The Rhodesian Iron and Steel Co. (Risco) has confirmed a report that Spain has ordered 20,000 tons of crude steel worth $1.4 million. Portugal has ordered 18,000 tons of steel.

Britian will continue to give financial help to the University College of Rhodesia as long as the school discharges its multiracial function.

Increased British action: Troops to Zambia, Economic Measures:

Prime Minister Wilson announced that Britian would send troops into Rhodesia if that were necessary to protect the Kariba Dam. Wilson is ready to send a token force to Zambia. It would be a Royal Air Force squadron with ground protection. Agreement to send armed forces is seen by many as the breaking of a real psychological barrier. Wilson made it clear that the power station was too vital for the rebel Rhodesian Government to be allowed to control it and deprive Zambia of its power. He refused to be explicit about what he would do if Rhodesia cut off Zambia's power. There were strong protests to the sending of troops from the Conservatives. However, Wilson is committed to go ahead.

However, Zambia is not satisfied with British restrictions on the use of forces. Kaunda wants the troops to take up positions around the Kariba power complex. This is in Rhodesia and would mean that British forces would have to move a few hundred yards into Rhodesian territory. Britian feels this could lead to violence, but Kaunda believes the Rhodesian forces would simply retreat. Commonwealth Secretary Bottomley is in Lusaka working out the differences. A squadron of British jets flew to Kenya to standby for possible use in Zambia.

In addition to committing himself to the use of troops, Wilson imposed new and more stringent economic measures. 95% of imports from Rhodesia are banned. No pensions, dividends or interest will be paid to anyone in Rhodesia. Bank loans are forbidden. In the long run, these measures may be more important than the military ones according to some observers.

SOUTH AFRICA:

Rhodesia's response to British sanctions is to turn to South Africa as her main trading partner. But how much can and will South Africa respond? The Economist answers political and economic questions:

First of all, South Africa does not approve of Rhodesia's race policy. Rhodesian whites continue to talk of "eventual" black participation and even control. Dr. Verwoerd of South Africa is an ideologist who believes that Rhodesia will continue to be unstable because of its policy of racial partnership. This being true, the South African leader is able to see the possible destruction of white control in Rhodesia and thus he is not about to take too many risks to prop up
Rhodesia. White public opinion in South Africa is generally very enthusiastic about U.D.I. however.

On the other hand, Rhodesia is a test-case for sanctions. For years there has been pressure from many quarters to place economic sanctions on South Africa because of its policy of apartheid. South Africa has a great fear of sanctions. So far they have not been tried, in part because there is widespread belief that they couldn't work. If they did work against Rhodesia, there would be increased pressure to impose them on South Africa. And if they failed to destroy white control in Rhodesia, they would never be expected to work in South Africa. One obvious reason is that Rhodesia has only 220,000 whites, while South Africa has 3 million. Thus, Verwoerd is very eager to see sanctions fail.

However, much as Verwoerd wants sanctions to fail against Rhodesia, he is not prepared to take so much action that his own nation will become the object of sanctions. He will not strain the South African economy or do anything to weaken his stance of non-intervention. Economic strength is South Africa's strongest protection from outside interference and must be maintained, according to Verwoerd.

Thus, military involvement would be out of the question. Further South Africa would be very hesitant, according to the Economist, to try to break an oil boycott. She is too vulnerable herself to such a boycott to be willing to risk too much.

Further, South Africa does not particularly need the products Rhodesia must sell. She has tobacco and sugar surpluses. Rhodesia's manufacturing industries are the ones South Africa has been developing. However, Dr. Anton Ruppert, the Afrikaner tobacco magnate, may buy 1/3 of Rhodesia's 1966 crop. Finally, South Africa's incredible boom has fallen off. The economy expanded too rapidly. There is now inflation and a shortage of capital and foreign exchange. Thus South Africa is not at her best to be of help.

Rhodesia desperately needs South Africa, and S.A. will respond. But, the response will be highly determined by what South Africa sees in the future. That is, if it is clear that Britain and her allies will not destroy Smith, South Africa will aid Rhodesia to the hilt. But if sanctions are really firm and effective, South Africa will be cautious and will pull out altogether before Smith ever falls.

