

UNITED STATES POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

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PREFACE

This study was originally prepared for a seminar on "U.S. Policy Toward Africa" sponsored by the Phelps-Stokes Fund in March 1974. A month later, the repressive dictatorship of Marcello Caetano was overthrown by a military coup in Portugal.

While pressures had steadily been mounting on the regime both in its African colonies and at home in the metropole the Coup compressed great changes into a few days. Now there is a new regime in Portugal which has already shown itself willing to attempt some kind of negotiation with the liberation movements. Nevertheless, many questions remain unanswered. The liberation movements have long-stated their unequivocal demand for total independence from Portugal. The new government in Portugal represents several divergent forces—only some of which would be prepared to accede to such a demand, while there are strong forces pushing to maintain as extensive control as possible over the African territories.

Whatever the events of the future, they will not eradicate the record of the past, nor invalidate the thesis presented in this study: that U.S. policy in southern Africa up till now, has been one of support for the dominant white minority and colonial regimes. Policies in Portugal may well continue to change in the coming months. So far there is no indication of any change in the basic components of U.S. policy. And so long as that is true, the U.S. will continue to play a role which impedes the movement of the people of all southern Africa toward freedom.

Key to Organizations Mentioned:

- F.L.N. . . . National Liberation Front [Algeria]
- SWAPO: South West African Peoples Organization
- P.A.I.G.C.: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde)
- FRELIMO: Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique)
- MPLA: Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)

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A Position Stated

Perhaps it is appropriate at the outset of my argument to establish my position. My basic contention is that U.S. policy is much more dynamically keyed to forces attempting to maintain the status quo in southern Africa than to forces of change. Waldemar Nielsen put it very politely in terms of South Africa when he said in his book, *African Battleground*, "There is a considerable degree of truth in the designation of the United States as one of South Africa's chief allies. For the fact is that although the United States has repeatedly expressed criticism of apartheid in recent years, it has simultaneously appeared to contradict its statements by other actions. . . ."

In a pre-election interview in 1972 President Nixon said, "I wouldn't want to leave the impression that . . . Africa will not get attention. . . . [it] will, because none of our present policies are sacred cows. I'm going to look at the African policy to see how our programs can be improved in those areas."¹ The "improvements" made under the Nixon administration are indicative of the direction of U.S. policy toward southern Africa. Under the fitting headline "U.S. Widens Ties to African Whites," Terrence Smith summarized some of these policies in an article in the *New York Times* of April 2nd, 1972. He mentioned the sale of Boeing 707 airliners directly to the Portuguese government; the sale of small civilian jet aircraft to South Africa; the permission given Union Carbide Corporation to import a shipment of chrome from Rhodesia in 1970 which was said to have been purchased before U.N. sanctions (in spite of this request having been denied in 1968 and 1969); the agreement with Portugal to renew the lease for an American airbase in the Azores and the quid pro quo of export-import loans to Portugal; and the greatly increased negative voting record at the United Nations on issues related to colonialism in southern Africa. To this list one could add the weak administration position on the sanctions-breaking Byrd Amendment in 1971 and the continued provision of military training for Portuguese army and airforce personnel.

In a January, 1974 article appraising U.S.-South African relations during 1973, Ken Owen, the Washington correspondent for the *Johannesburg Star*, commented that "the democratic administration's drift towards a policy of isolating South Africa has been checked and in marginal areas where it was politically feasible, reversed."²

David Newsom, former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, set the theoretical context of U.S. policy towards southern Africa in a speech delivered to the Mid-America Committee in Chicago on June 28,

1972. He outlined three constant elements in that policy which certainly antedate Nixon's administration. These were, support for the principle of self-determination; abhorrence for the institution of apartheid; and support for peaceful change in southern Africa through constructive alternatives to the use of force. It is the contradiction between stated policy and practice that must dismay those who are concerned about the future of southern Africa.

It is important to note that the policy of the Nixon administration has differed only in degree, not in kind, from that which goes back to the early 1950s when the emergence of African independent states made it imperative to develop a policy toward Africa. In testifying before the House Subcommittee on Africa on U.S.-South African relations in March 1966, I commented that American policy towards South Africa was at best characterized as one of "reluctant concern." I pointed out that the United States had reluctantly been "pushed by the African countries to state an increasing concern about the injustices in South Africa," adding that it had "dragged its heels at almost every point." Immanuel Wallerstein elaborated further on this view in an article written in 1969 in which he observed that U.S. foreign policy on Africa, "consistent throughout American history," had "pursued the goal of a minimum amount of trouble purchased with a minimum expenditure of time, money and energy..." Wallerstein added, "Beginning with the Eisenhower administration and continuing under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the policy of neglecting Africa changed somewhat but more in style than in substance. Washington continued to want little trouble with less effort, but didn't want the Africans to know about it."³

Clearly, U.S. policy has been a non-initiating one and it has always lagged well behind the changed circumstances in Africa. In 1952, when South Africa's racial situation first became an item on the United Nations agenda, the United States opposed the formation of the "Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa". The U.S. position exactly paralleled that of South Africa, namely that the world organization was not competent to deal with the internal affairs of a member state. It was not until 1958 that the United States revised its position enough to vote with a majority resolution expressing "regret and concern" over South Africa's continual flouting of the United Nations charter. But even then the U.S. refused to permit the word "condemn" to be included in the resolution. This is typical of the development of American policy over the years. By the time the U.S. has found it possible to vote for a somewhat condemnatory resolution, majority world opinion has taken another long stride ahead leaving the U.S. again in the minority joining the colonialist nations.

Only during a portion of the Kennedy administration was there an

exception to the general stance of American policy. By the end of 1960 there were 26 independent African states. Kennedy's administration coincided with a period of great optimism in Africa. It was assumed even in the State Department that soon all of southern Africa would be under majority rule. In the cold war atmosphere of the early '60s the United States and the Soviet Union vied for influence particularly among southern Africans. The U.S. government was so concerned about reports of the number of southern African students going to Soviet bloc countries to study that a team was sent to East Africa to make a survey in 1963. The report from this investigation indicated that for every student that came to the U.S., nine were going to Communist countries. A student program was beefed-up by the United States. A growing number of students from southern Africa came to American colleges. They too were optimistic that their countries would be independent soon and that their advanced education would put them in a preferred position for leadership roles in their own countries.

During this period Francis Plimpton, speaking for the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, condemned apartheid in these words: "The United States abhors apartheid. We rejoice in the bravery of the men and women of South Africa who fight on day by day for racial justice." The Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front) representatives met for the first time with State Department officials in Washington. After the events of March 15, 1961 in Angola, the U.S. voted to condemn Portuguese policy in the Security Council. And in August, 1962, the U.S. voted for a Security Council resolution calling for a ban on the sale of arms to South Africa.

But on the whole, U.S. policy has been not to unduly disturb the status quo in southern Africa. Up to the time of the Nixon administration votes on colonial issues at the U.N. had frequently been abstentions (such as the astounding one in December, 1960, at the end of the Eisenhower administration, on the key U.N. resolution on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples). But under the Nixon administration, especially as the demands of the African states have become more urgent, the balance of U.S. voting record has tipped to the negative. In the 1972 General Assembly for example, of the eight major resolutions on southern Africa and colonial issues, the U.S. voted negatively on seven and abstained on one. For the most part the United States was joined in these votes by South Africa and Portugal.

The fact is that U.S. verbal support of the idea of self-determination (not necessarily independence) has not been reflected in performance. Government spokesmen explain this in a variety of ways. They say that other international issues take precedence; that government resources must be directed toward difficult domestic racial problems; that no

powerful pressure groups exist to force the U.S. to give top priority to the struggle for freedom in southern Africa. But the fact most obvious to onlookers including those engaged actively in the liberation struggle, is that American interests reflect concrete considerations of economic involvement in southern Africa and global military strategies.

Assumptions About the Nature of the Southern Africa Situation

Foreign policy cannot exist in a vacuum. It is judged realistic to the extent that it relates effectively to an objective situation. What is the objective situation in southern Africa to which policy must relate if it is to be realistic? Southern Africa can be considered as a unit because the vast majority of the people in the area share common problems. First, they have been the victims of conquest by a European power. While this was the experience of the entire African continent as well as other parts of the world, the difference is that for the southern African countries (and for our discussion here Guinea-Bissau is included as part of this complex) the conquest is still a fact of life.

Second, the people of southern Africa share a history of racial domination by a white minority. Racial laws were put into effect to keep the people permanently in a position of subjugation. Apartheid was codified into a system of laws in South Africa, and similar tactics were used throughout southern Africa to limit the movement of African people in their own countries. African labor could then be exploited and competition on the basis of equality avoided. In spite of some differences in the areas under Portuguese domination, a racist system also prevailed. As Eduardo Mondlane pointed out with regard to the racist policies introduced in Portuguese-dominated areas "the most the assimilado system even sets out to do is to create a few 'honorary whites,' and this certainly does not constitute non-racialism. . . ."⁴

Third, and closely related to the second point, the majority of the people in southern Africa share a common economic domination by the white minority. The greater portion of the land—the richest and most productive—as well as industries, managerial positions, and the better paying jobs are all in the hands of the white minority.

