were for ending economic investments and loans. In the United States an expression of this effort was in the campaign to end bank loans to South Africa. In the mid-1960s a consortium of ten banks, led by Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank in New York, joined in a $40 million revolving loan fund to South Africa. In the period after Sharpeville when loans and investments in South Africa from overseas fell off sharply, South Africa sought aid from United States banks. One way in which help was given was through this loan fund. It became the main target of an effort by the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid which was established by the American Committee on Africa for this purpose. Between 1966 and 1969 church bodies played a leading part in pressing the banks. Deputations were sent to talk with bank executives, statements were made opposing the loan at stock holder meetings, and some accounts were withdrawn. The Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church withdrew a portfolio of $10 million from First National City Bank. The revolving loan fund was finally terminated in 1969. If the protest campaign was not alone responsible for terminating the loan, it is unlikely the action would have been taken place without it.

International sports competition reflected the impact of the struggle against apartheid in the 1960s. The central focus was the Olympic games.
A South African team was excluded from the Olympic Games held in Tokyo in 1964. The South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) had appealed to the International Olympic Committee at its meeting in Baden Baden in 1963 to exclude South Africa. The demand had been made on South Africa to "declare formally that it understands and submits to the spirit of the Olympic charter... before 31 December 1963" or withdraw from the Olympics. South Africa did not comply.

The South Africans campaigned hard so that South African team could be represented at the Olympic Games held in Mexico City in 1968. At a meeting of the I.O.C. in Teheran in 1967 South Africa offered concessions to meet the demands of the Olympic Charter. They were embodied in a plan to have a racially-mixed South African team at Mexico City but that separate Olympic committees in South Africa would nominate candidates for the team with a liaison committee under a white chairman to designate the final members. Prime Minister Vorster and Minister of Sport, Fred Waring, both made public statements that this did not mean an end to apartheid in sports in South Africa. Waring said: "Our policy is separate sport and if the demand is made upon us... that we must change our pattern of sport and mix it, we are not prepared to pay the price." (Cape Argus, 16 September 1967)

In December 1966, thirty-two African countries formed the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa. One of the first actions of this body was to call for a boycott of the Olympics if South Africa participated. Even so, these so-called concessions were briefly accepted by the IOC at its Grenoble meeting in February 1968. However, the decision was soon reversed due to the prospect of a massive boycott of the Games to protest South African's presence. In support of this action sixty-four outstanding amateur and professional athletes spoke out for a boycott of the Games if South Africa participated. This group of primarily black athletes was led by Jackie Robinson.

An ever-increasing number of international sporting bodies suspended or excluded South African teams from participating in events including boxing, cricket, fencing, judo, soccer, table tennis, wrestling, weightlifting.

Bishop Ambrose Reeves wrote in 1968:
"The choice before the international community has been a clear one ever since Sharpeville. Either it takes every possible step to secure the abandonment of the present policies in South Africa or the coming years will bring increasing sorrow and strife both for South Africa and for the world."
IV. From the 1970s to the 1980s

A. The context

The importance of the changes in Africa in the past decade (the 1970s and early 1980s) has focused international attention on South Africa with a new intensity. The armed struggle waged against centuries-old Portuguese domination in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique came to a successful conclusion. The military coup in Portugal in April 1974 ushered in changes in Southern Africa that would affect the relationship of South Africa with the rest of Africa and the world. The struggle for power in Angola between contending movements backed by world Powers made the sub-continent a possible ground for major international conflict.

Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980 after a fourteen-year guerrilla struggle further isolated South Africa. The Government of this new country, headed by Robert Mugabe, represented a victory of a nationalist political coalition, the Patriotic Front, which South Africa had vigorously opposed. The political grouping led by Abel Muzorewa, which South Africa favoured, was decisively defeated in internationally supervised elections, and this victory came as a shock to South Africa.