SOURCES: Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 1
New York Times, Dec. 2
The Economist, Nov. 27
Zambia has accepted Britain's offer of Royal Air Force jets, but the dispatchment of ground forces is still being discussed. The first planes arrived in Lusaka Friday. Britain's Defense Ministry's director of military operations, Maj. Gen. R.G.V. Fitzgeorge-Balfour, is in Zambia studying the situation. Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Bottomley has been negotiating concerning the ground forces. A battalion of Scots Guards, 500 men, is what is being discussed. Kaunda wants the troops to move into Rhodesia and guard the Kariba power complex. Britain refuses. There is a real question as to whether 500 men could do this anyway. Certainly they could not if Rhodesia decided to oppose them. However, Britain's refusal to send ground forces means that Kaunda may ask for troops under OAU sponsorship. Such operations might seek financial support in Moscow or Peking.

The Conservatives are very much opposed to the sending of troops and even more angry with the Government's severe economic action including the suspension of all pension payments in Rhodesia.

Ian Smith has asked Queen Elizabeth to appoint Clifford Dupont as Rhodesia's Governor and indicated that Dupont will take over the governor's powers in two weeks whether Britain likes it or not. Smith also has ordered the Rhodesian Treasury to continue payment of pensions out of Rhodesian funds.

The refusal of the British Government to send ground troops into Rhodesia has meant that if Smith falls, it will be after a long and painful endurance of economic sanctions, which may only solidify his supporters rather than finish him. The critical question was asked in Britain: "If U.D.I. had been proclaimed by Adenis or Guyanans, can anyone deny we would have sent in troops immediately?" (New Statesman).

What gets lost a bit in the complexities of the situation are the conditions under which Africans live in Rhodesia and the failure of Britain to act because of too close identification with the white rebel government.

Britian's refusal to send ground troops:

What are the conditions? For example, an average income for a white clerk would run about $3,500 a year while an African counterpart would make only $350 a year. African peasants average little more than $11 cash income every year. Britain has stated a policy of educating the Africans for self-rule. Yet Smith's predictions have been that it will be at least 30 or 40 years before there is an African premier. When U.D.I. was declared, Smith spoke to the African population: "You must all continue to do your work and business as you have done before. You have nothing to fear. The laws of the country are all well known to you and you will continue to obey them as you have done in the past." (Rhodesian Herald).

The statement becomes extremely ironical when one realizes what some of these "well known laws" have done. They have greatly weakened the African opposition by banning the leadership and outlawing the movements. A lawyer who has won cases for Africans for 14 years in Bulawayo was arrested immediately after U.D.I. without charge or trial as a warning to other lawyers. Leo Baron is now in solitary confinement in Que Que prison where he is not allowed to even send or receive
DECEMBER 4:
U.S. Action:

The United States is moving to take stronger measures against Rhodesia. A selective ban on exports is to be imposed. First to be affected will be airplane parts. A ban on imports will probably be imposed later, but there are legal problems holding this up. The U.S. is discussing its role in the international trade embargo, including oil. Some officials oppose an oil embargo because of the difficulty of enforcement and because it would cause a confrontation with South Africa. The problem with Britain's and the U.S.'s economic measures is that they will take 6 to 9 months to really hurt. There is the very important question of whether the African States are prepared to wait that long for action.

U.S. officials will watch very closely the African's action over the next few days. Will the OAU take military action? If so they might ask for U.S. air transport. The U.S. would be reluctant to act, as it would be reluctant to act in response to a Zambian request for troops. Secondly, Kaunda's action is seen as critical. If he gets no help from Britain and decides to call in African troops, a new dimension will be added to the crisis. Also the U.S. is watching Britain's response to the call for ground troops very closely.

Much as Britain and the U.S. do not want to use military force, neither do they feel prepared to endanger the power supply for Zambia's copper. If copper production were halted, the British supply would be cut off. Also, Britain's export earnings would be hurt and thus the pound would be weakened. Neither the U.S. nor Britain wants this to happen. There is also the question of the U.S.'s and Britain's prestige in Africa, which will suffer greatly if Smith is victorious. Ineffective action could destroy "stable and progressive government" in sub-equatorial Africa, according to some observers.

Rhodesia and South Africa:

Smith reported that Rhodesia has no immediate plan for a formal defense arrangement with South Africa. However, there have been unconfirmed reports that S.A. has moved fighter planes into the Caprivi Strip close to Zambia's border. South African businessmen have been invited and have accepted the invitation to visit Rhodesia. The Handels Institut of South Africa will send representatives early next month. Also, South Africa's Industrial Development Council will send representatives.

Rhodesia Unable to Pay:

Rhodesia has announced that it will not be able to pay some of its international debts in London and to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Smith said that those who Rhodesia owes money "will have to look to the British Government for redress."