Fourth, the Africans in these dominated areas of southern Africa all have in common a political subjugation. Prior to the April, 1974, coup in Portugal, no African political organizations were permitted in the Portuguese-controlled areas.* In the others, the most dynamic African political groups have been banned, and non-whites either cannot serve in the legislatures of the countries or, as in the case of Rhodesia, are for all practical purposes permanently in a position where majority political control is an impossibility.

Finally, the majority of the people in the areas of southern Africa

* It is not yet clear what policies the new Portuguese government intends to pursue in this regard.

share the protest and struggle against this domination. Southern Africa is the area where the struggle for freedom on the continent remains unfinished. A policy which does not relate to this reality is either terribly mistaken or irrelevant.

The problems of southern Africa will not disappear simply. One consideration is that the African states will not let the rest of the world forget that a liberation struggle is taking place. This has been clearly indicated at the United Nations. In 1973, the U.N. General Assembly voted to reject South African credentials by a vote of 73 to 37 with 13 abstentions. And when the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs rose to address the Assembly, at least 100 of the delegations walked out, leaving him with an almost empty hall.

In addition, the oil producing Arab states, in response to pressure from the Organization of African Unity, announced at their Conference in Algeria on November 28, 1973 that they would embargo oil exports to Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. Attention is urgently called to southern Africa problems through many international conferences, perhaps the most significant of which was held in Oslo in April 1973, to outline ways to support the liberation movements in their struggle against colonial and white minority governments.

Another consideration is that the guerrilla warfare which has broken out in vast areas of southern Africa makes it impossible to ignore the problems. It is now expected that the struggle will be a protracted one. Although one can argue about the exact amount of territory in the Portuguese areas controlled by the liberation movements, there is no contesting the substantial advances of these forces in the last decade or the fact that the wars have been very costly to the fascist regime and have finally produced radical change inside Portugal. Likewise South Africa and Rhodesia are spending increasing amounts to try to protect themselves from an actual or potential military challenge.

Finally, the possibility is generally recognized that a wider race conflict may be in the offing. As Colin and Margaret Legum observed in a paper prepared for the 1973 session of African Studies Association, "The present drift of events is towards rather than away from, race war—the only logical outcome of a confrontation between white societies embattled in defense of their supremacy and black societies unwilling to accept the permanence of such a relationship."⁵ This view is reinforced by the degree of military cooperation among the colonial and white minority regimes.

Although the countries making up southern Africa have many things in common, they also have differences. In detailing my assumptions about the nature of the southern African situation it is perhaps useful to evaluate these differences in terms of the vulnerability of the various territories to change towards majority rule.

1. Rhodesia

The Rhodesian minority regime seems particularly vulnerable to change. Only five percent of the population of some five million is white. Although this white minority is in power and has unilaterally declared its independence from Great Britain, no countries have formally recognized this independence. On the other hand, both Portugal and South Africa have assisted Rhodesia, particularly in bypassing U.N. sanctions. Moreover, South Africa has military units in Rhodesia. Yet it is most unlikely that South Africa would agree to incorporate Rhodesia into the Republic, as such an act would increase the European population by only 250,000, while adding more than five million to the African population.

African opposition to the white minority regime is growing. The myth that Africans would meekly acquiesce to permanent white minority control was dramatically dispelled when the Pearce Commission, in conducting its "test of acceptability" for a proposed settlement between the Rhodesian and British governments, met with staunch African opposition. The African National Council was organized almost spontaneously around the issue of opposing the British-Rhodesian settlement. Although more than 1700 protesting Africans were arrested during the two month Pearce Commission investigation, the Commission was deluged by thousands of protest letters and Lord Pearce reported that eighty percent of the Africans rejected the settlement.

Despite differences between Zimbabwean Nationalist organizations, guerrilla action has intensified inside Rhodesia. An announcement in early February, 1974, that the Rhodesian government was doubling its military draft was an indication of the seriousness with which the white minority looked upon black nationalist action. Zambia provides friendly borders from which the Zimbabwe guerrillas can act. Furthermore both Rhodesia and Portugal are concerned at the signs of military cooperation between Zimbabwe guerrillas and the Mozambique Liberation Front along the northeastern border of Rhodesia. The evacuation of thousands of Africans and the creation of a "no-go" free fire zone on the Rhodesian side of this border is a clear indication of the Smith regime's concern over this development.

Except for its links with South Africa and the former Portuguese government, Rhodesia is an isolated country. Britain has never planned military intervention and has no intention of interfering militarily at this point. Despite limited effectiveness, international sanctions can be expected to continue and to make life hard in many ways for the European minority.

2. Namibia

Partly because of the international status of the territory, Namibia

also seems vulnerable to pressure for change. Although the South African apartheid laws extend to Namibia, they are applied a little less rigorously. African political organizations have not been banned, for example. Moreover, SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organization), which is carrying on at least limited guerrilla action, especially in Caprivi, still exists as an above-ground organization and has been very active in the country in the last year. The South West Africa Convention, a relatively new coalition of organizations committed to oppose apartheid and to gain independence, also exists legally. Events in Namibia draw particular international attention because the United Nations, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, has terminated South Africa's mandate over the territory and the International Court of Justice has termed South Africa's continued presence in Namibia illegal.

Ties with South Africa are of course very close. A majority of the European population (about thirteen percent of the whole) are Afrikaners from South Africa. The economy, based heavily on mineral wealth, is geared into South Africa's. Yet it is doubtful that South Africa would make an all-out effort to defend her actual presence in Namibia.

Neither Namibians nor South Africans take seriously the Advisory Council established by Prime Minister Vorster. The "homelands" policy which the South African government is attempting to implement in Namibia is rejected by the African political organizations and has become a focus of political opposition. South African nurturing of ethnic differences can, however, cause long-term problems.

Opposition to South Africa's continued presence in Namibia is almost universal. But more significant, active opposition inside the country is growing. Particularly important was the strike of some 15,000 contract workers from Ovamboland beginning in December 1971. This type of action can be expected to continue.

The U.N. has rejected a continued dialogue between the Secretary General and the government of South Africa over Namibia. Although there may be occasional efforts to reopen discussions, nothing important can happen until South Africa agrees to the two basic principles of both the African nationalists and the United Nations: namely the establishment of a unitary state, and independence.

3. Portuguese Territories

Until the coup on April 25, 1974, the Portuguese had given no indication that they were prepared to leave any of their colonial territories in Africa. They maintained the fiction that Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, together with their off-shore islands, were overseas provinces. Portugal had encouraged white immigration to

Africa in an effort to implement its policy of assimilation. In a forty year period from 1930 to 1970 the white population of Angola grew from 30,000 to about 350,000 and in Mozambique from 18,000 to 150,000.⁶ In spite of various reforms which Portugal had introduced virtually no observers had been deluded into thinking that the relation between Portugal and the overseas territories was anything other than that of a colonial power to a colonial people. The dramatic events of April make prediction about the immediate future difficult. It seems likely that the Portuguese will try to maintain links with Africa—possibly through a Federation. This is a “solution” that cannot ultimately be acceptable to the liberation movements, so that the struggle is not likely to end immediately.

The struggle for independence has been expanding for more than a decade. As a result, Portugal has been forced to employ over 150,000 troops and invest at least fifty per cent of its annual budget in wars in three colonies. Liberation movements control significant areas of the land. Military support comes from the OAU, from many African countries bilaterally and from Communist countries. In addition support for nation-building activities comes from some Western European countries, from a multitude of private Western organizations and from U.N. specialized agencies. The PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands) has proclaimed the existence of their state and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau has been recognized by at least 80 countries. FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) has been advancing further south in Mozambique.

Undoubtedly one of the factors which will make it difficult for the Portuguese to negotiate for complete independence is that they do not have the neo-colonial option which has been open to the French, the British and the Belgians in Africa. Portugal itself is an underdeveloped country. Its major economic enterprises in Angola and in Mozambique are already under foreign control. Thus if the Portuguese recognized the independence of their colonies, economic control would fall into the hands of South African, U.S., and British interests which already dominate the oil, the diamonds, the sugar estates, the hydroelectric and irrigation projects in Portuguese African territories.

