




#82

18 January 1989

## NAMIBIA - On the way to Independence?

The United Nations Security Council two days ago fixed 1 April 1989 as the date for the beginning of implementation of its ten and a half year old resolution 435 dealing with independence for Namibia. The Secretary-General was asked to report back as soon as possible after re-examining 'requirements necessary for UNTAG in order to identify wherever possible tangible cost-cutting measures without prejudice to his ability fully to carry out its mandate as established in 1978'.

Behind this phraseology lies an on-going struggle at the UN between the five permanent members of the Security Council - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China - and nations of the developing world over the size of UNTAG, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group. The Gang of Five - in the name of cost-cutting - are working to slash UNTAG's 7,500 military contingent by more than half. Equally endangered is the crucial civilian component of UNTAG - 360 policemen from various countries, 800 poll watchers and a few hundred other personnel intended to keep watch over South African occupation officials and the South African Police, being augmented by men from the dread Koevoet terror unit. It must never be out of mind that Pretoria remains in charge of Namibia and conducts the elections while UNTAG tries to ensure that the latter are 'free and fair'.



The following urgent plea by the Council of Churches in Namibia catalogues the absolute need for the strongest and most vigilant United Nations presence in Namibia. Support the long suffering Namibian people by contacting immediately your church leaders and political representatives all the way up to the new President, George Bush. Demand that they endorse the CCN plea.

FROM: NAMIBIA COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE, LONDON TLX 94070500 NAMI G  
TELEX FROM WINDHOEK, NAMIBIA, ROUTED VIA NAMIBIA COMMUNICATIONS  
DATE: 16TH JANUARY 1989 CENTRE, LONDON

TO: UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
FROM: THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN  
NAMIBIA (CCN) REPRESENTING OVER 900,000 NAMIBIAN CHRISTIANS  
RETAIN UNTAG GROUP AT 7,500

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We, the leaders of the Namibian churches, make a desperate and urgent plea to the members of the United Nations Security Council to retain the size of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group at 7,500 and not to reduce it in any way.

(continued, over)

Our plea is made desperate by our conviction that the independence process in Namibia will be seriously jeopardised if the UNTAG force is reduced.

Our conviction is based on our awareness of what is now happening in Namibia. We have strong reasons to believe that:

1. Arms are being cached at strategic places in Namibia by forces unfriendly to Namibian independence.
2. Some people in Namibia are being supplied with arms in order to destabilise the independence forces.
3. Young Namibians are not only being recruited but are being integrated into the present military groupings in Namibia. They are being subjected to anti-Namibian propazanda and training.
4. UNITA members are being issued with Namibian citizenship documents to enable them to vote against SWAPO.
5. The South West African radio and television services and the core government press are continually producing biased propaganda aimed at influencing the cause of elections in Namibia.
6. The South African military build-up is continuing in northern Namibia. Long convoys of army trucks are seen moving north even in Kavango. New 'police stations' are being built in Ovamboland with the South African flag flying higher.
7. Members of Koeovet, the brutal South African counter-insurgency force, are to be integrated into the regular police force.
8. Police and army forces are already campaigning for elections. They call people to meetings, offer to plough their field or provide piped water. This must be urgently and adequately monitored by UNTAG members or the elections will be unfairly influenced.
9. If the UNTAG force is reduced the Cuban withdrawal, already begun in good faith, will be seized by certain parties at any opportunity to bolster UNITA, hurt Angola and allow South Africa to retain its grip on Namibia.
10. The South West African Administrator General's proclamation of white elections on 1st March 1989 will further confuse the independence process.

Thus we are convinced that to reduce the size of the UNTAG force will seriously jeopardise the Namibian independence process. Namibian people will be left at the mercy of the South African forces and the whole of Southern Africa will remain unstable.

In addition, the delay occasioned by the Security Council debate is frustrating the planning and fundraising of well-intentioned people here. The repatriation programme is especially at risk. This delay in itself may weaken the effectiveness of the independence process in Namibia.

We therefore plead with the United Nations Security Council most desperately and urgently that the UNTAG be held at 7,500 and this force be constituted and established in Namibia without delay.

