Reagan and Africa: The Players and the Policy

Representatives of the South African government can hardly contain their delight at the way the Reagan team is shaping up. Reagan's foreign policy advisors will be sympathetic to white South Africa, because they share the same world view—that the West is facing a global challenge from the Soviet Union over control of raw materials and geopolitical power, and that South Africa is one of the most valuable prizes being fought over. At the same time, the South African press has tempered the euphoria over Reagan's victory with a touch of realism, warning not to expect a complete about-face in US policy. No matter how effectively South Africa promotes her economic and strategic benefits to the west, the legalized racism practiced there will be an anathema to independent Africa and the black and progressive white Americans. The Reagan administration, like its predecessors, will face international and domestic political pressures which may keep it from openly embracing the apartheid republic.

General Haig's Approach to South Africa

General Alexander Haig, Reagan's secretary of state-designate, is an ardent cold warrior and a strong advocate of South Africa's importance to the west. Throughout a long career in foreign policy jobs, Haig has favored military confrontation with the Soviet Union and has increasingly identified the Third World as the battleground. As deputy to Henry Kissinger on the National Security Council, Haig was one of the strongest proponents of the 1972 Christmas bombing of Hanoi. As NATO Commander from 1975 to June 1979, Haig warned of Soviet "illegal intervention" in the Third World and advocated US "regional military capabilities that would be employed as deterrent forces" to respond to escalating Third World conflicts.

Haig would like to see South Africa become a partner in the western alliance against the Soviet Union, though he knows open military collaboration will be politically difficult. He told the House Interior Committee's Subcommittee on Mining last September that extension of the NATO military "shield" to southern Africa was urgent, important and desirable. This proposal was discussed within NATO both before and during Haig's tenure as Commander, where it met with strenuous opposition from Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. South Africa's importance is not only military but economic as well. In the hearing on strategic minerals mentioned above, Haig described a "resource war" caused by "Soviet proxy activity in the Third World." "Should future trends, especially in southern Africa, result in alignment with Moscow of this critical resources area," Haig said, "then the USSR would control as much as 90 percent of several key minerals, ... the loss of which could bring the severest consequences to the existing economic and security framework of the free world." Richard Allen, Reagan's national security advisor, agrees with him. In view of South Africa's enormous mineral deposits, Allen says, "to be in open hostility toward South Africa makes no sense."

Chester Crocker: Reagan's Likely Africa Expert

Since Alexander Haig lacks any experience in African affairs, the person who becomes assistant secretary for Africa will play a big role in formulating an Africa policy that fits into the Administration's global approach. That person is almost certain to be Chester Crocker. The author of the State Department transition team's paper on Africa, Crocker's name is bound to be on the "short list" that goes to Haig from the White House, and Haig knows Crocker well. When Haig
General Haig carries the foreign policy baggage of the Nixon administration.

was deputy national security advisor, Crocker served on the National Security Council staff as assistant to Richard T. Kennedy, a long-time close associate of Haig. More recently in the summer of 1979 when Haig was testing the water for a bid for the presidency, he had an office at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies where he met occasionally with Crocker.

On Nixon's NSC staff, Crocker was responsible for Middle East, African and Indian Ocean matters as well as for inter-agency coordination of policy studies. He came in after the famous NSSM 39 policy paper on southern Africa had been completed, but he was one of the people responsible for its implementation from mid-1970 to mid-1972. According to Roger Morris, who with Richard Kennedy formulated the NSSM 39 policy options and soon thereafter left the administration in protest over the bombing of Cambodia, Crocker was politically and socially close to the Rhodesian lobbyists and the South Africa Foundation (a lobby office funded by South African business). Crocker played an important role in the decision to permit Union Carbide to import chrome from Rhodesia in spite of sanctions. (The order had supposedly been contracted for before sanctions went into effect.)