Portugal's African wars have been extremely unpopular among the Portuguese people. Portugal has had a shrinking population as people have gone across the border to France or to West Germany where they have sought to better their economic lot. Deserters and draft-dodgers amounted to about 15,000 a year in 1967 and by 1974 numbered more than 100,000.⁷ The political opposition in Portugal, finally able to express itself after 40 years of repression, has come out against the wars in Africa. Yet while a change of government in Portugal may end the

military adventure in Africa, most careful observers of the Portuguese scene, including liberation movement leaders, are not deluded into thinking that the change in Lisbon's government signals the end in their struggle for total liberation.

Because the situation in Portugal is in flux, it is possible only to raise certain questions, the answers to which will affect developments in Africa. 1. Can the new regime in Portugal achieve stability? If not, then there obviously will be an unsettled situation in Africa. 2. Will the white minority of South Africa (and Rhodesia) intervene in Mozambique or Angola to protect what they conceive as their own security? 3. Will the white minorities in Angola or Mozambique be able to frustrate African independence for a time?

4. *South Africa*

Of all the countries of southern Africa the Republic of South Africa seems least vulnerable to change. With a European population comprising almost twenty percent of the total population, the white minority is in firm control and committed to maintaining that control. This means that the struggle for fundamental change will be long and hard. Prime Minister Vorster probably spoke for the majority of the white population of South Africa when he said during the 1970 election, "... we are building a nation for whites only."⁸

Many of South Africa's whites come from generations of whites who were born and raised in the country. This is their home. They control a wealthy and strong country. South Africa prides itself on having 40% of all the automobiles of Africa, 57% of the electrical power, 50% of all telephones, 80% of the coal, and of course 64% of all the Western world's gold.

For a nation its size South Africa has a very powerful military, more powerful than the combined forces of the rest of the continent excluding Egypt. There are more than 100,000 all told in its armed forces. The Republic now produces eighty percent of its weapons. According to the *Financial Mail* of December 8, 1972 South Africa was at that time "producing more than 100 kinds of ammunition, rifles, sub-machine guns, explosives, canon, vehicles such as armored cars, electronic equipment like radar detection systems and walky-talkies, and aircraft." Expenditure for defense has risen from \$64.4 million in 1960-1961 to \$422.4 million in 1972-1973. The purpose of this strength is to protect white South Africa from any threats against its security either external or internal.

Just as South Africa is building a "whites only" society, it is attempting to impose a black society on its African population. However, it is impossible to look upon the "homelands" policy of the apartheid government as a serious permanent development. These

Bantustans represent a divide and rule tactic. They are a schematic necessity to make rational the claim that South Africa is not one nation but many. For Africans who live in them, the Bantustans represent a way of barely surviving on the fringes of the system. Only 6.9 million of the African population of over 15 million live in any of the reserves now and over a third of these are migratory laborers. The Bantustans do not represent a national base for the millions of men and women who were born and have worked in the urban areas for many years. Further, the Bantustans are on the whole uneconomic. Their arable land is greatly limited. Their natural resources and industry are almost non-existent. Whites and blacks alike realize that the economy of white South Africa is dependent upon black labor. Therefore the theory of the Bantustans simply perpetuates the idea of a permanent migratory labor scheme.

Is apartheid slowly being eroded? Can change come about peacefully from within South Africa? While change may not necessarily be accompanied by an Armageddon of violence, it nevertheless seems clear that it cannot come without persistent struggle and strife. One simply cannot take seriously the superficial signs of change which are popularly pointed to at the present time. For example, the so-called "outward look" and certain emphasis on "dialogue" does not, as Colin and Margaret Legum point out, represent "a change in policy, but of tactics, designed primarily to strengthen South Africa's capacity to resist change at home and to reduce the impact of international pressures."⁹

South Africa needs friends. It needs friends in Africa in order to minimize the risk of military action from other African states and to secure markets for the South African produced goods that blacks in South Africa, existing on subsistence wages, cannot afford to buy. South Africa needs friends elsewhere in the world, particularly in the West, both to encourage economic relations, commerce, investments, and to gain protection from Communist states committed to support of the liberation forces. This reality has been responsible for the creation of the "enlightened" policy of encouraging diplomatic relations with some black African states. Malawi is the only state which has openly accepted the invitation thus far. This reality has also been responsible for South Africa's accelerated public relations campaign, particularly in the Western press of the United States and Britain. To prove that apartheid is crumbling, apologists point to an increasing number of black American sportsmen, the most notable being Arthur Ashe, who can now compete in South Africa. They further point to "evidence" such as the recent decision of the Johannesburg City Council to eliminate petty apartheid (except in toilets) in Johannesburg.

Although for a time a few African states campaigned to open up

dialogue with South Africa, the OAU voted overwhelmingly to reject the concept at their meeting in June, 1971. The vote showed 28 countries against, 5 in favor and 6 abstaining. The overthrow of Dr. Busia in Ghana and of President Tsirinana of the Malagasy Republic has further weakened the voices in Africa calling for dialogue.

None of the superficial changes have had any effect on the basic aim of apartheid—the control of the black majority by the white minority. The pass laws still stand intact with over 600,000 being arrested under them every year. The possibility of black participation in the political process of the country is as remote as it was when the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948. Organizations committed to the dismantling of the apartheid system are still banned. Leaders of both radical and liberal opposition movements are banned, have passports withdrawn, have their homes raided. This has happened to leaders of the South African Student Organization, the Black Peoples Convention, the National Union of South African Students, the Christian Institute and even the South African Institute of Race Relations. Even the leader of the non-racial South African Amateur Swimming Federation has been placed under a ban because he was too outspoken. Moreover, the government has recently secured an “Affected Organizations” Law, which, among other things, will have the effect of cutting off all international financial assistance to organizations named by the Government.

No doubt the effectiveness of the police state apparatus in South Africa will be able, for some time, to forestall any fundamental challenge to the institutions of white supremacy. The most effective opposition to the system will probably come in the industrial structure as the great mass of workers, the Africans, demand better positions, increased pay, and the right of trade-unionism. Evidence of an accelerated campaign along these lines could be seen in the thousand of workers in the Durban area who went out on strike in 1973. One must expect growing police violence, as took place September 12th, 1973, at the Western Deep Level Mine at Carletonville when twelve Africans were killed, and twenty-seven injured as workers demonstrated for increased pay. Action by workers may be the most effective way of challenging the system because it will not seem to be a direct attack on the political structure of apartheid. But mass action on the part of Africans will inevitably lead to political action.

The basic reality of the South African situation is that a confrontation exists between a white minority wanting to maintain power and a black majority rejecting injustice and domination. How peacefully the change to majority rule will be made depends largely on the white minority.

In April, 1969, a conference of East and Central African states

adopted a Manifesto on Southern Africa. It was looked upon as a moderate document. Its principal message, found in the twelfth paragraph, reads in part: "on the objective of liberation . . . we can neither surrender nor compromise. We have always preferred . . . to achieve it without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than to kill. We do not advocate violence. . . . If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible . . . we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the states of southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors."

To summarize, there exists in southern Africa a confrontation between a white minority and a black majority that has taken the form of a liberation struggle. This struggle will continue until the forces of white supremacy and colonial domination have given way. Ultimately, the will of the majority will prevail. I assume that unitary states will be established. It is my hope that multi-racial societies will emerge; but this possibility will be increasingly remote as the struggle intensifies. U.S. policy must relate to this struggle if it is to be relevant.

U.S. Policy in Practice

An examination of actual U.S. practices in southern Africa can be divided into five components—trade and investment, military, cooperative schemes, liberation movements, and diplomatic relations.

1. Trade and Investment

a. South Africa

A great deal of attention has been given in the last several years to U.S. trade with and investments in South Africa. This is rightly so because economic ties dominate relations between the two countries. Officially, as has been stated time and again, "the U.S. government neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa." Because investment in South Africa has always been profitable for American businessmen, encouragement has never been necessary. John Blashill observed in an article in *Fortune Magazine*, "The Republic of South Africa has always been regarded by foreign investors as a gold mine, one of those rare and refreshing places where profits are great and problems small. Capital is not threatened by political instability or nationalization. Labor is cheap, the market booming, the currency hard and convertible."¹⁰

U.S. investment in South Africa has grown dramatically, especially in the last ten years. In 1943 it was estimated at only \$50 million. By 1950 it was \$140 million, \$284 million in 1960 and \$800 million in 1970.¹¹ Department of Commerce figures for 1971 show a total book value of \$964 million, about 11.1% higher than the figure for 1970. U.S. investment accounts for about 17% of total direct private foreign investment in South Africa. The repatriated earnings from this investment contributed about \$58 million to U.S. balance of payments in 1971.¹²

Over 300 American firms are involved in these investments and the general rate of return has been about 19%, although it is interesting to note that there was a high of 46% in mining in 1970. The average return on investment throughout the world in 1969 was 12.2%. Manufacturing dominates investments, especially the motor corporations which produce sixty per cent of South Africa's automobiles. In 1970, it represented 25% of all U.S. investments. Mobil and Caltex refine over half of the oil imported in South Africa, and also a large share of the capital for mining machinery and the construction industries is from American companies.