A Way Out:

One thing which has been lacking in Wilson's handling of the Rhodesian crisis is a way out for the Smith regime, according to some critics. However, it is reported that Wilson will be making
Rhodesian News Summary
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an official statement some time during the week of Dec. 6 setting
terms by which Rhodesia could return to normal relations with Britian.
This is felt necessary to allow for the possibility of second
thoughts on the part of white Rhodesia as it begins to realize
the real deprivations of independence.

OIL:

One of the unanswered questions is the feasibility and results
of an oil embargo. Some disregard it as a possibility because of a
disbelief in embargos altogether. The argument runs thus: the only
time world sanctions were placed on a nation, that is Italy in 1935-1936, they did not work. Therefore sanctions cannot work.

Anthony Howard of the London Observer did a careful study of
that past attempt at sanctions and rejects any generalizations from
it to Rhodesia. What happened in the 1930's was that by the time
the embargo even began to be felt, Mussolini already had half of
Ethiopia. Further, oil was not included in the embargo. In Mussolini's
own words, "If the League of Nations had extended economic sanctions
to oil, I would have had to withdraw from Abyssinia within a week." Thus it is false to use the only half hearted attempts at embargo
30 years ago as an argument against an oil embargo today.

Some action has already been taken. Iran has instructed the oil
exporting companies operating in Iran to refrain from the sale of
oil to Rhodesia. However, the only really effective way to control
the sale of oil to Rhodesia would be to physically check the tanker
traffic at Beira. This would have to be done for an oil embargo
to work.

Of course, South Africa and Portugal might still supply Rhodesia.
But there is some question as to whether they are really prepared to
buck world opinion that much at this point.

What would be most hurt by an oil embargo is Rhodesia's transport.
The almost entirely car-borne European population would strongly
feel an oil embargo.

SOURCES: Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 4
New York Times, Dec. 5
Observer, Nov. 21
Economist, Nov. 20
U.N. Security Council S/6971 23 Nov. 1965

DECEMBER 5:
Force Against Rhodesia:

The OAU has agreed to plan sabotage and military action against
Rhodesia if British action is not successful. Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania,
Kenya, and the United Arab Republic are responsible for working out
the plans. Approval of them may call for a special meeting of the
OAU's Council of Ministers or even heads of state.
Meanwhile Britain has finalized her refusal to send ground troops to Zambia on Kaunda's terms. Commonwealth Secretary Bottomley stated that neither British "or any other troops" would go to Zambia. Evidently, he got that promise from Kaunda. Mr. Bottomley not only talked to Kaunda, but also to Kenyatta of Kenya, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Obote of Uganda. He rejected the request for troops because the Africans insisted that the troops go into Rhodesia, Bottomley rejects this because he believes that "the Kariba Dam is mined and if troops went across, it is possible the dam could be blown up, in which case the very thing that Mr. Kaunda fears--the turning off of the switch--would be achieved not temporarily but for all time."

The New Statesman has raised some important questions about Britain's stand on the use of force. Wilson has repeatedly ruled out the use of force against Rhodesia. According to the New Statesman this stand has left Wilson in the position of reacting to the continuous unfolding of events, rather than controlling events. Thus the question: "Does Wilson still rule out the use of force as a means to bring the rebels to heel? If so, the decision to send military units to Zambia is illogical and hazardous. Alternatively, does he genuinely accept a military commitment to defend Zambia against economic aggression and internal violence? If so he must recognize that military action within Rhodesian territory is a logical--and possibly inevitable--consequence of this commitment, and he must make military dispositions accordingly."

Wilson's refusal to use force is grounded in the opposition to such action in Britain. Yet, what it achieves is the alienation of the African states, possibly an open break with them. Further, it reassures Ian Smith that he really has nothing to fear from Britain and decreases the possibility of strong action against Smith.

Copper from Zambia:

Portugal has approved a plan for shipping Zambian copper on the Benguela Railroad through Angola if Rhodesia closes her railroad to Zambia. The Angola line is owned by Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., a London based British concern. The Portuguese manager of the railroad flew to Lusaka Oct. 31 to talk of the plan. The talks were exploratory only. The final decision to use the Angola line is in the hands of the Company's Board. There are several key people who are British and who hold a right-wing view on the Rhodesian question. Their decisions will be crucial.

Sources: New York Times, Dec. 6
New Statesman, Dec. 3.