Crocker moved from the NSC staff to the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, where, as African Studies Director, he has been virtually the assistant secretary-in-waiting for the last two years. The Georgetown Center is a collection of right-of-center and mostly Republican academics which provided the largest number of foreign and defense advisors on Reagan's campaign team. Crocker has written prolifically on southern Africa recently, developing links with the foreign policy establishment. He was one of the authors of a 1979 study on Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa for the Defense Department, and wrote one of the major papers, on South Africa's military apparatus and the regional military balance, for the Rockefeller Foundation's study of US policy options in southern Africa, due for completion in early 1981.

1. The National Security Study Memorandum 39 study, written in 1969, laid out options for policy toward southern Africa. President Nixon decided on Option 2, the "Tar Baby Option," which called for closer ties to South Africa coupled with insignificant aid to black states intended to mute their criticism. It resulted in a clear US tilt toward South Africa.

Reagan's Policy Choices: South Africa

President Reagan will eliminate the Carter administration's critical anti-apartheid rhetoric, along with its whole human rights policy. In its place, we can expect to see a sympathetic encouragement of South African government minor reforms, and a return to closer US-South African economic and strategic collaboration. President Carter never did significantly reduce US support for the Nationalist government—the only real changes he could point to were agreement to the mandatory US arms embargo and the ban on US exports to the military and police—but he did enunciate for the first time official US support for the political rights of the disenfranchised black majority. Under Reagan, the stance of US disapproval and at least the potential for stronger steps against the minority government will be gone.

Closer US-South African intelligence collaboration similar to that during the Nixon and Ford years will probably be rapidly established. South Africa will probably also be more closely consulted by the Reagan administration about US strategy toward socialist states in the southern Africa region. Exports of nuclear fuel—which were on "hold" for the entire four years of the Carter administration—could resume. And more US investment in South Africa will be encouraged. Secretary of Energy designate James Edwards is likely to favor continuing purchases of South African coal gasification technology for the burgeoning US government-subsidized synthetic fuel program. During a trip to South Africa in 1977 while governor of South Carolina, Edwards said that black influence in American politics prevented the white South African government from getting "its fair share of sympathy and understanding."

Chester Crocker will provide the intellectual arguments and the moderate-sounding rationale to sell this tilt toward South Africa to as broad a constituency as possible. He calls his approach "constructive engagement," and it stands for expanded US involvement in South Africa and public support for South African government reforms. In spite of this prescription for greater sympathy toward white South
Apartheid's critics. Crocker criticized the hypocrisy of President Carter's high-sounding rhetoric that turned out to be hollow. But instead of urging policy restraints to give credence to US opposition to apartheid, Crocker will close the credibility gap by toning down official anti-apartheid statements.

Crocker thinks that reforms are on the way in South Africa because Prime Minister PW Botha has strengthened his position within the Nationalist Party and centralized authority within his office and the President's Council. The main area of reforms should be the expansion of black education, says Crocker, implying that blacks aren't yet ready to govern South Africa. He also wants to see the South African government develop political forums—in labor unions and township councils—for black leaders who can compete with the liberation movement leaders for influence in the black community. He does not call for scrapping of South Africa's security laws—arguing that whites need protection in times of "rapid rise of black expectations"—nor for the convening of a national convention that would at least acknowledge the right of Africans to have a voice in deciding the future of their country. Instead, minor, white-initiated reforms that pose no threat to the apartheid system will be rewarded by the US.

**Policy Towards South Africa's Neighbors**

Reagan's policies towards the frontline states will be closely linked with those toward South Africa. As Chester Crocker points out, "the West has much to gain and to lose in the way South Africa relates to its regional context." An important goal of US policy in the next period will be to deny the Soviet Union further influence in the frontline states and to prevent these states from giving sanctuaries to South African freedom fighters. Equally important, as Chester Crocker points out, is the expansion of these countries' economic ties with South Africa, not only as to narrow their political choices but also so as to enable US companies based in South Africa to expand their markets throughout the region.