Loans by two banking consortiums have been made directly to the South African government and its corporations rather than to private industry. One consortium loan of \$40 million was ended in 1969 after considerable pressure from concerned American groups who had protested the loan. A second, organized under the European-American Banking Corporation and totaling over \$210 million, began in 1970. It too was to the South African government and its agencies. The U.S. portion of this loan is \$18.5 million.

The U.S. has a favorable trade balance with South Africa. In 1972 South African exports to the United States amounted to \$324.7 million. Imports from the United States amounted to \$597.1 million. Major South African exports to the U.S. have consisted of diamonds, precious stones, metals and sugar. The imports from the U.S. are mainly machinery and electrical equipment, chemicals, textiles, base metals, precision instruments, and paper. Despite increasing competition coming from Japan, France and West Germany, the United States is still South Africa's second largest trading partner following Britain. The U.S. Department of Commerce projected that exports to South Africa in 1973 would amount to \$728 million, a 22% increase from 1972. This approximates the 17% share of total South African imports from the U.S.

b. Namibia

The U.S. officially discourages investments in Namibia. A formal announcement of this decision was made on May 20th, 1970, in

response to the judgment of the International Court. The policy of the government is not to protect investments already made against the claims of any future lawful government. No credit guarantees or other facilities from the Export-Import Bank will in future be extended for trade in the territory.

Most American investment in Namibia has been in the petroleum and mining industries. In 1971, three American oil companies (Exxon, Caltex, and Gulf) withdrew their off-shore oil concessions, but in 1972 four new investors were granted concessions. Companies involved are Aracca Exploration Limited, Continental, Getty, and Phillips. The terms of the concessions are for nine years with an initial investment of \$1.2 million and drilling after 3 years.

The most significant American investment is the Newmont Mining Corporation's and American Metal Climax, Inc.'s joint control (approximately 29% each) of the Tsumeb Corporation. Tsumeb accounts for approximately 80% of the base mineral production in Namibia. Other U.S. corporations involved in Namibia include U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Nord Mining, Navarro/Zapata, Phelps, Dodge and Tidal Diamonds. The total U.S. investment is in the neighborhood of \$50 million.

There are no separate trade statistics for Namibia since they are integrated into the figures between the United States and South Africa. A considerable portion of the exports consist of karakul pelts and fish products, but major exports are diamonds and copper.

c. Rhodesia

Investments and trade with Rhodesia have been reduced since the adoption of U.N. sanctions which the United States supported in the Security Council in 1966 and 1968. Prior to UDI and U.N. sanctions, there were some 53 U.S. owned and related corporations in Namibia. In 1969 there were only thirty-one. These were primarily distributors such as export brokers of tobacco, and mining concerns such as Union Carbide and American Metal Climax.

U.N. sanctions included a complete trade embargo as one of the mandatory provisions. In October, 1971, the Congress passed section 503 of the Military Procurement Act, the so-called Byrd Amendment, which stipulated that the President could not prohibit the importation into the U.S. of any strategic material so long as such material was not prohibited from a Communist dominated country. Thus by legislative action the position of the executive branch of government taken at the United Nations was undermined. In March 1972 the first shipments of chrome from Rhodesia came into the United States under the Byrd Amendment. In a study published by the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, the observation was made that "The most persistent lobbyist against the Byrd Amendment was the State Department—and its efforts were vitiated by the refusal of the White House to weigh in with phone calls to wavering Senators."¹³

The Executive Branch of government was severely embarrassed by the passage of the Byrd Amendment and key representatives of the administration appeared in Congressional hearings urging the repeal of the Amendment in late 1973. John Scalli, the Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations, said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on African Affairs "The United States importation of Rhodesian goods under section 503 has become an extremely serious issue in our relations with African countries." In the second time around, before the Senate voted to repeal the Byrd Amendment in December 1973, Secretary of State Kissinger indicated that the administration wanted the Byrd Amendment repealed.

The Byrd Amendment ripped a hole in the sanctions' dike. Between 1972 and January 1973 the value of Rhodesian exports to the United States amounted to \$13.3 million. This was only slightly less than the exports in 1965 prior to UDI when they reached \$14.1 million.¹⁴

There have been other leaks in the enforcement of total U.S. sanctions as indicated by export-import figures for 1971 when, for example, \$807,000.00 worth of Rhodesian goods were imported into the U.S. and \$652,000.00 exported to Rhodesia. An incident which attracted some attention involved the sale of three Boeing 720 jet liners. They were bought by a dummy company in Switzerland and put into service in Rhodesia in September 1973. According to an article in the *Washington Post* these airliners now are the mainstay of the Salisbury-Johannesburg run.¹⁵

A second pamphlet issued by the special Rhodesia project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reported on other American transactions with Rhodesia which violated sanctions. It detailed violations of sanctions through the use of credit cards; advertisements for Rhodesian industries, banks, hotels, touring companies and commercial enterprises appearing in such publications as the *Journal of Commerce* in New York; arrangements for renting cars in Rhodesia through Hertz and Avis offices in the United States. One can also stay in a Holiday Inn in Bulawayo.¹⁶

d. Portuguese Territories

The single largest U.S. investor in the Portuguese territories is the Gulf Oil Company through its subsidiary Gulf Cabinda. Gulf began prospecting for oil in Cabinda in 1954 and made its first discovery in 1966. By the end of 1972 Gulf's Angola investment had reached \$209 million. Payments by Gulf to Portugal for its Angolan concession

represented about thirteen percent of the total Angolan provincial budget and amounted to about \$61 million in 1972. 1973 payments were even greater, reaching a figure of \$91 million.¹⁷

By mid-1973, the U.S. State Department reported that four U.S. corporations were investing in oil in Angola—Tenneco, Texaco, Gulf and Mobil. Eight others had received off-shore concessions. Other capital investment in Angola totals about \$50 million.

U.S. investment in Mozambique is over \$30 million. In 1970 there were some 15 U.S. firms there of which 5 or more were primarily involved in the distribution of finished products. Oil exploration was being undertaken by Texaco, Sun Oil, Gulf, Hunt International. Bethlehem Steel was prospecting for minerals in the Tete Province.

Trade with Mozambique has been very modest. In 1972 for example, Mozambique exports to the United States were only \$23.2 million and imports from the United States were \$17.8 million. Cashews are the primary cash export.

Trade with Angola has been more extensive. In 1972 Angolan exports to the United States were worth \$76 million or 16.7% of total exports. Imports were \$48 million or 13.6% of Angola's total imports. The major Angolan export is coffee although this has dropped from 58% in 1971 to 46.5% in 1972. Other imports include crude oil, sisal, and beryllium and fish products. The U.S. exports to Angola, steel and iron works and heavy equipment parts. The U.S. has been Angola's second major trading partner after Portugal.

2. *Military*

a. South Africa

Official U.S. policy, originally announced in the U.N. by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, is to embargo military equipment and supplies to South Africa. This action was taken unilaterally by the United States even before the resolution calling for a military embargo against South Africa was introduced into the Security Council. The question is how well this embargo has been observed. Certainly the U.S. is not in the position of France, currently the chief supplier of military hardware to South Africa. Nevertheless the U.S. commitment to such an embargo has been compromised by a number of transactions and events. Among these are the following:

According to the April 17, 1971 *Johannesburg Star*, Mrs. Olive Beech, head of the American Beechcraft Corporation announced in Johannesburg that South Africa's defense force could now buy light American aircraft for reconnaissance and training purposes. Although this was denied by David Newsom, he went on to say that "normal trade with South Africa in civilian type goods for non-military purposes

continues and we are prepared to consider licensing for VIP transport purposes limited numbers of small unarmed executive civilian type aircraft which will not strengthen South Africa's military or internal security capacity." The critical question is whether the U.S. can police South Africa's use of small aircraft to be sure they are not converted for military use. This would be particularly difficult given the popularity of flying among whites in South Africa. The small aircraft which the U.S. is now authorized to sell to South Africa could easily be used by the Air Commandos, a volunteer group made up of private pilots commissioned for military activity in times of emergency.

Furthermore, the U.S. government has authorized the sale of helicopters to South Africa. One type of helicopter is the amphibious Sikorsky 62 which is capable of flying 400 miles without refueling. It was used extensively by the U.S. army in Vietnam. Here again, the question of U.S. ability to police the use of these helicopters is critical.

Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 16, 1971, Jennifer Davis, speaking for the American Committee on Africa said, "Beech has sold 25 planes [to South Africa] in the last six months. By 1969 Cessna had already sold more than 1,000 planes in its southern Africa area . . . which extended over South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique, and had sent a special 6 man selling team to South Africa to launch 3 new models in October 1970. Several executive jets had been sold by late 1969, and it is interesting to note that the technical report which appeared in the South Africa *Financial Gazette* stressed that the Lear-jet 24D can land and take off from nearly all landstrips in southern Africa."