The Namibian struggle for independence took center stage. The plan for a United Nations supervised and controlled election leading to independence, which South Africa had in principle accepted, was not implemented because of South Africa's fear of a SWAPO victory patterned after Mugabe's in Zimbabwe. The South African Government, in desperate military moves from bases in Namibia, made increasing raids into Southern Angola. Over 800 Namibian refugees were killed in a refugee camp at Kassinga in Angola in May 1978. In June 1980 an estimated 500 Angolan civilians and Namibians were killed in a South African raid called "Operation Smokeshell". A similar South African raid beginning on 21 August 1980 killed more than seven hundred people, according to Angolan reports. In January 1981 a South African commando raid to the outskirts of Maputo in the middle of the night, gutted three houses, killing thirteen people.

The 1970s marked a period of growing confrontation in South Africa. The greatest international impact came from the events which culminated in the Soweto student demonstrations of June 1976. Ironically the Soweto uprising and the draconian measures which the South African Government took to meet the challenge came on the heels of a brief experiment with détente in Africa. The overthrow of Portugal's empire in Africa, removing one of South Africa's major allies caused severe apprehension. Prime Minister Vorster travelled in Africa "in a vain effort to win friends and implement his forward policy". But this brief episode was interrupted by
the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, by the black demonstrations hailing the independence of Mozambique in 1975, by the struggle in Angola, and capped by the student uprising in Soweto and 70 other townships in South Africa.

The thousands of students demonstrating in the streets of Soweto in protest against the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of education and indeed against the whole apartheid system might have gone by relatively unnoticed in the outside world if it had not been for the violence perpetrated by the police. Six hundred to a thousand were killed in confrontations over a period of only a few days. The demonstrations spread to Capetown and other parts of South Africa. The world reacted. The student leaders came to public attention. A new generation of political exiles was created as hundreds of youth escaped from South Africa to bordering countries and then to other parts of Africa and the world. A crisis of major proportions unfolded in South Africa even more severe than that at Sharpeville.

A writer in the Johannesburg Star of 26 June 1976 commented:

"The Soweto riot last week... could have an effect as far-reaching as (Sharpeville) on South Africa's future. For the first time since the ANC pass campaign there are signs of a unified urban Black front closing rank against what it considers further unbearable oppression."

Signs of this unity were efforts of relatively new organizations to join forces, such as the Parents Vigilance Committee, the Parents Action Association, and the African Housewives League.

The atmosphere of confrontation in the 1970s was not limited to student actions. In 1973 a wave of wildcat strikes by trade unions erupted. More than 360 strikes and work stoppages took place in Natal in 1973 and 54 more in 1974. More than 50,000 African workers marched through the streets of Durban in February 1973 demanding higher wages. Dockworkers, bricklayers, textile and rubber workers, municipal employees were among those demonstrating. The strikes brought production to a halt in more than 100 firms and severely hampered municipal services. Five hundred workers in the textile industry were fired in Durban and financial help came through special funds mostly from trade unions. In September eleven miners were shot by police when demonstrating for increased wages at the Western Deep Levels Gold Mine at Carletonville.

During the 1970s the link between South Africa's economic activity and that of major Western Governments drew increased attention. The South African economy depends greatly on foreign capital. British firms provide about half of the long-term direct investment. The United States corporations make up about twenty per cent.
In 1950 United States investment in South Africa amounted to about $140 million. By 1976 the figure was $1.67 billion. Thus American investment became an important factor in the health of the white-controlled economy of South Africa.

The call from South African black leadership to Governments with strong economic links with South Africa to disengage became urgent. The South African Government looked upon this as treasonable. Nevertheless, leaders of the ANC, PAC and black organizations urged an end to economic ties. Bishop Tutu, then Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, had his passport withdrawn in 1979 after a trip abroad. Voicing the views of a large constituency in South Africa, Bishop Tutu called for "economic pressure... that will persuade the South African authorities to come to the conference table before it is too late", in a speech at the United Nations on 23 March 1981.

The South African Government proceeded with its apartheid policy in the 1970s with the creation of so-called "independent" bantustans beginning with the Transkei in 1976. Ciskei became the 4th such "state" on 1 December 1981. No country except South Africa has recognized them.

The South African Government continued its crackdown on its individual and organizational opponents. In September 1977 Steve Biko, the inspirational leader of the black consciousness movement, was killed while in custody by police. The reaction to this both inside and outside South Africa, was overwhelming. A little over a month later, in October 1977 19 organizations were banned and 28 individuals banned or detained.