To accomplish these goals, Crocker advocates a more pragmatic approach than most conservative Republicans in the Congress. Crocker urges granting aid to Zimbabwe and Mozambique that "builds on" economic ties to South Africa so as to encourage 'pragmatic' policies by their governments. The US cannot "easily distinguish between 'hostiles' and 'friendlies,' using Marxist rhetoric as the litmus test," he says. Whether the Reagan administration will actually develop significant aid programs for Zimbabwe and Mozambique remains to be seen. In his academic articles, Crocker argues that US interests in Africa, which are growing, can't be attained "on the cheap"; both economic and military aid must be used as a political tool to further US interests, and they must be increased to targeted countries to get the desired results. But this rationale will come up against the political realities of Reagan's commitment to budget-cutting. Congress' anti-foreign aid sentiment, and Reagan's New Right constituents' probable opposition.

**Policy Towards Namibia and Angola**

The Reagan administration's policy toward Namibia and Angola will be important indicators of its approach toward Africa. Decisions about the Namibia negotiations will face Reagan early in his term, and decisions in these areas will have to take into account conflicting domestic political pressures and international constraints that will affect other African choices as well.

Reagan will have limited room within which to maneuver with regard to Namibia, since the United Nations role as supervisor of Namibian elections is already established and the desire for a quick settlement by our European allies in the "Contact Group" is strong. There is no question that the Reagan administration would like to avoid "another Zimbabwe" in Namibia by the election of SWAPO, but even South Africa's own intelligence reports show SWAPO winning a sizable majority in any free election. [For fuller discussion of Reagan's policy on Namibia, see article on page 5.]

The decision on Angola will probably be much more controversial. There are strong proponents of military aid to UNITA among Reagan's advisors and supporters. President-elect Reagan himself supports giving military aid to UNITA guerrillas, and this is virtually the only African issue on which he has spoken out. Alexander Haig, too, puts a high premium on getting what he calls "Soviet proxies" out of the Third World. Haig is extremely critical of the Congressional ban on CIA involvement in Angola that was imposed during the 1975-76 war: "We found it too difficult ... to provide a pittance of support to those who were fighting for the independence and the values we cherish," he said. The blow paramilitary aid can be given to any group in Angola. The alternative language had been drawn up by several Washington lobbying groups including the Washington Office on Africa. Senator Paul Tsongas and Representative Stephen Solarz also fought to retain Congress' authority.

**Mozambique**

For the past four years, Mozambique has been prohibited from receiving US assistance. For two years, Congress imposed a total ban. Then they loosened the prohibition to permit aid if the President determines "that furnishing such assistance would further the foreign policy interests of the United States." After lobbying from religious and Africa-focused groups, President Carter made that determination in December. This means that the $6 million appropriated in the fiscal year 1981 continuing resolution can be sent.

**Good News on Angola and Mozambique**

**Angola**

During the recent lame-duck session of Congress we won two important victories! In June Senator Jesse Helms attempted in a floor amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill to repeal the Clark amendment, which prohibited covert CIA operations in Angola. The Senate adopted alternative Helms-Tsongas language which returned to the President sole authority over CIA operations in Angola, requiring only that he report such activities to senior members of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees as well as to House and Senate Intelligence Committees. The conferees on the bill rejected that language and adopted alternative wording which technically repeals the Clark amendment but substitutes virtually the same prohibition on covert operations, retaining the Congressional authority over CIA actions in Angola. Under the new language, both the full Senate and House must vote affirmatively before military or
to US prestige abroad was "devastating." Haig has no qualms about CIA covert operations or direct military intervention in the Third World. He told Newsweek last year that "we've got to shed the sackcloth and ashes" of the Vietnam war. General Haig was also the main liaison between the CIA and the White House during the CIA operations against the Allende government in Chile in 1970.