Several U.S. corporations have helped to supply South Africa with equipment which can be used for military purposes. For example, IBM has supplied at least 4 computers to the South African Department of Defense, while ITT equipment and expert knowledge has been applied to the regime's communications systems. General Electric, through its South African subsidiary, supplies about 95% of the diesel locomotives for South African railways. Again, equipment essential for communications and transport falls into a nebulous area which can be interpreted as having either war or peacetime value, depending on whether a society seems to be in a state of war or not.

In early February, 1973, the South African Minister for Information, Dr. Cornelius Mulder, spent several days in the U.S., and a considerable amount of that time in Washington. He met with a number of prominent political and governmental leaders including Vice-President Gerald Ford. But of particular concern in the present context was Mulder's visit to the Pentagon to meet with Vice-Admiral Ray Peet, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Although there was no

public announcement of the topic discussed, an interpretive memorandum from the Southern Africa Committee quite logically suggests that the discussion had implications for South African and American strategies in the Indian Ocean. The memorandum noted that the U.S. had opened a communication center on the British Island of Diego Garcia and that the Pentagon had announced plans to construct a \$29 million air and naval support facility on this island in the Indian Ocean. Further, the memorandum referred to a conclusion of a research team from a 1970 school of naval warfare proposing "a multi-national naval presence in the area." The research team report stated that since South Africa possessed the only strong maritime force in the area, "The navy of the Republic of South Africa should be invited to participate even though political differences are to be anticipated." Fears that the U.S. is approaching a military 'detente' with South Africa were further strengthened by the "unofficial" visit of the head of the South African armed forces, Admiral Hugo Biermann, to Washington and the Pentagon early in May, 1974.

b. Portugal

Since the 1961 uprising in Angola, the U.S. has had an announced policy of prohibiting Portugal's use of NATO military equipment outside of the North Atlantic zone. In terms of actual policy, the U.S. has attempted to remain neutral in Portugal's African wars, while simultaneously maintaining a military alliance with Portugal as a European country. A State Department officer put it this way: "U.S. policies towards the Portuguese territories in Africa are influenced by two principal factors. On the one hand we desire to maintain friendly, cooperative relations with Portugal that are consistent with our international undertakings, and to continue U.S.-Portuguese cooperation in the North Atlantic area as envisaged by the NATO treaty and by our defense facilities agreements with Portugal. On the other hand, we believe that the long range interests of Portugal and of the peoples of the overseas territories would be best served by full Portuguese acceptance of the principle of self-determination."¹⁸

The contradiction between these two aims has laid U.S. actions open to constant question on a number of important issues.

Most troubling has been the presence of an American airbase in the Azores, in use by the U.S. airforce since the Second World War. Until 1962, formal agreements between the U.S. government and the Portuguese determined the use of the base. However, following the explosion in Angola which led to U.S. votes in the U.N. critical of Portuguese policy in Africa, Salazar's government decided not to renew the formal agreement although the U.S. continued to use the base. In the meantime, in the summer of 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had

decided that the Azores base was essential to American security. In his discussion of this in *A Thousand Days*, Arthur Schlesinger said: "The problem led to continual wrangling in Washington—the Bureau of European Affairs versus the Bureau of African Affairs: the Mission to the U.N. versus the Pentagon...." Schlesinger continued, "this dilemma left us no choice but of moderating policy on Portuguese questions in the U.N.—never enough for the Nationalists in Africa and always too much for the Pentagon and Dr. Salazar."¹⁹

For a time in the late 1960s it looked as if the Azores would be officially regarded as of little strategic value to the U.S. Having always been looked upon as an important refueling point, their value was less apparent with the development of planes capable of flying long ranges. Writing in a *New York Times* column on March 5, 1969, James Reston noted that the need for the Azores no longer existed, "but the old arrangements go on."

In December, 1971, the Nixon administration concluded a new formalized agreement with Portugal for the use of the Azores. In exchange for the use of the Lajes airbase, the U.S. agreed to a \$436 million economic aid package to Portugal to be spread over a two year period. The bulk of this amount was in Export-Import Bank loans totaling \$400 million to buy American goods for development projects in Portugal. Other aspects included the loan of an oceanographic ship, a grant of one million dollars for educational projects in Portugal financed by the Defense Department, a minimum of five million dollars for road building machinery, cranes, hospitals, port and harbor equipment, and access to a fifteen million dollar loan for surplus agricultural commodities from the U.S.

Export-Import Bank press releases issued in 1973 indicate how some of the loan funds have been used. On June 21st, the Ex-Im Bank announced the sale of 22 General Electric locomotives to Mozambique at a cost of \$9.5 million; on July 19th, \$4 million to finance the sale of tire production facilities in Mozambique; on August 10th, \$30.2 million for the sale of one Boeing 747 to Portugal; on September 11th, \$7.8 million for the sale of goods and services required for a pulp and paper manufacturing facility in Portugal; on October 5th, \$6 million to help finance the sale of one Boeing 737-200 jet aircraft spare parts and related ground equipment purchased by Mozambique's Harbors, Railways and Transport Administration.

According to former Premier Caetano, the treaty was "a political act in which the solidarity of interests between the two countries is recognized and it is the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument of action at the disposal of our American friends, who are also now our allies."²⁰

The Middle East War of October, 1973, added another dimension to

the U.S. Azores problem. With the countries of Western Europe refusing landing rights to American planes flying military supplies to Israel, the Azores served an urgent purpose. The *Financial Times* (U.K.) of November 28, 1973, commented: "There is a change in Washington's sulky attitude of the past few months, which implied that the Azores base was no longer useful." Up to 800 tons of war equipment a day went by American planes, particularly the new super cargo plane, the C-5, through the Azores. On December 17th, Secretary of State Kissinger visited Lisbon and commented "On this trip through the Middle East, I was reminded of the fact that Portugal stood by its allies during the recent difficulties and the United States is extremely grateful for that. . . . I would like to say that as far as the United States is concerned, our journey together is not finished."²¹

Portugal was able to allow this use of her base and ignore threats of an oil embargo by Arab countries which had been supplying almost 90% of her crude oil because Gulf Cabinda produces enough to supply all of Portugal's requirements.

From this vantage point Portugal was able to use her new-found strategic position as an ally of the U.S. to exert additional pressure. For instance, Portugal's Ambassador to Washington called on Senator Humphrey and Senator Tunney and was undoubtedly partly responsible for watering down the Tunney-Young Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill. The original purpose of this Amendment was to make into law the American policy of embargoing arms to Portugal for use in Africa. The final version passed by the Senate struck out reference to Portugal and substituted "any non-African country". The bill, in its final form, required the President only to report "as soon as practicable" on the use of economic, military or agricultural assistance from the U.S. for military activities in African territories.²²

One of the complications in U.S. military policy towards Portugal was that the Portuguese have not made the distinction the U.S. tries to make between Africa and the North Atlantic area. Any military assistance to Portugal, whether directly from the U.S. or through NATO, could from the Portuguese point of view, be used either in Europe or Africa.

Under the Military Assistance Program the U.S. maintained a twenty-one man Military Advisory Group in Lisbon to "permit the training of key Portuguese military personnel." In addition, training for military officers in the United States has been provided. In 1968, 107 military personnel were trained here at a cost of \$120,000.00. In 1970, the training of thirty-three officers cost \$88,000.00. Recently under the Military Assistance Program about one million dollars a year has been given by the U.S. to Portugal. In the twenty year period prior to

1967 approximately \$326 million was spent.

In the last few years the U.S. has sold to the Portuguese commercial airline, TAP, seven 707s, three 727s, and two 727-Cs from Boeing. Sales have also been made from Boeing to DETA, the commercial airline in Mozambique. It is common knowledge in Mozambique that commercial aircraft have been used for military purposes. In fact DETA had a contract with the military authorities in Mozambique under which it guaranteed to "give the Military Region of Mozambique regular air transport on a charter basis." At the formal signing of the contract various military personnel, including the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Mozambique, were present.

In October, 1972, it was reported that North American Rockwell had sold four aircraft to a private airline company in northern Mozambique; in 1973 and again in 1974 helicopters were sold by Bell to several Mozambique government departments.

Reports from some of the liberation movements, particularly the MPLA, of Portuguese use of herbicides to destroy crops in liberated areas, raised serious questions about increasing U.S. exports of herbicides to Portugal and directly to Mozambique in 1972. It was precisely during this period that complaints were being made, first by MPLA and subsequently by FRELIMO that herbicides were being used in the war against them.