The small gestures toward reform made by the Government of P.W. Botha, who became Prime Minister in 1978, did not change the atmosphere of bitter struggle inside the country. The fundamental demand of the black people for participation in the political process and in holding power in Government commensurate to their numerical strength, was frustrated by the repressive acts of Government and the merciless implementation of the Bantustan policy. Sabotage activity by the underground ANC increased. In the two years from 30 June 1979, the Rand Daily Mail of 28 July 1981 reported 127 incidents of "political violence and sabotage" in which 70 people were killed. This included 30 serious arson attacks, 16 serious stonings, 13 explosive device incidents, 13 cases of railway sabotage, 10 grenade attacks, 6 attacks on police stations and 8 attacks on policemen. The most destructive attacks were on the oil-from-coal storage tanks at Sasolburg in 1980, with an estimated damage of $4 million, and on two major Transvaal Province power stations in July 1981.

The South African Government increased its defence spending by 40 per cent for fiscal year 1981/82 to 2.7 billion. The South African Government has also vastly increased its lobbying, and public relations activities
abroad in order to create a favourable image particularly in the United States. An estimated $1.8 million a year is spent in the United States to sell the Bantustan policy, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia, to encourage tourism, and to create an image of South Africa as an indispensable anti-communist ally globally.

In his speech before the Special Committee against Apartheid at the United Nations on 23 March 1980, Bishop Tutu said:

"I wish to say again that if the South African racial situation is not resolved reasonably quickly, it could very well be something that triggers off World War III. Now for some people that sounds melodramatic but when you have been aware of what nearly happened between the United States and the Soviet Union over Angola, then you can realize that what I am saying is not hyperbole."

B. The impact

The Soweto student uprising was undoubtedly the most traumatic development in South Africa in the 1970s. Yet, the international response, although immediate and dramatic, did not spawn new actions to the same degree as the Sharpeville Massacre did sixteen years earlier. The effect of Soweto was to spur on actions already in progress rather than to trigger new kinds of responses. Disengagement campaigns were quickened and broadened; United Nations resolutions were more demanding; efforts for sports and cultural boycotts were strengthened. Also, for at least a brief moment, Western Governments became more sensitive to South African racism and its international repercussions.

When, only a little more than a week after the Soweto demonstrations, Prime Minister Vorster was in West Germany to meet with Henry Kissinger, United States Secretary of State, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt used the occasion to speak of West Germany's strong opposition to South Africa's racial policies and to dissociate Bonn from Vorster's presence there.

The Carter administration came into office six months after the Soweto uprising when the effects of the student actions were still very fresh. The rhetoric of this administration was strong. Mr. Andrew Young, as an architect of the Carter policy toward Africa, spoke of a "revolution in the consciousness of the American people" toward Southern Africa. Vice-President Mondale met with Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna and said afterward that he hoped South Africa would not be under "any illusions that the United States will in the end intervene to save South Africa..."
One of the most concrete impacts of the South African struggle internationally in the 1970s was the quickened action for economic disengagement from South Africa in western countries that were the principal trading partners of the Republic. An early success was the dramatic withdrawal of the Polaroid Corporation from South Africa announced on 21 November 1977. This action was made all the more important as Polaroid had sponsored a widely publicized campaign in January 1971 proclaiming it would stay in South Africa in order to help improve the lives of South African blacks in spite of pressure from some of its black employees and its stockholders to terminate its business there. But with the discovery that Polaroid equipment was being used by the South African Government to produce the hated passes in violation of a specific agreement worked out in 1971, Polaroid terminated its South African business.