Pressure for renewed CIA operations in Angola can also be expected to come from the CIA and the Senate. Reagan's transition team for the CIA recommended that CIA covert operations be expanded; we do not know whether specific country targets accompanied the recommendation. In the Senate, Jesse Helms will almost certainly reintroduce his proposal to end congressional authority over military aid to Angola, opening the way again for covert operations. His 1980 amendment to the foreign aid bill to this effect was dropped in conference committee, but the new Senate is considerably more conservative than its predecessor. Also, UNITA's lobbyist Florence Tate and its main foreign representative Jeremiah Chitunda have been hard at work in Washington and New York during the transition period. Shortly after Chitunda visited Washington, Senator Lugar, who sits on the Foreign Relations Committee with Jesse Helms, wrote an "op ed" piece in the Washington Star singing UNITA's praises as defenders of US interests and ideals. Chester Crocker's policy recommendations on Angola are unclear. He does advocate "admitting publicly the legitimacy of UNITA" but he has not spoken out on the question of military aid.

But the linkage between Angola and Namibia poses complex policy problems for the Reagan administration. Angola provides bases and refugee camps for SWAPO, and her influence in the Namibia negotiations is considerable. If Reagan sends in the CIA, there is a real possibility that the Namibia negotiations would collapse. The US would also lose the option of a less confrontational approach to dealing with the Cuban presence; the Angolan government has stated that the Cuban troops would no longer be needed when a Namibia settlement is reached and South African logistical backing for UNITA is ended.

CIA intervention in Angola would also create a crisis in US relations with the rest of Africa. If Reagan decides to pursue this course, positive relations with many African states including Nigeria would be forfeited. The economic and political importance of these countries cannot be ignored. Black and white anti-apartheid advocates in the US would also mount a vigorous campaign to prevent US military intervention in southern Africa, which would inevitably be carried out in collaboration with South Africa. A CIA operation of this magnitude could not be kept secret, and it would have to be preceded by a public Congressional vote returning exclusive control over the CIA in Angola to the executive branch. The Senate would almost certainly be willing to adopt this proposal, but a hard fight could be expected in the House.

In view of these potential international and domestic conflicts, the Reagan administration will have to weigh carefully the costs of CIA action in Angola.

Constraints on Reagan's Policy

President Reagan could face stiff opposition from independent Africa in response to several possible policy initiatives: CIA intervention in the internal affairs of an African state, close identification with the South African apartheid regime, or increased militarization of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The Carter administration turned around much of African opinion toward the US, largely through the skilled salesmanship of Andrew Young. Reagan's lack of black American support at home and his likely tilt toward South Africa could bring a repetition of the Nixon administration's plight in Africa, when Secretary of State Kissinger couldn't even get an invitation to visit Nigeria. Africa countries are important to the United States—Nigeria—second largest supplier of oil to the US—is only the most significant example. Many other African countries produce other important raw materials, and their economies offer substantial potential for American investment. African countries also have some political influence; they have an important voice within the nonaligned movement and in the United Nations.

Along with African opposition, organized protest from black and progressive white Americans could be an important constraint on Reagan's policy toward southern Africa. A strong US movement against CIA intervention in Angola was built rapidly during the 1975-76 Angolan War and was rekindled briefly in 1980 when Congress threatened to permit the Executive Branch to decide unilaterally to intervene again. A combination of southern Africa groups, anti-interventionists, black and white, organized to prevent US military intervention. These forces can be expected to continue to expand during the Reagan administration, from the ranks of the anti-apartheid movement and the anti-CIA movement.

CIA intervention in Angola is unlikely because of pressure from Congress, the public, and Africa. The Senate, the CIA, and several members of Congress who sit on Africa-related committees, are unlikely to support CIA intervention in Angola. The Senate is likely to continue to hold a referendum vote on CIA intervention in Angola, and the new Senate will be more likely to pass legislation to end CIA action in Angola. The new Senate is likely to oppose CIA intervention in Angola and to support African opposition to US intervention in Angola.

Congressional Africa Subcommittees Switch Hands

Both the Senate and House Africa Subcommittee will have new leaders in the 97th Congress. Since the Republicans gained control of the Senate, they will chair all full Committees and Subcommittees. As in almost every previous session, Africa was at the bottom of the list when the majority members of the Foreign Relations Committee chose their assignments. Senators Jesse Helms and S.I. Hayakawa, more senior Committee members who have led Republican fights on Africa policy, decided to take the chairmanships of the Latin America and the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittees respectively. This left Africa to Senator Kassebaum, who will replace defeated Senator George McGovern in that position. Kassebaum, who was only assigned to the Foreign Relations Committee in December, has no experience as yet in Africa policy.