Signed:

THE RT. REV. HENDRIK FREDERIK (President, Council of Churches in Namibia, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church)

DR. ABISAI SHEJAVALI (General Secretary, CCN)

THE RT. REV. JAMES KAULUMA (Anglican Diocese of Namibia)

THE RT. REV. JAMES PRINZ (Methodist Church)

THE REV. PETER LAMOELA (United Congregational Church)

THE RT. REV. KLEOPAS DUMENI (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia)

THE RT. REV. BONIFATIUS HAUSHIKU (Roman Catholic Church)

THE REV. BARTOLOMEUS KARUAERA (African Methodist Episcopal Church)

end.

END

Namibia: Informal Check List

(summarized, with comments)

*This undated, unsigned document, of uncertain provenance, appears to be an American summary of the broad outlines of Security Council resolution 435 as it is to be affirmed and modified by the Security Council through adoption of an enabling resolution. As has become evident since this document appeared, the five Permanent Members of the Security Council hope to decrease substantially the agreed upon size of the UNTAG military contingent -- and the civilian contingent also? -- to save themselves money even if it jeopardizes the "free and fair elections" they profess to want.*

*It is fair to assume that this document is only one part of the U.S. government's strategy to manipulate the future of Namibia.*

When outstanding issues are resolved, in part through "informal understandings," the Permanent Members shall write the President of the Security Council, "recording in outline the agreements reached." The Secretary General will then make a report to the Security Council "recommending implementation of SCR 435 on the above basis.... [T]he Security Council would then adopt a brief resolution endorsing the agreements reached on Phase I and II, reaffirming the need for impartiality in the transition, and triggering implementation of SCR 435."

**Comment:** The opening paragraph sets out how agreements by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council are to be translated, by proper bureaucratic procedure, into the final game-plan for Namibian independence. And how neither the Secretary General nor the other members of the Council will know precisely what they are voting for, since the Five will provide only an outline, not the exact text, of those agreements. It is clear that the Five expect to be able to dictate essential terms to SWAPO and its Non-Aligned allies. The Council for Namibia, legal authority in the Territory, is not even mentioned.

1. The elections will be under UN supervision and control. The UN Special Representative (UNSR) must be satisfied as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at every level before any such measure takes effect. (Set out in res. 435.)

**Comment.** Apparently the only remedy of the UNSR if he is not satisfied is to delay the next step in the political process. This is hardly a powerful weapon, particularly if delaying a step lengthens the overall period, thus increasing UN costs and the contributions due from the Five.

2. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. (Set out in res. 435.)

3. All legislation inconsistent with res. 435 must be

repealed. All discriminatory or restrictive laws or measures that might abridge or inhibit free and fair elections must be repealed. (Set out in res. 435.)

4. Before the electoral campaign begins, the South African Administrator General (AG) must release all Namibian political prisoners or detainees held by South African authorities. (Set out in res. 435.)

5. All Namibians in exile shall have the right to return peacefully and safely so they can participate freely and fully in the elections. (Set out in res. 435.)

6. The UN will finance the return of detainees and exiles. (Agreed under res. 435. \$33 million in original UN budget.)

7. Unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia "in relation to the transfer of power" are null and void. Only the AG and the UNSR will exercise authority during the transition period; and they will do so impartially. (Set out or implied in res. 435; confirmed with South Africa.)

**Comment:** It appears that the "unilateral measures" do not extend to Proclamation AG 8 of 1980, which established the "representative authorities" governing the "homelands."

8. Impartiality provisions are to be covered by the enabling resolution, which shall emphasize responsibility of all to ensure impartial implementation of res. 435. The Secretary-General shall be directed to ensure that all UN programs relating to Namibia are administered impartially and to seek cooperation of other UN agencies to conduct their Namibia-related programs impartially. ("Final impartiality language, cleared with the parties to the negotiation," is contained in the Five's draft letter to the President of the Security Council and in the draft paragraphs of the Secretary-General's report to the Council.)

**Comment:** This is an incredible provision for what it omits. It assumes that the need for impartiality is one-sided, on the part of the UN only, although South Africa-- not the UN-- will run the election. Even before the Namibian agreements were signed, South African armed forces had started intimidatory campaigning against SWAPO in northern Namibia. Yet there is no requirement of South African impartiality. In the 1978 election run by Pretoria Namibians who did not openly support Pretoria's preferred candidates were refused pension payments and admission to public hospitals.

