British Troops to Zambia:

Reuters reported that Britain has agreed "in principle" to send a token force of aircraft followed by a limited number of ground troops to Zambia. These forces are strictly for use within Zambia and under no circumstances are to be used against Rhodesia. Kaunda asked for the force to protect the Kariba dam. Britain's response is largely due to a desire to keep Zambia from turning to African or Arab states for troops. However, the presence of the forces will secure Zambia's airfields if Rhodesia closes her border, forcing Zambia to fly copper out and oil in.

The second British cabinet meeting in 24 hours is expected to be held Nov. 30 to discuss the operation. Wilson is then expected to make a statement to parliament.

African Protest in Rhodesia:

In spite of a mandatory death sentence for terrorism or sabotage, dozens of incidents are taking place in and around Salisbury, according to N.Y. Times reporter Lawrence Fellows. Buses are stopped in an effort to keep Africans from getting to their jobs in white parts of Rhodesia. Numerous incidents of gasoline bombs have been reported. However, a general strike in Bulawayo was prevented last week and police helicopters are keeping order there. A strike planned for today in Salisbury was frustrated by the arrest of a number of nationalist leaders who were shipped to restricted areas. So far this year there have been about 500 instances of property damage by the African opposition. Fellows reported that Russian-made hand grenades had been found and that a group of terrorists trained in the Soviet Union had been picked up last August, as a third of the group turned out to be informers.

Minister of Law and Order, Desmond Lardner-Burke reported that African nationalists were trained in Ghana and then reentered Rhodesia from Zambia. He said there were 7 or 8 hundred such people being trained, but that the police and the special emergency powers of the government were strong enough to control any African violence.

African acts of violence are committed to express the extreme opposition that the Africans feel toward the Smith regime. The hope is that the economy can be crippled, destroying Smith, and that British troops can be forced to intervene. Lack of jobs and detention of leadership greatly multiply the African's problems. It was reported that Sithole is in a Salisbury jail, not at Sikombela.

Wilson met with both Joshua Nkomo and Sithole when he was in Rhodesia before U.D.I. According to a member of his delegation, he was not impressed with either leader.

British Action:

In spite of anticipated negative reaction from the Conservatives, Wilson appears ready to increase the economic pressures on Rhodesia. Probable measures include, first of all, the extension of Britain's
trade embargo to include more than tobacco, sugar, chrome, and copper which it has already ceased to buy. Secondly, the financial measures on which Wilson already has authority to act, could be applied in the extreme. These measures require official permission for nearly all transfers from or to the special quarantined Rhodesian sterling accounts. Rhodesian importers can be forced to pay for all British goods in sterling. And they also must get specific permission from the Bank of England for each payment. Thus it would be easy to completely strangle trade between Britain and Rhodesia, and between Rhodesia and other nations. Rhodesia would not be able to get foreign exchange. The only source would be her gold exports which could be sold in Zurich instead of London and which amounted to almost $20 million a year over the last eight years. Rhodesia could be hurt even more if Britain took full control over her foreign capital holdings. Rhodesia transferred L 12 million from London to Switzerland and South Africa before U.D.I. Britain could take over the powers of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank and in so doing order Switzerland and South Africa not to make payments from Rhodesian accounts except on approval by the Bank of England.

The final step that Wilson is likely to take involves the Commonwealth nations. First, a committee could be set up to coordinate Commonwealth sanctions and insure total participation. Secondly, a Commonwealth lobby could be organized to pressure such nations as West Germany, France, Spain, Japan, and Italy to apply sanctions fully.

Is Wilson really prepared to take these steps, given the opposition at home? Those who see Rhodesia only from the perspective of British national politics say no. The London Observer however, states that Wilson will act because of the realities of the international factors. The consequences of ineffective sanctions leading to a Rhodesian victory are far more serious than the Conservative opposition. To allow Smith to get away with U.D.I. would undoubtedly lead to a majority of African states withdrawal from the Commonwealth. India might withdraw also. The African nations are not really satisfied with sanctions; they want military intervention. Thus they would never stand for a sellout to Smith. Further, if Britain surrenders her leadership in Rhodesia, the door is wide open to Communist intervention. And the Soviet Union would probably be forced to act to keep China from moving into Africa as the great opponent of white supremacy.