In the House, Rep. Stephen Solarz has decided to give up chairmanship of the Africa Subcommittee in favor of the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee. Observers speculate that Solarz considered the Asia chairmanship a more powerful position since more foreign aid money goes to that part of the world. Several important policy debates concerning Asia will come up during Reagan's presidency, whereas liberal Democrats will likely be on the defensive on Africa policy. Democratic members of the Foreign Affairs Committee will meet in early January to decide on the new chairman for the Africa Subcommittee. The contenders are Representatives Mica and Ireland of Florida, Michael Barnes of Maryland and Africa Subcommittee member Bill Gray of Philadelphia.
Namibian Conference: Breakthrough or South African Success?

A pre-implementation conference on Namibia has been set for January 7 to 15 in Geneva, Switzerland. The participants will include the Western Five Contact Group, the Front-Line States, Nigeria, SWAPO, South Africa and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). Ostensibly, this meeting is to work out the details for a ceasefire which will go into effect March 1st, followed by October elections for a Constituent Assembly and independence by the end of 1981. However, after years of South Africa’s stalling tactics in its attempt to maintain its illegal control over this mineral-rich territory, optimism is not high for the success of this conference. And for very good reason: no agenda has been set, the status of the South Africans or the DTA delegations has not been confirmed and constitutional or other long-term discussions have not been ruled out. The ambiguities and obfuscations on so many important aspects of this upcoming conference lends credence to SWAPO UN observer Theo-Ben Gurirab’s declaration that the conference does not mark a breakthrough but a success by South Africa for yet another delay.

Since September, 1978 when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 435, which calls for a ceasefire and elections leading to independence, South Africa has repeatedly stalled on its implementation. SWAPO, on the other hand, in its desire for peace and an independent Namibia, has met all of South Africa’s incessant demands. These have included agreement to the creation of a demilitarized zone, increased numbers of South African bases to be maintained, also concessions on troop placement and election procedures.

South Africa realizes that, internationally, patience is running out with its intransigence, particularly since all its concrete demands have been met. Thus, it has now come up with a subjective demand, a criterion of which only it can be the determinator. In a letter to UN Secretary-General Waldheim on August 29, 1980, South Africa raised the issue of the “impartiality” of the UN, warning that “successful implementation of the settlement proposal . . . will continue to be seriously jeopardized if all the parties are not treated on an equal basis.” South Africa charged that the UN General Assembly’s designation of SWAPO as the “sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia” compromised the impartiality of the UN. South Africa argues that “preferential treatment of SWAPO should now cease.”

A UN mission visited South Africa from October 20 to 25 to set a time-frame and discuss the details of the plan’s implementation. The issue of impartiality dominated these talks, which were chaired by Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs. The South Africans refused to focus on firm dates for implementation, stating that UN impartiality would first have to be established. It was in this climate that the conference was born as the only possible solution to this latest stalling tactic. The conference is to instill in the South Africans a feeling of trust and confidence in the UN and its ability to conduct fair and impartial elections. The only concession the UN extracted from the South Africans was the linking of the conference to a date for the ceasefire.

Why South Africa Wants the Conference

South Africa’s latest tactic fits into its three-pronged strategy to delay Namibian independence: (1) continue diplomatic initiatives to gain increased support for its position; (2) build up internal South African puppets to challenge SWAPO; (3) pursue efforts to weaken SWAPO militarily. The delay caused by the conference allows it to continue to pursue this strategy on all fronts. South Africa is using this time to pursue its diplomatic objectives. Foreign Minister Botha’s European trip in November tested the waters on two international issues: the conference and sanctions. He met with British Prime Minister Thatcher and Lord Carrington in London, with NATO Secretary-General Josef Luns and other Belgian officials in Brussels, and with Henry Kissinger and French officials in Paris. Their unanimous message to Botha was: South Africa must start moving on implementation or they could no longer prevent sanctions.