This provision also makes it clear that the Five have prepared all the documents necessary to put their version of resolution 435 into operation. Their letter to the President of the Council (sent around 22 December, when the Namibian agreements were signed?) included their draft of a Council resolution which would call on the Secretary General to report on the proposed implementation of resolution 435. (This draft

resolution, which effectively directs the Secretary General to report that the size of the UNTAG military contingent can be substantially reduced, is now being bitterly opposed by the Front Line and other Non-Aligned States.) Furthermore, the letter contained a draft of the report the Secretary General was to make to the Security Council-- thus ensuring that it says what they want it to.

9. "[S]peakers should be kept to a minimum" when the Security Council meets to adopt the enabling resolution. "Specifically, none of the parties to the election or to the ceasefire would speak." (Agreed by the Five.)

**Comment:** In the best democratic tradition-- which Namibians should be warned never to imitate-- those most affected are to be denied the right to speak at the meeting in which 15 members of the UN will decide on the terms on which Namibia's future will be determined.

10. "The question of Namibia" is not to be considered in the General Assembly during the transition period. (Agreed between the Five and the Front Line States.)

11. The UN will not provide funds for SWAPO or any other party during the transition period. (Informal understanding reached between the Five and the Front Line States and SWAPO.)

**Comment:** Why should the UN be bound by such a restriction if South Africa is not? And, as a matter of fact, if all Member States of the UN are not so bound? When Pretoria ran its own elections in Namibia in 1978, it poured money into the Territory in support of its preferred candidates and blanketed the air waves with propaganda for them while denying air time to other parties. Additional support was given by semi-public European foundations and by foreign governments and political parties. Do the Five believe that such support will be acceptable in 1989?

12. The UN Council for Namibia shall refrain from engaging in "all public activities" after implementation begins. (An informal understanding has been reached between the Five and the Front Line States and SWAPO on this issue.)

13. The Office of the Commissioner for Namibia shall suspend all "political activities" during the transition period. (Informal agreement between the Five and the Front Line States on how to achieve this while continuing assistance programs.)

14. SWAPO will voluntarily forego exercise of the special privileges granted to it by the General Assembly. (Agreed.)

15. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order during transition shall rest on "existing police forces." The AG shall insure good conduct of the police "to the satisfaction of the UNSR" and shall take action to ensure their suitability for continued employment. When appropriate, UN personnel shall

accompany SWA police on duty. SWA police will carry only small arms in "normal performance of their duties."

UNSR will "take steps" to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process "from whatever quarter." Professionally qualified civilian personnel will be at the disposal of the UNSR to ensure the "monitoring responsibilities" will be satisfactorily performed. "The number of UN personnel to monitor the police appropriate to the tasks they are expected to perform will be kept under continuous review." (Agreed.)

**Comment:** What happens if the AG and the UNSR disagree on good conduct and suitability? It is reported that members of Koevoet (the Counter Insurgency Force, nominally a police unit, which has the worst record for atrocities of any military/paramilitary unit) are now being integrated into the regular SWA Police. Can they possibly be deemed suitable for maintaining law and order?

What is "non-normal" performance of police duties? When would that occur? What kinds of arms would be carried in such instances?

Given the attempt by the Five to decrease the size of the UNTAG military contingent, is it likely that they would support a request for more UNTAG police ("professionally qualified civilians"), who would increase UN costs and the financial burdens of the Five?


16. UNTAG will monitor the demobilization of SWATF and the dismantling of its command structure. (Agreed? (missing text).)

17. Composition of the UNTAG military component will be decided by Security Council on recommendation of the Secretary General after consultation. Final arrangements for the military component of UNTAG, "including monitoring of SWAPO facilities in Angola and Zambia," will be decided by the Secretary General after consultation. (Secretary General to act.)

**Comment:** In 1978 South Africa insisted on a right of veto over the military components of UNTAG's military personnel. Presumably the language of this section ensures that Pretoria may continue to exercise that right in 1989 and even to refuse to approve some forces that might have been acceptable in 1978.