3. Cooperative Programs

The U.S. government has been involved with southern African countries in a limited way in cooperative schemes. Most of these programs relate to South Africa. They include:

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

In 1961 NASA established three space tracking stations in South Africa. The most important were the Deep Space Instrumentation Facility and Station for Satellite Tracking and Data Acquisition. NASA supplied equipment, technical supplies and finances (annual operating cost was \$2.5 million) while South Africa's Council on Scientific and Industrial Research provided the staff, most of which has been trained by the U.S. Some years ago the question of racial segregation at these facilities was raised. The State Department stated that no discrimination in the facility would be countenanced; however the issue was avoided by using South Africans in all 250 or so positions with the exception of one person from the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. According to an article in the July 10th, 1970 issue of *Science Magazine*, employment was "in accord with the Apartheid regulations," and the program was of considerable help to

South Africa. Among other things, it helped train South African personnel in advanced technology in a four year training program partially financed by NASA in which South African secondary graduates received a diploma for work done at the installation. As of 1970, thirty or forty students had completed the course. The fifteen year agreement between NASA and South Africa expires in 1975 and the U.S. government has announced that it will not be renewed.

Atomic Energy

Since 1962 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has worked with South Africa's Atomic Energy Board. With U.S. cooperation, South Africa's first nuclear reactor was inaugurated at Pelindaba near Pretoria in mid-1965. Many South African staff members were trained at Oak Ridge; the U.S. supplied a consultant for the Pelindaba reactor; the U.S. supplied the enriched uranium to start the reactor; the main contractor for the project was Allis-Chalmers with eight other American organizations involved. All 900 employees at Pelindaba are white.

Cooperative Scientific Arrangements

In the field of astronomy the Smithsonian Institute plans to set up an observatory in South Africa.

There is a plan for U.S. cooperation with South Africa in lunar research inasmuch as South Africa has some of the oldest rocks on earth. This is to be a cooperative scheme with the geology department of Witwatersrand University.

There was a cooperative arrangement between the U.S. and South Africa on an Antarctic Research Program.

There have been exchange programs between a number of South African and American Universities including Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of California, Colorado School of Mines.

In 1972 an agreement was made between NASA and the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research which involved taking satellite pictures of South Africa. These pictures are to be studied by the South African Department of Agriculture, Planning and Mines.

Exchange and Visitation Programs

The U.S. government has for many years sponsored a visitation program of South Africans to the United States. On September 27, 1973, John W. Foley, Jr., Director of the State Department's Office of Southern African Affairs reported to the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements that in the fiscal years 1968 to 1973 the State Department awarded a total of 91 leader grants to South Africans of whom the vast majority were black.

In addition to the government sponsored program, private agencies such as the American Field Service, the United States South African Leadership Program and the Rotary Club have sponsored exchange programs.

4. *Liberation Movements*

The official U.S. attitude towards liberation movements was probably best stated by David Newsom in his address to the Mid-American Committee in Chicago. He said: "The question of U.S. official relations with leaders of opposition movements in colonial territories has always posed a dilemma for American policy makers. . . . These movements are a political fact. On the one hand, the absence of contact or support from us leaves the leaders subject to certain other outside influences. On the other hand, the United States has traditionally been unwilling to recognize the opposition elements in colonial territories until an internationally recognized transfer of power has taken place."

This policy was reflected in 1972 votes in the U.N. General Assembly when the U.S. opposed two important resolutions effecting the liberation movements. One admitted representatives of liberation movements from Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Portuguese colonies as observers to the Committee discussions on colonialism; the other affirmed the legitimacy of the struggle against apartheid and colonialism "by all available means."

The United States has also made it clear that it will not respond to the PAIGC appeal for recognition of the newly proclaimed Republic of Guinea-Bissau. The U.S. Government position is that the Republic of Guinea-Bissau does not meet the standards of an independent state: its geographical area cannot be clearly defined; it doesn't have control over a given area; and it is not in a position to conduct foreign relations. In a letter to Congressman Donald Fraser, National Chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action, Claude G. Ross, Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs said on November 9th, 1973 "The best information we have indicates that the PAIGC . . . does not control as much as one-third of the territory in question . . . there is clearly no settled capital where governmental affairs are conducted or where foreign representatives could be received or live. . . . Portugal completely controls about two-thirds to three-fourths of the territory. . . . The PAIGC probably controls between 25,000 to 50,000 people out of a total Portuguese Guinea population of 490,000."

A letter to the African Studies Association dated December 3, 1973 and signed by Carol C. Laise, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, ends with almost the same wording as the letter quoted above: "Because the U.S. government must take into account both the facts it

possesses and the possible far reaching implications of extending recognition to any new claimants of independence, we do not recognize the PAIGC claim of an independent Guinea-Bissau."

The State Department has been particularly careful not to disturb Portugal by exhibiting any relationship to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. For example, when a FRELIMO delegation of three came to New York City in 1967 and asked me to arrange a visit to the State Department for them, I called the Mozambique desk officer who said he would consult others and call me back. He did this shortly to say that the best he could do would be to arrange to meet this delegation in some out-of-the-way restaurant in Washington or in New York. The delegation refused this invitation.

A newly appointed American Ambassador to an African state who prior to his appointment had established a close relationship with some representatives of African liberation movements was told that in his new post he would have to drop any such relationship with his former friends from any Portuguese areas.

When I was in Conakry in 1970, I asked the American Ambassador if he had had any contact with the PAIGC. He replied that for "obvious reasons" he had not, although he had met one of their leaders at a diplomatic reception. I subsequently learned that this leader, whose name the Ambassador didn't remember, was Aristides Pereira, now the Secretary General of the PAIGC.

The most sensitive posts for contacts with liberation movements in Africa are Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. In both of these embassies there is one political officer whose major responsibility is to try to maintain contact with the liberation movements. Increasingly, these representatives have been isolated by the movements. The task of these officers in any event is not one of offering any assistance to the movements; rather, it is to engage in information gathering which is of little use to the liberation movements.

The most substantial programs of the government related to liberation movements have been those of assistance to students from southern Africa inaugurated in 1962. Two such programs were funded by the government and administered by the African-American Institute. One provided secondary education for students from southern Africa, essentially political refugees, who were not ready to enter University. Two schools were established under this program, one at Kurasini in Tanzania and the other at Nkumbi in Zambia. The students who went to these two schools were, in effect, nominated by the liberation movements. Between 1962 and 1972, according to figures given by the U.S. government to the U.N., this program cost \$7,135,000.00. In December 1969 the Kurasini facility was turned over to the government

of Tanzania. A year later the property at Nkumbi was turned over to Zambia.

Under the other program, called the Southern African Student Program, approximately 500 students studied at various universities in the U.S. during a ten year period from 1963-73. According to the government figures submitted to the U.N., this program cost \$8,585,000.00. The AAI estimated the administrative cost of the program at approximately \$1,500,000.00.

5. The Nature of Diplomatic Relations

The U.S. government maintains diplomatic relations with Portugal and South Africa. The post of Ambassador to Lisbon has been regarded as an important one. Presumably, within the Portuguese structure, the Embassy in Portugal has been a direct relationship with the U.S. Consulates in African territories. U.S. Consulates have been maintained in Lourenco Marques and Luanda. There is none in Bissau.

The U.S. Embassy in South Africa is located at the administrative capital in Pretoria. In addition there are Consulates in Capetown and Durban.

The apartheid pattern in South Africa has caused some strains in American diplomatic practices, especially because of pressure from civil rights forces on the homefront. On the whole the U.S. has followed a fairly timid policy aimed primarily at avoiding the exacerbation of official diplomatic relations. The current policy and practice was outlined by Mr. Foley in this statement to the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements September 27th, 1973: "We consider it important to maintain contact with all segments of the South African population and promote interracial communication in South Africa. Our Embassy and Consulates in general in South Africa have wide ranging contacts among all racial groups. Multi-racial social events at the homes of American officials serving in South Africa bring together various South Africans who might otherwise not meet. We were pleased to note that the American Ambassador's last Fourth of July reception, traditionally multi-racial, was attended by South African government officials who for the first time accepted invitations." A number of years ago, such multi-racial gatherings were held only on the Fourth of July. Now they are held more frequently.

The U.S. government has very cautiously begun to break down racial barriers in the assignment of American personnel to South Africa. In his speech to the Mid-America Committee in Chicago, Mr. Newsom pointed out that Black diplomatic couriers have been placed on runs to South Africa and that in 1971, three Black foreign service officers were given temporary assignments in South Africa. In 1973, the first permanent

assignment of a Black American to a diplomatic post in South Africa was made. Black Americans have also been sent to South Africa under the official cultural exchange program. Pressure from civil rights organizations protesting the visit of U.S. naval vessels to South Africa has caused such visits to be suspended since 1967.

Namibia has, of course, never been looked upon as separate from South Africa until the last few years. The U.S. supported the U.N. resolution terminating the mandate of South Africa over Namibia. There is no U.S. Consular office in Windhoek, and if any special problems arise, they are taken care of in the U.S. Consulate in Capetown.