Botha also got the conference date moved from early December to January 7th, closer to the Reagan Administration coming to power. The South Africans clearly would prefer dealing with UN Ambassador-designate Jeanne Kirkpatrick who has endorsed US support for “moderately-repressive regimes,” than with Ambassador Donald McHenry whom South Africa regards as its staunch enemy.

The South Africans are also using this delay to try to undermine the international legitimacy of SWAPO and to cut off its UN funding. The Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa reports that British and US Mission representatives paid visits to the UN Council for Namibia in early December requesting that funding for SWAPO and for the Council itself be cut off to demonstrate UN impartiality and to increase the chances for a successful conference. However, the Council budget had already been approved and the UN General Assembly confirmed the approval.
Political Strategy

Despite the lesson of Zimbabwe election results, the South Africans are still trying to bolster their puppets in Namibia. South Africa hoped that by granting the DTA executive powers and financial resources to carry out reforms it could become a stronger rival party to SWAPO. A DTA-controlled Ministerial Council was created in 1979 to assume many of the previous duties of the South African-appointed Administrator-General. However, South Africa’s backing almost insures the defeat of the DTA as it becomes increasingly viewed as a puppet of the racist regime.

The new administration has made known in various ways that it favors a less confrontational approach in dealing with South Africa. The transition team’s Africa report written by Chester Crocker voices support for the conference and states opposition to UN sanctions. The November 14th meeting between Kissinger and Botha was also a positive indication to South Africa that a more sympathetic ear will now be available in Washington. European and American officials voiced concern to Kissinger that such a meeting would be regarded as a positive signal by Pretoria and might lead to further blaming on its part. Kissinger insisted he would only give his personal advice if Namibia came up. Marion Smoak, an agent for the Administrator-General of Namibia was appointed to the transition team at the State Department. Smoak is the chairman of the Namibian South West Africa Trade and Cultural Council incorporated in August, 1980. In September, 1980, Smoak arranged a trip for Ben Africa, a member of the DTA, to visit members of Congress and the media. Smoak has also sent out letters to members of Congress and to major national newspapers urging support for the DTA in its struggle against the “Soviet-backed” SWAPO forces.

Why the West Wants the Conference

The West is as well aware as South Africa of the gains to be had from these continuing delays. It has vast economic interests to protect in Namibia and that is why it has colluded with South Africa in its stalling game. The upcoming conference can also prove advantageous for the West.

The fact that no agenda has been set for the conference could allow South Africa and the Contact Group to pressure SWAPO for more concessions. Guarantees for minority rights in Namibia could be negotiated, providing a political bonus for Botha. Guarantees and protection for private enterprise mining rights in an independent Namibia could be sought. Nationalization or government control of resources which the west has exploited for years could decrease the high profits it is now enjoying. The seeking of protection against reparation which SWAPO has vowed to pursue against mining companies operating illegally in Namibia could also be discussed. All foreign mining operations have been forbidden since 1974 to operate in Namibia without permission from the UN Council on Namibia. It would be highly desirable for the west to try to obtain some assurance on these issues before independence comes to Namibia.

The South Africans have pushed the conference as close as possible to January 20th. The UN General Assembly has now scheduled the sanctions and Namibian debate for January 15th, if the pre-implementation conference is unsuccessful. However, it would be a simple matter for the South Africans to stall the sanctions vote for a few days to let Reagan’s people get in place. There is a strong likelihood that the US would veto sanctions.

In addition, South African stallings have become a diplomatic embarrassment for the west. African nations are almost unanimous in their support for sanctions and western nations would rather not risk alienating the Africans by a likely veto. In examining its policy options in Namibia the Reagan administration will realize that it is not the sole negotiator but part of the Contact Group. For the US to unilaterally withdraw from the negotiations would put an early strain on Reagan’s dealings with European allies, threatening future relations. Most probably Reagan will continue to push South Africa on Namibia but promise to withhold pressure on South Africa for internal reforms. But even that promise will be swept aside by the winds of change blowing in southern Africa.
Zimbabwe on a Tightrope

Zimbabwe is digging out from under 14 years of liberation struggle which took 30,000 lives and left a legacy of destruction and bitterness. Having achieved political independence and majority rule, Zimbabwe now confronts the formidable tasks of national reconstruction and development. The new government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe has chosen the path of reconciliation to bind together the war-torn nation and attract needed foreign resources. "Reconciliation, not revolution, is the watchword of the current period," concluded a Canadian observer who recently visited Salisbury.