The South African issue of apartheid was responsible for rejuvenating student organizations and action on college and university campuses across the United States. An editorial appearing in the New York Times on 2 April 1978, said: "The campuses are astir again and the issue is South Africa. Students and teachers want to attack that nation's racist policies through the power of the American corporations doing business there.". Almost overnight, campaigns began springing up on campuses shortly after the Soweto uprising to pressure the universities and colleges to divest themselves of stockholding in corporations doing business in South Africa. At Princeton University, the People's Front for the Liberation of Southern Africa was set up. The South Africa Support Committee was organized at Amherst. At Stanford University the Stanford Committee for a Responsible Investment Policy led the effort. A South African Catalyst Project was set up to help initiate and co-ordinate efforts on a large number of campuses in the western part of the United States. A north-East coalition for the Liberation of Southern Africa was organized in the past. Demonstrations, mass meetings, leaflet distribution, confrontation tactics with university administrators and trustees were actively pursued. And the universities began to respond. By 1979 at least 18 outstanding institutions of higher learning in the United States partly or wholly divested. On dozens of other campuses the issue dominated campus activity. Universities had seriously begun to deal with the issue for the first time.

Churches were impelled to action in response to the liberation struggle in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1969 the World Council of Churches inaugurated its Programme to combat Racism. In ten
years $2.6 million, more than half of it in southern Africa, had been spent in pursuit of its aim to oppose racism. Although the funds granted were to be used for humanitarian, not military purposes, the programme has been highly controversial leading the Salvation Army to withdraw from the Council in 1981. Both the ANC and the PAC have been recipient of grants.

The major policy issue confronting the churches has been their holdings in corporations or banks doing business in South Africa. The World Council of Churches took a position on this issue in 1972 when its Finance Committee was instructed to sell holdings and end investments in South Africa and Namibia, and not to make deposits in banks operating in these countries. One million and half dollars was involved.

The Governing Board of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America, representing 30 church bodies, made its definitive statement on the issue of investment on 1 November 1977 less than a month after the large-scale bannings and arrests in South Africa. The policy statement:

"called for ending economic and military collaboration with South Africa and to undertake to withdraw all funds and close all accounts in financial institutions which have investments in South Africa or make loans to the South African Government or businesses..."

The beginning of organized church efforts in the United States to give concentrated attention to social and political responsibilities in financial investments date from the early 1960s. The civil rights struggle first prompted attention to investments as a means of pressing for political ends. In 1969, James Forman, who had been one of the leaders of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, raised the issue to a new level when he appeared uninvited and unexpectedly in the pulpit of Riverside Church, perhaps the most prestigious Protestant church in the country, to present a black manifesto calling for reparations from the churches to black Americans for injustices of the past. Sit-ins took place at the headquarters of the National Council of Churches and denominations were spurred by internal pressure to give serious attention for the first time to church investments. The Corporate Information Centre, established in 1970, was broadened in 1974 to become the Interfaith Center of Corporate Responsibility with 14 Protestant denominations and 150 Catholic orders associated.

Church bodies have been the most influential sector of American institutional life in pressing corporations involved in South Africa to examine their operations. Every year since 1971 resolutions at stock-
holders meetings have been sponsored by church groups calling for withdrawal from South Africa or at least to end expansion.

A broad coalition of organizations – black and civil rights, churches, trade unions, students – have joined in the campaign to end bank loans to the South African Government. In Britain an organization called End Loans to South Africa was founded in 1974. Its first objective was to campaign against Midlands Bank and its part in the European-American Banking Corporation loan of over $210 million which had come to public attention the year before. The main supporter in this campaign in Britain was the Finance Board of the Methodist Church. The issue was taken to the Midland’s stockholder meeting where the call for a termination of the bank’s involvement in the European-American Bank Corporation did not win, but where significant support for the campaign came from the Greater London Council, the Commissioners of the Church of England, more than a dozen other church bodies and three universities.

In the United States the Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa with 38 affiliated organizations was set up to spearhead efforts for the withdrawal of funds from banks making loans to South Africa. Combined with this effort have been resolutions, made in stockholder meetings calling for an end to loans. Such resolutions also emanated mainly from church bodies. Although no major international bank has completely withdrawn from South Africa, the effect of the campaign loans to South Africa has been to force bank administrations to announce policies which have, in some cases, ended loans to the South African Government or its projects, and have led to statements critical of apartheid.

A newer focus for campaigns has been investment policies of State and local Governments in the United States. Twelve states and ten cities in the United States have either adopted legislation against allowing public funds to be used for loans or investment in South Africa, or have efforts under way to accomplish this. States that have passed resolutions or legislation ending or limiting public funds for South Africa investment are California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska and Wisconsin.