Obviously, the United States is not prepared to see a Communist victory in Rhodesia. British inaction would force the U.S. to take the initiative. But, the U.S. doesn't want to have to play this role and Britian knows it. The United States is presently fully behind Britian and expects Britian to act responsibly. These factors may force Wilson to make sanctions really hurt. He will have the difficult task of interpreting this action at home, but the task must be done. The Observer calls on Britian to take three necessary steps: (1) a complete trade embargo, (2) initiation of a United Nations resolution making sanctions mandatory under chapter 7, and (3) the sending of a force to Zambia. If these steps are followed, it may
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still be possible to end the white supremacy government of Ian Smith.

SOURCES: N.Y. Times, Nov. 30
The Observer, Nov. 28
The Economist, Nov. 20-26

NOVEMBER 30: Troops to Zambia:

Prime Minister Wilson did not make his expected statement today on the dispatchment of troops to Zambia. Zambia has objected to some of the stringent conditions set by Britain concerning the force's operations. Both Malcolm MacDonald and Commonwealth Secretary Arthur Bottomley are in Lusaka working out the problem.

In Salisbury, Prime Minister Ian Smith said he would welcome British troops in Zambia as they would help to maintain law and order in that country. He insisted once again that he has no quarrel with Zambia and that we were ready to meet with Kaunda or Wilson to discuss common problems. Smith stated that British troops would not be tolerated on Rhodesian soil, and then added hastily that he was sure Britain would never violate Rhodesian territory.

The Situation in Rhodesia after U.D.I.

Ian Smith's offer to talk on a constructive basis is much in line with one form of action being urged on the British Government. Before things get worse, the Economist feels that attempts should again be made for negotiations between Wilson and Smith. The question the Economist is asking is "what has been gained by U.D.I.?" The answer in Britain is that the whites in Rhodesia are worse off than they were before November 11. If the whites in Rhodesia can be made to admit this, there might be grounds for talks. Smith has continually stated that his reason for declaring independence was not racist. He is not committed to apartheid in the South African form. He says that the economic question was of extreme importance in his U.D.I.

And what is the economic result of U.D.I.? The Economist asks key questions: "One year from now, is UDI likely to have increased Rhodesia's trade, strengthened its currency, stepped up foreign investment there? Is UDI even likely to have increased political stability compared with November 10th, ended the danger of black African intervention, made the African population more docile, less willing to listen to its extremists?"

The answer from the outside is an obvious NO. The Economist urges negotiations on these grounds. But, negotiations going back to the 1961 Constitution seem too much to expect from Smith, given his confidence in himself and his government. Further, in spite of tightening economic problems, the "carpet-baggers" have arrived. Some of the agents in Salisbury obviously represent only themselves. Others have been identified as agents for French and Italian principals who must be, because of the kinds of terms they are discussing, in
contact with European headquarters. Japanese agents are also present but evidently are ambivalent about involvement in Rhodesia, given the reaction of black Africa to such a move. Thus Rhodesia does not yet feel totally isolated.

Rhodesia is aware, of course, that there will be unrest, and has already calculated the number of expected unemployed. The estimate is that only 5,000 whites out of a labor force of 88,000 will be laid off, and that 25,000 Africans out of 645,000 workers will be laid off. The Rhodesian Government believes that it can handle the problems caused by this unemployment.

The question that emerges is for what reason did Smith really declare independence from Britain. The economic answer just does not make sense. The real reason must be recognized in order that efforts against Smith can attack the real problems, and the real sources of Rhodesian strength.

The Observer, Nov. 28.
The Economist, Nov. 27.