The new government has moved quickly to improve the material well-being of the majority population. Expenditures for health, education and social programs were substantially increased in the government's first budget presented in July. Refugees are being given packets containing seeds, fertilizer and tools to get them started. Free primary education has been instituted and enrollment jumped over 50 percent to 1,300,00 students. Almost all of the 160 health centers closed during the war have been reopened and medical care is now free for everyone earning less than $225 per month. Minimum wage levels for all workers have been increased and additional increases for industrial and commercial workers are expected early next year. Finally, the government has succeeded in reversing Zimbabwe's negative economic trends and, for the first time in five years, the country will have a positive growth rate in real gross national product estimated at 6 percent for 1980.

Mugabe's Hands Tied

No government could instantly fulfill all of the long-repressed demands of the black population but Zimbabwe presently faces some especially serious obstacles. Whites continue to control the commanding heights of the economy, supply the technological expertise and run the civil service and the judiciary. White-owned farms produce 75 percent of the nation's food crops and over 30 percent of the white population is employed in the civil service which has become the locus for the expression of their political interests.

The political rivalry between Mugabe's ZANU-PF supporters and those of Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front is really serving the cause of peace itself. "The Rand Daily Mail called the hiring of Smathers and Symington "a spectacular public relations coup" since both men are prominent Democrats who have "top contacts in and out of the US Government." George Smathers represented Florida in the Senate from 1950 to 1968, when he retired to practice law. James Symington, son of former Missouri Senator and one-time presidential hopeful Stuart Symington, was a member of the House of Representatives from 1969 to 1976. In 1976 he ran for the Senate seat vacated by his father but was defeated in the primary. Saddled with a campaign debt of $100,000, Symington joined Smathers' law firm in January, 1977.

Although Symington claims that they will be acting as lawyers and not as public relations people, it is clear from the terms of their agreement with South Africa that they will be using their influence as much as their legal counsel. Their duties include maintaining contacts with members of Congress and government officials, conferring with corporate representatives, and assisting the embassy in promoting friendly relations between the US and South Africa.

South Africa's New Foreign Agents

The South African government has hired new agents to lobby and disseminate political propaganda on its behalf in Washington. The prestigious law firm of Smathers, Symington and Herlong (all partners are former Congressmen) was hired on April 1, 1980 replacing Donald de Kieffer whose contract was terminated in 1979. De Kieffer was South Africa's chief lobbyist during the heyday of the Department of Information's attempts to influence US opinion. Changing agents is one way in which the present South African government of P.W. Botha hopes to distance itself from the influence-buying scandal which forced into retirement his predecessor, John Vorster, and former Minister of Information Connie Mulder.

The Botha government is also trying to project a positive image of its "reform" policies in order to retain the confidence of foreign investors. This "reform" image is one which the new lobbyists will present in the US. Symington claims that South Africa was accepted as a client by his firm only after he received assurances that a "transitional period" to racial reform was underway. He adds, "one feels that one
conditions in the Tribal Trust Lands. It is estimated that the cost of compensation alone could require upwards of $1 billion for a reasonable land redistribution plan.

The US has not provided any funds for the purchase of land in spite of the vague public commitments it made at Lancaster House for a "multi-donor regional agricultural development program." It was the US statements, however, which persuaded the Patriotic Front negotiators to agree to the land compensation provision. No doubt they had in mind the previous Kissinger plan of 1976 and the Anglo-American proposals of 1977 which had envisioned a Zimbabwe Development Fund of approximately $1.5 billion.