Internationally, the trade union movement has given increased attention to South Africa's apartheid policy. The International Labour Organisation first denounced South Africa and apartheid in 1964. Nine years later, only 3 months after wildcat strikes erupted throughout South Africa, the ILO sponsored an International Trade Union Conference against Apartheid in Geneva. More than 200 national, regional and
international unions, representing more than 180 million workers, participated. At about the same time the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) compiled a list of 1,600 companies with investments and/or in South Africa. The ICFTU called for unions affiliated with it to refuse to handle goods from South Africa. In Britain the Postal Truckers Union planned a work stoppage which the Government refused to permit. Boycott actions did take place in Canada, the Netherlands and Australia.

A number of national unions in the United States have withdrawn funds from banks loaning money to South Africa including the Joint Furriers Council which withdrew an $8 million payroll account and a $16 million welfare and pension account from Manufactures Hanover Trust. Other similar withdrawals have been made by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, District 1199 of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, the National Longshoremen and Warehouse workers Union. Douglas Fraser, President of the United Auto Workers made the following policy statement on 3 March 1978:

"The UAW will withdraw its funds from banks and financial institutions that participate in loans to South Africa because of the country's racist, undemocratic, political and economic practices."

In 1974 the United Mine Workers actively supported a boycott of coal from South Africa. Local dock workers refused to unload coal from southern ports of entry.

Perhaps it should not be surprising that one result growing out of the Soweto uprising in South Africa and the crisis atmosphere this helped engender, together with the action campaigns focused on companies doing business with South Africa, was a new emphasis on reform in foreign-owned corporations in South Africa. These corporations were subjected to pressure to prove they could be a force for change in South Africa. The European Economic Community adopted a Code of Conduct for European business enterprises in South Africa. In the United States the so-called Sullivan Principles outlined six practices recommended for American-related corporations such as non-segregation, equal pay for equal work, increased managerial positions for blacks, and initiation of training programmes for blacks. Rev. Leon Sullivan, a Baptist minister and the only black member of General Motors Board of Directors, was the architect of these principles. The "codes of conduct" approach to change in South Africa immediately became a controversial issue. Opponents argued that they not only could not be a force for change, but they became a rationale for foreign-related firms to continue their role in South Africa which strengthened the white-minority Government. The fact that codes of conduct became an accepted approach by so many foreign companies in South Africa to justify their continued operation there was further testimony to the centrality of the issue of investment in South Africa.
United Nations resolutions and activities on South Africa and apartheid were speeded up in the 1970s to keep pace with the urgency of developments. The Special Committee against Apartheid initiated a multitude of conferences, seminars and studies. Among some of the notable actions were initiation of International Year to Combat Racism in 1971, the International Labour Conference against Apartheid in 1974, Seminar on the Eradication of Apartheid and in Support of the Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa held in Havana, Cuba, in 1976, and also the initiation of a Programme for the Decade of Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination the same year. 1976 was a land-mark session for the General Assembly on Southern Africa. Thirty-seven resolutions were passed by overwhelming majorities marking the year of Soweto and Transkei "Independence". There was the World Conference for Action against Apartheid in 1977, and the Seminar on South Africa, Military Build-up and Nuclear Plans held in London in 1978. 1978 was also proclaimed and observed as International Anti-Apartheid Year.

The resolutions of the General Assembly annually called for the isolation of South Africa for a boycott of South African goods and for sanctions. In 1976 emphasis was put on an embargo on the supply of petroleum as a strategic raw material. The Security Council was more inhibited in its action than the General Assembly because of the constant reality of veto against any move for sanctions on South Africa by the 3 permanent Western Members of the Security Council. A mandatory arms embargo action was imposed by the Security Council in November 1977 with United States approval. On 30 April 1981, however, the United States, Britain and France vetoed resolutions calling for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa on the issue of Namibia.

The increased attention by the United Nations to the arms embargo against South Africa and to the supply of oil to the régime stimulated activities in these areas.

In Oslo an office under the direction of Mr. Samad Abdul Minty was set up called The World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. This office monitored violations of the arms embargo and helped to coordinate action internationally.