Where did the provision for monitoring SWAPO facilities in Angola and Zambia come from? It cannot be found anywhere in res. 435. For what purpose will they be monitored? Presumably all Namibians will be returning to Namibia, which they are to enter peaceably, through designated entry points, unless they have become settled in their new home and wish to continue to live there. If UNTAG military personnel are reduced in number, as the Five wish, and then some of the remaining forces are sent to Angola and Zambia, who will be left minding the store in Namibia?

Already there are complaints that Namibians (and possibly some UNITA or other mercenaries) are being trained in little populated areas of Namibia to form a "contra"/ Renamo type army if SWAPO wins the election. This is the sort of matter that UNTAG military forces should check out. But will they have the numbers available to act?



UNITED NATIONS  
SECURITY  
COUNCIL



Distr.  
GENERAL

S/RES/435 (1978)  
29 September 1978

RESOLUTION 435 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2087th meeting  
on 29 September 1978

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 385 (1976) and 431 (1978), and 432 (1978),

Having considered the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827) and his explanatory statement made in the Security Council on 29 September 1978 (S/12869),

Taking note of the relevant communications from the Government of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General,

Taking note also of the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) addressed to the Secretary-General (S/12841),

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General (S/12827) for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation (S/12636) and his explanatory statement (S/12869);
2. Reiterates that its objective is the withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 385 (1976);
3. Decides to establish under its authority a United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate conferred upon him by paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), namely, to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations;
4. Welcomes SWAPO's preparedness to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, including its expressed readiness to sign and observe the cease-fire provisions as manifested in the letter from the President of SWAPO dated 8 September 1978 (S/12841);
5. Calls on South Africa forthwith to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;
6. Declares that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, in contravention of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) and this resolution are null and void;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council no later than 23 October 1978 on the implementation of this resolution.

The Administration's Views  
as to Security Council Resolution 435

[On 4 October 1988 the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Howard Wolpe, sent written questions to Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, concerning the "Administration's thinking" on certain ambiguities in or omissions from resolution 435, "recognizing that... [the resolution] was adopted... over ten years ago." The questions are summarized below and the answers abridged.]

Q 1a. How will provisions governing South African forces and "existing police" be applied to military and paramilitary units created since 1978, specifically the South West Africa Territorial Forces (SWATF) and Koevoet (the Counter Insurgency Unit hated and feared for their atrocities against Namibian citizens)?

A 1a. ...It is our understanding that UNTAG will monitor the demobilization of SWATF and the dismantling of its command structure. The Koevoet is considered to be part of the SWA police, whose "good conduct" and "suitability for continued employment" ...will be ensured by the Administrator General "to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative."

Q 1b. Will persons born in Walvis Bay (which Pretoria wrongfully separated from Namibian administration in 1977) be allowed to vote in the election?

A 1b. Precisely who will be able to vote will probably hinge on how the definition of a "Namibian" is ultimately arrived at with respect to such persons, i.e., whether persons born in Walvis Bay are in fact legally deemed to be Namibians or may choose to be so deemed.

Q 1c. Will facilities be made available to help migratory workers return home, assuming they must register there?

A 1c. Voter registration for migratory workers is... unresolved.... The SR [UN Special Representative] will have to ensure that practical and legal requirements for full [political] participation are met. The specifics ... remain to be worked out. To our knowledge, it has not been determined that such workers "must" return to their home districts to vote.

Q 2. Can you give us information (texts, status, binding effect) of agreements and understandings reported by the press to have been arrived at since resolution 435 was adopted? Will they be endorsed or ratified by the Security Council prior to implementation?

A 2. [Agreements] ...dealing with constitutional principles and were contained in a letter from the Western Contact Group to the

Security Council dated July 12, 1982, in which they stated that "all Parties to the negotiations now accept these principles."... [Plans for the composition of UNTAG ... first formulated in 1982 are now being reviewed in the light of current conditions.... The composition of UNTAG will be ratified [when the enabling resolution is adopted]. With respect to the United Nations' impartiality... [South Africa]... has accepted the UN's assurances in this regard. [No response concerning other agreements or understandings not specifically referred to in the Wolpe letter. No attached texts.]

Q 3. What about access to Namibia by press or international monitoring bodies during the transition period?

A 3. It is our understanding that... access to Namibia during the transition period for the purpose of observing and monitoring implementation will be within the purview of the UN Special Representative.

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