Prior to UDI in Rhodesia some 20 countries including the U.S. maintained consular establishments there. Since the adoption of sanctions, all of these offices have been closed. The U.S. Consulate in Salisbury was officially closed in March, 1970.

U.S. Policy Characterized

Constant themes have run through U.S. policy towards southern Africa for the past 20 years. Some of these themes are clearly stated. Others are implied. In general U.S. policy has been weak and non-initiating—reactive rather than active. A major objective had been to avoid confrontation with the colonial and white majority governments in power. The “toughest” policies have in fact been emasculated: sanctions against Rhodesia have been compromised by the import of chrome and other strategic materials under the Byrd Amendment; support for the termination of South Africa’s mandate over Namibia and the discouragement of investment in that country has been weakened by the unwillingness of the U.S. to engage in implementing action through the U.N., and particularly by not serving on the U.N. Council for Namibia; an embargo on arms to South Africa has been diluted by permitting planes and other materials which can be converted to military use to go to South Africa; an arms limitation on Portugal stipulating that NATO arms cannot be used in Africa has been vitiated by the fact that Portugal has not recognized any distinction between its activities in the North Atlantic area and the wars in Africa.

In view of these facts, U.S. policy can be characterized as follows:

1. U.S. policy towards southern Africa has low priority on the scale of American foreign interests. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in his maiden speech at the U.N., did not mention Africa once even though the General Assembly agenda was, as usual, loaded with African issues. Justifications for this low priority position are that more pressing issues exist elsewhere in the world, or that African independent states are not pressing as hard in private contacts with the U.S. government as in their

public declarations. It is also pointed out that the cold war between the Soviet Union and the U.S. is tempered, and certainly is not actively pursued in Africa at this point. Colin and Margaret Legum commented that southern Africa is a low priority for the Russians and Chinese as well, "which is one major reason why Western policymakers can afford to relegate it to 'tomorrow's problems' rather than today's." But they added that the Chinese and Russian "diplomacy and long term strategy can proceed in low key, but purposeful support for the challengers of apartheid, while the West is still principally engaged in tactical diplomacy of avoiding active involvement with either side."^{2 3}

2. U.S. policy is one of dialogue and communication. When Mr. Nixon became President he ordered a review of U.S. policy toward southern Africa. By April 1969 a report was submitted to the National Security Council for discussion of various options open to the U.S. It was decided that the Kennedy and Johnson policies of verbal attacks on apartheid should be played down and a program of increased communication instituted. As Terence Smith put it, the policy was adopted on "the theory that friendly persuasion rather than constant condemnation would be more likely to make them [southern African white minority governments] modify their racial policies." In furtherance of this policy the U.S. helped pave the way for some American Black athletes such as Lee Elder, the golfer, and Arthur Ashe, the tennis player to go to South Africa. In line with the "Verligte" policy of the Vorster regime, South Africa cooperated by granting visas. This policy was working well enough so that last January, when Dr. Cornelius Mulder came to the U.S., he had no difficulty seeing such highly placed individuals as Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Thomas Morgan, Senator John Tower of Texas, Governor Ronald Reagan of California, and a number of Black leaders, including Mayor Thomas Bradley of Los Angeles.

The U.S. enthusiastically endorsed the proposal of Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the U.N., for entering into dialogue with the Republic of South Africa on Namibia. In his statement to the Security Council, Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., U.S. Deputy Rep. to the Security Council stated: "We are reluctant to eliminate the possibility of future talks [with South Africa]. The U.S. continues to believe that such discussions are also the most realistic way of gaining self-determination for the people of Namibia. . . ."

The African states which had temporarily endorsed the dialogue approach to South Africa on the Namibian question reversed their position by a formal vote at the O.A.U. in 1973, and in the Security Council voted for the Secretary General to discontinue his efforts. From an African perspective, these discussions had not led to any

constructive developments, and South Africa had continued its policy of formalizing the bantustans in Namibia.

Early in the Nixon administration the policy of dialogue and communication was also applied to Portugal. Seymour Finger, speaking for the U.S., said in the Fourth Committee at the U.N. on November 14th, 1969: "It is not at all certain that a conciliatory approach to Portugal would lead toward the goal of self-determination. . . . But we are convinced it is worth trying . . . condemnation of the colonial war which is allegedly being waged by Portugal against the people in its African territories . . . is hardly likely to achieve a constructive dialogue with the government of Portugal."

3. U.S. policy is opposed to isolating South Africa. A statement in the 1969-70 Foreign Policy Report says, "We do not believe that isolating them [South Africa] from the influence of the rest of the world is an effective way of encouraging them to follow a course of moderation and to accommodate change." But, in fact, this policy has worked most effectively in the area of sports. Contrary to the claims of those who say isolation will not yield results, the exclusion of South Africa from the last two Olympic games and from participation in many international sporting events seems to have had an effect on policy at home. Although apartheid has by no means disappeared from sport, and probably will not as long as the present regime is in power, it has been modified to the extent that a distinction is now made between "domestic" and "international" sporting events which allows for the abandonment of some apartheid regulations in the latter.

4. U.S. policy strongly advocates peaceful changes as against violence in southern Africa. In a speech made by former Secretary Newsom on September 17th, 1969, he put it very clearly: "We do not believe it is a feasible answer given the strength of the white regime. We do not believe it is a just answer because violence hardly brings justice to all."

In his speech in Atlanta in October, 1971, Newsom expanded on this theme: "We believe change will come in southern Africa. Economic and demographic pressures make this inevitable. In South Africa itself there is a lessening of rigidity. Change is a central theme of discussion. . . . We cannot expect change to come quickly or easily, our hope is that it will come peacefully."

The hope is implied in U.S. policy that somehow "economic and demographic pressures" will bring this change about. This is in effect an argument for U.S. non-involvement in the struggle for change in South Africa. As Jennifer Davis pointed out in a paper before the African Studies Association on November 19th, 1971, "There is violence in South Africa every moment of the day; there is violence when 33 out of 100 babies die before they are one year old; there is violence in the

daily arrest of 2500 men and women for infringements of the pass laws; there is violence in a system of forced labor. . . ." The majority in Southern Africa find it understandably difficult to take seriously an argument against violence which comes from a country which indiscriminately bombed Southeast Asia to the horror of the world. And yet part of the U.S. rationale for voting against U.N. resolutions giving legitimate status to the liberation movements is based on this argument for "peaceful change."

5. U.S. policy is white and European-oriented. In his book *The Discipline of Power*, George Ball pointed out that Africa is a "special European responsibility just as today the European nations recognize our particular responsibility in Latin America." Support for Portugal in votes on U.N. resolutions reflect this policy. Interestingly, the first veto which the U.S. cast in the Security Council came on March 17, 1970 on an issue condemning Great Britain for not using force in Rhodesia. In his Chicago speech in 1972 Mr. Newsom tried to rebut this position when he said: "We have had to deny both in Africa and in this country that we have chosen sides in this southern conflict and that the U.S. would intervene on the sides of the white regimes in the event of trouble."

While the question of U.S. intervention to uphold the white status quo and economic interests in southern Africa is a matter of conjecture, it is a concrete fact that U.S. policies are focused almost exclusively on the white regimes. It is assumed that the white regimes will initiate the policies which will help to bring about change. The aim of U.S. policy is therefore to remain on good terms with the white minority in South Africa and the colonialists in the Portuguese territories. As for policy on relations with the liberation movements, it is virtually non-existent. They are just not taken seriously.

It was this European and white-oriented policy which finally led to the resignation of Congressman Charles Diggs from the U.S. delegation at the United Nations in 1971. The immediate cause of the resignation was the renewed agreement with Portugal for the use of the Azores. In his statement Diggs said: "I object most strenuously to the U.S. commitment to bail Portugal out of the economic and political consequences of its nefarious policies in Africa without any commitment and definitive action towards Portugal towards ending the wars and towards granting independence to the people of these areas." Diggs added that, "In the Azores agreement, this administration has announced both an open alliance with Portugal and a decision which I can interpret only to mean 'partnership' in the subjugation of the Africa people."

6. U.S. policy towards southern Africa is pretty much "business as usual." A partial exception to this may be seen in policy toward

Rhodesia, but American economic involvement there has never been great, and in any event imports from Rhodesia under the Byrd Amendment have virtually equalled what they were in 1965 and before. It is impossible to judge the net effect of the U.S. policy of discouraging new investment in Namibia.

In the case of the Portuguese territories and South Africa, trade and investment have continued and in fact have grown. Here the government rationale is that "improvements in labor practices can be a catalyst for change in the South Africa situation." (From the government document "Employment Practices of U.S. Firms in South Africa"). This idea is enlarged upon by saying that U.S. firms can improve labor practices and thus become a force for change in South Africa.