One case which received considerable attention involving an open violation of the South African arms embargo was the shipment of 50,000 shells and up to 60 gun barrels from the Space Research Corporation (now known as Sabre Industries). Space Research operates in the United States, Canada, the Caribbean and Belgium. The exposure of the gross violation of the arms embargo was first discovered by dock workers in Antigua in 1977. On 22 April 1980, the United States reported to the United Nations that the SRC had pleaded guilty in the legal case brought by the United States. Two men were sentenced to 6 months in prison.
The company was given a $45,000 fine and went into bankruptcy.

The most effective work researching the supply of oil to South Africa has been done from the Netherlands. In March 1980 an International Seminar on an Oil embargo against South Africa was held in Amsterdam. It was organized by the Holland Committee on Southern Africa, and the Working Group Kairos in cooperation with the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid. The declaration of the Seminar referred to the United Nations General Assembly resolution on an oil embargo against South Africa of 12 December 1979, supported the implementation of an embargo and said "Such an embargo has become feasible since all Member States of OPEC and other major oil exporting countries have now prohibited export of their oil to South Africa". This action was taken by OPEC countries in 1979. And yet a study issued by the two Holland organizations in March 1981 revealed that "Approximately once every five days, a supertanker sails into one of oil worth around $50 million." These oil deliveries are secret because the identity of the source of the oil must be guarded in view of the Member States embargo by OPEC.

Experience has shown the difficulty of effectively implementing both the oil and arms embargoes because of the complexity of trade and the multiplicity of agencies involved. More apparent success has occurred in the quite different area of international sports activities. The impact of South African events of the 1970s in international sport was considerable. A 1970 South African cricket team tour of Britain sponsored by the prestigious Marylebone Cricket Club (MCC) was finally cancelled by the British Government. But this occurred only after months of demonstrations. A Stop-the-Seventies-Tour (STST) campaign was organized in 1969 which used a South African rugby team tour of Britain for a show of strength. Some 50,000 demonstrators were involved with 400 arrests in opposing the rugby tour. In spite of this, the MCC and the Cricket Council continued with their plans for the cricket tour. The British Government finally took action cancelling the 1970s tour when the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa threatened a boycott of the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games scheduled for later in the year and Government such as India said they would definitely not participate if the cricket tour took place.

The 1971 Springbok Rugby Tour of Australia was a catalyst for national organization which affected political alignments in the country. The tour was not cancelled but it ignited mass anti-South African demonstrations of unprecedented scope. For the first time since Sharpeville, South Africa was in the headlines in Australia. There were over 500 arrests, a strike by 125,000 workers, an 18 day state of emergency in Queensland and an expenditure of some $27 million by the Government for police. The coalition formed in opposition to this tour consisting of unions, students,
churches and aboriginals may have been a key to electing Gough Whitlam head of the Australian Labour Party, to power in 1972. This in turn was responsible for a new Australian policy on South Africa, disallowing any future racially selected teams to visit or transit the country, joining the Council for Namibia at the United Nations, contributing to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and even voting for the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations.

South Africa was officially excluded from the Olympic Movement by action of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1970. Nevertheless, South Africa's racial policies were a central feature affecting the Montreal Games in 1976. The issue was a tour by a New Zealand rugby team of South Africa only weeks after the Soweto student uprising. The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa made quite clear its intention to boycott the Olympic Games if New Zealand was permitted to participate following the rugby tour of South Africa. More than 30 national teams and at least 600 athletes were involved in the boycott. This action heralded the distinct possibility that future Olympics could definitely be jeopardized by sports contacts between any country and teams in South Africa selected within the framework of apartheid.

The effective extension of the principle of boycotting apartheid in sports was realized by the so-called Gleneagles Agreement signed in Scotland in 1977. The signatories were the Heads of the Commonwealth countries. By it they agreed to take all measures to stop sporting contacts with South African teams and individuals.