Increased Aid Sought

Since independence Mugabe has made a concerted effort to attract aid from western nations but he has met with only limited success. The combined US and western aid strategy so far seems designed to keep Mugabe walking on a tightrope, granting him enough aid and promises to keep him hoping for more but insufficient assistance to allow him to carry out the programs needed for Zimbabwe's stability and growth. Britain and the United Nations have contributed the majority of the $350 million which has been pledged to Zimbabwe for 1980 and 1981 with the bulk of their aid going towards training the armed forces and refugee relief respectively. The aid pledged thus far does not even cover the $450 million worth of war damage nor the additional $100 million it is costing to clothe, feed and shelter the soldiers in the assembly camps.

Mugabe told the United States in August that the cost of reconstruction and development would "amount to well over $4 billion within the next five years." He lamented that "the aid so far forthcoming and the general flow of external development resources fell far short of our requirements," and called upon those countries which had made promises at Lancaster House to "match their words with concrete action." From the UN Mugabe traveled to Washington to appeal to President Carter for more aid. The two exchanged warm greetings but Mugabe left empty-handed after Carter rejected a State Department recommendation for a three-year $300 million aid package. Zimbabwe's Economic Planning Minister, Bernard Chidzero, who accompanied Mugabe later claimed that Carter promised to revive this aid package if he was re-elected, a promise which he does not now have to keep.

While in Washington Mugabe met with 35 members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and made a very favorable impression. Taking advantage of this mood, Africa Subcommittee Chairman Stephen Solarz introduced a bill to provide $200 million in aid to Zimbabwe over a three year period beginning in 1981. Solarz called for hearings on his bill and got both Cyrus Vance and Averill Harriman to testify in support. "If we and others in the west fail to respond adequately," Vance said, "I think there is a serious likelihood it will be impossible to meet the needs and expectations of the people of that country."

Solarz had hoped to raise the amount of aid for Zimbabwe in FY 1981 from $30 million to $50 million through an amendment to the foreign aid appropriations bill. But the Congress did not consider this appropriations bill in the recent "lame duck" session and so, for the second year in a row, foreign aid is being administered under a "continuing resolution" which provides for spending only at preceding-year levels. Under this arrangement Zimbabwe is expected to receive between $25 million and $30 million for FY 1981. In 1980 the US allocated some $26 million for health, education and rural development projects and an additional $25 million in housing investment guarantees, a loan program which is not directly controlled by Congress. The Export-Import Bank also authorized its first credit of $33 million to Zimbabwe for the purchase of coal mining equipment for the Wankie Colliery which is owned by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. The FY 1981 US assistance is expected to be used for resettlement, health and a transportation project which will have a regional impact. USAID opened a mission office in Salisbury in August and two AID teams will go to Zimbabwe in January to develop a country assistance program and plan the US response to land reform proposals.

The amount of US aid for Zimbabwe in FY 1982 has not yet been announced. The State Department requested $75 million for Zimbabwe but the Office of Management and Budget which turned down the previous recommendation for increased aid, tried to keep the FY 1982 level at only $40 million. Following strenuous protest from the State Department, the amount of $75 million has reportedly been restored.

Future Prospects

Congress has thrown another potential obstacle in the way of increased aid to Zimbabwe passing an amendment to the FY 1981 foreign aid authorization bill sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms. If any US aid is granted to Zimbabwe, this amendment requires the President to report to Congress every 60 days "on the internal situation in Zimbabwe, particularly upon the implementation of the Declaration of Rights contained in Annex C of the agreement signed at Lancaster House." Among other things Annex C protects the property rights of the white minority from expropriation without adequate compensation. This provision helps to insure that not only will the white minority continue to exert a disproportionate amount of influence on the policies of the Zimbabwe government but that the US government will also continue to be a tangible presence watching over Mugabe's shoulder.

In spite of the numerous obstacles thrown in his path, Mugabe fully intends to carry out his government's program. He told a conference of potential investors in Salisbury in September: "We have a job to do and this job must be accomplished regardless of whether or not those who lured us along the garden path of ample aid fulfill their promises."

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