Amilcar Cabral, speaking to a gathering of a few friends one evening on his last visit to New York in October 1972, told of an incident which may be instructive at this point. In a discussion between Cabral and a secretary in the American Embassy in Conakry, the problem of the off-shore presence of Continental and Esso in Guinea Bissau was discussed. "I told him," explained Cabral, "that we considered this an unfriendly attitude from the United States toward our people. And he said 'Oh, no, we can do nothing at all through our government, because it is a private company and you see, Mr. Cabral, this company would very much like to be the first, because when you'll be independent, it will be the first there.' I told him, 'You are a Christian. You must remember that Christ said that maybe the first will be last'. He was not too happy with that."

7. Legality and international law are central in U.S. policy towards southern Africa. This has been particularly clear in the case of Namibia. The U.S. looked upon the June 21, 1971 decision of the International Court of Justice declaring South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal as of vital importance. In the Rhodesian case U.S. policy prior to U.D.I. was based essentially on the legal arrangement between the white minority government of the self-governing colony and Great Britain. When Britain declared that the Ian Smith regime had violated this legal relationship, the U.S. supported Britain. Within this context the United States could support Britain in its call for sanctions against the illegal regime.

This same approach apparently carried over in the relationship between Portugal and her territories overseas. George Bush, in the Security Council on November 22, 1973, had this to say: "Under international law, sovereignty over the Portuguese territories is invested in the state of Portugal. Now we recognize Portugal's sovereignty, even while we continually urge Portugal, as we do, to permit the exercise of self-determination in these territories."

Appraisal and Direction

African nations and the United States see the world from two different perspectives. Most of Africa wants secure nationhood, political stability, improved education, expanded health facilities, and genuine economic progress. The going is difficult. The unfinished struggle for freedom in southern Africa is part of this perspective. In Southern Africa the mass of people, the Africans, are not free to build their own institutions or to find their own national identity. They are kept in subservience by European and white minority forces. They are in a clash with the regimes that control them.

In contrast, the United States, including the government and most of its people, feel generally satisfied with the world since they have, relatively speaking, good education, health, national identity, economic security. They want to keep them. They do not want this, their world, to be disturbed by reminders of the gross injustice and inequality elsewhere. The dynamics of the third world of which Africa and certainly southern Africa are a part, are disturbing. The U.S. is generally uncomfortable in the presence of these dynamics. There is much more comfort and ease in the seeming stability of the white South African world. Nevertheless, there is always the annoying feeling, even in this relatively comfortable environment, that everything isn't quite all right. But there is also the seemingly naive hope that somehow it will be possible for things to change with little or no inconvenience. This just isn't so. The beginnings and expansion of guerrilla warfare are already attesting to that.

To avoid facing the uncomfortable fact of the real dynamics of change in southern Africa, the U.S. has taken a number of protective actions. The U.S. has resigned from the U.N. Committee on Decolonization. It was embarrassing for the United States to be constantly the butt of criticism of African countries, some Asian countries and the Communist countries, while trying to participate half-heartedly in a Committee whose function was to implement the anti-colonial resolution on which the U.S. abstained back in 1960. The U.S. did not accept the invitation to attend the Oslo Conference held in April 1973. The argument might have been given privately that the Conference could not be effective or that it would be unrealistic. The fact is that it would have been embarrassing to the United States to again be confronted with the dynamic demands of third world countries in Africa. The U.S. did not take a seat on the U.N. Council for Namibia because to do so would have meant accepting the logic that the world body and the Republic of South Africa are in direct confrontation over the issue of Namibian independence.

Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the problem of U.S. policy in a dynamic third world atmosphere is on the issue of the recognition

of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. It may be possible to argue about the actual percentage of the territory of Guinea-Bissau controlled by the PAIGC as against that controlled by the Portuguese. However, the point is that the U.S. government believes, and seemingly *wants to believe*, that the Portuguese, not the PAIGC control three-fourths of it. The U.S. *wants to believe* that the PAIGC only governs about ten percent of the population. Most of the countries in the U.N. want to believe the contrary—that the PAIGC has sway over most of the country and the allegiance of most of the people. It is comforting to the U.S. to accept a legalistic approach to the question of recognition, which involves secondary issues such as the location of the capital. Pointing to a large tree in one of the liberated areas of his country, Amilcar Cabral once said to Gerard Chaliand, "You see, once we have independence this wouldn't be bad as a capital for our country: a tree where you could rest after a trip to the villages."²⁴ If the U.S. wanted to recognize the Republic of Guinea-Bissau a way to do so would be found.

The sad fact is that U.S. policy is not related to the dynamics of change in Africa nor to the reality of the so-called third world. On the contrary, it relates most effectively to the static reality of the status quo. Thus, the policy is one of accomodating the white and European regimes, of hypocritically emphasizing peaceful change, of avoiding confrontation, and of carrying on business as usual. The official attitude towards liberation movements is at best paternalistic. On the whole the Nixon administration only perpetuates a policy which has existed for the last twenty years or so. There is less pretense; consequently there are more negative votes than either abstentions or affirmative votes on key resolutions in the U.N. The attitude seemingly expressed by the Nixon administration is "We are a big power and we are no longer going to be pushed around by these mini-Republics."

Can the U.S. get away with pursuing this policy toward southern Africa? As a big and powerful country, the U.S. can withstand a great deal of international animosity. But if the present policy continues, it will be at considerable cost. First, there will be periods of great tension with many countries in the world. The kind of criticism the U.S. had been subjected to since being saddled with the Byrd Amendment is a small sample of what may be involved. Second, as the crisis in southern Africa deepens, as I believe it will, the U.S. may well be subjected to joint and concerted action by many third world countries. An indication of the possibilities of such joint action can be seen in the current Middle East crisis and the embargo on oil to countries aiding Israel. It is by no means inconceivable for the African countries, joined by some of their friends elsewhere in the world, to undertake similar action.

Third, if present U.S. policy continues, we can hardly expect good

relations to be established as independent states emerge in all of southern Africa. Although the United States could survive strained relations with countries controlled by African majorities in all of southern Africa, it would not be a simple burden to bear.

Finally, if present policy continues in the face of an increased crisis in southern Africa, it can add to tensions on the homefront. In his book *Great Powers in Africa*, Waldemar Nielsen predicted that once the "Vietnam agony" was over, southern African issues would be "the next foreign policy focus. . . ." ²⁵ This prophecy has not yet been borne out. The next crisis has been the Middle East, not southern Africa. Yet I believe that there will be a major focus on southern Africa soon. A growing number of segments in American society are not only conscious of the struggle in southern Africa, but keenly dissatisfied with American policy towards it. As yet the coalitions of concerned citizens are not very large, although there has been increasingly effective action by churches, by some student groups, and by some community organizations. The most effective action has been and probably will be taken by various elements in the Black community. The Congressional Black Caucus had provided a legislative focus to this concern. The First National Black Convention held in Gary, Indiana, in March, 1972, gave primary attention to the question of U.S. policy towards Africa. On May 27th, 1972, the number of people, mostly Blacks, celebrating African Liberation Day was estimated as high as 30,000. They gathered from all over the country to press for support of the liberation struggles of Africa and for a change in U.S. policy. A permanent organization, the African Liberation Support Committee, has grown out of this effort. When the first shipment of chrome from Rhodesia came into a Louisiana port in March, 1972, it was a combination of Black longshoremen and students at Southern University who mounted a protest demonstration against the violation of sanctions. And in the fall of 1973 and spring of 1974, a coalition of organizations in port cities such as Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, led primarily by Black longshoremen, delayed, by their protest and boycott, and in some cases, prevented the unloading of some Rhodesian metals. In early 1974, the annual Convention of the International Longshoremen voted officially to refuse to unload any more shipments from Rhodesia.

This may be only a beginning. Efforts will increase as the internal struggle in the southern African countries deepens. Many Americans understand the connection between the struggle for equality at home and the struggle for liberation abroad.

Can the U.S. basically change its policy toward the liberation struggle of southern Africa? It would be difficult without some rather fundamental changes within the United States. Nevertheless, one lives

in hope. This is not the place to try to blueprint the elements of a different policy. Here it is necessary only to say that a new policy, adequate to meet the demands for change in southern Africa, would be a positive one. It would be geared to support for the liberation struggles rather than support for the minority regimes. With this change of orientation, a whole set of specifics would become possible such as: massive support for the liberation movements; large contributions to the U.N. Trust Fund for Southern Africa; an end to the training of Portuguese military personnel; acceptance of a position on the U.N. Council from Namibia; the granting of political asylum to refugees from southern Africa; an end to the shipment of military equipment to Portugal so long as it holds on to the colonies; the cessation of oil exploration by American companies in South Africa and any of the Portuguese territories; a move towards the withdrawal of American capital aiding the minority regimes. ●

FOOTNOTES

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