International antipathy to apartheid was well enough established by the 1970s so that any sports or cultural contact with South Africa almost any place in the world became a matter of controversy and confrontation. More than 6,000 people representing a broad coalition of civil rights organizations headed by the NAACP protested South Africa's participation in the Davis Cup tennis match in Nashville, Tennessee in 1978. Demonstrators outnumbered spectators by more than 3 to 1, the matches were a financial disaster, and South Africa was subsequently suspended from further Davis Cup competition one month later. Protests did not stop Mike Weaver from his heavyweight match with Garrie Coetzee in Bophutatswana in 1980, but they did stop John Mc Enroe form going through with a million dollar tennis contest against Bjorn Börg in the same place.

The 1981 Springbok Rugby Tour of New Zealand and the United States led to protests of major proportions. The tour of New Zealand lasted six weeks, beginning in July. More than 2,000 were arrested and hundreds hurt as a result of demonstrations and police action. The Government of New Zealand opposed the tour but did not cancel it. Prime Minister Muldoon commented: "Long before the tour began, I said it would be a disaster."
I believe I was right.". The New York Times story of 22 October 1981 read as follows: "Most New Zealanders believe that the invitation to the South African Springbok team to play rugby here was not worth it."

In the United States, the rugby tour began on the heels of the New Zealand visit. An ad hoc Stop the Apartheid Rush Tour (SART), with more than 100 organizations in the coalition, was organized. The original schedule called for the Springboks to play in Chicago, New York and Albany. The Chicago and New York matches were cancelled through mass pressure on the city administrations. A game was secretly played with no fanfare or advance publicity in Racine, Wisconsin. The only publicized match took place in Albany with about 2,500 demonstrating against it in a heavy rain and a very sparse attendance of perhaps 300 in the stadium.

A measure of the international impact of the South African struggle is seen in the campaign for the release of political prisoners, particularly pointed toward the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress of South Africa now serving a life sentence on Robben Island for his conviction in the Rivonia trial of 1964. Next to Chief Lutuli, he probably is the most outstanding leader of the ANC. He was in charge of recruiting and directing volunteers in the Defiance Campaign on 1952. He was a law partner of Mr. Oliver Tambo in Johannesburg, now the President of the ANC. He was one of those accused of treason in 1956. He was also a founder of Umkhonto We Sizwe, the military arm of the ANC, which first organized acts of sabotage against the South African Government.

Although there have been limited campaigns for release of South African prisoners over the years, particularly in Britain where there are so many South African political exiles, the effort begun in 1980 received widespread international support. The campaign was started by the Sunday Post in South Africa in March 1980 after the dramatic victory of Robert Mugabe in the Zimbabwe elections. It gathered international support of significant proportions no doubt because it was initiated inside South Africa. Bishop Tutu was the first to sign the petition for Mandela's release to be circulated in all churches of the South Africa Council of Churches. Lutu commented:

"We call for the release of Mandela because the Government has to deal with him as a leader of the blacks. Once they release him they will have difficulty in justifying holding other leaders such as Walter Sisulu."

In June the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the release of Mandela and all other political prisoners. In July all
the Commonwealth countries called for Mandela's immediate and unconditional release. The British Labour Party invited Mandela and Toivo ya Toivo of Namibia (also on Robben Island) to address their party conference in October.

By September 1960 72,000 people in South Africa had signed the petition, an act of particular courage because Mandela's name, picture or writings are displayed illegally according to the prevailing security legislation and government regulation. Typical of action on African countries were 6,000 signatures to a petition circulated at the University of Zimbabwe in November. In April 1981, the British Anti-Apartheid movement and the Defence and Aid Fund released an amazingly distinguished list of signatures representing members of Parliament, Labour, Church and Community leaders. The combined constituency of the signatories represented an estimated 10 million people.

The South African struggle has had and will continue to have a major international impact because the majority of the South African people and their outstanding leaders such as Mandela are committed to carry on. In a letter to the South African Prime Minister just before Mandela received a five-year sentence for leaving the country illegally in 1962 he said:

"... we wish to make it perfectly clear that we shall never cease to fight against repression and injustice... We have no illusions of the serious implications of our decision. We know that your Government will once again unleash its fury and barbarity to persecute the African people... But no power on earth can stop an oppressed people determined to win their freedom."

Chief Lutuli was reflecting the same determination when he said in his address upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize:

"We South Africans... understand that much as others might do for us, our freedom cannot come to us as a gift from abroad. Our freedom we must make ourselves."